Machine Gun Platoon and Abbey Taxis

Chapter 17: Machine Gun Platoon and Abbey Taxis

17.1 As we have already observed, at about 1540 hours Major Loden (the Commander of Support Company, 1 PARA), ordered Machine Gun Platoon of this company forward from its Assault Position in Queen’s Street to the derelict building Abbey Taxis. This was the building with nine windows facing east onto the waste land where Richardson’s shirt factory used to be.

17.2 The exact route that Machine Gun Platoon used to get to Abbey Taxis is in some doubt, as the evidence is conflicting and it is difficult to tie in the verbal accounts with such photographs as exist of the area. However, we are reasonably confident that the route started on the western side of the Presbyterian church, and involved using an alleyway that ran behind the wall to the west of the waste ground, climbing one or two walls, and getting into Abbey Taxis through a window at the level of the first floor, ie the level above the ground floor. The route is indicated by the red dotted line on the map below.

17.3 It is unlikely that the soldiers went along the top of the wall to the west of the waste ground, as this could hardly be described (as Major Loden described it in his Diary of Operations) as a “concealed route”.1 Furthermore, at the time when Machine Gun Platoon was moving, there would have been many people in William Street who would have had a clear view of soldiers on this wall, but there is no persuasive evidence that the soldiers were seen by anyone on the march at this time. Private INQ 1553 (in a draft statement to this Inquiry that he approved but never signed) recorded, “As we were climbing over the roof, the rioting crowd in the street below saw us”.2 However, this soldier did not give oral evidence for medical reasons, and we are of the view that his recollection is probably inaccurate.

17.4 One of the photographs of the area shows Abbey Taxis from the west. This photograph was taken before 30th January 1972, as it shows houses to the north of the Rossville Flats that had been demolished by that day.

17.5 If that part of the photograph showing Abbey Taxis is enlarged, it can be seen that the building has no roof or wall to the west.

17.6 It is difficult to see from this enlargement whether there had been or remained any flooring or rafters at the first floor level, but the photograph is consistent with other aspects of the description of the building given to the Inquiry by Corporal A (a member of Machine Gun Platoon), who told us in his written evidence to this Inquiry that it was:1

1 B20.002

17.7 Corporal A (in his oral evidence to this Inquiry),1 recalled that there was some sort of brick or concrete floor at the first floor level, but in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry2 he recorded that, when he got into the building, he was standing on one of the broken-down interior walls, which in our view was more likely to be the case. Private B (another member of Machine Gun Platoon) in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry3 recorded that there were no floors as such. What is clear is that, having entered the building at the first floor level, the soldiers had to climb or jump down to get to the ground floor, as there were no stairs.

17.8 Sergeant INQ 441, the Commander of Machine Gun Platoon, told this Inquiry1 that he sent one of his men, he believed Corporal A, to what he described as a window on the second floor level looking south over William Street, in order to give cover for the remainder of the soldiers who had climbed or jumped down to the ground floor. However, the contemporary evidence shows that Corporal A was positioned at the first floor level, at or near the most southerly of the three windows that faced westwards towards the waste ground, which did give a view southwards across William Street. There appear to have been no windows in the side of Abbey Taxis facing directly south.

1 C441.4

17.9 At some stage, Private INQ 455, the Machine Gun Platoon signaller, fell off a wall and badly bruised his back. This might have been either immediately before entering Abbey Taxis or as he attempted to get down to ground level inside the building.1

1 C455.1; C441.4; Day 297/19-20; B20.009

17.10 Some members of Machine Gun Platoon thought that fewer than a dozen members of the platoon were sent to Abbey Taxis.1 However, it seems more likely that, with the exception of the drivers and a sentry for the APCs, Major Loden sent forward the whole platoon.2 Private 0053 and Private INQ 439⁴told us that they were the drivers and Private INQ 15445 that he was a sentry. The nominal roll6 records the strength of Machine Gun Platoon deployed on Operation Forecast (the Brigade order for 30th January 1972) as 21. Corporal INQ 513 was on the strength but did not recall being in Abbey Taxis.7 If he was right about this, the number deployed forward to this position would have been 17, though it might be that not all of them went inside the building.

Rioting near Abbey Taxis

17.11 There is some evidence that, as the main body of the march was coming down William Street and past the waste ground in front of the Presbyterian church at or shortly after 3.30pm, a few youths saw members of Mortar Platoon reconnoitring the wall to the east of the church and began shouting and jeering at them. They might have thrown a few stones at this time, but, if so, this was a short-lived and minor incident and provoked no response from the soldiers.1

1 AO56.13-14; AF26.8; AF26.2-3; AB68.1

17.12 At the same time as Major Loden had ordered Machine Gun Platoon forward to Abbey Taxis (at about 1540 hours) he deployed members of Mortar Platoon forward to cut the wire on the top of the wall to the east side of the Presbyterian church. The Mortar Platoon Commander (Lieutenant N) in turn deployed men (he said two but it might have been four) onto the flat roof of the GPO sorting office on the eastern side of the waste ground to cover the wire-cutting party. The GPO sorting office can be seen in the following photograph, taken after Bloody Sunday.

17.13 This photograph also shows that on the south side of William Street, more or less opposite the waste ground to the side of Abbey Taxis, there was another area of waste ground that, as we have noted earlier, has been called the “laundry waste ground”, as it was once the site of Castle Laundry.

17.14 It was in the area of the waste ground next to Abbey Taxis, the laundry waste ground and that part of William Street dividing these two areas that there was rioting.

17.15 A large number of individuals gave evidence about the duration and severity of the rioting in this area, much of it conflicting. What must be borne in mind is that the situation on William Street at the time of this disorder was continuously changing; that the witnesses were widely dispersed and moving and looking in different directions; and that there is no relevant photographic or film evidence of the rioting with which witnesses’ memories could be jogged and tested. In these circumstances, it is unsurprising that accounts and recollections vary considerably.

17.16 Our consideration of the evidence as a whole leads us to conclude that it was not until shortly after 3.40pm, when the tail end of the march was passing the area, that any significant rioting took place. By this time, the main body of the march had more or less come to a stop at Aggro Corner, causing a bottleneck further west up William Street. The rioting at Barriers 12, 13 and 14 and the counter-measures employed by the soldiers at these barriers caused marchers and rioters to move back up William Street, where those at the tail end of the march were still standing or walking. Some people turned into the laundry waste ground toward Columbcille Court and Rossville Street to avoid the bottleneck and the trouble further down William Street. Others joined in or stopped to observe the rioting in the area of Abbey Taxis. The result was a fluid and confused situation, changing minute by minute, in which rioters and marchers intermingled and moved between various locations.

17.17 The first targets of the rioters on William Street were the soldiers on the GPO roof and beside the Presbyterian church.1 In response to the throwing of stones and similar objects, Private 112, who was positioned next to the church, fired baton rounds, and the soldiers on the GPO roof were ordered to draw back in order to move out of range of the rioters.2 Some civilians gave evidence in 1972 and to this Inquiry that one of these soldiers gesticulated at the crowd with his weapon as he moved.3,4 It was probably not until shortly after this outbreak of rioting that the soldiers in Abbey Taxis were spotted, since it would have taken those soldiers time to get to this position and (as observed above) there is no persuasive evidence that they were seen while getting there. Once they were seen, there were jeers and shouts from people present, such as “There are Brits in there. Get the bastards out! ” followed by rioters directing missiles at these soldiers.5

17.18 Although there is some evidence that there were about 50 youths involved in rioting, others gave a smaller number, in some cases only very few.1 It is, of course, likely that the numbers actually stoning fluctuated from time to time. Weighing the whole of the voluminous and conflicting evidence on this matter, we conclude that, at its height, there were probably (at most) about 30 rioters in this area (and often many fewer actually stoning), though there were undoubtedly numbers of onlookers in the immediate area, as well as stragglers at the tail end of the march. The rioters collected stones, bricks, bottles and other debris from the area of the laundry waste ground, and then advanced onto William Street or even into the waste ground next to Abbey Taxis to throw what they had collected at the soldiers, before returning for more missiles. Some of those involved had previously been rioting at Barriers 12 and 14.

1 CS3.260-268; CS3.391-400; FS7.1038-1088; FS1.951-979; FR1.441-443

17.19 Support Company did not employ CS gas. There is evidence of CS gas in the area, but this had been used at Barrier 12 (and probably Barrier 13) and many witnesses (both civilians and soldiers) recalled that some of this had drifted westwards towards the waste ground area.

17.20 According to Major Loden’s Diary of Operations1 (and his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry2), his soldiers responded with rubber bullets, four fired by Machine Gun Platoon and two by Mortar Platoon. Major Loden told this Inquiry that he obtained this figure from an ammunition count at the end of the day.3 Corporal A told the Royal Military Police (RMP) and the Widgery Inquiry that he heard baton guns being fired by a member or members of his platoon while they were in Abbey Taxis, but even in 1972 he could not recall how many rounds were fired.4 Private B told the same sources that two soldiers were armed with baton guns inside Abbey Taxis, and his evidence was that both these soldiers fired; but he too provided no assistance on the number of rounds discharged.5

17.21 According to Lance Corporal INQ 588’s written evidence to this Inquiry, he fired 20–30 baton rounds while he was in Abbey Taxis.1 According to Private 112’s evidence to this Inquiry, he fired 8–10 baton rounds from his position on a roof next to the Presbyterian church.2

17.22 In our view, it is highly unlikely that Lance Corporal INQ 588 fired as many baton rounds as he now recalls. Even if he fired as quickly as he could, this number would have taken some time to discharge, it is doubtful that he would have been able to carry so many, and other members of Machine Gun Platoon make no reference to such a level of firing. We are also not persuaded, in view of Major Loden’s Diary of Operations,1 and the civilian evidence discussed below, that Private 112’s recollection of firing as many as 8–10 rounds is correct.

1 B2212

17.23 A number of civilians gave estimates as to how many baton rounds they recalled being fired in this area at this time. In assessing this evidence, it must be borne in mind, as noted above, that the march was in some disarray and the situation very fluid, with marchers and rioters moving between locations, some affected by the CS gas being discharged at Barrier 12 and possibly Barrier 13. In addition, differing levels of violence were directed at three different locations (namely the GPO roof, the side of the Presbyterian church and Abbey Taxis) at different times, while baton rounds were also being fired at about the same time from Barriers 12, 14 and possibly 13.

17.24 In such circumstances, it is not surprising that estimates vary, with some given long after the event. However, the overall impression that we gained from this evidence, was that only a few baton rounds were fired in the area under discussion. For example, in his NICRA statement, Padraig O’Mianain recorded that he was aware of three rubber bullets being fired.1 Patricia McGowan told this Inquiry that she was aware of “just a couple” being fired.2 Michael McGuinness told the Sunday Times that “a few” were fired, at least one from Abbey Taxis.³ James Wilson told NICRA that he heard one being fired, but in his evidence to us recalled that four or five had been fired.4 Patrick McCourt told this Inquiry that the soldiers in Abbey Taxis fired “one or two” rubber bullets at rioters.5 To our minds this evidence tends to support the number given by Major Loden in his 1972 evidence.

17.25 We are satisfied from the civilian evidence that it was very shortly after soldiers had fired the last of these baton rounds that Damien Donaghey and John Johnston were shot and wounded by Army gunfire.