1 Tuesday, 13th May 2003
2 (9.30 am)
3 LORD SAVILLE: We start, I think, by swearing David, do we
4 not.
5 DAVID, sworn
6 Questioned by MR CLARKE
7 LORD SAVILLE: David, I will introduce myself. I am the
8 Chairman of the Inquiry. My colleagues sit beside me.
9 Questions will come from the barristers and we may ask
10 you to speak up, but at the moment your voice is coming
11 over loud and clear.
12 MR CLARKE: I am Counsel to the Tribunal. I am the first
13 person who is going to ask you some questions.
14 There are a number of preliminaries that I ought to
15 explain before we start. As I am sure you know, we are
16 sitting in the Methodist Central Hall in London where
17 you can be seen by the Tribunal and by the lawyers to
18 the parties, but not by the public, although they can
19 hear what you say.
20 I should tell you that the Tribunal has made some
21 rulings which relate, or may relate to your evidence.
22 The first is that witnesses should not be asked, nor
23 should they answer, any questions the answer to which
24 would or might identify members of the Security Service
25 past and present, including, of course, yourself, or
1 questions which would prejudice the operation of the
2 Security Service by revealing its methods of operation
3 or techniques or the like.
4 If you think that an answer to any question that
5 anybody asks you will or might do any of those things,
6 please do not answer it and we will see if we can
7 resolve the issue here. I should tell you that Counsel
8 and solicitors for the security service are in the hall
9 and please take your time if you have any doubt.
10 It is possible that in the course of your evidence
11 somebody will object to your being asked or answering
12 a particular question. That will mean that somebody
13 will stand up in the hall here; you may not be able to
14 see that happening, but you will be able to hear what is
15 said.
16 Please do not answer a question if objection is
17 taken to it before the Tribunal has dealt with the
18 objection.
19 Next, you have, I believe, two hard copy bundles of
20 documents for you to look at. I will have to give
21 instructions for documents to appear on a screen in this
22 hall, but we will be looking at the same document but in
23 different forms.
24 The last matter that I should explain is that
25 everybody here has had the opportunity of reading your
1 statement to this Tribunal and I am going to ask you
2 a number of questions that arise out of it.
3 Do you have your statement to this Tribunal? Could
4 we have it on the screen here, KD2.1, which, as appears
5 from the second page, you signed on 17th February 2000?
6 LORD SAVILLE: While we are looking for that, as
7 I understand it, Mr Tate, our solicitor to the Inquiry
8 is present.
9 A. Yes, I have it.
10 Q. Are the contents that statement true to the best of your
11 knowledge and belief?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Could you have a look at paragraphs 1 to 3 and could we
14 have those highlighted on the screen here. You
15 describe, in the first paragraph, how in 1970 you were
16 appointed as Security Liaison Officer for
17 Northern Ireland and you describe how, in paragraph 2,
18 some three months after arriving in Northern Ireland,
19 you were appointed Director of Intelligence for
20 Northern Ireland, based at the Army's headquarters in
21 Lisburn and given an equivalent military rank of major
22 general.
23 You describe in paragraph 3 how your task was to
24 co-ordinate intelligence-gathering efforts of the
25 various elements of the Security Forces and how you
1 oversaw a department consisting of Security Service and
2 military officers. Do you recall how big your
3 department was at that stage?
4 A. No, I do not, I am afraid. It is the size -- it was a
5 pretty small Security Service then, but I maintained the
6 SLO's role, as well as being Director of Intelligence.
7 Q. Can you give us any idea of the size; are we talking
8 about four or five people or 20 or 30, or what sort
9 of --
10 A. The Security Service had about four or five.
11 Q. From the military, from the Army itself, do you remember
12 how many approximately?
13 A. There were a fair number of Army, most of them
14 regimental Officers.
15 Q. Would I be right in thinking that you were in regular
16 contact with the GOC and the CLF and other senior
17 officers?
18 A. Oh, yes, every morning.
19 Q. I would now like to have on the screen in London,
20 please, C48.299 and I would like you to look at
21 a document which in our yellow bundle is at flag 1D; it
22 is the memorandum headed, "The situation in Londonderry
23 as at the 7th January 1972"?
24 A. Yes, I have it.
25 Q. This is a memorandum which was written by General Ford
1 as Commander of Land Forces for the attention of the
2 GOC, General Tuzo. It is headed, and it describes, "The
3 situation in Londonderry as at the 7th January 1972" and
4 it was probably written on the following Monday, which
5 was 10th January, and it describes, as one can see in
6 the first paragraph, a visit that General Ford had paid
7 to Londonderry on Friday, 7th January with the Assistant
8 Chief Constable (Operations) and discussions that he had
9 had with the Commander of 8 Brigade and others.
10 Do you recall ever having seen this document?
11 A. I cannot recall it.
12 Q. If we turn over the page to paragraph 6, in the document
13 General Ford considers how to deal with the problem of
14 the DYH, as he describes them, the Derry Young Hooligans
15 and if you look in the middle of the paragraph, there is
16 a sentence which begins:
17 "As I understand it, the commander of a body of
18 troops called out to restore law and order has a duty to
19 use minimum force but he also has a duty to restore law
20 and order. We have fulfilled the first duty but are
21 failing in the second. I am coming to the conclusion
22 that the minimum force necessary to achieve
23 a restoration of law and order is to shoot selected
24 ringleaders amongst the DYH, after clear warnings have
25 been issued."
1 Do you recall that suggestion or proposal being
2 considered in January 1972?
3 A. Sorry, I have got a frog -- I was not consulted on this
4 document and I dealt more or less exclusively with the
5 GOC rather than with General Ford.
6 Q. Whether or not you consulted on this document, do you
7 have any recollection of this proposal or suggestion
8 being discussed with you or when you were present?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Could we come over the page, please, to paragraph 8. In
11 this paragraph of the document, General Ford deals with
12 the possibility of a march from the Creggan to the
13 Guildhall Square at 1400 hours on Sunday, 16th January.
14 He goes on to say that he has told the Commander of
15 8 Brigade to prepare a plan over the weekend. About
16 halfway down the paragraph he says:
17 "I have issued a warning order to 1 King's Own
18 Border ... and 1 Para."
19 He goes on to say this:
20 "I have asked D Int [which presumably is you] to get
21 the best possible intelligence of the possible strengths
22 of the march and its real intentions. As a result D Int
23 went to Londonderry yesterday and will report today.
24 I understand that the SB [Special Branch] warnings I had
25 about the march may well prove to be unfounded."
1 Do you recall going to Londonderry on the second
2 Sunday in January in order to get intelligence about the
3 possible strength of the march and its real intentions?
4 A. No, I do not and I went frequently to various parts of
5 Northern Ireland and I was dealing and making contact
6 with the Security Forces and I had no knowledge whatever
7 of what General Ford was talking about.
8 I said, I think in my first statement --
9 Q. Do you have any recollection of what you reported on at
10 this stage about the march?
11 A. Reported on to whom?
12 Q. To General Ford?
13 A. No, I do not report to General Ford, I report
14 exclusively to the GOC.
15 Q. Do you have any recollection of reporting anything to
16 the GOC about the march as a result of going to
17 Londonderry to find out about it?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Can you, please, have a look at paragraph 8 of your
20 statement --
21 LORD SAVILLE: Before you do that, Lord Gifford is on his
22 feet.
23 LORD GIFFORD: Sir, the fault may be mine, but it would be
24 most helpful to have at least an index to the bundle
25 which David has been supplied with. I had not
1 appreciated that the screen would not be visible to him
2 and in case there are documents which we possibly should
3 have given notice of but are not in the bundle, it would
4 be helpful to know which documents are in the bundle
5 and, indeed, when we later come to question him, it may
6 be better to be able to give the appropriate references.
7 LORD SAVILLE: I wonder which is the best way of dealing
8 with it. We can either deal with it that way or are you
9 in a position to supply documents you may wish to deploy
10 to the Inquiry?
11 LORD GIFFORD: Very soon if asked, yes. I know which ones
12 I may want to refer to and certainly during the next
13 half hour I could put it in written form.
14 LORD SAVILLE: I do not know, Mr Clarke, do you have any
15 suggestions as to which is the best way? In a sense
16 I think the quickest way -- is the quickest way to let
17 Lord Gifford have a list of the documents in the bundle
18 Mr Tate has, or for Lord Gifford to give us a list of
19 documents so that we can do the same exercise but the
20 other way round, so to speak.
21 MR CLARKE: I am quite happy for my learned friends to have
22 a list of the documents in the bundle that I have
23 prepared. I do observe that parties were invited, by
24 Wednesday of last week, to produce a list of documents
25 to which they wished to refer, to which Messrs Madden &
1 Finucane produced a most helpful list, together with the
2 attachments.
3 What my learned friend is asking for is, if I may
4 respectfully say so, that with which he should have
5 complied.
6 LORD SAVILLE: If you have a copy of that list, Mr Clarke,
7 perhaps you would give it to Lord Gifford and we will
8 see, Lord Gifford, if there are additional documents,
9 whether we can do anything at this stage, but we did
10 make the request some days ago. Do you have a list for
11 Lord Gifford or can someone supply him with one?
12 (Handed)
13 I am sorry, David, for that interruption.
14 Mr Clarke, do continue.
15 MR CLARKE: I was asking you to look at paragraph 8 of your
16 statement, and we have that on the screen at KD2.2.
17 Paragraph 8 of your statement in February 2000 you said,
18 this:
19 "I have been asked if there was any intelligence of
20 which I was aware that specifically predicted that the
21 IRA would attempt to exploit the NICRA march in
22 Londonderry on 30th January 1972 as cover for attacking
23 the Army. I do not remember any intelligence specific
24 to the march in question to that effect but I do
25 remember that it was endemic at the time that the IRA
1 would join marches, demonstrations and any civil
2 disturbance to exploit opportunities to cause
3 trouble ..."
4 Since that statement was signed by you in the year
5 2000, further evidence has come to light relating,
6 amongst other things, to an agent in Londonderry who is
7 known to this Inquiry as Observer C and who communicated
8 from time to time with the Security Service through
9 Observer D and I believe that you have seen the bundle
10 of documents that we are working on last night; is that
11 right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Looking at the document that you have seen, do you have
14 any recollection now of there being a Security Service
15 agent in Londonderry in January 1972?
16 A. The problem is, you see, I did not go to Londonderry to
17 get information about the march and I really cannot now
18 recollect the identity or names of --
19 Q. I do not want you in any way to reveal anything about
20 identity or names of any agents. I was asking whether
21 you had now any recollection of there being an agent in
22 Londonderry, who lived in Londonderry?
23 A. Not, I think -- I was the -- principally with the
24 Special Branch of the RUC for internal security.
25 Q. I would like, in that case, if I may, to go through the
1 documents the Inquiry has been provided with to see if
2 they bring back any recollection. Could we, please,
3 have on the screen KJ4.62. This is a document which you
4 will find in tab 1E of the bundle with which we are
5 working. On the first page at tab 1E there is a copy of
6 the original telegram, KJ4.61, but there is a fair typed
7 copy at KJ4.62. Do you have that document?
8 A. Document 62?
9 Q. Yes?
10 A. Yes, I have that in front of me.
11 Q. We can see that this is a telegram sent from D of I
12 Northern Ireland to, or passed for the attention of
13 Julian. It is dated 10th January 1972. It reads as
14 follows:
15 "Following for Julian from Director of Intelligence,
16 Northern Ireland.
17 "We spoke on Saturday about the possibility of march
18 from the Creggan/Bogside to the Guildhall in Londonderry
19 on Sunday, 16th January. I was over there yesterday and
20 was told by Special Branch that there is some doubt
21 whether the march will in fact take place. The
22 organisations primarily concerned are the James Connolly
23 Republican Club, Derry CRA, with which are associated
24 the SRG and kindred souls of the lunatic left. Sam
25 Donnelly had some coverage but anything that you can do
1 to let us know whether a march is intended, its
2 forming-up place and route, the intentions of the
3 organisers in the event of Security Forces counteraction
4 et cetera will be very welcome. We are anxious to take
5 no action that might stimulate a march where none is
6 intended but any action that you can take to secure the
7 information we need without this side effect deserves,
8 I think, a high priority."
9 Do you remember asking the Security Service Officer,
10 whom we know as Julian, to take action to secure
11 information about the intended march?
12 A. I have got almost no recollection of documents. I would
13 in fact draw attention to the JIC papers which I have
14 dealt with in my statement which shows the high level of
15 militant activity taking part in the area, with my
16 comments on it, and I suggest it might not be a bad idea
17 to start with that assessment of the troubles occurring
18 in various parts of Northern Ireland.
19 Q. I will come to that in due course. Are you telling us
20 that you now have no recollection of making efforts
21 through the security officer known as Julian --
22 A. I have no recollection of that at all.
23 Q. Can we come, please, to what for you is tab 2 of the
24 bundle. Could we have on the screen G50A.309.1. This
25 is a Joint Intelligence Committee document. It is dated
1 11th January 1972. It says:
2 "The attached assessment by the Director of
3 Intelligence Northern Ireland for the week ended
4 10th January 1972 is circulated for consideration by the
5 Ireland Current Intelligence Group at their meeting on
6 12th January 1972."
7 Were you a member of the Joint Intelligence
8 Committee?
9 A. Is this the joint intelligence of Northern Ireland? Um,
10 no, I am sorry, I am still confused with these various
11 documents.
12 Q. Let us turn over the page to G50A.309.2 because the
13 first page that we were looking at is the UK Cabinet
14 Office document and the assessment which is attached, or
15 the document that is attached to it includes the
16 document that we are looking at now, G50A.309.2, which
17 is a meeting of the Director of Operations Intelligence
18 Committee Northern Ireland and am I right in thinking
19 that you certainly were a member of that committee?
20 A. Yes, but I have still no recollection of these documents
21 or of what, um, Julian and James were putting forward.
22 Q. Can you help us on this: if you look at the document
23 that follows the minutes of the meeting of the Director
24 of Operations Intelligence Committee, there is an
25 assessment for the period from 4th to 10th January 1972.
1 If you look over the page to 309.3, in fact a number of
2 passages in the assessment have been blanked out. But
3 if we come, for instance, to 309.5, which is two pages
4 on, we can see the sort of thing with which it dealt
5 with. In paragraph 10 there is a reference to marches
6 and in the last sentence of paragraph 10, the assessment
7 reads:
8 "A further march which may be contemplated is in
9 Londonderry on 16th January sponsored by NICRA and the
10 James Connolly Republican Club: but there remains some
11 doubt as to whether the organisers will pursue the
12 idea."
13 Can you help us as to who would be the actual author
14 of these assessments for the Director of Operations
15 Intelligence Committee; would it be you?
16 A. No, what was the question?
17 Q. The question is: do you know who was the actual author
18 of the assessments that were provided to the Director of
19 Operations Intelligence Committee, such as the one that
20 we are looking at now, and in particular would it be you
21 yourself?
22 A. I really cannot remember the documents at this distance
23 of time.
24 Q. You cannot recall who would have written these
25 assessments?
1 A. No.
2 Q. Could we go to tab 4A and for us on the screen in London
3 can we have KJ4.66. The document which has the
4 reference KJ4.66 is a fair copy of the document
5 immediately before it, which is KJ4.65, which is a note
6 for the file of the Security Service Officer named
7 Julian, dated 14th January 1972.
8 MR TATE: Christopher, could you hold on a moment, we do not
9 seem to have the document.
10 MR CLARKE: If you look immediately before tab 5.
11 MR TATE: Okay, I have it.
12 MR CLARKE: The file note reads as follows:
13 "Source (1) [he is the source we know as Observer D]
14 telephoned on 12th January to say that source (2) [he is
15 the one we know as Observer C] had visited all the
16 places in Derry where he would be likely to gather
17 information about the proposed march but had gleaned
18 absolutely no information about it at all and nobody
19 seemed to have heard of it.
20 "2. Source (1) rang again on 13th January with the
21 following message. He had spent a couple of hours in
22 Londonderry that morning and there was still no sign of
23 any march on Sunday. He thought, however, that a large
24 meeting of the Officials from Magherafelt and other
25 areas, which took place on 12th January in the evening
1 in Magherafelt, might possibly have some bearing on the
2 matter."
3 I leave out paragraphs 3 and 4. Paragraph 5 of the
4 file note reads:
5 "All the above has been passed by telephone by me to
6 David."
7 The file note is signed by Julian.
8 I know that you have no recollection in relation to
9 specific documents, but do you recall, in January 1972,
10 being informed by the Security Service Officer known as
11 Julian, of intelligence about the march that he was
12 gaining or trying to gain from a source in Londonderry?
13 A. No, I do not recollect.
14 Q. Could we please turn to G60B367.4, and that is the
15 second document at tab 5. These are the minutes of the
16 Director of Operations Intelligence Committee for
17 Northern Ireland for the next Monday, 17th January.
18 They have attached to them an assessment for the period
19 from 11th to 17thth January. If we turn, please, to
20 G60B.367.10, which is the last document in tab 5, there
21 is a passage in the assessment marked, "Outlook." If
22 one looks at the last two sentences, they read:
23 "The anti-internment campaign has been given new
24 momentum by the opening of Magilligan internment camp.
25 The planned march in Londonderry on 30th January will
1 present a serious security problem."
2 Do you recall what exactly it was that caused the
3 assessment to be made that the planned march on
4 30th January would present a serious security problem?
5 A. No.
6 Q. I want to come on in time, if I may, to events
7 immediately before the march. Could we come, please, to
8 G75.459, which is tab 10 in the folder of documents. Do
9 you have that page; do you have it in front of you?
10 These are the minutes of the Director of Operations'
11 meeting, held on 26th January at HQ Northern Ireland.
12 In the first paragraph, under the heading "Intelligence
13 review," the minutes read:
14 "D Int spoke of intelligence developments noted
15 during the last week."
16 At paragraph 5, under the heading, "NICRA march
17 Londonderry -- 30th January," the minutes record:
18 "Head of Special Branch said that NICRA plans two
19 marches; one from the Creggan to the Guildhall and the
20 other from Shantallow to the Guildhall. The organisers
21 are holding a further meeting on Thursday,
22 27th January ..."
23 The minutes then go on to record that:
24 "Three courses open to the Security Forces for the
25 main march were then considered."
1 They are then set out. Then the minute records:
2 "After discussing the implications of each course it
3 was agreed that the second course would be adopted,
4 namely that the marchers would be prevented from leaving
5 the Bogside and Creggan and that barriers would be
6 placed up to 200 yards inside these areas."
7 Do you have any recollection now of discussing the
8 march that was to take place the following Sunday at the
9 meeting of the Director of Operations committee on the
10 Wednesday prior to the march?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Do you have any recollection of discussing either at
13 that meeting or outside that meeting an arrest operation
14 to be conducted in Londonderry on that Sunday?
15 A. No, I do not.
16 Q. Do you have any recollection of any discussion about
17 whether or not the Army or the RUC might be fired upon
18 at the march which was due to take place the following
19 Sunday?
20 A. No.
21 Q. Could we come, please, to tab 16 of the folder that you
22 have. May we have on the screen KJ4.71.
23 MR TATE: Would you repeat the reference?
24 MR CLARKE: KJ4.71, it is at tab 16. 4.71 is a typed-up
25 copy of a note for the file, which is on the two
1 immediately preceding pages. The note is made by Julian
2 and it records, this:
3 "I saw Observer C at Observer D's house on
4 26th January. Apart from the intelligence in the note
5 for file at serial [blank] he also gave me the
6 following, which was passed by me verbally to David that
7 evening."
8 Paragraph 2:
9 "Plans for the march were as follows ..." and he
10 gives a series of details about the proposed route and
11 about five lines up from the bottom of paragraph 2,
12 says:
13 "The marchers were expecting to meet Security
14 Forces' road blocks and had made plans for alternative
15 routes if necessary. They were also prepared to cause
16 diversions to draw troops from the main route, using
17 their hooligan element. These diversions were probably
18 taking place in the Brandywell area."
19 If one looks back at the first paragraph, he refers
20 to intelligence in the note for file at a different
21 serial number. If you could go three pages on to
22 KJ4.74, there is a note for the file which is, we think,
23 the one to which he must have been referring. That note
24 records:
25 "On Monday, 31st January at about 9.45 a.m, David
1 telephoned and asked me to pass over, within half an
2 hour, the gist of the intelligence we had given to him
3 verbally during the previous week ..."
4 In paragraph 2 he sets out a message which
5 incorporates that gist. That message, is this:
6 "A reliable source reported on 26th January that the
7 organisers of this Londonderry march on 30th January
8 were planning their route to pass the maximum number of
9 flashpoints and had prepared alternative routes as they
10 knew they would be stopped by the Security Forces. It
11 was believed that the marchers would be armed with
12 stones and bottles and that the IRA would use the crowd
13 as cover for sniping attacks on the Security Forces.
14 The organisers were determined to have their revenge for
15 Magilligan, which they regarded as a humiliating defeat.
16 Also that the hooligan element would be used to create
17 diversions and draw the troops away from the main
18 route."
19 According to the two file notes, the information
20 about what Observer C was saying about what was going to
21 happen at the march was passed by Julian to you verbally
22 on the evening of 26th January. Do you have now any
23 recollection of receiving, shortly before the march,
24 intelligence of this nature from Julian which he had
25 received from an agent in Londonderry?
1 A. I think we can go on and on about these documents, which
2 I do not remember and, um, in fact I have some
3 difficulty in, until I had met him, of who Julian was.
4 Q. I think the answer to my question is: this brings back
5 no recollection at all?
6 A. No recollection at all. I mean, there is a difference
7 between, you know, operational intelligence which the
8 Army and police need and security intelligence which,
9 um, we need to build up a picture of the, um, capacity
10 of the IRA and its potential for causing trouble.
11 I was concerned with the latter rather than the
12 former. All the times I was in Northern Ireland, as
13 I have repeatedly said, I was trying to build up
14 a security organisation -- a security and an
15 intelligence organisation, I had both -- which would
16 provide reliable source, reliable structure to produce
17 reports which would be of use both to the operational
18 Army, police and me, and my job is to get the Army and
19 police to work together and this is told to me very
20 considerably, as I say, in the report which I signed
21 in March and which has been disclosed.
22 Q. Could we have on the screen, please, G81A.511.1. This
23 is tab 13. This is a letter to Mr David Johnston in the
24 RUC, dated 27th January 1972. It reads:
25 "Dear David:
1 "I enclose a copy of a signal I have this morning
2 sent to Commander 8th Infantry Brigade, based on
3 information from London. I have reversed the normal
4 process of passing information first to you on this
5 occasion because the commander is holding a planning
6 meeting this morning.
7 "Yours sincerely, David."
8 Do you recognise the "Dear David" and "yours
9 sincerely, David" handwriting?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. Is it yours?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. If one goes over the page, which for us is KJ4.45, there
14 is a largely illegible signal, but we can see from the
15 copy on the screen and in front of you that it was sent
16 on 27th January 1972 from HQ Northern Ireland to
17 Commander 8 Brigade.
18 If we go to KJ4.48, there is a typed copy of the
19 signal. The operative words of the signal read as
20 follows:
21 "Following is personal for commander from Director
22 of Intelligence:
23 "One. The source known to you has provided the
24 following information about plans for the march ..."
25 Item two deals with the route that the march is
1 expected to take. Item three deals with a possible
2 diversion in the Brandywell area. Item four contains
3 the intelligence:
4 "Source believes that the marchers will be armed
5 with sticks and stones and he expects that the IRA will
6 use the crowd as cover. The organisers are determined
7 to have their revenge to what they regard as
8 a humiliating defeat at Magilligan."
9 Do you have any recollection now of sending a signal
10 to this effect?
11 A. What is in paragraphs one, two, three and four is
12 basically operational intelligence, which is needed by
13 the police and Army. It is not security intelligence
14 with which I am interested with regard to the capacity
15 of the, um, various factions in the IRA, or other
16 terrorists.
17 Q. I understand that distinction. But if we go back to the
18 original document, the signal at KJ4.45?
19 A. Uh-huh.
20 Q. This appears, upon its face, to be a signal sent from HQ
21 Northern Ireland to the commander of 8 Infantry from the
22 Director of Intelligence, which is you. Are you saying
23 that you do not think that you sent any such signal or
24 simply that you have no recollection now of this
25 document, as of many others?
1 A. I do recollect that intelligence, but, as I said, there
2 is a difference between security intelligence and
3 operational intelligence, and I was merely a conduit to
4 get the information as rapidly as possible to people who
5 would have to deal with it on the ground.
6 Q. So in one sense you were acting as a post bag, to get
7 the intelligence from those who had gathered it to the
8 people on the ground who had to deal with it
9 operationally?
10 A. Right.
11 Q. Is that your point?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Could we have a look, please, at what for you is tab 11;
14 for us, G76.464, the second page in tab 11. These are
15 the minutes of a meeting of the joint Security Committee
16 held on Thursday, 27th January at Stormont. This is not
17 a meeting at which you are recorded as being present.
18 Did you ever attend the Joint Security Committee
19 meetings in Northern Ireland?
20 A. This is a Northern Ireland --
21 Q. Yes, it is?
22 A. No, I mean a Northern Ireland committee.
23 Q. Yes, it is; did you ever attend it?
24 A. Not that I am aware of.
25 Q. There is only one point I would like to ask you about,
1 which is this: could we come over to the next page,
2 G76.465. Under the heading, "Forthcoming events," there
3 is a discussion of the:
4 "Proposed marches on Saturday ... and Sunday (in
5 Londonderry)," and how they posed considerable problems.
6 In the second paragraph, beginning at the second
7 sentence, the minute records:
8 "The Londonderry marches presented more serious
9 difficulties and security action will be primarily an
10 Army operation."
11 Then I omit the next sentence. The sentence after
12 that reads as follows:
13 "The basic plan here will be to block all routes
14 into William Street and stop the march there. The
15 operation might well develop into rioting and even
16 a shooting war."
17 Then it goes on to deal with other things. Do you
18 have any recollection of it being recognised at HQ
19 Northern Ireland that there was a prospect that the
20 Londonderry march might develop into a shooting war?
21 A. I do not recollect that specifically, no. I was not at
22 that meeting.
23 Q. Were you yourself involved in any way with the planning
24 of the operation in Londonderry on 30th January?
25 A. Not in any way whatever.
1 Q. May we go back, please, to tab 16; for us KJ4.74. The
2 march, as we know, of course took place on Sunday,
3 30th January. This file note by James of 31st January
4 records, that at about 9.45 on that day, Monday,
5 31st January, David, that is to say you:
6 "... telephoned and asked me to pass over, within
7 half an hour, the gist of the intelligence we had given
8 to him verbally during the previous week when Julian was
9 in Northern Ireland."
10 Do you have any recollection of asking for the gist
11 of the intelligence that you had been given verbally to
12 be passed over in writing and doing so on Monday,
13 31st January?
14 A. No, I do not.
15 Q. I think it follows from that that you do not know why,
16 if you made this request, you did make it?
17 A. I was not concerned with the operational aspects, not at
18 any stage.
19 Q. Assuming that this note is accurate and you telephoned
20 to ask Julian to pass over the gist of the intelligence
21 that had been given to you verbally, do you know what
22 would have prompted you to do that?
23 A. I do not really recollect doing it.
24 Q. Can we turn over the page, for us KJ4.76, which is
25 a fair copy of what appears at KJ4.75, which is
1 a telegram, dated 31st January. It reads as follows:
2 "Following for James or Julian from Director of
3 Intelligence, Northern Ireland:
4 "1. We should be grateful if you could arrange to
5 contact your source in Londonderry for any background to
6 yesterday's events that he can provide.
7 "2. Special Branch have a report, which they grade
8 about B3, that [blank] who live in the Rossville Flats
9 saw weapons being distributed behind the flats a short
10 distance beyond the furthest point to which the
11 Parachute Regiment penetrated. Any confirmation of such
12 arming would be extremely valuable."
13 The document speaks for itself, but do you have any
14 recollection now of learning from Special Branch that
15 somebody had reported seeing weapons being distributed
16 behind the flats a short distance beyond the furthest
17 point to which the Parachute Regiment had penetrated?
18 A. Yes, as I said before, operational, not security
19 intelligence and I was, in that sort of case, a conduit
20 for getting it quickly to the people who would have to
21 deal with it, and I was not one of those people.
22 Q. My question was whether you have any recollection now of
23 receiving this intelligence from Special Branch and
24 passing it on?
25 A. No.
1 Q. May we look, please, at -- for us G123.819. This you
2 will find at the back of tab 17, it is the last document
3 in tab 17, which is a fair copy of the telegram, which
4 is very difficult to read which, in your bundle, is
5 immediately before this fair copy. It is a telegram of
6 the 1st February 1972 and what it reads is, "Following
7 for [blank]." It is in fact:
8 "Following for James from Director of Intelligence
9 Northern Ireland.
10 "Reference my telegram ..."
11 It says 22 of 21 January, but that is a mistake for
12 the 31st and it is a reference to the telegram we were
13 looking at a moment ago:
14 "I have now learnt that the B3 report of weapons
15 being handed out in Londonderry came from [something has
16 been left out, but in fact it is a reference to the
17 agent or informer whom we know as] Observer B who learnt
18 of it from colleagues in Londonderry. I believe you are
19 meeting him on Wednesday. Could you please debrief him
20 on this."
21 We have understood from other evidence that
22 Observer B was an informant who did not live in
23 Londonderry, but who visited Londonderry from time to
24 time. Do you now have any recollection of an agent or
25 informant who answers to that description?
1 A. No.
2 Q. Can we turn, please, to tab 17A, for us G123.815.
3 G123.815 is a fair copy of a telegram, a copy of the
4 original of which appears on the two preceding pages,
5 813 and 814. It reads -- in fact there should be
6 something added to what is there. What it reads is:
7 "Following from Julian I saw [something has been
8 omitted that should be] Observer B yesterday and
9 obtained more precise information about the report he
10 submitted ... on Monday, 31st January."
11 Then it deals with the circumstances in which the
12 information was obtained and has a reference to an
13 "unconscious subsource." In the last full paragraph the
14 telegram, reads:
15 "This subsource said that he had caught one of the
16 buses from the New Lodge Road on the morning of Sunday,
17 30th January, which was taking people to join the
18 march."
19 Then there is a reference to the bus arriving late.
20 Then in the fifth line, it says, this:
21 "He said that he saw cars (numbers not stated)
22 loaded with weapons in the Brandywell area near
23 Free Derry Corner/Lecky Road. One car had a pile of
24 Thompson sub-machine-guns on the back seat, others were
25 loaded with rifles and pistols. These weapons were
1 being distributed from the cars at the location stated.
2 This same subsource said that he had talked that same
3 afternoon to a group of Provisionals ... who were very
4 angry with themselves for having left their guns in the
5 pub at Free Derry Corner ..."
6 This appears to be intelligence from an unconscious
7 subsource that cars, loaded with weapons, had appeared
8 at some stage and weapons were distributed from those
9 cars.
10 Do you have any recollection of learning of that
11 sort of intelligence, that information?
12 A. No, I have not and, once again, it is a question of
13 operational intelligence for which I was nothing really
14 more than a conduit.
15 Q. The Observer, Observer B from whom this information was
16 obtained, has now died. But before he died he gave
17 a statement to this Tribunal in which he said that he
18 was in Londonderry two days prior to the march and saw
19 a group of what he took to be IRA auxiliaries drilling
20 in an area called Glenfada Park and later saw them on
21 the landings of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats,
22 apparently planning how to direct sniper fire at the
23 Army.
24 Do you now have any recollection of any intelligence
25 about people being seen drilling or practising sniper
1 activity?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Thank you, those are my questions, there will be some
4 others.
5 MR TATE: Lord Saville, could we have a break for two
6 moments, please.
7 LORD SAVILLE: Do you want to ask a question before we have
8 a break, Mr Mansfield?
9 MR MANSFIELD: Could I ask for clarification on one matter;
10 it may be we have misheard, it may be we have not been
11 provided with certain things. On three separate
12 occasions during the evidence this morning, the witness
13 seems to be referring to documents that we do not have.
14 For example, on the first occasion, when talking
15 about the Ford memorandum, the witness said that in his
16 first statement, but he never completed what he was
17 going to say. We only have one statement, it may be he
18 meant that statement.
19 However, on a second occasion, when drawing
20 attention to the Joint Intelligence Committee papers, he
21 said that they were dealt with in his statement. Well,
22 they are not in the statement that we have.
23 Thirdly, when he was dealing with his role of
24 getting the Army and the police to work together, he
25 indicated that he had signed a report in March which had
1 been disclosed. Again, if it has -- and it is something
2 that has happened since his statement, we do not appear
3 to have it.
4 May I ask that this opportunity is taken to see
5 whether what I have highlighted is either correct or an
6 error.
7 LORD SAVILLE: I think that is a very good idea,
8 Mr Mansfield. I only have one statement in front of me.
9 The other points you raise also did not ring any bells
10 with me either. Mr Clarke may be able to help, but
11 otherwise we will take this opportunity of a break to
12 see if we can clarify the position.
13 We will take a break for a few minutes now and come
14 back in about 10, 15 minutes time.
15 (10.35 a.m)
16 (A short break)
17 (1.55 pm)
18 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Clarke, I understand we have largely
19 sorted this matter out. The Tribunal has been given
20 a second statement by David and there are various other
21 documents I think to which Mr Mansfield referred, but on
22 which you can now explain the position.
23 MR CLARKE: We have resolved some of the problems. There
24 is, and there has now been circulated, a second
25 statement of David's signed, apparently, on
1 11th April 2003. I am afraid I was not personally aware
2 of its existence until after my examination was
3 concluded.
4 What appears to have happened is that although the
5 statement was prepared and signed, it does not, I think,
6 appear to have been delivered to the Inquiry so that
7 I was obviously unaware of it when I examined by
8 reference to what I supposed to be the only statement.
9 That statement refers in it to a number of documents
10 which are documents that have already been disclosed and
11 I can give the references if anybody has failed to find
12 them. It does refer in paragraph 27 to a number of
13 intelligence reports or assessments and it does so in
14 terms that appear to reveal more than is contained in
15 the redacted version of the reports that have been
16 included in the bundles.
17 Mr Mansfield raised that with me when we adjourned.
18 The position appears to be that, at any rate in relation
19 to those documents, what is in the bundles is the most
20 redacted version, in the sense that when the documents
21 were put into the bundles, they were put into a form
22 which contained then suggested redactions, as I think
23 the maximum of what might be redacted. There was then
24 an exercise by all relevant security agencies for the
25 purposes of making a PII claim and it transpires that
1 some of that which was originally redacted has become
2 unredacted and it is the unredacted copy that David had
3 obviously seen at the time when his statement, his
4 second statement was drafted.
5 I have handed to my learned friend Mr Mansfield
6 copies of the documents in which he is particularly
7 interested in the ultimate form in which they should be
8 redacted. There are still some redactions, but
9 considerably less and I hope that that will meet
10 a difficulty that might otherwise have arisen.
11 In the light of the fact that I now have the second
12 statement, I would just like to ask David to attest to
13 its accuracy and to deal with a supplementary question
14 that arises out of it.
15 David, do you have your second statement. Could we
16 have on the screen KD2.3, which you signed on 11th April
17 of this year?
18 A. Yes, I have got it.
19 Q. Are the contents of that statement true to the best of
20 your knowledge and belief?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. I must say that I am very sorry that you have been asked
23 by me this morning a number of questions which it would
24 not have been necessary for me to ask had I been aware
25 of the existence of your second statement and which you
1 must have been wondering why I was asking, in the light
2 of the fact that you had signed that statement. I am
3 sorry about that.
4 There is one question that I would like to ask you
5 which arises out of your second statement. Could you
6 look at paragraph 3 and could we have on the screen
7 KD2.4. You refer in that paragraph 3 to a document
8 which we have been describing as "the signal document,"
9 dated 27th January 1972 which we looked at this morning.
10 You say in the fourth line:
11 "I believe that it is genuine. I recognise my
12 signature on the covering letter and the format is
13 a standard one that I used. I find it surprising that
14 I did not initial this document before it was sent; that
15 was my normal practice. However, while I do not
16 recollect sending this document, it is unlikely that any
17 of my staff would have issued it in my name, without
18 first clearing it with me."
19 You told us this morning, and you say here that you
20 recognised your signature on the covering letter. When
21 you say you find it surprising that you did not initial
22 this document, is that referring to the signal which was
23 sent or appears to have been sent with the letter?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. There is one further question I would like to ask you
1 about this letter and the signal. The Tribunal received
2 some evidence yesterday which suggested that in sending
3 to the RUC your letter with the signal that we are
4 talking about, it might have been necessary for you to
5 follow a procedure that applied to the Ministry of
6 Defence in respect of recording documents and it was
7 suggested that it might have been necessary to complete
8 a form 102 document and to stamp the document that was
9 sent with a stamp showing on what file the original of
10 the document was stored?
11 A. What is a 102 form?
12 Q. I gather it is a form in use by the MoD for recording
13 what has happened to secret documents. Do I understand
14 from your answer that it is not a form you have any
15 recollection of?
16 A. No, it is not.
17 Q. Was it your practice at any stage to stamp documents,
18 such as your letter or the signal attached to the
19 letter, with some form of stamp referring to a file on
20 which an original of the document was stored or could be
21 found?
22 A. I think what I have said on this is that with the amount
23 of stuff that is going through, it was -- and which is
24 reflected in the signals that are quoted in my second
25 statement, um, it is entirely unlikely, we would be more
1 or less making up procedures as we went along.
2 MR CLARKE: Thank you, that is the only additional question
3 that I wanted to ask.
4 Questioned by MR MACDONALD
5 MR MACDONALD: David, can you hear me?
6 LORD SAVILLE: Try again, it was not very clear to me
7 either.
8 MR MACDONALD: Can you hear me?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. My name is MacDonald, I represent some of the families,
11 if I could ask you a few questions.
12 Can I ask you first of all, without saying where you
13 are, why you were not prepared to come to London to give
14 evidence to this Inquiry?
15 A. The reason for that is that I now find it extremely
16 difficult to concentrate for any length of time and I am
17 fairly shattered when I have had to do so and it takes
18 time to recover. I am 84 years old now and I do not
19 travel well and so I elected to give evidence on
20 a videolink.
21 Q. Did you consult with members of the Security Service
22 whenever you were preparing your second statement?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And they in fact drafted that statement for you
25 effectively; did they not?
1 A. No, I signed, this being my view.
2 Q. To what extent did you draft any of the passages that
3 appear in your second statement?
4 A. Are you referring to the, the telegrams and so on?
5 Q. No, the second statement that was signed, apparently on
6 11th April this year?
7 A. I did the -- I gave the information to security,
8 present-day security staff who put it into the form in
9 which it now is.
10 Q. Can I ask you whether you travelled to London for any
11 purposes related to that, either to speak to the
12 Security Service or to look at documents?
13 A. I have been to London, yes, but, as I said a few minutes
14 ago, the effort of, of concentrating has a long-term
15 effect on my very short-term mental capacity now.
16 Q. Did you travel to London in order to consult with the
17 Security Service for the purpose of drafting and
18 preparing this statement that was signed in April this
19 year?
20 A. No.
21 Q. Sorry, I thought you said you have travelled to London
22 recently; did I misunderstand you?
23 A. I travelled to London and experienced reaction to the
24 prolonged exposure to trying to bring back memories of
25 30-odd years ago, particularly when they were referring
1 to individual documents which I just do not recollect.
2 Q. Can I ask you when you last travelled to London?
3 A. When did I last travel to London, um, I know, yes, it
4 was on, on the 11th, when I signed the document.
5 Q. The 11th April. Is that the 11th April this year?
6 A. No, sorry, I signed it here, sorry, I have got it wrong,
7 yes.
8 Q. Sorry, are you saying this on the basis of your own
9 recollection or are you saying this on the basis of
10 prompts that you are receiving in that room? I ask you
11 that because you seem to be looking around a lot.
12 LORD SAVILLE: I think, be assured on that point,
13 Mr MacDonald, we have Mr Tate in the room.
14 MR MACDONALD: It appears that there are other people in the
15 room, maybe I have misunderstood this, but it looks as
16 if there are other people in the room apart from
17 Mr Tate; is that right.
18 MR TATE: Lord Saville, in addition to myself there is
19 David's son, the technician and a gentleman from the
20 Security Service who is helping me hand documents over
21 to David.
22 LORD SAVILLE: I would assume, Mr Tate, that you were
23 ensuring there was no communication between the last of
24 those you mentioned and the witness.
25 MR TATE: Indeed.
1 MR MACDONALD: It is just, David, I can see you looking for
2 reassurance, perhaps, from other people in the room and
3 I was going to ask you whether there was a member of the
4 Security Service in the room with you and that appears
5 to be the case; do you understand? Can you hear me?
6 A. Yes, but as has just been explained, there is a member
7 of the Security Service.
8 Q. You said you travelled to London on 11th April this
9 year, as I understood it, to sign your statement --
10 LORD SAVILLE: I do not think that is clear yet,
11 Mr MacDonald, looking at the transcript. Perhaps you
12 could make one further attempt to see if this witness
13 can remember so that he can answer your original
14 question which is, I think: when did you last travel to
15 London.
16 MR MACDONALD: Before I ask that question again, I thought
17 you had said that but then changed your mind when you
18 looked around at someone else in the room; is that not
19 the way it happened?
20 A. Could you repeat that question?
21 Q. I thought you had said originally that you had travelled
22 to London on the 11th to sign your statement, that is
23 11th April of this year. Then you looked around and
24 changed your mind.
25 A. Mmm.
1 Q. What is the position; when was the last time you
2 travelled to London?
3 A. The last time I travelled to London, I am afraid
4 I cannot precisely remember.
5 Q. Was it in the last few --
6 A. The documents -- this document here was not signed in
7 London.
8 Q. Did you travel to London within the last few months in
9 order to either read documents for the purpose of this
10 statement or to consult with the Security Service or for
11 any other purpose?
12 A. I think I have already answered that question: yes,
13 I had gone to London and was completely knackered as
14 a result of the experience I had in trying to recall
15 evidence, particularly evidence on little bits of paper
16 which, um, by which I had been surrounded.
17 Q. If you were prepared to travel to London for that
18 purpose or for some other purpose within the last few
19 months, why were you not willing to come to London again
20 to appear in person before this Tribunal?
21 A. But again, can you make me aware what it is you are
22 leading up to?
23 Q. No.
24 A. Well, I told you that the experience of going to London
25 had a lasting effect. I am now 84 years old; I have
1 a very dodgy short-term memory and it takes a while for
2 me to recover.
3 Q. Do you know why your statement was not supplied, that is
4 your second statement was not supplied to the Inquiry;
5 I am not suggesting that you have any direct
6 responsibility for this, David, I just want to inquire
7 whether or not you had any knowledge of that?
8 A. No, I had nothing to do with it today, transmitting it.
9 Q. Is it the case that you are reluctant to co-operate with
10 this Inquiry fully?
11 A. I am sorry?
12 Q. Is it the case that you are reluctant to co-operate with
13 this Inquiry fully and you did not want to attend in
14 person?
15 A. No.
16 Q. But you prefer to have --
17 A. I am trying to be as helpful as I can in the statements
18 that I made -- my second statement and um I do not think
19 I can go further than that. I just do not remember --
20 Q. Do you feel more comfortable giving evidence from where
21 you are on a video screen with a Security Service
22 Officer by your side?
23 A. No.
24 Q. You have suggested in your evidence that there was an
25 important distinction between operational intelligence
1 and security intelligence?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And that you really were not responsible for operational
4 intelligence?
5 A. That is true.
6 Q. Is it true? Is it not the case that you were equally
7 responsible for operational intelligence?
8 A. It is equally true that I was building up an
9 intelligence organisation which could deal with
10 operational intelligence.
11 Q. But you were actually equally responsible for
12 operational intelligence as of Bloody Sunday?
13 A. I am sorry?
14 Q. You were responsible for operational intelligence just
15 as much as you were responsible for security
16 intelligence as of January 1972?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Could I ask you to look at a document that should have
19 been sent to you some time today at GEN 1.72. Do you
20 see that that is --
21 A. I have not seen this document before.
22 Q. This is a document that was provided by the Cabinet
23 Office in July 2000 for the purpose of assisting the
24 Tribunal in understanding the nature and operation of
25 the intelligence organisation in Northern Ireland
1 in January 1972?
2 A. Yes, but I have not seen this before.
3 Q. I am not suggesting you have, but your terms of
4 reference are set out at GEN 1.74, if that could be
5 pointed out to you. You see there is a bullet point
6 about halfway down the page:
7 "Terms of reference for the Director of
8 Intelligence ..."
9 That is you and you were to be responsible to the
10 GOC for the co-ordination of all sources of intelligence
11 deployed in Northern Ireland; to recommend certain
12 things to the GOC:
13 " ... to assess and present to the GOC material from
14 all sources bearing on Northern Ireland; to arrange for
15 the release of all possible material to operational
16 units, as appropriate ..."
17 That was an operational function that you were
18 responsible for?
19 A. Responsible as a conduit for getting the information to
20 the responsible bodies, but I was not responsible
21 for ...
22 Q. Sorry, had you finished, you were not responsible for?
23 A. Sorry, I thought your attention had wandered.
24 Q. What are you saying you were not responsible for?
25 A. I was a conduit for getting a security organisation set
1 up in a form which could provide operational
2 intelligence or security intelligence or both of them,
3 but I was concerned, not with the, if you like,
4 consumption of operational intelligence, except as
5 a conduit for getting it to the people who were
6 responsible for it, which is to the Army and police.
7 Q. Could I ask you to look at your second statement,
8 paragraph 5, KD2.4. You see in that paragraph you talk
9 about the distinction between operational
10 intelligence --
11 A. I am with you, yes.
12 Q. And security intelligence. Over the page at KD2.5, you
13 suggest in the third line there:
14 "The type of operational intelligence in the signal
15 document".
16 Do you remember what the signal document was that
17 was referred to this morning? Perhaps if I could remind
18 you --
19 A. What I am saying is, this is perfectly clear:
20 "The type of operational intelligence in the signal
21 document ... I would not have been in a position to
22 judge its significance, but I would have been concerned
23 to pass it on as quickly as possible to those who would
24 be able to assess its value, ie the Army and the RUC."
25 That was time-critical information for them and not for
1 me.
2 Q. Was part of your function not to assess intelligence and
3 to advise the recipients of this material on the
4 implications?
5 LORD SAVILLE: I think you could put that question again.
6 MR MACDONALD: Was it not part of your function to assess
7 and evaluate the intelligence material that came your
8 way before you passed it on to its ultimate recipients.
9 A. For the umpteenth time, not operational intelligence.
10 I was responsible, as this document sets out, for
11 assessing the security intelligence quality of the IRA
12 which, for operational purposes, I would not assess. I
13 would pass it quickly, being a conduit, to get the
14 information to the police and the Army.
15 Q. How could the Army assess the value of intelligence
16 material supplied to it by you if the Army had no idea
17 of the reliability of the source? Did you hear the
18 question?
19 A. Yes, but on the source you are talking about, the
20 identity of the source was known to the brigadier
21 concerned.
22 Q. So it was because the identity of that source was known
23 to the brigadier that he could assess this material
24 himself?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. That is why you played no part in assessing the
2 reliability of this source or passing on any evaluation?
3 A. I did not pass an evaluation on that information, no,
4 not at all.
5 Q. I will come back to that shortly. You say at
6 paragraph 3 of your first statement, this is at KD2.1,
7 that your task was to co-ordinate the
8 intelligence-gathering efforts of the various elements
9 of the Security Forces operating in Northern Ireland at
10 the time. I just want to ask you about one of those
11 elements.
12 What can you tell us about the Special
13 Anti-Terrorist Team which was deployed in Derry?
14 A. I was not aware of it.
15 Q. If I could refresh your memory. If you could look at
16 G27.200. This is part of an operational directive,
17 number 4 of 1971, that was issued on 10th November 1971
18 by headquarters 8 Infantry Brigade. At page 5 of the
19 document that appears --
20 MR TATE: Mr MacDonald, could we have a moment, we are
21 trying to find the document.
22 MR MACDONALD: It starts at G27.196.
23 MR CLARKE: It is in Madden & Finucane's bundle at the last
24 tab, I think, the last tab but one, tab 11.
25 MR TATE: What was the date of the document again,
1 Mr MacDonald?
2 MR MACDONALD: 10th November 1971. Page 5 of that document,
3 G27.200, there is a reference to a "mission".
4 "8 Infantry Brigade is to restore and maintain law
5 and order throughout the brigade area acting in aid of
6 the civil power in conjunction with the RUC:
7 "Execution:
8 "General outline. In its directive the Commander of
9 Land Forces pointed out that the battle against the IRA
10 must be conducted on three simultaneous and
11 inter-related fronts: the intelligence front, the
12 operational front and the public information front."
13 If you go over the page, there is a reference at the
14 top of the page, sub-paragraph 3, to this:
15 "To increase the flow of intelligence, we must also
16 make use of the Special Anti-Terrorist Team, SATT, which
17 is now deployed operationally within the city, which
18 operates in support of the Special Branch but which
19 remains under command of the city battalion"?
20 A. I have no memory of that.
21 Q. Nobody else has any memory of this and I was wondering
22 if you could help seeing you were the man responsible
23 for the co-ordination of all these different elements.
24 Doing your best, can you offer any kind of assistance to
25 the Tribunal about what this Special Anti-Terrorist Team
1 might have done about the time of Bloody Sunday, to
2 increase the flow of intelligence?
3 A. But this is a 38 Brigade document, is it not?
4 Q. Yes.
5 A. I was not involved in the drafting of that.
6 Q. I am not suggesting you were. But you were responsible
7 for co-ordination of all the different elements within
8 the Security Forces dealing with intelligence. Are you
9 saying you have never heard of this expression
10 "anti-terrorist team"?
11 A. No, I have not. I cannot recall it.
12 Q. Nobody else can either. Can you offer an explanation as
13 to why that should be?
14 MR CLARKE: I hesitate to rise but it is not quite correct
15 to say that nobody else is able to offer an explanation.
16 I think, Day 284, page 132, 2241 said that the SATT team
17 consisted of people in the city battalion who were
18 tasked with looking out for low-grade informers.
19 A. Yes, but that is Army intelligence, not security
20 intelligence.
21 MR MACDONALD: You know nothing about that?
22 A. No, at least I cannot recall it.
23 Q. Turning to your first statement, paragraph 8, KD2.2, you
24 say there in the second sentence:
25 "I do not remember ..."
1 A. Which one?
2 Q. KD2.2, paragraph 8, the third line:
3 "I do not remember any intelligence specific to the
4 march in question to that effect [that is that the IRA
5 will attempt to exploit the NICRA march in Derry on
6 30th January 1972 as] as cover for attacking the Army."
7 If there had been any intelligence to that effect,
8 that presumably would have featured in the Int Summ 4 of
9 1972 of 27th January 1972; is that right? Do you want
10 to look at that document? G80.488. This is a document
11 that you should be familiar with; is it?
12 A. Well, this is a, a regular publication for the period
13 towards the end of January 1972.
14 Q. Yes, and it went under your name, it was signed "Major
15 for the Director of Intelligence"; you see that on the
16 last page, page 5?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. The point is that if there had been any information
19 received up to 27th January to the effect that the IRA
20 would attempt to exploit the NICRA march in Derry on
21 30th January as cover for attacking the Army, that
22 should have appeared in some way in this document;
23 should it not?
24 Specifically if you look at paragraph 23 at
25 page G80.491, you see the reference there to the march?
1 MR TATE: Could you give the reference again, Mr MacDonald.
2 MR MACDONALD: G80.491, paragraph 23. It is mentioned also
3 in paragraph 22, but paragraph 23 is the relevant
4 paragraph. It refers to the march and to the fact that:
5 "The march will present particular problems and
6 a greater than usual opportunity for demonstrating the
7 difficulties of preventing violations of the ban in
8 Republican areas."
9 To complete the picture, paragraph 24 over the page
10 there is a reference to:
11 "IRA activity in the country and border areas ..."
12 Presumably if there had been any intelligence of the
13 kind that I referred to, it would have featured in some
14 way or would have been mentioned in some way in this
15 Int Summ?
16 A. No, I have no recollection of it.
17 Q. I appreciate that, but what I am saying is: if there had
18 been any such intelligence then it would have featured
19 in this Int Summ, perhaps in paragraphs 23 or 24 and the
20 fact that there is no reference to any such intelligence
21 here tends to suggest, does it not, that there was no
22 intelligence indicating that the IRA would be creating
23 any problem at this march; is that fair?
24 A. I do not know who in fact drafted it, it was not I.
25 Q. It is signed by "Major for Director Intelligence", that
1 is you?
2 A. No, I am the Director of Intelligence.
3 Q. Yes, I know. Major [blank], I cannot remember the
4 cipher of this major, but it was signed by a major under
5 your command or responsibility on your behalf?
6 A. I have a feeling we are going round in circles on this.
7 Q. If you just answer the question we may not.
8 A. Can you repeat the question?
9 Q. If there had been any intelligence that the IRA -- as of
10 27th January -- that the IRA were going to use this
11 march in Derry on 30th January to attack the Army, that
12 would have appeared in this document, this Int Summ in
13 some shape or form; is that not right?
14 A. When I took -- the first statement of mine was drafted,
15 I did say that it was endemic.
16 Q. I am coming to that. Just answer the question, if you
17 could. I will try again for the last time: the absence
18 in this document of 27th January to any reference to any
19 IRA plans, to engage in hostile activity at Derry on
20 30th January, would tend to suggest, would it not, that
21 there was no intelligence to that effect as of that
22 date?
23 LORD SAVILLE: Well, Mr MacDonald, we will move on because
24 I think it is, to a quite substantial extent, a point of
25 submission.
1 MR MACDONALD: Well, except that this is the Director of
2 Intelligence who was responsible for this document --
3 LORD SAVILLE: I agree you have made three attempts and you
4 can draw that to our attention in due course, for what
5 it may be worth. I think we must seek to try and get on
6 as best we may.
7 MR MACDONALD: If I could move on to the next part of that
8 sentence, going back to KD2.2, you say in the fourth
9 line:
10 "I do remember that it was endemic at that time that
11 the IRA would join marches, demonstrations and any civil
12 disturbance to exploit opportunities to cause trouble to
13 the Security Forces."
14 You have dealt with that in more detail in
15 paragraph 27 of your second statement. What you say
16 there, KD2.11, paragraph 27, about six or seven lines
17 down, is that you have asked:
18 " ... current Security Service staff if they could
19 identify any further documents, apart from that
20 telegram, which would illustrate the point that I made
21 in my first statement about it being endemic at that
22 time that the IRA would join marches, demonstrations and
23 any civil disturbance to exploit opportunities to cause
24 trouble to the Security Forces."
25 I think you have already said today that you
1 yourself cannot remember any instances of this
2 happening, but the Security Service have on your behalf
3 trawled all the documentation available to them, have
4 they not, in order to see whether they could come up
5 with a single example of the IRA using a civil rights
6 march to engage in hostile activity against the Security
7 Forces; is that right?
8 A. No, I do not think it is.
9 Q. Is that not what you are saying in your statement: that
10 you have asked current Security Service staff if they
11 could identify any further documents which would
12 illustrate your point?
13 A. Illustrate the point that it was endemic?
14 Q. All they have been able to come up with is, in total,
15 three examples, going back to July of the previous year,
16 of simple street disorder where they suggest the IRA
17 became involved; do you accept --
18 A. Might I suggest you re-read my second statement.
19 Q. I am reading it now.
20 A. Uh-huh.
21 Q. Do you accept that neither you nor the Security Service
22 staff acting on your behalf could not come up with any
23 example of a civil rights march where the IRA took
24 advantage of the occasion to attack soldiers?
25 A. They took a lot of opportunity to attack the RUC, we are
1 not dealing particularly with soldiers.
2 Q. Or the RUC, there is no example provided by you or the
3 Security Service after a trawl of all the documentation
4 available to them of the IRA using any civil rights
5 march to attack soldiers or police or anyone else; is
6 that right?
7 A. There is a very great deal of evidence of them attacking
8 the -- in particular the RUC, not the Army because the
9 Army was capable of -- was normally represented in
10 force, but in the more remote areas, the RUC were
11 constantly -- it is illustrated in the statements I have
12 prepared on 11th of whatever it was.
13 Q. Not on the occasion of a civil rights march; is that
14 right; do you accept that?
15 A. No.
16 Q. You do not. The point is that if you had been doing
17 your job properly, you would have realised that at the
18 time; would you not?
19 A. Could you repeat the question, I would realise what at
20 the time?
21 Q. You would have realised that there had been no previous
22 occasion when the IRA took advantage of a civil rights
23 march to attack policemen or soldiers?
24 A. I have provided plenty of evidence in the telegram, JLC,
25 whatever it was, that I sent and included in my second
1 statement.
2 Q. That is the point: that you sent this telegram to
3 8 Brigade suggesting that this would happen, that the
4 IRA would take advantage of this civil rights march when
5 you must have known that that had never happened before;
6 is that right?
7 A. No, it happened repeatedly with the RUC in particular
8 and that had been listed in my second statement.
9 Q. And you said in the circumstances when you did not offer
10 an assessment of the reliability of this particular
11 source?
12 A. Why? Oh, that is that again. It is because it was
13 clear from the context that Brigadier MacLellan knew the
14 person reporting.
15 Q. Yes, that is right. It would appear to be so and
16 Brigadier MacLellan discounted your intelligence
17 entirely because we have evidence from the Brigade
18 Major, Colonel Steele to the effect that --
19 A. From whom --
20 Q. That at the brigade order group conference that appears
21 to have taken place after this signal was received,
22 there was no talk of any shooting; it was not assessed
23 that there was a prospect of shooting at this march.
24 Now he, that is the brigadier, presumably took that
25 decision and made that assessment himself on the basis
1 of a number of different factors, including, first of
2 all, his knowledge of his source; is that possible?
3 That you would have taken into account his knowledge of
4 his source in order to discount it?
5 A. Not necessarily to discount it.
6 Q. Secondly, he could have taken into account intelligence
7 that he received from the police in Derry in order to
8 discount it; is that right?
9 A. No, I do not think he did.
10 Q. You say in your own statement, which should be in front
11 of you, paragraph 8 of your first statement, KD2.2, the
12 last sentence:
13 "In any event, Special Branch Londonderry would more
14 than likely have collected what intelligence there was
15 on the march at a local level at the time and would have
16 given their information directly to the local brigade
17 commander without it ever coming to my attention."
18 A. That was in the context of intelligence coming from
19 London.
20 Q. In whatever context it appears, it seems to be accepted
21 by you that Brigadier MacLellan could have accepted
22 Special Branch intelligence which you received locally;
23 would that be right first of all?
24 A. I hope he would, that was part of my doctrine, that they
25 should get together.
1 Q. Such locally-gathered intelligence could have allowed
2 them to discount the signal document; is that right?
3 A. I do not think it would.
4 Q. At paragraph 9 of your statement in the last sentence,
5 you say:
6 "I would have had no input into how to deal with the
7 march itself."
8 That is not entirely correct, is it, in the sense
9 that although you may not have been directly involved or
10 present at the planning meetings, decisions as to how to
11 deal with the march would or could have depended on the
12 intelligence information that you provided; is that
13 right?
14 A. It would be provided on the basis of what intelligence
15 was available, yes.
16 Q. And you therefore had a responsibility to evaluate all
17 the material that you had and offer guidance from an
18 intelligence perspective?
19 A. Not for operational intelligence, no.
20 Q. You did not see that as part of your responsibility at
21 all?
22 A. I was not giving orders to the Army or in Londonderry or
23 anywhere else.
24 Q. But you were providing the brigadier with operational
25 intelligence about the march; were you not?
1 A. I was telling him what information I was receiving, but
2 I was not assessing the operational aspects of that
3 intelligence.
4 Q. Was that not irresponsible on your part?
5 Perhaps I will move on. Paragraph 10, when you talk
6 about having no knowledge or recollection of the
7 informer who may have given information about IRA
8 drilling, you see that in paragraph 10.
9 Without taking you to the documents again, can the
10 Tribunal take it from you as the person responsible for
11 the compilation, or at least the oversight of the
12 compilation of the headquarters Int Summs that if any
13 such intelligence had been received, it would have
14 appeared in some shape or form in one of the Int Summs,
15 either before or after Bloody Sunday?
16 A. I think we are going round in circles here. Can you
17 make a more specific question for me to reply to?
18 Q. There is no reference in the Int Summs before or after
19 Bloody Sunday to any kind of IRA drilling or practising
20 of ambushes or anything of that kind. What I am asking
21 you, as the person responsible for the compilation of
22 these Int Summs, is this: does that not mean that there
23 could not have been any such intelligence received to
24 that effect?
25 A. I do not think so, no.
1 Q. Why not?
2 A. Because we have been going round in circles on this.
3 Q. If intelligence had been received after the event about
4 civilians firing guns on Bloody Sunday, would that have
5 been Int Summs?
6 A. Have you received my second statement?
7 Q. Yes?
8 A. I deal at some length with, um, the intelligence and the
9 volume of it that was going through at the time. It was
10 a very hectic period and I cannot seriously remember the
11 contents of individual Int Summs.
12 Q. I am not asking you to do that; I am not saying you
13 should have read all the Int Summs or written all the
14 Int Summs. But can we take it that you would have
15 expected these Int Summs to have contained a reference
16 to any intelligence that may have been received after
17 Bloody Sunday, to the effect that civilians were firing
18 guns on Bloody Sunday, if that had been the case?
19 A. Well, that has been answered, I think, in my second
20 statement.
21 Q. What is the answer, is it yes or no? Do you not wish to
22 answer that question?
23 Perhaps I will move on. The UK Government in
24 Northern Ireland was represented by Mr Howard Smith; is
25 that right, at the time?
1 A. Yes, I think it was.
2 Q. We know that Mr Smith became head of the
3 Security Service some time after Bloody Sunday. Do you
4 know whether or not he was a member of the Security
5 Services or the Secret Intelligence Services on
6 Bloody Sunday or about that time?
7 A. No, he was Foreign Office.
8 Q. He was Foreign Office. He was assisted by
9 a Mr Frank Steele from MI6; is that right or do you not
10 remember that?
11 A. I had no contact with the MI6 set-up. As I have said,
12 they were operating on a separate brief and I did not
13 control their operation or activities in any way.
14 Q. Did you not have to liaise with the RUC rep and his
15 staff?
16 A. Sorry.
17 Q. Did you not have to liaise with the RUC rep and his
18 staff?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Did you not in fact have contacts with the UK rep and
21 his staff?
22 A. No, I knew them, of course, but I did not organise them
23 in any way.
24 Q. So you had no form of liaison at all?
25 A. I had more than a plateful of my own problems.
1 Q. Did the Intelligence Services in Northern Ireland,
2 including yourself, regard the civil rights movement and
3 the IRA as linked?
4 A. There were individuals who needed to be looked at, but
5 the organisation itself, no.
6 Q. Did you not think that they were connected and both
7 subversive?
8 A. Sorry, could you repeat that?
9 Q. Did you not think that the Civil Rights Association and
10 the IRA were linked; did you not form that perception?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Did you see them in the same sort of light?
13 A. I am finding it very hard to hear what you are saying.
14 Q. I am sorry, did you see the civil rights movement and
15 the IRA in the same sort of light?
16 A. Oh no, of course not.
17 Q. Did you know who organised the march in Derry on
18 Bloody Sunday?
19 A. As far as I remember it was NICRA.
20 Q. Did you think it was NICRA or did you think it was the
21 IRA who organised it?
22 A. I just answered the question.
23 Q. You thought it was NICRA?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And did you think they were part of the lunatic left?
1 A. No.
2 Q. If we look at KJ4.61, you see that is a telegram sent by
3 you to Julian in January 1972; do you see that?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Do you see that you were suggesting to Julian that this
6 march -- maybe to be complete about it, it says:
7 "We spoke on Saturday about the possibility of a
8 march from the Creggan/Bogside to the Guildhall in
9 Londonderry on Sunday, 16th January. I was over there
10 yesterday and was told by Special Branch that there was
11 some doubt whether the march will in fact take place.
12 The organisations primarily concerned are the
13 James Connolly Republican Club, Derry CRA with which are
14 associated the SRG".
15 Do you remember what that was?
16 A. Not at the moment, no.
17 Q. "and kindred souls of the lunatic left."
18 That was your comment; was it not?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. You did regard the Civil Rights Association in Derry as
21 part of the lunatic left; did you not?
22 A. We are not really on the same wavelength on this. I had
23 no remembrance of what happened in -- over the period of
24 Bloody Sunday. I was reminded of it because it was
25 obviously a time of critical importance for the
1 reputation of the services and police and -- although
2 I had reach the point, as I said earlier on, I was, at
3 the time this was happening, I was -- I am now 84 and
4 with a very short span of attention and I find it very
5 difficult to recall people or individual telegrams or
6 individual summaries.
7 Q. Could you look at KJ4.67. Do you have that?
8 A. Not yet.
9 Q. Do you have that now?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You see there they are talking about the same march,
12 which was supposed to have taken place on 16th January
13 and:
14 " ... would now definitely take place on Sunday,
15 30th January."
16 Julian records that it was being organised by those
17 members of the IRA who had attended the meeting in
18 Magherafelt to which he had previously referred. Was it
19 the Security Services' belief, your belief, that this
20 march was being organised by the IRA or by the
21 Civil Rights Association, or did it just not matter to
22 you because they were really both the same sort of
23 thing?
24 A. I have had to be reminded of this correspondence.
25 I have reached the point where I could not remember who,
1 for instance, Julian was, until I met him.
2 Q. Do you agree that it appears to be the case that the
3 Security Service may have formed the view that the IRA
4 were organising this march?
5 A. I do not think that follows.
6 Q. If I could ask you to look finally at G72.451, this is
7 a page in Int Summ 101 which was prepared by 8 Brigade.
8 Do you see paragraph 27 on page G72.451.
9 A. Yes, I am there.
10 Q. Under the heading "Future Events:
11 "A NICRA sponsored march followed by a meeting at
12 the Guildhall Londonderry is planned for 30th January.
13 It is believed that all civil rights groups, whether IRA
14 Goulding or Brady aligned, will combine together in an
15 attempt to cause maximum embarrassment to the
16 Security Forces."
17 This was not a document compiled by you, but does
18 that represent the kind of view that you held at the
19 time, that these civil rights groups were aligned to one
20 faction or other of the IRA?
21 A. I think I have already answered that point: I do not
22 think that they were aligned in that way and I have,
23 until comparatively recently, no recollection of that
24 particular political Int Summ.
25 Q. The question is whether your belief that civil rights
1 and the IRA were all mixed up into one big organisation
2 in some general way allowed you to take the view that
3 you could feed the Army with so-called intelligence to
4 the effect that the IRA were going to use this civil
5 rights march to attack soldiers?
6 A. They did use the civil rights march to attack the RUC.
7 Q. Do you take the view that marchers taking part in this
8 march were fair game?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Did you feel any sense of responsibility about advising
11 8 Brigade or General Ford, if you did advise
12 General Ford about your intelligence --
13 A. I did not report to General Ford, I reported to the GOC.
14 Q. Did you advise the GOC that you thought that this was
15 just an IRA march and the IRA would take advantage of
16 it?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Did you speak to General Ford about this --
19 A. No.
20 Q. He says he sent you to Derry --
21 A. I dealt with the GOC, not with General Ford.
22 General Ford was dealing with the, um, if you like,
23 tactical intelligence. But I was completely oblivious
24 to all this until comparatively recently when this
25 Inquiry was started up and I was encouraged to try to
1 refresh my memory of what happened at the time, which is
2 what I have tried to do, but with little success.
3 MR MACDONALD: Thank you very much.
4 MR TATE: Lord Saville, David would appreciate a break, if
5 he could have one, please.
6 LORD SAVILLE: We will break for about 10 minutes.
7 (3.00 pm)
8 (A short break)
9 (3.15 pm)
10 Questioned by MR MANSFIELD
11 MR MANSFIELD: David, I represent some of the families,
12 I only have two points I want to make.
13 Sir, the first is really an observation, but I make
14 it in his presence without taking time. Could we have
15 KD2.11, please, this is a statement that we have had
16 disclosed today, KD2.11.
17 MR TATE: Would you give us a paragraph number so we can
18 look at the pages, please.
19 MR MANSFIELD: It is paragraph 27 on that page which refers
20 to three JIC papers as illustrating the endemic point.
21 Sir, we have had those papers produced, they were
22 already amongst our bundles; we have also had, although
23 I do not think they are scanned, the unredacted
24 versions, so the redactions have been removed from the
25 documents we had originally. The point I want to make,
1 in relation to each of the three documents specified on
2 that page, that none of those three, when you look at
3 the unredacted versions, relate to hooligan activity
4 being used as cover on a civil rights march. Sir, I do
5 not take more time than that, that is the simple point
6 that comes out of all that material.
7 The question I have for you, David, relates to
8 another topic. If you could have KD2.1, paragraph 7,
9 please. In paragraph 7 you are asked about a document
10 that we know as the Ford memorandum, entitled:
11 "The situation in Londonderry as at the
12 7th January," and you say in that paragraph that you
13 have no recollection that you went to Londonderry on
14 6th January to gather intelligence; do you see that,
15 David?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. I want to follow that through because I want to see if
18 we can go a little further with that. Could we have
19 G48.301. You have seen this before; this is the
20 memorandum, and the paragraph that is relevant. I do
21 not know which tab it is, but it is paragraph 8 in the
22 documents you have. May I read you the sentence to save
23 you having to look at it, but that is where it is.
24 General Ford says that he has asked you to get the
25 best possible intelligence of the possible strengths of
1 the march and its real intentions. He goes on to say
2 that as a result you went to Londonderry yesterday.
3 I am going to pause, it looks as though this is
4 a document that he was writing on Monday, 10th January,
5 referring to a visit that he has made, General Ford, on
6 Friday, 7th January; do you follow?
7 A. Yes, that is right.
8 Q. So he is saying, it would appear, that you went to
9 Londonderry on the 9th January and that you would
10 report, it says, the day on which he appears to be
11 writing, namely, 10th January 1972; do you follow?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. You do not recollect this; is that right?
14 A. Sorry?
15 Q. You do not seem to recollect this; is that right: that
16 you went to Londonderry let alone --
17 A. I did not go to Londonderry tasked by General Ford.
18 Q. Did you go to Londonderry tasked by someone else?
19 A. Not on that date, no.
20 Q. In view of that, would you now see, please, KJ4.61,
21 which you saw a few minutes ago. This is a telegram,
22 and would you just look at this one. You will see that
23 the date on this telegram is 10th January 1972; do you
24 see the date on the right-hand corner, up towards the
25 right-hand side "Date of Origin"; do you see the date?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Then if we look at the text for a moment, you are saying
3 to Julian that you spoke on Saturday about the
4 possibility of a march from the Creggan and so forth,
5 and there is some doubt about it taking place:
6 "I was over there yesterday".
7 Do you see those words; would you look at the
8 telegram for a moment.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. It is the third line down in the main paragraph:
11 "I was over there yesterday ..."
12 That would be the 9th January, which is when
13 General Ford said you went. I want to ask you
14 again: you did go to Londonderry on 9th January, did you
15 not?
16 A. That I do not recall. General Ford did not task me.
17 Q. We will do it in stages: you did go to Derry on the 9th,
18 it would appear from this telegram; is that right?
19 A. Yes, that is right.
20 Q. Right. Who asked you to go if it was not General Ford?
21 A. Well, I went on my own steam. I used to go round, as
22 far as possible, meeting Army and Special Branch
23 officers.
24 Q. Had you gone because there was the possibility of a
25 march the following weekend, in other words, the weekend
1 after the one you went; is that why you went on the 9th?
2 A. As far as I was concerned, it was a routine visit on the
3 9th, tasked by myself.
4 Q. Did you discuss the march with anyone while you were
5 there on the 9th?
6 A. Well, that I really do not recall. I must have done.
7 Q. You must have done because it appears in the same
8 sentence that you certainly spoke to Special Branch
9 because they were in some doubt as to whether it would
10 in fact take place; do you see, that is all in the
11 telegram?
12 A. Yes, I tasked myself.
13 Q. You tasked yourself. Would you have gone there on your
14 own?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Did you --
17 A. I tasked myself.
18 Q. And you went on your own?
19 A. Well, I cannot remember this particular thing, but that
20 was the normal form, I went round as and when necessary,
21 if possible with the head of Northern Ireland
22 Special Branch but if necessary without him.
23 Q. The next question I have, this is in order to trace
24 documents, that is why I ask this question, if you went
25 on your own on the 9th tasked by yourself and you did
1 have conversations about the civil rights march, did you
2 keep any records at the time?
3 A. I -- it is a detail I cannot remember, but if you look
4 at the statement I have made, I was, um, tasking myself;
5 I was not tasked by General Ford.
6 Q. Your statement says you do not remember doing so, that
7 is going to Derry. We are now in the position that you
8 obviously did go to Derry. The question I am currently
9 asking you is whether a record was kept so that we can
10 ask the Security Services now, as you did over other
11 documents, whether there are other documents about your
12 visits, made by you; do you follow?
13 If you went on your own it is likely you would have
14 made notes while you were there and made a report. The
15 question is: where are they?
16 A. Well, it is something I cannot answer because when
17 I left Northern Ireland, um, the -- my successor went to
18 Stormont and some of the documents would have gone
19 there; some would have been returned to London; some may
20 have been transferred to the police. It was a complete
21 reorganisation at that time.
22 Q. Can I ask you this, then: was it your habit to keep
23 a diary or report book?
24 A. No, absolutely not.
25 Q. So how did you make records yourself?
1 A. How did I make records myself?
2 Q. Yes, how did you make records yourself of intelligence
3 that you gathered?
4 A. Well, I would leave a note with one of the staff.
5 Q. Which one of the staff would keep a note?
6 A. The position is that, as I said in my report, we were
7 more or less making up what to do as we went along and
8 the volume of traffic was huge, um, but at this stage in
9 time, I have absolutely no idea where those records
10 might be.
11 Q. Sorry, the question was, may I ask you again: which
12 member of staff would keep a record of intelligence
13 gathered by you?
14 A. Well, it would have been the -- you see, I had
15 a military staff; I had Northern Ireland staff and I had
16 a Security Service staff.
17 Q. Yes. The question is: so we can see if there is any
18 possibility of tracing anything else, which of these
19 staff sections would be entrusted with intelligence
20 which you gathered?
21 A. That would almost certainly be the small
22 Security Service staff.
23 Q. Small Security Service staff?
24 A. Staff.
25 Q. Just roughly how many; are we talking about two or
1 three?
2 A. Um, I forget exactly, I think maybe four.
3 Q. Do you remember -- and I do not ask for names -- if you
4 remember the names, if you could just say yes or no: do
5 you remember the names of any of them now?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. You do. Would you be in a position -- I do not ask you
8 to say who they were out loud -- would you be in
9 a position to communicate the names by writing them down
10 for us, and so it is clear to you, I am not asking for
11 their real names at any stage, but a way in which
12 matters could be progressed; would you be in a position
13 to write down either the real names or the code names of
14 the four, approximately, who formed your security staff
15 who might have kept a record of your intelligence?
16 A. I would find it difficult because, um, you know, married
17 names differ and, um --
18 Q. Could I ask you, this is the final thing I ask you,
19 could I ask you, with the Tribunal's permission, if you
20 would not mind writing down, at your convenience today,
21 the names, purely for the Tribunal's benefit -- and we
22 may get a redacted version -- of those or any of those
23 four that you can remember; could you do that, please?
24 A. I could go some way towards it, but I do not think
25 I could be accurate at this stage.
1 MR MANSFIELD: Sir, I do not have any other questions.
2 LORD SAVILLE: I would have thought, Mr Mansfield, subject
3 to any views you might like to express, that the better
4 idea would be, when we have finished with the videolink,
5 for Mr Tate to see if he can ascertain from this witness
6 any names that this witness remembers.
7 MR MANSFIELD: Yes, thank you.
8 MR TATE: I will do that, Lord Saville.
9 Questioned by LORD GIFFORD
10 LORD GIFFORD: David, I am Anthony Gifford and I represent
11 the family of James Wray. Are you able to see me from
12 where you are sitting?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. I will try not to tax you with documents, but I only
15 want to put one or two things to you for your comment
16 and possible recollection.
17 First of all, in relation to the signal there are
18 two things which you may be able to help on. Could we
19 have the legible version which is at KJ4.48, that is the
20 typed, the re-typed version of the signal with the
21 points going one, two, three, four. We have it on the
22 screen, please will you indicate when you have it in
23 front of you.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Do you see that there is a great deal of detail
1 contained in the signal, for instance, do you see in
2 paragraph two that a great number of street names are
3 set out?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. These street names would not have been known to you from
6 your prior knowledge; would they?
7 A. No.
8 Q. You must have been supplied with the details by, one
9 presumes, the officer Julian, who has given evidence
10 about supplying you verbally with information. If one
11 looks to paragraph seven over the page, in addition to
12 more street names there is a map reference; do you see?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Assuming, as I think we must, that it was you who
15 drafted this signal, you must, must you not, have had
16 some document in front of you containing these details?
17 A. But this has been mulled over before, um, it is clear
18 that Commander 8 Brigade knew the source and --
19 Q. I am not asking you about that, I am only asking: if, in
20 order to give him so much detail you must have had a
21 written report in front of you?
22 A. Well, I have not any idea.
23 Q. Thank you. Could we turn now to what happened on the
24 Monday after Bloody Sunday, in particular, the document
25 which we have at KJ4.73. You will see that that is
1 a document signed by the person we know as James.
2 A. Yes, I have the document.
3 Q. Do you remember James?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. You will see that the document at the beginning recites:
6 "On Monday, 31st January, at about 9.45 a.m, David
7 telephoned and asked me to pass over, within half an
8 hour, the gist of the intelligence we had given to him
9 verbally during the previous week when Julian was in
10 Northern Ireland and in touch with Observer C."
11 The question which puzzles me and you may be able to
12 help over, is why, when you had so much detail already
13 which you had put in the signal, you are now asking for
14 the gist on the morning after the event?
15 A. At this distance in time, I do not recall.
16 Q. If that document, that signal had been sent on the
17 27th January, you already had and knew not just the gist
18 of the intelligence, but the detail, why ask him for the
19 gist?
20 A. I am really not sure, but you see Brigadier Lewis was
21 nothing to do with, um -- he is somebody in London,
22 Brigadier Lewis, extension 2733 was not available, but
23 his message was passed to his staff officer.
24 I did not deal with Brigadier Lewis, he was in
25 London.
1 Q. I appreciate that, but the sequence of events on the
2 Monday starts with your telephone call?
3 A. My telephone call to Brigadier Lewis?
4 Q. Asking James to pass over the gist?
5 A. Mmm.
6 Q. And he passed it over to the Ministry of Defence?
7 A. Yes, that is right, yes.
8 Q. That is all I ask you at the moment about the signal.
9 Just going back in time, it has already been suggested
10 to you that you were relied on by the senior military to
11 be personally responsible for providing intelligence
12 about the march; you have answered some questions about
13 that.
14 It appears from the documents -- and I just ask you
15 if you agree -- that you continued to be relied on up
16 until 30th January for intelligence about possible IRA
17 intentions regarding the march; would that be right?
18 A. The best assessment about the march for people in
19 Londonderry would have been the RUC Special Branch.
20 Q. Do you recall that the intelligence which came from RUC
21 Special Branch was to the effect that no trouble was
22 anticipated on the march?
23 A. I cannot remember that far back.
24 Q. I want to ask you now about the Monday and Tuesday
25 before the Sunday, namely, 24th and 25th. Did you know
1 at the time the Chief of the Defence Staff,
2 Admiral Sir Peter Hill-Norton?
3 A. Did I know him?
4 Q. Yes?
5 A. No, I do not know him.
6 Q. You did not know him?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Do you not --
9 A. I know of him.
10 Q. Of him, but you did not know him as a friend?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Do you not recall that he visited Northern Ireland on
13 Monday, 24th January and was briefed by you?
14 A. I cannot remember that far back, no.
15 Q. He was accompanied, we have heard, by a Colonel in the
16 Ministry of Defence, Colonel Dalzell-Payne; you remember
17 Colonel Dalzell-Payne?
18 A. No, as far as I know I never met him; he was in London.
19 Q. He was in London, and the documents show that he came
20 over and took notes of a briefing and he says there were
21 briefings from the GOC, General Tuzo, the CLF,
22 General Ford, and yourself, briefing Sir Peter --
23 A. Yes, I gave a briefing to nearly every conference there
24 was.
25 Q. It sounds like, for the document, and the document is
1 not one you drew up and unless you wish to I do not need
2 to show it to you, the document records that you were
3 one of the people who briefed Admiral
4 Sir Peter Hill-Norton?
5 A. Well, it could be, but I have no recollection of it.
6 Q. Do you remember the -- did you know the Vice Chief of
7 the General Staff at the time? I am not sure whether
8 I am at liberty -- I would have thought his name must be
9 in the public domain, but I am never quite sure in this
10 Inquiry of whether we have released it. UNK840, I am
11 told, is the symbol by which we know him. Does Mr Tate
12 have that available?
13 MR TATE: I am afraid we do not have the answer to that
14 particular cipher. May I be allowed to know if I can
15 speak his name, he must be a public figure.
16 LORD SAVILLE: Perhaps you could start by mentioning it to
17 Mr Clarke quietly to see what the position is?
18 LORD GIFFORD: The documents indicate that you briefed also
19 the Vice Chief of the General Staff who visited
20 Northern Ireland on 25th January; do you recall that?
21 A. I was briefing people endlessly on visits, but
22 I normally did an intelligence input to every visitor
23 who came, and at times I used to say that if I had to
24 keep briefing them I would not have time to count out
25 what to (indistinguishable).
1 Q. I am going to put to you for your comment that the
2 briefings being given by Generals Tuzo and Ford to these
3 senior figures about the march, the forthcoming march
4 were to the effect that the problem was the defiance of
5 the ban on marches and the problems that would cause in
6 relation to Protestant opinion; do you recall that
7 problem being discussed?
8 A. No, I do not.
9 Q. Did you not appreciate -- do you not recall that the
10 Protestants, from the Prime Minister downwards, were
11 very agitated about the series of marches which NICRA
12 had been holding since the beginning of the month?
13 A. Yes, that appeared in numerous documents.
14 Q. You knew, I suggest, by 27th January that the Army had
15 determined to carry out a robust operation against the
16 marchers?
17 A. I was not privy to that.
18 Q. One that was likely to result in casualties?
19 A. That, I think, was General Ford's briefing.
20 Q. Do you recall being aware of it during the days
21 preceding the march?
22 A. No, I really cannot, I cannot remember that far back.
23 Q. Was your signal, if it was indeed sent on 27th January,
24 intended to create a justification for casualties by
25 creating an account of likely IRA intervention when in
1 fact you did not believe there would be any such?
2 A. No.
3 LORD GIFFORD: Sir, those are my questions.
4 LORD SAVILLE: Do we have any other questions for David?
5 David, it is the Chairman speaking. Thank you very
6 much indeed for giving evidence to this Tribunal, thank
7 you very much.
8 We will come back to the matter, Mr Clarke, please,
9 at 9.30 tomorrow morning.
10 MR CLARKE: Sir, there is a slight change of plan from the
11 announced programme. Officer Z will not be giving
12 evidence tomorrow, it will be Officer Y and then
13 Soldier S.
14 LORD SAVILLE: Thank you.
15 (3.50 pm)
16 (Proceedings adjourned until 9.30 am on
17 Wednesday, 14th May 2003)
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1 INDEX
2 PAGE
3 DAVID, sworn ................................. 1
4 Questioned by MR CLARKE ...................... 1
5 Questioned by MR MACDONALD ................... 37
6 Questioned by MR MANSFIELD ................... 67
7 Questioned by LORD GIFFORD ................... 75
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25