1 Monday, 31st March 2003
2 (9.30 am)
3 COLONEL WILFORD (continued)
4 Questioned by MR ELIAS (continued)
5 MR ELIAS: Colonel Wilford, good morning, I am over to your
6 right.
7 I was asking you on Thursday just to consider the
8 operation as in fact it was conducted. I was suggesting
9 to you that in fact there was no real pincer movement.
10 We have dealt with that.
11 I suggest further to you that there was no real
12 containment of the rioters, no sealing off, as there
13 would have been in arrest operations, for example, in
14 Belfast; would you agree with that?
15 A. No, I would not.
16 Q. Let me ask you this: you were in your OP when you gave
17 the order for the troops to go in through barrier 12 in
18 Pigs; did you leave your OP more or less as soon as
19 giving that order?
20 A. No, no.
21 Q. You describe in your statement to Lord Widgery how you
22 saw the Pigs coming down Little James Street and through
23 the barrier and to the junction with Rossville Street.
24 Was it at about that time that you left your OP?
25 A. Yes, it was.
1 Q. So what actually happened on the wasteground in the
2 early minutes was not something that you actually
3 witnessed?
4 A. No, I did not.
5 Q. Would you look, please, with me at the statement to this
6 Inquiry of Major Loden at B2283.005, paragraph 30. This
7 is what Major Loden says happened after the order had
8 been given:
9 "The Mortar Platoon Pigs drove straight south down
10 Rossville Street chasing the mob who were running away
11 as fast as they could. My orders were to arrest as many
12 rioters as possible and therefore the Mortar Platoon's
13 Pigs pursued them as quickly as possible, trying to
14 drive past them, after which they would debus and begin
15 making arrests. The two Pigs quickly got into the open
16 wasteground around Rossville Street, the second Pig went
17 quite close to the northern end of the Rossville Flats.
18 Generally, I recall that the Mortar Platoon moved off
19 towards the left (east) and the Composite Platoon and
20 the Anti-Tank Platoon moved in towards the right
21 (west)."
22 It does not sound from that, does it, from that
23 description of the early moments of the troops going in,
24 as though there was much sealing off or containment?
25 A. Since they were on the move there was no sealing off at
1 a precise moment, but that, that action was taking place
2 and it was intended that it should take place.
3 If I could just refer back, if I may.
4 Q. Please.
5 A. This blueprint which you keep referring to is in fact
6 a blueprint and an operation of this kind simply is not
7 choreographed to perfection, it cannot be.
8 Q. I accepted at the very outset of questioning you that
9 any operation of this kind is and has to remain
10 flexible, but nonetheless, in actuality when the
11 operation was carried out, whatever the intention may
12 have been, there was no sealing off or containment of
13 rioters to any measurable extent?
14 A. You cannot measure it, of course not. The other thing
15 that has been forgotten here, that Support Company were
16 not on their own, C Company were coming from a different
17 direction.
18 Q. I think we dealt with that on Friday, did we not, and
19 the Chairman asked you and I asked you certain questions
20 about the pincer movement. I do not want to go back to
21 that.
22 Could we look, please, at the assessment of the
23 Company Sergeant Major 202. Could we look at B2111.024.
24 Paragraph 165 at the foot of that page:
25 "On Bloody Sunday, the rioters were not contained.
1 The wide open spaces in which we were deployed were not
2 suitable for containment. I do not feel now that there
3 was a proper controllable plan to contain the march or
4 a clear indication before we deployed of what was
5 expected or of how the arrest operation was to take
6 place. We were shown maps of the area where we were to
7 deploy but did not know the city and did not know
8 precisely where other soldiers were deployed or how they
9 intended to seal off the areas in which arrests would be
10 carried out. In the event, there was no sealing off of
11 the area and this lack of containment meant that the
12 rioters were not prevented from running away so soldiers
13 ended up chasing them."
14 Echoes of what Major Loden had been saying, it
15 seems:
16 "The result on the day was that people were all over
17 the place and there was a situation of confusion."
18 You did not get that impression at all, did you?
19 A. No, I did not have it.
20 Q. Do you tell this Tribunal that from what you saw and
21 heard, the operation was carried out as you had expected
22 with an element of containment, sealing off and arrest?
23 A. Yes, that is how I saw it.
24 Q. And so the arrest operation from your perspective was
25 successful, was it?
1 A. The arrest operation was successful until the moment
2 that, of course, we came under fire and then the whole
3 situation changed.
4 Q. That I understand and I do not want to go beyond that
5 point in putting my questions to you.
6 You are aware, are you, that in the event I think
7 fewer than ten persons were arrested in what might be
8 called that arrest operation on the wasteground?
9 A. Well, I cannot -- I am afraid I do not recall how many
10 people were arrested where, but I think the total sum
11 was in excess of 50.
12 Q. Quite a large number came from houses and quite a large
13 number were picked up sheltering at a gable end; you
14 were aware of that, were you not?
15 A. Well I am now, I was not at the time.
16 Q. You were not. I want to put to you six steps that might
17 have been taken in the planning and execution, which we
18 suggest were not, which may have brought about
19 a different end result without, as I suggest, the chaos
20 and confusion that in fact was the result.
21 Could there, Colonel Wilford, have been better
22 reconnaissance before the day and more involvement in
23 brigade in the planning of this operation?
24 A. No, there could not. We did -- I did all that was
25 possible, I believe, in the circumstances.
1 Q. May we look at just a couple of things that appear to
2 have, if not gone wrong, caused difficulty.
3 The impracticability of the Presbyterian Church
4 route, let us take that one; that could have been
5 determined at an earlier stage than in fact it was,
6 could it not?
7 A. I am sorry, Presbyterian Church roof, I do not see how
8 that comes into it.
9 Q. The route?
10 A. The route, I beg your pardon. I cannot reflect back in
11 any kind of detail now because it has all gone, but the
12 route that I was able to explore was, of course, limited
13 but not so limited in fact that I could not get
14 a reasonable, or make a reasonable appreciation of what
15 it is I wanted C Company -- I beg your pardon, Support
16 Company to do.
17 Q. It seems from the evidence this Tribunal has heard that
18 brigade had not asked you, and neither had you
19 delivered, even a basic outline of your plan. Had there
20 been discussion, on either side, with brigade or with
21 local commanders as to the proposed route, for example,
22 through the Presbyterian Church, you might have been
23 told a day or two or three before "that simply is not
24 a practicable route"?
25 A. Well, I cannot, I cannot recall, in fact, having had
1 a conversation with the Brigade Commander, but I am
2 certain I must have had.
3 Q. Not about the detail of the route?
4 A. I am sure I would have spoken about what I -- my initial
5 appreciation was.
6 Q. Did you speak with other local commanding officers?
7 A. No, because I did not meet other local commanding
8 officers until in fact the day of the briefing.
9 Q. So their knowledge of the locality and what has
10 sometimes been described as the tactics of the rioters,
11 the routes they may use, the routes into the area, were
12 not discussed in any detail by you with the local
13 commanders?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Would that not have been a sensible step to take in
16 preparation for this operation?
17 A. Well, they were not, they were not presented to me.
18 I do not think that at the time that I, that I gave it
19 much thought, but I honestly again cannot recall.
20 I looked at the ground myself. I obviously did have
21 some conversation with the person who took me round and
22 I had some conversation, which I do not recall, with the
23 brigadier, um, and that, I think, was sufficient.
24 This was a built-up area and although it was in
25 Londonderry, not in Belfast, it was a, a built-up area,
1 the sort of area that we were totally accustomed to.
2 Q. You had looked at the ground, as you have told us, but
3 I think you said to the Tribunal, in answer to Mr Clarke
4 last week, the opportunity for you to carry out a recce
5 was limited by the circumstances?
6 A. Oh, it was limited, yes.
7 Q. In those particular circumstances, would it not have
8 been better, had you discussed matters in more detail
9 with those who knew the area?
10 A. Well, from a theoretical point of view as I sit here
11 now, perhaps it may have been, but at the time I did
12 not -- well, it was not suggested to me; it did not seem
13 necessary at the time.
14 Q. Hindsight may inform the answers that you give now, but
15 even with hindsight, it would have been better to have
16 discussed matters in more detail; would it not?
17 A. I cannot honestly say that it was because I cannot
18 remember exactly how it was at that particular time.
19 Q. I move on. Would there have been an advantage -- your
20 own operational plan seemed to suggest it -- in giving
21 more detail to the company commanders, Major Loden and
22 the others, as to exactly what was expected of them in
23 this arrest operation?
24 A. I think, I think the company commanders and the platoon
25 commanders and the platoon sergeants and the platoon
1 corporals were fully aware of what was required of them.
2 Q. Your O Group was expecting, because that is what you
3 indicated would happen, that you would give a detailed
4 tactical plan; you never did?
5 A. Because a detailed tactical plan was not possible and --
6 or necessary at the time. Again, I must come back to
7 this business of, if you like, a blueprint, if I may
8 call it that. You cannot have a blueprint in this
9 situation, and I am not using the word "flexibility" as
10 a let-out, I am just saying flexibility is something one
11 had to have and -- I am sorry.
12 Q. Please, carry on.
13 A. I am sorry, I thought I heard another voice. I am
14 sorry, I forget where I was now, talking about
15 flexibility.
16 Q. You cannot use flexibility as a let-out, you say, you
17 cannot have a blueprint?
18 A. You cannot have a blueprint for this sort of thing at
19 all because the situation is constantly changing from
20 moment to moment.
21 Q. You do not suggest, do you, Colonel, there was not
22 a plan, however outlined it might be?
23 A. There was a plan.
24 Q. So, when the Presbyterian Church route became
25 impracticable, was there then still no need to give any
1 detailed tactical appreciation on how the operation now
2 would run, given that you were going in in Pigs through
3 barrier 12?
4 A. No, not at all.
5 Q. So why had you put in your order, why had you said that
6 you would give a detailed tactical plan:
7 "I will give the company deployment in our
8 forming-up position and then give my concept of how
9 I think the battle can go."
10 What was the purpose of putting that in your orders?
11 A. Because at that time I supposed, reasonably, that I may
12 have the opportunity to give a more detailed plan of
13 what we intended. I had to wait. There was no point in
14 making a plan at that time at all. In fact it was
15 impossible to make a plan at that time, one could only
16 make a plan as the whole circumstances unfolded.
17 Q. You are not saying you did not have the opportunity, are
18 you, before the arrest operation was launched?
19 A. An opportunity for what?
20 Q. For giving the detailed battle plan?
21 A. But I did not have to have a detailed battle plan; the
22 detail was within the company's gift, if you wish.
23 Q. Then I come back to my question: what was the purpose of
24 putting that in your O Group order?
25 A. The purpose was that I might find the opportunity or the
1 situation might develop that that would be
2 a possibility; that is all. I was not laying down
3 a blueprint once more, I was saying, in effect, to my
4 company commanders "we will deal with the situation as
5 it develops".
6 Q. But you never gave them any further detailed order?
7 A. No.
8 Q. With hindsight, was that an error?
9 A. No.
10 Q. We dealt last week with what Major Loden seems to have
11 thought the position was as to going through the
12 Presbyterian Church and when he first received the
13 warning order that he was going through barrier 12.
14 I do not want to go back over it. 1600 hours appears to
15 be what he was saying was the time when he was first
16 aware of the warning order going through barrier 12 with
17 Pigs; do you follow?
18 You said that the wire-cutting party, you told the
19 Tribunal last week, was perhaps what you might have
20 expected from an officer considering all aspects of the
21 matter.
22 Could I take you back to Major Loden's diary at
23 B2212. At 1540. By this time you have told the
24 Tribunal, no doubt in your mind, you had indicated that
25 the Presbyterian Church route was abandoned and that you
1 were going to go in through barrier 12. You have told
2 the Tribunal that Major Loden would have known that?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. He says in this diary, line four:
5 "... Mortar Platoon cuts the wire on top of the wall
6 and the Composite Platoon [Guinness] under my command
7 was given a warning order to deploy [forward] to the
8 open ground south of the Presbyterian Church ..."
9 If you had told Major Loden the Presbyterian Church
10 was not on and that now he was to go through barrier 12,
11 he could not, could he, have given a warning order to
12 Composite Platoon to go through the Presbyterian Church
13 route?
14 A. Yes, indeed he could.
15 Q. Could he?
16 A. Of course. He was using -- he was a Company Commander
17 and he was trying to exploit all the possible ways of
18 making his arrest operation, as ordered by me, to be as
19 successful as possible.
20 Q. The fact you had told him, if you are right, before
21 this, perhaps two hours before, that the Presbyterian
22 Church route was off and that barrier 12 with Pigs was
23 on, did not preclude him from issuing a warning order to
24 Guinness Force that they would be going through the
25 Presbyterian Church?
1 A. Not at all.
2 Q. There is not any doubt, is there, that the communication
3 of the decision to go through barrier 12 with Pigs and
4 the abandonment of the Presbyterian Church route, that
5 was your responsibility, was it, to ensure that your
6 company commanders knew the position?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. If Major Loden did not know, before 4 o'clock, that
9 would be your responsibility; would it?
10 A. If he did not know?
11 Q. Yes?
12 A. But he did know.
13 Q. It would be your responsibility were he not to have been
14 told?
15 A. But he did know.
16 Q. I move on, please, to deploy at the barriers. There was
17 delay at barrier 12 and also it seems at barrier 14
18 because of the removal of the barriers. How should that
19 delay -- which again, even if it were only measured in
20 half minutes, might have been important in terms of the
21 rioters moving back from the areas Rossville Street and
22 William Street -- how could that delay have been avoided
23 if you were planning in advance, Colonel?
24 A. Well, I could only, I could only talk about this -- and
25 I cannot talk about it now because I am no longer aware
1 of the circumstances -- in what I would call staff
2 college terms.
3 Q. I follow. Can I try to assist you?
4 A. Yes, please do.
5 Q. Presumably the units at those barriers had been informed
6 in good time?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. That paratroopers were going to come through in Pigs?
9 A. Uh-huh.
10 Q. They could have taken the necessary steps to ensure that
11 the barriers could be open as the paratroopers arrived,
12 if not before; would you agree?
13 A. I think at barrier 14 there was no problem at all. The
14 problem at barrier 12, I think you would have to ask the
15 Company Commander because I am not, certainly not now,
16 aware of how it occurred.
17 Q. If it occurred, let us stay with barrier 12: if the
18 barrier was not ready to be removed for Pigs to come
19 through, that would tend to indicate, would it not -- it
20 may not be the only explanation, but an explanation --
21 that the unit at the barrier had not been informed, in
22 good time, of the intention of the paratroopers to come
23 through?
24 A. I think there is evidence that they were.
25 Q. There may be evidence that they were, but it would tend
1 to suggest, would it not -- that is one explanation
2 anyway -- that they were not informed in timely fashion
3 that this was now the plan?
4 A. No, I do not think it does that at all, and I think once
5 more you will have to go to the Company Commander as to
6 why the barriers in fact were delayed. But they were --
7 they had been informed and they failed to move them as
8 quickly as the Company Commander wished them to be
9 removed.
10 Q. Would it be fair to say, Colonel, that this, if indeed
11 there was a delay at barrier 12, let alone at
12 barrier 14, this is yet another indication that
13 co-ordination between brigade and you, the Paras, was
14 not what it ought to have been, whoever's fault it may
15 be?
16 A. I am sorry?
17 Q. Whoever's fault it may be?
18 A. (Pause). I do not, I do not think there was a fault in
19 that sense of a breakdown in communication, which you
20 are suggesting. I think the fault lay with individual
21 actions at the barrier. This was the sort of thing that
22 happens in this sort of situation.
23 Q. So you think there could not have been better
24 communication between you and brigade, clearer
25 indication of what you were proposing to do, for example
1 sending Pigs through barrier 12; no fault in any of
2 these communications, so far as you are concerned?
3 A. No, not that I recall. I thought everything worked
4 perfectly well.
5 Q. The other element of delay -- I leave that -- of course,
6 was, as I understand it, your own view that deployment
7 for the arrest operation ought to have taken place some
8 ten minutes or so before it did?
9 A. Yes, the fact that I was making representations to move,
10 yes, that is so.
11 Q. You were satisfied that launching the arrest operation
12 at five minutes to four, when you made your request, was
13 the time to go to scoop-up the maximum rioters?
14 A. At that time, yes.
15 Q. Do you say the fact that you did not get the order to
16 move for those additional minutes meant that it became
17 more difficult to scoop-up rioters?
18 A. It did not make it more difficult, it meant in fact
19 perhaps -- perhaps -- that we were not going to arrest
20 as many people as perhaps we might have done.
21 Q. May I ask you about CS gas and the use of CS gas. Was
22 it the fact that paratroopers did not wish for CS gas to
23 be used at situations where there was to be launched an
24 arrest operation carried out by them?
25 A. We did not like it.
1 Q. The Tribunal has heard evidence, of course, that CS gas
2 may have been released, to an extent anyway, by those in
3 the crowd, the rioters; CS gas was also used by troops
4 at the barriers. You are aware of that, are you?
5 A. No, I am not aware that it may have been used by the
6 rioters, at least I was not then.
7 Q. If indeed troops at the barriers were using CS gas in
8 circumstances which was contrary to brigade orders, that
9 is to say brigade had indicated that CS gas should be
10 used in circumstances were barriers were close to being
11 overrun, for example; was it, in your view, any
12 breakdown in co-ordination between the Paras and other
13 units that CS gas was used in areas where you were to
14 mount arrest operations?
15 A. It was nothing to do with us, this was a brigade matter.
16 Q. As a brigade matter, not a matter which you would have
17 thought to discuss with brigade before the operation?
18 A. No, not at all. If the brigadier decided he wanted to
19 use CS gas, then it was entirely up to him and he would
20 use it or he would give his commanders the opportunity
21 to use it if the situation made it necessary.
22 All I am saying is we did not like it, we did not
23 demand ever that it should not be used, we did not like
24 it.
25 Q. Did you discuss your dislikes and the reasons for it
1 with brigade?
2 A. No.
3 Q. The sixth point I want to put to you for your
4 consideration is this: prior to the event, prior to the
5 order being given, was consideration given to
6 circumstances in which the arrest operation might have
7 to be called off, it having been commenced?
8 A. No, I do not recall any of that.
9 Q. Again, with hindsight if you like, might it have been
10 desirable that you should have discussed with the
11 brigadier whether there would be circumstances in which,
12 once launched, the arrest operation might be aborted or
13 called off?
14 A. I think not.
15 Q. In any event, no discussion had taken place with the
16 brigadier about such a possibility?
17 A. No, I do not think that sort of discussion was
18 necessary. The whole situation was obviously one of
19 flexibility; how the thing developed. The brigadier in
20 fact was having an arrest operation, but at any time he
21 was able to change it in any way that he wished.
22 Q. Had you or your company commanders discussed the
23 possibility of this arrest operation being called off
24 once launched?
25 A. No, we had not.
1 Q. You do not accept, do you, that there were, therefore,
2 any significant flaws in the planning or execution of
3 Operation Forecast as far as you and your companies were
4 concerned?
5 A. No, I do not think -- I do not, but I do accept, of
6 course, that in this sort of situation there are always
7 flaws, but whether you can put your finger on them or
8 not I cannot say.
9 Q. You tell this Tribunal, do you, that you find none which
10 you can put your finger on?
11 A. Not at this immediate moment.
12 Q. You have presumably thought about it these 30 years,
13 have you?
14 A. Not in that way, I have not, no.
15 Q. You have never, therefore, sought to identify what might
16 have been flaws in the planning or execution, have you?
17 A. No, I do not think I have.
18 Q. Two other matters, if I may: first of all the question
19 of deployment limits. We examined last week how the
20 original plan, plan (a), if you like, would have seen an
21 arrest operation carried out near Aggro Corner, the
22 junction of William Street and Rossville Street,
23 Little James Street.
24 Your secondary plan, I think you agreed last week,
25 was to result in a shift of emphasis, at least a little
1 further south of that point.
2 Would this be right, Colonel: had brigade determined
3 that in no circumstances, without further order anyway,
4 were you to go further south than X yards south of
5 Aggro Corner or a fixed and defined point, it would have
6 been possible, would it, for the brigadier to have set
7 down a line in the operation order?
8 A. I think he would have found it very difficult to have
9 set down a line because that would, again, go to
10 a blueprint, which you just cannot expect to work.
11 Q. If he had determined that on no account did he wish
12 troops to go further than, whatever it might be, 10, 20,
13 50, 100 yards south of a particular point, that is to
14 say, let us say Aggro Corner and barrier 14, such a line
15 could, could it, have been drawn in the operational
16 order?
17 A. But he did not.
18 Q. No, I appreciate that. Had he determined so to do,
19 there is no reason why it could not have been put in the
20 operational order?
21 A. I cannot speak for the brigadier.
22 Q. I do not ask you to speak for him; there would have been
23 no reason, from your point of view, would there -- put
24 it another way round, if you like: if it had been the
25 brigadier's intention that the paratroopers should not
1 go in further than a line, let us say, 20 yards south of
2 the William Street/Rossville Street/Little James Street
3 junction, he could, could he, have drawn a line across
4 the plan and that is what you might have expected, if
5 that was his intention?
6 A. No, it is entirely hypothetical. I really cannot
7 respond to that as a question because he did not.
8 Q. You cannot help?
9 A. No, I cannot help.
10 Q. If it had been the brigadier's intention that you should
11 not go beyond a line 20 yards, 50 yards or whatever it
12 may have been, if that had been his intention, would you
13 have expected to have received that in the operational
14 order with a line drawn?
15 A. If that had been his intention, yes.
16 Q. If it were not in the operational order, you would,
17 would you, if that had been his intention, have expected
18 that to be a matter which he would have raised and
19 discussed with you in the co-ordinating conference at
20 least?
21 A. Well, it would have been in his operational orders, in
22 the very first instance.
23 Q. That is where you would have expected it, is it?
24 A. That is where it would appear, yes.
25 Q. As you rightly say, it was not there. One of the
1 matters this Tribunal has to consider, as Mr Clarke put
2 it to you last week in asking you questions, the great
3 question is: how far were you allowed to go down into
4 Rossville Street. You went into the interpretation of
5 "no running battles"; I do not want to go into that
6 again.
7 You were reminded by Mr Clarke that the evidence of
8 Brigadier MacLellan to this Tribunal on two aspects was
9 that he, the brigadier, was unaware of the motorised
10 operation going through barrier 12. Secondly, he told
11 this Inquiry, as summarised by Mr Clarke, that he, the
12 brigadier, regarded going down Rossville Street as
13 a breach of the order that he had given. Mr Clarke put
14 that to you last week and he asked whether you were
15 aware of the brigadier's evidence, and you said, no,
16 that you were not.
17 I do want to remind you of what the brigadier said
18 in 1972 so that we can get your comment on that, what he
19 said both in writing and on oath. If we look first of
20 all, please, at Brigadier MacLellan's statement to the
21 Widgery Tribunal at B1235, if we highlight paragraphs 28
22 and 29.
23 This is Brigadier MacLellan:
24 "I therefore gave orders at 1607 that the 1 Para
25 arrest operation should be launched. My Brigade Major
1 conveyed those orders in my presence to 1 Para on the
2 secure radio -- the orders were that:
3 "(a) The operation was to be launched forthwith to
4 arrest as many rioters as possible in the area of the
5 junction ...
6 "(b) 1 Para were not to conduct a running battle
7 down Rossville Street and not to get involved with the
8 Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association marchers.
9 "The purpose of my order was to ensure that the
10 arresting force only 'scooped up' those actively engaged
11 in riotous behaviour in the William Street/Rossville
12 Street area, and not those other persons engaged in
13 a non-violent meeting which had already started at
14 Fox's Corner. To achieve this scoop-up, it was
15 necessary for the troops to get beyond the rioters and
16 place themselves between the rioters and those already
17 at the meeting place at Fox's Corner. The company
18 therefore that moved rapidly in their vehicles to the
19 area north of the Rossville Flats, acted in accordance
20 with my instructions, in that such action would
21 effectively place the troops between the rioters and the
22 marchers."
23 That is what he said in the statement. I would like
24 to refer you to a passage of his evidence to
25 Lord Widgery, 1279, please. Highlight letters B to D.
1 The brigadier was asked this question at letter B:
2 "Question: Did you know that in fact two sub-units
3 were going to be used?
4 "Answer: I knew three were going to be used.
5 "Question: And you knew they would be going not
6 only through barrier 14 but also through the Great James
7 Street barrier as well?
8 "Answer: Yes.
9 "Question: Had Colonel Wilford discussed his plan
10 with you or not?
11 "Answer: Not in detail, because we did not know (a)
12 whether there would be any hooligans on the day for
13 sure, or rioters; or (b) where they would be. We could
14 merely make an outline plan.
15 "Question: Did you yourself know that the plan
16 involved or might involve the Parachutists going
17 sufficiently far down into the Bogside as to be at the
18 north end of the Rossville Flats?
19 "Answer: I knew they would have to get behind to
20 cut off; I did not know they would go that far."
21 Finally, in relation to the point that Mr Clarke put
22 to you last week as to the use of Pigs, could I take you
23 to what Brigadier MacLellan said in 1972 to
24 Lord Widgery. Page 1254, letter B to E, please:
25 "Question: If we can come to paragraph 9(f) [this
1 is the brigade operation orders] the role of 1 Para:
2 "'Maintain a brigade arrest force, to conduct
3 a 'scoop-up' operation of as many hooligans and rioters
4 as possible.
5 "'This operation will only be launched, either in
6 whole or in part, on the orders of the brigade command'.
7 "That is in fact what happened?
8 "Answer: Yes.
9 "Question: In (d) it says 'It is expected that the
10 arrest operation will be conducted on foot'. Would you
11 explain that, because according to all the evidence,
12 when the arrest operation went in some Paras went on
13 foot and some in a number of armoured vehicles which
14 swept on to the waste ground. Was that a breach of that
15 expectation or not?
16 "Answer: No, certainly not. The normal way is for
17 the men to go in on foot, followed up by the vehicles,
18 in case they come under sniper fire, and to be a black
19 mariah so to speak for any arrest. I was not in the
20 least surprised that a few vehicles were used to get
21 behind the rioters to cut them off. Otherwise, they
22 would not have been able to get behind them.
23 "Question: What was the function of troops carried
24 in those vehicles? Were they to use the vehicles for
25 some form of arrest or would they get out in order to
1 effect an arrest?
2 "Answer: Purely as transport to get the men in
3 quickly.
4 "Question: So in the end the arrest operation would
5 be on foot?
6 "Answer: Yes."
7 Those were the answers that Brigadier MacLellan was
8 giving to Lord Widgery. How does your understanding of
9 the possible deployment, as far as the wasteground to
10 the north of the Rossville Flats and of the possible use
11 of Pigs with men if circumstances so dictated, differ
12 from what the brigadier was then telling Lord Widgery's
13 Inquiry, that he contemplated as a possibility for the
14 deployment of 1 Para?
15 A. Well, what I have just seen, that all sounds very
16 reasonable.
17 Q. Was that your understanding of the position?
18 A. Yes. This is the first time I have seen this, I would
19 have to read it a little more closely to be certain, but
20 it seems to me to give a very good description of what
21 happened and what we did.
22 Q. May I come to one final point of detail. Could we put
23 on the screen, please, on the left-hand side of the
24 screen the photograph EP4.38 and on the right-hand side
25 of the screen EP4.42.
1 Just to put these in time sequence, it does appear
2 from the evidence, Colonel, that the photograph on the
3 left was taken in sequence before the photograph on the
4 right; do you follow?
5 A. No, I think you have got that wrong.
6 Q. You may think that, but it seems that that is the
7 position. Let me take it in a little more detail. You
8 went from your OP to the north of William Street and
9 Rossville Street, did you not?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You then went down Rossville Street, ending up at that
12 position we can see in photograph 4.38, the left hand
13 photograph?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. You went from there to the Military Police team before
16 going to the gable of Block 1 where you encountered
17 Major Loden?
18 A. I am sorry, I missed part of your question.
19 Q. You went from that wall, which we see in the photograph
20 38, you then went down via the Military Police,
21 I suggest, to the gable of Block 1. I am taking this
22 from your account given to Widgery and the statement you
23 made to him; do you follow? The gable at Block 1 you
24 encountered Major Loden?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And you left him to go and find C Company. According to
2 your account that you gave to Lord Widgery and the
3 statement, that took you back to the junction of
4 William Street and Rossville Street; do you see, and
5 from there you went down Rossville Street back towards
6 Rossville Flats.
7 What I am suggesting to you -- and we have the block
8 of negatives, you see, and we can see the order in which
9 the photographs have been taken?
10 A. Mmm.
11 Q. What I am suggesting to you is that you were at the
12 junction of Rossville Street twice, on that account that
13 you were giving in 1972. Because we know the order in
14 which these photographs were taken, you at the wall in
15 the left hand photograph is taken before you at the
16 junction of Rossville Street and William Street, or
17 close to it in photograph 42 as we have it on the
18 screen; and it follows that that must be the second time
19 that you were at that point?
20 A. Well, I have no comment. I mean, it has been, it has
21 been suggested to me in fact that that was my first
22 appearance there.
23 Q. It was; I suggest to you in fact it was your second.
24 You do not disagree with that, do you; if in fact the
25 negatives indicate the order in which these photographs
1 were taken, that must be so?
2 A. I cannot agree or not agree.
3 Q. If it is the second occasion, of course, it would be
4 quite late on in the day; would it not?
5 A. I do not know. There is nothing here to indicate what
6 time it was.
7 MR CLARKE: I wonder if I could intervene.
8 A. It is all becoming rather confusing.
9 MR CLARKE: I am slightly puzzled by my learned friend's
10 observation. I think he is referring, in the order of
11 negatives, to the contact print that appears at P233.65,
12 if we could have that on the screen. We may have to
13 look at it in hard copy if we really cannot get it on
14 the screen.
15 MR ELIAS: May I indicate I have no further questions of
16 Colonel Wilford and I am very happy to explain to
17 Mr Clarke why we conclude what we do.
18 LORD SAVILLE: I think it may be helpful to do it now,
19 Mr Elias, if we can without too great a delay. The
20 reference P233.065 is on, but it does not seem to be
21 picking anything up.
22 MR CLARKE: Could we have a look at it in hard copy, because
23 it is the only way it seems we can do it. If you look
24 at the bottom set of contact prints, the picture with
25 Colonel Wilford just below Bradley's pub is on the far
1 right hand side. There is a picture two from the left
2 which is a picture which has Colonel Wilford at
3 Kells Walk wall. If the sequence of photographs is from
4 left to right, as you would normally expect it to be,
5 then these photographs would appear to show, as my
6 learned friend rightly says, that the photograph on the
7 far right is subsequent to the photograph two in from
8 the left.
9 The puzzling thing -- it may be my learned friend
10 has the answer to it -- is that the numbering of the
11 photographs appears to work in the opposite direction
12 because the number above the photograph at Bradley's pub
13 is 3A and 4, whereas the numbering of the photograph two
14 in from the left is 7A and 8.
15 On the assumption that the numbers fit the
16 photographs that we see, they appear to go in opposite
17 directions, that is to say from right to left, unless
18 that is the numbering of another set of contact prints.
19 I do not know whether my learned friend has the magic
20 answer to that question.
21 MR ELIAS: We do not have the magic photographic answer or
22 the technical answer, it may well be, if the film can be
23 put in upside down the numbers are plainly upside down
24 to the photographs. That we do not know. We do suggest
25 the photograph bottom left, taken plainly at barrier 14
1 immediately preceding the photograph of the Colonel at
2 the wall, and if one then runs from left to right at the
3 bottom line, left to right the top line, it does seem
4 that chronologically they must run in that order.
5 MR CLARKE: That seems compelling, subject to the curiosity
6 about the numbering.
7 MR ELIAS: That is the basis on which I put it.
8 LORD SAVILLE: We may be able to do some more work on it,
9 I do not think we can get much further today, Mr Elias.
10 MR ELIAS: Thank you, Colonel.
11 Questioned by MS HORWOOD-SMART
12 MS HORWOOD-SMART: Colonel Wilford, do you see me here
13 behind Mr Elias? My name is Rosamund Horwood-Smart and
14 I appear on behalf of Soldier L.
15 If you would have a look at the photograph EP2.8, we
16 see you there at Kells Walk with your men and your style
17 of leadership, much appreciated by your men, was, was it
18 not, to be with them, to encourage them and to give them
19 confidence in whatever it was they were doing?
20 A. That is how I wanted it to be, yes.
21 Q. The soldier that we represent, Soldier L, is there to
22 the left-hand side with his rifle raised. Your memory
23 now, as I understand it, is that you do not remember any
24 individual soldiers who were there with you at
25 Kells Walk; is that correct?
1 A. No, I am afraid I do not.
2 Q. In giving evidence to Lord Widgery, you remembered that
3 time and you remembered that soldier and you remembered
4 hearing him fire?
5 A. Yes, I think that is correct.
6 Q. And seeing him fire?
7 A. I am sorry?
8 Q. And seeing him fire as well?
9 A. (Pause). If I said at Widgery that I saw him fire,
10 I accept that, but I cannot recall that I did now.
11 Q. Of course, now you cannot remember whether it was one or
12 more shots that he fired?
13 A. I think I would remember that, one shot.
14 Q. Do you remember giving the soldiers their words of
15 encouragement; you remembered that their cover was
16 loose?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. You wanted them to tighten up and to look after
19 themselves?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Would it be right for us to have a picture that you were
22 talking to them there?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. You also describe the NCO being present, the sergeant --
25 002, for the record -- but again perhaps you do not
1 remember exactly who it was?
2 A. No, I do not. I do not. I do not recall that
3 I actually mentioned a sergeant being there, but I may
4 have done. I do not recall the evidence, I am afraid,
5 you would have to, you would have to show it to me.
6 Q. They were with, if you look at B985 -- this is your
7 evidence to Lord Widgery at letter E:
8 "They were in perfect control. They had an NCO with
9 them."
10 A. The NCO, but it could have been a lance corporal.
11 Q. It could have been, yes, but do you remember them being
12 "in perfect control"?
13 A. Yes, I do.
14 Q. Do you remember some conversation between them as to
15 whether they should fire?
16 A. No.
17 Q. The recollection of Soldier L is that he was talking to
18 his sergeant and you too were taking part in that
19 conversation, and he was given an order to fire by
20 either his sergeant or you. It could have been by the
21 sergeant with you confirming it. Can you help me there?
22 A. No, I really do not recall that.
23 Q. The words that he remembers were to the effect of "in
24 your own time, commence firing if you have a target"?
25 A. (Pause). Well I do not recall it, but that is certainly
1 the language which I would expect the soldiers to be
2 using.
3 Q. Is that the sort of language that you too might have
4 used?
5 A. (Pause). Mmm, something like that, I suppose, but
6 I really could not put words to it.
7 Q. Your first thought was for the safety of your men?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Would that be right?
10 A. Well, I am not sure it would be the first thought, it
11 would be a general thought, a thought that I always had.
12 Q. If the picture we have is of you first of all reminding
13 the men to tighten up so that they did not present
14 a target to any gunmen firing at them?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Your second, when the soldier is preparing to fire, is
17 to encourage him to fire if he has a target?
18 A. Yes. I might have said, I cannot remember any kind of
19 conversation or anything I said at that time, but it is
20 reasonable to suggest that I might have said, um "only
21 fire, only fire at an identifiable target", yes, I might
22 have said that, but I do not recall it.
23 Q. It goes without saying, does it not, that if they were
24 firing, you would stay with them until they had finished
25 firing in that particular engagement?
1 A. No, no, not at all.
2 Q. It does not. Does it go without saying that you would
3 not have left them without telling them you were leaving
4 them?
5 A. I do not think I had to tell them that I was leaving
6 them. I think, in fact, I asked where the Company
7 Commander was and someone pointed "oh, he is over
8 there", which I more or less knew anyway and then I was
9 off. I did not have to say "will you excuse me".
10 Q. Certainly not, but with a final word of encouragement?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. You would have gone?
13 A. Yes.
14 Questioned by MR A HARVEY
15 MR HARVEY: Colonel, my name is Arthur Harvey and I appear
16 on behalf of a number of the families of the deceased
17 and injured. Can you hear me?
18 A. Yes, I can.
19 Q. If I understand your evidence correctly, that even after
20 a period of reflection over 30 years, when you have made
21 a number of statements to a number of different persons
22 from various media, that is newspapers, television,
23 radio, that the conclusion you have come to is, firstly,
24 that neither you nor your men did anything improper on
25 30th January 1972; is that right?
1 A. We did nothing improper.
2 Q. Could you have done anything better?
3 A. I am sorry?
4 Q. Could you have done anything better?
5 A. I really have no idea.
6 Q. Have you not given that any contemplation over the last
7 30 years?
8 A. No, no, not that I could have done something or we could
9 have done something better.
10 Q. Could brigade have done anything better?
11 A. You would have to ask brigade that.
12 Q. I am asking you, on the opinion, in relation to the
13 framework in which they set for your men to operate,
14 could brigade have done anything better?
15 A. I really cannot say whether, whether they could have
16 done something better or not.
17 Q. Headquarters Northern Ireland or General Ford; could
18 they have done anything better?
19 A. I cannot speak for him.
20 Q. In relation to the framework within which they set the
21 task of the operation for your men and you, could they
22 have done anything better?
23 A. I really cannot say.
24 Q. The planning in relation to this particular incident
25 envisaged, according to General Ford, the arrest of in
1 excess of 300 persons; were you ever made aware of that?
2 A. No, I was not.
3 Q. Had you have been made aware of that, would you have
4 been able to express any opinion as to the capacity of
5 your battalion to effect such an arrest in the
6 circumstances of the march which actually took place?
7 A. If he had said that, I think I might have raised my
8 eyebrows, it is a very large number.
9 Q. Well, when you say "raised your eyebrows", is the system
10 of the exercise of authority within the Army so
11 hierarchical that you would not have given your opinion
12 that this is frankly impossible?
13 A. I was never asked.
14 Q. You said you would have raised your eyebrows. I am now
15 asking you: is that the extent that you would have gone
16 to to demonstrate doubts as to the wisdom of such
17 a plan?
18 A. No, no. If the General had actually discussed this with
19 me and there had been a discussion, then, of course,
20 I would have raised some kind of questions about it.
21 Q. In relation to your men having been chosen to complete
22 this operation, it was important at least to have
23 a blueprint whether or not it would have to be altered
24 to meet the exigencies of the day; would it not?
25 A. There would have been a general plan, yes.
1 Q. There was a general plan for every operation where men
2 are being committed in a considered way like this?
3 A. Yes, of course there was always a plan made.
4 Q. And the plan was based upon what would represent the
5 optimum circumstances for the achievement of one's
6 objectives; would they not?
7 A. I think they would have taken the available information,
8 the available intelligence, the available circumstances
9 into consideration and that would in fact form the basis
10 of their, of their planning.
11 Q. Therefore the plan which was prepared by brigade upon
12 the instructions and, indeed, with a number of the
13 requirements of General Ford, was designed to represent
14 the optimum circumstances for making arrests; is that
15 not so?
16 A. Well, I cannot speak for the brigadier of how in fact he
17 formulated his plan, but that sounds reasonable.
18 Q. The actual plan -- and you have indicated on a number of
19 occasions -- was that barrier 14 was the crux or the
20 central point of where disturbances were likely to take
21 place and arrests ideally made; is that not so?
22 A. Yes, barrier 14, that area, yes, was the area which was
23 considered to be the likely area for rioting, riotous
24 behaviour.
25 Q. You also said that in fact, when you were being asked by
1 Mr Elias, the ideal place for making arrests was within
2 a short distance of barrier 14; was that a considered
3 view?
4 A. No, of any barrier, of any barrier, whether it was
5 barrier 14, barrier 12, barrier 16. Wherever in fact
6 there is a riot, the shorter distance, of course, is the
7 ideal.
8 Q. If I could ask you to look at your statement to this
9 Inquiry at 1110.32, paragraph 85. Do you see that?
10 A. Which am I looking at, sir?
11 Q. Paragraph 85?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. "I have been shown serial 147 in the 8 Brigade log
14 (appendix 9). I cannot recall now the terms in which
15 I sought permission to deploy. What I was saying to
16 8 Brigade in effect was that here in the area of
17 barrier 14 I had the opportunity to carry out
18 a successful arrest operation. Bearing the 25-yard rule
19 in mind, we could almost reach out and touch the rioters
20 who were concentrated in their attack on the barriers."
21 Is that so?
22 A. Is that so?
23 Q. Yes, is that a statement --
24 A. I am sorry.
25 Q. Continue.
1 A. That sounds a reasonable description.
2 Q. That in fact you could have just reached out, within
3 that space of time, and arrested most of those
4 responsible for the disturbances between barrier 14 and
5 the junction of Rossville Street/William Street; is that
6 so?
7 A. I am sorry, you will have to ask me that question again.
8 Q. Perhaps if you care firstly to look at a map and then we
9 will return to it. Could we look at Q8. Can you
10 identify barrier 14 on the map?
11 LORD SAVILLE: Can we highlight that area and enlarge it.
12 A. Yes, barrier 14 I have.
13 MR HARVEY: Can you identify what has been described as
14 Aggro Corner, Little James Street, William Street?
15 A. Yes, I see that.
16 Q. Having regard to the first sentence in paragraph 85, you
17 would have expected to be able to launch an arrest
18 operation and effect the arrests in an area between
19 barrier 14 and William Street, Little James Street,
20 Rossville Street junction; is that not so?
21 A. No, that is asking me to pre-- I beg your pardon -- to
22 be precise, and you cannot be precise in this situation.
23 Q. I asked what you expected?
24 A. What I expected --
25 Q. Would you not have expected to be able to effect the
1 maximum number of arrests within that small area?
2 A. No, I cannot be precise in that.
3 Q. I am not asking you to be precise, I am asking you what
4 you would have expected -- perhaps if you let me
5 finish -- which gives a substantial degree of latitude.
6 It may well be that things do not turn out in life as we
7 expect, but it is a very decent starting point for
8 making any plan or any assessment; is it not?
9 A. If you wish me to answer that question, my answer to
10 that question is that I would have expected my troops
11 coming through barrier 14 and barrier 12 to be operating
12 in an area -- and I have said this previously -- in an
13 area roughly 200 yards by 200 yards.
14 Q. I know you have said that, and I will come back to that.
15 If we go back, then, to paragraph 85, which is at
16 1110.32:
17 "I never intended to use only one company for the
18 operation, and to the extent the log gives that
19 impression it is misleading and incorrect. As my
20 requests to deploy were not granted, I realised that
21 whereas I had previously planned to arrest in the area
22 between barrier 14 and Aggro Corner, if we were going to
23 conduct the operation now, we would clearly have to go
24 further to get them."
25 Could you please reconcile that sentence with what
1 you have just told me?
2 A. (Pause). My position does not change in this. If my
3 troops are moving into an area of this nature, they are
4 not going to operate as a phalanx, they are going to
5 spread out.
6 Q. Could you please seek to reconcile that sentence with
7 what you have just told me? If you cannot, please say
8 you cannot.
9 A. Well, I can, I am sorry, I can only come back to what
10 I have just said.
11 Q. "... I realised that whereas I had previously planned to
12 arrest in the area between barrier 14 and
13 Aggro Corner ..."
14 That means that that is where precisely you expected
15 to carry out the operation, but the operation was
16 slipping away from you as originally planned; does it
17 not?
18 A. But I have to come back to this impression that everyone
19 seems to have, that the soldiers just operate in
20 a phalanx, that they do not move other than going
21 forward in a straight line. They did not and they would
22 not, and even if in fact that was my original plan, or
23 my conception that they would make the arrest between
24 barrier 14 and Aggro Corner, I would not have expected
25 them, it would have been absolutely not anything in my
1 mind that they would just go down that road.
2 Q. Why did you say it in a statement that gave ample room
3 for consideration and reflection?
4 A. I was being, I was being asked questions, I did not --
5 what, I would have to ask you now, if I may, what did
6 I say to Widgery?
7 Q. I will come back to what you said to Widgery, and I will
8 because you have already indicated, as you have
9 indicated to this Tribunal, that the area that you
10 thought your men -- it would be suicidal, were your
11 words to Lord Widgery, to operate in less than 200 by
12 200 metres.
13 If it was suicidal, how could you have made this
14 statement in paragraph 85?
15 A. When I was asked the question, that is how I responded
16 to it, and in fact it seems, even now when I look at it,
17 it seems perfectly reasonable, provided you accept the
18 fact that my soldiers would not go through barrier 14 --
19 after all we are talking maybe about 70 soldiers -- that
20 they would stay together and just go up the road trying
21 to make arrests, because they could not have done.
22 The rioters do not stand still, they themselves do
23 not retreat in one direction.
24 Q. "We could almost reach out and touch the rioters ..."?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. You would not have had to go very far if you could
2 almost reach out and touch them?
3 A. You certainly would if they turned round and ran away.
4 Q. The situation is, so far as the brigade order that you
5 received -- and I wonder if we could look at that for
6 a moment. Could we look at 1110.122. What you have
7 also said is that, when it came to your own order group,
8 it began some time around 10.30, it finished some time
9 around 12.15 and it was based upon the actual brigade
10 operation order that you had received; do you recall
11 that?
12 A. I am sorry, this has come up and I started looking at
13 it. Could you repeat your question?
14 Q. That your own operations order group, it began at 10.30
15 in the morning --
16 LORD SAVILLE: I think Colonel Wilford was asking what the
17 document --
18 MR HARVEY: This document is in fact the brigade operation
19 order for the day and this is one portion of it.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. But you have indicated that your order group and the
22 orders that you gave were based upon the actual brigade
23 operation order.
24 "Dispersal of the marches" you can see begins B1:
25 "(1) Initially, we intend to deal with any illegal
1 marches in as low a key as possible and for as long as
2 possible. Generally speaking the front men will be
3 moderate and non-violent -- the second rank will be
4 those to start any violence that may erupt. The
5 Security Forces are to take no action against the
6 marches until either:
7 "(a) An attempt is made to breach the blocking
8 points.
9 "(b) Violence against the Security Forces, in the
10 form of stone, bottle and nail bombing, takes place:
11 "(2) Illegal marches are to be halted and dispersed
12 on the ground of our own choosing. If possible
13 ringleaders are to be arrested on the spot. Where it is
14 impractical to make such arrests, photographs of
15 ringleaders and participants are to be taken, for
16 identification and arrest at a later stage."
17 Did you go over this portion of the brigade
18 operation order at your order group?
19 A. No, I did not, as I recall.
20 Q. Was it part of your understanding that once the barriers
21 were attacked, that it was then permissible to effect
22 arrests of those responsible?
23 A. Only on the orders of the brigadier.
24 Q. We will come to that. Was it also your understanding
25 from the order that it was not just simply those who
1 were responsible for the actual nail bombing, bottling
2 or stoning, but all of those who were participants in
3 this unlawful march could be properly arrested?
4 A. I think it followed that when you are breaking up
5 a riot, that people, other than stone throwers, might
6 well be apprehended.
7 Q. When you say it was recognised that they might well be
8 apprehended, how could that come about?
9 A. Well, if they were there they could be apprehended.
10 I am sorry --
11 Q. So you just arrest -- it comes about because anyone who
12 is present at the scene of a riot is liable to be
13 arrested?
14 A. It is possible, if they remain there and appear to be
15 a part of that riot.
16 Q. I wonder could we go to W123.
17 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Harvey, if we are going to another
18 document, if this is a convenient moment, we will have
19 a short break.
20 (10.50 am)
21 (A short break)
22 (11.00 am)
23 MR HARVEY: Colonel, I would ask you to look at W123, this
24 is at serial 286. This is an extract from the audio
25 tape that was prepared by Mr Porter of the brigade log
1 communications. This communication takes place some
2 time around 1358 to 1359. It is to the 90A --
3 LORD SAVILLE: I am sorry to interrupt you, Mr Harvey, why
4 do you say 1558?
5 MR HARVEY: 1538, 39, I am sorry, I apologise.
6 It is to the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment and it
7 is from you:
8 "Hello 90, this is 65. Can you be prepared to lift
9 your barriers 12 and 14 should we require to push
10 through them to disperse these crowds."
11 Where did you get the notion that the force you had
12 was to push through to disperse crowds?
13 A. Can you repeat that?
14 Q. Where did you get the notion that it was part of your
15 responsibility to push through to disperse crowds?
16 A. Well, these are not my words, but the word --
17 Q. They are the words that were actually spoken because
18 this is an audio tape of the communications received by
19 brigade?
20 A. Yes, but I do not think they are my words, that is what
21 I was saying, and I was merely referring to the word
22 "disperse".
23 Q. It is "these crowds"?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. These words were spoken; they were spoken by your
1 battalion headquarters. You do not know whether they
2 were yours words or not. Would there be any reason why
3 your radio operators, who are charged with making
4 communications to brigade, would do so inaccurately?
5 A. It is not inaccurately, it is just an interpretation of
6 something which I had obviously asked them to do.
7 Q. Why is it an interpretation as opposed to a direct quote
8 of the actual verbatim words that you used at the time?
9 A. This is not how it works, Mr Harvey.
10 Q. Is there any reason why your communications at your Tac
11 headquarters should so consistently misinterpret what
12 you say?
13 A. No, not "misinterpret", I am not suggesting for one
14 moment it is a misinterpretation, I said it was an
15 interpretation.
16 Q. If it is an interpretation, is it a correct
17 interpretation, then?
18 A. To disperse crowds, it seems reasonable, yes, it is just
19 a matter of, a form of words which were used.
20 Q. "Disperse crowds" means simply that these marchers have
21 now approached barrier 12 and 14 and you are going to
22 disperse them?
23 A. Only if I in fact get --
24 Q. Permission from brigade?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Did you believe, therefore, that part of the permission
2 that brigade may be prepared to grant you was to move
3 forward and disperse the crowds?
4 A. No, to go through and make an arrest.
5 Q. At this stage the whole of William Street right up to
6 Creggan Street and Lone Moor Road was blocked by those
7 involved in the procession?
8 A. Uh-huh. Can I draw your attention to the word "should
9 we require".
10 Q. Yes, should you require. Should you be required to
11 disperse the crowds, you would have been prepared to do
12 it?
13 A. Should we be required to make arrests, yes.
14 Q. And if, at this particular stage, the whole of
15 William Street right up to Creggan Street was blocked,
16 there would be absolutely no possibility of anyone
17 coming through the Presbyterian Church; that is clear,
18 and meeting up in a pincer-like movement with persons
19 coming through barrier 14?
20 A. That is so, but I had already dismissed that
21 possibility.
22 Q. The only possibility would be of making arrests, quite
23 literally within a short distance, a number of yards of
24 both these barriers, because the crowd that was behind,
25 of several thousand strong, would in fact form
1 a blocking point against the escape of the rioters?
2 A. But we were not proposing to make arrests at that stage,
3 we were merely looking ahead.
4 Q. Looking ahead to disperse the crowds?
5 A. No, looking ahead to making arrests of rioters.
6 Q. Perhaps at that stage if we go and look at your order
7 group notes. If we go to 1110.141 and under "3.
8 Execution":
9 "General outline. The battalion is to move to
10 Londonderry via Drumahoe, taking up its position in
11 Foyle College car park by 1300. D Company is detached
12 under command 22 Light Air Defence Regiment. If the
13 march takes place and confrontation becomes hostile, the
14 battalion will deploy forward to break up the rioters
15 and make the maximum number of arrests."
16 Was that your understanding?
17 A. Yes, I would say it looks perfectly clear.
18 Q. Therefore, what you anticipated was that your soldiers
19 would be used if a confrontation became hostile?
20 A. Providing the Brigade Commander decided that was
21 something to be done.
22 Q. Again, you have said:
23 "At this stage I cannot give a detailed tactical
24 plan. I will give the company deployment in our
25 forming-up position and then give my concept of how
1 I think the battle can go."
2 What does "the battle" mean?
3 A. It means the arrest operation.
4 Q. If we look down at the concept of the battle. Again,
5 the "concept of the battle", that refers to the concept
6 of the arrest operation?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. The first route is the route which was not used. If we
9 go to the second sentence:
10 "In this event I would want to put a company down
11 the Strand into Waterloo Street and two companies in
12 William Street and the Lower Road and the Presbyterian
13 Church."
14 If we go over the page:
15 "Second. From William Street. We can take this the
16 same way except this time putting two companies in from
17 the church.
18 "You will appreciate that much will depend on the
19 view I can get of the crowd and once you get the order
20 to move you will have to move fast. I shall probably
21 bring you forward in anticipation."
22 We come on to "minor tactics".
23 Why did you not use two companies through the
24 Presbyterian Church or through barrier 12?
25 A. Sorry, why did I not?
1 Q. Use two companies?
2 A. Why did I use two companies?
3 Q. Why did you not?
4 A. Because I decided that one company would be sufficient.
5 Q. When did you decide that?
6 A. Well, I decided it right from the very beginning really,
7 it was a concept of two companies to be used in the
8 arrest operation.
9 Q. No, it was not a concept for two companies to be used in
10 the arrest operation, this is a concept for three
11 companies to be used, Colonel; do you not appreciate
12 that from reading it?
13 A. Well, perhaps -- I am sorry, I mean, this is, this is
14 old stuff now. Just touching upon it, when I actually
15 thought of this, when I actually gave these operational
16 orders, I was perhaps thinking in terms of three
17 companies, I might have been thinking in terms of four
18 companies, because it was quite clear -- and I made it
19 clear in these orders in my talk to my company
20 commanders -- that I could not possibly at this stage
21 say how we were going to do it in any kind of detail
22 whatsoever. A basic concept of a two-company or
23 a three-company operation was all I could talk about.
24 Q. As far as brigade was concerned, brigade had complete
25 control over the nature and the extent of the arrest
1 operation; is that right?
2 A. Well, they had complete control over -- of certainly
3 saying when it should go.
4 Q. And not only as to when it should go, but in fact the
5 manner in which it should go in terms of numbers?
6 A. Well, only --
7 Q. Locations; they could determine whether it was one
8 company or three companies; they could determine whether
9 it was through barrier 14 or barrier 12 or the
10 Presbyterian Church, not you?
11 A. No, that is not so.
12 Q. Why is that not so?
13 A. Because I was given, as Battalion Commander, I was given
14 the task of -- make an arrest operation. I made a basic
15 appreciation in the early stages of how I thought in
16 fact we might be able to conduct it, knowing full well,
17 of course, that the chances of having to adjust that,
18 change that, would occur.
19 I had discussed -- I cannot recall the circumstances
20 of it now, as I have tried to indicate to this
21 Tribunal -- that when I discussed it or how I discussed
22 it with the brigadier, but I think it is quite clear
23 from what he said at Widgery that he was in fact aware
24 of what I intended to do.
25 Q. I do not think he actually did say that, but we will
1 return to that. If one looks at the actual brigade
2 order, the brigade order again is at 1110.125, and under
3 paragraph F "1 Para", sub-paragraph 1(a):
4 "This operation will only be launched, either in
5 whole or in part, on the orders of the Brigade
6 Commander."
7 Does that not retain to the Brigade Commander the
8 right to determine what barriers you will go through,
9 what companies you will use and the locations in which
10 you will operate?
11 A. No, it is not, it is not as singular as that. Certainly
12 the Brigade Commander could direct what it is that he
13 wanted my battalion to do.
14 Q. The truth of the matter is that your intentions,
15 whatever they were, were subordinate and secondary to
16 the orders you received from brigade; is that not so?
17 A. I, I really do not see what you are getting at. The
18 orders I received from brigade in the first instance
19 were quite clear. Here they are in front of me and
20 subsequently any orders he gave to me were also quite
21 clear.
22 Q. I suggest that probably is so, but was it your
23 understanding that how the arrest operation was
24 launched, through what barriers it was launched and the
25 number of companies to be used that were effective,
1 those were all to be determined by you?
2 A. Yes, I determined in fact the operation itself.
3 Q. Therefore, once you had permission to launch an
4 operation you took it as a carte blanche to launch an
5 operation which was consistent with your intentions and
6 your objectives; is that right?
7 A. Well, I do not know what you really mean by "carte
8 blanche".
9 Q. I mean carte blanche, a blank cheque. Once the
10 operation was launched, you could, within the law,
11 effectively deploy your troops to whatever areas, in
12 whatever numbers you chose?
13 A. No, that is not so.
14 Q. How would you interpret it?
15 A. I interpret it that I in fact would operate within the
16 area which again I have described many times, in
17 200 square yards -- 200 yards by 200 yards, that sort of
18 area, and that was the sort of area that was generally
19 accepted by everybody who was involved in riot/arrest
20 operations. It was not a blueprint, but it was
21 understood.
22 Q. Firstly, that is the area within which the operation is
23 taking place. I am talking about the deployment through
24 particular barriers, from locations and numbers. Did
25 you have the right to make those determinations?
1 A. I made the initial determination that barrier -- in this
2 particular instance -- that barrier 12 and barrier 14
3 were the two areas in fact which I would use as the
4 leaping-off point, if you like, for the arrest
5 operation.
6 I had at one particular time thought that barrier 16
7 might be useful as well.
8 Q. I appreciate that. Now we come down to it: once you
9 permission or once brigade had determined to launch an
10 arrest operation, did you regard it as then part of your
11 province to determine the areas that you would deploy
12 from, whether it be barrier 14, barrier 12 or
13 barrier 16; was that a matter for your determination?
14 A. It had already been determined that 12 and 14 were the
15 two barriers which we were going to use.
16 Q. If you kindly listen to the question again: once you had
17 permission to launch an arrest operation, did you regard
18 it as within your province to decide where the arrest
19 operation would be launched from?
20 A. The permission, the permission had already been given,
21 that it was barrier 12 and barrier 14; that was
22 understood.
23 Q. You say --
24 A. So it was not within my gift.
25 Q. Is the answer to that: that it was not within your
1 province but that permission had already been given for
2 you to use barriers 12 and 14?
3 A. Not to use them, but it was understood that those two
4 barriers were --
5 Q. Whatever is understood and whatever your intentions, did
6 you have an instruction that you could use barrier 12 to
7 launch an arrest operation once you had been given
8 permission to arrest anyone?
9 A. I am sorry, sir, I simply do not get the point of your
10 question.
11 Q. The question is: lots of things can be understood, I can
12 understand your intentions, I can then tell you that you
13 are not to actually utilise them?
14 A. Yes, but I was not told not to utilise barrier 12 and
15 barrier 14.
16 Q. So because you were not told not to use them, you
17 construed that as permission to use them; is that right?
18 A. Of course I had permission to use them because it had
19 already been decided that barrier 12 and barrier 14
20 would be the point from which I would launch my arrest
21 operation.
22 Q. You say that. Where is there any documentary or other
23 evidence that that had already been decided, as opposed
24 to a part of a pre-plan intention which may be altered
25 and could only be effected on the order of the Brigade
1 Commander?
2 A. Well, I think the Brigade Commander in his evidence to
3 Widgery has actually made that quite clear, unless I am
4 misunderstanding it.
5 Q. We will come back to that.
6 What you are saying is, in fact, that you had
7 permission from the Brigade Commander to go through
8 barrier 12?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. When did you get the permission?
11 A. Well, when it was discussed. It had already -- it had
12 already been understood. I know you --
13 Q. When was it discussed?
14 A. I cannot, as I said earlier on, I cannot recall when it
15 was discussed now. It would have certainly have been
16 discussed before in fact the operation, what do you call
17 it, co-ordinating conference. I would have had some
18 conversation with him about the various possibilities of
19 the arrest operation, based on what I already knew and
20 what he already knew and what he had already determined
21 was a confrontation in that particular area.
22 Q. So the actual permission to use barrier 12 was not
23 a permission which was granted on the day, but one which
24 was granted on 29th January?
25 A. No, it was granted on the day because he said "conduct
1 your arrest operation".
2 Q. He did not say "conduct your arrest operation" in those
3 bland terms. You do not really need me to go over this,
4 do you?
5 A. Well, if you wish.
6 Q. No, do you wish?
7 LORD SAVILLE: I think we had better look at it.
8 MR HARVEY: I think we had better look at it. If we go to
9 W47. It is at serial 159, 1609, it is an entry which is
10 made in the brigade log by the Brigade Major:
11 "Orders given to 1 Para at 1607 for one sub-unit of
12 1 Para to do scoop-up Op through barrier 14."
13 That does not refer to doing any scoop-up through
14 barrier 12; does it?
15 A. That particular message does not, but it --
16 Q. That is the only message?
17 A. No, there are other messages, I believe, I had my
18 attention drawn to them elsewhere.
19 Q. If you let me finish, that is the only message which
20 gives an order to conduct a scoop-up operation. There
21 are other messages, many of them requests from you.
22 That is the only order.
23 Would you look at that order? It does not refer to
24 barrier 12 at all, does it?
25 A. No, it does not, but I believe --
1 Q. It means, does it not, that therefore you did not have
2 permission to go through barrier 12, does it not?
3 A. I did have permission to go through barrier 12, and
4 I can only refer back to the Widgery evidence from the
5 brigadier, that he understood only too well that I would
6 actually be proceeding through barrier 12 and
7 barrier 14.
8 Q. You see, understandings is not how the Army works; the
9 Army works in a hierarchical system of orders; does it
10 not?
11 A. I am sorry, you have a mistaken view.
12 Q. I do. So, in other words when you are given an order to
13 launch one sub-unit of 1 Para to do a scoop-up operation
14 through barrier 14, that also means barrier 12?
15 A. In this particular instance, yes. But what I cannot do,
16 because I cannot, I cannot remember the log, I do not
17 have any particular picture of it, but my attention has
18 been drawn previously in this room to other messages and
19 I have referred to the particularisation of this
20 barrier 14.
21 The barrier 14 was referred to in a particular
22 instance because of something happening and it had been
23 taken that barrier 14 was the only barrier that in fact
24 that we were interested in, and this is not so.
25 Q. It may well not be the only barrier you were interested
1 in, it is the only barrier you were given an order to go
2 through?
3 A. Well, what I am saying is and what I have said
4 previously is that this is only a partial message, and
5 I cannot, I cannot recall any more than that. But I do
6 recall, as I say, what the brigadier said in his
7 evidence, and I am quite, and I am quite clear that on
8 the day I knew that I had permission to go through
9 barrier 14 and barrier 12.
10 Q. The other message that perhaps you are referring to is
11 at W127, if one could go to that, 343.
12 A. This is the one I am referring to.
13 Q. Yes. This is to brigade headquarters; it is from you or
14 rather from your tac HQ:
15 "He would like to deploy one of his sub-units
16 through barrier 14 around the back into the area
17 William Street/Little James Street. He reckons if he
18 does this he will be able to pick up quite a number of
19 yobbos. Over."
20 There is absolutely no reference to barrier 12, is
21 there?
22 A. No, there is not, but --
23 Q. The request that is being made is a request which is
24 specific: "one sub unit through barrier 14 ..."; is that
25 right?
1 A. What was happening here is that I had actually spoken to
2 my main headquarters and had particularised barrier 14
3 because, at that particular time, I wanted to get my
4 troops into that area, but this did not exclude
5 barrier 12. It seems that the inference is that because
6 barrier 12 was not mentioned, that barrier 12 was not in
7 the frame; it was, and always had been.
8 Q. How are brigade supposed to know that you want to launch
9 an operation through barrier 12 if you do not
10 communicate with them on the day and tell them?
11 A. Because brigade knew perfectly well what the plan was;
12 they knew in fact it was going to be an operation --
13 a two-company operation, one from barrier 14 and one
14 from barrier 12 and you do not have to spell it out to
15 them again and again and again.
16 Q. Then why mention barrier 14 at all, why not just simply
17 mention to them "I now want to launch my arrest
18 operation"?
19 A. Because at this particular time, as far as I can
20 recall -- and the only evidence I have in fact is in
21 front of me -- that I was asking a particular question
22 about barrier 14; I was not, I was not excluding
23 barrier 12, I was just talking about barrier 14.
24 I had no, no need to talk about barrier 12 at that
25 stage because I was talking about barrier 14.
1 Q. The real difficulty with that is that you never talked
2 about barrier 12; you never informed brigade that you
3 were going through barrier 12?
4 A. I did not have to tell them I was going through; they
5 knew I was going through barrier 12, and if I may come
6 back again to the brigadier's evidence, he was quite
7 clear that that is what I was going to do. You know,
8 that is how it works.
9 Q. That is how it works. In other words, if you had asked
10 for permission to go through barrier 12, and permission
11 to go through barrier 12 had been granted, you would
12 have been perfectly at liberty to go through barrier 14
13 because that is what brigade understood; is that the
14 crazy form of logic we are into now?
15 A. It is not a crazy form of logic at all, if you know what
16 is proposed, and that was always proposed.
17 Q. One of the matters in relation to dealing with these
18 particular crowds: at this stage you are looking for
19 permission to go through barrier 14. You believe, as
20 you said in this particular order:
21 "He reckons if he does this he will be able to pick
22 up quite a number ..."
23 The actual request therefore means once you go
24 through barrier 14, you expect to be able to go round
25 the back and pick these people up in the area of
1 Little James Street/William Street; that is also
2 correct, is it not?
3 A. Yes, as it is proposed here, yes.
4 Q. That again is something which complies with what the
5 brigade order had set out in terms of the instructions
6 or in terms of the brigade order, namely that it was
7 anticipated that the arrests would take place. If one
8 goes to 1110.125, at paragraph(c), (f):
9 "The scoop-up operation is likely to be launched on
10 two axes, one directed towards hooligan activity in the
11 area of William Street/Little Diamond, and one towards
12 the area of William Street/Little James Street."
13 What you are specifically seeking at 1555 is to
14 conduct a scoop-up operation in the location precisely
15 set out in the brigade operation order; is that right?
16 A. Again you use the word "precise", William Street/Little
17 James Street --
18 Q. Excuse me, it is the first time I have used the word
19 "precise". "Precise" is your word. I am using it
20 because it is precisely what was set out in the brigade
21 operation order?
22 A. Yes, but what I am saying is that it has the air of
23 being precision, but it is a geographical area, and any
24 soldier actually understands that.
25 Q. I wonder could we go back to Q8. The distance from
1 barrier 14 to the junction of William Street,
2 approximately 100 yards. The distance from the GPO
3 sorting office, through which it was initially planned
4 that Support Company would come through, is 150 yards?
5 LORD SAVILLE: Just to be exact, Colonel Wilford told us the
6 idea originally was to go round the back of the houses
7 rather than down William Street itself.
8 MR HARVEY: That is a minimum now of 150 yards. That is
9 a fairly extensive area to be covered, is it not?
10 A. Well, I am not sure what you are asking me, 150 yards --
11 Q. It fits in with operating within an area of 200 yards?
12 A. Yes, yes.
13 Q. Not only does it fit in, it has been identified with
14 precision within the area; is that correct?
15 A. No, can I put my finger on this?
16 Q. Yes?
17 A. The precision which we are talking about is there
18 (indicating) but in fact a soldier understands that it
19 is in fact merely an indication of a geographical area
20 and would have to think in terms, like that. That is
21 very rough, of course.
22 Q. "No running battle". In military terms, "battle" means
23 arrest operation?
24 A. In this situation, yes.
25 Q. "No running battle" means no running arrest operation
1 down Rossville Street; does it not?
2 A. No.
3 Q. No; why not?
4 A. Because I was not actually told that I could not go down
5 Rossville Street and a "running battle", a running
6 battle is not something which can take place in an area
7 200 yards by 200 yards.
8 Q. Hold on, the initial direction in the brigade operation
9 order was that it was expected this operation would take
10 place at the junction of William Street/Little James
11 Street/Rossville Street, at that junction; that is
12 right, is it not?
13 A. No, that is not -- again, that is not how a soldier
14 would interpret that. Could you bring me back to that
15 part of the brigade order which talks about that?
16 Sorry, I cannot recall it in --
17 Q. If one goes to, it is on the brigade operation log, it
18 is at W47 and at 159.
19 A. I have a log sheet here.
20 Q. The brigade order is at 1110.125.
21 A. I can just about read it.
22 Q. Under (c):
23 "The scoop-up operation is likely to be launched on
24 two axes ... and one towards the area of William
25 Street/Little James Street"?
1 A. You see the word "the area" is significant.
2 Q. But it does not mention Rossville Street?
3 A. No, it does not.
4 Q. The qualification that is given on the brigade order to
5 launch this operation is "no running battles down
6 Rossville Street"; that means no running arrest
7 operation down Rossville Street?
8 A. No, it did not say that I should not go down
9 Rossville Street, it merely said that I should not
10 actually get sucked in down Rossville Street.
11 Q. It does not say "sucked in", it says --
12 A. No, no, but that was the understanding and would be the
13 understanding always.
14 Q. If that is the case, why was it necessary for the
15 Brigade Major or the brigadier to impose a limitation
16 upon you?
17 A. Well, what was the limitation? The limitation --
18 Q. "No running battles down Rossville Street" seems to me
19 to be a limitation; does it seem to you to be
20 a limitation?
21 A. The limitation was not to get sucked in.
22 Q. Does it seem to you to be a limitation, firstly?
23 A. No, it is not a limitation.
24 Q. What was it?
25 A. It was an injunction not to get sucked in.
1 Q. A piece of advice?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Just "do not allow yourself to be sucked in by the
4 enemy"?
5 A. Exactly. Which was hardly necessary, but of course he
6 was perfectly entitled, and very sensible, of course, to
7 give that information. It was the sort of information
8 I would give my soldiers.
9 Q. You did not, did you? You have already told the Inquiry
10 that you did not pass this on?
11 A. No, because it was unnecessary to do so because they
12 understood.
13 Q. Why is it sensible for brigade to provide you with
14 information that you yourself think is so superfluous
15 you do not pass it on to your own men?
16 A. It was the Brigade Major in fact who passed the
17 information on and he was merely advising me not to get
18 sucked in. I did not actually have to tell my soldiers
19 not to get sucked in, they knew perfectly well how to
20 conduct this sort of operation.
21 Q. The important matter about this operation, it did
22 require planning, did it not?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. It required you to reconnoitre the area?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. It required you to come up with, however limited, the
2 best plan that was available to you; is that right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. The first time it would appear you reconnoitred the area
5 was when you flew up in Belfast from a helicopter?
6 A. I am not sure that I did, but I --
7 Q. It is in your Widgery evidence that you did and it is in
8 your Widgery evidence that having flown up in
9 a helicopter, you reconnoitred the area, then you went
10 to Ebrington and went out in a vehicle, a car?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. How could you reconnoitre an area you had never been in
13 before from the air?
14 A. From the air in fact is actually rather more easy than
15 doing it from the ground, in this particular instance,
16 because from the ground I could not go into, if I may
17 use the word, the enemy territory.
18 Q. The situation is: from the air were you able to identify
19 the Bogside?
20 A. Oh, yes.
21 Q. Rossville Flats?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. The Creggan?
24 A. Yes, I mean, I do not recall it now, but of course
25 I could. You know, it is a very stable platform,
1 a helicopter, and it gets up as high or as low as you
2 wish; you can see all sorts of things.
3 Q. Did you check out: Glenfada Park, Abbey Park?
4 A. Well, I cannot recall that I did, now, but I was looking
5 at the whole area.
6 Q. And then you went down and you reconnoitred the area by
7 car, not on foot?
8 A. I did get out, I think, on a couple of occasions, yes.
9 Q. When you did indicate to your order group that you would
10 give them further instructions at the forming-up place,
11 you also indicated that it would be necessary for you to
12 get pretty far forward in order to observe what was
13 going on?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Again, if we go back to Q8, it has been difficult to
16 ascertain where your observation post is. Major Loden
17 has given the co-ordinates for an observation post he
18 was in as being in a building there. Were you in an
19 observation post with Major Loden at any time?
20 A. No, I was not.
21 Q. The suggestion has been made that in fact the
22 observation post that you were in was in a building in
23 this approximate location?
24 A. Yes, that is right.
25 Q. The important matter in relation to the observation was
1 that to control an operation involving up to three
2 companies and possibly two companies, that you had to be
3 in a position to observe the area, what was happening;
4 is that right?
5 A. Yes, in the best circumstances.
6 Q. Not only what was happening, where it was happening and
7 the movements of the crowd; is that correct?
8 A. Partially, yes, but of course communication would also
9 tell me what was happening, and did.
10 Q. You were also responsible, as the commanding officer,
11 for co-ordinating the movements of your different
12 companies; is that right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. The observation post you have indicated, in fact, again
15 in your Widgery testimony, was approximately 100 yards
16 from Abbey Taxis?
17 A. From where?
18 Q. From Abbey Taxis, which is a building which is just
19 here, that is the building from which soldiers A and B
20 fired?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. The importance of flexibility; it is absolutely
23 essential that someone is in control when you have
24 flexibility, is it not?
25 A. Well, you hope so, in the very best of circumstances,
1 yes, but the best of circumstances are rarely there.
2 Q. But the person who ought to have been in control of
3 co-ordinating the operation was you?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Once it was launched?
6 A. I am sorry?
7 Q. Once the operation was launched, you were the person who
8 was responsible for co-ordinating?
9 A. I was responsible right from the very beginning, for all
10 things that were happening to my battalion.
11 Q. You chose an observation post where in fact you had no
12 view of what was happening at barrier 14?
13 A. I chose an observation post that gave me the best
14 available observation on the day.
15 Q. But it did not have --
16 A. As I thought.
17 Q. As you thought, I appreciate that. But it did not have
18 a view of barrier 14?
19 A. No, it did not, not directly, no.
20 Q. So far as the receipt and provision of information, that
21 was exceptionally important in terms of the deployment
22 of your men; is that not right?
23 A. What, that I should have observation?
24 Q. Yes?
25 A. No, no. No, no, one cannot always have perfect
1 situation and --
2 Q. I did not say "perfect observation"?
3 A. No, I am just explaining, sir, you cannot, and so of
4 course you would then use other means and my other means
5 was communication, not only from my own troops, but of
6 course from the company that was responsible for
7 barrier 14 and the people who were responsible for
8 barrier -- well, all of barriers, of course. That
9 information would come to me --
10 Q. Therefore it is important, if your observation is
11 limited, or even denied, that you have information which
12 is coming to you across the radio nets; is that right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And perhaps also direct communications with those
15 persons on the ground?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. If possible?
18 A. If possible, yes.
19 Q. On the ground, if you were to launch an operation going
20 through barrier 14 and launch an operation through
21 barrier 12, it was essential that the commander of
22 C Company, 221A, and the commander of Support Company,
23 Major Loden, were completely aware of the activities of
24 each other?
25 A. In general terms, yes.
1 Q. And also important that you were able to provide
2 co-ordination between those two groups?
3 A. If co-ordination was necessary.
4 Q. Co-ordination, if you are seeking to implement a pincer
5 movement, would be necessary; would it not?
6 A. No, because the two companies, operating in this small
7 area, which I have already indicated was always an area
8 which in fact we looked upon as being, if you like, the
9 optimum area for this sort of operation, they would in
10 fact be quickly in contact with each other and observing
11 what each other was doing, and the troops would then act
12 in concert, without any more orders; lance corporals and
13 corporals and sergeants were all capable, highly capable
14 of co-ordinating those sort of operations, in this
15 relatively small scale.
16 Q. Had you operated at battalion level before in
17 a situation where there were several thousand marchers
18 and fronted by perhaps some 200 rioters?
19 A. I had certainly operated in riot situations where --
20 Q. Riot situations similar to this?
21 A. No, not, not identical, I would say, certainly lots and
22 lots of people, but I cannot put a figure on it, of
23 course. I mean, I cannot even now put a figure on this,
24 but the number of rioters, yes, I can: the number of
25 rioters at barrier 14 and barrier 12, this was something
1 in fact that we had experienced on a lot of occasions.
2 Q. I would be surprised if it were otherwise, Colonel?
3 A. Mmm.
4 Q. The real complicating factor here was the presence of
5 several thousand innocent civilians; you appreciate
6 that?
7 A. Yes, but we had actually been in similar situations.
8 Q. With several thousand innocent civilians?
9 A. Well, I cannot talk about thousands.
10 Q. How many are we talking about?
11 A. Well, we are talking about a lot, hundreds.
12 Q. In what circumstances are these?
13 A. In Belfast, when --
14 Q. In what circumstances in Belfast?
15 A. Well, when people were marching and, for one reason and
16 another, where barriers had been put up; where there was
17 a threat to public order; that sort of thing. I cannot
18 recall exact and precise occasions, but I do know that
19 we had been in those situations before.
20 Q. Right. What function did you serve on the day?
21 A. I am sorry?
22 Q. What function did you serve on the day?
23 A. I was a commanding officer.
24 Q. But what function did you serve?
25 A. I had the function of being a commanding officer.
1 Q. What did you do; what was your role on the day?
2 A. My role was to command my battalion.
3 Q. Was it to just jolly your troops along or was it to
4 actually ensure that how they operated was co-ordinated,
5 properly timed, synchronised, and that they were aware
6 of the presence of each other; were those part of your
7 functions?
8 A. Yes, if those functions were necessary.
9 Q. Once you left the observation post, what effectively did
10 you achieve?
11 A. I am sorry, what did I --
12 Q. What did you effectively achieve once you left your
13 observation post?
14 A. I joined my soldiers; my soldiers knew that I was there;
15 they expected to find me there and if I had not have
16 been there, um, I would not say they would have been
17 disappointed, but they would have been surprised.
18 Q. You were a morale booster, were you?
19 A. No, I was their commanding officer.
20 Q. Commanding officers normally, forgive me for my own
21 ignorance, I would have expected to be there to command?
22 A. I was commanding.
23 Q. To control?
24 A. I have company commanders, and the company commanders
25 have platoon commanders, platoon commanders have platoon
1 sergeants, platoon sergeants have platoon corporals, and
2 we go all the way down the line.
3 In the way of the Army that that command and control
4 starts at the top from me and goes down the line through
5 all those people that I have mentioned and that, in
6 fact, is how an Army and an infantry battalion or
7 a parachute battalion operates.
8 They do not require a commanding officer to stand
9 there and say "stop, now I want you to do this".
10 Q. What were you doing on the ground?
11 A. I was being a commanding officer.
12 Q. Surely if you were in command of this operation, you had
13 an observation post which, according again to the
14 evidence at Widgery, apart from a blind spot behind the
15 William Street houses backing on to Eden Place, you had
16 a good view across Eden Place, Pilot's Row,
17 William Street, Little James Street and
18 Rossville Street, right down to the Rossville Flats.
19 Would it not have been better for you, as
20 a commanding officer, to remain in your observation post
21 and seek to co-ordinate the movements of your two
22 companies?
23 A. Not at all.
24 Q. Once you had put them through?
25 A. Not at all, my best chance of co-ordination was to be
1 down with my troops.
2 Q. You were in radio communication with your troops?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Once you are on the ground, all that you are able to see
5 is the small slice of the action in which you are
6 a participant, even if peripherally involved; is that
7 not right?
8 A. That is true at a particular moment, but I actually
9 moved around, I did not stand in one place.
10 Q. We will come to that. If you are in an observation
11 post, you have the benefit of binoculars; you have the
12 benefit of radio communications; you have the benefit of
13 seeing the whole picture, a bird's eye view; that is the
14 importance of observation posts, is it not?
15 A. You have the wrong view of it.
16 Q. Do I? How would you describe your behaviour on the
17 ground that particular day?
18 A. How would I describe my behaviour?
19 Q. Yes?
20 A. Would I describe my behaviour as being a commanding
21 officer.
22 Q. Perhaps if we could go to 1110.101 at paragraph A. This
23 is an answer to a question that is dealing with an
24 allegation that you had seen a civilian gunman. If I go
25 to the second question:
1 "Question: But did you not tell me a moment ago
2 that you did not see any civilians with weapons?
3 "Answer: You have already adduced from me that
4 I was running around this area like a blue-arsed fly.
5 There were many things which I saw at that time which
6 would perhaps have made an impression on my mind which
7 I did not immediately recall. My recollection is that
8 I thought I saw a man with a carbine ..."
9 That is not relevant.
10 That is a fair description of how you described your
11 own behaviour on that day; is it not?
12 A. Yes, it is a fair description; I was running around;
13 I was trying to become aware of all that was going on;
14 I went to see my company commanders; I went to see, in
15 some cases, platoon commanders -- no, I do not think
16 I ever saw a platoon commander to speak to in any
17 particular way, but I saw NCOs and I saw my troops, and
18 I got a very good picture, of course, of what was going
19 on.
20 Q. I wonder could we go to your initial statement which was
21 made just after these events and in particular to
22 1110.48. You will see at paragraph 15:
23 "At 1610 I was ordered to make arrests and I called
24 support and C companies to move. There was a slight
25 delay and then I saw the first armoured vehicles known
1 to us as 'Pigs' moving south down Little James Street
2 and across William Street/Rossville Street junction.
3 I heard several high velocity shots at about this moment
4 and several rubber bullet guns went off in the Rossville
5 area as I and my signaller left the OP to move in behind
6 the leading companies."
7 According to this you have seen the Pigs moving
8 south; you have heard several high velocity shots at
9 about this moment and several rubber bullet guns going
10 off in Rossville Street as you and your signaller left
11 the OP to move in behind the leading companies. When
12 that happened, why did you leave the OP?
13 A. No, I think there is a, there is a -- the sequence in
14 this is not quite right. I think I left the OP and then
15 I heard the high velocity shots and what I have
16 described as, I say rubber bullets, rubber bullet guns
17 going off.
18 I left the OP because, when I saw my troops going
19 into the area, I decided that was the moment that
20 I should then join them. It was always my intention to
21 join them and I decided, my judgment was that that was
22 the time when I should go.
23 Q. Your soldiers in fact fired rubber bullets before
24 dismounting from their vehicles?
25 A. Did they?
1 Q. They did.
2 A. Well, I was not aware of that.
3 Q. Did you not see that from your observation post?
4 A. No, I did not.
5 Q. The very moment that there is action beginning to
6 commence, from then on the sole contribution you make is
7 by going down on to the ground and visiting with your
8 troops; is that right?
9 A. If you put it that way, yes, but I was being commanding
10 officer. My company commanders were doing their job and
11 my soldiers were doing their job. It was not up to me
12 to interfere at that stage unless interference became
13 necessary.
14 Q. Right. In terms of what happens on the ground, if
15 a soldier hears a high velocity SLR shot being
16 discharged, he would have the right to assume, would he
17 not, that if an SLR shot is being fired by one of his
18 colleagues, that it is being fired at a target?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Because that is the way soldiers are taught, is that not
21 right?
22 A. Well, if you put it that way, yes, that is simply
23 enough.
24 Q. They are trained to fire aimed shots only at
25 identifiable targets?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. They are not permitted to fire over a person's head; is
3 that not correct?
4 A. In normal circumstances that is so.
5 Q. Why is that?
6 A. About firing over a person's head?
7 Q. Yes.
8 A. Because I think the effect it is likely to have, in
9 fact, on the crowd is a dangerous one. Anyway,
10 discharging a weapon not at a target, but firing it in
11 the air is something which in fact one would not
12 normally wish to do.
13 Q. Apart from basically perhaps reducing the deterrent
14 effect upon the crowd, if soldiers are operating over
15 a broad area, they will assume that in fact there are
16 persons there armed either with firearms or other
17 weapons and are engaged themselves in hostile activity
18 towards the Army; is that not so?
19 A. If they heard incoming shots, they would certainly be
20 entitled to make that assumption. If they heard a shot
21 from one of their own comrades, they would look and try
22 to engage in why that shot had been fired.
23 Q. In fact once shooting starts, is it not difficult to
24 control it?
25 A. Oh, no, it is not, you can control it most easily.
1 Q. If we return to the first part of this statement. This
2 statement also deals with the position, as you saw it,
3 in relation to the possibility of the arrest operation.
4 If we go to 1110.43, it against deals with -- you went
5 through the brigade operation order in detail, if you
6 see under paragraph 5(a). This again is dealing with
7 your order group at 10.30 on 29th January 1972:
8 "(c) I explained that until the rioting started it
9 was not really possible for me to be specific in my
10 plans and I therefore gave a general idea on how
11 I thought it could go."
12 You set out the two routes, but in fact it was at
13 the co-ordinating conference that it was also pointed
14 out the most likely route was the second route. So by
15 the time you came to the forming-up position on
16 30th January, you knew what was the most likely route,
17 namely that it would come down William Street; did you
18 not?
19 A. No, I do not think so, I do not think anyone knew that.
20 I think until the march started one was going to be
21 unaware as to exactly where it was going to go.
22 Q. If we go over the page:
23 "If rioting broke out from this approach
24 I considered that two companies would come in from north
25 and one from the east to pinch them out from a retreat
1 west and south. Route two would bring them into
2 William Street at the junction with Lone Moor Road and
3 although confrontation would not take place until the
4 William Street barrier it would likely spread backwards
5 and it would be necessary to put in two companies
6 together to get the maximum impact and achieve mutual
7 support. I thought that the best approach would be from
8 behind the Presbyterian Church. I was going to be
9 forward where I could see the crowd and get an early
10 view of its behaviour. On this I confidently expected
11 to move the companies forward to jump off points.
12 "(d) I spoke about the Derry rioters and our lack of
13 experience against them, the fact that they were quite
14 used to rubber bullets and gas, but not to the quick use
15 of snatch squads which would tell against them.
16 However, I warned that we must look to our flanks and
17 front particularly in the open area of Rossville and
18 William Street where there has been so much sniping
19 during previous rioting."
20 What you anticipated was the quick use of snatch
21 squads; is that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And snatch squads basically are groups that come through
24 on foot and snatch people who are close at hand?
25 A. That is the ideal, yes.
1 Q. That is the ideal that on the day you saw slip away?
2 A. Yes, the ideal, of course, is never there entirely.
3 Q. It was there because you have said it was there?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And it did slip away?
6 A. It did slip away, yes.
7 Q. And it did not slip away due to any failure on your part
8 because you were actually anxious to go in and use quick
9 snatch squads at barrier 14 and perhaps even barrier 12;
10 is that not right?
11 A. Yes, I was.
12 Q. It slipped away because brigade refused to give you
13 permission to go in at the time that you regarded as
14 optimum; is that not right?
15 A. That is reasonable.
16 Q. Would it be reasonable to suppose that had you not have
17 put the pressure on brigade, which you were putting on
18 them to get in; you were putting pressure on them, were
19 you not?
20 A. I was not putting pressure on them, I was doing my job
21 to tell them what I thought was the best situation for
22 me to conduct what they had wanted me to do, that was an
23 arrest operation, scoop up the maximum number of
24 rioters.
25 Q. That would have been done within a very short distance
1 of those barriers?
2 A. No, unlikely. That is where I would have hoped to have
3 picked up a large number.
4 Q. By "a large number", how many do you mean?
5 A. Oh, I cannot say that, a large number. 10, 20, maybe.
6 Q. The pressure that you were putting on, firstly, you were
7 requesting brigade from an early stage to get in; is
8 that right?
9 A. I was requesting them from the stage where I judged it
10 likely that I would be able to effect arrests.
11 Q. Secondly, you were trying to put pressure on them by
12 going through the Light Air Defence Regiment to get them
13 to inform brigade, who did not appear to believe you
14 about the trouble?
15 A. There was no question of pressure. I was informing them
16 of what the situation was.
17 Q. Did you get the impression that they did not believe
18 you?
19 A. I do not know where that particular thing came from.
20 I remember it being brought up here the other day, um,
21 it seems to me, um, a fair bit of initiative on the part
22 of my headquarters, my main headquarters to get them to
23 confirm the situation, but it was not something which
24 I did myself, as I recall, as I recall.
25 Q. Did you in fact not put pressure on your tactical
1 headquarters to get on to brigade to get this operation
2 launched?
3 A. No, I do not believe I did. I think my headquarters in
4 fact were using their own initiative, which I think was
5 fair and sensible. They were backing me up.
6 Q. The situation is: did you approve of what they were
7 doing?
8 A. There was neither approval or disapproval, at the time
9 I was responding to a situation. I mean, if you ask me
10 if I approve or disapprove now, well, again, I have no,
11 I have no view of it because I would have to know
12 absolutely what the circumstances were, and I do not
13 recall, I do not remember, but it seems to me that they
14 were doing a sensible job.
15 Q. In fact, what was slipping away was not simply the ideal
16 opportunity to launch an arrest operation, Colonel; what
17 was slipping away was the arrest operation itself; is
18 that not so?
19 A. I think that was certainly a possibility, a danger, yes,
20 but that was not my judgment, that was going to be the
21 brigadier's judgment.
22 Q. But your judgment on the ground was: the ideal
23 opportunity is gone, if there is any further delay, then
24 it would be pointless to actually launch any arrest
25 operation at all?
1 A. No, those words you put into my mouth. I did not think
2 in those terms. I did not think in those terms,
3 Mr Harvey.
4 Q. In fact, had you not have put pressure on brigade, do
5 you think that they would ever have ordered an arrest
6 operation?
7 A. I have no idea.
8 Q. Have you not thought about that over the last 30 years?
9 A. No, I have not.
10 Q. What your original contemplation was, was the quick use
11 of snatch squads; is that right?
12 A. Snatch squads are a part of a company group, that is
13 what I was thinking of, and I never went away from that;
14 I was not thinking of just putting in half a dozen
15 snatch squads to effect arrests, I was thinking in fact
16 of using two companies to do that job because it could
17 not have been done otherwise.
18 Q. That might well be so, but ultimately you know that
19 C Company, when it went through barrier 14, there
20 basically was no rioting at barrier 14, the rioters had
21 all disappeared?
22 A. No, I am not sure that is so.
23 Q. You are not sure that is so?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Even 30 years later?
1 A. Oh, well, I am only responding -- 30 years later has
2 nothing to do with it, I am merely responding to the
3 information that I had at the time and I think the
4 information I had at the time was that they were still
5 there, and I certainly recall seeing photographs shortly
6 after the event, of course, you know, television
7 footage, of seeing soldiers going through the barrier
8 and there were still rioters around, as I recall. It is
9 not a very strong recollection now.
10 Q. I will show you the footage because it is my intention
11 to do so. I want to suggest to you that when C Company
12 went through barrier 14, far from acting as a quick
13 snatch squad, they went through barrier 14 and all but
14 one platoon went up Chamberlain Street and there were no
15 rioters and they arrested no rioters; were you aware of
16 that?
17 A. I am aware of it now, yes, I was not aware of it at the
18 time.
19 Q. It is something you ought to have been aware of at the
20 time, Colonel, if you were seeking to co-ordinate
21 movements between Support Company and C Company?
22 A. No. I mean, have you any idea of how people passing
23 through a barrier in that way, under a great deal of
24 pressure, and how quickly that they would move? How do
25 you suppose they would get that information, first to
1 their Company Commander and then their Company Commander
2 to me?
3 Q. By their company commander having a radio and the actual
4 Battalion Commander being in a position to receive
5 information to co-ordinate the movements between his
6 groups?
7 A. Yes, but we are not talking about the Company Commander
8 in the first instance, we are talking about the lance
9 corporals and the corporals and the sergeants.
10 Q. No, when C Company went through, the Company Commander,
11 221A, was there; he moved down Chamberlain Street?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And, according to his evidence, he went down to check to
14 see what Support Company, down Eden Place, and kept his
15 company totally separate from what was happening. So
16 far from in fact giving mutual support to Support
17 Company or receiving it, his objective was to isolate
18 C Company from what they were doing; were you aware of
19 that?
20 A. I simply do not understand the point that you are
21 making.
22 Q. The point I am making is that once C Company went
23 through, there were no rioters to be arrested. Let us
24 go back to Support Company --
25 A. I am sorry, could I interrupt there. When you say there
1 were no rioters to be arrested, on what basis do you say
2 that?
3 Q. The film you have just seen?
4 A. No, I do not think the film in fact is a fair comment.
5 Q. We will see the film.
6 A. Films never are.
7 Q. I appreciate there are limitations, but they made no
8 arrests. The only persons they arrested were the
9 persons who were detained in a house after your soldiers
10 were invited into the house because there were two
11 persons there who needed medical attention, and they
12 simply arrested everyone who was there; that is the
13 arrest C Company effected, did you not know that?
14 A. I know it now, I did not know it then.
15 Q. Over 30 years that you have spent reflecting on these
16 matters, giving interviews, seeking to justify what had
17 happened?
18 A. No, no, I did not try to justify anything.
19 Q. Have you not?
20 A. No.
21 Q. I will come back to that. Support Company went through
22 barrier 12 in vehicles?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Initially at Widgery you said that there was a delay of
25 approximately three minutes at barrier 12?
1 A. (Witness nodding)
2 Q. Where did you get that figure of three minutes from?
3 A. That information I got from the Company Commander.
4 Q. Was there any attempt by you, as the Battalion
5 Commander, to see whether one company was going in
6 hopelessly behind another so as not to be in a position
7 to provide mutual support and cohesion?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Why not?
10 A. Because I was not aware of it.
11 Q. Why were you not aware of it?
12 A. Because I had not been told of it.
13 Q. Communication, again once there is flexibility, is
14 highly important, is it not?
15 A. But that, I do not think in this case, has anything to
16 do with it. The Company Commander, his problem was
17 getting through that barrier and that was his concern at
18 the time, his concern was not actually telling me.
19 If the delay had been a very long delay, then, of
20 course, he would have told me. But he did not feel
21 necessary at that time to tell me because he did not see
22 it as that important, clearly, but you will have on the
23 opportunity of speaking to the Company Commander
24 concerned.
25 Q. What you saw in fact was the lead vehicles from Support
1 Company crossing the junction of William
2 Street/Rossville Street/Little James Street?
3 A. I?
4 Q. Yes?
5 A. In fact, when I think about it, I think I only saw the
6 first vehicle, and it was when I saw the first vehicle
7 that I moved. Again, I could not swear to that now
8 because it simply is, you know, a very, very vague
9 picture.
10 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Harvey, is that a moment convenient to
11 you?
12 MR HARVEY: Yes, it is.
13 LORD SAVILLE: Colonel Wilford, we will come back to your
14 evidence at 9.30 tomorrow.
15 MR CLARKE: One matter I would like to mention: could we
16 have on the screen P233.65, which I think is now
17 available. Could we highlight the bottom row. My
18 learned friend Mr Elias pointed out that it appeared to
19 be the case that the picture which shows Colonel Wilford
20 near Con Bradley's was later in time than the picture
21 that shows him at the Kells Walk wall, as appears to be
22 the position from the fact that the picture before the
23 picture at the Kells Walk wall shows rioting near
24 barrier 14. The curiosity is that the numbering of the
25 pictures, 4, 5, 6, et cetera, is from right to left
1 rather than left to right.
2 If one looks at the preceding page, P233.64, it is
3 apparent -- it is rather difficult to follow from what
4 we see on the screen at the moment -- that the
5 chronological order of the photographs, which begin at
6 the bottom left, is such that the earlier photographs in
7 time have the higher number and it appears that, for
8 whatever reason, therefore, the film that is at P233.64
9 and which carries over into P233.65 is, in one sense,
10 reverse numbered in that the photographs first taken
11 have higher numbers than those subsequently taken.
12 This would appear to be confirmed by the fact that
13 the stills of the photographs which are at EP4 are in
14 the order in which they appear on the contact sheets,
15 taking the highest numbers first.
16 So that I think is the explanation of why the
17 numbering seems, but is not in fact, askew and my
18 learned friend Mr Elias must, I think, be correct in the
19 sequence that he indicated this morning.
20 LORD SAVILLE: Thank you very much indeed. So far as the
21 rest of us are concerned, apart from Colonel Wilford, we
22 will come back at 12.55, please.
23 (12.15 pm)
24 (The Short Adjournment)
25 (12.55 pm)
1 INQ1940, sworn
2 Questioned by MS McGAHEY
3 LORD SAVILLE: If you look across you can see who is talking
4 to you. I say this to all the witnesses: I am the
5 Chairman. The questions will come from the barristers,
6 they are the people in front of me. Could I ask you to
7 pull that microphone towards you a little bit and then
8 come a little bit closer to it, and then we will be able
9 to hear what you have to say.
10 MS McGAHEY: Do you have with you, please, a copy of the
11 statement that you made to this Inquiry and signed on
12 3rd May 2000?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Are the contents of that statement true to the best of
15 your knowledge and belief?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. As I am sure you know, many soldiers, not only you, have
18 been granted anonymity for the purposes of this Inquiry.
19 When giving your answers, please do not give the name of
20 any soldier, apart from senior officers.
21 Everyone here has had the chance to read your
22 statement, I am only going to ask you about parts of it.
23 I am going to ask you first about paragraph 2. You will
24 see that is on the screen in front of you, you may find
25 it easier to read it from the screen.
1 You have told us in the preceding paragraph that
2 in January 1972 you were a lance corporal in the
3 Anti-Tank Platoon of Support Company of 1 Para?
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. In paragraph 2 you refer to the briefing that you
6 received. You believe you were briefed by
7 Colonel Wilford and were told you were going to
8 Londonderry on Sunday, that there was a civilian march
9 to take place and there, "would be IRA suspects there
10 who were wanted by the police."
11 Were you told at that briefing what the Army
12 expected the IRA to do on the march?
13 A. Not really, no.
14 Q. Do you remember being told anything about what the Army
15 thought the IRA's plans were?
16 A. No.
17 Q. You were told that there would be wanted men there.
18 Were you told how the Army planned to deal with those
19 wanted men?
20 A. Not really, because in my own opinion we did not know
21 the situation on the ground until we got there.
22 Q. Do you have any recollection of being told that 1 Para
23 was to be involved in an arrest operation?
24 A. There was a possibility of us being on an arrest
25 situation.
1 Q. Was that something you remember Colonel Wilford telling
2 you?
3 A. He just said there was a possibility because there was
4 two more regiments before us on the ground.
5 Q. Do you remember whether he named those two regiments?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Could we go on, please, to paragraphs 5 and 6 of your
8 statement. You are dealing there with the situation as
9 it was when you arrived in Londonderry on the Sunday.
10 You say that as far as you were concerned the orders had
11 changed, you were no longer to assist in cordoning off
12 an area and you were ordered to carry out escort duties.
13 Do you remember whether the orders were changed for
14 the other members of your platoon?
15 A. I do not really know about the other people of the
16 platoon, all I know is what I was told.
17 Q. When you made your statement to the Inquiry you could
18 not remember the name of the other private from your
19 platoon who was detailed to be on escort duties; do you
20 remember it now?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Are you certain that he was a private?
23 A. I think so.
24 Q. You say that you and the private were first ordered to
25 go to a location which you cannot now name or describe
1 and to meet Colonel Wilford and another officer there.
2 We do have the names of some other soldiers who were
3 detailed to escort Colonel Wilford on the day or were
4 with him in their capacity as signallers. None of them
5 is from your platoon, but I would like to send you the
6 names of them to see whether these bring back any
7 recollections at all of the people who were with you.
8 (Pause).
9 For the record, sir, the names I have sent are those
10 of soldiers known to us as INQ834, INQ1488, INQ1027 and
11 INQ1152.
12 A. No, they do not.
13 Q. You do not remember those names at all?
14 A. No.
15 Q. You have said that you cannot remember the location at
16 which you met Colonel Wilford and the other officer and
17 you have also told us this was your first time in
18 Londonderry. I would like to ask you to look at
19 a photograph to see whether it does jog any memories at
20 all. Could we have on the screen, please, P199.
21 There is evidence that Colonel Wilford went to an
22 observation post in a building somewhere in the area
23 that I have marked with the blue arrow. It is not
24 certain that it was this building, but it is certain he
25 was in this area. The building I have marked in red is
1 a church; it is a Presbyterian Church.
2 Do you have any recollection now of being near
3 a church at any time?
4 A. No, sorry, I do not.
5 Q. Do any of the buildings on this picture look familiar?
6 A. No.
7 Q. We will leave the photograph on the screen for the
8 moment. You recollect meeting Colonel Wilford and
9 another officer. Did you meet them outside or in
10 a building?
11 A. Outside.
12 Q. On a street?
13 A. Back door of the building.
14 Q. You have said that the officer was of higher rank than
15 the Colonel. Do you recall what rank he held?
16 A. No, not really.
17 Q. Are you certain he was senior to the Colonel?
18 A. By the ensigns on his shoulders, yes.
19 Q. Are you certain the other officer was Colonel Wilford?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. The Inquiry has evidence of there being one senior
22 officer on the ground, one officer who was senior to
23 Colonel Wilford; that was the Commander of Land Forces,
24 General Ford. There is no evidence at the moment to
25 suggest that he was in the area of these buildings at
1 the same time as Colonel Wilford.
2 Did you know what General Ford looked like?
3 A. No.
4 Q. If I showed you a picture of him now, is there any
5 chance it might jog any memories?
6 A. I would not have thought so, no.
7 Q. Your recollection is that you went into a two-storey
8 building. The one into which there is evidence that
9 Colonel Wilford went, the one marked with the blue arrow
10 on this picture, is at least three storeys. Could you
11 be wrong about that and could it have been a bigger
12 building?
13 A. I can only say that we went in from the back door, went
14 up the one flight of stairs and then went on the floor.
15 I do not know what was above that building or not.
16 Q. As far as you are aware, was this other officer with
17 Colonel Wilford all the time?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Might he have been a more junior rank than lieutenant
20 colonel?
21 A. I cannot really say.
22 Q. Could we go -- stay with the picture for the moment --
23 in your statement, although we need not turn to it,
24 paragraph 8, you say that Colonel Wilford and the other
25 officer looked out of one window. You do not believe
1 the officers had a radio with them.
2 Do you remember if they had a radio operator
3 anywhere in the area?
4 A. No, they did not, not in the vicinity of the building,
5 no.
6 Q. You say they looked out of one window, you looked out of
7 the other and you could hear sounds of screaming,
8 bricks, bottles and stones being thrown and you could
9 see a group of people surging from an open area outside
10 throwing stones and bottles, but you could not see what
11 they were throwing them at.
12 How far away from you was this group of people?
13 A. I could not really say now, it would be a guess, but we
14 could see the faces and what, what they had in their
15 hands, so we must have been fairly close.
16 Q. Did you feel there was any risk that those people would
17 throw missiles that would go into your building?
18 A. No, because they were not looking at our building, they
19 were looking at whoever they were throwing the debris
20 and bottles at.
21 Q. Were they close enough to hurl missiles through the
22 windows of your building if they saw you?
23 A. Oh, yes.
24 Q. Were you, the private and the two officers, the only
25 people in this building?
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. Were there any other soldiers in the vicinity?
3 A. Not as far as we were aware.
4 Q. As you were looking out of the window, you say you saw
5 a group of people; how many people, very roughly, were
6 in that group?
7 A. It was impossible to count them. It was a crowd, it was
8 a mob. Not a mob of five or six people, there was a lot
9 of people there.
10 Q. Did you see the main body of a march passing by?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Of the people throwing stones, are we talking about 50
13 people or 1,000 people; roughly what size was this crowd
14 that you remember?
15 A. From the angle of our window, because the windows in the
16 building was on our right-hand side, so all we got was
17 the window, another building, but a passageway where we
18 could see the crowd running backwards and forwards.
19 I cannot really say how many, but there was quite
20 a few of people there, a lot of people there.
21 Q. Could we go back to your statement, please, C1940.2,
22 paragraphs 9 to 10. You say that a short while after
23 you had entered the building, the officers released you
24 and the private and you returned on foot to your Pig,
25 which you say:
1 " ... was still parked at the housing estate."
2 Earlier in your statement you say you stopped
3 outside Londonderry near a housing estate. When you
4 were released by the officers, did you really go back
5 outside Londonderry?
6 A. No. We stopped -- as far as I can remember we made our
7 way to the outskirts of Londonderry. We stopped there
8 for a while, I do not know how long. Then we got told
9 to move further into Londonderry location and that is
10 when meself and the private, when we were in this closer
11 location, was asked to, um, meet Colonel Wilford.
12 Q. How far away was your Pig when you went back to it from
13 the building that you had been in with Colonel Wilford?
14 A. Um, at a guess I would say two or three minutes',
15 running.
16 Q. You have said that when you reached the Pig Sergeant
17 Major 202 ordered you to go and assist with escorting
18 prisoners.
19 Sergeant Major 202's surname is now known publicly,
20 it is Sergeant Major Lewis; is that right?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. His first name is not known, I would ask you, please,
23 not to give that.
24 When you saw him and he ordered you to go and assist
25 with escorting prisoners, was this before members of
1 your regiment had deployed into the Bogside or after?
2 A. I think it was going to be at the beginning of the --
3 all the battalion, or should I say all Support Company
4 going forward.
5 Q. When you went back to your Pig, were other members of
6 Support Company there with other Pigs?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And were they waiting to go into the Bogside?
9 A. They were waiting for orders.
10 Q. Do you remember now going through a barrier into the
11 Bogside?
12 A. No, I do not.
13 Q. When Sergeant Major Lewis gave you the order to assist
14 with escorting prisoners, was this, as far as you are
15 aware, before any prisoners had actually been taken?
16 A. Well, we were told that people, if there was any arrest,
17 that people would be bringing them to certain locations
18 and I was to take the prisoners off the arresting
19 soldier and take them to a certain point.
20 Q. Did you stay with other members of the company until the
21 order was given to go into the Bogside?
22 A. No, I think meself and whoever was with me, we moved,
23 um, because we did not have a big distance to cover, we
24 moved further -- first, I think, that we moved first
25 before the rest of the company did.
1 Q. And you were on foot?
2 A. We were on foot.
3 Q. Do you remember seeing the rest of the company come in
4 behind you?
5 A. No.
6 Q. You have said that you were ordered to position
7 yourselves; you cannot say where that was, but you
8 remember running through alleyways to get there and you
9 remember seeing a crowd when you emerged from the
10 alleyway, who were throwing all sorts of missiles.
11 I would like to ask you to look at another
12 photograph to see if you can place yourself on it.
13 Could we please have P203 on the left-hand side of the
14 screen and keep this paragraph on the right.
15 There is evidence that members of your platoon --
16 Sergeant Major Lewis was positioned at a barrier known
17 to us as barrier 12, which was very roughly in the
18 position I have marked with my arrow and that soldiers
19 deployed in the direction that I have marked, going down
20 into Rossville Street, which is where my furthest red
21 arrow is. (Indicating)
22 Looking at that now, does that bring back any
23 recollections of where you went?
24 A. No, sorry, it does not, no.
25 Q. You say, if we look at the text on the right-hand side,
1 that you remember seeing a crowd when you emerged from
2 the alleyway and from where you were positioned, you
3 were able to see a small part of the Rossville Flats.
4 The Rossville Flats you can see are the three
5 buildings in the top left-hand side of the picture. Do
6 you remember now, looking back, where the crowd was that
7 you could see throwing missiles?
8 A. I cannot really remember, to tell you the truth. If
9 I guessed it would not be right.
10 Q. Do you remember how close you were to the flats?
11 A. We could see, um, one corner.
12 Q. Was there a street between you and the flats?
13 A. A street or a road, yes.
14 Q. Do you remember seeing anything like a wasteground that
15 we see here marked on the map, known to us as the
16 Eden Place wasteground?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Do you remember being able to see a barricade placed
19 across the road by civilians; this is not an Army
20 barricade, but one made of rubble and debris?
21 A. From our position we never saw nothing like that, no.
22 Q. Do you remember, as you looked across, as you looked
23 across the street towards the Rossville Flats, seeing
24 a large body of people other than the people throwing
25 missiles?
1 A. There was people all over the place, not just the people
2 that were throwing stones, there was people milling
3 about and running about in a lot of places.
4 Q. Do you remember seeing any Army vehicles?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Do you remember seeing any other soldiers on foot?
7 A. The only personnel I saw was when people from the
8 battalion was bringing prisoners back in to be escorted,
9 they were the only people I saw.
10 Q. Looking at the picture on the left now, do you remember
11 where you were when other soldiers brought prisoners to
12 you?
13 A. No, I do not, to be honest.
14 Q. As you ran into position, obeying Sergeant Major Lewis's
15 order; do you remember hearing any shots?
16 A. I heard one shot. At the time I thought it was a pistol
17 shot, a low velocity, um, weapon shot.
18 Q. Were you sure about that?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. About it being a low velocity shot?
21 A. You can tell the difference between a high velocity and
22 low, low velocity, um, shot, by pistol (inaudible).
23 Q. Were you sure it came from a pistol?
24 A. I thought it came from a pistol, yes.
25 Q. At the time you heard that shot, had you collected any
1 prisoners?
2 A. One, one had been brought to me at the time, which I was
3 taking to the four-tonners, to where the Military Police
4 were.
5 Q. Were you taking him as you heard the shot?
6 A. I heard the shot first. Then the prisoner came. Then
7 I took him to the wagons where the MPs were.
8 Q. Was he the first prisoner you had check?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Do you have any idea where he came from?
11 A. No.
12 Q. You have said in your statement that you thought that
13 shot came from the Rossville Flats. Could we have on
14 the right-hand side of the screen paragraphs 11 to 12,
15 please. In your statement you say you cannot say why
16 you believe that. Do you have any idea now why you
17 think that shot came from the area of the
18 Rossville Flats?
19 A. I am still under the same opinion, me own impression,
20 that it came from the Rossville Flats.
21 Q. Do you have now any idea where you were when you heard
22 the shot?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Do you feel that you were under fire?
25 A. Meself personally, no.
1 Q. You have also said in your statement that you did hear
2 some other bangs, but they could have been anything?
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. We know that members of the Parachute Regiment fired
5 over 100 live SLR rounds. Do you have any recollection
6 of hearing that volume of shooting?
7 A. I heard bangs, they might have been shots; they could
8 have been rubber Dick guns going off, I do not know.
9 I never heard all that many shots.
10 Q. What made you distinguish this one low velocity shot
11 from all the other bangs that you heard?
12 A. Because it was the first shot, what I had heard while we
13 were there.
14 Q. When you heard it, do you have any idea how long it was
15 after you had gone into the Bogside in obedience to the
16 sergeant major's order?
17 A. I cannot really say, no.
18 Q. Thank you very much. Those are all my questions.
19 Questioned by MR ELIAS
20 MR ELIAS: 1940, I act for Company Sergeant Major Lewis,
21 202. My name is Elias.
22 Just a question or two about your recollection.
23 Sergeant Major Lewis has no specific recollection of
24 ordering you to do anything. Maybe that is not
25 surprising, but could I ask you, this: you are quite
1 clear, are you, that when you were given the order to
2 form part of the prisoner escort party, that was before
3 the Pigs had gone in?
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. Do you think it may be rather than being sent to
6 a specific spot as part of the escort party, the
7 instruction that was given to you was along these
8 lines: that you should follow your unit in and remain
9 towards the rear, in order to act as an escort party for
10 those who might be arrested by those ahead of you?
11 A. From what I can remember from the sergeant major was we
12 had to go to a certain position and escort people who
13 had been arrested to a certain position, to where the
14 four-tonners were.
15 Q. You cannot remember to where the certain position was?
16 A. No.
17 Q. If I were to suggest that the sergeant major could not
18 have known it at this stage because the arrest operation
19 had not begun and that he was saying to you, in effect,
20 "Follow your unit in and remain at the rear," do you
21 think that may be right?
22 A. I do not think so, because I never moved in with my
23 unit.
24 Q. You went in entirely -- just with one other man, did
25 you?
1 A. We were told where to go and stopped there until
2 prisoners had come to us.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 LORD SAVILLE: Do we have any other questions of this
5 witness?
6 MS McGAHEY: I have no further questions, thank you, sir.
7 LORD SAVILLE: It is the Chairman again: thank you very much
8 for coming here to give evidence to the Tribunal, thank
9 you.
10 (The witness withdrew)
11 LIEUTENANT 026, sworn
12 Questioned by MR ROXBURGH
13 LORD SAVILLE: If look across to your left, you can see who
14 is speaking to you. I say this to all the
15 witnesses: I am the Chairman. The questions will come
16 from the barristers, the people in front of me. Could
17 I ask you to pull the microphone a little towards you so
18 we will all be able to hear what you have to say.
19 MR ROXBURGH: May we have on the screen, please, B1544.
20 026, do you have with you a copy of the statement you
21 made to this Inquiry on 4th October 1999?
22 A. Yes, I do.
23 Q. Are the contents of that statement true to the best of
24 your knowledge and belief?
25 A. Yes, they are.
1 Q. In paragraph 3 you explain the position that you held
2 in January 1972, you say that you were a second
3 lieutenant and platoon commander of a platoon in
4 C Company of your battalion.
5 Was that 8 Platoon?
6 A. Yes, it was.
7 Q. Your officer commanding was Major 221A and you say that
8 your battalion was the reserve for the province.
9 Strictly speaking, was the position that your battalion
10 was the reserve for 39 Brigade in Belfast?
11 A. Strictly speaking it was, indeed.
12 Q. May we go on to paragraph 5, where you say that prior to
13 30th January 1972 you had never been to Londonderry, but
14 you were well aware of the situation there. What, in
15 general terms, was your understanding at the time of the
16 situation in Londonderry?
17 A. Firstly, I had been in Northern Ireland since --
18 virtually continuously since August 1971, therefore
19 I would have been well aware of what was going on, not
20 only in Londonderry, but in also the border areas.
21 Therefore, I was well aware of the situation of the
22 three Army brigades and what was occurring.
23 My understanding of the situation in Londonderry at
24 the time was, um, certainly that there was a strong IRA
25 element in the city; there had been a lot of, a lot of
1 disturbances and, equally, a lot of shootings and
2 bombings.
3 Q. Were you conscious -- again in general terms -- of any
4 differences between the way the Army had been dealing
5 with the situation in Londonderry from the way in which
6 the Army tended to act in Belfast?
7 A. Most of my operations -- operational duties had been in
8 Belfast. I cannot at this stage -- at this time say
9 I can recall any particular differences. I am certain
10 there probably were, but I cannot recall.
11 Q. If we go on to paragraphs 6 to 8 in your statement, you
12 describe there what you remember about briefings that
13 you received before your deployment on
14 30th January 1972. You explain that after such a long
15 time it is difficult to be certain, but as far as you
16 recall, the first briefing took place about a week
17 before you went to Londonderry.
18 In relation to that first briefing, in paragraph 7
19 you say, this:
20 "To me, the most important aspect of the briefing
21 was the threat assessment during which we were provided
22 with information regarding the strength of the IRA in
23 Londonderry at the time. The IRA in this area were
24 known to be engaged in more shooting incidents than
25 their counterparts in Belfast."
1 Do you remember anything else that you were told
2 about either the strength of the IRA in Londonderry or
3 the tactics that they used?
4 A. At this stage I cannot recall, no, I cannot.
5 Q. Do you remember whether you were told anything at this
6 briefing about how the IRA was expected to behave on the
7 day of the march?
8 A. I cannot honestly recall, I am sorry to say.
9 Q. In paragraph 8 you say that you believe that at some
10 point you were shown a map of Londonderry and informed
11 that:
12 "... historically, Waterloo Place was the likely
13 flash point for a riot."
14 Are you sure that Waterloo Place was the place that
15 was mentioned to you?
16 A. Once again the name, the name, "Waterloo Place," is one
17 I remember as being associated with being a flash point.
18 I cannot, after this period of time, be 100 per cent
19 certain, but I recall it as being a name synonymous with
20 being a potential flash point.
21 Q. May we go on to the next page, please, to paragraphs 9
22 and 10, where you explain that on the morning of
23 30th January you arrived at a building on the outskirts
24 of the city and then you and the other platoon
25 commanders were given a tour of the area, which you
1 describe in more detail in paragraph 10. You say that
2 you were shown around by a lieutenant from the Scots
3 Guards.
4 Are you sure that he was from the Scots Guards or
5 may it have been another regiment?
6 A. It could have been. I seem to recall -- it was
7 certainly a lieutenant, without any doubt, and I believe
8 he was from a Guards regiment, but I cannot be
9 100 per cent certain about it being Scots Guards. I can
10 certainly be 100 per cent certain that it was
11 a lieutenant from another unit.
12 Q. Our understanding is that the Scots Guards were not in
13 Londonderry on that day, but that a battalion of the
14 Coldstream Guards was?
15 A. In that case it was a Coldstream Guards lieutenant.
16 I am happy to accept that.
17 Q. In paragraphs 11 to 15 you go on to deal with a further
18 briefing that you received on the day, which you say
19 concentrated mostly on the threat posed by the local IRA
20 and was a briefing given either by Colonel Wilford or by
21 Major 221A, that is the officer commanding C Company.
22 Is the position that you just cannot remember one
23 way or the other which of those two officers it was, or
24 do you have an idea as to which it probably was?
25 A. No, I certainly cannot recall. I think also I ought to
1 define the word "briefing"; I have used the word
2 "briefing" a lot, partly because Eversheds, when they
3 were taking the statement, were -- I believe were
4 pushing me for a number of briefings that were given.
5 I should say that briefings could last anything from 45
6 seconds to 45 minutes, depending on, on what was going
7 on at the time.
8 I would have expected there to be a briefing given
9 by Major 221A, certainly more likely than by
10 Colonel Wilford, but it is possible it was by
11 Colonel Wilford, that is all I can really recall.
12 Q. Do you recall, in this particular case, how substantial
13 or formal or brief and informal the briefing was?
14 A. I do not. I am fairly certain there was some form of
15 briefing, there ought to have been, to get us moving;
16 that is the point I am really making, but I would have
17 expected as much information as was available to be
18 provided, but that may only have taken a minute or two.
19 Q. Are you able to say anything more about this briefing
20 than that it concentrated on the threat posed by the
21 local IRA?
22 A. I cannot recall. I mean, we are all aware of what the
23 battalion was doing there at the time so, and we were
24 there, as I understand it, as part of a much larger
25 arrest operation.
1 When I refer to briefings I am talking about
2 specific briefings that affected our individual role.
3 Q. Do you remember whether, at any stage, any briefing or
4 warning was given to you about an expectation that IRA
5 gunmen might use the march as an opportunity to mount
6 attacks on the Security Forces?
7 A. I do not think there was any requirement for a briefing.
8 By the time it came to January 1972 we had already taken
9 part in many riot situations in Belfast; we were well
10 versed in the tactics of the IRA in using riots to
11 shield their own gunmen. Therefore, it was an
12 expectation that, in the event of there being a riot,
13 there could be gunmen and that was our job as soldiers
14 to prepare for that.
15 Q. In paragraph 15 you say:
16 "As the briefing was taking place, I remember that
17 I became aware that there was something going on in the
18 city, I cannot now remember how I knew this. It may
19 have been the sound of gunfire or baton rounds, I am not
20 sure, but we all would have known that trouble had
21 broken out."
22 Can you remember, is this realisation, that
23 something was going on, something that came to you as
24 a result of something you heard live, or may it have
25 been something that resulted from a message over the
1 radio?
2 A. My, my recollection, without any doubt, is that
3 something was heard live; it was either baton rounds or
4 live rounds, I cannot recall. But my recollection is
5 that we all heard some form of noise in the background
6 coming from the city, literally minutes before we
7 actually deployed on to the vehicles.
8 Q. If your recollection is of hearing something live, may
9 it be that you heard it at a time when you were much
10 closer to the area where you were in fact in due course
11 deployed than the building on the outskirts of the city
12 to which you have referred?
13 A. Sorry, I have not made that clear: we were, we were
14 certainly within -- I do not know where it was, I cannot
15 recall after this amount of time, but we were certainly
16 on the outskirts of the city where we had stopped.
17 I still have it in my mind it was a school, but I have
18 been led to believe the original place where we all
19 formed up was the Drumahoe factory.
20 But when we heard, we, we certainly were close, very
21 close to the, the main city centre and we must have
22 paused there for whatever reason and it is at that stage
23 that I can, without any doubt, say I certainly heard
24 some form of either baton rounds or live rounds being
25 fired.
1 Q. In paragraph 16 you explain, if we go to the top of the
2 next page, that you travelled in two Pigs but one of the
3 Pigs broke down and you ordered four of your men to stay
4 with it, including the driver.
5 Did that vehicle and those men remain out of action
6 for the rest of the afternoon or did there come a time
7 when they rejoined you and the rest of the platoon?
8 A. At no stage did that vehicle, that breakdown or the
9 driver and the men I left behind rejoin me. I later
10 found out, in fact, that I believe they were used as
11 escort duty for the, for the -- or for an ambulance.
12 Certainly I am aware that they became, that the driver,
13 who I can remember, was INQ2121, I am aware from talking
14 to him, and we all met up at the end of it, he had been
15 used as an escort for an ambulance, but he did not, nor
16 did the others, join me.
17 Q. Was he acting as an escort for a military ambulance or
18 a civilian ambulance?
19 A. Military ambulance. I would see no reason why he would
20 be used as an escort for a, for a civilian ambulance.
21 Q. Do you know who was in the military ambulance?
22 A. I, I do not. I believe it was the regimental doctor
23 whose name is not on my list, but I can recall it.
24 Q. Did you ever discover whether the ambulance contained
25 any casualties?
1 A. No, I did not. I mean, I only brought that up because
2 you mentioned did they ever rejoin me. I was actually
3 clarifying, they did not rejoin me, but they did play
4 another part in the events of the afternoon, as far as
5 I can recall.
6 Q. May we go on to your actual deployment, which you
7 describe in paragraphs 17 to 19. You explain the
8 congestion in Waterloo place and the way in which your
9 men proceeded on foot.
10 You say in paragraph 17 that you had one of your
11 soldiers carry a night-sight on his rifle. We have
12 heard references in other evidence to a kind of sight
13 called a Starlight scope; is that the same as the
14 night-sight to which you are referring, or is it
15 something different?
16 A. Yes, it is, I think it was -- military term was an IWS,
17 "Individual Weapon Sight," the term "starlight scope,"
18 I think was the reference to the original American
19 version. Yes, it was known as a Starlight scope.
20 Q. Would such a sight have been of any use in daylight
21 conditions, or would it only have been of use at night?
22 A. No, as far as I can recall it was good enough to use --
23 it was perfectly good enough to use in daylight, it
24 tended not to be used too much in daylight because it
25 was, it was fragile, but because it was getting dark at
1 the time, I thought it wise to have him carry that
2 night-sight on his rifle.
3 Q. I would like to show you a photograph, please, P253. We
4 can see in this photograph a number of soldiers at what
5 is in fact the corner of Chamberlain Street. The third
6 soldier from the left, who is holding his rifle down
7 towards the ground, appears to have some form of
8 unusually large sight on the weapon. Are you able to
9 say whether that is a night-sight or not?
10 A. Yes, I can, firstly, say that the soldiers are
11 8 Platoon, that is my platoon. Secondly, that is the
12 night-sight to which you refer.
13 Q. Please do not mention any names, but are you able to
14 recognise soldiers in that photograph by name?
15 A. Yes, I am.
16 Q. Would you be kind enough to type the names that you
17 remember one by one into the keyboard to your right and
18 may we take the soldiers from left to right, first of
19 all; can you remember the soldier on the extreme left
20 who is pointing his rifle horizontally?
21 A. I am sorry I cannot identify him from that, from that --
22 the angle he is, nor can I identify the second one. The
23 one with the night-sight I can identify.
24 Q. Would you kindly type his name into the keyboard,
25 please. (Pause).
1 Are you able to give his first name, his surname is
2 a reasonably common one?
3 A. I am sorry, I can only give his rank, I cannot recall
4 his first name.
5 Q. His rank would be helpful as well, please?
6 A. Private soldier.
7 Q. We may have to check up on that, because we have
8 a number of soldiers by that name?
9 A. Right, there was only one of that name serving in
10 8 Platoon.
11 Q. We will look into that. May we carry on, moving to the
12 right, please?
13 A. Yes, indeed (Pause).
14 Q. Thank you. The soldier fourth from the left facing the
15 camera is INQ2151. We then see a soldier five from the
16 left with his visor up and somebody else's hand
17 appearing above his head; do you recognise him?
18 A. I am 80 per cent certain who I think it is. Shall
19 I type his name in?
20 Q. Yes, please. (Pause). Thank you, that is Private
21 INQ12. There is a soldier to the right of him in the
22 photograph, pointing his rifle down towards the ground
23 with one foot on the kerb and one in the roadway; do you
24 recognise him?
25 A. Yes, I do.
1 Q. Could you kindly type his name in, please. (Pause).
2 That is INQ579.
3 May we go back to your statement at page 1545.002,
4 paragraphs 18 to 19, where you say that after receiving
5 orders from Major 221A, you climbed over the barrier on
6 foot and turned left into Chamberlain Street and at the
7 end of that paragraph you say that your platoon was not
8 the first through the barrier, you believe that 7 and 9
9 Platoons went through before you.
10 Are you sure about that, that 7 and 9 Platoons went
11 through before you?
12 A. I am as certain as I can be, because if you recall
13 I stated that one of my Pigs breakdown. That delayed us
14 while I moved most of my men from that Pig on to the one
15 remaining Pig that was serviceable.
16 By the time we got to the -- that is 8 Platoon --
17 barrier I was fairly certain that the -- we had already
18 lost the other two platoons and the rest of the company,
19 so I am certain they were ahead of me. At the barrier
20 I was met by 221A.
21 Q. Did you know what tasks had been given to the other
22 platoons in your company?
23 A. Yes, I assume it is the same, and I am assuming, but the
24 tasks given to us all were to arrest, to arrest people
25 rioting.
1 Q. Had you been told to operate in different areas or were
2 you all going into the same area to do the same job?
3 A. We were all operating in the same area.
4 Q. Did you see where the other platoons went when they went
5 through the barrier?
6 A. Yes, I did, I mentioned they were in front of me, but
7 they were only no more than a few hundred metres in
8 front of me, so I could still see them going off to
9 the -- I do not have a map in front of me -- but they
10 went off to the right as I was tasked to go left down
11 Chamberlain Street.
12 Q. If we have the plan on the screen, page 1545.006?
13 A. Soree, I have now a map in front of me.
14 Q. It should be on the screen as well?
15 A. 7 and 9 Platoon went off down William Street and I was,
16 at that stage, caught up with Major 221A and was tasked
17 to go down Chamberlain Street.
18 Q. May we go back to paragraph 19 of your statement where
19 you describe moving down Chamberlain Street with your
20 men and you say at the end of the paragraph:
21 "It was clear to me from debris on the road and the
22 smell of CS gas that a riot had recently been
23 dispersed."
24 Do you remember where you saw debris on the road?
25 A. No, I cannot specifically recall. All I can recall is
1 that the -- it just appeared around the whole of the top
2 of the Chamberlain Street area, that there had been some
3 sort of rioting situation and certainly I seem to recall
4 the smell of CS gas.
5 Q. Should we take it from what you say here that you
6 yourself had not actually seen the rioting in progress
7 at all, you simply saw the debris that it had left?
8 A. At that particular location on -- let me look to my map
9 again (Pause). That particular location on
10 William Street, I did not see any rioting. It was only
11 when I turned into Chamberlain Street that I had a crowd
12 of 60 to 70 people who were generally hurling abuse and
13 behaving as if it was the tail end of a riot. But that
14 was when I became aware that a riot had actually taken
15 place in that particular area.
16 Q. If we look at the beginning of paragraph 20, you refer
17 to a crowd of people ahead of you at the opposite end of
18 the street, the southern end. Is that the group that
19 you are referring to as being -- behaving as if they
20 were the tail end of a riot?
21 A. That is correct. I think in -- my recollection, when
22 I gave this statement in 1999, was that they were at the
23 opposite end of the street. In fairness, if I were to
24 recall my statement given in 1972, I did actually say
25 that they were much closer to us than that and actually
1 withdrew as we advanced down Chamberlain Street, but at
2 a point where, or at a distance where they did not pose
3 us any particular threat, and I -- what I am trying to
4 say is I would actually rather stick by my statement of
5 1972 than that of 1999, if that is possible.
6 Q. Is it also correct, as you said in your statement in
7 1972, that nothing was thrown at you from this crowd of
8 people?
9 A. No, they were actually too -- there was too great
10 a distance. I think they were generally -- there were
11 a few stones that were thrown, but they were not going
12 to hit us, they were probably a good -- too far away for
13 that.
14 Q. You were in charge of a platoon of soldiers, one of
15 whose tasks that afternoon might have been to make
16 arrests; is that not right?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Did you give them any orders before they were deployed
19 about the circumstances in which they ought to make
20 arrests?
21 A. It was not necessary. We had been serving continually
22 in the province since, well, certainly I had been
23 commanding the platoon since -- well, for several
24 months. We had taken part in arrest operations on many
25 many occasions, it was what we would call a standard
1 operating procedure.
2 Q. Under that Standard Operating Procedure, in what
3 circumstances should your soldiers have made arrests?
4 A. In the -- whenever they are ordered to do so by
5 a non-commissioned officer or by myself.
6 Q. In what circumstances would you order your soldiers to
7 make arrests?
8 A. We were part of a battalion arrest operation; it was our
9 job to make arrests on anyone that we thought was
10 responsible for riotous behaviour.
11 Q. Would it be right to say that you would only arrest
12 someone, or you should only have arrested someone, or
13 the soldiers under your command should only have
14 arrested someone if there were grounds for supposing
15 that he had been involved in riotous behaviour, or some
16 other illegal activity?
17 A. We had -- yes, we had every grounds to believe that
18 those people withdrawing down Chamberlain Street had
19 been involved in a riotous situation. As it was, they
20 were hurling abuse and throwing stones at us, even
21 though they were out of range, so to speak.
22 Q. You say that they were throwing stones even though they
23 were out of range. May we look at what you said at the
24 time at B1545.007, where, in the fourth paragraph, you
25 describe the crowd moving backwards down the street and
1 you say:
2 "They remained 50 yards ahead of us all the time.
3 Nothing was thrown at us."
4 A. Right, in that case I accept my version of 1972, nothing
5 was thrown at us.
6 Q. What behaviour did you see on the part of that crowd of
7 people that enabled you to conclude that they had been
8 engaged in riotous behaviour?
9 A. The riotous behaviour, as I recall, had taken place in
10 the area of Waterloo Street and was dispersing by the
11 time we, C Company, went in there. So we were following
12 up a rioting situation.
13 I had every reason to believe, based on the fact
14 that the crowd was dispersing and the crowd were
15 throwing -- were shouting abuse at us, that those people
16 on Chamberlain Street had been part of the, part of the
17 rioters.
18 Q. When a soldier made an arrest, was he under any
19 obligation to explain to the person being arrested why
20 he was being arrested?
21 A. I do not think so. I think, as I seem to recall, it was
22 a simple case of stating, "As a member of her Majesty's
23 Forces, I arrest you."
24 Q. What procedure was supposed to be followed once an
25 arrest had been made in that way?
1 A. Once the arrest had been made, the person arrested was
2 then taken back to -- there would normally be an area
3 where those arrested would be detained and that would be
4 organised by battalion headquarters.
5 Q. So the soldier who had made the arrest would take the
6 arrested person back to that area; is that right?
7 A. That would be the normal procedure, yes.
8 Q. Then what would happen?
9 A. I cannot say, I was never part of that, that operation.
10 I can tell you what I would have expected to happen, but
11 I was not part of the operation.
12 Q. Do you know whether, as a matter of Standard Operating
13 Procedure, a soldier who made an arrest was expected to
14 make any form of statement to anyone explaining why he
15 had arrested the person?
16 A. Yes, the soldier being arrested would have been expected
17 to make a statement. I mean, I cannot say what the
18 detail was, or I cannot recall the detail beyond that.
19 Q. May we go, please, to paragraphs 20 and 21 of your
20 statement at B1545.002. We have seen the passage in
21 which you describe the crowd in Chamberlain Street and
22 you then go on to say that at point A you saw a priest,
23 who you now know to be Father Daly, emerge from the
24 junction of Chamberlain Street and Eden Place at point
25 B.
1 Perhaps we should look at the plan again, to
2 identify where you are talking about. B1545.006. Point
3 A has been marked to show your position approximately in
4 Chamberlain Street close to the junction with
5 High Street.
6 Point B as shown on the plan is actually a little
7 distance from the junction of Chamberlain Street and
8 Harvey Street. We have seen video footage of
9 Father Daly and the group with the wounded young man,
10 coming up Chamberlain Street from the direction of the
11 Rossville Flats and then turning into Harvey Street.
12 Is that what you remember seeing, or do you remember
13 something different?
14 A. I tended to think that Father Daly had moved all the way
15 up Chamberlain Street, but I cannot recall exactly where
16 he went after he passed through us, mainly because I was
17 concentrating on moving down to, down to Chamberlain --
18 down to the bottom of Chamberlain Street.
19 I always had it in mind that he had come out of
20 Eden Place, I cannot think why, but certainly he, he
21 emerged from behind sort of the crowd of people who were
22 withdrawing, but he very definitely passed through us.
23 Q. When you first arrived in Chamberlain Street, were you
24 right up with the other members of your platoon or did
25 you lag behind for any reason?
1 A. There was absolutely no reason why I would lag behind,
2 I was the platoon commander.
3 Q. The next question is: do you have any memory of how long
4 you had been in Chamberlain Street before you saw
5 Father Daly?
6 A. Not very long. It is difficult to say, I think he came
7 up Chamberlain Street more or less as we, um -- he
8 certainly passed through us more or less as we moved in.
9 Q. Do you remember whether the crowd that had retreated
10 down Chamberlain Street was still there when Father Daly
11 came through, or not?
12 A. I think they probably were, but I cannot be certain.
13 Q. Do you have any recollection really of anything that
14 happened in Chamberlain Street between the time when you
15 arrived and the time when you saw Father Daly
16 approaching?
17 A. No, I do not.
18 Q. Were you aware, before you saw Father Daly, of any
19 shooting of any kind taking place in the area?
20 A. Yes. I was well aware of shooting going on even whilst
21 we were at the Waterloo Place end. It was quite clear
22 that shooting was going on at that stage.
23 From the time we got to the top of Chamberlain
24 Street, I personally do not recall any shooting
25 happening from that point on.
1 Q. When you heard shooting, were you able to tell what kind
2 of shooting it was?
3 A. I cannot recall, I mean, it did not -- nothing stuck out
4 in mind, I certainly cannot recall, I am sorry.
5 Q. When you saw Father Daly, you say that you sent
6 a soldier to check the young man who was being carried;
7 is that right?
8 A. That is correct. I can give his name as INQ1334.
9 Q. What was the purpose of asking him to check the young
10 man?
11 A. Firstly, he was carrying -- Father Daly was carrying
12 someone who had clearly been wounded, um -- I wanted to
13 make sure there was no weapon being carried and it was
14 fairly clear from just a quick look that that was not
15 the case.
16 Secondly, it was common military sense to find out
17 what on earth was going on.
18 Q. Did it occur to you to call an ambulance over the radio?
19 A. Well, two things: we did not have any medical -- as
20 I have said, we had no medical facilities and, secondly,
21 Father Daly and his, and the group of people with him,
22 made it quite clear to us he did not want our
23 assistance.
24 Q. If we may go to page 1545.003, please, paragraphs 22 and
25 23, you describe being joined by your platoon Pig,
1 driven by a soldier whose ciphers is INQ876?
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. And then after that you moved down to the south end of
4 Chamberlain Street, as you describe in paragraph 23,
5 where you say:
6 "I got to the end of Chamberlain Street, the Pig
7 parked at the most southerly point of the street with
8 its nose facing towards Block 3 of the Rossville Flats.
9 I have marked its approximate position as C on the
10 attached map."
11 Do you remember whether or not Major 221A was with
12 you at this point?
13 A. He was not with me at that point.
14 Q. And you go on to say:
15 "Ahead of me in the courtyard of the Rossville Flats
16 I could see two frightened women crouching behind
17 a small car. The car was similar in size to an old
18 Hillman Imp and its approximate position is marked E on
19 the map. The women were clearly in fear and we
20 persuaded them to come to us. We then arranged for them
21 to move further up Chamberlain Street to a place of
22 safety."
23 May we look once again at the plan, B1545.006. We
24 can see where point C has been marked, showing the
25 position of the Pig, and E, the approximate position of
1 the car. With that in mind, may we look at photograph
2 EP28.1, please. This is a photograph, as you can see,
3 taken from the Rossville Flats looking towards
4 Chamberlain Street on the right and in the foreground we
5 have the car park of the Rossville Flats. This
6 photograph was taken at a time that must have been some
7 minutes before you arrived at the south end of
8 Chamberlain Street.
9 We can see in it a car parked close to the western
10 gable end of Chamberlain Street. Are you able to say
11 whether or not that might have been the car behind which
12 the women were sheltering?
13 A. It could possibly have been the car, that is all I can
14 say. I am still perhaps 95 per cent certain that the
15 car was parked more in the open where I had indicated
16 it, that is further towards the bottom of the picture
17 and down level with the end of Chamberlain Street.
18 Q. It may be nothing much turns on this, but we can just
19 see also in this photograph that right down across the
20 mouth of Chamberlain Street there were four bollards
21 which would have prevented a vehicle from driving from
22 Chamberlain Street into the car park. May it be that
23 the Pig of your platoon did not come quite so far down
24 as to have its nose actually sticking into the car park?
25 A. We certainly did not knock the bollards over. In that
1 case, we did not protrude beyond the bollards, but we
2 were certainly were down as far as we possibly could go.
3 Q. When you looked from Chamberlain Street into the car
4 park, was the car park empty of people, or were there
5 people in it?
6 A. My memory was that the people who had moved down the
7 Chamberlain Street ahead of us, some dispersed into the
8 bottom left house at the -- I do not know the number --
9 and some dispersed across the car park. It was very
10 quickly -- the car park was very quickly empty of all
11 people, apart from the two women.
12 Q. Are you sure that when you looked into the car park that
13 was after Father Daly had moved up Chamberlain Street
14 with the wounded boy?
15 A. Without any doubt.
16 Q. You have told us that you arranged for the women behind
17 the car to move up Chamberlain Street to a place of
18 safety. Did you go with them or did you stay where you
19 were?
20 A. I stayed exactly where I was. I had no reason to go
21 with them, nor any interest.
22 Q. If we go to paragraphs 24 and 25 in your statement, you
23 deal with the gunfire that you heard, and you say:
24 "So far as I am able to recall, shortly after we got
25 to the end of Chamberlain Street, I heard two or three
1 gunshots which I believe were fired from a high velocity
2 weapon. It sounded to me, and to some of the men with
3 me, like an M1 carbine."
4 Please do not mention anyone by name, but do you in
5 fact remember who the men were who were with you when
6 you heard the shots that you describe?
7 A. I cannot specifically remember exactly who was around.
8 I believe it may well have been INQ1334 and one or two
9 others. I cannot personally recall.
10 Q. You say that the shots seemed to come from Block 2 of
11 the Rossville Flats, but you could not be sure, and were
12 directed in a north-westerly direction as indicated by
13 the arrows on the map. How sure were you about the
14 direction in which the shots were travelling?
15 A. Pretty certain. They were fired across our front, they
16 were not fired at us, nor did the round pass directly
17 over our head. But I am as certain as anyone can be,
18 they were fired in that direction.
19 Q. Would you have been able at that time to distinguish
20 reasonably accurately between the sounds of different
21 kinds of high velocity weapon?
22 A. Without any doubt.
23 Q. Do you have any present recollection of hearing any
24 other firing at this stage apart from those two or three
25 shots?
1 A. No, my memory is based on my statement which -- you will
2 also recall that my 1999 statement said two or three
3 gunshots, my 1972 statement described a lot more. I am
4 certain that the weapon that was fired was an
5 M1 carbine. I am less certain about the other weapon,
6 but I can say it was another high velocity weapon and it
7 was certainly not an SLR.
8 Q. We can all see what is written in your 1972 statement,
9 but just focusing on what you can actually remember now,
10 did you form any impression, so far as you can remember,
11 as to whether the shots were being fired from ground
12 level or from higher up?
13 A. I personally felt they were being fired from higher up.
14 I am fairly certain they were not fired from ground
15 level.
16 Q. Is it fair to say that in a built-up area it can be very
17 difficult to tell where firing is coming from, even for
18 an experienced soldier?
19 A. It is not easy, but I am fairly certain that the fire
20 was going in that direction. If it had been coming in
21 the other direction, we would have picked up ricochets.
22 There were no ricochets associated with those, those
23 weapons firing.
24 Q. Do you think there is any possibility that any of the
25 firing that you heard was 7.62-millimetre SLR fire?
1 A. Absolutely none.
2 Q. Do you remember hearing any firing while you were in the
3 vicinity of the south end of Chamberlain Street that you
4 recognised as Army fire?
5 A. No, there was -- I am not aware of there being any 7.62
6 fire from the time I was in Chamberlain Street.
7 Q. Do you have any recollection of approximately how long
8 after Father Daly had come past you you heard this
9 firing?
10 A. I could not say exactly, but it would only have taken us
11 about a minute to get to the bottom of Chamberlain
12 Street, so possibly, um, possibly no more than a few
13 minutes, but I cannot recall specifically.
14 Q. If we look at the statement that you made at the time at
15 B1545.007, you set out in the last paragraph on this
16 page the recollection that you had at the time, of
17 hearing the sound of:
18 "... two distinct weapons, firing between 20 and 30
19 rounds within a space of five to ten minutes."
20 You deal with the direction of fire and your
21 identification of one of the weapons almost certainly as
22 an M1 carbine and the other possibly of a .303 calibre,
23 but definitely not 7.62.
24 Over the page you said in this statement:
25 "I could not see the target in question, neither was
1 I able to pinpoint the exact position of the gunmen.
2 I could not see any weapon or flashes indicating firing
3 position, consequently we did not return any fire.
4 "From my own observations, I am of the opinion that
5 both weapons were located on the roof of Rossville Flats
6 in the immediate vicinity of a lift housing. I have
7 marked the area concerned on the map, the approximate
8 map reference being 4328/1675."
9 When you used the words, "from my own observations,"
10 what did you mean by that?
11 A. That is the area in which I believed the gunmen were
12 located, the statement of the opinion was mine, it was
13 not anyone else's.
14 Q. Do you remember whether you were shown any photographs
15 when you made this statement to the Military Police?
16 A. I cannot honestly recall. All I would say is that the
17 Rossville Flats were relatively high from ground level
18 and we were fairly close to the bottom of them, so we
19 were looking up at quite a steep angle. So it would
20 have been perfectly possible for gunmen to have been on
21 the roof or in the higher elements of the block of flats
22 without us being able to see them clearly.
23 Q. Would you have been able to see a lift housing on the
24 top of one of the blocks?
25 A. I cannot honestly say, um, someone must have mentioned
1 the lift housing to me, possibly it was the Military
2 Police.
3 Q. Do you think that somebody must have mentioned it to you
4 or is it possible that this is something you saw
5 yourself?
6 A. I cannot honestly recall. As I think back, I cannot
7 recall a lift housing at all.
8 Q. Perhaps we had better look briefly at Q3 just to see
9 where the grid reference that you gave is. Can we
10 enlarge the area around the Rossville Flats, please. We
11 can see that grid reference 4328/1675 is approximately
12 there, in other words somewhere towards the southern end
13 of the central block of the Rossville Flats and you
14 would have been observing from somewhere around the
15 south end of Chamberlain Street, just where my second
16 arrow is? (Indicating)
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. With that in mind, may we look at a photograph, please,
19 P205. This obviously is an aerial photograph and it
20 shows the mouth of Chamberlain Street and the three
21 blocks of the Rossville Flats. Does anything in that
22 photograph help you to remember the lift housing or
23 anything that you saw that was where you thought the
24 gunman was?
25 A. Not from that angle, but I would say the gunman appeared
1 to be in the left-hand area. I would abide by what
2 I said where the grid reference was. That, of course,
3 is taking the exact opposite to the angle that we were
4 looking at it.
5 Q. Yes, it is. May we go to page B1545.003, paragraph 26,
6 where you say:
7 "I was conscious of the fact that I had no cover at
8 all at the (southern) end of Chamberlain Street.
9 I approached the door of the end house on the east side
10 of the street. I remember being with one of my men at
11 the time."
12 The cipher given is UNK411, but for the benefit of
13 others in the room, I can say that that is, that cipher
14 refers to the same individual as INQ12. Why did you
15 decide to enter this house?
16 A. For the simple, the simple reason, the door, the door
17 opened; there was absolutely no cover there at all; it
18 was -- at that stage, I was very keen to have some form
19 of protection rather than being out in the open and the
20 door opened without any resistance.
21 And I should also add, we were generally aware that
22 the people, rioters as we thought they were, who had
23 moved down Chamberlain Street, had disappeared in the
24 general area of that house. So I was half expecting
25 there to be people inside.
1 Q. Had you seen any casualties being taken into that house?
2 A. No, not at any stage.
3 Q. And you say that you sent an NCO to check the occupants
4 and discovered that no fewer than 30 people were
5 gathered in this location.
6 Without mentioning anyone by name, do you remember
7 who that NCO was?
8 A. I do not exactly. I know that INQ12, I think, was with
9 them, as you indicated to me. I cannot recall the name
10 of the NCO, I am sorry.
11 Q. Did you go into the house yourself?
12 A. No, I did not, other than just simply kneeling in the
13 doorway to obtain a degree of cover.
14 Q. Should we understand, then, that one of the soldiers who
15 had gone into the house came out and told you that there
16 was a number of people inside?
17 A. That is correct, I was more interested in what was going
18 on in the general area of the Rossville Flats without
19 being involved in checking out the back of a house.
20 Q. You radioed back to the company commander and, if we go
21 over the page, you say you were:
22 "... ordered to detain the people and take them back
23 up Chamberlain Street."
24 Do you know why you were ordered to detain these
25 people?
1 A. No, I cannot recall any specific reasons, but we were
2 after all engaged in an overall arrest operation, so
3 I think it would have been perfectly normal to arrest
4 people we suspected of having been in a riot situation.
5 Q. Did you tell the company commander that you suspected
6 these people of having been involved in a riotous
7 situation?
8 A. I cannot specifically recall that.
9 Q. You go on to say that you saw your soldiers leading the
10 people out of the house and you say:
11 "They were not badly treated by my men and none of
12 the people were wounded or injured. My men were not
13 aggressive and the people did not offer physical
14 resistance."
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. Were you in a position to see anything that happened
17 inside the house?
18 A. Yes, because there was -- I would not have been able to
19 see anything that happened in the back room, I do not
20 even have a clue what the back -- bottom room was, but
21 I do not believe any of my soldiers entered it, other
22 than to order the people there out. I could certainly
23 see everything that happened in the corridor of that
24 room, that is the hallway leading to the front door.
25 Q. What did you see happening in the hallway?
1 A. All I saw was my soldiers ordering the occupants
2 outside.
3 Q. Did the occupants comply with that without any
4 difficulty?
5 A. They complied without offering any -- without offering
6 physical resistance.
7 Q. And then you say:
8 "As far as I am able to recall, I asked a corporal
9 or lance corporal to accompany the people up Chamberlain
10 Street to Waterloo Place."
11 Once again, without mentioning any name, do you
12 remember who that corporal or lance corporal was?
13 A. I cannot honestly recall. We would certainly have --
14 I should add, we would certainly have searched the
15 people very quickly to make sure they were carrying no
16 weapons. That, once again, was Standard Operating
17 Procedure. But I cannot recall who would have been
18 given the task of escorting the people back up
19 Chamberlain Street.
20 Q. When the people moved up Chamberlain Street, what did
21 you do?
22 A. I remained exactly where I was. I would possibly have
23 seen, seen them for the first 100 metres or so, but
24 after that I stayed in place.
25 Q. So after that, you are not in a position to give
1 evidence about what happened to them; is that right?
2 A. No, I saw them being escorted down Chamberlain Street in
3 a perfectly orderly manner.
4 Q. Do you know how many of your soldiers in total went into
5 that house?
6 A. It was a pretty narrow corridor. I do not believe it
7 would have been possible for more than about two to
8 three.
9 Q. Did it at any stage come to your attention that there
10 had been two wounded people in the house?
11 A. No, it did not, not as far as I can recall anyway.
12 Q. Did it ever come to your attention that a complaint had
13 been made to the police about the aggressive behaviour
14 and abusive language allegedly used by soldiers towards
15 the people arrested in that house?
16 A. I was not aware of any specific complaints, but in
17 fairness we were well used to, um, people complaining we
18 had acted over-aggressively, most of which, I would
19 hasten to add, were totally untrue.
20 Q. When you say that you were not aware of any specific
21 complaints, does that mean that a complaint about this
22 particular occasion never came to your attention, or can
23 you just not remember?
24 A. I will repeat that: I was not aware of any complaints of
25 any nature against any of my men on that day.
1 Q. May we take it that you were never asked by anyone to
2 respond to those allegations?
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. Thank you very much.
5 Questioned by MR MACDONALD
6 Q. Lieutenant 26, my name is MacDonald, I represent some of
7 the relatives.
8 Could I ask you to look first of all at paragraph 5
9 of your statement. That is where you say you had never
10 been to Derry, but you were well aware of the situation
11 there.
12 I want to show you three paragraphs of the statement
13 of a member of your platoon to see whether it
14 corresponds with your understanding of what you were
15 aware of in terms of the situation there.
16 Could you look at C1334.1. This is the statement of
17 1334, I think whose name you know. I am not asking you
18 to say, but you know who I am talking about?
19 A. Yes, I do.
20 Q. He was a lance corporal in C Company. Was he at some
21 stage a section commander as well?
22 A. Yes, he was.
23 Q. A fairly influential character, was he?
24 A. He, he was a very professional lance corporal.
25 Q. In paragraph 2 he says:
1 "We knew that Londonderry was becoming an unruly
2 place."
3 Did you know that?
4 A. I was aware that there was a lot of trouble in
5 Londonderry, as much as I was aware there was a lot of
6 trouble in Belfast.
7 Q. Did you have a notice board at your barracks in Belfast
8 upon which you pinned or someone pinned newspaper
9 cuttings of relevant local news?
10 A. I do not recall any such notice board.
11 Q. In paragraph 3 he says:
12 "The general feeling amongst the Paras was that
13 Londonderry was out of hand."
14 Was that your view too?
15 A. Um, that is an opinion perhaps that others can express.
16 Q. I am asking you whether it was your view; did you share
17 that general feeling amongst the Paras?
18 A. I did not have any particular general feeling about
19 Londonderry at all.
20 Q. You had no feelings about Londonderry?
21 A. No, it was another part of the province.
22 Q. He talks about hearing stories on the television from
23 Derry, of soldiers being stoned, petrol bombed and
24 generally subjected to the kind of behaviour that would
25 never be tolerated in Belfast. The Paras kept tight
1 control of Belfast; was that your view, the Paras kept
2 tight control of Belfast?
3 A. We did not keep control at all of Belfast, we were the
4 reserve unit of Belfast, it was the responsibility of
5 other units and the police force to keep control of
6 Belfast.
7 Q. Paragraph 4:
8 "Our impression was that leadership was weak and wet
9 in Londonderry."
10 Was that your impression too?
11 A. Once again, that is an opinion I cannot recall having.
12 Q. He refers to this coming from the paper that referred to
13 soldiers as "beaten dogs"; do you see that, paragraph 4?
14 A. I do not recall that cutting from the paper at all.
15 Q. In the last three lines of paragraph 4:
16 "No-one in the Army was a 'beaten dog'. I felt very
17 emotional about that headline because those lads did not
18 deserve it. We were looking forward to a chance to put
19 things right."
20 Do you remember that feeling being expressed in your
21 platoon?
22 A. Not at all, these are rather emotive words. I cannot
23 say I can recall hearing them from anyone else.
24 Q. You were a commander of a platoon?
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. Which consisted only of about 20, 22 men?
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. Are you saying you are totally unaware of those feelings
4 being expressed by your men?
5 A. I am saying I cannot recall those feelings.
6 Q. Are you denying your men felt like that?
7 A. Soldiers have opinions. If you pay attention to what is
8 going on in the Gulf, you will listen to soldiers
9 expressing opinions about what is going on there now and
10 about the leadership. I cannot personally recall any
11 instances of soldiers expressing opinions about what was
12 going on in Londonderry at that particular time.
13 Q. Would your men have felt comfortable about expressing
14 their opinions about such matters to you?
15 A. I would like to think so, but at the same time I was an
16 officer, they might not have done.
17 Q. Did you do anything to dampen down their emotional
18 feelings about this?
19 A. As I have said, I do not recall their emotional feelings
20 about this at all.
21 Q. At paragraph 7 in your statement, going back to B1544,
22 you refer to this threat assessment. Can we take it
23 that you did not expect to be ambushed in Derry on this
24 day?
25 A. What do you mean by the word "ambush"?
1 Q. Attacked by surprise?
2 A. We were used to what was going on in the province; we
3 were well aware that at any stage we could be attacked
4 by any member of the IRA, or indeed, as happened, by
5 Protestant paramilitaries. So we could have come under
6 attack from anyone at any stage and it was our job to
7 protect against that.
8 Q. Clearly you are always, as a soldier, under threat of
9 attack from the IRA. The question is whether or not you
10 expected anything more than the usual level of threat
11 when you went to Derry that day. In particular, did you
12 expect to be ambushed or fired upon as opposed to having
13 been aware of the possibility that that would happen.
14 A. I think there was always the possibility that, as I have
15 said, anywhere in the province, we all knew what the
16 situation was in Londonderry, much as we knew what it
17 was in Belfast. There was every likelihood that we
18 could have been attacked, at any stage.
19 Q. Is the situation you could have been attacked by gunmen
20 and you had to be prepared for it?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. And no more than that?
23 A. That is absolutely correct.
24 Q. Would your understanding have been any better than Major
25 221A's, do you think?
1 A. In what respect?
2 Q. If we look at his statement at B2168.003,
3 paragraph 22 -- perhaps we could start at paragraph 21.
4 He says he stepped out on to the wasteground. This is
5 having come down Chamberlain Street. He stepped out on
6 to wasteground near the western corner of Eden Place and
7 Chamberlain Street:
8 "... and I was immediately aware that Support
9 Company had taken up defensive positions and were not
10 moving around the area overtly."
11 A. Can I just stop to check the map, please, I have a copy
12 here. Right, that is fine.
13 Q. He says at paragraph 22:
14 "I was initially surprised to see Support Company
15 adopting a defensive stance as we had not expected to
16 encounter aggression on that scale [on the scale of
17 requiring taking up defensive positions] although we
18 accepted that there was always a possibility of small
19 arms fire being directed at the Security Forces."
20 Is that a reflection of your own view?
21 A. I would probably agree with that.
22 Q. If I take you to paragraph 14 in your statement,
23 1545.001. Before looking at that, is it right to say
24 that you were not in fact briefed to take part in an
25 arrest operation, as such?
1 A. We were briefed overall, the battalion operation was
2 part of an arrest operation. We all understood what an
3 arrest operation was. We had carried out very many to
4 that date.
5 Q. But you were not told you were going to take part in an
6 arrest operation?
7 A. I cannot specifically recall exactly what we were told,
8 but I am aware that the battalion task that day was as
9 part of an arrest operation.
10 Q. Was it not the case you were going there as members of
11 the Parachute Battalion to sort out the situation in
12 Derry?
13 A. I would deny that.
14 Q. Were you there to simply administer violence to people?
15 A. Certainly not.
16 Q. Who may have been taking part in disturbances?
17 A. That was not our duty at all.
18 Q. And arresting people may have been just an option that
19 may have occurred incidentally during the course of
20 dispersing crowds in a violent manner?
21 A. I cannot accept that in any way.
22 Q. What you were doing there was just to control the
23 situation in some violent way and possibly arresting
24 people if the opportunity arose?
25 A. It was our job first and foremost, not only as the
1 reserve battalion, but to be prepared to deploy in any
2 situation, but the primary aim was to be part of an
3 arrest operation that afternoon.
4 Q. The primary aim?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. Are you sure about that?
7 A. Absolutely.
8 Q. Look at paragraph 14. The second line:
9 "The mood was not aggressive."
10 Why did you feel the need to say that, the mood was
11 not aggressive?
12 A. Because I was asked that by Eversheds.
13 Q. The next sentence:
14 "As the reserve battalion, our role would have been
15 to react to whatever situation developed and to bring it
16 under control. As far as I can recall, we had no
17 advance order to detain specific people, we were just
18 given the general instructions to control the situation.
19 The option to make arrests always remained."
20 Why did you say that?
21 A. Because that was the way the question was framed --
22 phrased by Eversheds when I gave the statement. Um,
23 I cannot recall, if I read that again, I cannot recall
24 that we were given orders to detain specific people.
25 We were given orders that we should be prepared to
1 control whatever situation resulted and when I say, "the
2 option to make arrests always remained," I mean that
3 that was always one of the options, that we would react
4 to, the same as if we came under fire, we would react to
5 that.
6 Q. When I put these words in this way a few moments ago you
7 disputed it and said the primary purpose of your mission
8 there was to carry out arrests?
9 A. The primary purpose of the battalion that day was to
10 carry out arrests, I thought we had already accepted
11 that. I certainly have. I may not have made it clear.
12 Q. You do not make it very clear there, do you, in
13 paragraph 14?
14 A. Probably not, but I am certain in my own mind that the
15 first and foremost job of the battalion that day was to
16 take part in an arrest operation.
17 Q. You had no idea that you were to take part in any kind
18 of pincer movement?
19 A. I cannot recall that at all.
20 Q. It is quite clear from what you say in paragraph 17, is
21 it not, you had no understanding of being involved in
22 a pincer movement, if you look at paragraph 17 on the
23 next page, about halfway down:
24 "Whilst at this location, [that is before you went
25 through the barrier] Major 221A gave me orders to take
1 my platoon down Chamberlain Street and secure the
2 battalion's left flank. I was not told what the other
3 companies were doing, but my impression was that they
4 were to the east [I think you mean west] of Chamberlain
5 Street and my duty was to protect them and to prevent
6 crowds or gunmen from getting through to them."
7 If you did not know what the other companies were
8 doing and if your job was simply to protect and prevent,
9 protect them and prevent crowds from getting to them,
10 you could not have been engaged in any kind of pincer
11 movement?
12 A. I am not certain where this terms "pincer movement"
13 comes from, is this your term or --
14 Q. You do not need to know where it comes from. Is it
15 right you had never any understanding of being involved
16 in any kind of pincer movement?
17 A. To the best of my knowledge, I was not involved in any
18 pincer movement. As I said, I was given -- by the time
19 I arrived -- bear in mind I was the very last one to
20 arrive there -- by the time I arrived, a lot had already
21 happened and I was given orders by Major 221A to take my
22 platoon down Chamberlain Street and, as I understood it,
23 to secure the battalion's left flank.
24 The rest of the battalion, I was well aware, was off
25 to the right.
1 Q. When you are describing your duty, your duty did not
2 involve arresting people, according to your statement?
3 A. By that stage we had already had gunfire before we even
4 got into Chamberlain Street. I think by that stage
5 I had probably assumed that the riot, as such, was
6 breaking up and I was far more concerned about the
7 gunfire that was now -- sorry, the gunfire that had
8 occurred before we actually moved down Chamberlain
9 Street.
10 Q. If you look at photograph 793, please. That shows
11 a scene in the street leading from Chamberlain Street to
12 Eden Place, the wasteground of Eden Place; do you know
13 where I am talking about?
14 A. Could I check the map again, please? (Pause). Could
15 you say that slowly?
16 Q. This photograph is looking towards Kells Walk. If you
17 are looking at the map, it is as if the photographer has
18 his back to Harvey Street and is looking down along
19 Eden Place. Do you see that on your map?
20 A. Yes, I have Eden Place and Kells Walk.
21 LORD SAVILLE: Perhaps I could help: the individual we can
22 see in the front of the picture is either in or only
23 just out of Chamberlain Street. The photographer is
24 probably in Chamberlain Street, looking west down
25 Eden Place.
1 A. Thank you, sir.
2 MR MACDONALD: That is not a scene you saw, is it?
3 A. That is correct, I do not recall seeing that at all.
4 Q. There were no civilians in that street when you got
5 there?
6 A. That is in Eden Place?
7 Q. Yes?
8 A. No, as far as I can recall there were no civilians
9 there.
10 Q. Can we take it you were not shot at by Lieutenant N or
11 any other soldier who was standing at the far end of
12 this street?
13 A. I was personally not shot at by anyone on that day.
14 Q. You witnessed Father Daly passing about this point?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. And then you waited for your Pig to arrive?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. And then did you walk down Chamberlain Street?
19 A. Yes, I walked down beside the Pig, which gave us
20 a degree of cover, having first put some of my men in
21 the back of the Pig.
22 Q. At no stage, I think you have already said, did you see
23 any wounded people being taken into the house at the end
24 of Chamberlain Street?
25 A. Other than the person that Father Daly was carrying,
1 I did not see any other wounded people on that day.
2 Q. Can I suggest to you that in fact by the time you got to
3 the end of Chamberlain Street all the shooting had
4 already taken place and that you did not hear any
5 further shooting when you reached the end of Chamberlain
6 Street?
7 A. I heard no shooting when I was moving down Chamberlain
8 Street. When I got to the end of Chamberlain Street, at
9 some stage there were at least two weapons -- sorry,
10 there were two weapons, at least one of which was an
11 M1 carbine were firing. I am absolutely convinced about
12 that.
13 Q. I will come to that in just a moment. When you got to
14 the end of Chamberlain Street, the Pig parked at the
15 very end, with its nose facing towards Block 3?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. You were an absolutely perfect target there for any
18 gunmen operating in the Rossville Flats?
19 A. That is correct, that is why we parked the Pig like that
20 and that is why I pushed the door open of that house.
21 Q. The Pig was not fired upon, was it?
22 A. The Pig was not, no.
23 Q. And you were not fired upon?
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. And none of your men were fired upon?
1 A. That is correct.
2 Q. You talk about seeing two frightened women in
3 paragraph 23 of your statement?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And you persuaded them to come across to you?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Would you have done that if there was any firing going
8 on?
9 A. I think we would have done.
10 Q. Would have done?
11 A. Absolutely. I mean --
12 Q. Firing was going on and you persuaded two frightened
13 women to cross the car park?
14 A. They were quite clearly, they were quite clearly
15 frightened. They should not have been there. I think
16 it was our aim to get them out of it as quickly as
17 possible and as safely as possible.
18 Q. Which side of the car were they crouching behind?
19 A. I cannot honestly recall.
20 Q. You have them in your diagram as being not exactly in
21 the middle of the car park, but towards the middle of
22 the car park?
23 A. That is as I recall where the car was, yes.
24 Q. You invited them to cross from their position of cover
25 to Chamberlain Street?
1 A. No, I actually sent a lance corporal and one private
2 soldier over to the car to escort them back.
3 Q. Clearly there was no firing going on then, at that
4 point, was there?
5 A. Not at that specific moment, no, but there had been
6 firing, as we discussed.
7 Q. You say in paragraph 24 of your statement that:
8 "So far as I am able to recall, shortly after we got
9 to the end of Chamberlain Street, I heard two or three
10 gunshots, which I believe were fired from a high
11 velocity weapon."
12 You are already aware what you had said in 1972 was
13 you had heard 20 or 30?
14 A. That is correct, yes.
15 Q. You have no explanation as to how that has shrunk to two
16 or three?
17 A. What about sort of 29-odd years?
18 Q. Is that the reason, do you think?
19 A. I think so. I am actually quite happy to stand by my
20 1972 statement as being correct.
21 Q. You do recall personally hearing shooting?
22 A. Yes, I do.
23 Q. From the time that you had got to that top end of
24 Chamberlain Street?
25 A. Yes, I do.
1 Q. Could you look at page 133 of today's transcript, line
2 22. It is page 134, line 5. To get this into context,
3 if you look at 133, line 23:
4 "Question: Do you have any recollection really of
5 anything that happened in Chamberlain Street between the
6 time when you arrived and the time when you saw Father
7 Daly approaching?
8 "Answer: No, I do not.
9 "Question: Were you aware, before you saw Father
10 Daly, of any shooting taking place in the area?
11 "Answer: Yes, I was well aware of shooting going
12 on, even whilst we were at the Waterloo Place end. It
13 was quite clear that shooting was going on at that
14 stage. From the time we got to the top of Chamberlain
15 Street, I personally do not recall any shooting
16 happening from that point on."
17 Why did you say that, if it is not true?
18 A. I am sorry, I do not understand what the problem is.
19 Shall I clarify what I mean? I do not recall any
20 shooting from that point on -- shall I actually
21 clarify: while we are walking down Chamberlain Street,
22 at the bottom, when we got to the bottom of Chamberlain
23 Street, that is when I can recall hearing the shots
24 fired across our front.
25 Q. "From the time we got to the top of Chamberlain Street
1 I personally do not recall any shooting happening from
2 that point on"?
3 A. I will rephrase that, "from that point on whilst we
4 walked down Chamberlain Street".
5 Q. So when you talk about the top of Chamberlain Street,
6 you are talking about the Waterloo Place end?
7 A. That is correct, yes.
8 Q. But you said just before that, "I was well aware of
9 shooting going on even whilst we were at the Waterloo
10 Place end"?
11 A. Would you like me to clarify that? As I understand
12 it: I do recall that I was the last platoon to arrive
13 there because of the broken down vehicle. By the time
14 we had got out of the Pig, at Waterloo Place I was aware
15 there was some shooting going on in the general area to
16 the west --
17 Q. Sorry, 026, we are talking about Chamberlain Street.
18 You were asked about what you remember happening in
19 Chamberlain Street, there are two ends of Chamberlain
20 Street, the Waterloo Place end and the top?
21 A. By the time we had got to the top of Waterloo Place --
22 sorry, by the time we got to the Waterloo Place end of
23 Chamberlain Street, from the time I walked down
24 Chamberlain Street to the time I got to the
25 Rossville Street, Rossville Flats end, I do not recall
1 any shooting in that street.
2 It was only when we -- after we had stopped, after
3 we had brought the two women out that I do recall
4 shooting from the top of the Rossville Flats.
5 Q. You are talking about the Waterloo Place end of
6 Chamberlain Street and the top of Chamberlain Street,
7 you are actually talking about the same thing?
8 A. You are actually tying me in knots here.
9 Q. You seem to be using those terms in contra-distinction
10 to each other, as if they are opposite ends of the
11 street?
12 A. Let me start again. Right, I arrived through Waterloo
13 Place with my platoon. When we got out of the Pig at
14 Waterloo Place, we were aware of shooting going on in
15 the general area of west, somewhere in the area of
16 Rossville Street and beyond.
17 Q. This is even before you had crossed the barrier?
18 A. That is as we were crossing the barrier, there were
19 sounds of gunfire, right, from the time we got to the
20 top of Chamberlain Street and was ordered down
21 Chamberlain Street towards the Rossville Flats,
22 throughout the entire time we walked down Chamberlain
23 Street, I personally am not aware of any shooting at
24 all, although I must say there were one or two other
25 things going on at the time.
1 MR TOOHEY: Lieutenant 026, I think the problem arose
2 because you have used the word "top," as I understand
3 it, synonymously with "the Waterloo Place end" of
4 Chamberlain Street.
5 A. Correct, sir.
6 MR TOOHEY: Mr MacDonald has taken it to mean the other end.
7 A. I do apologise for the confusion there. If I could
8 clarify that: from the time that I was at the Waterloo
9 Place end of Chamberlain Street to the time I arrived at
10 the Rossville Flats end of Chamberlain Street, I do not
11 believe there was any shooting, certainly none that
12 I was aware of.
13 Q. In any event, you are still not sure whether or not the
14 shots that you heard were from a high velocity weapon?
15 A. I do not recall saying that.
16 Q. You said that you believe they were from a high velocity
17 weapon, which implies that you are not really sure?
18 A. Can I ask which shots you are talking about?
19 Q. These are the gunshots that you say you heard at the
20 end, shortly after you got to the end of Chamberlain
21 Street?
22 A. The shots --
23 Q. The Rossville Flats end?
24 A. The shots I heard from the Rossville Flats, I am
25 absolutely certain, came from an M1 carbine which, to
1 the best of my knowledge, is a high velocity weapon.
2 Q. Do you get more and more certain as time passes about
3 these things?
4 A. I was certain at the time and I am certain now that it
5 was an M1 carbine.
6 Q. You were not certain at the time, were you? B1541 --
7 A. Well, almost certainly.
8 Q. The bottom of the page, it was, "almost certainly an
9 M1 carbine"?
10 A. I am happy to use the word "almost certainly," as
11 opposed to "absolutely certain," in that case.
12 Q. You are in some doubt?
13 A. I am not in any doubt, I am pretty certain that it was
14 an M1 carbine.
15 Q. The other was possibly a .303. What you were concerned
16 in your 1972 statement to make clear was, whatever it
17 was, it was certainly not the soldiers' gun that was
18 being fired; is that right?
19 A. Yes, because it was not even coming in that direction.
20 There were no friendly forces in the direction from
21 which those rounds were coming.
22 Q. You did not know where they were coming from, did you?
23 A. Yes, I did.
24 Q. Because you could not pinpoint the position?
25 A. I could not pinpoint then, but I had a fairly decent
1 idea of the general area and I certainly knew there were
2 no friendly forces there.
3 Q. How was it that you had an idea?
4 A. Well, that was part of one's normal experience, of
5 virtually coming under fire in several different
6 occasions, in different places.
7 Q. The crack was not something that you heard?
8 A. I do not recall stating I had heard "crack" or "thump".
9 Q. You did not?
10 A. We, at the time, and my memory now is, we were pretty
11 certain that firing was coming from somewhere at the top
12 of those flats in the general area that I described in
13 my earlier statement.
14 Q. Is that because someone else told you that?
15 A. No, but I can say that at the time we all agreed, those
16 were the soldiers who were with me, agreed that the
17 rounds were coming in that direction, but it was my
18 opinion as well, and perhaps it was my opinion first.
19 Q. When you refer to "lift housing," what do you mean
20 exactly?
21 A. I cannot honestly recall, I am sorry to say. I gave it
22 in my statement in 1972. I assume possibly it might
23 have looked like some sort of hut or structure on top of
24 the flat, on top of the roof, but I cannot honestly say
25 beyond that.
1 Q. It is fairly clear from the photographs that you have
2 now seen, that you cannot actually see any such
3 structure, from where you were?
4 A. That is correct, there is some sort of structure along
5 the top. I would also point out, as I did earlier on,
6 that we were looking at it from the opposite angle, we
7 were down at kneeling height, looking up at a very
8 tall -- or a relatively tall block of flats.
9 Q. The structures that you saw on the top of the flats are
10 actually at the back of the roof, are they not?
11 A. I do not know, I do not know what they were.
12 Q. Perhaps we should look at P205 again. Can you see
13 anything on the roof at the front that you could
14 possibly have seen from the car park?
15 A. Can I say that my recollection of that Sunday afternoon
16 was that it was some time round about 4.30 in
17 late January and if it was not dark by then, it was
18 getting dark. I had just had an idea that there was
19 some sort of structure on the roof. My belief is that
20 there was shooting coming from that general area. It
21 may even have been from the -- one of the balconies, but
22 I suspect it was coming from the roof area.
23 Q. Can you answer the question, please: is there anything
24 you can see on that roof that would have looked anything
25 like a lift housing that you could have seen from the
1 car park angle?
2 A. Not that I can see from that angle, no.
3 Q. So now you saying it maybe was a balcony?
4 A. I am not saying it was a balcony, I am saying that at
5 the time I thought it could have been in the area of
6 a lift housing, what I thought as a lift housing, but
7 I did not actually go up and check.
8 Q. You say in your statement that, "these shots were
9 directed in a north-westerly direction;" how could you
10 possibly know which way they were going if you did not
11 hear a crack?
12 A. Because they passed directly across our front.
13 Q. How do you know that?
14 A. Well, it was our judgment at the time.
15 Q. You did not see them, did you?
16 A. Certainly not.
17 Q. You did not hear them?
18 A. We heard them, yes.
19 Q. You did not hear the bullet?
20 A. Yes, we did.
21 Q. If it was a high velocity bullet you would have heard it
22 crack, is that right; if it passed overhead, but not
23 otherwise?
24 A. If it passes directly overhead, yes, it passed to our
25 front.
1 Q. Did you or did you not hear it?
2 A. I cannot recall if I heard a crack or thump or not,
3 I can recall that I heard shooting.
4 Q. Unless you heard it passing over your head, you would
5 have no idea where it was going?
6 A. I am fairly convinced from my recollection of the time
7 that it was actually fired from somewhere round about
8 that position. I believe from my Army days you would
9 only get crack and thump if it passes directly overhead.
10 The bullet did not pass overhead.
11 Q. I suggest to you there was nothing that would have
12 indicated to you the direction in which these bullets
13 would have travelled and the only reason you suggest
14 they travelled in that direction was to try and indicate
15 that there were civilians firing from Rossville Flats at
16 soldiers in the car park?
17 A. I cannot accept that. I would say it is a long time ago
18 since I actually was in uniform. At the time I was
19 fairly convinced that rounds were fired, high velocity
20 rounds across our front. That is all I can say.
21 Q. I would like you to look at some trajectory photographs.
22 P21, first of all. I should explain -- you will see
23 this is a photograph of the area where you were. Can we
24 take it that you did look into the car park?
25 A. That is correct, yes.
1 Q. And if you were trying to ascertain the whereabouts of
2 these gunmen that you thought were operating there, you
3 would have looked all around the car park?
4 A. Insofar as one could see from the position we were.
5 Q. You were in a perfect position there at the very end of
6 Chamberlain Street to see all round that car park and up
7 to the three blocks around the car park?
8 A. I would actually challenge that. We were actually at
9 ground level. It was possible to see only a limited
10 part of that car park and, as I recall, there was
11 a fence off to the left anyway, which obscured the
12 vision to the left.
13 Q. This is, this photograph we have on the screen is
14 a trajectory photograph that was marked by a soldier
15 known to us as Soldier O, Sergeant O. He was firing his
16 SLR from a point that appears in the right-hand corner,
17 do you see in the mouth of the car park where the three
18 lines start; do you see that?
19 A. Yes, I do.
20 Q. He fired at targets, he says, which appear at the end of
21 those lines. The first, which would have been the
22 closest to you, was supposed to have been a man with
23 a pistol behind a Cortina. Did you see a man with
24 a pistol behind a Cortina?
25 A. No, I did not.
1 Q. The second was a man with an M1 carbine on the lowest
2 balcony of Block 3; you did not see that, did you?
3 A. No, I did not.
4 Q. The third was a man with an M1 carbine, allegedly, in
5 the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 on the ground floor; you
6 did not see that, did you?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Looking at P23, that is another trajectory photograph
9 showing what Soldier Q says was his line of fire towards
10 a nail bomber on the ground floor, do you see the end of
11 that line is circled. In the gap between Blocks 2 and 3
12 he suggested he saw a nail bomber there; you did not see
13 anything like that, did you?
14 A. No, I did not.
15 LORD SAVILLE: Apart from the two ladies behind the Imp or
16 whatever it was, did you see anybody in the car park.
17 A. Nobody at all, sir.
18 MR MACDONALD: That is one of the reasons I am suggesting to
19 you, by the time you got to the end of Chamberlain
20 Street, everything had happened, the shooting was over
21 and you did not hear any shooting one way or the other
22 and that the purpose of making your statement in 1972
23 was simply to try and bolster the Army position, to the
24 effect that there was civilian gunfire directed at them.
25 LORD SAVILLE: I think you have already made that
1 suggestion, Mr MacDonald, and the witness has rejected
2 it.
3 MR MACDONALD: Yes, sir.
4 At paragraph 25 you say that you reported the
5 gunfire from the flats to your company commander on the
6 radio. There does not appear to be any reference in any
7 of the logs and no record in the audio tapes we have of
8 any report; can you understand why that would be?
9 A. Firstly, I would not have assumed that there were any
10 audio tapes of our company net unless, of course, it was
11 somebody else other than the Army listening in. At the
12 same time, it is quite possible that logs were not kept
13 at company headquarters. Company headquarters consisted
14 of, what, possibly one signaller and possibly one
15 company sergeant major listening in to the radio.
16 I am fairly certain, as far as I can recall, that
17 I reported that.
18 Q. I want to ask you about the conduct of your men at the
19 end of Chamberlain Street. You saw nothing improper on
20 the part of your soldiers; is that right?
21 A. I saw nothing improper at all.
22 Q. There is a statement from a witness called Antoinette
23 Coyle. You may want to look at it at AC85.17,
24 paragraph 42. This witness was a civilian witness who
25 was at the time a volunteer in the Knights of Malta
1 Knights of Malta who helped a number of civilian
2 casualties. She says that she crossed over the car park
3 to the end of Chamberlain Street:
4 "We saw a group of soldiers at the south end of
5 Chamberlain Street and one Saracen. The soldiers
6 appeared to be very high and they were laughing and
7 joking. We told them that we needed an ambulance. They
8 made us stand against a wall at about position Q on the
9 [map]. They were going to search us. Alice said to the
10 soldiers that there were three people injured on the
11 other side of the Rossville Flats who needed an
12 ambulance urgently. The soldiers just laughed and
13 jeered and I remember them celebrating and cheering at
14 this news."
15 Can we take it you did not see anything like that?
16 A. I saw absolutely nothing like that at all. Firstly,
17 I cannot recall making anyone stand against a wall,
18 other than the people we searched when we, we moved them
19 out of the end house.
20 Secondly, I do not recall anyone telling us that
21 there were three people injured and I certainly have
22 absolutely no recollection of anyone requesting an
23 ambulance.
24 Q. That looks as if the soldiers, according to this
25 evidence, the soldiers were behaving in the sort of way
1 you might expect them to behave if they had taken their
2 chance, "to put things right," as Soldier 1334 put it;
3 is that right?
4 A. I would be very surprised if there were that many
5 soldiers around, because most of them -- I had put them
6 in a position of all round defence where they were in
7 fire positions. Also, I had most of them in the back of
8 the Pig in cover. I cannot vouch for whatever might
9 have been said further to people at different points
10 down Chamberlain Street, but I would like to think that
11 our soldiers would not behave in that way.
12 Q. Thank you very much.
13 LORD SAVILLE: Do we have any other questions?
14 MR ROXBURGH: Sir, I have no further questions.
15 LORD SAVILLE: 026, the Chairman again. Thank you very much
16 indeed for coming here to assist us, thank you.
17 We shall start again at 9.30 tomorrow morning,
18 please.
19 (3.00 pm)
20 (Proceedings adjourned until 9.30 am
21 on Tuesday, 1st April 2003)
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4 COLONEL WILFORD (continued) .................. 2
5 Questioned by MR ELIAS (continued) ........... 2
6 Questioned by MS HORWOOD-SMART ............... 32
7 Questioned by MR A HARVEY .................... 36
8 INQ1940, sworn ............................... 96
9 Questioned by MS McGAHEY ..................... 96
10 Questioned by MR ELIAS ....................... 110
11 LIEUTENANT 026, sworn ........................ 112
12 Questioned by MR ROXBURGH .................... 112
13 Questioned by MR MACDONALD ................... 147
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