1 Friday, 28th February 2003
2 (9.35 a.m)
3 SOLDIER 128, sworn
4 Questioned by MR ROXBURGH
5 LORD SAVILLE: If you look across to your left, you can see
6 who is talking to you. I say this to all the witnesses:
7 we are going to call you Soldier 128; the questions will
8 come from the barristers, the people in front of me.
9 Could you keep close to the microphone and then we will
10 be able to hear what you have to say.
11 MR ROXBURGH: May we have on the screen, please, page
12 B1802.001. Colonel, do you have with you a copy of the
13 statement that you made to this Inquiry on
14 20th March 2000, of which the first page is on the
15 screen in front of you?
16 A. I do.
17 Q. I understand there are two changes that you wish to
18 make, so before I ask you to confirm the truth of the
19 statement, we had better deal with those.
20 Paragraph 5 is, I think, the first one?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. If we can highlight paragraph 5 on the screen, please.
23 In the penultimate sentence of the paragraph what is
24 currently written is:
25 "I was also aware that there was a view held by the
1 military at that time".
2 I understand you wish to change that so it reads:
3 "I was also aware that there was a view held by the
4 politicians at that time"?
5 A. That is correct.
6 Q. Secondly, if we go to paragraph 23 on page 1802.004,
7 right at the foot of the page there is a sentence that
8 begins:
9 "I then saw the Commander of Land Forces ..."
10 Is it right you wish to change that so it reads:
11 "I then saw the Commanding Officer of 1 Para ..."?
12 A. That is correct, yes.
13 Q. Subject to those two changes, are the contents of this
14 statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
15 A. They are.
16 Q. May we then go back to the beginning of the statement
17 and look at paragraphs 1 to 3. You explain in
18 paragraph 1 that, on 30th January 1972, you were
19 a captain in the Second Battalion, the Royal Green
20 Jackets, and had been the operations officer of your
21 battalion since about September 1971.
22 In paragraph 3 you say, this:
23 "It was at that time the policy to restore law and
24 order to the community. An important tenet of that
25 policy was the use of minimum force. It was drilled
1 into us from the RUC Divisional Commander through the
2 chain of command not to provoke unnecessary violence."
3 Is the divisional commander to whom you are
4 referring there Chief Superintendent Lagan?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. When you say that the message not to provoke unnecessary
7 violence was drilled into you from the Chief
8 Superintendent through the chain of command, does that
9 mean that Chief Superintendent Lagan was giving that
10 message to more senior officers and the message was then
11 being transmitted down the chain of command?
12 A. Yes, although we worked -- or my commanding officer at
13 the time worked -- very closely with the RUC Divisional
14 Commander.
15 Q. In that case, were you aware of the Divisional Commander
16 communicating that message to perhaps, among others,
17 your commanding officer?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And why was it necessary for the Police Divisional
20 Commander to tell the Army that it should not provoke
21 unnecessary violence?
22 A. We were in support of the RUC at that time and it was
23 very much in accordance with what their requirements
24 were that we acted.
25 Q. Should it not really have been obvious to any Army
1 officer operating in Northern Ireland that he ought not
2 to provoke unnecessary violence?
3 A. It may seem to you to be obvious, but certainly it is --
4 it is important that the troops are made aware of the
5 necessity of minimum force.
6 Q. Do you recall that elements of the Second Battalion
7 Royal Green Jackets were deployed on 22nd January 1972
8 at a demonstration at Magilligan Strand?
9 A. I do.
10 Q. Were you present on that occasion?
11 A. I was.
12 Q. Were you acting as battalion operations officer on that
13 occasion?
14 A. I was.
15 Q. I am going to send you the name of another officer who
16 is known in this Inquiry as INQ573. (Pause).
17 If you look at the screen to your right, you should
18 see his name. I have given you the rank that he held at
19 the time, rather than the rank that he subsequently
20 achieved. Is that a name that is familiar to you?
21 A. Yes, although you have got his Christian name wrong.
22 Q. I do not know why that is, but never mind. We are
23 talking about the officer who was the Adjutant of your
24 battalion at the time, I think?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. May I send you one more name. This is of an officer
2 whose rank the Inquiry is unaware of, so I will simply
3 give you his name. (Pause). Does that name mean
4 anything to you?
5 A. Yes, it does, although not actually in connection with
6 that particular event. That is memory rather than --
7 I am not quite sure what role he had at that time.
8 Q. I should say for the record that the name I have sent
9 you is that of an officer known as UNK166.
10 Should we understand you do not remember that second
11 person as having been present at Magilligan?
12 A. I do not recall it. That is not to say he was not
13 there. Of course he was, but I --
14 Q. The reason why I asked that question is that the
15 Adjutant, whose name I sent you first, has said in his
16 statement to this Inquiry that the second officer, whose
17 name I sent to you, was the operations officer at
18 Magilligan for your battalion. Are you able to say
19 whether that is right or not?
20 A. I was under the impression I was. (Laughing). That
21 must be easily researched through the records. I was
22 certainly present. My impression was that I was the
23 operations officer. If I was not, I am not quite sure
24 what role I did have.
25 Q. Moving on to the event at Magilligan itself, is it right
1 that at Magilligan a wire fence was in place to mark the
2 limit beyond which the demonstrators were not to pass on
3 the beach?
4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. And is it also right that the tide was out and so the
6 fence did not extend all the way down to the water?
7 A. The tide was going out and hence the fence had to be
8 made longer.
9 Q. Do you remember what happened when the demonstrators
10 approached the wire fence?
11 A. Yes. There was a period of stoning, and the usual --
12 the usual aggro that one would expect. My memory is
13 somewhat patchy.
14 I remember -- I do not know if I am allowed to say
15 his name -- but a politician being there at the march.
16 Q. You can say the name of a politician.
17 A. I can? John Hume being there. And I recall that -- the
18 Commanding Officer going to talk to John Hume at the
19 wire, or at the barrier.
20 Q. What happened after that, can you remember?
21 A. This is very sketchy: I seem to recall that some of the
22 youths had either -- were in danger of crossing the
23 wire, or actually had crossed the wire.
24 Q. Did a stage come when a company of the Parachute
25 Regiment launched a baton charge against the crowd?
1 A. Yes, it did.
2 Q. Where were you when that happened?
3 A. My impression is that I was standing on a slope or
4 a bluff, if you like, on the -- overlooking the beach.
5 Q. And approximately how far away were you from the area
6 where the baton charge was taking place?
7 A. About 100 yards.
8 Q. And --
9 A. To the best of my recall.
10 Q. Were you watching with the naked eye or through
11 binoculars?
12 A. With the naked eye, as far as I can recall.
13 Q. Did you see anything that happened that gave you cause
14 for concern about the behaviour of the Parachute
15 Regiment on that occasion?
16 A. There was one or two incidents that were of some
17 concern.
18 Q. What were they?
19 A. Some of the members of the company concerned were, in my
20 view, using undue violence or undue force, I should say.
21 Q. That undue force, what form did it take?
22 A. It -- I cannot remember a distinct incident, apart from
23 one, where a soldier was unnecessarily hitting a member
24 of the crowd.
25 Q. Was he hitting the member of the crowd with something
1 other than his bare hands?
2 A. My impression was that it was a baton, which was carried
3 at that time.
4 Q. So far as you know, did any form of inquiry take place
5 within the Army afterwards into what had happened at
6 Magilligan?
7 A. I can vaguely remember there was talk of an inquiry. My
8 impression was that it was overtaken by events the
9 subsequent week. I think perhaps there was some
10 communication between my Commanding Officer and the
11 Brigade Commander.
12 Q. Yes?
13 A. Which I cannot recall. I may not even have been privy
14 to it.
15 Q. Do you remember whether any officer or soldier of your
16 battalion was involved in an inquiry that took place at
17 Headquarters Northern Ireland?
18 A. Yes, I do vaguely remember the -- I cannot work out your
19 code here, but the name that you got the Christian name
20 wrong.
21 Q. The Adjutant who is known to us as INQ573, the Captain?
22 A. Yes. I do not see that number here. I see 094741,
23 which I think is the time.
24 Q. That may be the time, yes.
25 A. I do not have a number.
1 Q. I can tell you that the number for the Captain on your
2 screen is INQ573.
3 A. I will try and remember it.
4 Q. Let us refer to him as the Adjutant, if we may.
5 A. Indeed.
6 Q. You remember, do you, or you think you remember that the
7 Adjutant was, in some way, involved in the inquiry that
8 took place?
9 A. Yes. I think -- I was not actually aware that there was
10 a formal inquiry, but I was aware of the fact that there
11 was comment made -- that comments needed to be made
12 about that particular incident.
13 Q. May we move on to the planning for the march on
14 30th January, and to paragraphs 4 and 5 of your
15 statement. You say in paragraph 4 that you were fully
16 aware from the press and the media that there was to be
17 a large march on that Sunday. A little further on in
18 paragraph 4, you say:
19 "There was concern in the military as to how the
20 march should be handled."
21 Then in paragraph 5 you outline at any rate some of
22 the concerns. You say, for example, that it was felt
23 that the city centre was vulnerable, and that some
24 faction of the march would perhaps flood the city centre
25 and cause disruption and destruction.
1 There was also concern that the Security Forces
2 could be a target of gunmen that day. Was there any
3 specific reason, so far as you can recall, for fearing
4 that gunmen might choose to attack the Security Forces
5 during the march or on the fringes of the march?
6 A. There was no -- I was not informed of any specific
7 threat. Clearly it was a tactic that was used. Clearly
8 when soldiers were in anti-riot posture, if you like, on
9 barricades or whatever, there was always a danger of
10 sniping taking place.
11 Q. Had you, personally, previous experience of situations
12 in which gunmen had exploited the presence of crowds in
13 order to fire at the Army.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Had that been in the context of events that were
16 otherwise peaceful, or had it be in the context of
17 riots?
18 A. It had been in the -- "riots" may be too much, but it
19 was in the context of stone throwing or missile
20 throwing, nail bomb throwing, whatever.
21 Q. Were you aware, in the light of concerns you have
22 described, of some debate taking place or discussion
23 taking place at brigade level about how this particular
24 march should be handled?
25 A. No.
1 Q. Were you aware of any views held by your own Commanding
2 Officer about how the march should be handled?
3 A. We would clearly have discussed it, but I do not recall
4 any specific views, apart from the fact that this was
5 going to be a major event.
6 Q. In the sentence we looked at at the beginning of your
7 evidence, you say now that you were aware that there was
8 a view held by politicians at that time that the
9 situation in Derry was not being properly handled and
10 that control in Derry should not be lost.
11 Did you have any particular politicians or group of
12 politicians in mind in putting that proposition forward?
13 A. No, I think it was a generally held view. After all, it
14 was the only no-go area in the United Kingdom at that
15 time. So quite clearly there was concern at all levels.
16 Q. Are you talking about politicians in Northern Ireland,
17 or politicians in Great Britain, or both?
18 A. Certainly politicians in Northern Ireland, and I -- I do
19 not recall any specific politician, but I do recall the
20 feeling within the press and Parliamentary debate, and
21 so on, that it was -- "unacceptable situation" perhaps
22 may be putting it too strong, but it was certainly an
23 unfortunate situation.
24 Q. Were you aware of the extent to which, if at all, that
25 view was one shared in the upper echelons of the Army?
1 A. No.
2 Q. You say in the last sentence of paragraph 5 that there
3 was irritation that no-go areas had been created in the
4 Bogside, which the previous year had been re-taken for
5 a short period of time. Is that all part of the view
6 you are attributing to politicians, or is that a view
7 you are attributing to the Army?
8 A. Well, I -- it is a view held by both the police and the
9 Army that having an area where British rule did not
10 extend to was clearly a bad situation, and that, if it
11 could be corrected, that was very much in line with
12 bringing normality to the province.
13 Q. Did you ever become aware of any pressure on 8 Brigade
14 from a higher command for 8 Brigade to toughen its
15 approach in Derry?
16 A. No. You must understand I was not part of brigade
17 headquarters; I was an operations officer, and not even
18 in the city at the time. So that form of debate would
19 not have reached my ears.
20 Q. In paragraph 6 you come on to deal with the role that
21 you fulfilled on the day itself. You explain that
22 although you were the battalion operations officer it
23 had been decided, most probably by your Commanding
24 Officer, Colonel Welsh, that some officers of battalion
25 HQ would be reinforcing A Company that day, and that you
1 were to act as a rifleman, together with another
2 rifleman, and to carry out anti-sniper duties.
3 Does it follow from what you say here that on that
4 afternoon you would have been operating under the
5 command of the Company Commander of A Company of your
6 battalion?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Please do not give his name publicly, but do you
9 remember the identity of Company Commander A Company?
10 A. I do.
11 Q. Do you also remember that on that day A Company of your
12 battalion was under command of the 22nd Light Air
13 Defence Regiment?
14 A. I could not remember whose command we were under until
15 you told me. That would be logical, though.
16 Q. In the next sentence of this paragraph, you say:
17 "I believe that the name of the other rifleman was
18 ..."
19 And then in the original of the statement you gave
20 a name which has been replaced with the cipher INQ460.
21 Again, please do not mention the name, but do you
22 remember the surname that you gave in the original
23 version of your statement?
24 A. I am afraid I do not, no.
25 Q. Let me remind you of it. (Pause).
1 A. Yes, that is familiar.
2 Q. May we have on the screen, please, B1799. This is the
3 statement that you made at the time to the Royal
4 Military Police. In this statement, in the second
5 paragraph, you say:
6 "On 30th January 1972, about 1200 hours, I was
7 deployed with 1 Platoon of A Company in the capacity of
8 sniper [at a particular grid reference] with ..."
9 And then a name was given, which has been blanked
10 out. I can tell you that in this statement, in its
11 original version, you gave the name of a Lance Corporal,
12 and the surname that appears in this statement is not
13 the same as the one that you have given in your
14 statement to this Inquiry, although it does end with the
15 same letters.
16 What I am going to do is hand to you the original of
17 the statement that you made at the time so that you can
18 see the name of the Lance Corporal that appears in it.
19 (Handed).
20 A. Right.
21 Q. Is it likely that the statement you made at the time
22 will be more accurate --
23 A. I really do not -- as I said at the beginning, I really
24 cannot remember the name. I know both of them, or
25 I recall both of them, and I will not argue at all which
1 one it was. I really do not know, I really cannot
2 remember.
3 Q. Were they both members of your battalion or not?
4 A. Oh, yes.
5 MR TOOHEY: 128, was it usual for an officer to be deployed
6 in the role of sniper?
7 A. No, sir, it was not.
8 MR TOOHEY: Was any particular reason offered to you that
9 day?
10 A. Yes, it was going to be a major event. We were heavily
11 involved in the city, in respect that we would be called
12 in to reinforce any particular operations. So although
13 we were not deployed in the city -- our operation role
14 was outside -- what happened in the city was very
15 important to us, and I think the question would be
16 better put to my commanding officer at the time, but
17 I think his belief was that we should be, all of us,
18 well aware of what was going to happen that day. But it
19 was an unusual --
20 MR TOOHEY: Did you understand that you were deployed
21 actively as a sniper if the occasion arose, or were you
22 there in a supervisory role?
23 A. I was very much there as a rifleman, under command.
24 MR ROXBURGH: May we go back to the statement you have made
25 to this Inquiry at B1802.002.
1 LORD GIFFORD: I am a little confused about the different
2 names. Could we know the cipher number of the name in
3 the statement which was recognised?
4 MR ROXBURGH: No, because there is no cipher number because
5 we have not been able to identify the soldier concerned.
6 LORD GIFFORD: Perhaps everybody is confused.
7 LORD SAVILLE: I am confused, but whether we can clarify it
8 or not, I do not know, Lord Gifford.
9 MR ROXBURGH: I can clarify it to this extent: the name that
10 appeared in the witness's Eversheds statement is
11 a surname. That surname corresponds to a soldier of the
12 Royal Green Jackets who has been identified by the
13 Inquiry and whose cipher is INQ460.
14 INQ460 has told the Inquiry that he was not present
15 in Derry on Bloody Sunday.
16 The name that appears in this witness's Royal
17 Military Police statement is a different name, and we
18 have not been able to identify a soldier of the Royal
19 Green Jackets with that name, although this witness has
20 told the Tribunal this morning that he was a member of
21 that battalion. It may be possible, with further
22 inquiries, to identify him.
23 Colonel, if we look at the top of the page, we will
24 see the end of paragraph 6 of your statement. You
25 explain that you were to be deployed with the other
1 riflemen close to a barrier which was to be erected on
2 William Street marked as barrier 14 on the map attached
3 to your statement. Then you say:
4 "I knew that men from our battalion were to man the
5 barrier, the aim being to ensure that any rioters did
6 not move into the city centre and into the commercial
7 centres of Derry and the Waterside area. It was
8 standard procedure at that time to carry out this type
9 of operation and to conduct arrest operations with the
10 RUC."
11 As a matter of normal practice, if there was such
12 a thing, when your battalion carried out an arrest
13 operation in conjunction with the RUC, what were the
14 respective functions of the Army and the police?
15 A. The police made the arrest and the Army protected the
16 police in the normal "lift operations", as we used to
17 call them; those were planned arrests. I think you are
18 talking more about arrests of rioters, rather than
19 planned arrests of people who were wanted by the RUC.
20 Q. I am talking about arrests of rioters.
21 A. In that case, normally speaking the soldiers would make
22 the arrests and take the arrestee back to the RUC
23 station, or hand him over to the RUC at some stage, it
24 might be in the RUC vehicle.
25 Q. On 30th January 1972, did you know in advance that an
1 arrest operation was going to be carried out, or might
2 be going to be carried out that afternoon?
3 A. No.
4 Q. In paragraph 7 you say that you only vaguely remember
5 discussions concerning your role that day and the orders
6 that were given to you. Now that we have established
7 that you were operating under command of the Company
8 Commander of A Company, and that he in turn was under
9 command of 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment, does that
10 enable you to recollect with any more clarity any
11 discussions that took place about your role or the
12 orders that were given to you?
13 A. No. I think paragraph 7 is as exact as I can make, and
14 I really cannot recall any further detail.
15 Q. Let us move on to paragraph 8, where you say that, as
16 the battalion operations officer, you were aware of
17 brigade operations. How, in general, were you made
18 aware of brigade operations?
19 A. In the form of operation orders or possibly telephone
20 calls.
21 Q. And you say in the middle of paragraph 8:
22 "It must have been in the brigade operations log
23 that the Paras were to be brought into Derry as part of
24 the military operation ..."
25 Do you mean the brigade log or do you mean a Brigade
1 Operations Order?
2 A. Well, it would have been -- yes, it would have been in
3 the operations order; it would have been in the log.
4 I think that statement is in answer to a question that
5 was asked to me.
6 Q. The log is something that is written after the event or
7 as the event proceeds?
8 A. As the event proceeds, yes. I take your point, yes.
9 Yes, it would have been in an operations order, yes.
10 Q. As the battalion operations officer, would you have
11 attended brigade order group meetings?
12 A. No, unless -- I might have done on occasions, but
13 normally speaking the commanding officer would go and
14 would then subsequently brief us, or me.
15 Q. Did you attend the brigade order group meeting in
16 relation to this operation?
17 A. No, certainly not.
18 Q. If we go on to paragraph 10, you attach, helpfully, to
19 your statement, two photographs, on each of which you
20 have marked the building in which you believe that you
21 were positioned that afternoon. You say, reading from
22 the fifth line:
23 "I did have it in my mind that I was in a projection
24 room of a burnt-out cinema, but, on reflection, I now
25 think that we were in a small room in a building next to
1 a cinema. We entered the building by unlocking
2 a corrugated door. There may have been a padlock on the
3 door. I have in my mind's eye a line of corrugated iron
4 through which we entered the building at street level.
5 I think that after entering the building we turned right
6 to walk up some steps, and we may have gone through
7 a cinema to get into the small room where we took up
8 positions. The room had a window through which you
9 could look out onto William Street. As we looked out of
10 the window the barrier was to our right. I have no
11 recollection of other military snipers being positioned
12 near to us."
13 If we look at B1802.006, we will find one of the
14 photographs attached to your statement. We can see that
15 the window you have indicated is above McCool's
16 newsagent. Do you see on this photograph any building
17 that you can recognise as the burnt-out cinema?
18 A. Well, I -- under oath I could not say, but I have the
19 impression it is the building to the left.
20 Q. We can see that the main entrance -- or what must once
21 have been the main entrance -- to that building is
22 blocked up with what other photographs show us are
23 corrugated sheets of metal.
24 We can also see, just to the left of McCool's
25 newsagent, another little opening. And if we may put
1 another photograph beside this one on the screen, P387,
2 we get a better view of that opening. We can see, in
3 the photograph on the right, that it too appears to have
4 corrugated metal across it.
5 Looking at those photographs, are you able to
6 remember how you gained access to the building?
7 A. I am afraid I am not, no. It would have been one --
8 through one of those three corrugated iron doors. If
9 you ask me to guess, as it were, I think it was through
10 the cinema. But I really must be very careful here;
11 I really do not remember.
12 Q. In each of these photographs we can see, immediately
13 above the smaller entrance that I was pointing to and
14 where I am now pointing with what I had hoped was going
15 to be a red arrow --
16 A. I see it anyway.
17 Q. That is now a red arrow on the right, a form of slit or
18 opening of some kind. With that in mind, may we look at
19 one more photograph, please, P602. We can take the
20 photograph on the right off the screen. Perhaps we had
21 better take the photograph on the left off the screen as
22 well, and have P602 on its own.
23 Once again, on this photograph we can see the
24 opening to which I was referring, and you can probably
25 just see that there appears to be a soldier there with
1 what looks like a rifle. Would you have been wearing
2 spectacles on that day?
3 A. Certainly.
4 Q. We have an enlarged view of this at E16.004.
5 A. Good heavens!
6 Q. Do you recognise that face?
7 A. I do. How extraordinary.
8 Q. It may be a redundant question, but who is it?
9 A. It has to be me. Quite extraordinary.
10 Q. May we go back to page B1802.006. While you were
11 waiting for the march to arrive, did you stay in the
12 same position, or did you move around?
13 A. No, we stayed in the same position. It is interesting
14 actually because my own impression was it was in the
15 cinema, and it was only that I was persuaded it was not,
16 it was in the newsagent. But that is clearly part of
17 the cinema.
18 So I regret to say that that X is inaccurate, and
19 I now firmly believe that it was in that gap that you
20 just enlarged.
21 Q. You do not believe, for example, that it was possible to
22 get from the cinema into the room above the newsagent,
23 and that you moved backwards and forwards between the
24 two?
25 A. I do not recall it. I suppose it is feasible. I am
1 sorry not to be more precise.
2 Q. In your statement you say that you stood slightly back
3 from the window or opening, whatever it was, to watch
4 the riot that was going on at the barrier, and that your
5 fellow riflemen did the same. Is it your recollection
6 that you were both at the same opening?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. We can see from the photographs that some of the
9 buildings in this area were, to a greater or lesser
10 extent, burnt out or derelict. We can see, so far as
11 the cinema is concerned, that it was clearly in a bad
12 state. Do you remember what sort of state of repair the
13 buildings to the west of the cinema, that is to say
14 McCool's newsagent itself and -- if you could see any
15 part of them -- the buildings beyond McCool's, were in?
16 A. No, I cannot. I recall the area of the cinema being
17 open, an open space. But no, I really cannot go any
18 further than that.
19 Q. Did you at any stage become aware of any civilians
20 having entered any of the buildings in this part of
21 William Street?
22 A. I do not recall. I do not recall it, no.
23 Q. If we can go back to your statement at page B1802.003,
24 you describe, in helpful detail, the sequence of events
25 that followed, in which the riot developed at the
1 barrier, and your fellow rifleman was then spotted, and
2 some of the crowd began to attack the corrugated
3 sheeting below you. In paragraph 16 you explain how the
4 water cannon was brought forward and dispersed most of
5 the crowd.
6 If we can look a little more closely at
7 paragraph 17, you explain that you left the building by
8 the same route as you had entered it, and you found
9 General Ford and some men from the Parachute Regiment
10 behind the barrier in William Street.
11 You then say this:
12 "It was my immediate feeling that it was too late
13 for the Paras to go in as a snatch squad, as the rioting
14 had finished and people had dispersed away from
15 William Street. I could see no point in a snatch squad
16 operation as the Paras had clearly missed the rioters.
17 It seemed to me to be a pointless exercise, the Paras
18 going into the Bogside, and I thought it would be
19 a seriously stupid and dangerous thing for them to do.
20 It was not a tactic that made any sense to me, and not
21 one which I had envisaged."
22 Are you able to give any estimate of the period of
23 time for which the area in front of the barrier had been
24 empty of rioters before the Parachute Regiment's arrest
25 operation began?
1 A. No, I am not. I would not have left that building --
2 cinema or newsagent or whichever -- until the area
3 immediately in front of me had been cleared. My
4 impression was that it was cleared by the water cannon.
5 It is equally possible that it was clearly actually by
6 the presence of the Parachute Regiment. I mean, the
7 Parachute Regiment must have been crossing the barrier
8 as I was leaving the building. I do not remember that,
9 but logically that would seem to be the case.
10 Q. Are you able to say whether you would have left the
11 building as soon as you were satisfied that the area in
12 front of the barrier was empty of rioters?
13 A. Yes. I certainly would not have left it any sooner or
14 any earlier.
15 Q. Why you did you regard the snatch squad operation that
16 was about to be launched as not merely pointless but
17 seriously stupid and dangerous?
18 A. I was not aware then, nor indeed am I now, of precisely
19 what that operation was intended to do; I still do not
20 know. If it was intended to relieve the pressure on the
21 barricade and to arrest those people who were -- who
22 were attacking the barricade, then it was too late. And
23 the impression I got at the time was that that was the
24 intention, and they subsequently followed,
25 ill-advisedly, the rioters into the Bogside.
1 Q. Why was that an ill-advised thing to do?
2 A. We had a lot of experience of operating in that
3 particular area. It is a phenomenally difficult area to
4 control; the danger of being ambushed in that area is
5 very great indeed. Indeed, in my experience
6 subsequently in Belfast and other places in
7 Northern Ireland, it was, you know, the most difficult,
8 tactically, to get it right. Our -- our tactics in our
9 regiment would never have followed that course. It
10 would have been a very dangerous thing to do.
11 Q. When your regiment had been involved in operating snatch
12 squads in this part of the city, was there any
13 particular area within which the snatch squads aimed to
14 pick up rioters or hooligans?
15 A. The -- if I recall, the whole concept of snatch squads
16 at that stage really had ceased to be used. It was not
17 believed to be cost-effective in the return that it
18 produced as a deterrent.
19 But if snatch squads were deployed, or in earlier
20 times they had been deployed around the area that we
21 used to know as Aggro Corner, that being the junction of
22 William Street and Rossville Street.
23 Q. To your knowledge, had snatch squads -- or, if you
24 prefer to call them something else, please do -- but had
25 arresting soldiers on previous occasions chased
1 hooligans down Rossville Street?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. How far --
4 A. Sorry, I beg your pardon, down Rossville Street?
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. Unusually. Certainly down William Street, from -- from
7 the Little Diamond down to what I refer to as
8 Aggro Corner. Yes, occasionally in Rossville Street,
9 but more usually in William Street.
10 Q. And how far down Rossville Street?
11 A. I mean, it is an impossible question.
12 Q. Do you have any recollection of particular occasions
13 when that happened?
14 A. There were occasions when we did go right into the
15 Bogside, of course there were, into the flats, into
16 Columbcille Court and all those other areas. Yes, there
17 were. Those operations, however, were normally lift
18 operations; that was planned -- planned search or lift
19 operations, requested by the RUC.
20 Q. Let us put to one side planned search or lift
21 operations, and focus on operations in which the aim was
22 to pick up rioters.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Do you have a recollection of particular occasions when
25 operations of that sort, to pick up rioters, went into
1 Rossville Street or took place in Rossville Street?
2 A. I am not quite sure how to go about this, because you
3 are asking a very specific question. If this helps,
4 I will say it; if it does not help, then please stop me.
5 The normal routine in the city, previous to that
6 time, was rioting in order to suck the Security Forces
7 in. We would deploy; we would not wish to get too
8 heavily involved; we would not wish to get face to face;
9 and our task really was to ensure the integrity of the
10 city centre and property in that area. It was not to go
11 out and make -- make snatches. And at the appropriate
12 time the rioting would die down, everybody would go back
13 for tea, watch Scene around Six, and then go out again
14 in the evening.
15 I am not trivialising it, but that was actually the
16 routine, and over that was always the danger of sniping.
17 But it was not routine to go out and arrest people, as
18 you put it.
19 But what was -- what was routine, and where we did
20 go into the Bogside, as I say -- I mean, you said "Put
21 that aside", but the time we spent in the Bogside or in
22 the Creggan were on these lift operations, usually very
23 early in the morning.
24 Q. That is helpful. What I was seeking to understand is
25 simply this: you have stated in your statement to this
1 Inquiry that you considered that the snatch squad
2 operation that appeared to be about to be launched was
3 not just a pointless exercise, but one that was stupid
4 and dangerous. I was seeking to understand how it
5 differed from operations that your battalion had been
6 involved with which, presumably, you would not have
7 regarded as stupid and dangerous operations.
8 A. I rather hoped that I had explained that.
9 Q. I think you have.
10 May we then go to paragraph 18 on the next page,
11 where you describe in some detail the entry of the
12 Parachute Regiment through the barrier, and an incident
13 in which the last paratrooper to run through the barrier
14 reached the approximate point marked A on the map
15 attached to your statement; which we can look at if
16 necessary, but it is just by the north end of
17 Chamberlain Street. You say that:
18 "He turned round, immediately went down on one knee
19 to present a low target, put his rifle up to his
20 shoulder to aim, and shouted 'Gunman'."
21 You say that he was pointing his rifle towards the
22 Army observation point on the Embassy Ballroom. You ran
23 towards him, shouting "No", and you slipped and fell.
24 And, by the time you lifted yourself up, the paratrooper
25 had moved on.
1 At the time when this happened, were you able to see
2 whether there were armed soldiers visible up on the
3 Embassy Ballroom observation post?
4 A. Did I see the soldiers on the embassy post, is that the
5 question?
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. No. I mean, I knew they were there, they had been there
8 all the time. It was a static OP. I did not need to
9 look to see there were soldiers there, I knew perfectly
10 well there were.
11 Q. Did it appear to you that this paratrooper was under the
12 mistaken impression that there was a civilian gunman up
13 in what you knew to be an Army observation post?
14 A. That was the distinct and very worrying impression I had
15 at the time.
16 Q. Did you yourself see any sign of a civilian gunman in
17 the area?
18 A. No.
19 Q. May we go on to paragraphs 19 and 20. You say that
20 after the paratrooper had moved away, you heard shots,
21 and in fact a journalist with whom you were having
22 a conversation recognised the noises before you did. Do
23 you happen to remember who that journalist was?
24 A. No. It may well have been Gerald Seymour, but
25 I cannot -- I only make that connection because I saw
1 him interviewing the Commanding Officer later on. But
2 I cannot say for certain it was him.
3 Q. You say that you heard a large number of individual
4 shots which sounded to you like SLR fire.
5 A. Yes.
6 LORD SAVILLE: Going back to this journalist, it is very
7 difficult to remember now, but do you have any
8 recollection as to whether he was part of part of a TV
9 crew or otherwise?
10 A. I do not, sir. My recollection is actually rather
11 ashamed that he had identified the shots before I had,
12 which made me seem rather unprofessional, because at
13 first the conversation went something like "Those are
14 shots, are they not?" and I said "No, I do not think
15 they are". "Yes, they are." And then I realised that
16 they were. But I am afraid I cannot identify whether he
17 was part of a TV crew or not.
18 LORD SAVILLE: That was just an idea in case we could help
19 to identify him.
20 A. Indeed, yes.
21 LORD SAVILLE: But there we are. Thank you.
22 MR ROXBURGH: You describe the shooting as quite protracted,
23 and you say you did not hear any automatic fire.
24 Did you hear any firing at all that you could
25 identify as coming from a weapon other than an SLR?
1 A. No. And a comment, if I may: the identification of
2 firing from outside that area is extremely difficult.
3 Indeed, in any urban environment, identifying shots --
4 be they high velocity, low velocity, automatic, or
5 whatever -- is -- is very tricky indeed, and curious
6 things happen to sound in built-up areas.
7 Q. Did you hear any explosions?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Were you familiar at the time with the sound of nail
10 bombs?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. It may be difficult, but can you give any description of
13 the sound that a nail bomb makes when it explodes?
14 A. It is a big bang. Nail bombs are, by virtue of being
15 home-made -- were very different in their makeup. They
16 were actually extraordinarily ineffective. There was
17 usually an explosion and the nails were just left lying
18 on the ground.
19 But could I identify a nail bomb as opposed to an
20 automatic weapon? Yes, I certainly could.
21 Q. In paragraph 20, you say:
22 "I was fully aware that a large number of rounds had
23 been fired and I immediately feared the worst. It was
24 always very difficult to identify from where shots were
25 being fired in the Bogside because of the layout of the
1 area and the Rossville Flats, which would distort
2 sounds. When you hear shots, as a soldier, your
3 automatic reaction is to fire yourself, which is
4 a difficult reaction to stop. I was concerned that the
5 troops who had gone into the Bogside had believed that
6 they were under fire and had lost control of their
7 firing. When firing breaks out in tense situations it
8 can spread very quickly and is very difficult to
9 control. Direct action is often necessary."
10 Should we understand from that paragraph that the
11 concern that you had was that the troops who had gone
12 into the Bogside might have opened fire in the mistaken
13 belief that they were under fire themselves?
14 A. No, I do not think you would be right to draw that
15 conclusion.
16 Q. The point you are making is that you were concerned that
17 the troops had believed, rightly or wrongly, that they
18 were under fire?
19 A. Yes. I mean, the wider point is the concern that I had
20 at the time, and still do, is that in a firefight it is
21 extraordinarily difficult to control fire. People, when
22 they are frightened, tend to fire indiscriminately -- it
23 is human nature, I am afraid -- and a heck of a lot of
24 training goes into ensure that that does not happen.
25 But I have experienced it.
1 I was involved subsequently in training soldiers for
2 duties in Northern Ireland, and it is a problem.
3 I suspect it always has been, and my impression at the
4 time, because of the number of rounds being fired, was
5 that there may have been some problems with fire
6 control.
7 Q. Would it be fair to say, in view of the position where
8 you were and the point that you have made about the
9 difficulty of identifying the sounds of gunfire in urban
10 areas, that you are not in a position to say whether or
11 not fire was directed at the soldiers in the Bogside?
12 A. Emphatically I was not in a position so to do.
13 Q. Thank you very much.
14 Questioned by MR ELIAS
15 MR ELIAS: 128, my name is Elias. I represent a number of
16 former soldiers.
17 Just clarification, essentially, of one part of your
18 evidence, the timing. May I take you, please, to your
19 1972 statement, at our page 1802.009. About five or six
20 lines down, you begin saying:
21 "I was preparing to evacuate the location [the OP
22 that you were in, the sniper position]."
23 Do you have that?
24 A. I do, yes. Can I just read it?
25 Q. Please. I want to read it through so we see the
1 context. You were preparing to evacuate:
2 "At this time a few baton rounds were fired at the
3 marchers as the situation, by now, warranted their use.
4 The marchers reformed and got very close to the barrier.
5 At this point the water cannon was brought forward and
6 fired at the crowd; the water contained a reddish dye.
7 The peaceful element of the marchers then moved away and
8 went down Rossville Street, leaving a hardcore of
9 rioters numbering about 200 to 300 people. These
10 continued to hurl stones and odd items at the troops,
11 and in fact produced some corrugated metal sheets to use
12 as they advanced towards the barrier. The water cannon
13 was again employed and fired at the rioters, again at
14 the hardcore. Throughout this period baton rounds were
15 being fired to keep the rioters at bay. I vaguely
16 remember that at this time the majority of the rioters
17 vanished from our location."
18 What you seem to be saying then is that you
19 recalled, as we know seems to have happened, the water
20 cannon being brought up and used twice; firstly, it did
21 just disperse a large element of the crowd, left the
22 hardcore rioters, and the water cannon was employed on
23 that hardcore a second time. Do you actually remember
24 that now?
25 A. I do not, no. I only remember it once now. Quite
1 clearly --
2 Q. You must have remembered it at the time?
3 A. I mean, it must have been used twice, yes.
4 Q. You say your recollection at the time. Your account at
5 the time was that the use of the water cannon the second
6 time caused the majority of the rioters, as you put it,
7 to vanish from that area. It was at that time, was it?
8 As you go on to say, you then saw the six Armoured
9 Personnel Carriers appear and cross into
10 Rossville Street from Little James Street, and at the
11 same time men from the Parachute Regiment coming over
12 barrier 14, where you were located.
13 A. Yes, I do not now recall. I mean, it is very difficult
14 to contradict myself on a statement that I made at that
15 time, but I do not recall now the six armoured
16 personnel, seeing the six armoured personnel trucks
17 crossing.
18 Q. Since you said it at the time, it must have been true to
19 the best of your knowledge at that time?
20 A. Exactly.
21 Questioned by LORD GIFFORD
22 LORD GIFFORD: Very briefly. I am Anthony Gifford.
23 I appear for the family of James Wray.
24 I wanted to understand, as far as you can give it to
25 us, your position at certain times. Could we look at
1 your plan, 1,802.011, and highlight where we have A and
2 B. B was indicating, as best you could, your building
3 where you had been observing?
4 A. (Witness nodding).
5 Q. And could you see the junction of Aggro Corner from your
6 observation point?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Would it have been from that raised level that you would
9 have seen the Army vehicles crossing the junction?
10 A. As I just answered just now, I cannot actually remember
11 that, but I -- but it would so have been.
12 Q. Then --
13 A. I am so sorry, equally I could have seen it from when
14 I was standing on the ground.
15 Q. Because the point at which you left your position, you
16 came down into William Street?
17 A. Yes, as I recall.
18 Q. Before the paratroopers went in over the barrier 14?
19 A. No, I cannot say that for certain. In fact, logically,
20 as the last -- the tail end Charlie, as I took it to be,
21 who was at A, and as the whole company had gone through,
22 they must have been going through when I came out of the
23 building.
24 Q. Certainly you were down in the street when you saw the
25 paratrooper at A make this remarkable movement as if to
1 shoot at the embassy OP?
2 A. Yes, perhaps. Perhaps "as if to shoot" is a bit strong,
3 but certainly it caused me concern.
4 Q. You then ran towards him, and did you reach the top of
5 Chamberlain Street?
6 A. I slipped -- the water from the water cannon had frozen,
7 so I -- rather undignified approach, I recall sort of
8 reaching him on my chest, as it were. I recall being
9 about a yard away from him when he moved.
10 Q. After you had picked yourself up, it was from about that
11 position at the junction that you were with the
12 journalist and heard the shots?
13 A. I rather think I had moved further back.
14 Q. Further back towards the barricade?
15 A. Yes. I cannot say. I cannot say.
16 Questioned by MR COYLE
17 MR COYLE: My name is Coyle. I appear for some of the
18 families, particularly the McGuigan family.
19 I want to explore one issue of the topography of
20 Columbcille Court. B197.2 is an aerial photograph of
21 the location.
22 This is an aerial photograph, as you will see,
23 Colonel, of the Bogside, in or about the time of
24 Bloody Sunday. You can see the Rossville Flats and,
25 helpfully marked upon the map, you can see
1 William Street in blue and Glenfada Park behind.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Do you have your bearings?
4 A. I do. I think this photograph is rather before though,
5 because I notice the cinema has not been burnt out.
6 Q. Yes, you are quite right.
7 A. But, however, yes, I do I have my bearings.
8 Q. There is one matter I wonder could you assist the
9 Tribunal with a little further. Mr Roxburgh asked you
10 a question, and your answer was to the effect that you
11 and your colleagues had advanced into Columbcille Court,
12 which is, if I may isolate it in a different colour, in
13 or about that area of Rossville Street.
14 A. No, I think you misunderstood. I never said I had been
15 to Columbcille Court on that day.
16 Q. Certainly not on that day, but on other occasions?
17 A. I see. Yes, on other occasions, yes.
18 Q. That is the topic I would like to ask your assistance
19 on. In terms of the topography of Columbcille Court and
20 Glenfada Park, which you see marked, it was your
21 impression it was a very difficult area and terrain,
22 because of the nature of the buildings and walkways, to
23 enter safely?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Thank you very much.
1 Questioned by MR GLASGOW
2 MR GLASGOW: There is one matter you may be able to help the
3 Tribunal with. I apologise: I think this photograph was
4 not shown to you. Would you look with us, please, at
5 C387. Am I right in thinking this was not shown to you?
6 A. No, it was not.
7 Q. It shows the barrier we are talking about with, as we
8 all know, some of the paratroopers of C Company going
9 over the barrier.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. I think the window we see at the top is the window at
12 which, at least for some of the time, you accept you
13 must have been at.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. I say "window"; I should not say that. Whatever it
16 is --
17 A. It is that gap, yes.
18 Q. The gap, whatever it was.
19 A. Whatever it was.
20 Q. Do you have any recollection, sir, of what it was?
21 A. I have always had a problem, because I recall my
22 colleague, whose name we do not know, leaning out of the
23 window with his elbow like this. Quite clearly, the one
24 above the newsagent he could not have done that; and,
25 therefore, this -- and always my impression has been
1 that it was in the projection room of the cinema. I now
2 subsequently believe I was right in the first place, and
3 I believe that is a projection room or a similar small
4 room with stone steps leading down.
5 Q. The other matter: you do have a recollection, I think
6 you always have, of being at an aperture, which was at
7 least wide enough for you and the soldier to be able to
8 back away from and yet still see out?
9 A. That is quite correct. That is my recollection, yes.
10 Q. Without leading you in any way, does that gap look as if
11 it is wide enough for what you recall?
12 A. It does not, does it?
13 Q. I do not know, sir.
14 A. It does not, I have to say. This is very confusing.
15 I do not recall moving from one room to another, and yet
16 quite clearly I was shown a photograph earlier which was
17 certainly me, and certainly in that particular gap.
18 Q. The other matter, sir, is this: your recollection
19 I think always has been that you remained in the
20 building, in some part of the building?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Until at least the initial wave of the paratroopers had
23 gone in?
24 A. That would be logical, yes.
25 Q. We have not had this enlarged. Doing the best we can,
1 we think the distinctive cap badge of your regiment is
2 in fact visible in this photograph, as it was in the E
3 photograph that was shown.
4 A. It does look so, does it not.
5 Q. You see it yourself?
6 A. I do.
7 Q. Do you now happen to have any recall as to whether or
8 not you or the soldier were at that slit as what I think
9 must be the first wave went in?
10 To be fair to you, sir, I ought to explain why I put
11 the question in that form: we are told, I think it is
12 not disputed, that at least some of the first wave of
13 paratroopers would have gone over the barrier, as
14 illustrated in this photograph; whereas at a later
15 stage, perhaps by the time you got down to the pavement,
16 the barrier would have been sufficiently opened for them
17 not to need to climb over the barbed wire. That is why
18 I put the question in that way.
19 A. I believe that is the truth.
20 Q. At any event, your recollection, whether or not
21 confirmed by this photograph, is that by the time you
22 got down to the pavement, at least a number of
23 paratroopers had already gone over the barrier?
24 A. There were -- they were still crossing the barrier when
25 I was there. But in fact they were going, as I recall
1 it, through a gap, rather than climbing over it, on the
2 north side.
3 Q. By the time you got down, you believe that the
4 paratroopers who were still going through were going
5 through a gap --
6 A. That is my recollection.
7 Q. -- of what would have been the far side, which you
8 rightly call the north pavement?
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. Through which -- again it is not necessary to take up
11 everybody's time, but -- we know at least one vehicle
12 subsequently passed, but you did not see that?
13 A. I do not recall it. I cannot say I did not see it; I do
14 not recall it.
15 Q. This much is clear, sir: by the time you got down onto
16 the pavement, there was no sign of any rioters at all?
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. And it was at that stage that you formed the view that
19 you did, that the operation seemed either pointless or,
20 at worst, dangerous and silly?
21 A. That accurately describes (inaudible).
22 Q. The last matter I wonder if you could help the Tribunal
23 a little more with is this riot by comparison with other
24 riots, of which, regrettably you and your regiment had
25 considerable experience.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. You rightly say, I am sure, they were not always very
3 serious.
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. If we could look at your paragraph 15 at 1,802.003, look
6 at the centre of paragraph 15, you there describe the
7 ferocity of the attack directed at the location where
8 you were.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And you say how frightened you were.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Does that just apply to the attack on your location, or
13 were you also describing the severity of the riot as
14 a whole?
15 A. No, I was describing the severity of the riot as
16 a whole. It was exceptionally, as I think I have said,
17 ferocious.
18 Q. I did not want to draw wrong significance to that. Your
19 drawing attention to the ferocity of the riot is the
20 riot as a whole, not just the attack on the building
21 that put you in fear of your life?
22 A. That is what I meant when I answered your question.
23 Q. In the light of that, your own experience with your own
24 regiment of conducting arrest operations, for the most
25 part they had been -- I do not know how to describe
1 them, but "dash and grab operation", rushing out and
2 grabbing individuals and rushing back; is that right?
3 A. That is correct. In the early days we used to do that.
4 Q. The Tribunal heard some evidence, particularly from the
5 Royal Anglian senior officers, that they had developed
6 a technique, sometimes employed with you when both your
7 regiments were together, of a rather different type of
8 operation, known to some as the "Derry hook".
9 A. Yes, I recall that.
10 Q. Did you have some experience of that?
11 A. I did, yes.
12 Q. Was that different from what I rather call the "dash and
13 grab"?
14 A. Yes, it was.
15 Q. From your own recollection, sir, could you tell the
16 Tribunal how that sort of operation, the Derry hook,
17 differed from the dash and grab?
18 A. The dash and grab, as you describe it, were usually sort
19 of three or four soldiers, usually wearing gym shoes,
20 who came in at an indirect angle, rapidly, not armed but
21 with a baton (inaudible).
22 The hook operations were more planned and on
23 a larger scale, usually two-company operations, or at
24 least the size of two platoon operations.
25 Q. At the time when you got down to the pavement and saw
1 the empty street with some of the paratroopers still
2 going through, did you form any impression as to what
3 type of operation this one appeared to be?
4 A. No. I have to say I was in ignorance. I really did not
5 know what it was doing.
6 MR ROXBURGH: Sir, I have no further questions.
7 LORD SAVILLE: The Chairman again. Thank you very much
8 indeed for coming here to assist us, thank you.
9 (The witness withdrew)
10 INQ1002, sworn
11 Questioned by MS McGAHEY
12 LORD SAVILLE: If you look across to your left you can see
13 who is talking to you. I say this to all the
14 witnesses: I am the Chairman; the questions will come
15 from the barristers, the people in front of me. Could
16 you pull the microphone towards you a little bit and
17 then we will be able to hear what you have to say.
18 MS McGAHEY: Do you have with you, please, a copy of the
19 statement that you made to this Inquiry and signed on
20 6th July 1999?
21 A. I do, yes.
22 Q. Are the contents of that statement true to the best of
23 your knowledge and belief?
24 A. They are, yes.
25 Q. Everybody here has had a chance to read your statement.
1 I am only going to ask you about parts of it.
2 As I am sure you know that not only you but many
3 other soldiers here have been granted anonymity. So, in
4 the course of your answers, please do not give the name
5 of any soldier. If you know a name you can write it
6 down and we will give you the cipher to use.
7 The first page of your statement is on the screen at
8 the moment. Could I ask you to look first, please, at
9 paragraph 7. You say there you have your own
10 photographs of the day, which you attach as two
11 appendices. Stopping there, you have brought the
12 originals with you this morning?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. They have now been scanned onto our system so that we
15 can have a better view of them. Perhaps I could ask if
16 those could be put up on the screen at the moment.
17 Could we have C1002.5, please. That is the first
18 photograph that you provided to us, is it not?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Are you the soldier in the front on the far right-hand
21 side?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Secondly, could we have O2.6. That is your appendix B.
24 Can you recognise yourself in this photograph?
25 A. No, not from that photograph, no.
1 Q. Or anybody else?
2 A. No, not really, no.
3 Q. Could we go back to your statement, please, at C1002.1,
4 paragraph 7. You say that these photographs were taken
5 by the battalion photographer. I would like to send you
6 the name of an individual whom we know to have been at
7 least one of the battalion photographers, to see whether
8 you recognise that name. (Pause). The name should now
9 have appeared on the screen to your right. Is that the
10 photographer who gave you the photographs?
11 A. I do not know. I did not know his name then and I do
12 not know it now. I did not know him. He recognised me
13 from the photographs he took, and he approached me.
14 I did not know who he was, and he told me who he was,
15 and then he gave me the photographs, and that was it.
16 Q. Did he tell you whether he was a member of the
17 battalion's intelligence section?
18 A. No, he did not. All he said, "Battalion photographer",
19 he took the photographs that day, "I've got a couple of
20 photographs with you in it. Would you like them?"
21 "Yes, please". And he gave me them, and that was the
22 last I saw of him. I did not know his name.
23 Q. It might help a little if you slow down a bit, because
24 the stenographer to your left has to take down
25 everything you say.
1 For the record, the cipher of the name I gave to the
2 witness was INQ1231.
3 Could we go over the page, please, to paragraph 11.
4 MR TOOHEY: Before you do, Ms McGahey, INQ1002, did you
5 understand that the photographer was giving you a copy
6 of all the photographs he had, or the photographs he
7 had, or merely those that he thought you might be
8 particularly interested in because you appeared in them?
9 A. I -- he recognised me, and he said "I've got
10 a photograph of you", and I think he had a pile, and he
11 said -- I said "Can I have perhaps that one as well",
12 being the other one of me not in it. And that was it.
13 I obviously wanted the one with me in it, and just the
14 other one. I did not think a lot of it, really. He
15 just gave me the photographs, and I have just kept them
16 ever since.
17 MR TOOHEY: I take it from that that you did not understand
18 that he was giving you all the photographs that he had,
19 is that right?
20 A. He was just giving me the two. I do not know if he just
21 happened to have them with him that day, but he just
22 gave me the two photographs, the one with me in it, and
23 I perhaps said "Could I have that one as well?" And so
24 he gave me the two.
25 MS McGAHEY: At paragraphs 11 and 12 you set out your
1 recollection of the marchers arriving at the barrier,
2 and their arrival being followed by a riot. Your
3 recollection is that the marchers arrived, moved off
4 quickly; and that, after that, rioters and stone
5 throwers stayed for about two hours; and that, after
6 about two hours, you were asked to go round the corner
7 into Waterloo Place and call up the water cannon. And
8 you say:
9 "The water cannon came forward and started firing
10 [into the crowd]."
11 From the radio logs we have of the day, it does
12 appear that there was a much shorter time than two hours
13 between the head of the march arriving at William Street
14 and the water cannon being deployed, in fact something
15 closer to ten minutes than two hours. Is it possible
16 that your recollection is at fault in this respect?
17 A. It may be. It did -- thinking back on it, it did seem
18 a long time at that time, but obviously it was not that
19 long a time. It is just -- I was just trying to
20 remember how long it actually was, and that is the best
21 I could come up with.
22 Q. Had you been present at many other riots at this time?
23 A. We -- every day there was something going on. Every day
24 that we was in the city there was something going on,
25 usually at the junction of William Street/Rossville
1 Street, close to the Rossville Flats. There was always
2 some type of stone throwing, all the time, most days.
3 Q. Is it possible you have confused the length of time of
4 this riot with another one?
5 A. It may be. It did seem to me to be -- I may have --
6 from the initial marchers coming up to the barricade,
7 I may have judged it from then up until the water cannon
8 coming, and not from the actual time that just the
9 rioters were throwing the stones.
10 Q. Could we go over the page, please, to paragraph 14. You
11 are dealing there with the situation after the Parachute
12 Regiment have gone through barrier 14 and down
13 William Street towards Rossville Street. You say that,
14 as the Paras turned the corner down Rossville Street:
15 "I suddenly heard a lot of shooting. That was the
16 first shooting I had heard that day. I can
17 categorically state that there was no shooting before
18 then."
19 Was there a lot of noise around you before that
20 time?
21 A. The noise -- there was not a lot of noise then because,
22 when the Paras went in, the rioters had gone. So
23 basically all there was was the scuffle of feet of
24 paratroopers going in, the movement of barricades, the
25 odd vehicle noise. But there was not the shouting, as
1 there would have been if the stone throwers were still
2 there.
3 So it was quite -- from what I can recollect --
4 quiet, if you can understand.
5 Q. At the time that the rioters were present, was there
6 a great deal of noise?
7 A. Yes, shouting, stones hitting the ground, hitting
8 vehicles.
9 Q. Could we go on, please, to paragraph 15. You say the
10 rioters had gone, the Paras had left, and you were just
11 left with all the debris from the riot. Then you say:
12 "I think it was at this stage that I remember seeing
13 a Para taking aim at the corner of William Street and
14 Rossville Street. He was aiming southwards down
15 Rossville Street and I remember thinking it was very
16 strange."
17 I am very sorry, I wonder if you would mind rising
18 for a few moments.
19 (11.00 a.m)
20 (A short break)
21 (11.15 a.m)
22 MS McGAHEY: Thank you very much, sir, for the time.
23 Could we go back, please, to your statement at
24 C1002.3, paragraph 15. You say in that paragraph that
25 you saw a Para taking aim at the corner of
1 William Street and Rossville Street. Do you remember
2 where you were when you saw this, please?
3 A. I believe I was on the -- as you are looking up
4 William Street, I was on the left; that is where I ended
5 up, on the left-hand side, as you are looking up the
6 street, where the barricades were, just the other side
7 of the barricade, or in that vicinity.
8 Q. Had you gone through the barricade?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Towards Rossville Street?
11 A. A bit further up, yes, than what we was before.
12 Q. Did you have a clear view of the Rossville Street and
13 William Street junction from where you were?
14 A. I -- I cannot remember. I really cannot remember that.
15 Q. Can I ask you to look at a photograph. Could we have
16 P203 on the screen, please. Please ignore the markings
17 at the top of this photograph. To help you get your
18 bearings, that is Rossville Street running south to
19 north; William Street running west to east; barrier 14,
20 where you were, would be roughly in the area of my red
21 arrow. Do you have your bearings now on the picture?
22 A. Yes, I do, yes.
23 Q. Looking at that picture, can you now work out where the
24 paratrooper you saw aiming was?
25 A. It was -- like I say, I was on the left, perhaps a lot
1 nearer the corner of the other street, on the left,
2 looking --
3 Q. If you have control of the screen, would you like to
4 mark where you were?
5 A. I must have been around about that area, there
6 (indicating). Is that working correctly? Yes, over on
7 the -- perhaps --
8 Q. Shall I have a go? Is that right?
9 A. Round about that area, yes, because I could see up the
10 street.
11 Q. You would be at the point where William Street turns
12 a slight bend until you get the straight bit down
13 towards Rossville Street?
14 A. Yes, that is as far as we actually went that day.
15 Q. Where was the paratrooper?
16 A. He could have been -- he was somewhere around about that
17 area, somewhere around that area, because I thought it
18 was a strange place to be standing still.
19 Q. You have put him on the corner of the junction nearest
20 the wasteground, which is to the north of that.
21 A. He could have been in the middle of the road. He could
22 have been slightly down William Street. It is just
23 a rough area that I can say. I cannot pinpoint actually
24 where he was actually standing.
25 Q. Were there other people around him?
1 A. I cannot remember. If there was, they was perhaps
2 running, because he stood out because he was stationary,
3 as I said. At that time it was not a place to be
4 stationary, standing still.
5 Q. Was he standing vertically, or kneeling?
6 A. I believe he was -- he was standing.
7 Q. Do you have any idea at all what he was aiming at?
8 A. No, no.
9 Q. Could we save that image, please, as C1002.12. Could we
10 go back to your statement, when that has been done,
11 C1002.3, paragraph 18. You are talking there about your
12 reaction to the events of the day. You say:
13 "No-one talked about it until we got back that
14 evening, when we found out how many casualties there had
15 been. No-one could believe it, and we were all
16 wondering what on earth had happened. As far as we were
17 concerned, the situation had been under control. My
18 feeling at the time was that the Paras had lost it and
19 had just gone crazy and fired indiscriminately."
20 Was your feeling, that the Paras had lost it and
21 gone crazy, based simply on gossip among soldiers of
22 your regiment?
23 A. No. Obviously we talked about it, but I cannot remember
24 me talking to people. Obviously it was talked about.
25 They was my feelings from that day. They were my own
1 personal feelings from that incident that we had been
2 there for some time.
3 We had riots every day. They was controlled. The
4 riots went away. That day the rioters went away. The
5 Paras went in, and that happened, and that was our own
6 thoughts about what happened. Someone lost control of
7 something, something that spooked the Paras to fire;
8 they did. And they are my feelings about what happened
9 that day.
10 Q. That is just guesswork on your part, is that right?
11 A. I believe it is more than guesswork really. It is -- it
12 is not just -- I have had that thought with me ever
13 since the day it happened. I have always believed
14 personally -- it is just my own view -- that something
15 spooked them, a noise, someone fired and then other
16 people fired.
17 I did not see anyone firing, but I believe that that
18 is -- that is the thought I have always had from that
19 day, that something like that happened.
20 Q. I would like to ask you about one particular incident
21 that you recall. Could we go over the page to
22 paragraph 19, please. You say:
23 "Some time after the Paras had gone down Rossville
24 Street, a Pig came northwards up Chamberlain Street or
25 William Street and through barrier 14. Someone said the
1 Pig had a Para in it who was injured. As I understood
2 it, he was not injured by a gunshot but a missile,
3 perhaps a brick had hit him. There was also a body on
4 top of the Pig, and I could see its arm or leg hanging
5 down, I am not sure which it was. There was a tarpaulin
6 chucked over the top of the Pig and the body was
7 underneath it. I tried looking in the back of the Pig
8 to see if there were people in there, but I could not
9 see."
10 When you saw this Pig, were you in the area of
11 barrier 14 yourself?
12 A. Yes. That is the only area that we stayed in that area
13 for the duration of the incident.
14 Q. Was this an ordinary Pig or an Army ambulance?
15 A. I -- I do not know. It was a Pig, an armoured Pig; that
16 is what we used to call them. I cannot remember if it
17 was an ambulance one. I believe there was some, but
18 I cannot remember if it was.
19 Q. You have referred to there being a tarpaulin over the
20 top of the Pig, and that was over the body. Can you
21 recall now seeing a shape under that tarpaulin that
22 looked like the shape of a body?
23 A. I -- I cannot. It happened very quickly. Just as
24 I looked round -- it drove past as I looked round, and
25 that is -- that is -- I cannot really remember a lot
1 about that, just an incident that came to mind as I was
2 being -- giving my evidence at the -- doing my
3 statement.
4 Q. You say that you could see an arm or a leg hanging down.
5 Can you be sure about that?
6 A. I cannot be sure. I seem to remember vaguely about
7 that. I cannot 100 per cent say that I did actually say
8 that, although I have said it in my statement.
9 Q. We do have evidence that there was an Army ambulance,
10 a Pig, that picked up a paratrooper. It seems likely
11 that that ambulance did come back through barrier 14.
12 I would like to ask you to look at the description given
13 in 1972 of that ambulance by the 1 Para medical officer.
14 Could we have on the screen, please, B2160. This is
15 the statement of an officer known to us as Soldier 219.
16 He is referring to his duties acting as a medical
17 back-up to 1 Para on the day. He says:
18 "Amongst the equipment used by me in such
19 a situation is a Humber one-tonne APC converted for use
20 as an ambulance. The Humber is marked in the normal
21 fashion, with a Red Cross in a white circle. A spare
22 stretcher and the screens for a chemical toilet are
23 carried on the roof of the Humber. The screens are
24 wrapped in hessian to keep them together. All the
25 equipment on the roof is lashed under a tarpaulin to
1 keep it safe. When rolled up, the screens are
2 approximately six feet long, and one foot six in
3 diameter."
4 He is there describing something on the roof of his
5 Army Pig that would have looked about six feet long,
6 have been one foot six in diameter, and kept under
7 a tarpaulin. Is it possible that you saw that bundle on
8 the roof and, in the fleeting glimpse you had, mistook
9 it for a body?
10 A. It is possible, yes. I cannot be, as I say,
11 100 per cent about what I did see at that time.
12 Q. I used the expression "fleeting glimpse". Is it
13 right -- I think you have told us -- you saw it only for
14 a short time?
15 A. Yes, as it went past me.
16 Q. Thank you. Thank you very much. Those are all the
17 questions I have.
18 Questioned by MR GLASGOW
19 MR GLASGOW: On your right, sir. 1002, my name is Glasgow
20 and I represent many of the other soldiers, a large
21 number of them. A very few matters.
22 Could you help the Tribunal a little more, if you
23 can, with what you saw going on at the time when you
24 first became aware of the paratroopers going through
25 your barrier?
1 A. What was going -- we -- the -- the marchers come up to
2 the barricade with their banners, shouting, but they
3 dispersed. The actual marchers dispersed, which left
4 stone throwers.
5 Q. Yes?
6 A. That carried on for a certain length of time. The water
7 cannon was brought in, fired the water cannon at the
8 stone throwers. The stone throwers eventually
9 dispersed. From what I can recollect, the Paras come up
10 the side of us, coming up William Street --
11 Q. Could I ask you to pause. That is the particular time
12 that I wanted you to help the Tribunal with, if you
13 could. To be fair to you, look at your own statement at
14 paragraph 13. Could we have on the screen C1002.2.
15 I should make quite plain: I am not criticising you in
16 any way; I am just anxious you should do your best.
17 What you wrote down here was:
18 "Just as the rioters started to disperse, some
19 soldiers came up William Street from Waterloo Place,
20 running on either side of the road westwards."
21 You did not then know they were Paras, but it became
22 fairly obvious?
23 A. We did not know at the time, because no-one told us they
24 would be there that day.
25 Q. Is it your recollection now that those two things
1 happened at about the same time, just as the rioters
2 started to disperse? That was the time when you first
3 became aware of the soldiers who ultimately went over
4 the barrier; those things happened together?
5 A. They would not -- as -- when the stone throwers were
6 throwing their bricks and bottles and stones, they -- it
7 would not have been then, because the Paras went in with
8 their rifles, they was not -- as far as I can recollect,
9 they was not -- did not have self-protection, they did
10 not have shields. So it would have been when the
11 rioters -- sorry, the stone throwers had dispersed; it
12 was then that the Paras went in.
13 Q. At the same time?
14 A. Perhaps not at the same -- perhaps a few -- a minute or
15 so afterwards, perhaps a little bit longer. But we was
16 told -- they come up, we was told to pull the barricades
17 aside, they rushed through the open barricades, some
18 actually jumped over the barricades as we were trying to
19 pull them away.
20 Q. Do you remember that some of the Paras were
21 jumping/climbing over the barricade, even before you had
22 managed to open it?
23 A. I do remember, yes. We could not get them pulled open
24 fast enough. Some -- it may have only been one, but
25 I remember jumping -- trying to jump over the actual
1 wooden barricade.
2 Q. Looking once more at the way in which you wrote it in
3 your statement -- please correct it if it is wrong --
4 when it says "just as the rioters started to disperse,"
5 what were you trying to suggest? What were you saying
6 happened just at that time? Was it the first arrival of
7 the Paras, or them going over the barricade?
8 A. What -- at the time that the -- the stone throwers
9 dispersed, or ...
10 Q. Yes, just as the rioters started to disperse, do you
11 remember? Or is that the best you can do, in the way it
12 is written down there?
13 A. That is the best I can do.
14 Q. The second matter, please, if you can help: the Para
15 that you saw standing somewhere in the area we have all
16 called Aggro Corner ...
17 A. Aggro Corner, yes.
18 Q. Do you know what I mean, William Street, Rossville
19 Street?
20 A. Yes, I know exactly where you mean.
21 Q. I was not trying to tie you down to a precise location.
22 You remember seeing approximately 100 yards away?
23 A. Whatever the distance is from where I was standing to
24 the Rossville Street/William Street junction.
25 Q. You told the Tribunal this morning -- again I make no
1 criticism, but I want to make sure it is what you
2 mean -- at that time it was not a time to be standing
3 stationary?
4 A. It was never a time to be standing stationary at that
5 position, not just at that time but it was not the
6 place. It would be a place you would run across very
7 fast, because you was in a big open space.
8 Q. Was there anything in particular that was happening when
9 you say "at that time"? Did it strike you at that time
10 that that was a silly place to be standing still, or
11 just a place you would never standstill?
12 A. It was a place -- you would not standstill in any big
13 open area, especially that place, because it was a flash
14 point. It was a place, if you was there, you would run
15 across it, because it would -- being open ground.
16 Q. What was striking you at the time was, putting it
17 bluntly, that it seemed to be a silly place to be
18 standing still?
19 A. It was a place where, I think, we had known people to
20 shoot at in that -- not shoot from that area, but shoot
21 into that area.
22 Q. You had yourself heard no shots fired at all. I think
23 I can tell you fairly that we know that at least some
24 shots had been fired on the wasteground on the far side
25 of that area we are just talking about.
1 A. I personally never heard --
2 Q. You had not heard anything at all?
3 A. I never heard any shots.
4 Q. If we go back to the first page of your statement, if we
5 may, 1002.1, you talk about what went on in the area, at
6 the William Street/Rossville Street junction.
7 One particular matter: you say in paragraph 6 that
8 there was a cab company that had particular connections
9 with the IRA. Was that cab company actually in
10 William Street, do you remember?
11 A. It was -- from what I can recollect, it was across from
12 Rossville -- the junction of Rossville
13 Street/William Street. I think it was actually on
14 perhaps the corner William Street/Rossville Street.
15 Q. To make sure we do not have the wrong one, could you
16 help us, please, with a photograph EP5.21. Is that the
17 cab company you are talking about?
18 A. It may be, yes. We did not go -- get that close to it.
19 We did not get that close to it, but I believe --
20 Q. You remember its location being in William Street on the
21 west side of the junction with Rossville Street?
22 A. Yes.
23 MR TOOHEY: Do you remember, INQ1002, which side of
24 William Street it was? I know you say it was --
25 A. The other side to the junction, on the left.
1 MR TOOHEY: On the left, as you were proceeding --
2 A. As you look up William Street.
3 MR TOOHEY: You put it on the south side?
4 A. Yes.
5 MR TOOHEY: I do not ask you to agree with that, but you can
6 take it that that is the south side.
7 A. Right. Yes.
8 MR GLASGOW: You remember the location, but you do not
9 remember the photograph particularly?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Can you remember why it was that you believed that it --
12 whatever cab company it was -- had particular
13 connections with the IRA, or was that just gossip?
14 A. I must admit it was just gossip, but it is what we
15 believed.
16 Q. The last matter, if I may: could we go to the third page
17 of your statement, 1,002.3, paragraph 14 at the top,
18 just the last three lines. You say:
19 "As far as we were concerned, we had control of the
20 area ..."
21 The area you are there referring to is the area
22 where there had been a riot, and your regiment and your
23 section had looked after it?
24 A. When I talk of "the area", I was only in the area of
25 barricade 14 for the duration. That is the only area
1 I can talk about because it is the only area I was in.
2 Q. When you say "we had control of the area", that was the
3 area in front of the barricade where there had been
4 a riot?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. You are not suggesting the area into which the Parachute
7 Regiment ultimately went was one over which you had
8 control?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Thank you very much indeed.
11 Questioned by MS MCGAHEY
12 MS McGAHEY: There was one matter I should have asked
13 in-chief: you gave your recollection of seeing a body on
14 the roof of an Army Pig. Did you report seeing that
15 body to anybody?
16 A. No. I could have been wrong. That is what I thought at
17 the time: I could have been wrong. I did not tell
18 anyone. I believe there were a couple of us were
19 talking, and I think someone said to me "Did you see
20 that on the top of the Pig? And there is a Para inside
21 it". And I looked, but that is it. That is all I can
22 remember about that.
23 Q. Thank you very much, those are all my questions.
24 LORD SAVILLE: It is the Chairman again. Thank you very
25 much indeed for coming here to assist us, thank you.
1 (The witness withdrew)
2 INQ441, sworn
3 Questioned by MR CLARKE
4 LORD SAVILLE: INQ441, you can see who is talking to you.
5 I say this to all the witnesses: I am the Chairman; the
6 questions will come from the barristers, the people in
7 front of me. Could I ask you to try and remember to
8 keep reasonably close to that microphone in front of
9 you -- you can pull it towards you a bit if you like to
10 make it more comfortable -- and then we will be able to
11 hear what you have.
12 MR CLARKE: Could we have on the screen, please, C441.1. Do
13 you have with you your statement to this Inquiry, the
14 first page of which is presently on the screen?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Are the contents of that statement true to the best of
17 your knowledge and belief?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. There are some preliminary things I must tell you before
20 we start. Firstly, everybody in the room has had the
21 opportunity of reading this statement, so I am only
22 going to ask you questions that arise out of it.
23 Secondly, as I am sure you will appreciate, you and
24 most of the other soldiers are entitled to be anonymous
25 in these proceedings. Please take care not to mention
1 the name of a soldier. I think you have been provided
2 with a list of the codes that are likely to apply to any
3 soldiers to whom you are likely to refer.
4 A. I have.
5 Q. You tell us in paragraph 1 how, in January 1972, you
6 were a sergeant in Support Company and, on that day, on
7 30th January, you were acting Platoon Commander in
8 charge of Machine Gun Platoon because the resident
9 Commander was on a course in America.
10 Had you acted as Platoon Commander of Machine Gun
11 Platoon before?
12 A. Just for the period of a few weeks before 30th January.
13 Q. By 30th January, you knew all the men in the platoon?
14 A. I did.
15 Q. May we come, now, to paragraph 5. You recall a briefing
16 that took place on the evening of 29th January 1972,
17 held by what you have described as Major 236. I can
18 tell you that that soldier's name is in the public
19 domain, and we can call him by his proper name,
20 Major Loden.
21 You describe the briefing as given to all the
22 platoon commanders, as well as the Company Sergeant
23 Major, so that there were about five or six of you at
24 the briefing, which took place in Major Loden's office.
25 Do you have any recollection now as to how long that
1 briefing lasted?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Have you no idea between, say, ten minutes and an hour?
4 A. Exact timing, no.
5 Q. You say that the reason the briefing sticks in your mind
6 is that it was one of the most full and thorough
7 briefings you think that you have ever been given,
8 although I think, as you tell us, your actual
9 recollection of what was said is very limited indeed; is
10 that right?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. You say that you believe that you were shown maps and
13 plans of the area. Do you have a recollection of being
14 shown any photographs of the area into which you were to
15 go?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Do you recollect being told what you should expect in
18 Londonderry, what might happen?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Do you recollect being told what other companies, apart
21 from Support Company, would be doing?
22 A. No.
23 Q. When you say that you do not recollect, is the position
24 that you simply do not recall one way or the other
25 whether you were told any of those things?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. You describe in paragraph 6 how the usual agenda for
3 a briefing would be to outline the aim of the operation
4 and to set out what the plan was, including details of
5 individual tasks assigned to each platoon or section.
6 One of the things you do remember is that the aim of
7 the operation was to provide a back-up reaction force
8 for the resident battalions in Londonderry, to enable
9 them to cover the civil rights march. Can you tell us
10 what you mean by the expression "a back-up reaction
11 force"?
12 A. I cannot remember now exactly what it was.
13 Q. Do you have a recollection of that description being
14 used, the phrase "a back-up reaction force"?
15 A. Yes, I have a recollection.
16 Q. But you cannot recall --
17 A. I cannot recall what it was.
18 Q. You say you do not remember what you were told about the
19 plan at the briefing:
20 " ... nor do I remember discussing the details of an
21 arrest operation."
22 Are you saying that an arrest operation was not
23 discussed on this occasion, or simply that you do not
24 recall whether or not it was?
25 A. I simply do not recall whether it was.
1 Q. You describe, in the next paragraph, how, after the
2 briefing was over, you were told to go into the barrack
3 room in order to brief your own platoons. You describe
4 how you started briefing your men at about 10 o'clock in
5 the evening, and how Major Loden and the Company
6 Sergeant Major patrolled around the barrack room while
7 the briefings were going on to ensure that full and
8 detailed instructions were being given.
9 Can you recollect anything now of what you told your
10 platoon at the briefing that you gave to them at this
11 time?
12 A. No.
13 Q. Nothing?
14 A. Nothing.
15 Q. May we have a look, please, at paragraph 9. You
16 describe the events of the next day, and you say that,
17 in terms of equipment, you remember having the usual
18 webbing:
19 "Our SLRs and at least one rubber bullet gun and
20 a tear gas gun per Pig."
21 You said:
22 "Some of the platoons may have carried
23 sub-machine-guns ..."
24 Do you know whether anybody in the Machine Gun
25 Platoon carried sub-machine-guns on this occasion?
1 A. No.
2 Q. You do not know whether they did or not?
3 A. I do not recall.
4 Q. What about rifles? Should we understand that each man
5 in the platoon would, in ordinary course, have a rifle
6 on the day, or may it have been the case that some of
7 the men did not have a rifle?
8 A. I would expect them to have an SLR.
9 Q. You would expect them to have an SLR?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. So that if they had a rubber bullet gun or a tear gas
12 gun, that would be additional to their SLR?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. You make it clear that there was at least one rubber
15 bullet gun and a tear gas gun per Pig. Was that, as it
16 were, the standard distribution?
17 A. As far as I recall, yes.
18 Q. What about batons? I do not mean baton guns; I mean
19 staves. Did you have any of those?
20 A. No.
21 Q. You describe, in paragraph 10, how there are a number of
22 things that stick in your mind about the journey from
23 Palace barracks to Londonderry, the first of which is
24 that your Pig picked up Sergeant O at the gates of the
25 barracks, because he had been on a course in Cyprus and
1 had literally got off the ferry and come to the barracks
2 that morning.
3 You describe giving him a general briefing during
4 the journey to Derry. Can you recollect now what you
5 told him or would have told him?
6 A. No.
7 Q. You describe in paragraph 12 how Private INQ455 was the
8 radio operator for Machine Gun Platoon. It is right, is
9 it not, that Machine Gun Platoon travelled to
10 Londonderry in two Pigs on this occasion?
11 A. I cannot recall if it was one or two.
12 Q. You cannot recall. Can you recall whether there was one
13 or more than one radio operator?
14 A. No.
15 Q. May we come then, please, to paragraph 14. You describe
16 in that paragraph how you do not actually remember
17 arriving in Londonderry, and cannot recall where the
18 first rendevous point was. You say that you understand
19 that you stopped close to the Presbyterian Church and
20 that, although you do not remember the church itself,
21 you do recall that all the vehicles parked up along the
22 side of the road:
23 "The Company Commander gave a sitrep to platoon
24 commanders".
25 And then took them on a reconnaissance of the area.
1 Pausing there, you say you cannot recall where the
2 first rendevous point was. Do you have a recollection
3 of going to a particular point in Londonderry
4 originally, and then, during the course of the day,
5 moving from that point to somewhere else?
6 A. I recall moving from a point, but where the point was,
7 I cannot remember.
8 Q. That, I may tell you, ties in with other evidence we
9 have heard, which suggests that Support Company were
10 positioned for a while, after arrival in the morning, at
11 a residential street some way away from the Presbyterian
12 Church, and moved to the Presbyterian Church, or close
13 to the Presbyterian Church, some time at about 3.15 in
14 the afternoon.
15 That would be consistent with your general
16 recollection?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. You describe the Company Commander taking Platoon
19 Commanders on a reconnaissance of the area. Do you
20 recall what time of day, approximately, that took place?
21 A. No.
22 Q. May it have been the case that the platoon commanders
23 left the area where their men were and went to see the
24 Company Commander, or with the Company Commander, to
25 have a reconnaissance of the area, when their men were
1 some way away from the area where the reconnaissance was
2 taking place?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. You describe how one of the things that you do remember
5 was that you were told to watch the roofs as you went
6 around the area. For what purpose were you to watch the
7 roofs?
8 A. I cannot recall the purpose, but I remember being told
9 to watch the roofs.
10 Q. May it have been to watch the roofs to see if there were
11 any snipers around?
12 A. It may have been, but I cannot recall.
13 Q. May we, please, highlight paragraph 15. You describe
14 there how the task of the Machine Gun Platoon was to go
15 along a wall and get into a position inside a derelict
16 house, bringing up the right flank. The rest of the
17 company were going down to where the barrier was near to
18 Rossville Street, through which they would move; you
19 would all meet up in Rossville Street. You say that:
20 "I believe that the plan may have been originally
21 for Machine Gun Platoon to go through the churchyard."
22 But this was changed when the recce took place and
23 it was discovered that you were unable to get through
24 the churchyard.
25 I would like, if I may, to show you a photograph of
1 the area where we know the Machine Gun Platoon to have
2 been. Could we have up on the screen P199. This is an
3 aerial photograph taken before Bloody Sunday, but it
4 shows, in the bottom of the photograph, William Street,
5 which is the street along which the march was eventually
6 to come; and Rossville Street, down which most of the
7 marchers turned. It also shows the Presbyterian Church,
8 and it shows, here, a street which is called Great James
9 Street; and a street off it, which is called
10 Queen's Street, to which Support Company was ordered in
11 the afternoon.
12 Does looking at that photograph bring back
13 a recollection of the area where you were?
14 A. Of which point do you mean? By the church or
15 afterwards?
16 Q. By the church.
17 A. I do not recall the church, no.
18 Q. You can take it from me that that is the church through
19 whose yard the plan originally was for the platoon to
20 go. Can you help us on this: the original plan which
21 had to be changed, did it involve going over a wall?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Do you recollect that?
24 A. I recollect that, yes.
25 Q. When I use the expression "over a wall," does that mean
1 climbing over a wall?
2 A. No.
3 Q. What was the plan originally?
4 A. As I recall, it was to actually go along a wall, scaling
5 a wall and walking along it, or in the area of the wall.
6 Q. We have heard evidence from a number of people that an
7 original plan had been to go over the wall that I am
8 pointing out with the green arrow, next door to the
9 little building with a flat roof, which is to the east
10 of the church, in order to get into the wasteground to
11 the south of the wall which leads onto William Street.
12 Does that bring back any recollection?
13 A. No.
14 Q. You have a recollection that the original plan was to go
15 along a wall, and then do what?
16 A. Go along a wall and then go into a derelict house.
17 Q. Are you talking about the original plan when you
18 describe that?
19 A. I cannot recall if it was the original plan or one that
20 was to -- thought on later on.
21 Q. Because the Tribunal has heard a body of evidence that
22 the original plan was to go over the wall I have
23 mentioned; or, according to some accounts, through the
24 wall. Pausing there: were you ever aware it was
25 contemplated that a Pig might actually drive through
1 a wall?
2 A. I cannot recall.
3 Q. The Tribunal has heard evidence that, because of the
4 problems that arose with the original plan, there was
5 a subsequent plan, which I can show in this way: could
6 we have on the screen, P201.
7 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Clarke, sorry to interrupt you, but,
8 according to my notes here, we had decided that, as far
9 as this witness was concerned, we would limit him to the
10 questions of briefings and the events in and around
11 Abbey Taxis.
12 MR CLARKE: Yes.
13 LORD SAVILLE: If you wish to suggest to the Tribunal that
14 it would be of value to ask questions about other
15 events, by all means do. But, as Mr Glasgow pointed out
16 the other day, if that comes at the last moment, other
17 people may be put in difficulty in preparing their own
18 questioning.
19 MR CLARKE: I see. I am afraid my list of the topics for
20 the witnesses for today, including 441, has no
21 limitation placed on it at all.
22 LORD SAVILLE: Can anyone else tell me whether I have it
23 right or Mr Clarke has it right?
24 MR GLASGOW: Sir, not wanting to judge between the two of
25 you, but you have got it right, if I can say that
1 without any disrespect. I have the form in front of us,
2 because those instructing me prepared this client on
3 that basis. The words you have just spoken are exactly
4 right, I think. I have the form here. Forgive me one
5 second, 441 "Briefings and events in/around Abbey
6 Taxis."
7 Thank you.
8 LORD SAVILLE: I think we have made clear in correspondence
9 that this is a view we have had to take on a number of
10 witnesses, because we have a huge number of witnesses
11 and we have to form a judgment as to where and in what
12 particular circumstances we think oral evidence may be
13 of assistance to us. And I think we have made clear
14 that, if people wish to suggest there are other
15 instances where they think that the Tribunal may be
16 assisted by oral evidence, they are, of course, at
17 liberty to get up and say so.
18 But at the moment that is the limitation -- having
19 looked more than once at this statement and, indeed, at
20 all the other evidence -- that we have imposed,
21 Mr Clarke.
22 MR CLARKE: Yes. So be it, though I am somewhat conscious
23 of the fact that what I am dealing with is events
24 relating to Abbey Taxis. But I will get there more
25 quickly than I might otherwise have done.
1 Looking at this photograph, the building we are
2 referring to as Abbey Taxis is this building, because it
3 has on it the word "taxis", which one can just read
4 below the yellow arrow. We know that in the events
5 which happened, the Machine Gun Platoon ended up at the
6 building which has the nine empty windows in its face.
7 Looking at that photograph, does that bring back any
8 recollection of the building in which you ended up?
9 A. It does.
10 Q. So far as that building is concerned, do you recall at
11 what level you entered it?
12 A. I recall it would be the middle floor, which is level
13 with the brick wall coming from the right.
14 Q. Your recollection is that you entered it at the middle
15 floor?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. If we come to paragraph 18, C441.4, when you say that
18 you entered the derelict house at about the second floor
19 level, you are meaning by that the middle floor in the
20 photograph we have just seen; is that right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You describe the building as having no stairs in it, as
23 a result of which you had to climb down the remaining
24 brickwork, one man at a time. You describe sending at
25 least one of your men over to a large window on the
1 second floor, looking south over William Street. You
2 describe how the first soldiers to climb down onto the
3 ground floor also took up positions at the windows of
4 the derelict house.
5 When you say the men had to climb down the
6 brickwork, can you explain just what you mean? There
7 was a floor, was there, between the ground level and the
8 middle level?
9 A. I cannot recall an actual floor or if it was just
10 rafters.
11 Q. Or just rafters?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. When you say that they had to climb down, how did they
14 do that?
15 A. As I recall, it would be by dropping out from the
16 windows onto the ground floor.
17 Q. They had literally to jump down?
18 A. Jump down or scale themselves down by leaning out of the
19 window and dropping.
20 Q. Thank you. You describe in paragraph 19 --
21 LORD SAVILLE: I think if we are going on to paragraph 19 it
22 might be a convenient moment, Mr Clarke, because it is
23 mid-day.
24 INQ441, the Chairman again. We will stop for lunch
25 now. Could you come back for quarter to 1, please.
1 A. Yes.
2 LORD SAVILLE: As I say to all the witnesses, do not discuss
3 the evidence you are giving until you have finished
4 giving it.
5 A. Okay.
6 (12.00 pm)
7 (The Short Adjournment)
8 (12.45 pm)
9 MR CLARKE: Could we have P201 back on the screen, please.
10 We were looking before lunch at this photograph of what
11 we are calling the Abbey Taxis building. Can you tell
12 the Tribunal what you understood the plan to be about
13 what you were going to do, having got into the building?
14 A. I cannot recall exactly what it was now.
15 Q. Were you to come out of the building at some stage?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And do, what, when you had come out of it?
18 A. As I recall, it was to follow up the rear of the march
19 and pick up stragglers.
20 Q. Pick up stragglers on the march. Was this to arrest
21 them or to stop the march or, what, exactly?
22 A. I cannot recall exactly what it was.
23 Q. May we go to C441.4, paragraphs 19 and 20. In
24 paragraph 19 you describe how the operation of getting
25 the men on to the ground floor was going well until
1 INQ455, a signaller, fell backwards from the end of the
2 floor and landed on his back with the radio beneath him.
3 Is this something that happened inside the building,
4 that is to say by the time you got to the building with
5 nine windows?
6 A. No, it was outside the building.
7 Q. When you say that he fell backwards from the edge of the
8 floor, did he land outside the building or inside the
9 building?
10 A. Outside.
11 Q. As a result of that, you made your way to attend to him
12 and you say that you believe that you actually radioed
13 the company commander to inform him that, "we had an
14 injured man".
15 Do you recall whether the radio suffered any damage
16 on account of 455 falling backwards with the radio on
17 his back?
18 A. I cannot recall.
19 Q. What happened to 455 at this stage?
20 A. I cannot recall exactly what happened to him.
21 Q. You describe him as being walking injured. He has given
22 a statement to this Tribunal in which he has
23 a recollection of being in hospital at some stage, but
24 it is not clear whether he was taken from where he fell
25 by an ambulance to hospital, or whether in fact after he
1 fell, although badly bruised, he was able to continue
2 walking about.
3 Do you have any recollection as to which one it was?
4 A. No.
5 Q. You describe in paragraph 20 how, whilst you were
6 tending to him, INQ455, Corporal A and Private B fired
7 a number of shots. As I understand what you say in
8 paragraph 20, you have now no recollection of hearing
9 those shots; is that right?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Or of telling them to shoot if they identified a target;
12 do you have any recollection of that?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Or of ordering them to cease firing?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Is the position that, whatever Corporal A and Private B
17 were doing, about which they have given evidence both to
18 Lord Widgery and to this Tribunal, is the position that
19 whatever they were doing, they were inside the building
20 whilst you were outside the building looking after
21 INQ455?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You say that the reason that you know they had fired at
24 nail bombers was because that was what you said on the
25 ITV "World in Action" film. We have a transcript of
1 what appears on the "World in Action" film. I would
2 like to show you a passage from the transcript where you
3 are speaking. Could we have on the screen X117.15.
4 Somebody has listened to the clip of film and made
5 a transcript. We know that the film shows a number of
6 sergeants talking. I think you must be the one who
7 appears in the transcript as sergeant 4. What you are
8 recorded as saying, is this:
9 "They are on about the shooting, but nobody has
10 spoken about the nail bombs. My platoon had nail bombs
11 thrown at them and one of my men shot a man in the
12 process of the throwing a nail bomb, this was in the
13 William Street area before the actual main onslaught
14 that they are talking about started, when they are all
15 talking about us firing indiscriminately, where does
16 they say come in what they can do? As far as I am
17 concerned, if a man throws a nail bomb at my platoon or
18 at me he deserves the only thing that can happen back to
19 him and a rubber bullet will not stop a nail bomber so
20 the only thing you can stop him is with, is with
21 a bullet, as far as I am concerned."
22 Should we understand from your last answer that you
23 were outside the building, that when you said on this
24 television programme, "My platoon had nail bombs thrown
25 at them and one of my men shot a man in the process of
1 throwing a nail bomb," that that must have been entirely
2 derived from what you had been told by A and B?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Do you have any recollection as to whether or not you
5 or, so far as you are aware, anybody else reported the
6 fact, either of nail bombs being thrown or of A or B
7 shooting live rounds to the company commander or anyone
8 else?
9 A. No, I cannot recall.
10 Q. Do you recall now the building in which you were in
11 being stoned?
12 A. No.
13 Q. Do you have any recollection of rubber bullets being
14 fired?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Or anything coming in to the building?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Or hitting it?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Can we come back, please, to C441.4. At paragraph 20
21 you use the expression:
22 "I would have then told them to cease fire, although
23 again, I do not remember doing this."
24 To be fair to you, you say that is what you would
25 have done. But if, as you have just told us, the
1 position was that you were outside the building when
2 Corporal A and B fired their shots, would you
3 necessarily have told them to cease fire, if they had
4 already done so by the time you saw them again?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. You would have done?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. In paragraph 22 you describe how, once all your men were
9 on the ground floor:
10 "... we broke cover on to the open ground in front
11 of the derelict house."
12 You describe going and chasing one of the stragglers
13 into a derelict building on the south side of
14 William Street, which turned out to be a bookmaker's,
15 because he had been throwing a brick in your vicinity,
16 arresting the man and handing him over to a member of
17 Guinness Force.
18 Should we understand that all of Machine Gun
19 Platoon, with the exception of the driver of the Pigs,
20 and possibly a sentry for the Pigs, came into the
21 derelict house?
22 A. No.
23 Q. Only some did?
24 A. As far as I can recall only myself went in.
25 LORD SAVILLE: I think the derelict house and the
1 bookmaker's ...
2 MR CLARKE: I am not talking about the bookmaker's where you
3 arrested somebody.
4 A. I am sorry, I misunderstood.
5 Q. It is my fault, it was a badly phrased question. The
6 building with the nine windows, the building we looked
7 at in the photograph?
8 A. Could you repeat the question, please?
9 Q. Yes. With the exception of the driver or drivers of the
10 Pigs and possibly a sentry for the Pigs, did the rest of
11 Machine Gun Platoon make their way to the house with the
12 nine windows in it?
13 A. As far as I recall, yes.
14 Q. So far as you recall, did all those who came into that
15 house, the one with the nine windows, come out of it as
16 you did, by going out into the open ground in front of
17 the house?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. The reason I ask is that there is some evidence, though
20 not very strong, that some of the platoon may have gone
21 down Rossville Street in Pigs; is that possible?
22 A. I cannot recall.
23 Q. You cannot recall that happening. Can I show you an
24 entry in a document at ED49.11. This is Major Loden's
25 diary of operations, compiled the next day, on
1 31st January. What he has written at 1600 hours, is
2 this:
3 "A warning order was received to be prepared to
4 assault the rioters in William Street through the
5 barrier in Little James Street. Accordingly I ordered
6 the company to return to their vehicles. The Machine
7 Gun Platoon were unable to extricate themselves due to
8 the final drop of 25 feet from the first floor of
9 a disused building which had been used to gain covered
10 access to their present position. I ordered the Platoon
11 Commander to remain where he was and informed him that
12 I would bring his vehicles to his position via
13 Little James Street and William Street when the company
14 assaulted through barrier number 12."
15 The evidence that you have given to this Tribunal
16 shows, as does this document, that the Machine Gun
17 Platoon had had to jump down quite a large number of
18 feet to the ground level.
19 Do you recollect receiving an order for the company
20 to return to its vehicles?
21 A. Do you mean the platoon or the company?
22 Q. I am so sorry, the platoon?
23 A. No.
24 Q. You do not recall that?
25 A. I do not recall that, no.
1 Q. Do you have any recollection of being told by
2 Major Loden, when the problem about getting back to
3 where you had come from emerged, to stay where you were
4 and being told that the Machine Gun Platoon's vehicles
5 would be brought to your position via Little James
6 Street and William Street?
7 A. No.
8 Q. So far as you are concerned, you went out on foot
9 through the window of the derelict building; went to
10 arrest somebody in the bookmaker's and then went on to
11 Rossville Street on foot?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Were there others with you at that stage?
14 A. I cannot recall.
15 Q. May we then come on, please, to later in the day. Can
16 we have C441.6, paragraph 29. This is a portion of your
17 statement which deals with events after an order to
18 cease fire had been given and people had stopped firing.
19 You describe how, as soon as matters were quiet, the
20 Company sergeant major called for an ammunitions check.
21 MR GLASGOW: Sorry, I do not want to interfere again
22 unnecessarily, but I think we are going way outside your
23 indications now; are we not?
24 MR CLARKE: We certainly are not.
25 LORD SAVILLE: We will have to wait and see, Mr Glasgow.
1 MR CLARKE: We certainly are not, for the following reason:
2 it is not possible to reach a view about what may or may
3 not have happened at Abbey Taxis without knowing the
4 upshot of an ammunition check in relation to those
5 persons who alone, so far, have admitted firing from
6 Abbey Taxis.
7 LORD SAVILLE: Yes.
8 MR CLARKE: Now, as I was saying, you describe there how
9 Corporal 1686 was your acting platoon sergeant and you
10 told him to do the ammunition return. Can you very
11 briefly explain to us exactly what doing the ammunition
12 return amounts to?
13 A. By doing ammunition check they go to each soldier and
14 see what ammunition they had left in his magazine and
15 also in any bandoliers he may have had with him, so as
16 the company sergeant major can tally up the exact number
17 of rounds that had been fired and what happened.
18 Q. You say you distinctly remember that some of your
19 platoon had hard extractions on their rifles earlier in
20 the day and you say a little later on that you believe
21 you heard the hard extractions:
22 "While we were in the derelict building [that is to
23 say Abbey Taxis] when Corporal A and Private B fired at
24 nail bombers."
25 When you say that you believe you heard the hard
1 extractions, can you tell us exactly what you are
2 telling us you think that you heard?
3 A. I thought I heard a weapon being caught and, like a ping
4 of a round being ejected, which should not have been
5 ejected, which is similar to a double feed, if you
6 understand how an SLR works.
7 Q. It is similar to a?
8 A. A double feed of ammunition.
9 Q. Should we not distinguish two things: when you talk
10 about a double feed of ammunition, you are referring, as
11 I understand it, but please tell me if I am wrong, to
12 a circumstance where two bullets go into breech?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. As a result of which, is this right, one of them will be
15 ignited by the firing pin?
16 A. No, not necessarily. As I recall, as I say it was
17 31 years ago and I cannot remember exactly what
18 happened.
19 Q. The description that you give here, is this:
20 "A hard extraction occurs when a weapon is cocked
21 and the trigger is pulled, but it does not fire properly
22 because two bullets have gone into the breech. One of
23 the bullets is simply expelled from the breech of the
24 rifle rather than being fired from it."
25 I had understood you there to be saying that you can
1 have a circumstance in which two bullets go into the
2 breech. One of them is fired, but the other is not, so
3 that the forward bullet is simply expelled without any
4 firing, whereas the latter bullet is fired and
5 discharged in the normal manner; is that what you were
6 saying?
7 A. That may be, but I cannot recall exactly what would
8 happen.
9 Q. I understand that set of circumstances. If that
10 occurred, one bullet was in front of the other and one
11 bullet was simply expelled, but one was fired; is there
12 anything that you would hear which could indicate that
13 there had been a hard extraction, as you define it in
14 this sentence?
15 A. Beyond hearing a round pinging off the floor or the
16 wall, no.
17 Q. What you believe that you heard was, was it, the sound
18 of a round pinging off the floor?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. I do not quite follow how that recollection ties in with
21 what I understood you to be saying a moment ago, that
22 when Corporal A and Private B fired, you were actually
23 outside the building looking after the signaller?
24 A. It was not just myself outside the building, the rest of
25 the soldiers who were with me were outside the building
1 as well.
2 Q. What, including A and B?
3 A. No, except A and B, the remainder were outside the
4 building.
5 Q. I repeat my point, therefore: if the position is that
6 Corporal A and B were within the building, firing, and
7 you were outside the building, with others, looking
8 after the signaller, how could you have heard the ping
9 of a hard extraction?
10 A. I cannot recall how, but that is what I felt when I made
11 my statement.
12 Q. You go on to say:
13 "It was for this reason I wanted to know what the
14 ammunition count was before I reported back to the
15 Company sergeant major so that if necessary I could
16 account for the hard extractions."
17 Can you recall how many, if more than one ping, you
18 believe that you heard?
19 A. I cannot recall.
20 Q. When you say that you wanted to know what the ammunition
21 count was before you reported back in order to account
22 for the hard extractions, what was the problem or
23 difficulty that you envisaged which caused you to want
24 to know what the ammunition count was?
25 A. Well, if the round had not been fired and had not been
1 picked up off the floor, it would have to account for
2 those rounds.
3 Q. You knew, at the very lowest, I suppose, that if there
4 had been one hard extraction, there was at least one
5 bullet to be accounted for?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. I follow. Can you recall what you discovered as
8 a result of the ammunitions check by your acting platoon
9 sergeant as to what bullets had been fired and whether
10 there had been any hard extractions?
11 A. No.
12 Q. How clear is your memory about believing that there were
13 hard extractions? Can I tell you why I ask: neither
14 Corporal A nor Private B have, so far as I am aware, at
15 any stage in their evidence, indicated that there was
16 one or more hard extractions when they fired?
17 A. No.
18 Q. My question to you is: how confident are you now that
19 this is what you had heard in 1972?
20 A. In my mind I felt I heard an extraction.
21 Q. Do you have any recollection of asking Corporal A or
22 Private B whether they had had a hard extraction?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Or of learning from them whether they had or not?
25 A. No.
1 Q. One other matter on the question of firing in Abbey
2 Taxis, or around Abbey Taxis: did you ever hear someone
3 say that Corporal A had fired with somebody else's
4 rifle, that is to say not Corporal A's rifle?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Could we come, please, to paragraph 34 at the bottom of
7 this page. You describe there how you stayed at
8 temporary barracks that night and how all the platoon
9 commanders had to make statements and you gave
10 a statement to someone who you think was from the MoD,
11 although you cannot be sure. Could it have been that
12 you spoke to somebody who was from the Royal Military
13 Police?
14 A. It could have been, yes.
15 Q. Can you tell us whether the person to whom you spoke
16 appeared to be taking down a statement or just making
17 notes about what you were saying?
18 A. I feel it was a statement.
19 Q. Did you ever see a statement?
20 A. No.
21 Q. The last matter I wanted to ask you about, is
22 this: could we have on the screen C2037.5, paragraph 24,
23 the relevance of which to the events of Abbey Taxis will
24 be apparent in a moment.
25 This is a statement of a witness whose cipher is
1 2037, and he was the regimental sergeant major of
2 1 Para; do you follow?
3 A. Which one am I looking at, sorry?
4 Q. I am sorry, this is part of a statement of a soldier
5 whose code number is 2037, you can take that from me for
6 the moment?
7 A. Okay, sorry.
8 Q. 2037 was the regimental sergeant major of 1 Para on the
9 day; do you follow?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Without mentioning his name, do you remember the man who
12 was the RSM of 1 Para on the day?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. In this statement there is this paragraph, paragraph 24:
15 "It was only when we returned to Belfast that things
16 started filtering through and statements were taken.
17 The view at that time was that the Paras had done a good
18 job. INQ1446 and Sergeant O were the two who said they
19 had shot people and done most of the firing."
20 INQ1446 is not your code, but I can tell you that
21 the name which has been given the code INQ1446 is the
22 same surname as you and the usual abbreviation of your
23 Christian name; do you follow what I am saying?
24 A. I follow, yes.
25 Q. On one reading, unless there are two people with the
1 same name, what is being said in this statement is:
2 "The view at that time was that the Paras had done
3 a good job. [You] and Sergeant O were the two who said
4 they had shot people and done most of the firing."
5 Had you fired at all on Bloody Sunday?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Had you told anybody that you had fired on
8 Bloody Sunday?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Thank you. Those are my questions.
11 Questioned by MR A HARVEY
12 MR HARVEY: My name is Arthur Harvey and I appear on behalf
13 of a number of the families of the deceased and injured.
14 There are a few matters I would like you, perhaps,
15 to assist me with. You have now indicated that in fact
16 when the radio operator, 455, fell, he fell outside the
17 building and that all of the other members of your
18 platoon were outside the building except two, A and B;
19 is that right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. I wonder could you look at paragraph 18 of your
22 statement, that is C441.4. Again, if one starts at the
23 third sentence:
24 "The first soldiers to climb down on to the ground
25 floor also took up positions at the windows of the
1 derelict house in order to provide further cover."
2 Does that not tend to suggest that there was more
3 than one soldier on the ground floor who had occupied
4 a position at the windows to provide cover?
5 A. It may have been the case, but I do not recall now
6 exactly where they were, whether it was at the window or
7 in front of the window.
8 Q. It then goes:
9 "I believe that it was Corporal A who took up the
10 position at the second floor window and Private B who
11 took up a position on the ground floor. I may have this
12 the wrong way round ..." that does not really matter, go
13 on to paragraph 19:
14 "The operation of getting the men on to the ground
15 floor was going well until Private INQ455, the
16 signaller, fell backwards from the edge of the floor and
17 landed on his back with the radio beneath him."
18 Again, does that not tend to suggest that in fact
19 the radio operator fell inside the building and that you
20 were inside the building at the time?
21 A. No, where it says "floor," that should be the edge of
22 the window on the second floor, because we dropped from
23 the window ledge on to the ground.
24 Q. Your recollection now, for what it is worth, is that all
25 of the men, apart from A and B, were in an area behind
1 the derelict building?
2 A. You said behind the derelict building.
3 Q. Yes, behind the derelict building?
4 A. No, I have got them looking into the wasteground.
5 Q. Looking into the wasteground?
6 A. Where the nine windows show, on to the wasteground.
7 Q. Where were the men who were outside the building, where
8 were they looking?
9 A. They would be looking into the wasteground, as far as
10 I can recall now.
11 Q. In other words, what you recollect is that those people
12 had a clear view of the wasteground?
13 A. In front of the building, yes.
14 Q. And a clear view, therefore, of the rioters who were on
15 the wasteground?
16 A. I cannot recall that now.
17 Q. But would they have been able physically to see people
18 on the wasteground?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Would people on the wasteground have been physically
21 able to see them?
22 A. I cannot recall.
23 Q. Your evidence is now that you cannot recall hearing
24 either A or B fire?
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. But you do have -- and your statement at paragraph 29
2 records:
3 "I distinctly remember some of my platoon had hard
4 extractions."
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. In other words, it was not just one hard extraction, it
7 was a number of hard extractions; is that right?
8 A. I cannot recall if it was a number or just one.
9 Q. You said -- "some of my platoon" tends to indicate that
10 there was more than one member of your platoon had hard
11 extractions?
12 A. This may be the case, but I cannot recall how many.
13 Q. If there is a hard extraction, firstly, it would be your
14 duty as the platoon commander to ensure that live
15 ammunition was not left at a particular scene; is that
16 correct?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Did you order your men to pick up the complete rifle or
19 bullet which would have been thereby extracted?
20 A. I cannot remember.
21 Q. Would it have been your duty to do so?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Would you have done so?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. If your members of your platoon came into contact with
1 persons who are either firing or throwing nail bombs at
2 them, it would also be your duty as the platoon
3 commander to report that back to your company commander?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Did you do that on this day?
6 A. I cannot recall.
7 Q. Would it have been the type of action that you would
8 have been required to take by your company commander?
9 A. Can you re--
10 Q. In other words, would your company commander make it
11 quite clear that if any of his platoons were in contact
12 and discharged shots, that he should be made aware of
13 it?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. If the contact resulted in a person actually being shot,
16 that also is something that ought to have been reported
17 back immediately; is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Any soldier who was a member of your platoon who
20 discharged shots, as a result of which he believed he
21 had killed or wounded a person, he would be obliged to
22 tell you and inform you of that immediately; is that not
23 so?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. It would be highly irregular for a soldier to discharge
1 two rounds, believe that he has killed or seriously
2 injured a person and not inform you until some
3 considerable time later?
4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. So far as the radio was concerned, you have been
6 referred to part of a diary that was prepared by
7 Major Loden on 31st, that is the next day. He indicates
8 that at 1600 hours he instructed Machine Gun Platoon to
9 remain in the building. You have no recollection of
10 that now; is that right?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. The only way he would have been able to contact you was
13 via the radio; is that correct?
14 A. I would say: yes.
15 Q. Because you knew that your platoon in fact was isolated?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. You were the furthest platoon forward of the Support
18 Company, prior to the entry into the Bogside; is that
19 correct?
20 A. I cannot recall if we were or not.
21 Q. The radio, in fact, it is very important for soldiers to
22 use the radio to inform the company commander of contact
23 because that can have a dramatic influence upon
24 decisions which he has to make in relation to the
25 deployment of other platoons or other companies; is that
1 right?
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. You cannot recall A and B firing, but can you recall,
4 even subsequently when talking to them, how long this
5 incident was before the rest of Support Company had gone
6 through barrier 12?
7 A. No.
8 Q. The situation is that Corporal A says that he informed
9 you that he had shot at, and hit, a nail bomber later in
10 a vehicle. Do you have any recollection of that?
11 A. No.
12 Q. You have no recollection of either ordering or
13 instructing A or B to fire?
14 A. No.
15 Q. In fact, your memory today is that you were not in
16 a position so to do because you were otherwise engaged
17 and looking after 455, the signal operator?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Would it also be correct to say that, not having been in
20 a position to instruct them, having heard them fire, why
21 would you have ordered them to cease fire if you did not
22 know what they were firing at?
23 A. It was to gain control of any fire power that was going
24 down.
25 Q. In fact, control of fire power is very important; is
1 that not right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. It is very important because one of the things that
4 happens in war is that you pump bullets into a target
5 area once a target has been engaged; is that right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And if a company commander does not have control of his
8 men, the natural reaction will be to pump bullets into
9 a target area rather than at a specific individual; is
10 that right?
11 A. No.
12 Q. When did you learn that both A and B claimed to have
13 shot the identically same person?
14 A. I have no recall.
15 Q. Did you learn that?
16 A. I cannot recall learning it. I must have learnt it at
17 some stage, but when, I do not know.
18 Q. One of the matters also that would be important for
19 a platoon commander: when he reports back to his company
20 commander that members of his platoon had fired, was to
21 ensure that he had an accurate record of the
22 circumstances in which the fire was discharged; is that
23 not right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. It would be important to determine whether or not the
1 soldier was justified in firing; is that correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And if the soldier was not justified in firing, that
4 would create real problems, not only for the soldier but
5 the platoon commander?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Because the platoon commander is there specifically to
8 ensure that when fire is directed, it is within the
9 terms of the Yellow Card; is that right?
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. And he is there to ensure that when a soldier discharges
12 a weapon, that it is in controlled circumstances?
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. That particular day, would it also be correct to say
15 that the soldiers who discharged shots were aware that
16 they would be interviewed by the Military Police?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And when they were interviewed by the Military Police,
19 the Military Police would be interested in why they
20 fired?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And were they justified in firing?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And did they hit a specific target?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And they would be well aware of that before they saw the
2 Military Police; is that correct?
3 A. I would assume so, yes.
4 Q. And the natural instincts of any person in those
5 circumstances would be to compare notes, for the
6 soldiers -- among themselves?
7 A. Probably.
8 Q. And in comparing notes, to determine whether or not they
9 fired at two separate targets or at a single target; is
10 that not right?
11 A. I would say so, yes.
12 Q. And to determine whether or not the target at which they
13 fired was wearing the same clothing or different
14 clothing; is that right?
15 A. Probably, yes.
16 Q. And whether the target at which they fired was engaged
17 in the same actions or different actions; is that not
18 right?
19 A. I suppose so, yes.
20 Q. And they would be well aware that that is exactly what
21 the Royal Military Police would be looking for when they
22 would be interviewed later?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. It is also correct to say that before soldiers are
25 interviewed by the Military Police, in circumstances
1 which may call into question their actions, they would
2 be anxious to ensure that their stories married?
3 A. No.
4 Q. In terms of the position that day, you were not aware,
5 from the area where you were, what they had fired at; is
6 that not right?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And they did not inform you of what they had fired at,
9 at that time?
10 A. I do not recall, no.
11 Q. I wonder, could we look again at photograph 201.
12 Soldier A marked up a photograph, I believe it is at
13 20.009, which is similar to this, where he believes 455
14 was when he fell. He puts it somewhere in this region,
15 here. Just behind that we can see there is, from other
16 photographs, an alleyway or it could be described again
17 as a courtyard behind this building. Just to the ground
18 floor of this there appears to be, where that yellow
19 arrow is and just to the left of it, two gaps. But
20 there does not appear to be anywhere to the right of the
21 blue arrow where soldiers could observe what was going
22 on, on the wasteground. (Indicating)
23 Perhaps if we look at the photograph that was marked
24 up, it is at B20.009, by A. We can see there is
25 a circle in the area, and if one follows the horizontal
1 line, it goes:
2 "Position where INQ455 fell."
3 Again, it shows the full length of the wall in this
4 particular enlargement, but just over the wall, is in
5 fact that where your men were?
6 A. I cannot recall exactly where they were.
7 Q. But you are certain that they were not in this building,
8 other than A and B, or are you?
9 A. I -- at the time when I made my statement I was to
10 believe they were in a building.
11 Q. You were to believe?
12 A. They were in a building.
13 Q. In a building?
14 A. Yes, having gone along the wall that is indicated.
15 Q. You believed you walked along the wall that the
16 horizontal line runs parallel to?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Do you recall yourself being interviewed by your company
19 commander as to the circumstances in which your men
20 fired, or did he interview them directly himself?
21 A. I do not recall which -- where he interviewed me or the
22 soldiers.
23 Q. I have no further questions.
24 Questioned by MR GLASGOW
25 MR GLASGOW: Could I, on your behalf, make quite sure the
1 Tribunal has accurately got the evidence of the
2 admission that you are making as to what you should have
3 done and what you did do?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. You are admitting, I think, quite clearly, that you had
6 a duty to report what had happened in this building?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Do you now have any recollection of making any radio
9 report on that day?
10 A. No.
11 Q. You accept, of course, that you should have done so?
12 A. I do.
13 Q. And you cannot say one way or the other whether you did?
14 A. I cannot, no.
15 Q. If you did not, can you help the Tribunal as to why that
16 may have been; do you know whether A or B had told you
17 about the shooting while you were still at the building?
18 A. I cannot recall now, no.
19 Q. You cannot recall?
20 A. No.
21 LORD SAVILLE: INQ441, it is the Chairman again. Thank you
22 for coming here to give evidence, thank you.
23 (The witness withdrew)
24 INQ1791, sworn
25 Questioned by MR CLARKE
1 LORD SAVILLE: INQ1791, I will have to call you that, I say
2 this to all the witnesses: I am the Chairman of the
3 Tribunal. The questions will come from the barristers
4 in front of me. Could you keep reasonably close to that
5 microphone and then we will all hear what you have to
6 say. Thank you.
7 MR CLARKE: Could we have on the screen, please, C1791.1.
8 Do you have with you your statement to this Tribunal
9 which you signed on 15th July 2000, the first page of
10 which is presently on the screen?
11 A. Yes, sir.
12 Q. Are the contents of that statement true to the best of
13 your knowledge and belief?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. Because everybody has had the opportunity of reading it,
16 I am going to ask you only a few questions about it. As
17 I am sure you will appreciate, you and most of the
18 soldiers have anonymity. Please do not refer to
19 a soldier's name. You have, I hope, been provided with
20 a list of ciphers?
21 A. Yes, I have.
22 Q. You tell us in the first paragraph that you were
23 a sergeant in the 42nd battery of the 22nd Light Air
24 Defence Regiment. You describe in paragraph 4 how, at
25 the time, you were based in Londonderry at the bridge.
1 By that you mean the Craigavon Bridge, do you?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. On the day, were you attached to the Royal Anglians?
4 A. No, sir, I was still attached to my own regiment.
5 Q. Was 42 Battery attached to the Royal Anglians?
6 A. No, we were always in Londonderry, we were the serving
7 regiment guarding that part of the town all of the time.
8 Q. But you were not under the command of the Royal Anglians
9 on the Sunday?
10 A. How the actual command structure above me worked, I do
11 not know. I worked directly to my battery.
12 Q. May we have a look, please, at paragraph 8. You
13 describe there how, on the day, you were to be a section
14 commander, guarding the rear of some shops overlooking
15 Little James Street and the wasteground and you have
16 kindly marked what you recall to be your position on the
17 map, which is attached to your statement.
18 May we have a look, please, at C1791.9. We can see
19 that the spot that you have marked A is approximately
20 there, is it not, just below the Embassy Ballroom?
21 A. Yes, sir, about the point of the A.
22 Q. You are familiar with what I mean by the Embassy
23 Ballroom, are you?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. As you indicate, and as appears from the map, you can
1 look out in two directions: towards Little James Street
2 and down towards William Street in what we know as
3 Macari's Lane?
4 A. Correct, sir.
5 Q. Could we have on the screen photograph P197. That is an
6 aerial photograph of Londonderry taken shortly before
7 Bloody Sunday. If one enlarges the relevant area, in
8 order to get our bearings, here is the embassy Ballroom;
9 here is William Street down which the march was to go,
10 and Rossville Street down which it turned. Here is
11 Little James Street. That, I think, is Prince Arthur
12 Street and there seems to be a rather confused jumble of
13 buildings below the Embassy building, though one can see
14 there is a distinct laneway off William Street in that
15 direction. (Indicating)
16 I do not know whether looking at that photograph
17 brings back any better recollection of where you were on
18 the day?
19 A. Where you just draw your arrow, going down that little
20 street where you came in, further across, keep coming
21 across --
22 Q. Would you like to mark it, we can give you control, can
23 we give 1791 control of the screen?
24 A. How do I move it?
25 Q. You should have a stylus nearby -- perhaps somebody
1 could help you -- which will enable you to put a mark on
2 the screen.
3 A. It would have been about there. (Marked with red arrow
4 - C1791.10)
5 Q. Somewhere approximately where the red arrow is; is that
6 right?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Could we preserve that as C1791.10.
9 May we go back to your statement at C1791.2. You
10 describe in paragraph 12 how, before the march reached
11 your area, two engineers came through the buildings, you
12 do not know from which direction. You say you must have
13 been briefed that they were going to blow some padlocks
14 off a nearby gate because you knew that this was going
15 to happen and INQ1759 and possibly another soldier
16 escorted the engineers to some gates in the derelict
17 area and they blew the padlocks off the gates and you
18 think there was a possibility that troops could be
19 deployed through those gates and that is why the
20 padlocks were blown away.
21 If we go back to the photograph that you marked just
22 a moment ago, which will become C1791.10, is it possible
23 to indicate with any greater detail on the photograph
24 where the gates were?
25 A. (Indicating). Sorry, the arrow is pointing, the arrow
1 should be pointed right at the end of the street there.
2 Q. Can I do it for you and you can tell me if I get it
3 wrong. (Marked with blue arrow - C1791.10)
4 A. Just there, yes, that is it.
5 Q. Where the blue arrow is?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Can we preserve it in that form. And you understood
8 that the idea was that soldiers might come through where
9 the gate was. Did you understand from which direction
10 they might come?
11 A. It was my understanding that it was one of the options,
12 that some troops may come through there at a later date,
13 from behind me, through the buildings and then through
14 there as, as a deployment to drive anything that might
15 happen away.
16 Q. They would deploy through the building where you were
17 and in the direction of the blue arrow?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. That was a possibility?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. I am not sure a great deal turns on it, I think perhaps
22 I ought to ask you: in the statement that has been given
23 to this Inquiry by 1255, who was one of the men in your
24 section, he suggests that it was your unit that had
25 called for the locks to be removed in case you needed
1 some back-up, is the expression he uses, later in the
2 day?
3 A. No, that was incorrect. It was definitely -- we knew
4 that that was going to happen.
5 Q. Can you recall approximately what time of day this
6 explosion took place?
7 A. I am not at all certain of the time of day, but it was
8 very early, before any of the march had even started or
9 even began to assemble.
10 Q. I want now to come, if I may, to the subsequent incident
11 with which the Inquiry is interested. May we please go
12 to C1791.3, paragraphs 25 to the end. You describe in
13 this portion of your statement having a recollection of
14 seeing paratroopers with prisoners spreadeagled along
15 a fence near the GPO sorting office.
16 In paragraph 27 you say that you remember at some
17 stage receiving a message over the radio that all those
18 going on R&R the next day would not be able to go unless
19 they were back at Drumahoe by 6 o'clock. You say it was
20 after that message had come through on the radio about
21 R&R that INQ1255 shot himself in the foot.
22 Can we take it from the way in which you express
23 things in these paragraphs that whenever else the
24 message was, it must have been prior to 6 o'clock?
25 A. Though I have said 6 o'clock there I could not actually
1 swear that was the time, but it would have been around
2 about that time and it was after the paratroopers had
3 gone in, um, but before he shot himself in the foot.
4 Q. Could we have a look, please, at paragraph 31. You have
5 described, in the preceding paragraphs, the incident
6 when 1255 shot himself in the foot, and you say at
7 paragraph 31:
8 "I immediately reported the incident over the radio.
9 This is what the Army call a negligent discharge and it
10 had to be reported."
11 This may seem a silly question, but how
12 "immediately" is immediately?
13 A. Immediately would actually be the wrong word. I have
14 only got a vague recollection of how it went, but
15 I believe, first of all, I believe they were on the, the
16 next floor above me, I was on the ground floor. I went
17 up the stairs and first of all I investigated the
18 incident. And I remember INQ1759 first of all thought
19 he had been shot, but in fact he had not, it was an
20 empty cartridge case had actually hit him from INQ1255's
21 rifle.
22 1255 said he had shot himself in the foot. I then
23 looked at his boot. I could not see any damage,
24 although it was all happening very quickly, so I was not
25 actually really looking that closely. I took his boot
1 off and there was nothing. I took his sock off, there
2 was nothing. I then parted his toes and the blood came
3 it. It would have been after this that I actually then
4 reported it.
5 In fact, I do remember him saying to me, "Just stick
6 a field dressing and we will not say anything," and
7 I remember saying, "You cannot do that, it must be
8 reported." I would have thought five minutes at maximum
9 from the time of it actually happening, but it could be
10 a lot less.
11 Q. Could we have on the screen, please, W98. This is part
12 of the log of the Light Air Defence Regiment for
13 30th January 1972. I think we can time the message --
14 I would like your assistance on it -- in the log. In we
15 look at serial 78, that appears to be a message from 42,
16 which I assume is 42 Battery, to Ops, which I assume is
17 the operations room of 22LAD. Then it has:
18 "Gunner" and there is a name which has been blanked
19 out and then the apostrophe has been kept in, there is
20 a figure 115, which I do not understand:
21 "Accidental discharge, slight injury to foot."
22 Would I be right to understand that to be your
23 message from 42 Battery to the Ops room of 22LAD,
24 reporting the shooting in the foot?
25 A. No, um, my -- I would have reported it a few minutes
1 prior to that to the battery and that is the battery
2 then passing it up the chain of command.
3 Q. Do you understand what the figure 115 is?
4 A. I believe I do, and I have been asked by my Counsel not
5 to say here, because it could identify.
6 Q. Thank you very much.
7 LORD SAVILLE: I think those are all the questions we have
8 for you. Thank you very much indeed for coming here to
9 assist us, thank you.
10 (The witness withdrew)
11 MR RAWAT: Sir, whilst the next witness is being brought up,
12 can I -- I hope everyone should now have a list for next
13 week and the pool for the following week. Can I confirm
14 that INQ2003 is scheduled for 10th March.
15 INQ480, sworn
16 Questioned by MR RAWAT
17 LORD SAVILLE: INQ480, if you look to your left you will see
18 who is talking to you. I say this to all the
19 witnesses: I am the Chairman. Questions will come from
20 the barristers, the people in front of me. Could you
21 keep close to the microphone so we can hear what you
22 have to say.
23 MR RAWAT: INQ480, do you have with you a copy of the
24 statement you have made to this Inquiry?
25 A. Yes, I have.
1 Q. Are the contents of that statement true to the best of
2 your knowledge and belief?
3 A. Yes, they are.
4 Q. Like you, many soldiers who have given evidence to the
5 Inquiry have anonymity and so are known only by ciphers.
6 Can I ask you, during the course of your evidence,
7 please do not mention any names. Where necessary, we
8 will give you the cipher to use. We have also all had
9 a chance to read your written evidence and so today
10 I want to ask you about some parts of it.
11 We have the first page on the screen in front of us.
12 As you say in paragraph 1, at the time of Bloody Sunday
13 you were a gunner in 42 Battery of 22 Light Air Defence
14 Regiment and you were under the command of Lieutenant
15 146.
16 Could we go to the second page of your statement,
17 pick it up at paragraph 15. You had a general briefing,
18 you say in the preceding paragraph, on 29th January.
19 In paragraphs 15 through to 17 you describe the
20 morning briefing that you had in relation to the
21 operation. If we go over and focus on paragraph 17,
22 please, you say that the briefing had been given by
23 Lieutenant 146 and an intelligence officer.
24 Was it usual before every operation for your troop
25 to have a briefing from an intelligence officer?
1 A. Yes, it was.
2 Q. Again, please do not mention any names, but do you
3 recall the name of the intelligence officer who gave you
4 the briefing?
5 A. Um, no, because it was, um, usually a different member
6 of the section that dealt with it. It was not one
7 specific officer.
8 Q. Can you tell us what rank the officer had?
9 A. Um, not really, no. I know the O/C of it was a captain,
10 as far as I can remember, but it was other members of
11 the section that usually gave us our day-to-day
12 briefings on what was going on that day.
13 Q. When you say "other members of the section," you are
14 referring also to people who were non-commissioned
15 officers or even held the rank of private?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Or gunner, it should be?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. So the reference to intelligence officer is not
20 specifically to someone of officer rank?
21 A. Um, on that day, yes.
22 Q. You cannot help with the rank at all, can you?
23 A. Um, no, I am sorry, it is, it is gone.
24 Q. You should have a cipher list with you?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And you can see on that cipher list Soldier O21 and
2 Soldier 028. Do those names mean anything to you?
3 A. 028 does.
4 Q. Could it have been 028 that might have given you the
5 briefing?
6 A. Um, I do not think so, no. He could have given the
7 senior ranks and the officers in charge a general
8 briefing and we could have got it from his, his other
9 staff on that day, but I cannot remember if it was him
10 on that day.
11 Q. What you can say about that morning briefing was that it
12 was a briefing to your troop?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. You give, in paragraph 15, your recollection of the
15 orders you may have had and you mention rioters. Would
16 it be right to say you were warned about the possibility
17 of there being riots?
18 A. Yes, but not specifically. We were always warned if any
19 large march was going on there could be someone who
20 wanted to cause trouble, so we were always warned about
21 that.
22 Q. You say "not specifically." If we look at paragraph 16
23 you say:
24 "We were also told that there may be some [I think
25 we should add the word 'people'] there with weapons
1 although I thought that there would not be because there
2 would be too many good people in the crowd who would
3 prevent them doing this."
4 Were you told what kind of weapons?
5 A. Standard small arms, pistol, sub-machine-guns, nothing
6 specific. We were always told to be on the look-out for
7 it.
8 Q. Again, this was not specific information that you were
9 being given?
10 A. Not to my recollection, no.
11 Q. You were just told to be on the look-out for the
12 possibility?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Again, if we go back to paragraph 17 and what you say
15 there, you say after that morning briefing that you were
16 not happy. The intelligence officer had given you the
17 background and Lieutenant 106 had briefed you as to your
18 duties:
19 "However, we did not feel we had enough detail and
20 I, together with others, went and talked to the
21 'squirrels'. The squirrels were intelligence officers
22 who operated on the ground and had their contacts in the
23 community. We all wanted to find out anything else they
24 knew."
25 Why were you not happy?
1 A. It seemed at the time that there was an awful lot of
2 preparation for just a march and we, we felt -- or
3 I felt at the time there must have been something more
4 to it, but we could not really get much more information
5 than we were given at the morning briefing.
6 Q. The information that you had been given at the morning
7 briefing, was it typical of the level of information
8 that you were usually given?
9 A. Normally yes, you know, "Look out for certain people in
10 the bingo book," things like that, they were expecting
11 this, that and the other, but because of the length of
12 preparation for that day, a lot of us thought there
13 might be something else going on but we could not really
14 find out.
15 Q. When you say the squirrels, officers who operated on the
16 ground, what do you mean by that, operating on the
17 ground?
18 A. Undercover.
19 Q. That was their general role, was it?
20 A. Usually.
21 Q. And these were members of your unit?
22 A. Not necessarily, no. We knew where they were and we
23 asked, but we could not get hold of them. Some of our
24 own unit went out to the civvies, but we could not get
25 much more information than we got at the briefing.
1 Q. Can we try and break it down. You say "went and talked
2 to the squirrels"?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Where would you go to talk to the squirrels?
5 A. Um, we -- let me see if I have got the name here. Yes,
6 one of our blokes in the signals section and with
7 intelligence group would contact his mate by telephone,
8 a secure line, ask for an update and he would pass it on
9 to us, you know, if there was anything going on, but for
10 that day we could not get anything else except for the
11 normal briefing.
12 Q. The upshot of your inquiries was that you learnt nothing
13 new?
14 A. Nothing really, no.
15 Q. But the way you went about it was to speak to one of
16 your blokes in the intelligence section?
17 A. As I say again, it is because of the preparations for
18 the day, we thought there might be something more to it
19 and we just wanted to be a bit better prepared, that is
20 all.
21 Q. You have your cipher list. Is the name of the person
22 that you approached on that list -- please do not
23 mention the name?
24 A. No, no, I will not. (Pause). Could be, well, I think
25 we asked 697 to, um, check with the signals boys and the
1 intelligence section to see if he could get us some more
2 background, I think. I cannot be too sure.
3 Q. 697 is the person that you mention in your statement,
4 UNK697. We will come back to that in a moment. Linked
5 to that, can I say that prior to giving your evidence,
6 I believe you were asked to look at a video?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And that is video 3 and it is a video that is familiar
9 to us here, showing the man in civilian clothing walking
10 across the path of the arrestees.
11 You were not able to confirm that that was a member
12 of the military, were you?
13 A. No.
14 Q. If we could move on, please, and go on to paragraph 20,
15 please, of your statement. If we deal with your
16 position on Bloody Sunday which you described as
17 a stupid position, but as a disused garage on
18 William Street.
19 Lieutenant 146 and Sergeant 117, in statements they
20 made in 1972, identified this as Harrison's Garage. If
21 I could have, please, side by side, P904 and P892. Just
22 to help you orientate yourself, INQ480, these are two
23 photographs not taken on Bloody Sunday, but which show
24 William Street. You can see, on the first photograph,
25 Stevenson's bakery, and a bit further on is Harrison's
1 Garage. We see it here again on this image.
2 If we could have, please, P234, this is
3 William Street. Again, it is a photograph that was not
4 taken on the day, but we can identify Harrison's Garage,
5 here, with the sort of ornate front part of its roof.
6 That would be the garage where you and your half troop
7 were located. The march would have moved in this
8 direction, past you, down towards the junction of
9 William Street and Rossville Street.
10 It would have been on the north side of
11 William Street?
12 A. Uh-huh.
13 Q. As you say, the person that you have identified as
14 UNK697 in your statement was one person that you
15 remember being with you in that garage. Can I ask you
16 again to look at your cipher list. You have a name
17 there for INQ1058.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Is that the person that you were referring to?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. For the transcript, UNK697 is also INQ1058.
22 Could we have P235, please. This is again an aerial
23 view of the area of William Street and Rossville Street.
24 Again, it is not a photograph taken on Bloody Sunday,
25 but what you can see is Harrison's Garage, where you
1 would have been positioned, is approximately there.
2 Just here, where I have marked a second blue arrow, is
3 the location of other members of your platoon, because
4 the evidence that we have is that this area, and in
5 particular barriers in William Street and Sackville
6 Street and Little James Street, were all under the
7 control of 11 Battery of 22LAD, but attached to that
8 battery was one platoon from 42 Battery which would,
9 I think we are sure, be the platoon under the command of
10 Lieutenant 146.
11 That platoon was split, so that some of the platoon
12 were based in Harrison's Garage and others were based in
13 a building approximately in the area I have marked with
14 the red arrow. (Indicating)
15 INQ1058 has made a statement. In his statement his
16 recollection is that he was not in the garage where you
17 were located, but he was actually in the other location.
18 Is it possible that you could be mistaken in your
19 recollection?
20 A. Could well be, but I remember him quite strongly at that
21 time. I feel, you know, I was sure it was him, but
22 I could be wrong.
23 Q. Is it your recollection that he was acting as a radio
24 operator on that day?
25 A. No, I do not think so.
1 Q. Can we go back, please, to paragraph 16 of your
2 statement at C480.2. In this paragraph you explain the
3 orders that you were given. You say:
4 "We were told that we were to be part of a break-off
5 group. This meant that we would be placed out of sight,
6 but were intended, if the riot got out of control, to
7 come out of our positions and herd the rioters. This
8 was designed to control their activities so that they
9 did not hurt anyone other than themselves."
10 Were you told in the briefings you received before
11 the operation, that 1 Para would be involved in the
12 operation on 30th January?
13 A. To be honest, I cannot really recall. I know I spotted
14 the Paras as we were coming across the bridge, but
15 I really cannot recall the specifics of the briefing.
16 Q. If I could have P199, that is Harrison's Garage where
17 you were. The reason I asked about the Paras is because
18 both Lieutenant 146, who was your troop commander, and
19 Sergeant 117, who was a section commander -- I do not
20 know whether you recall 117 being with you on the day;
21 do you?
22 A. No.
23 Q. But they both said in 1972, to the RMP, that the main
24 task of the troops deployed in Harrison's Garage was to
25 protect Stevenson's bakery. They make no suggestion
1 that there was any contemplation that your unit would be
2 engaged in dealing with rioters.
3 Are you sure in your recollection that you were
4 briefed for a possible role in dealing with rioters?
5 A. Um, that was our general role anyway, but, to be honest,
6 the specific day, um, all I can truly remember is
7 a general briefing, going to the garage, waiting there
8 a number of hours and then going back.
9 Q. Can you recall if the building that you were in, the
10 garage, had a roof to it?
11 A. No, it did not.
12 Q. It did not?
13 A. No.
14 Q. If you look at your cipher list, it has a name for
15 soldier -- it may not have, -- I will give you a name in
16 a moment. Lieutenant 146, when he made his RMP
17 statement, said that he deployed a sniper in the attic
18 of Harrison's Garage. I am just going to send you
19 a name. (Pause). It is the name of Soldier 143; is
20 that name familiar to you?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Do you recall a sniper being deployed or one of your
23 half troop being deployed into sniping position in
24 Harrison's Garage?
25 A. No, I do not.
1 Q. If we go back to your own statement, page 4, C480.4,
2 paragraphs 22 to 25, and I will summarise these
3 paragraphs because you describe sitting in the garage
4 and the marchers beginning to go past you. Then you say
5 in paragraph 22 that the next thing you recollect is
6 hearing two to three cracks from a high velocity weapon
7 and from the sound you could tell it was some distance
8 away. You make the point that it was difficult to
9 pinpoint the direction of the shots.
10 Are you clear that you heard these high velocity
11 shots after the marchers had begun to go past your
12 location?
13 A. Some time after, not immediately after, it was quite
14 some time after.
15 Q. Were there still people going past the location?
16 A. I do not think so, no.
17 Q. If we look at paragraphs 25 to 26, what you say is that
18 the response of you and your colleagues was to put your
19 weapons in port positions and then you looked to
20 Lieutenant 146 and then you waited for the contact
21 report.
22 In paragraph 26 you say:
23 "I cannot now recall whether the radio man received
24 the report and then passed Lieutenant 146 the microphone
25 set or whether he simply released on the information he
1 had heard in his headset to Lieutenant Soldier 146."
2 You describe how the contact report would be given
3 and what would simply be said would be the word
4 "contact."
5 A. (Witness nodding)
6 Q. Do we take it, then, if you heard that, all you could
7 understand from that was that there had been a shot
8 fired?
9 A. Yes, that is all I could get from it.
10 Q. Can we go back, please, to P199. Again, this is
11 Harrison's Garage, where you were located. We know that
12 in this nine-windowed derelict building, which I have
13 marked with a yellow arrow, the ground floor of which
14 was a former taxi firm called Abbey Taxis, we know there
15 were two Paras positioned in that building who fired
16 before any Paras had deployed into or down
17 Rossville Street, that these two Paras fired five shots,
18 and they fired approximately in this direction, and
19 these shots were fired, as I have said, before the Paras
20 went into the Bogside.
21 These were obviously high velocity SLR shots. We
22 also know that a member of the Official IRA fired
23 a round from a .303, and it was approximately in this
24 direction. (Indicating) Again, this was before the
25 Paras had deployed into the Bogside.
1 Given what you have said about the difficulties of
2 pinpointing direction of shots, is it possible that the
3 high velocity shots you heard were the shots that were
4 fired, either by the Paras from that derelict building
5 or by the member of the Official IRA?
6 A. It is possible because, with the buildings around you,
7 um, the sound would move around, you would not be able
8 to pinpoint it.
9 Q. Could we go on to paragraph 28, which is on C480.5. The
10 next sort of incident of firing that you describe was
11 what you thought was someone letting loose from the city
12 walls. You say:
13 "I assumed it was return or counter fire. It
14 sounded to me like heavy weaponry such as SLRs. I think
15 there were quite a few rounds. The sound of an SLR shot
16 is a loud bang with a loud metallic clink at the same
17 time."
18 Having looked at that, can we go to the next page
19 and tie in a comment you made about Lieutenant 146's RMP
20 statement, which is in paragraph 35, because you say
21 there.
22 "Although he refers to hearing a Thompson, I do not
23 recall hearing this. The sound of a Thompson is a very
24 distinctive noise, like a Pitbull barking. It has quite
25 a low growling sound. It is a good weapon to start
1 a fight with. I think that we discussed at the time
2 whether or not there was a Thompson and we decided that
3 there was not."
4 Do you have a clear recollection of discussing or
5 trying to identify gunfire as possible Thompson
6 machine-gun fire in that garage?
7 A. It was not in the garage that we discussed it.
8 Q. When was it?
9 A. We went back to the barracks. We were thinking about
10 what we heard, but we were not really sure. I mean,
11 I certainly was not sure I heard a Thompson. I heard
12 some high velocity weapons and some automatic fire, but
13 I could not, you know, specifically say, "That was
14 a Thompson".
15 Q. When you say you heard automatic fire?
16 A. It sounded like it, yes.
17 Q. When was that?
18 A. Um --
19 Q. If we go back to paragraph 28, In paragraph 28 you
20 describe hearing gunfire that sounded like SLR fire?
21 A. Uh-huh.
22 Q. When was it that you heard the automatic gunfire?
23 A. Um, I think it was slightly before that, but there were
24 a lot of rounds going off and I could be mistaken, but
25 it did sound like it. It could have been a number of
1 people firing off, you know. To me at the time it
2 sounded like an automatic.
3 Q. It could have been a number of SLR shots being fired at
4 the same time?
5 A. Well, yes, immediately after each other.
6 Q. Who did you have the discussion with about whether or
7 not there had been Thompson sub-machine-gun fire?
8 A. Um --
9 Q. Again, no names, please?
10 A. No, no, it was the guys who were with me in the garage
11 when we went back, when we were stood down. We were
12 just talking generally about the day; what we had heard;
13 what we had experienced. Um, but I have no -- I just
14 feel myself that I could not recall the Thompson going
15 off.
16 Q. Are you able to help us with the names of any of the
17 guys you had this discussion with from your cipher list?
18 A. Yes, um 1058, 1255, um, I think -- yes, I think that was
19 it, and a few others. They were in other places, but,
20 you know, we all got round a couple of mugs of tea and
21 talked about it.
22 Q. Do you recall INQ1255 being injured on that day?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Two final matters: before you left the garage, do you
25 have any recollection of Army vehicles, manned by Paras,
1 pulling up in front of your location or close to it?
2 A. I think so, yes.
3 Q. The final matter, INQ480, have you ever spoken to any
4 journalist or TV programme-maker about the events of
5 Bloody Sunday?
6 A. No.
7 Questioned by MR BRADLY
8 MR BRADLY: INQ480, my name is Bradly and I represent
9 a large number of soldiers who are witnesses to this
10 Inquiry, including INQ1058, a soldier who you mention in
11 your statement as UNK697 and now identified as 1058.
12 With that in mind, would you look at paragraph 17 in
13 your statement, C480.3. Can you look again, please, at
14 the sentence three lines up from the bottom, where you
15 say:
16 "I, together with others, went and talked to the
17 squirrels"; do you see that?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. What you clearly say in your written evidence is that
20 you went and spoke to these people you refer to as
21 squirrels?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Is that in fact what happened?
24 A. Um, I, I specifically did not. I asked what was going
25 on, what information. Um --
1 Q. Sorry, when you say in your statement you went and
2 personally spoke to the squirrels, that is not right,
3 you did not do that?
4 A. Well, I gather there was a bunch of us, we went and
5 talked to them.
6 Q. You, included with a number of others, went and spoke to
7 the squirrels?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. You went and spoke to them?
10 A. Well, we got, we got someone to make a call, to my
11 recollection, to get more information.
12 Q. I am just trying to understand what you say. The
13 position we have got to, then, although you say in your
14 statement you went and spoke, what you mean to say is
15 you had a call made?
16 A. Yes, yes.
17 Q. This call that you had made, you are telling the
18 Tribunal that you got INQ1058 to make it?
19 A. To my recollection we all looked up to him and asked him
20 to get us more information, I think, I cannot be sure,
21 but he always seemed, in the forefront of my memories,
22 um --
23 Q. Just tell the Tribunal how it worked, what in fact
24 happened.
25 A. Basically, um, some of us were a bit, I do not know --
1 Q. I understand that because that is already dealt with in
2 your statement in your oral evidence; tell the Tribunal
3 what happened in terms of this contact with the
4 squirrels?
5 A. I think we got someone to make a call, basically.
6 Q. You think you did?
7 A. I think. Yes, it seems like it.
8 Q. Either it was a call or you went?
9 A. Well, we went up to an office area and someone, someone
10 made the call, but we, we could not get anything else
11 out of him.
12 Q. Who went to the office area?
13 A. It is gone, I am sorry, I just. It is like a murky
14 recollection. There is something there but, no.
15 Q. Is it possible INQ1058 was not one of them?
16 A. It could well be, yes.
17 Q. You do not know who went to the office area. Where was
18 the office area?
19 A. (Witness shaking head). No. No, it is, I cannot
20 remember the exact area, sorry.
21 Q. Whose office was it?
22 A. Um, it was the people who -- they briefed us in the
23 mornings, or before going out on patrol about the new
24 problems and who was wanted on the bingo book, yes,
25 I think it was their office.
1 Q. Who was the person who made the call to the squirrels?
2 A. Um, I do not know, I am sorry, I do not know. I cannot
3 really remember, specifically.
4 Q. Sir, I have no further questions.
5 Questioned by MR ELIAS
6 MR ELIAS: INQ480, my name is Elias and I act for a number
7 of former soldiers. Could I ask you to look for
8 a moment at C480.4, the top of the page, the second half
9 of paragraph 21.
10 Please do not take this as in any way critical of
11 you, you are making this statement 30 years, or
12 thereabouts, after the events.
13 In this statement, as we see in the top three or
14 four lines, your feeling is that the marchers came from
15 left to right:
16 "... reinforces my view that our position was on the
17 south of William Street and we were looking north."
18 We now know that is wrong, do we not, you were in
19 fact on the other side.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. You now, or at the time of making the statement recorded
22 a recollection, surrounded as you were by brick walls
23 and corrugated metal:
24 "I thought that the cracks came from behind me at
25 about 45 degrees as I was standing facing north."
1 That must be a false recollection, must it not?
2 A. After seeing that, yes, yes.
3 Q. And the detail you give of all turning around in
4 response to the sound, again, whilst no doubt honest, at
5 the time must be mistaken, must it not?
6 A. From seeing what happened with the maps, yes, I am
7 sorry.
8 LORD SAVILLE: I am not quite sure I understand why that is
9 suggested. I can quite see you have to orientate the
10 whole thing by 180 degrees; why should it follow from
11 what this witness has now been able to help us with that
12 it is wrong to say, "The cracks came from behind me at
13 about 45 degrees."
14 MR ELIAS: Because you are standing, as I understand it --
15 can I put it to the witness this way, sir.
16 As I understand it you are standing now on the north
17 side of William Street and would have been facing
18 looking out on to William Street; correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And the noise you thought you heard would have come
21 from, generally speaking, an area in front of you?
22 A. Well, more to my left area.
23 Q. To your left, I understand?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. The impression that you give in this paragraph is that
1 you turned round, because of course you were facing
2 north, according to the account you were giving at this
3 time?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. If we go to paragraph 32 on the following page --
6 LORD SAVILLE: Before we do, I wonder if we could have
7 a photograph of the area up on the screen, the one that
8 particularly shows the derelict house and, so far as
9 possible, Harrison's Garage.
10 MR ELIAS: Is that the one Mr Rawat referred to?
11 MR RAWAT: P199.
12 LORD SAVILLE: If you point with an arrow, Mr Elias.
13 480, can you see off this one, the garage, it was
14 shown to you before?
15 A. (Indicating)
16 LORD SAVILLE: Have another arrow to the derelict building.
17 MR ELIAS: This is the derelict building from which the --
18 LORD SAVILLE: Which the "ST" of "William Street". No-one
19 is criticising you for getting the orientation wrong
20 after all this time. It does look very likely indeed
21 that you were in that garage.
22 A. Yes.
23 LORD SAVILLE: If you were facing across William Street then
24 the noise you heard, as I think you said to us a moment
25 ago, was coming from your left?
1 A. (Witness nodding)
2 LORD SAVILLE: Is it feasible that in fact it could have
3 been the shots that we know were fired from the derelict
4 building marked on the photograph with a yellow arrow?
5 A. Yes, it could be, because, as I said, I had great
6 difficulty in trying to find out where the shots came
7 from.
8 LORD SAVILLE: I think your recollection is that they were
9 from your left.
10 A. Yes.
11 LORD SAVILLE: I do not want to put words into your mouth.
12 On the face of it, if they came from your left, it looks
13 as though it could have been the shots that were fired
14 from the derelict building.
15 A. It looks like it.
16 LORD SAVILLE: Or indeed, as Mr Rawat pointed out, another
17 shot we know was fired, coming in the other direction.
18 A. As I have said previously, there are a number of shots
19 and, as I said also, because of the buildings around
20 I had trouble trying to find where they came from. But,
21 yes, it could be.
22 LORD SAVILLE: It is just that on your original recollection
23 your left would be off to the right-hand side of this
24 photograph, whereas where it now appears --
25 A. Mirror image.
1 LORD SAVILLE: It looks rather different. Thank you very
2 much.
3 MR ELIAS: You were going on to say -- this is just the
4 point we wanted to come to, if we go to paragraph 32,
5 you say in that paragraph, referring to the bakery shot
6 the Chairman has just referred you to:
7 "I do not recollect specifically recognising such
8 shots. However, our position, surrounded by walls, may
9 have meant that such shots could have bounced around the
10 surrounding buildings but not have been heard by us, or
11 were not recognised by us when we heard them."
12 As you said earlier in the statement, you were in
13 a building surrounded by walls. It was very difficult,
14 therefore, was it, generally, to get an impression
15 either, with any precision at all, where the shots were
16 fired from and in which direction they were aimed at?
17 A. That is correct, yes.
18 Q. So, when you say, as you do in paragraph 28, if we could
19 have that on the screen for a moment, and highlight it,
20 you heard:
21 "Then I heard what I thought was someone letting
22 loose from the city walls. I assumed it was return or
23 counter fire."
24 Would the same considerations apply, INQ480, that
25 was to say that was an assumption, but it could be
1 nothing more than a rough guess?
2 A. Yes, that is what I said at the time.
3 Q. From your position, as we now believe it to be, the
4 north side of William Street, you were able to say, so
5 far as this firing is concerned, that it was coming from
6 the direction of the walls, some distance away from you,
7 but no more than that; would that be fair?
8 A. That is about all I could say, yes.
9 MR RAWAT: Sir, I have no additional questions.
10 LORD SAVILLE: INQ480, thank you very much indeed for coming
11 here to help us, thank you.
12 We will return to the matter at 9.30 on Monday
13 morning, please.
14 (2.30 pm)
15 (Proceedings adjourned until 9.30 am
16 on Monday, 3rd March 2003)
17
18 SOLDIER 128, sworn ........................... 2
19 Questioned by MR ROXBURGH .................... 2
20 Questioned by MR ELIAS ....................... 35
21 Questioned by LORD GIFFORD ................... 37
22 Questioned by MR COYLE ....................... 39
23 Questioned by MR GLASGOW ..................... 41
24 INQ1002, sworn ............................... 47
25 Questioned by MS McGAHEY ..................... 47
1 Questioned by MR GLASGOW ..................... 60
2 Questioned by MS MCGAHEY ..................... 67
3 INQ441, sworn ................................ 68
4 Questioned by MR CLARKE ...................... 68
5 Questioned by MR A HARVEY .................... 99
6 Questioned by MR GLASGOW ..................... 110
7 INQ1791, sworn ............................... 111
8 Questioned by MR CLARKE ...................... 111
9 INQ480, sworn ................................ 120
10 Questioned by MR RAWAT ....................... 120
11 Questioned by MR BRADLY ...................... 137
12 Questioned by MR ELIAS ....................... 140
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