1 Wednesday, 5th February 2003
2 (9.35 a.m)
3 LORD ARMSTRONG, sworn
4 Questioned by MR CLARKE
5 LORD SAVILLE: Lord Armstrong, you can see who is talking to
6 you, I say this to all the witnesses. I am the
7 Chairman. The questions will come from the barristers
8 in front of me. Could you remain reasonably close to
9 that microphone and then we will all be able to hear
10 what you have to say.
11 MR CLARKE: Could we have on the screen, please, KA5.1.
12 Lord Armstrong, do you have with you the statement to
13 this Inquiry, which you signed on 16th January of this
14 year?
15 A. I do.
16 Q. Are the contents of that statement true to the best of
17 your knowledge and belief?
18 A. They are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
19 Q. Because everybody has had the opportunity of reading it
20 and the attachments, I am only going to ask you a number
21 of questions that arise out of it. Could we look at
22 paragraph 4, KA5.2. You describe in that paragraph what
23 your position as the Prime Minister's Principal Private
24 Secretary amounted to and you describe how you thought
25 that it was part of your duty to be as closely in touch
1 as possible with what was in the Prime Minister's mind
2 and thinking.
3 I presume that you were in very regular, probably
4 daily contact with the Prime Minister; is that right?
5 A. Several times a day.
6 Q. Did you see most or perhaps all of what went into his
7 box?
8 A. I saw all of it. Whether I read all of it with the same
9 degree of detail, I would not answer.
10 Q. So far as the type of documents which you would see,
11 would you see the Cabinet minutes?
12 A. I would see the Cabinet minutes, but I would not put
13 them in to the Prime Minister.
14 Q. Would you see the minutes of the Cabinet Committee
15 meetings?
16 A. I should see minutes of Cabinet Committee meetings of
17 which the Prime Minister was in the chair, and perhaps
18 some others as well.
19 Q. Did you see the briefs that the Cabinet Secretary gave
20 to the Prime Minister for either Cabinet or Cabinet
21 Committee meetings?
22 A. I should have seen them, yes.
23 Q. Presumably you saw some of the correspondence between,
24 indeed wrote some of the correspondence between the
25 Prime Minister and other Ministers or their Private
1 Secretaries?
2 A. As I say in the statement, that was one of the principal
3 functions of the Private Secretary, to be the channel of
4 communication between the Prime Minister and his
5 colleagues.
6 Q. Can we come, please, to paragraph 9 in your statement at
7 KA5.4. You refer there to a letter of
8 30th September 1971, which is attached to your statement
9 when you:
10 "... conveyed the Prime Minister's request for:
11 "'A full military appreciation of the security
12 situation in Northern Ireland, including an assessment
13 of what measures the Army would propose, if they were
14 instructed that the primary objective was to bring
15 terrorism to an end at the earliest possible moment,
16 without regard to the inconveniences caused to the
17 civilian population, and what forces they would require
18 to carry these measures out'."
19 You observe that you remember thinking that, in
20 asking for this, the Prime Minister was wanting to
21 ensure that the review of policy options was, and was
22 seen to be comprehensive, but was not expecting that
23 this option would be likely to prove to be either
24 desirable or feasible.
25 We have seen the military appreciation that followed
1 this request and we know that it recommended a number of
2 courses, of which one of the more moderate courses
3 proposed was adopted.
4 What I wanted to ask you was whether you were ever
5 conscious that the Army were instructed that the primary
6 objective was to bring terrorism to an end at the
7 earliest possible moment without regard to the
8 inconveniences caused to the civilian population?
9 A. So far as I am aware no such instruction was ever
10 issued.
11 Q. Could we come to the meeting that took place on
12 27th January 1972 between the two Prime Ministers of
13 Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Could we have on
14 the screen G81.507. This is a copy, with which the
15 Inquiry is now familiar, of your note for the record of
16 this meeting.
17 Can you help me on a very basic question: does the
18 heading "Note for the record" signify anything in
19 particular?
20 A. No, it signifies exactly what it says.
21 Q. You may have thought it a silly question, but it does
22 not signify that there is another note which is not for
23 the record?
24 A. No, no, it was a heading we commonly used for such notes
25 which were going to be in the file. If I may add to
1 that: it was a note for the record which was seen by
2 other colleagues and departments concerned. I do not
3 think it says so formally here, but it would have been
4 certainly copied to the Home Office -- the Home
5 Secretary, the Defence Secretaries and the Foreign and
6 Commonwealth Secretary.
7 Q. If we go to 5.11, you are right -- sorry, I thought it
8 had a list of persons to whom it was sent, I beg your
9 pardon. Can we go back to page 507.
10 This is, as I understand from your statement, the
11 only note that was made of this meeting?
12 A. The only note.
13 Q. You do not have a diary note of your own or anything?
14 A. No, I must have made manuscript notes at the time, but
15 they would have been destroyed, I think.
16 Q. Could we have on the screen page 510. Could we
17 highlight the second half. This is the passage in the
18 note which deals with the parades that were going to
19 take place on the forthcoming weekend. What you have
20 recorded, is this:
21 "Mr Faulkner recognised that the civil disobedience
22 parades in the coming weekend in Derry would be
23 difficult; but there had been no alternative to refusing
24 permission for them. If Orange parades were to be
25 banned, it would be impossible in political terms to let
1 civil rights or other parades go ahead."
2 Do you have any recollection now as to whether
3 Mr Faulkner explained what he meant by saying or
4 recognising that the parades would be difficult?
5 A. I do not remember that he expanded on that word.
6 Q. Your note records that he says "but there had been no
7 alternative to refusing permission for them." I am not
8 sure much turns on it, but it is a little unclear to
9 us -- at any rate to me -- why Mr Faulkner should be
10 saying there had been no alternative but to refuse
11 permission for the marches that weekend when all marches
12 had been banned since 9th August 1971, when internment
13 was introduced; are you able to cast any light on that?
14 A. Not from memory. I can only assume that he was ruling
15 out the possibility of an exceptional lifting of the ban
16 for this particular march.
17 Q. You say in your statement to this Inquiry that there was
18 no discussion about how the march was to be handled by
19 the Security Forces. Do you recall whether Mr Faulkner
20 urged any particular course or approach on Sir Edward in
21 relation to the marches that weekend?
22 A. I do not recall that he made any approach. I do not
23 recall him saying anything beyond what is recorded here.
24 Q. May we have on the screen, please, G78.485. Can we have
25 the next page, please, 78.485.001.
1 These are the minutes of the GEN 47 meeting that
2 took place at 10.30 in the morning on Thursday 27th, the
3 day on which Sir Edward saw Mr Faulkner in the evening.
4 If we go to the next page, 79.486, without going
5 through it, we have seen the Chief of the General Staff
6 reported about incidents in the previous week and
7 discussed the position in relation to the rally and
8 march that was planned for 30th January.
9 Do you recall learning of the upshot of the GEN 47
10 meeting during the course of the day or thereafter?
11 A. I am not sure what you mean by "upshot".
12 Q. The result, what happened at it?
13 A. Well, I recall -- I think I was probably sitting in the
14 back of the room at that meeting, though I cannot be
15 sure of that. The reason why I think that was because
16 I knew that I should be taking the note at the meeting
17 with Mr Faulkner later in the day and, as to "upshot",
18 we -- I mean, the committee clearly noted the Chief of
19 the General Staff's description of the arrangements that
20 were being made for the march on Sunday. I do not
21 recall that there was any comments on them or suggestion
22 that they were inappropriate.
23 Q. Could we go back to the previous page, please. I had
24 not appreciated that you would have been in the
25 background at the meeting. You are not described in the
1 formal minutes as being present, but that does not
2 signify that you were not in the room?
3 A. When the Prime Minister had a meeting in the Cabinet
4 room, it was the practice for one or other of the
5 Private Secretaries to sit at the back of the room in
6 order to take any messages or take any instructions that
7 the Prime Minister wanted to give. If I was there,
8 I was there for that purpose. I was not part of the
9 meeting.
10 Q. Do you recall receiving any impression from what the
11 Chief of the General Staff or anybody else was saying
12 that there was perceived to be a risk, of whatever
13 degree of magnitude, of a shooting war, or something
14 like it, developing on the march?
15 A. I recall simply the impression that this was going to be
16 a comparatively peaceful occasion, that there had been
17 of course -- there had been confrontations at other
18 marches and it was not excluded that there would be such
19 confrontations at this.
20 But the tenor of the discussion was that this was
21 going to be a comparatively peaceful march.
22 Q. We know that a GEN 47 took place in the morning; we know
23 that Sir Edward met with Mr Faulkner in the evening,
24 this is the Thursday. Are you aware of any briefing of
25 the Prime Minister in respect of the march outside the
1 confines of the GEN 47 meeting?
2 A. I am not aware of any such meeting.
3 Q. Or of any discussion or consultation with him, or
4 between him and others, about the march and how to deal
5 with it other than the discussion at GEN 47 and at the
6 meeting with Mr Faulkner?
7 A. I have no recollection of any such, any such event. The
8 Prime Minister, of course, was attending a meeting of
9 the Cabinet directly after the GEN 47 and would have
10 been answering questions in the House of Commons that
11 afternoon, so his time was fully occupied.
12 Q. He then saw Mr Faulkner and then went to a dinner for
13 Conservative agents?
14 A. I think it was a drinks party.
15 Q. The precise function may not be critical.
16 Could we have a look at G79.487. This is the minute
17 of the Prime Minister's summary of the discussion. It
18 ends with the observation:
19 "Maximum publicity should also be secured for
20 arrests and court proceedings following the marches."
21 If we could then have on the screen G91.551. This
22 is a telex that was sent by Sir Donald Maitland, as he
23 was to become, to Mr Hill, pressman in Belfast on
24 27th January. It records:
25 "This morning Ministers discussed the public
1 relations aspects of the coming weekend's marches and
2 particularly Sunday's in Londonderry. They accepted
3 that there would be TV coverage of marchers
4 forming-up ... They felt this might best be counteracted
5 by TV coverage at the point where the march is broken up
6 and of the arrest and subsequent proceedings in
7 court ...
8 "In the light of today's discussion by the JSC,
9 would you please do all you can to ensure balanced
10 coverage of Sunday's march."
11 That appears to tie in with the last sentence of the
12 minutes of GEN 47. If we go to G90.550, there is
13 a telex of the next day, 28th March, to the UK Rep in
14 Belfast, telex number 8 of 28th January:
15 "Following for Hill from Maitland.
16 "Ministers would like the suggestion put to
17 Mr Faulkner that a statement be issued by the
18 Northern Ireland Government before Sunday's march."
19 Then there is suggested what the statement might
20 say, and then the purpose of the statement is said to
21 be:
22 "(A) to prepare public opinion here and in
23 Northern Ireland for the violent scenes on TV following
24 the march;
25 "(B) to explain in advance that the Security Forces'
1 countermeasures will take place at points of the Army's
2 choosing;
3 "(C) to explain in advance why CS gas may not be
4 used."
5 Do you know or surmise who are the Ministers who are
6 being referred to in this Foreign Office telex?
7 A. I cannot say that I know because I was not aware of
8 these telexes until they appeared in the -- I do not
9 remember being aware of them at the time and I was not
10 aware of them until I saw them in the papers for this
11 Inquiry.
12 If I am asked to surmise, I think that "Ministers"
13 in this telex refers to GEN 47, the previous day.
14 Q. May we come, please, to KA5.5, paragraphs 12 and
15 following of your statement. You are dealing in this
16 paragraph of your statement with what is described as
17 a letter dated 1st February 1972 from 10 Downing Street
18 to the Home Office, recording the Prime Minister's
19 meeting the previous evening with the
20 Lord Chief Justice, Lord Widgery, and the
21 Lord Chancellor.
22 If we may go to the next page, paragraph 16, you say
23 there that your recollection is that there was some
24 discussion between Ministers during the course of
25 31st January as to the nature of the Inquiry. Your
1 recollection is entirely accurate.
2 If we have on the screen G99A.600.004, we know that
3 GEN 47 met on the Monday, initially at 11.30 and then
4 resumed the meeting at 5.15. If you can take it from
5 me, the meeting in the morning discussed whether to hold
6 an Inquiry and what sort of an Inquiry to hold. Then
7 a statement was made in the House.
8 Can we have G100.603. G100.603 is the last part of
9 the minute of the morning meeting:
10 "The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion so
11 far, said that the balance of the arguments discussed
12 appeared to favour in principle the establishment of
13 a Tribunal under the 1921 Act."
14 Then G100.604, the meeting then resumed at 5.15. It
15 resumed a discussion of the nature of the Inquiry and
16 then, if one goes to G100.605, the conclusion of that
17 discussion was that there should be an Inquiry under the
18 1921 Act and:
19 "The Lord Chancellor should approach a very senior
20 member of the judiciary to ascertain whether he would be
21 willing to act as Chairman, and to discuss with him the
22 composition of the Tribunal ..."
23 It looks, on the face of the minute, as if
24 Lord Widgery was not approached until some time in
25 the -- half an hour or so, at the earliest, after 5.15
1 on that Thursday; does that accord with your
2 recollection or do you not recall?
3 A. I recall that the Lord Chancellor was asked to approach
4 Lord Widgery after that meeting; I cannot remember
5 exactly how long that meeting took.
6 Q. May we then have on the screen G105.636. This is your
7 note of the meeting between Sir Edward, the
8 Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor. You record
9 that Lord Widgery came round with the Lord Chancellor to
10 see the Prime Minister at 7.20 on the evening of Monday,
11 31st January, the day before this note was written.
12 You record in the first page of the note that there
13 were a number of points to which the Prime Minister
14 thought it right to draw the Lord Chief Justice's
15 attention.
16 If we go over the page to 637, the last of the
17 points, the fifth point, as recorded by you, is this:
18 "It had to be remembered that we were in
19 Northern Ireland fighting not only a military war but
20 a propaganda war."
21 You say in paragraph 20 of your statement to this
22 Tribunal that you took the Prime Minister to be
23 reminding the Lord Chief Justice that his Inquiry would
24 attract much publicity which the IRA would seek to
25 exploit to their own advantage. What, if anything, did
1 you take to be the point of the Prime Minister telling
2 the Lord Chief Justice that?
3 A. At this stage the Lord Chief Justice was coming fresh
4 into the whole subject. The Lord Chief Justice at any
5 time is a very busy man and it was impossible to know
6 just how familiar he would have been as a spectator, as
7 a reader of the newspapers and so on, about the state of
8 matters in relation to Northern Ireland.
9 So this was a reminder, in case he was not fully
10 aware, that a great deal of propaganda was being put out
11 by the IRA and other bodies and the two Governments, the
12 Government in Westminster and the Government in
13 Stormont, were seeking to counter it when they could.
14 Q. Did you interpret what the Prime Minister was saying to
15 be in any way a warning that the Lord Chief Justice
16 should be careful about making findings against, or
17 which could be represented, possibly misrepresented, as
18 being adverse to the Army because of the use to which
19 such findings could be put?
20 A. I am sure that he was not intending to try to seek to
21 influence the Lord Chief Justice's findings or the
22 outcome of the Inquiry and if the Lord Chief Justice, if
23 that Lord Chief Justice or perhaps any
24 Lord Chief Justice, thought that was happening, he would
25 be the first to object to it and to say that he would
1 not put up with it.
2 I think it was clear that -- to all concerned at
3 that meeting that the Prime Minister was talking about
4 the general background to the Inquiry and perhaps to the
5 possibility that decisions which the Lord Chief Justice
6 might take about procedures such as where the Inquiry
7 should be held, could be taken up in the propaganda --
8 exchanges of propaganda.
9 Q. I want, if I may, to show you two passages in the
10 evidence to this Tribunal of Sir Edward Heath. Could we
11 have on the screen the transcript for Day 283, page 73.
12 I appreciate, of course, in asking you the questions
13 I am about to ask, that this is the evidence of
14 Sir Edward, but it may be you can cast some light on
15 passages in it which might be obscure.
16 This is the passage in my questioning of Sir Edward
17 when I referred to the passage in your note and said at
18 line 1, as it appears on the page at the moment:
19 "Question: What was the point of drawing that to
20 Lord Widgery's attention?
21 "Answer: Because we did not want him to
22 misunderstand what was going on. It was a -- part of
23 the Government's task through other sources, the
24 military and so on, to point out to people that we were
25 trying to deal with these people who were causing so
1 much trouble up and down the country and it was right to
2 tell them that this would continue, that it was really
3 nothing to do with his operation.
4 "Question: Let me understand that I follow that.
5 You were seeking to tell him that the Government would
6 deal with the propaganda war, is that what you are
7 saying?
8 "Answer: I was telling him that this propaganda war
9 was going on the whole time and would continue.
10 "Question: Why was that relevant for him to know?
11 "Answer: Because I did not want him to think we
12 were interfering with his operation.
13 "Question: How could he have thought that you were
14 interfering with his operation?
15 "Answer: Well, we thought there was a possibility."
16 Sir Edward appears in those sentences to be saying
17 that he was intending to tell Lord Widgery that the
18 propaganda war would continue, on the Government's part,
19 and that Lord Widgery should not think that the
20 Government or the administration were in any way
21 interfering with what he was doing.
22 Do you have any recollection of matters being put in
23 that way, or any comment to make on this evidence?
24 A. I do not think that I do have any comment. I think
25 that, as I say, Lord Widgery was coming to it without
1 the background that those of us who were involved from
2 day-to-day had had, and the Prime Minister wanted to
3 make sure he understood there was what he called
4 a propaganda war going on and that that would continue
5 and he would need to have that in his mind as he decided
6 things about where the Inquiry should sit and so on.
7 But I do not think -- I am sure that the
8 Prime Minister or the Lord Chancellor were not in any
9 way seeking to interfere with his operation in the sense
10 of influencing his findings or the outcome and I am sure
11 that Lord Widgery understood that.
12 Q. The second passage I wanted to draw your attention to is
13 this: could we have a look at Day 291, page 80. This is
14 a page at the very end of Sir Edward's examination, the
15 end of his evidence. The questions again come from me.
16 I am afraid I need to read a fairly long passage before
17 asking you a question about it. Line 3, I said this:
18 "Question: The second and last matter I wanted to
19 ask you about was a passage in your evidence when you
20 were being asked questions by Mr Lavery."
21 I ask him to be provided with a reference, and I say
22 at line 9:
23 "Question: I am still at the same document, let me
24 turn to [and the passage from your note is quoted]."
25 If we go to line 17:
1 "Question: At line 24 you were asked this:
2 "'Question: The propaganda war and the
3 military war are of course inter-linked, are
4 they not?
5 "'Answer: What I wanted to make plain to
6 you was that all the efforts in explaining the
7 situation carried out in our country during
8 this time would continue, that they were
9 entirely separate from his own task there and
10 he accepted that at once'."
11 That is me quoting the exchange from Mr Lavery.
12 I say:
13 "Question: Do I understand you there to be saying
14 that what you were telling Lord Widgery was that the
15 Government's efforts to explain the situation in
16 Northern Ireland would continue, but that was something
17 entirely separate from his own Inquiry?
18 "Answer: Well, I was thinking more of explaining it
19 in England."
20 I think Sir Edward had interpreted the phrase "to
21 explain the situation in Northern Ireland" as meaning to
22 explain the situation to people in Northern Ireland,
23 rather than the situation that pertained in
24 Northern Ireland. He went on to say this:
25 "... I was thinking more of explaining it in
1 England. But what was explained really did not need
2 explaining in Northern Ireland and, in any case, it was
3 quite separate, yes, of course, from what Lord Widgery
4 was doing.
5 "Question: Is what you were telling Lord Widgery
6 that the Government would continue to try and explain to
7 people in England what the situation was in
8 Northern Ireland, but that was something completely
9 distinct from what his task would be?
10 "Answer: Well, I should have said 'the
11 United Kingdom' rather than 'England'. Secondly, that
12 we had -- after all, we had our own troubles with very
13 destructive actions in some of our cities by the people
14 who were also connected with those in Ireland. And what
15 we would continue to do would be to explain to our
16 people who those -- this group were, and that we were
17 doing our best to deal with them, either by finding out
18 beforehand who they were -- which is what the police
19 were doing -- and arresting them, or, if they were
20 successful in causing trouble, to track them down and
21 arrest them afterwards.
22 "Question: What was the purpose of giving
23 Lord Widgery that information?
24 "Answer: Well, so that the citizens should
25 understand what was going on.
1 "Question: What was the purpose of giving this
2 information to Lord Widgery about what the Government
3 would be doing?
4 "Answer: Well, because he might come across it in
5 his activities, and I did not want him to think that we
6 were in any way treading on those, because we were not.
7 And he immediately responded, he did not suspect it for
8 a moment, that it was causing him any trouble.
9 "Question: What was it you thought he might come
10 across, exactly?
11 "Answer: Oh, that police and others were tracking
12 down people who were causing trouble.
13 "Question: How could that possibly impact on what
14 he was doing?
15 "Answer: What he was doing?
16 "Question: Yes.
17 "Answer: Oh, we thought he might be upset by the
18 fact that we were taking this action at the same time as
19 he was doing his Inquiry, and we wanted him to be quite
20 clear, and he was immediately clear, accepted it at
21 once.
22 "Question: What was the sort of action that you
23 would be taking which he might have thought could
24 interfere with his Inquiry?
25 "Answer: Well, the police --
1 "Question: The police doing what?
2 "Answer: Tracking down offenders."
3 It is rather a long passage, but Sir Edward appears,
4 rightly or wrongly, to be saying that it was explained
5 to Lord Widgery that the authorities, and in particular
6 the police, would be tracking down offenders and he
7 should not be concerned that that might interfere with
8 his Inquiry.
9 Do you have any recollection about any discussion of
10 the impact of police activities on Lord Widgery's
11 inquiries?
12 A. I have no such recollection.
13 Q. I want then, as my last topic, to deal with what you
14 refer to in paragraph 25. May we have on the screen
15 KA5.8. You were asked in that paragraph whether you
16 were aware of a comment by Lord Hailsham during the
17 course of 1971 to the effect that those resisting the
18 Armed Forces were in effect enemies of the Queen, and
19 you say you became aware of a comment along these lines
20 at second-hand in, you think, the summer of 1971.
21 Can you recall on what occasion Lord Hailsham was
22 reported as having made some such remark?
23 A. I am afraid I cannot remember on what occasion he made
24 it, but I remember being told he had made it.
25 Q. Do you remember who told you?
1 A. It may well have been the Prime Minister himself.
2 Q. He has told us that he recollected some such remark
3 being made as well.
4 There is one other matter I want to ask you about in
5 relation to this. I should explain that this surfaced
6 as a matter of interest as a result of something that
7 appeared in a Channel 4 documentary called "The Last
8 Colony," which was broadcast on Channel 4 in July 1994.
9 Could we have on the screen X133.2, to show you what
10 this is. This is a transcript of a portion of that
11 documentary. You can see the people who appeared on it.
12 The journalist who presented the programme was called
13 Martin Dillon.
14 Can we have X1.33.11. There is a passage in it
15 I would invite your assistance on. It begins at the
16 very bottom of this page where the journalist,
17 Mr Dillon, says this:
18 "The failure of IRA talks led to an explosion of
19 terrorist violence on both sides."
20 Then he refers to the --
21 "And that led the secret Cabinet Committee, GEN 42
22 [I think he has the number wrong], to advocate a policy,
23 which again brought it into conflict with the Army;
24 a policy, which could have added to the series of
25 blunders which characterised those early years.
1 "One of the most disturbing discussions about policy
2 in Northern Ireland took place within the Cabinet
3 Sub-Committee. At one of these meetings the Chief of
4 the General Staff was confronted with a radical and
5 a dangerous plan for a new military policy. Now that
6 plan would have allowed soldiers in the streets of
7 Northern Ireland to shoot anyone who obstructed them or
8 got in their way. Carver's reaction was very simple.
9 He said, I am not going to do it. In fact, I will not
10 implement that kind of policy. For me it is unthinkable
11 that a British Government should have ever considered
12 introducing such a plan."
13 That is all the journalist speaking. If we scroll
14 down, we see Lord Carver appears on the programme. What
15 he says is:
16 "It was being suggested that it was perfectly legal
17 for the Army to shoot somebody, whether or not they
18 thought that they were being shot at. Because anybody
19 who obstructed or got in the way of the Armed Forces of
20 the Queen was, by that very act, the Queen's enemy, and
21 this was being put forward by a legal luminary in the
22 Cabinet. And I said to the Prime Minister that I could
23 not, under any circumstances, order a British, or allow
24 a British soldier to be ordered to do such a thing
25 because it would not be lawful.
1 "Dillon: Was it the Prime Minister's view that the
2 Attorney General was agreeing that this was lawful?
3 "Carver: I think he did say that his legal advisors
4 suggested to him that it was all right, and I said, well
5 you are not bound by what they say. What I am bound by
6 is my own judgment of whether or not the act of the
7 soldier concerned would be legal, because it is the
8 courts that decide in the end, not the Attorney General
9 or the Lord Chancellor."
10 That is what appeared in the programme. Could we
11 have on the screen KH4.26. Two years later, in a letter
12 written by Lord Carver to a journalist whose name is
13 Gerraghty, Lord Carver -- this is a letter from him --
14 wrote as follows:
15 "The review from the Observer of 3rd July 1994 [that
16 was the date when the programme was to be broadcast] is
17 accurate, but the heading is not, although I cannot
18 recall much of the Channel 4 documentary, which I am not
19 sure that I saw. The 'legal luminary in the Cabinet'
20 was the Lord Chancellor. The account mixes up the
21 Cabinet Committee meeting at which he expressed that
22 astonishing opinion, and a private meeting I had with
23 Heath, when he referred to the same matter and I gave
24 him the answer quoted."
25 Were you aware or present at or become aware of
1 a private meeting between the Prime Minister and
2 Lord Carver at which Sir Edward referred to
3 Lord Hailsham's opinion and Lord Carver said that he
4 would, under no circumstances, allow soldiers to proceed
5 on that footing?
6 A. I was not aware of such a private meeting between
7 Mr Heath and Lord Carver. I think that Lord Carver
8 takes this all, in these things that you have quoted,
9 rather bigger than it warranted and I think that
10 Mr Dillon takes it rather bigger than was appropriate
11 when he talks about "a radical and dangerous plan."
12 The Lord Chancellor clearly did say something of
13 this kind. I do not think anybody was disposed to
14 follow that up, and of course the Lord Chancellor is not
15 the Cabinet's legal advisor -- the Government's legal
16 advisor and no Government, I imagine, would act on
17 a mere relatively casual expression of opinion by the
18 Lord Chancellor on a matter of law; they would take the
19 advice of the Attorney General.
20 Q. Sir Edward's evidence to this Tribunal was that he and
21 his colleagues said "well, that was only Quinton" and
22 moved on. In the light of what you have just been
23 saying --
24 A. I could not possibly say a comment like that.
25 Q. I am simply telling you what Sir Edward, who enjoys
1 a greater latitude, said.
2 Could we have on the screen KH4.28. In the light of
3 what you have just said, I think I ought to draw your
4 attention to a subsequent letter from Lord Carver in
5 1999 in which he says, referring to this incident, that
6 it happened, so far as he could recall, at a meeting of
7 GEN 47 -- he may well be wrong on that -- some time in
8 the summer of 1971. At a later stage in the letter he
9 says:
10 "Lord Hailsham, who was then Attorney General, said
11 that, under some", and then he sets out what
12 Lord Hailsham said and adds the observation:
13 "He did not appear to be joking, but I certainly did
14 not take him seriously, nor, I suspect, did anyone
15 else."
16 A. Nor was he Attorney General.
17 Q. Quite. Were you aware of it ever being the current
18 understanding, or an understanding conveyed to the Army
19 that they could proceed upon the basis that anyone who
20 obstructed them in Northern Ireland was in effect an
21 enemy of the Queen, and could shoot them on that
22 account?
23 A. I was not aware of any such instruction being given to
24 the Army, and should have been greatly surprised if it
25 had been.
1 MR CLARKE: Thank you, those are my questions.
2 Questioned by MR LAVERY
3 MR LAVERY: My name is Lavery, Lord Armstrong, and I appear
4 for some of the families of the persons, individuals who
5 were killed on Bloody Sunday and some of the injured.
6 I appear in particular for the families of Hugh Gilmore
7 and Kevin McElhinney, who died on that date.
8 Could I ask you, Lord Armstrong, to turn to your
9 statement at KA5.2, paragraph 4. At the last line of
10 that statement you use the term "political situation in
11 Northern Ireland". I take it you are referring to the
12 entire situation in Northern Ireland because politics
13 and security were inextricably mixed up; is that right?
14 A. That is quite right.
15 Q. Could I ask you to look, then, at document KH4.85. This
16 is the second statement of Sir Edward Heath. In
17 sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 1 he confirms really what
18 you have said:
19 "Ministers in my Government had full responsibility
20 for the running of their own policy areas and I would
21 generally only become involved if they wished to refer
22 important matters to me. My principal preoccupation in
23 January 1972 was the UK's entry into the European
24 Economic Community."
25 Can you give an example of any important matters
1 relating to Northern Ireland that might have been
2 referred to the Prime Minister?
3 A. There were many matters during this period. There were
4 regular meetings of GEN 47 and other committees. There
5 were regular reports to the Cabinet about the situation
6 in Northern Ireland and the Prime Minister was very
7 regularly involved in discussions about both the
8 political situation and the security situation in
9 Northern Ireland, particularly, of course, on the
10 political developments which he as a politician was
11 especially concerned with; he was concerned with the
12 security situation because of the effect on people's
13 lives in Northern Ireland and because the security
14 situation had a bearing on what happened in the
15 political situation.
16 Q. If you would be good enough to look at sub-paragraph (3)
17 where he says:
18 "GEN 47 was a Cabinet Committee, chaired by me, and
19 usually attended by four or five other Ministers. It
20 was a forum for keeping Ministers updated on
21 Northern Ireland policy developments and for collective
22 discussion and decision as required. GEN 47 meetings
23 were generally short and discussions brief."
24 What I want to ask you is: did the Prime Minister
25 more or less simply rubber-stamp the decisions that had
1 been brought to him, or did he take an active part in
2 the formation of these decisions?
3 A. These meetings of GEN 47 were really to enable the
4 Ministers at it, including the Prime Minister, to
5 receive the latest briefing on the state of the security
6 situation and on the latest position in relation to any
7 political developments, and that was the purpose of the
8 meetings and they went on for as long as was necessary
9 to achieve that purpose.
10 Q. It is obvious, I think, from what you have said and from
11 what Sir Edward said, that he had a great deal on his
12 mind with other matters. I notice in paragraph 4
13 Northern Ireland comes at the end of the list. Would he
14 have had much time really to become involved in
15 a hands-on way in Northern Ireland?
16 A. Oh, certainly he would. Any Prime Minister, including
17 Mr Heath, has to be able to turn his attention to
18 different matters at great speed, and during this period
19 the situation in Northern Ireland and the possibilities
20 of political development in Northern Ireland were
21 constantly under review and in his mind.
22 Q. Ultimately, of course, he is responsible as
23 Prime Minister for what happens there; is that right?
24 A. At this time there was a Government in Stormont which
25 had responsibility for many matters rather than the
1 United Kingdom Government.
2 Q. How did that affect Sir Edward's attitude, then?
3 A. Because the Army was acting in support of the civil
4 power in Northern Ireland, and of course the British
5 Government was responsible for the British Army.
6 Q. But you seem to suggest in your answer to me that the
7 Prime Minister, Sir Edward Heath, was not fully
8 responsible for what happened in Northern Ireland; is
9 that right?
10 A. Well, it was a divided responsibility, was it not?
11 Q. Was the ultimate responsibility, though, not his?
12 A. There was a responsibility in Stormont with the
13 Northern Ireland Government for many matters.
14 Q. Security could not have functioned in Northern Ireland
15 without the Army, could it?
16 A. So he had the -- the British Government had a strong
17 interest in that.
18 Q. There was more than that, I suggest: if they controlled
19 the Army and if the Army controlled security, surely
20 they were in control of security, were they not?
21 A. The responsibility for security lay formally with the
22 Northern Ireland Government.
23 Q. Formally is the word, but in practical terms it lay with
24 the British Government and with the British Army; is
25 that not right?
1 A. Because the British Government was responsible for the
2 Army, which was engaged in these operations, it clearly
3 had a role to perform, but it was not an ultimate role.
4 Q. Ultimately they had the power to say what the
5 British Army would or would not do; did they not?
6 A. The Army had the responsibility for saying what they
7 would or would not do.
8 Q. Are you suggesting, then, that the Army was some sort of
9 autonomous body and that it could make up its own mind
10 what it could do without referring to the British
11 Prime Minister?
12 A. It acted within the policy instructions which had been
13 given to it.
14 Q. You seem reluctant to suggest that -- you seem anxious
15 to qualify in some way Sir Edward's, or the British
16 Prime Minister's and the British Government's
17 responsibility for the actions of the Army in
18 Northern Ireland. Could you specify that qualification
19 in a little more detail, please; like give an example?
20 A. I do not think I could off-hand, Mr Lavery, I think that
21 I have sought to explain that security was within the
22 formal responsibility of the Northern Ireland Government
23 in Stormont.
24 Q. Security was inextricably mixed up with politics and the
25 Army was at all times subject to politicians; is that
1 not right? Is that right, Lord Armstrong?
2 A. The Army acts within the policy instructions which it is
3 given.
4 Q. And you must have been aware at the time that a large
5 number of military decisions were informed by political
6 considerations. I can take you to chapter and verse of
7 that in a moment, if you want. Is that not a fact, that
8 military --
9 A. Clearly the way in which the Army conducted its
10 operations was governed by the instructions which
11 Ministers in Stormont gave it.
12 Q. And indeed a very good example of that is the military
13 attitude to Derry, to the situation in Derry; is that
14 not right?
15 A. I am not sure that that question is sufficiently
16 specific for me to be able to answer, Mr Lavery.
17 Q. I will come back to that in a moment. Could I ask you
18 to turn to page KA5.4 of your statement, paragraph 9.
19 You are commenting on the letter 30th September. My
20 learned friend Mr Clarke has already asked you about
21 this. What I would like to ask you, Lord Armstrong, is
22 what was meant by "inconveniences"?
23 A. I cannot answer for the state of mind -- my state of
24 mind at the time, I have forgotten, but I would assume
25 that referred to such things as barriers across streets;
1 inconveniences which would be caused if barriers were
2 put across streets and other interventions in the normal
3 life; troops stationed across streets; anything which
4 made it difficult for the public in Northern Ireland to
5 go about its normal occasions.
6 Q. But these were, were they not, in place all over
7 Northern Ireland at that time?
8 A. I cannot answer for what was happening in the whole of
9 the Northern Ireland at that time, I am afraid.
10 Q. Can you really make a judgment between stopping people
11 killing other people and not doing that simply because
12 they had found it inconvenient to be held up at a road
13 block; is that what you are saying?
14 A. I do not think killing people is inconvenience.
15 Q. Is it not just a euphemism for military measures which
16 would lead to deaths?
17 A. It is not that.
18 Q. Let me ask you another question, then: were you aware
19 that military activities were restricted in order not to
20 upset the Catholics and the Irish Government?
21 A. Are you speaking of any particular occasion or --
22 Q. Yes, I can go to the military assessments about Derry in
23 fact. Perhaps we could have G41.263 on the screen. The
24 Tribunal, Lord Armstrong, has a wealth of evidence about
25 this. I do not want to take up a great deal of time.
1 If I read this passage to you, it might give you
2 a flavour of what would happen.
3 LORD SAVILLE: Can you remind us all what this is,
4 Mr Lavery?
5 MR LAVERY: This is an appreciation of the situation by the
6 Commander of Land Forces, General Ford, on
7 14th December 1971. I am not clear what the circulation
8 was just at the moment, but it is described as "Future
9 military policy for Londonderry." I am told
10 General Ford in his evidence said "this went to the
11 top", whatever that meant.
12 It is an assessment by General Ford, who was the
13 Commander of Land Forces. If you look at (b), they are
14 describing beforehand military action that was
15 a possibility:
16 "The military action would be represented by
17 Republican propaganda organisation ... Catholic
18 population (it will be up to us to show by our actions
19 that this is not so). It will have a marked effect on
20 Catholic opinion" --
21 LORD SAVILLE: I am sorry to interrupt, Mr Lavery; where are
22 you reading from?
23 MR LAVERY: G41, page 27, paragraph (b), it is the first
24 paragraph beginning (b):
25 "The military action would be represented by the..."
1 G41.270, I beg your pardon.
2 MR TOOHEY: Mr Lavery, could I ask you how much of this you
3 are going to read? We have had the document before. Is
4 it satisfactory for Lord Armstrong to read whatever part
5 of it you propose to put to him and then you direct
6 questions to him?
7 MR LAVERY: The only reason I refer to the document at all
8 was because Lord Armstrong asked me to be more specific.
9 Our contention or submission is that the Tribunal has
10 abundant evidence which shows that a lot of military
11 action was not engaged upon because the Catholics would
12 find it unpalatable, there would be political
13 consequences to pay for it; and if Lord Armstrong is
14 content to accept that that was a factor in determining
15 military policy in the Bogside in particular, I would be
16 content with that.
17 MR TOOHEY: That was not the point of my question. I am
18 just concerned that not too much time be taken up by
19 reading lengthy passages, if in fact they focus in your
20 questioning on particular sentences and so on, and maybe
21 it is more satisfactory to give Lord Armstrong an
22 opportunity to read the paragraph and then for you to
23 ask him about passages.
24 MR LAVERY: Yes, indeed.
25 Perhaps, then, Lord Armstrong, if you would be good
1 enough to read paragraph (b). (Pause).
2 A. Thank you, I have read that.
3 Q. Perhaps it might be convenient, although I am not going
4 to ask you immediately about this, if you read paragraph
5 (c) as well. We will come back to that later on in
6 another context, to save putting the document up again.
7 That suggests certainly that one of the factors in
8 considering military action was Catholic reaction; is
9 that right?
10 A. I find it difficult to comment on a document which
11 I have never seen before and -- all that I feel I can
12 say on this matter is that, in relation to the events of
13 30th January 1972, certainly adverse reaction by
14 Catholics was no doubt one of the reasons why the
15 decision was taken to contain the march outside the
16 Bogside and the Creggan and not going into those areas.
17 Q. So you do accept that, on at least one occasion, adverse
18 Catholic reaction was a factor in determining what
19 military action should be taken; is that right?
20 A. Adverse reaction, certainly by Catholic communities, but
21 not perhaps only by them.
22 Q. Lord Armstrong, you have had an opportunity to read
23 these papers and read a considerable number of them,
24 I am sure. You must have some recollection of what was
25 happening in 1971/1972 in Northern Ireland; is that not
1 right?
2 A. Yes, it is right that I have some recollection, though
3 it is a very long time ago now and I have been doing
4 a good deal since that time.
5 Q. I am sure that is right. You must have been aware, for
6 example, that there were no-go areas in Derry; you can
7 remember those, can you not?
8 A. I can remember the Bogside and the Creggan, the Army did
9 not go into them; the police certainly did not go into
10 them and the Army only went into them for particular,
11 particular reasons.
12 Q. Did you know the reason why the Army did not go into
13 those areas at that time?
14 A. I do not think I can answer that question fully, but
15 certainly one of the reasons was, it was based on the
16 desire to defuse the situation, if that is the right
17 phrase to use, sufficiently to make possible some
18 political initiative and that clearly involved trying
19 not to take actions which would needlessly -- cause
20 a needlessly adverse reaction among the Catholic
21 communities.
22 Q. I think we are getting there slowly, Lord Armstrong.
23 What you have just said really confirms the proposition
24 that I was putting to you, that an important factor in
25 military actions was a desire or an anxiety not to upset
1 the Catholics too much; is that not right?
2 A. I cannot answer for what the military thought, but
3 certainly at the political level at which I was
4 concerned, which I was concerned in No. 10
5 Downing Street, it was certainly a desire to try not to
6 aggravate Catholic opinion.
7 Q. It was therefore political considerations primarily --
8 although military considerations entered into it as
9 well -- political considerations that were preventing
10 the British Army just walking straight into the Bogside
11 in January 1972 and taking on all comers; is that not
12 right?
13 A. January 1972.
14 Q. January 1972?
15 A. Well, the political considerations were certainly part
16 of it. What military considerations there may have
17 been, I really cannot say.
18 Q. All I am trying to establish through you,
19 Lord Armstrong: that there were clearly political
20 consideration involved in military decisions? I think,
21 without going over the whole ground again, you have
22 accepted that; have you?
23 A. I do not think one would contest that, put in that way.
24 Q. Political decisions of course are supposed to be taken
25 by politicians?
1 A. Indeed.
2 Q. This again comes back to the question that I asked you
3 earlier on about who had control in Northern Ireland,
4 does it not?
5 A. There are two sets of politicians involved, as we said
6 earlier, are there not?
7 Q. I will not go over that matter again.
8 Since we are on the question of the Bogside, I think
9 you have accepted that you knew that there were no-go
10 areas and that the no-go areas meant that the British
11 military actions in the Bogside were to be limited for
12 the time being; would you accept that?
13 A. I think that I would accept, from recollection, that the
14 Bogside and the Creggan were no-go areas for the RUC and
15 that the Army only went in for special reasons on
16 particular occasions.
17 Q. The military problem about going into the Bogside --
18 were you aware of this -- the military problem was that
19 when you went into the Bogside, you had confrontations
20 with rioters and once you had confrontations with
21 rioters, the IRA came out and shooting started?
22 A. I suppose so, though eventually, was it in June 1972,
23 there was Operation Motorman.
24 Q. Because the received wisdom -- again the Tribunal will
25 be familiar with that -- was that one does not go into
1 the Bogside until one is in the position to dominate it
2 because forays or incursions into the Bogside merely
3 lead to trouble and, at most, short-term gains; is that
4 not the reason why no major operation was taken against
5 the Bogside until Operation Motorman?
6 A. I think the reasons were more complex than that, though
7 there was certainly a political element in it. The
8 other element in it, of course, was the availability --
9 the capacity of the forces in Northern Ireland to take
10 on too many responsibilities at once and during the
11 period which we are discussing, it was Belfast and the
12 border areas which had priority.
13 Q. Yes. Let me ask you to turn to KA5.5, it is your
14 statement, paragraph 13. You say there:
15 "I had believed, after the discussion at the meeting
16 of GEN 47 on 27th January 1972, that, although the NICRA
17 march was expected to be difficult, the Security Forces
18 would be able to control it by means of standard crowd
19 control measures (e.g. water cannon). The news of what
20 had occurred therefore came as a shock."
21 That would appear to mean that it did not enter your
22 mind that there might be gunfire on this occasion; is
23 that right?
24 A. It did not, no.
25 Q. And nobody told you that?
1 A. Nobody told me that.
2 Q. Or told the Prime Minister that? It was not said at the
3 GEN 47 meeting that this could end up in a gun battle?
4 A. There was nothing said at the GEN 47 meeting, so far as
5 I recollect, that would have led Ministers present at it
6 to think that there was going to be any use of lethal
7 force on that occasion.
8 Q. Let me refer you to the JSC meeting which took place on
9 the same date. It is G47.465. I do not need to remind
10 you of what the JSC meeting was, do I; it was the Joint
11 Security meeting that took place in Northern Ireland and
12 this was a meeting that took place on 27th January. It
13 included normally, although not on this occasion, the
14 Prime Minister for Northern Ireland, representatives of
15 the Army and the British Government representative,
16 a Mr Smith at that time. It is G76.465, if that could
17 be put up, please.
18 Do you remember that committee, Lord Armstrong?
19 A. No, I do not remember that committee, it was -- met in
20 Belfast and I never, I had never had any sight or
21 knowledge of its proceedings.
22 LORD SAVILLE: Lord Armstrong, it is the Chairman. Would
23 you like a couple of minutes' break?
24 A. I think my voice will clear pretty quickly, thank you
25 very much.
1 LORD SAVILLE: Do ask.
2 A. No, carry on.
3 MR LAVERY: Are you saying that the reports of this body
4 never came as far as you or the Prime Minister?
5 A. I never saw them and I do not think the Prime Minister
6 ever did, the British Prime Minister.
7 Q. Did it not occur to you then and does it not occur to
8 you now that this would be a very relevant consideration
9 for the British Prime Minister in the days leading up to
10 this march?
11 A. I can only say that as far as I know he did not see the
12 notes of the JSC meeting on 27th January, and nor did I.
13 Q. To whom did the British Government representative report
14 then?
15 A. I suppose to the Home Office, but I do not know.
16 I think to the Home Office.
17 Q. If what you are saying is correct, the Home Office kept
18 this to themselves, did not tell either you or the
19 Prime Minister about it; is that right?
20 A. I can only say that I did not see this and I do not
21 think the Prime Minister saw it. I do not know who else
22 may have seen it.
23 Q. Let me refer you to one well-known sentence in this.
24 Paragraph 4, "Forthcoming events", if that could be
25 highlighted. About five lines down:
1 "The basic plan here --"
2 Maybe I should read earlier on:
3 "The Londonderry marches presented more serious
4 difficulties and security action will be primarily an
5 Army operation. It is planned to stifle the Shantallow
6 march at source but it would be pointless to attempt the
7 same tactics in the Creggan area. The basic plan here
8 will be to block all routes into William Street and stop
9 the march there. The operation might well develop into
10 rioting and even a shooting war."
11 A. I see those sentences; are you asking me a question,
12 Mr Lavery?
13 Q. Yes, what you are saying is no hint or indication of
14 that was given to you or the Prime Minister, or indeed
15 the Cabinet at the GEN 47 meeting; is that right?
16 A. There was no suggestion at the GEN 47 meeting that I can
17 remember that it would be other than a comparatively
18 peaceful occasion, though clearly there had been other
19 marches where there had been more violent developments
20 on the fringes.
21 Q. By implication, what you are saying is that nobody was
22 preparing anybody for the possibility of a shooting war;
23 is that not right?
24 A. On this occasion nobody was alerting GEN 47 to that
25 possibility.
1 Q. If that was the view of the Army, that there might well
2 be a shooting war, would you have expected them to have
3 communicated that to the Prime Minister?
4 A. I can only rest on what the Chief of the General Staff
5 said on 27th January as recorded in the minutes of the
6 GEN 47 meeting.
7 Q. That is not my question, Lord Armstrong. I am saying
8 that if it was the view of the military that there might
9 be a shooting war, would you have expected them to have
10 communicated this to the British Prime Minister and
11 Cabinet?
12 A. I cannot really say what I would have expected. I can
13 only really comment on what was actually said at the
14 time, so far as I recollect it.
15 Q. Can you not assist the Tribunal with your opinion, at
16 least, as to the type of material or the type of
17 information that ought to be furnished to the British
18 Prime Minister?
19 A. I think that was up to the Chief of the General Staff to
20 decide what the Prime Minister needed to be told about
21 operations of this kind.
22 Q. So you think he may well have felt that there was going
23 to be a shooting war, a shooting war in which there
24 might well be innocent casualties, and your opinion is
25 that it is quite proper for him not to alert the British
1 Prime Minister as to this possibility?
2 A. I cannot tell you what Lord Carver, or Sir Michael
3 Carver as he then was, was thinking about this at the
4 time.
5 Q. If you would be good enough to assume for the moment
6 that the military thinking was that there was going to
7 be rioting. Again I can give you chapter and verse for
8 that if necessary, but if you will be good enough to
9 take it from me, it was put no later than yesterday by
10 the Army that hooligans were expected and that the IRA
11 practice was, when hooligans appeared, they appeared and
12 engaged in shooting.
13 Translating this into the circumstances on
14 Bloody Sunday, what this meant is that the Army
15 anticipated that hooligans would take advantage of the
16 march, that the IRA would take advantage of the
17 hooligans, and that there would be possibly a shooting
18 war, but this shooting war was going to take place in
19 the vicinity of large numbers of peaceful marchers.
20 Are you giving this as your opinion to the
21 Prime Minister that this was something that you would
22 not really have expected Lord Carver to have told him
23 about?
24 A. I cannot answer for what the Army thought, I can only
25 really answer --
1 Q. Please forgive me, Lord Armstrong, I am not asking you
2 at the present time about what the Army thought or did
3 not think. I am putting to you as a proposition,
4 rightly or wrongly, what they thought. I am simply
5 asking for your view, with your knowledge and experience
6 in politics and what is important and what is not
7 important, for your view as to whether or not you would
8 have expected the Army to have told the Prime Minister
9 to have painted this rather foreboding scenario; or do
10 you think it was acceptable for them to leave him in
11 such a state that he could go off in quite a relaxed way
12 for lunch or dinner or whatever; what is your answer to
13 that?
14 A. I am afraid I come back to say what I said
15 before: I cannot say what the Army thought. This JSC
16 minute, which I have seen for the first time now, says
17 that the operation might well develop into rioting. It
18 does not say it was going to or it was expected to; it
19 was a possibility. It was not a possibility which
20 Sir Michael Carver mentioned at the GEN 47.
21 Q. Lord Armstrong, I have already tried unsuccessfully on
22 a number of occasions to get you to answer my question,
23 I am not going to weary the Tribunal with repeating it
24 ad nauseam, but I suggest that inferences, because of
25 your failure to answer the question, might be drawn; do
1 you realise that?
2 A. I think it will have to be for the Tribunal to decide
3 what inferences to draw from what I have said.
4 Q. You are content to leave it in that way: that you are
5 not prepared to express an opinion as to the propriety
6 or otherwise of the Army keeping this ugly scenario to
7 themselves; that is the end position, is it?
8 A. I do not know what Sir Michael Carver's view or
9 knowledge was about what you call that ugly scenario,
10 I can only really say that was not what emerged at
11 GEN 47.
12 Q. I do not want to keep on at this, I have said to you
13 repeatedly that was not the question I was asking,
14 however I will go on to something else.
15 You yourself said, in answering the question earlier
16 on today from Mr Clarke -- it is page 14 of the
17 transcript, line 6. That is not the passage that
18 I intended to refer to; it was where you were asked by
19 Mr Clarke what you thought at the GEN 47 meeting and you
20 said, if my memory serves me, "we knew there had been
21 confrontations in the past"; do you remember that
22 question and that answer?
23 A. I remember that such a question was asked. I cannot
24 remember exactly what I said.
25 Q. What I wanted to ask you: you referred to confrontations
1 in your answer to Mr Clarke?
2 A. I think I said that there had been -- before this
3 occasion, there had been marches at which confrontations
4 occurred.
5 LORD SAVILLE: I think you want page 8, line 18 or
6 thereabouts.
7 MR LAVERY: I am very much obliged to you, sir.
8 LORD SAVILLE: Is that the passage you had in mind.
9 MR LAVERY: "... there had been confrontations at other
10 marches and it was not excluded that there would be such
11 confrontations at this."
12 Yes, that is the passage. What I want to ask you
13 about is what your understanding of the confrontations
14 that took place were? The previous confrontations you
15 are talking about.
16 Let me put it to you specifically: were these
17 confrontations between rioters and hooligans where the
18 IRA intervened?
19 A. I was thinking more of confrontations at the point where
20 a march was stopped between the Security Forces and the
21 people on the march.
22 Q. You were not thinking of gun confrontations in the past
23 that had led to gun battles?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Let me refer now to the meeting with Mr Faulkner. You
1 have already given your account. That took place on the
2 same day, is that right, on the 27th?
3 A. It took place on the evening of the same day.
4 Q. At that time everybody knew the march was going to take
5 place on the 30th; is that not so?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. At that time also the Prime Minister had been warned --
8 perhaps that is too strong an expression -- had been
9 told about a problem which had arisen with the
10 paratroopers at Magilligan. Do you remember the
11 incident at Magilligan?
12 A. I cannot say I remember it, as it were, at the time, no.
13 Q. Could I refer you to G75CA.462.5.4. This is
14 a memorandum dated 26th January 1972 and it is from
15 Sir Burke Trend. It was for the attention of the
16 Prime Minister. This was the briefing paper for the
17 GEN 47 meeting. I take it you cannot remember seeing
18 this?
19 A. I would have seen the brief at the time, though I do
20 not, as it were, have a live memory of that.
21 Q. What he was saying there was:
22 "You may wish to question the Secretary of State for
23 Defence about recent discussions in the press and on
24 television that the Army overreacted against some of the
25 civil rights demonstrations last weekend and that, in
1 particular, soldiers of the Parachute Regiment, by being
2 unnecessarily rough, have gratuitously provoked
3 resentment among peaceful elements of the Roman Catholic
4 population.
5 "Overshadowing this question, however, is the graver
6 issue of the attitude to be adopted by the Security
7 Forces if the renewed ban on marches is openly defied.
8 Are we able -- and prepared -- to deal with that
9 situation? Perhaps the question should be explored
10 urgently with Mr Faulkner during his visit to London."
11 Were you aware of the importance of demonstrating to
12 Protestants in particular that the ban ought to be
13 enforced?
14 A. I am aware that the ban was general, applying to
15 Protestant or Loyalist demonstrations as well as to
16 nationalist demonstrations, and that Mr Faulkner in
17 particular attached great importance to it being
18 general.
19 Q. Were you aware that Mr Faulkner was being criticised by
20 Protestant groups because of what they saw as the
21 failure to enforce the ban against Catholic marchers, if
22 I might call them that; were you aware of that problem?
23 A. I cannot remember being specifically aware of it, no.
24 Q. You must have been aware that Mr Faulkner's Government
25 was under pressure at that time?
1 A. That is a very general question, Mr Lavery: yes, of
2 course I was aware of that.
3 Q. I was giving you an example of one of the pressure
4 points that was being put upon him, pressure by
5 Protestants who felt the ban was not being enforced
6 properly; were you aware of that?
7 A. I cannot say that I was at the time, no.
8 Q. If you had read that document and if the matter had been
9 explored with Mr Faulkner, you would have become aware
10 of it; would you not?
11 A. Well, I was aware of what Mr Faulkner said at the
12 meeting he had with the Prime Minister.
13 Q. Did he emphasise the importance of showing a firm
14 attitude at this march?
15 A. He emphasised the importance of the ban on marches being
16 general, applying both sides, to both the Protestants --
17 Q. Did he emphasise, because of the state of Protestant
18 opinion and their dissatisfaction with the way the ban
19 had been enforced up until then, that he would expect to
20 see a robust enforcement of the ban at this meeting; did
21 he say that?
22 A. I do not remember anything beyond what I recorded in the
23 note, Mr Lavery.
24 Q. Can you say, then, whether the British Government
25 regarded it as important to demonstrate to the
1 Protestants that the ban was being enforced?
2 A. I am sure the British Government did regard it as
3 important that the ban should be impartially enforced,
4 to the greatest possible extent.
5 Q. The result of an apparent failure to enforce the ban
6 might have ongoing consequences for law and order
7 generally and for Mr Faulkner in particular; is that not
8 right; is that not obvious?
9 A. I think that is clear.
10 Q. And was the British Government then determined to pull
11 up its socks, so to speak, and say "this time we are not
12 going to let them away with it"?
13 A. I think what the British Government said or thought is
14 sufficiently recorded in the GEN 47 minute to which we
15 have referred, that this march was going to be contained
16 just outside the Bogside and Creggan areas; it was not
17 going to be prevented from assembling inside those
18 areas.
19 Q. This is the GEN 47 minute, G79.487.003. About six lines
20 down:
21 "The 'Official' wing of the IRA were no doubt
22 seeking through NICRA to exploit the difficulties" --
23 A. I am sorry, I do not have this on the screen.
24 Q. I beg your pardon.
25 LORD SAVILLE: What GEN 47 meeting are we looking at?
1 MR LAVERY: 27th January 1972.
2 A. I think you need page 2 of those minutes and you have
3 page 4 up there now. That is page 3.
4 MR LAVERY: G79.487:
5 "The 'Official' wing of the IRA were no doubt
6 seeking through NICRA to exploit the difficulties
7 confronting the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland,
8 Mr Faulkner, following the Northern Ireland Government's
9 decision to extend the ban on marches. The
10 United Kingdom Government must support the
11 Northern Ireland Government's decision with the
12 necessary deployment of Security Forces. The meeting
13 agreed that in Londonderry the marchers must be
14 prevented from coming out of the Bogside and Creggan
15 areas; and criticism of the Security Forces for not
16 entering those areas must be countered by pointing out
17 that it was a matter of military judgment to choose the
18 best place for achieving the aim of preventing the march
19 from reaching its destination. Maximum publicity should
20 also be ensured for arrests and court proceedings
21 following the marches."
22 The issue, Lord Armstrong, that that was directed to
23 was to satisfying Protestant opinion that the ban was
24 properly enforced; is that not right?
25 A. I think it was designed to ensure that the march, the
1 march in question, was contained on the edges of the
2 Bogside and Creggan areas, and that the reason for
3 containing it in that way and not in another way was
4 that was the best -- that was the military judgment that
5 that was the best place for achieving the aim of
6 preventing the march from reaching its destination.
7 Q. Where was the criticism of the Security Forces going to
8 come from?
9 A. It would presumably come from Unionist opinion in
10 Northern Ireland, possibly more widely, but that is the
11 first consideration.
12 Q. That is the point I am making: that one of the very
13 important factors in this march was to ensure that it
14 was dealt with sufficiently robustly so as to pacify
15 Protestant opinion, is that not right, who were
16 concerned about the way the ban was being flouted; is
17 that not obvious?
18 A. That way well have been one of the considerations, yes.
19 Q. The importance of that was that if the civil rights
20 marchers were seen to get away with it, so to speak,
21 this was going to weaken Mr Faulkner's position to the
22 point that his Government might collapse; is that not
23 right?
24 A. That takes -- that goes to a very general area. I do
25 not know Mr Faulkner was thinking his Government would
1 collapse. He was clearly thinking that the ban must be
2 seen to be enforced without discrimination to the best
3 possible extent.
4 Q. Lord Armstrong, was it not a constant theme of
5 Mr Faulkner's discussions with the Government: "I am
6 under pressure from Loyalists who do not like what is
7 happening here, unless you do something it will be
8 impossible" -- that is why you got internment, for
9 example -- "unless you do something my Government will
10 collapse, and if it collapses you will have direct
11 rule", and the British Government did not want that; is
12 that not a fair summary of it?
13 A. I think this takes us back to the decision to introduce
14 internment and I think that, yes, I agree that the
15 British Government was reluctant to agree to that
16 decision; it was a decision recommended by Mr Faulkner.
17 Q. I am not going to take up a great deal more time on
18 this, I am just trying to see to what extent you accept
19 there were considerable pressures on the British
20 Government at that time to take, to use a neutral
21 expression, robust steps to enforce the ban; is that not
22 right?
23 A. It was the British Government who, in the first
24 instance, had stipulated for the ban as a condition of
25 agreeing to internment and they were well content when
1 Mr Faulkner decided to extend the ban.
2 Q. Did you or the Prime Minister know -- we understand that
3 the Prime Minister did not in fact raise the question of
4 the use of the Paras at Magilligan with the Secretary of
5 State for Defence. Do you know what, if any, action he
6 took about that, about the Paras?
7 A. I only know that he did not raise that at the meeting of
8 GEN 47 or, as far as I know, subsequently.
9 Q. Was he aware, was the Prime Minister aware, then, he
10 must have been aware that there had been problems with
11 the Paras at Magilligan?
12 A. Well, if he read Sir Burke Trend's brief, he would have
13 been aware.
14 Q. Was he aware or were you aware that the Paras were going
15 to be used in Derry?
16 A. I was not aware of it and I do not think Mr Heath was.
17 Q. Would it have made any difference to you if you had been
18 aware that the Paras were intended to be used?
19 A. I really cannot answer that. The decisions on which
20 units to deploy on any particular occasion was
21 a decision for the Army commanders to take, not to be
22 taken in London.
23 Q. It is particularly difficult in the Northern Ireland
24 context to draw a line between operational matters and
25 political matters; is it not?
1 A. I think I can only say, Mr Lavery, that decisions about
2 which units to deploy on a particular occasion were for
3 the Army to take on each occasion and those were not
4 decisions which the Prime Minister thought that he had
5 reason to be concerned with.
6 Q. On the question of the use of the Paras, could I refer
7 you to the statement of Mr Jeffrey Johnson-Smith and see
8 if this helps you. It is KJ3.2, paragraph 11:
9 "I was not in Ulster when ..."
10 You remember Jeffrey Johnson-Smith, I am sure?
11 A. I do. I have not seen this statement before.
12 Q. He was the Under-Secretary of State for Defence:
13 "I was not in Ulster when Bloody Sunday occurred and
14 I was shocked to be told as to what had happened.
15 I think I would have been aware of the decision to use
16 the Parachute Regiment to assist in handling the civil
17 rights march as this was, at the time, 'au courant'. It
18 would not be for politicians to tell the senior
19 commanding officers of the Army as to which troops to
20 deploy, and how; we would be expected to respect the
21 commanding officer's decisions on such matters. However
22 politicians would have the right to be told by the Army
23 how they were going to carry out operations and how the
24 Army personnel interpreted strategic guidance given by
25 politicians. I have no doubt that both Harry Tuzo and
1 General Kitson fully understood and recognised that they
2 were not working in a battlefield and were supporting
3 the civilian powers."
4 You are saying, as far as you are concerned, that
5 does not trigger any memory, does it?
6 A. None at all. Sir Jeffrey Johnson-Smith may well have
7 been aware of the decision to use the Parachute
8 Regiment, I do not know whether he was.
9 Q. But if he was, would you have --
10 A. But I was not aware of it for this occasion on
11 30th January and I do not think the Prime Minister was
12 aware of it.
13 Q. Would you have expected him to have told you if he had
14 been?
15 A. I would not have expected the Chief of the General Staff
16 to tell us which units he proposed to deploy on
17 a particular occasion.
18 Q. Let me turn again briefly to your reaction after you
19 heard of the events. I think you have accepted that,
20 whatever you were expecting on that Sunday, you were not
21 expecting a gun battle in which 13 people were going to
22 be left dead; is that not right?
23 A. I was not expecting that.
24 Q. Did you or did the Prime Minister call in General Carver
25 or somebody and say "look, why did you not tell us this
1 was going to happen" or "did you know this was going to
2 happen"?
3 A. I think the Prime Minister was much more concerned with
4 following up with the Taoiseach, he had a telephone
5 conversation, and in deciding on the Monday what action
6 should be taken following what did happen.
7 Q. If the Army had forebodings about a gun battle and
8 innocent casualties and had not told the Prime Minister
9 about this, surely he would have been entitled to
10 reproach them for not having done so, would he not?
11 A. I do not think that he questioned that
12 Sir Michael Carver had given his information about the
13 security situation to GEN 47 in good faith.
14 Q. Would it not have been a very obvious thing, at the very
15 least, to say to General Carver "you did not tell us
16 a word about this at the GEN 47 meeting; did you not
17 expect it"?
18 A. I do not think General Carver was asked that question
19 and I do not think -- from what he said at GEN 47, he
20 did not appear to be expecting it.
21 Q. Let me refer to KC8.3. This is a statement that was
22 taken from Lord Carver before he died, unfortunately.
23 If paragraph 18 could be put on the screen:
24 "The first I personally knew about what had happened
25 on 30th January was when I received a telephone call
1 from Major General Coaker ... I did not have
2 a television and therefore had not seen any news.
3 Major General Coaker told me that Peter Carrington was
4 with Heath and I telephoned Carrington to discuss the
5 situation with him. At that stage we had no way of
6 checking ... My first reaction was to heave a sigh of
7 relief that so few had been killed. I assumed that the
8 IRA had been present ..."
9 If we could look at the next page, page 4:
10 "... that there was an exchange of fire and that
11 civilians were killed. I accepted that the Army had
12 come under heavy fire. It was not until the
13 Widgery Inquiry report came out that I began to doubt
14 that the Army was under such heavy fire. I still have
15 no doubt at all that they did come under fire."
16 His reaction was not the same as yours. If the
17 statement is correct, he was relieved that there had
18 been so few casualties and you were shocked that there
19 were any casualties; can you explain the difference
20 between those two reactions?
21 A. I have seen references to what Lord Carver said in the
22 statement about being relieved and I really read that as
23 him saying, as one might say if there was an unexpected
24 earthquake and five people were killed, and you might
25 well say afterwards "I was greatly relieved that there
1 were not many more people killed"; it does not mean that
2 he foresaw the events which occurred.
3 Q. If he had known that there was a likelihood of a gun
4 battle, it would be difficult to say that he did not
5 foresee at least the possibility, is it not?
6 A. He did not appear to foresee the possibility at GEN 47
7 on the Thursday, 27th January.
8 Q. There are two possible explanations, Lord Armstrong: one
9 is that the reason that nobody jumped up and down and
10 said "why on earth did you not tell us about that" was
11 because Lord Carver did indeed, one way or the other,
12 whether formally or informally, did tell the Cabinet
13 there could well be trouble and the Cabinet was prepared
14 to go along with that. That is one possibility.
15 The other possibility is that, at that stage, they
16 were just simply interested in retrieving the situation
17 and that they did not care whether there were casualties
18 or not. Which is it?
19 A. It was certainly not the case that they did not care
20 where there had been casualties or not. The news that
21 there had been people killed was a great shock to
22 everybody, I think, in London and great regret was
23 expressed at the time about that in the House of Commons
24 and elsewhere.
25 The next stage for the Government was what action
1 should be taken following what had happened.
2 Q. One of the normal actions of a government would be that,
3 where crimes have been committed, that they would seek
4 out the criminals and try to bring them to justice; is
5 that right?
6 A. I suppose that was the purpose of setting up the
7 Widgery Inquiry, was it not?
8 Q. Even before the Widgery Inquiry was set up -- again
9 I can refer you to the documents if necessary -- it was
10 the general belief that soldiers were not going to be
11 prosecuted, whatever happened; and we know that in the
12 events that happened, not only were soldiers not
13 prosecuted, but it would appear no action was taken
14 against them at all. Are you aware of any action that
15 was taken against the soldiers?
16 A. I am not aware of it, no.
17 Q. You read the Widgery Report, I take it?
18 A. I did at the time, yes.
19 Q. And Lord Widgery was extremely critical of some
20 soldiers?
21 A. Yes, he was.
22 Q. Soldier H, for instance, his firing was described as
23 bordering on the reckless. Did you or the
24 Prime Minister ever ask yourselves afterwards "I wonder
25 what happened to H"?
1 A. I cannot say that I asked myself. I do not know whether
2 Mr Heath did.
3 Q. Even as a citizen, H was obviously the sort of man that
4 should not be let out on the streets with a gun. On
5 Lord Widgery's finding, he should have been, if not
6 court martialled, at least he should have been made to
7 drive an ambulance or something like that; is that not
8 right?
9 A. That is a matter for military discipline, is it not?
10 Q. Did it never occur to you, as the Prime Minister, to ask
11 any of the people what was happening to them?
12 A. I was not the Prime Minister, of course.
13 Q. Or advise the Prime Minister to do that?
14 A. No, it did not occur to me to do that.
15 Q. Again a possible inference from this lack of action on
16 the part of the Government afterwards was that, tacitly
17 or otherwise, they approved or condoned what happened on
18 Bloody Sunday and did not feel it necessary, therefore,
19 to take any action about it; do you see the point?
20 A. I see the point. But I do not think it would be correct
21 or fair to say that they condoned the action. The whole
22 point of the Widgery Inquiry was to try to get to the
23 bottom of what happened.
24 Q. How would you define "not condone"? Apparently the
25 suggestion is that they set about trying to mitigate,
1 defend the British Army as best they could; they did not
2 take any action against any of the soldiers; they did
3 not take any action against -- even Brigadier MacLellan
4 was criticised, albeit in a qualified way, by
5 Lord Widgery and not a single step was taken, either to
6 move these people sideways, to make sure they were not
7 in the Army, to make any changes whatever as a result of
8 this debacle?
9 A. I am afraid I do not know what action was taken by the
10 Army or what consideration was given by the Army to the
11 criticisms made in the Widgery Report.
12 Q. Would you not think that the Prime Minister, as head of
13 the Government and who had presided over a debacle --
14 I am sure you would agree it was a debacle, whatever it
15 was -- that he did not try to make somebody accountable
16 for it or resign himself if the responsibility stayed
17 with him?
18 A. I think that in setting up the Widgery Inquiry he was
19 doing his best to find out what happened and --
20 Q. But having found out what happened and having found out,
21 even taking Lord Widgery's report at its bare minimum,
22 it was severely critical of individual soldiers and it
23 was critical, but perhaps less so, of
24 Brigadier MacLellan for organising the arrest operation
25 and nobody, as far as you know, not only was nobody made
1 accountable, but it would appear that neither you nor
2 the Prime Minister -- I do not blame you -- it appears
3 anyway that the Prime Minister never took any steps
4 whatsoever to make somebody accountable for this
5 disaster?
6 A. I think that would have been a matter for military
7 discipline at the time.
8 Q. So the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was
9 discharging his political responsibilities, is he, if he
10 says "well, let the soldiers sort this out" and he does
11 not even ask them if they have done anything about it?
12 A. It would certainly be up, in the first instance, to the
13 Secretary of State for Defence to discuss that with the
14 Army authorities.
15 Q. Ultimately --
16 A. I do not know whether he did so.
17 Q. There is no evidence that anybody ever took any steps
18 after Widgery to bring anybody to account. Even as
19 early -- I do not think I need put this up unless you
20 want me to -- as 5th February, the document for the
21 Tribunal's reference is G117.774, said there was little
22 danger of a soldier being prosecuted anyway. Even at
23 that stage the risk of soldiers being prosecuted was,
24 for whatever reason, deemed to be slight?
25 A. I cannot comment on that without seeing the document,
1 obviously.
2 Q. Yes. Let me turn to the question of the
3 Prime Minister's interview with Lord Widgery. Would you
4 agree that the British Army had an interest in the
5 outcome of the Inquiry, and the interest was to try and
6 show that none of his soldiers had behaved improperly;
7 would you agree with that?
8 A. The interest in the Widgery Inquiry was to find out what
9 happened, whether somebody behaved improperly or not.
10 Q. That may have been one of the interests. I am trying to
11 explore what other interests were involved. Would you
12 not agree it was in the interests of the British Army to
13 clear its name, if they could?
14 A. No doubt.
15 Q. And that the interests of the British Army were the
16 interests of the British Government?
17 A. The British Government wanted to find out, wanted
18 Lord Widgery to find out what had happened. There was
19 no attempt to tell Lord Widgery how he was -- what he
20 was to do; what findings he was to make; what the
21 outcome of the Inquiry was to be.
22 Q. I will come to that in a moment, Lord Armstrong. The
23 fact of the matter is that the Prime Minister himself
24 said to Lord Widgery "you are fighting a war"; is that
25 not so?
1 A. He did not say that Lord Widgery was fighting a war.
2 Q. I am sorry if you have misunderstood me.
3 A. He said that it had to be remembered that we were in
4 Northern Ireland fighting not only a military war, but
5 a propaganda war; and that is something that I have
6 already discussed with Counsel for the Inquiry.
7 Q. If you will be patient with me, Lord Armstrong, there
8 are one or two questions I would like to ask on that.
9 You were engaged at that particular time in a war;
10 is that not right?
11 A. We were -- it was a war against terrorism in
12 Northern Ireland.
13 Q. However you describe it, your principal instrument in
14 fighting that war was the British Army; is that not
15 right?
16 A. The Security Forces in Northern Ireland, including the
17 British Army.
18 Q. Are you trying to downgrade the role of the British Army
19 in the security situation?
20 A. Not in the least, I am trying not to ignore the role of
21 the Royal Ulster Constabulary.
22 Q. According to -- and there is a plethora of documentation
23 for it -- the military perception at that particular
24 time, the RUC had more or less given up, they were just
25 on the sidelines, and that effectively security was
1 being controlled by the Army.
2 Do we really need to waste time on what I suggest,
3 Lord Armstrong, is hair-splitting: whatever role the
4 British Army had in Northern Ireland was an important
5 one?
6 A. I agree with that.
7 Q. And whatever role the British Army played in the fight
8 against terrorism, it was basically the only instrument
9 that the Government -- the only effective instrument
10 that the Government had was the British Army?
11 A. That was a very important component of the Security
12 Forces at that time.
13 Q. And obviously the well-being and the morale of the
14 British Army would be something that would be of great
15 concern for the British Government; is that not right?
16 A. Of course that would be right. It would also be of
17 great concern to the Government if members of the
18 British Army were shown to have behaved in a way that
19 they should not have behaved, illegally or in other
20 respects.
21 Q. Only if it got out, Lord Armstrong?
22 A. That was the purpose of the Widgery Inquiry, was it not?
23 Q. There are different views about that, Lord Armstrong,
24 and that is of limited relevance. The interests of the
25 British Army -- this is borne out by their policy with
1 regard to soldiers -- was to protect soldiers insofar as
2 they could from being made accountable for any excesses
3 they committed in Northern Ireland, for the very obvious
4 reason: that this would damage the morale of the British
5 Army in Northern Ireland if their soldiers were to be
6 held accountable every time they fired a shot; do you
7 understand the point?
8 A. I understand the point. Insofar as firing shots were
9 concerned, they were subject to the limitations and
10 restrictions in the Yellow Card and if anybody was in
11 breach of that, then they would have been disciplined.
12 Q. Do you accept if it could be shown that a British
13 soldier, on duty in Northern Ireland, had committed
14 murder, that this would damage the morale of the British
15 Army?
16 A. I cannot really answer that question, I do not -- if the
17 British soldier had committed murder in the way -- in
18 the use of that phrase, I do not know whether it would
19 damage the morale of the British Army or not.
20 Q. That is what you are telling the Tribunal; you do not
21 know whether the fact that the IRA could trumpet from
22 the rooftops "British soldiers commit murder in
23 Northern Ireland" and you are unable to tell the
24 Tribunal whether or not that would damage the morale of
25 the British Army; is that your answer?
1 A. I think it would depend on the circumstances whether it
2 affected morale.
3 Q. So there is murder and murder, is there? If they murder
4 Catholics, for instance, or murder Protestants, is there
5 going to be a difference? What is the difference,
6 Lord Armstrong?
7 A. There is no difference between Catholics and Protestants
8 when it comes to murder.
9 Q. In what circumstances would a murder by a British
10 soldier on duty in Northern Ireland not damage, in your
11 opinion, the morale of the British Army?
12 A. I find that an impossible question to answer because
13 committing murder seems to being used in a very wide
14 sense. Somebody killed in the course of an exchange of
15 fire, is that to be regarded as committing murder? I do
16 not know.
17 Q. My basis of my question was that the firing was
18 unjustified and that it was murder?
19 A. That was what we set Widgery up to find out.
20 Q. And you found some difficulty in accepting that the
21 proof that a British soldier had committed murder -- if
22 you like I will tell you what murder is about: murder is
23 deliberately taking the life of another human being when
24 you did not have to, or to refine it a bit further, or
25 there is no justification for it; you understand what
1 murder means? You see somebody there, he is no threat
2 to you, and you kill him. That is what we lawyers call
3 murder, Lord Armstrong?
4 A. If there was no threat, clearly it would be more serious
5 than if there was a threat, yes. If there was a threat
6 it would be another matter. Somebody might have been
7 killed either way.
8 Q. Lord Armstrong, I think you know we are talking about
9 murder and I am trying to elicit from you, as a result
10 of answers you have given to questions, whether there
11 are different sorts of murder, some which will damage
12 the British Army, some which will not; I am merely
13 asking if you can give an example of one?
14 LORD SAVILLE: I am getting a bit lost as to the relevance
15 of this line of questioning.
16 MR LAVERY: I was trying to establish that the British
17 Government clearly had an interest in the outcome of the
18 proceedings, they clearly had an interest in
19 Lord Widgery's finding. There is nothing wrong with
20 this, may I say, they clearly had an interest in using
21 all legitimate means to ensure that soldiers were not
22 found guilty of any excess and then this has to be
23 interpreted in the light of Sir Edward's conversation
24 with Lord Widgery.
25 LORD SAVILLE: Going on from there: what has this to do with
1 the events of Bloody Sunday themselves?
2 MR LAVERY: I think this matter came up before. First of
3 all, what transpired at Widgery of course is only
4 relevant insofar as it may cast doubt upon the evidence
5 that is subsequently given and as a template against
6 that evidence.
7 The second matter, which I think I mentioned last
8 week, was that of course if the British Government had
9 in fact something to cover up, if there was some fault
10 they were aware of, if -- and I am saying if -- if they
11 had been guilty of some neglect, then it clearly would
12 be in their interest to mark Lord Widgery's card, so to
13 speak.
14 If the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that they
15 were sending an attempt to get him to do the right
16 thing, then the Tribunal might be prepared to draw the
17 inference from that, as in all cases of cover-up, that
18 they had something to fear and they had something to
19 hide.
20 LORD SAVILLE: I follow all that as a submission you may be
21 able to make at the end of the day. What I think I am
22 not following at the moment is how we can really take
23 this much further with Lord Armstrong. He has given his
24 answers. We will have to assess his evidence in due
25 course.
1 What you have just said sounds to me, if I may say
2 so, much more like a submission than a question.
3 MR LAVERY: He has already been asked questions as to how he
4 interpreted the exchanges between Sir Edward Heath and
5 Lord Widgery and he has put what I would respectfully
6 say is a gloss upon those. He is giving what he
7 understood at the time.
8 The purpose of this cross-examination is to
9 establish certain facts that ought to have been present
10 in his mind which might have coloured his answers. It
11 is important, I would have thought, for the Tribunal to
12 know what really was in his mind as he went to speak to
13 Lord Widgery -- sorry, what was in Sir Edward's mind
14 when he went to speak to Lord Widgery.
15 Perhaps if I go on and ask him about the exchanges
16 themselves.
17 LORD SAVILLE: Yes.
18 MR LAVERY: What I want to ask you, is this: your
19 explanation -- I was going to ask you, in the light of
20 the interests, so to speak, the partisan interest that
21 the British Government had in this affair, whether it
22 was appropriate at all to meet Lord Widgery and discuss
23 the Tribunal with him; this was really, I suggest, like
24 a party talking to the judge in the absence of another
25 party; do you understand?
1 A. We had not -- the matter had not reached that sort of
2 stage. Given the urgency of getting the Inquiry set up
3 and the speed with which it was being urged upon the
4 Government at the time, it did not seem inappropriate
5 that Lord Widgery should accept the invitation from the
6 Prime Minister and that there should be some discussion
7 of the questions that arose -- the questions or problems
8 that might arise from that, including whether
9 Lord Widgery wanted to sit with two other people or
10 whether he wanted to sit alone, and so on.
11 I do not see anything improper or inappropriate in
12 doing that with the Lord Chancellor present.
13 Q. How can you say that the matter had not reached that
14 stage, by which I meant the stage of the British
15 Government having a partisan interest in it, when that
16 must have been jumping out of the pages?
17 A. The British Government had an interest at this stage of
18 inquiring into what actually happened, and that was the
19 whole point of setting up the Widgery Inquiry.
20 Q. Yes. But, Lord Armstrong, you know amidst the clash of
21 arms the law is silent and there was a conflict,
22 I suggest, or there was a possible conflict between
23 Lord Widgery's duty as a judge to find the facts and
24 this patriotic duty not to aid and comfort the IRA; do
25 you understand?
1 A. I think Lord Widgery was an imminently independent
2 member of the judiciary and would have objected to and
3 resented any attempt to mark his card in the sense you
4 described and no such attempt was made.
5 Q. Let me ask you, then: what was it, do you think, that
6 Lord Widgery might have been unaware of about the
7 situation in Northern Ireland, because he was such
8 a busy man, that you felt it necessary to tell him?
9 A. There was partly that he should be aware of the
10 background in terms of what has been described as the
11 propaganda war, and partly the various practical issues
12 that came up in the course of the meeting about, as
13 I say, whether the Lord Chief Justice should sit with
14 two other members of a Tribunal, whether he should hear
15 evidence, whether evidence should be heard in public,
16 and so on.
17 Q. That is not the question I am asking, Lord Armstrong.
18 I am trying to elicit an answer or get some further
19 explanation of an answer that you gave: Lord Widgery was
20 a busy man, he might not know all that was going on in
21 Northern Ireland. I am asking you what you think
22 Lord Widgery might not have known was going on in
23 Northern Ireland that you felt it necessary to tell him.
24 When I say "you", I am identifying you with the
25 Prime Minister, forgive me; but what the Prime Minister
1 felt that he did not know in Northern Ireland, that he
2 felt it necessary to have a meeting to tell him about
3 it; that is all?
4 A. The purpose of the meeting was to reach a point where
5 Mr Heath, as he then was, could make a statement in the
6 House of Commons the following day about the Inquiry.
7 Q. I understand what you are saying is the purpose of the
8 meeting, Lord Armstrong. All I am asking is for you to
9 elaborate upon an answer that you gave earlier on:
10 because Lord Widgery was a busy man there were things he
11 might not know.
12 I am just asking you what sort of things do you
13 think that he might not have known were going on in
14 Northern Ireland that you found necessary to tell him?
15 A. The Prime Minister clearly thought he needed to be -- to
16 have his attention drawn to the nature and state of what
17 was called the propaganda war. That was something which
18 Lord Widgery might not have been as au fait with as many
19 other people.
20 Q. Might this be symptomatic of the average Englishman's
21 lack of knowledge and lack of interest in
22 Northern Ireland at that particular time?
23 A. I think that is an unanswerable question.
24 Q. Lord Widgery presumably would have known that there was
25 a terrorist organisation carrying on a campaign in an
1 integral part of the United Kingdom; would he not?
2 A. I am sure he would have been aware of so much.
3 Q. And he would have known that they were killing or
4 attempting to kill British soldiers?
5 A. And he would have known of operations outside
6 NOrthern Ireland, I dare say.
7 Q. He presumably would have known that, as in every war,
8 there is a propaganda campaign?
9 A. Whether he knew -- how far that was in the front of his
10 mind, I cannot say.
11 Q. It would not require a great leap of the imagination to
12 know, if he read the papers at all, that the IRA, as
13 every belligerent does, as the British Army did, were
14 engaged in propaganda; is that not right?
15 A. I do not think I can add to the explanations I have
16 already made, and Sir Edward Heath made in the evidence
17 to which my attention was drawn just now.
18 Q. Is there any sensible explanation for this, or any
19 reasonable explanation for this, other than a reminder
20 to Lord Widgery not to bring out findings that might
21 comfort the IRA, might aid them in their propaganda war
22 and so prolong the war against the British Army; is
23 there any other explanation?
24 A. What the Prime Minister said to Lord Widgery was not
25 intended to affect his findings or the outcome of the
1 Inquiry, and Lord Widgery perfectly accepted and
2 understood that.
3 Q. Let me turn to the meeting of 31st January 1972, this is
4 the GEN 47 meeting. You were present at that, were you?
5 This was the day after Bloody Sunday; were you present
6 at that meeting, sitting at the back?
7 A. I cannot remember, but I think I probably was not
8 because there were a lot of other things to do.
9 Q. You may not have been present?
10 A. One of my colleagues may have been sitting in.
11 Q. Have you had an opportunity to look at Sir Burke Trend's
12 private notes of what took place at that meeting?
13 A. I have.
14 Q. G100AB.605.6. This was on 31st January. This discusses
15 the Inquiry. If you see the Chief of the General Staff
16 gives a brief summary of what took place. I do not
17 think I need read anything.
18 If I go to the last sentence in the paragraph:
19 "Never a battle against NICRA marchers trouble was
20 hooligans.
21 "After 13 people shot, difficult to refuse inquiry.
22 "Are 13 verified? We should not leave any statement
23 unchallenged."
24 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Lavery, is there any real need to read all
25 this through?
1 MR LAVERY: I am sure not.
2 There are a couple of points here, but one is
3 relating to the Inquiry: was it accepted at that stage
4 that at least some, if not all of the 13 people who were
5 shot were probably innocent?
6 A. I do not think anything was accepted at that stage,
7 except that there should be an Inquiry.
8 Q. If, for example, there had been a gun battle and 13 IRA
9 men had been shot in flagrante, there would not have
10 been any need for an Inquiry into that, would there?
11 A. I do not know.
12 Q. That suggests too that the Cabinet was told at that time
13 that only shooting into crowds was directed against
14 hooligans?
15 A. Well, that was what the Chief of the General Staff said.
16 Q. A difficult area is to what exactly was in the state of
17 mind of the authorities and the British Prime Minister
18 in particular from the moment the news came out on
19 Bloody Sunday until, if you like, the Widgery Tribunal
20 was set up. Did they realise -- is it your
21 understanding -- did they realise that innocent people
22 had in fact been killed?
23 A. I do not think that they realised more than they were
24 told at this meeting.
25 MR LAVERY: (Pause). Thank you, Lord Armstrong, I have no
1 further questions.
2 Questioned by MR R HARVEY
3 MR HARVEY: My name is Richard Harvey, I represent the
4 family of James Wray, who was killed on Bloody Sunday.
5 You have told Mr Lavery already that
6 Sir Edward Heath was very hands-on, I think was the
7 expression you used, in relation to the political side
8 of events in Northern Ireland?
9 A. I do not remember using that phrase. I do remember
10 saying that throughout this period he was -- the
11 situation in Northern Ireland, political and security,
12 was a matter which was constantly coming to his
13 attention and his mind.
14 Q. And you were perhaps primarily responsible for bringing
15 many of those matters to his attention?
16 A. My colleagues and I, but most of the information would
17 have come from either the Home Office or the Ministry of
18 Defence.
19 Q. He would see, for instance, telexes from Howard Smith on
20 a fairly regular basis?
21 A. Generally speaking he would not see those unless the
22 Home Office or whoever -- to whomever they were sent
23 thought it necessary to send it. But we would not have
24 put routine reports of that kind to him.
25 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Harvey, we seem to be covering much the
1 same ground Mr Lavery has covered, are we not?
2 MR HARVEY: I am trying to avoid doing so, sir, but there
3 were a couple of specific documents that I wanted to
4 draw to Lord Armstrong's attention and ask for his
5 comments on those, if I may.
6 LORD SAVILLE: I hope everybody is bearing in mind what
7 I said, really quite a long time ago now, about the need
8 to avoid successive questioning by Counsel of witnesses
9 on the grounds, basically, that unless there was some
10 conflict of interest between various parties, the
11 Tribunal would expect one Counsel to question the
12 witness concerned.
13 Is the area on which you wish to question the
14 witness one which you can only canvass and that
15 Mr Lavery could not have canvassed because of some
16 conflict of interest?
17 MR HARVEY: Sir, with respect, I am not sure what Mr Lavery
18 could have canvassed. It appears to me that there are
19 areas that he has not covered which we believe ought to
20 be canvassed on behalf of our clients; that is the most
21 I can say.
22 LORD SAVILLE: Has there been any attempt to liaise with the
23 other interested parties on the families' side to ensure
24 the direction we laid down some time ago was going to be
25 adhered to?
1 MR HARVEY: In broad terms, there have been discussions.
2 There has not been complete agreement on who is going to
3 handle which subjects, but we have tried as best we can
4 to ensure that there is no overlap.
5 LORD SAVILLE: I am not going to stop you asking these
6 questions, Mr Harvey, it was an opportunity to remind
7 everybody that what the Tribunal expects is that there
8 is the greatest degree of co-operation possible between
9 interested parties having the same interests; that the
10 Tribunal is not disposed to allow, certainly not
11 disposed to allow successive questioning on the same
12 subject matter, and is anxious not to allow successive
13 questioning, even if it is on different subject matters,
14 in both cases, because it regards it as unfair to the
15 witness and likely to cause unnecessary delay.
16 Having reminded everybody that that is what we did
17 say some time ago, you may go on with your questioning,
18 but bear in mind, please, as I ask everyone else to do,
19 what I have just said.
20 MR HARVEY: I am particularly interested, Lord Armstrong, in
21 the 28th and 29th January, about which you have not been
22 questioned. If I could ask you, please, to look at
23 G91.551. This is the first telegram from Mr Maitland,
24 as he then was, to Mr Hill following the GEN 47 meeting
25 on the morning of 27th.
1 You see the time at the top left-hand corner, 27 is
2 the date, 1610 is the time in the afternoon, about an
3 hour before the meeting with Mr Faulkner.
4 Mr Hill was a Foreign Office appointee, is that
5 correct, in Belfast?
6 A. I am afraid I do not know. I know that he was in
7 Belfast on the information side.
8 Q. Can you help the Inquiry as to why this request to
9 Mr Hill would have come through the Foreign Office
10 rather than through the Home Office, which would be more
11 directly connected with the UK Rep?
12 A. I think I am right in saying that the Foreign Office
13 machine was providing the channel for communications
14 that went to the UK Rep Belfast. So that those
15 telegrams would have the name of the Foreign Secretary
16 at the bottom on them as a matter of routine.
17 Q. However, this would be something that flowed directly
18 out of the GEN 47 meeting that morning, reflecting the
19 Ministers' concern about the PR aspects of the weekend's
20 marches?
21 A. Evidently.
22 Q. Because in answer to Mr Clarke a little earlier -- could
23 we have 90.550, please -- when he asked you about the
24 following day's telegram -- again if we look at the top
25 left-hand corner, it is the 28th at 1945 hours, 7.45 in
1 the evening -- you opined that this telegram was
2 probably a product of the previous day's GEN 47 meeting.
3 Having seen the telegram that I would suggest
4 actually was the product of that meeting, when we look
5 at the text of this on the 28th, which begins:
6 "Ministers would like the suggestion put to
7 Mr Faulkner ..." and then we have a series of
8 suggestions; does this not suggest that there was some
9 other meeting that day, on the 28th, Lord Armstrong,
10 that would have generated this suggestion to
11 Mr Faulkner?
12 A. I believe that there was a meeting of -- the Permanent
13 Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defence had
14 a meeting that morning at which there was reference to
15 this, to the public relations aspects of this, and it
16 was said that those would be handled as between
17 Mr Maitland and Mr Hill.
18 Q. The timing of this is very late on a Friday, after
19 everyone has gone home; was there any kind of emergency
20 that you are aware of that was brought to the attention
21 of the Prime Minister or other Ministers that day that
22 led to this almost afterthought, I might suggest, of
23 a telegram?
24 A. I was not aware of the telegram until I saw it in the
25 papers for this Inquiry, so anything I say is surmise.
1 But my surmise would be that this rather more detailed
2 telegram was prepared in the light of the written
3 minutes of the GEN 47 meeting which would have been
4 circulated possibly at lunchtime on Friday the 28th,
5 perhaps earlier, and what was said at the Permanent
6 Under-Secretary of State's meeting and why it was so
7 late, I am afraid I do not know.
8 Q. Would not all of the matters discussed at GEN 47 have
9 been mentioned to Mr Faulkner anyway in the course of
10 the meeting between Mr Heath and Mr Faulkner on the
11 27th?
12 A. No, not at all necessarily so. That meeting was
13 a relatively short one and the Prime Minister's
14 principal concern at it was to canvass the possibilities
15 for political development in Northern Ireland.
16 Q. Was there not a sense -- I appreciate I am asking you
17 about something that is a long time ago and you have
18 been a busy man since -- that weekend, as that weekend
19 approached, that things were starting to move rapidly in
20 Northern Ireland?
21 A. It is quite difficult to disentangle what I thought at
22 the time, but it certainly seemed as if the security
23 situation in Belfast might be becoming, as indeed
24 Mr Faulkner said, sufficiently under control to permit
25 the two Governments to think of a political development.
1 Q. Was there also a sense that the situation in Derry might
2 be about to jeopardise that political development?
3 A. Not before 30th January, no.
4 Q. Again, could I ask you to look at OS4.194. This is
5 a telegram sent by the Prime Minister from Chequers on
6 the Saturday. I do not know if you have seen this
7 document before, have you, sir?
8 A. No, I have not.
9 Q. Would you like to take a moment to read it. (Pause).
10 A. Yes, I have read it.
11 Q. It appears that Mr Heath had discussed with
12 Sir Burke Trend some important items referring to
13 Northern Ireland on that Friday, the 28th.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Were you aware of those discussions, sir?
16 A. I do not remember them.
17 Q. Do you have any recollection about why it was felt
18 desirable to bring the ambassador, John Peck, back from
19 Dublin and the UK Rep, Howard Smith, back from Belfast?
20 A. I do not recollect anything beyond what is said here.
21 It was beginning to look as if there might be scope for
22 a political initiative and I presume that was what the
23 writers of this telegram -- the Prime Minister had in
24 mind when he talked about a rapidly developing situation
25 both north and south of the border.
1 Q. You are not aware now, sir, of any meetings of Ministers
2 that took place on that Friday, 28th?
3 A. I am not aware of any meeting of Ministers that took
4 place on that day.
5 Q. Would you agree with the proposition that he who writes
6 the minutes writes the official history?
7 A. I am not sure that I would, Mr Harvey. I can remember
8 occasions when people have said that minutes which were
9 written for the purposes of action at the time did not
10 reflect what the historian would be looking for.
11 Q. As we have been looking for items of history here, sir,
12 the notes for the record that you made on a number of
13 occasions, particularly the meeting between Mr Heath and
14 Mr Faulkner on the 27th, a note for the record is
15 something that is intended to be an agreed summary of
16 the discussion between the two parties, or however many
17 parties may be present?
18 A. It was not agreed with Mr Faulkner; it was not an agreed
19 summary in that sense. It was an account prepared
20 directly after the meeting and it was prepared, not
21 just, as you might say, as a historical record, but as
22 a record which would inform the Home Office, the Home
23 Secretary, the Defence Secretary and the departments
24 concerned what had passed at that meeting.
25 Q. A note that was intended, in other words, to be placed
1 on the record both for posterity and for possible
2 immediate action by other Government departments?
3 A. Yes, it was the latter which was of course uppermost in
4 one's mind from day-to-day.
5 Q. There would, of course, in the course of any diplomatic
6 discussion at that higher level, be statements made that
7 would not necessarily go into the official record?
8 A. I would say that this record would include anything
9 which was of significance.
10 Q. Would there be from time to time a moment when the
11 Prime Minister might turn to you and say "this is off
12 the record"?
13 A. This was a very rare event and I do not remember it
14 happening at this meeting.
15 Q. You, as you have told the Inquiry --
16 A. It was usually only confined to what you might call
17 jocular remarks which did not need to appear in the
18 permanent record, but there was no such case here, I do
19 not -- so far as I remember.
20 Q. May I ask you: you actually took this note down yourself
21 or did you have a secretary there?
22 A. No, I was at the meeting and I made manuscript notes
23 from which I compiled the note for record.
24 Q. You no longer have those manuscript notes?
25 A. No.
1 Q. And in taking down those manuscript notes, did you then
2 produce a draft for submission to the Prime Minister, or
3 was your completed record never viewed by him for any
4 other purpose?
5 A. I do not remember the Prime Minister ever asking to see
6 such a note. I was expected to write an accurate note
7 and I was relied upon by the Prime Minister to do that
8 and then this note was conveyed to the other
9 departments. The Home Secretary was at the meeting and
10 would be able to say if he thought there was any
11 material point omitted.
12 Q. Would it be fair to say that, knowing the
13 Prime Minister's mind, as you have told the Inquiry it
14 was your job to do, you would know pretty well what he
15 wanted put in the record?
16 A. I think that implies that I would be slanting the
17 account of the record to what I thought the
18 Prime Minister wanted to be said. That is not the case,
19 I was there to record what passed at the meeting.
20 Q. I say this not just in respect of yourself, but in
21 respect of others who, like Sir Burke Trend, might have
22 taken notes at GEN 47 meetings, there would be a caution
23 about not putting into the record things that might be
24 potentially embarrassing to any of the parties present?
25 A. You would try to record accurately and in as full detail
1 as possible what passed at the meeting, obviously.
2 Whether it was GEN 47 or it was a meeting of this kind.
3 Q. When I talk about matters that might be embarrassing to
4 parties present, I have in mind particularly
5 Lord Hailsham's comment that we do not find in any of
6 the documents that the Inquiry has been given so far.
7 Would you accept that it is quite likely that that
8 kind of comment, which everyone seems to recognise was
9 made at one of those meetings, would have been left out
10 because it might be embarrassing?
11 A. I do not know when it was made, of course. I mean, it
12 might have been made in a meeting which was not
13 officially recorded -- fully recorded. It could have
14 been omitted because it was not a really significant
15 contribution to the meeting.
16 Q. You are not prepared to accept that it might have been
17 left out because it was recognised that this could be
18 a seriously embarrassing thing to have on the official
19 record of the meeting?
20 A. Not in that context, no, no, I am not prepared to accept
21 that.
22 Questioned by MR CLARKE
23 MR CLARKE: Just one matter. You said there was a meeting
24 of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Defence --
25 MR MACKIE: Sorry to interrupt, I understand the sequence is
1 I go next.
2 LORD SAVILLE: I did look to you but since you did not move,
3 I moved on to Mr Clarke.
4 Questioned by MR MACKIE
5 MR MACKIE: Two brief matters, if I may, sir. That is
6 this: in his cross-examination of you, Mr Harvey asked
7 you some questions about the circumstances in which the
8 telegrams of the 27th and 28th January might have come
9 to be written. At that point you mentioned your
10 recollection of the existence of a document, I think it
11 was the PUS's morning meeting. You were not at that
12 point shown the document and I wonder if we could have
13 it up on the screen. It is G89A.548.1. You made some
14 reference to a meeting and Mr Maitland and Mr Hill.
15 When you have identified the document to your
16 satisfaction, would you be good enough to look at (b)
17 and let us know whether that is or is not the reference
18 that you had in mind?
19 A. It is the reference I had in mind.
20 Q. If one takes the morning meeting on 28th January, where
21 it says:
22 "There was discussion of the marches planned for
23 Northern Ireland this weekend.
24 "The basis of the security force's operations were
25 noted and it was agreed that Mr Maitland would take up
1 with Mr Hill the question of the PR activity which would
2 be necessary particularly in connection with the
3 Londonderry march."
4 Could we look on to G90.549, which is the telegram
5 sent out later on that day. We see, when we look at it,
6 it is indeed a document passing from Mr Maitland to
7 Mr Hill. Could I ask you one question about that, it
8 begins:
9 "Ministers would like ..."
10 The question I would like you to answer is
11 this: would there be or would you expect there to be any
12 further ministerial authentication or instruction
13 between the minute of the morning meeting we have just
14 been looking at and the despatch of the telegram that is
15 on the screen now?
16 A. I would have seen no need for further authentication of
17 the view of Ministers than the discussion at GEN 47.
18 I would suspect that this telegram was drafted within
19 the Ministry of Defence after the morning meeting and
20 after they had seen the minutes of -- the written
21 minutes of GEN 47 and was sent once it had been agreed.
22 Q. The other matter I wanted to ask you about was this: you
23 were asked some questions about your meeting and your
24 dealings with Lord Widgery. You referred, as
25 Sir Edward Heath did, to his independence of mind. Is
1 your perception of the independence of Lord Widgery
2 based on an assumption you made about his position or
3 based upon some broader experience of encountering him
4 from time to time in public life?
5 A. The latter, is the answer to that. As I have said,
6 I think, in my statement, I spent four years in the
7 Home Office between October 1975 and -- between
8 April 1975 and October 1979 and, in the course of my
9 time there as Permanent Secretary, I had occasion to
10 have some discussions with Lord Widgery, who was still
11 the Lord Chief Justice at that stage, and I was greatly
12 impressed by his determination to maintain the
13 independence of the judiciary from the Executive.
14 MR MACKIE: Thank you very much.
15 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Harvey?
16 MR HARVEY: Sir, I apologise to Mr Clarke and to yourself,
17 there was one matter I did overlook in my note I had
18 meant to ask Lord Armstrong, if I could crave your
19 indulgence for one moment.
20 Questioned by MR R HARVEY
21 MR HARVEY: Lord Armstrong, I had asked if there had been
22 any meetings on the 28th; was there a diary of
23 appointments for Sir Edward Heath, and who would have
24 kept that diary?
25 A. There certainly was a diary kept, a daily diary was kept
1 and it would have been kept by the diary secretary.
2 There was one member of the Private Secretary team who
3 was responsible for keeping the Prime Minister's diary.
4 Q. Do you have any idea whether a copy of that diary would
5 have been preserved and, if so, where it would be found?
6 A. I guess it would have been preserved, but I do not know.
7 I think you would have to ask the official record
8 keepers in the Cabinet Office or now the Public Record
9 Office because, if there is such a record, it is
10 presumably in the public domain because more than
11 30 years have elapsed.
12 Questioned by MR CLARKE
13 MR CLARKE: Mr Mackie has asked most of the questions
14 I wanted to ask. There are just two matters that arise
15 out of it.
16 Do you know how soon the GEN 47 minutes would come
17 forward?
18 A. They were the ones on 27th January. They would
19 certainly have come forward by 1 o'clock on the Friday
20 the 28th. They might have caught the early circulation,
21 but as it was a Cabinet day and the Cabinet minutes
22 would take precedence, they might not.
23 Q. Is it unlikely they would have been available at the
24 morning meeting of the Permanent Under-Secretary?
25 A. I should think it was unlikely, but it was possible they
1 had been circulated before that.
2 Q. If we look lastly at G90.549, what I understand you to
3 say is that you would suppose that GEN 47 took place,
4 there was then the meeting of the Permanent
5 Under-Secretary in the morning, when it is agreed
6 Mr Maitland would take up the question of PR activity
7 with Mr Hill, and that the reference to "Ministers would
8 like the suggestion to be put ... that a statement be
9 issued" is a reference back to GEN 47 without any
10 subsequent activity by Ministers between; is that what
11 you would regard --
12 A. I would certainly regard the discussion at GEN 47 as
13 sufficient authentication or justification for saying in
14 this telex "Ministers would like ..."
15 Q. When we see in this telex "This statement would be to
16 the effect that" such and such and "(b) the purposes of
17 this statement would be (a), (b) and (c)", should we
18 suppose that any Minister or Ministers had specifically
19 approved items 2 and 3, or are they likely to be
20 Mr Maitland's composition as to what he suggests the
21 statement would be and its purpose, or something else?
22 A. I think -- I do not think there would have been any
23 further ministerial contribution; I think that this
24 represents the official -- an official preparation based
25 on GEN 47 and I think it was likely that this draft was
1 prepared in the Ministry of Defence before it was issued
2 under Mr Maitland's name.
3 Q. Why do you think that?
4 A. Because I think that there are points in paragraph 2
5 which would certainly come from the Ministry of Defence
6 and perhaps from Lord Carver himself, Sir Michael Carver
7 himself, which are not directly reflected in GEN 47.
8 MR CLARKE: Thank you.
9 LORD SAVILLE: The Chairman again, thank you very much for
10 coming here to help us.
11 We will come back to it at 1 o'clock, please.
12 (12.10 pm)
13 (The Short Adjournment)
14 (1.00 pm)
15 MR ROXBURGH: Just before the witness is sworn, may I just
16 say, so that everyone knows, in relation to the
17 timetable for tomorrow: INQ1326, who was scheduled to
18 attend tomorrow, will not be attending because he is
19 unwell and he will be rescheduled for a later date.
20 INQ221A, sworn
21 Questioned by MR ROXBURGH
22 LORD SAVILLE: You are 221A; can we address you as Major?
23 A. You can indeed, sir.
24 LORD SAVILLE: I say this to all the witnesses: I am the
25 Chairman. The questions will come from the barristers
1 in front of me. Could you keep reasonably close to that
2 microphone and then we can all hear what you have to
3 say.
4 MR ROXBURGH: May we have on the screen, please, B2168.001.
5 Major, on the screen in front of you is the first
6 page of a statement that you made to this Inquiry on
7 17th March 2000. Do you have a copy of that statement
8 with you?
9 A. Yes, I do.
10 Q. I understand there are one or two amendments you would
11 like to make to it; is that so?
12 A. Yes, that is correct.
13 Q. Would you be kind enough to tell us what those
14 amendments are?
15 A. If you turn to paragraph 30.
16 Q. We have that at B2168.004.
17 A. Yes, it says:
18 "In addition to the low velocity handgun shooting
19 I heard on the wasteground ..."
20 I have no audial recollection of any shooting on
21 that particular day, nor of any rounds striking the
22 ground. Therefore, I would ask the Tribunal if that
23 could be deleted from my statement.
24 However, it was in my statement made in 1972, and
25 I have no reason to believe that, having stated it then,
1 it was not true at that time, or it is not true.
2 Q. Does what you have just said apply both to the low
3 velocity shooting and to the M1 Carbine?
4 A. It applies to all shooting on that day.
5 Q. Thank you. Is there another amendment you wish to make?
6 A. Yes, there is. On paragraph 32.
7 Q. On the next page?
8 A. It is by nature of a syntax amendment, the last
9 sentence, it would be better if it read:
10 "We did not set out to treat the situation on
11 30th January any differently from previous similar
12 incidents we had dealt with in Belfast."
13 Q. Are those the only amendments that you wish to make?
14 A. Yes, they are.
15 Q. Subject to those amendments, are the contents of this
16 statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
17 A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, they are
18 correct.
19 Q. May we then go back to the beginning of the statement
20 where you tell us that in January 1972 you were
21 a captain in the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment
22 but had been promoted to the temporary rank of major and
23 had taken command of C Company; is that right?
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. Do you remember when it was that you had taken command
1 of C Company?
2 A. Not precisely, but it was the latter end of 1971; it
3 could well have been September/October, the latter
4 quarter of 1971.
5 Q. In any event, in paragraph 2 you tell us that you were
6 in command of C Company on the day of the demonstration
7 at Magilligan, which we know to have been on Saturday,
8 22nd January 1972 and you say that on that occasion your
9 company was acting as a reserve company for the Royal
10 Green Jackets.
11 Does it follow that for the purposes of that
12 operation you were under command of the Battalion
13 Commander of the 2nd Royal Green Jackets?
14 A. Yes, I was detached under command of the commanding
15 officer of the Royal Green Jackets.
16 Q. That individual does not have anonymity in this Inquiry,
17 so there is no difficulty about identifying him as
18 Lieutenant Colonel Welsh, now Major General Welsh.
19 Do you remember him as an individual?
20 A. Not clearly, no.
21 Q. What, in outline, was the task assigned to your company
22 on that day?
23 A. To the best of my recollection, I was ear-marked to be
24 the reserve company. It was a Green Jackets operation
25 and I was the reserve company.
1 Q. Do you recall what the, what in outline the operation
2 was to consist of and what part you were to be called on
3 to play if the reserve was brought in?
4 A. No, I have only got a very general idea of the concept
5 of the operation. I believe it is true that the Royal
6 Green Jackets were to allow some sort of demonstration
7 at the de-bussing point where coaches would be received,
8 where they could overlook the Magilligan internment
9 camp. My company was not involved with that and was
10 kept back in reserve, back down towards Magilligan camp.
11 Q. Do you remember that a wire fence had been put in place
12 across the beach to mark the limit beyond which the
13 demonstrators were not to pass?
14 A. I do not believe it had been put in place. I believe
15 there was one, if not more fences. I have
16 a recollection of them being strewn in seaweed which
17 would indicate to me they had not been put there on the
18 day, but had been there for some time.
19 Q. Leaving the question of exactly when they had been put
20 there, is it right there was a fence of some sort or
21 a wire barrier which marked the point beyond which the
22 demonstrators were not to be allowed to pass?
23 A. There was certainly a wire barrier. Whether it was the
24 point beyond which they were not allowed to pass, I am
25 not sure, I cannot recall.
1 Q. Do you have a picture in your mind of the scene as the
2 demonstrators approached along the beach?
3 A. No, I was not able to see them. I was not able to see
4 them until they approached the wire.
5 Q. Where were you personally and, secondly, where was your
6 company at the time when the demonstrators approached
7 the wire?
8 A. Fine. Your first question, I was approximately 100,
9 maybe 150 metres away from the wire in an area,
10 I recollect, the sand dunes which are slightly inland
11 from the high-water mark and my platoons of my company
12 were in a similar area.
13 Q. Where were the soldiers of the Royal Green Jackets, do
14 you remember?
15 A. I do not remember -- further forward. When I say
16 "forward," I mean toward the de-bussing point, the area
17 from which the demonstrators were coming.
18 Q. Do you know at what point your company was brought into
19 action?
20 A. I cannot recall exactly when they were brought in, but
21 it was at a point when the demonstrators were moving en
22 masse down the beach and therefore had passed by the
23 Royal Green Jackets' positions.
24 Q. What were you ordered to do at that stage?
25 A. I cannot remember precisely.
1 Q. May we look, please, at a photograph, P625. This is
2 a photograph taken on that occasion by a gentleman
3 called Eamon Melaugh. We can see a wire barrier and on
4 the left side of the picture, a group of civilians
5 including Mr John Hume, MP.
6 Do you remember any scenes such as this, in which
7 Mr Hume and others approached the wire barrier and had
8 a conversation with Army officers and police officers?
9 A. No, as I said, I was approximately 150 metres back from
10 the wire fence.
11 Q. Without mentioning the name of any Army officer, unless
12 I have already used it this afternoon, do you recognise
13 any of the Army officers on the right-hand side of this
14 photograph?
15 A. No, I do not.
16 Q. When your company was deployed, did you personally
17 remain in your position among the sand dunes or did you
18 move from that position?
19 A. No, I personally stayed with my command vehicle, which
20 gave me my communications with battalion headquarters
21 and also my company. I was limited in that I did not
22 have radios that operated in what we call the man pack
23 roll, in other words they were vehicle-mounted radios so
24 I was limited to an area on the sand dunes where the
25 vehicle could be.
1 Q. Did you have any view from there of what happened when
2 your company went into action?
3 A. No, only a general view. I could not see in detail what
4 was happening.
5 Q. Is the position that you had a view of the scene but you
6 were too far away to see the details?
7 A. Precisely.
8 Q. Is it right that your company or elements of your
9 company conducted a baton charge that repelled the crowd
10 from the wire barrier or from the area of the wire
11 barrier?
12 A. I honestly cannot recall whether they did or not.
13 I have heard that that is the case.
14 Q. May we just, to see whether it brings back any
15 recollection, look at page R66. This is an extract from
16 the Royal Green Jackets chronicle for 1972 and it
17 includes an account from the perspective of their
18 battalion of the events at Magilligan. If we go on to
19 R69, we will find the relevant passage. Can we enlarge
20 the left hand page, please. What we see here at the
21 foot of this page is a passage that reads, as follows:
22 "After an hour or so, the head of the marchers
23 approached a wire fence which had been strung across the
24 beach to mark the boundary of the camp area. As it was
25 now low tide there was a gap at the end of the wire.
1 The leaders halted to allow stragglers to catch up and
2 a briefing was held. Mr Ivan Cooper, one of the
3 Stormont MPs, then went up to the gap and insisted that
4 they had a right to walk along the beach. When stopped
5 he told the crowd to link arms and advance towards the
6 wire. Some of the crowd surged through the gap but
7 a volley of baton rounds and a baton charge by one of
8 the platoons of the Parachute Regiment routed the crowd
9 who retreated in disorder. Mr Hume ... then attempted
10 to persuade Colonel Peter to let the march proceed but
11 all to no avail. The crowd started to break up but
12 elements turned nasty and burnt a couple of huts on the
13 adjoining training area and then on their way home set
14 fire to the meeting place."
15 Is there anything in that paragraph that you would
16 take issue with from your knowledge of what happened?
17 A. No, I would not take issue, but I have no memory as such
18 of the detail.
19 Q. May we go to paragraph 33 of your statement at B2168.005
20 where you comment on certain allegations that were made.
21 You say in the second sentence of this paragraph:
22 "I had already dealt with malicious allegations of
23 brutality against my company in relation to the
24 Magilligan demonstration one week before Bloody Sunday."
25 May I ask you just to spell out for us what you mean
1 by describing the allegations as "malicious"?
2 A. Well, it is, it is described in the next sentence when
3 I say:
4 "I was called before General Ford, the Commander of
5 Land Forces in Northern Ireland, to explain video
6 footage which appeared to suggest that members of my
7 company had engaged in brutality."
8 It was malicious, I suspect, because it was not
9 proven.
10 Q. A malicious allegation is something that is a little
11 more than something that is not proven, is that not
12 right, it is an allegation that is known to be untrue by
13 the person making it?
14 A. That may well be the case and the evidence that I was
15 presented was from television footage, which I gather
16 had appeared that weekend.
17 Q. Who was making these malicious allegations?
18 A. I do not know.
19 Q. Do you have no idea at all?
20 A. Well, as it was a Green Jackets operation, there was --
21 the allegation perhaps could only have come from the
22 Royal Green Jackets themselves.
23 Q. Is the position: you believe these to be allegations
24 made by other soldiers, not by civilians?
25 A. That may well be the case, but I cannot honestly
1 remember, or I do not know.
2 Q. Are you saying that you were able to satisfy yourself
3 that there had been no improper use of force by the
4 soldiers in your company on that day?
5 A. The only evidence that I was shown was of a civilian
6 lying on the ground being kicked by two soldiers, one
7 actually, what is described as putting the boot in.
8 That was shown to me on video footage. I had no
9 previous knowledge that this was about to be shown to
10 me, the first I had seen it was when I was called to
11 Headquarters Northern Ireland.
12 The reason I disbelieve it is because the pictures
13 which appeared on television show the soldier who is
14 doing the kicking to be dressed in what we call
15 disruptive pattern material trousers, DPM trousers, or
16 combat trousers as we used in those days. This was
17 a form of dress which was not worn by the Parachute
18 Regiment.
19 Q. You recall being summoned to see General Ford; is that
20 right?
21 A. Quite.
22 Q. What happened when you went to see General Ford?
23 A. Well, quite rightly, it was a particularly nasty
24 incident which had caused quite an outrage when it
25 appeared on television and the accusation was being
1 levelled against my company and therefore levelled
2 against me.
3 Q. When you went to see General Ford, did you look at the
4 video with him?
5 A. Yes, that is the only time I saw it, was in his presence
6 at Headquarters Northern Ireland.
7 Q. Are you sure that it was General Ford that you went to
8 see?
9 A. No, I am not. I know I say in the statement
10 General Ford, but in fact a senior general, certainly.
11 I mean, as a company commander it would have been quite
12 a difficult experience, being summoned to the
13 general officer's headquarters. I cannot, to be honest,
14 be sure it was General Ford himself. It was certainly
15 a senior officer, a member of the GOC staff.
16 Q. Not, for example, Colonel Wilford, the commanding
17 officer of your own battalion?
18 A. Absolutely not, he was not with me. In fact he had told
19 me -- I was required to go to Headquarters Northern
20 Ireland to explain an allegation of brutality.
21 Q. As far as you are aware, did anybody else have to go and
22 see General Ford or whoever it was that was conducting
23 this investigation?
24 A. I never heard of the outcome. The evidence was such
25 that it was not a member of the Parachute Regiment and
1 that was the last I heard of it. I do not know whether
2 it was subsequently followed up.
3 Q. Do you know whether the senior officer conducting the
4 investigation accepted your proposition, that the
5 soldier involved in this incident was not a member of
6 the Parachute Regiment?
7 A. Well, he had to, because my soldiers did not wear that
8 uniform.
9 Q. Do you know whether any steps were taken to investigate
10 the conduct of the Royal Green Jackets?
11 A. No, I have just said I do not know -- after I had
12 answered the allegation, I do not know what happened
13 thereafterwards.
14 Q. Was there any form of Inquiry into these allegations, so
15 far as you remember, within your own regiment?
16 A. Not that I recall, no.
17 Q. Do you recall when you went to see the senior officer,
18 either by date or by how long it was after the event
19 itself?
20 A. I do not. I would guess it would be the Monday.
21 MR TOOHEY: Major, how many men were in your company at
22 Magilligan?
23 A. About 60, sir.
24 MR TOOHEY: Did they remain together or did they move --
25 A. They operated in three platoons so each platoon, we were
1 relatively weak in strength, about 20 in number, three
2 platoons, so those platoons would remain together. So
3 three groups of 20.
4 MR TOOHEY: Do you mean that the 60 all told remained
5 together or each platoon of 20 remained together?
6 A. No, each platoon of 20 remained together, but within my
7 overall command.
8 MR ROXBURGH: In the paragraph we have on the screen you
9 say:
10 "The approach of the Parachute Regiment is certainly
11 direct and firm. However, brutality was never
12 tolerated. It was simply not the way the battalion
13 operated."
14 May we be clear about what exactly you mean by
15 that: are you saying that brutality simply never
16 occurred in your battalion, or are you saying that there
17 may have been incidents from time to time but that, if
18 they came to light, they were treated seriously and
19 disciplinary action taken?
20 A. No, I am saying we abided by the rules of operating
21 procedures, which were to use the minimum force.
22 Q. Was it the case in your experience that no soldier ever
23 stepped outside those rules, or was the position that
24 from time to time, human nature being what it is, the
25 rules were broken and steps had to be taken to deal with
1 that?
2 A. I cannot recall. I certainly have no memory of any
3 particular incident like that.
4 Q. If evidence had come to light that a soldier had beaten
5 up a civilian without justification, what sort of
6 disciplinary sanction would you expect to have been
7 taken?
8 A. Well, the soldier would have been subject to military
9 law and he would have been disciplined by military law.
10 Q. What level of sanction would be applied to an incident
11 of that nature, can you say?
12 A. It depends on what the circumstances were. It may have
13 been dealt with by the company commander, or it may be
14 then summarily dealt with by the commander officer and
15 if it was more serious than that, it would have gone to
16 a court's martial.
17 Q. If you remember this individual, please do not mention
18 his name, but can you tell me, please, whether you do
19 remember the officer who was the adjutant of the second
20 Royal Green Jackets at the time of the Magilligan
21 demonstration?
22 A. I know who he is. I do not believe I knew at the time.
23 Q. But you have discovered in the course of these
24 proceedings, is that the position, who he is?
25 A. Sorry, in the course of these proceedings, you mean --
1 Q. You say that you know who he is?
2 A. Yes, he and I served again later under Sandhurst(?),
3 that is two or three years later.
4 Q. To make absolutely sure we are talking about the same
5 person, I am going to send you a name and ask you to
6 confirm this is the individual you have in mind. If you
7 look at the screen to your right, you will see the name
8 of an individual with the rank that he held at the time,
9 and that individual is known to us as Captain INQ573,
10 now Brigadier INQ573; is that the person you recall or
11 you know to have been the adjutant of the 2nd Royal
12 Green Jackets on that day?
13 A. Yes, except the spelling is not what I recognise, or the
14 way his name has been put together I do not recognise.
15 Q. Yes, I think I know what you mean, but it is the same
16 individual?
17 A. Yes, it is.
18 Q. Is this right, you do not remember him being present at
19 Magilligan?
20 A. No, I do not.
21 Q. You did not know him personally at the time?
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. Do you have any reason, from having got to know him
24 later on, to have any doubt about his integrity?
25 A. No.
1 Q. Is he the sort of person who you would expect to have
2 made malicious allegations against your soldiers?
3 A. No, he is not.
4 Q. May we look at part of the statement that he has made to
5 this Inquiry at C573.1. We will try and manage without
6 it, but what I think I will do, if I may, is arrange for
7 you to have a hard copy of the statement that he has
8 made and I will then read out the paragraphs that I want
9 to ask you about. (Handed)
10 It may take a moment or two to sort that out, I will
11 move on to something else and then come back to it, if
12 I may.
13 May we have next on the screen, please, a part of
14 the Widgery transcript, Day 11, page 58. Is the Widgery
15 transcript available?
16 LORD SAVILLE: I wonder if there is a problem, if we rose
17 for a moment or two, you might be able to sort this one
18 out and 573 as well.
19 MR ROXBURGH: Alternatively I can try another topic.
20 LORD SAVILLE: We will rise for a moment or two and see if
21 we can sort things out.
22 (1.30 pm)
23 (A short break)
24 (1.32 pm)
25 MR ROXBURGH: May we have C573.1 on the screen, please.
1 Apologies for the delay. This is the statement of the
2 officer who at the time was the adjutant of the
3 2nd Battalion of the Royal Green Jackets. You have told
4 us, Major, that you came to know this officer in later
5 years. Have you ever had any discussion with him about
6 the events of 22nd January 1972?
7 A. No, I have not.
8 Q. If we go to the foot of the page we find paragraph 7 of
9 his statement, where he says this, describing
10 Magilligan:
11 "After a while the tide receded. It went out
12 further than we had anticipated and as a result the wire
13 no longer reached the sea. The crowd of marchers saw
14 this and some of them started to move around the end of
15 the wire. It was obvious that the soldiers at the wire
16 were going to be out-flanked. At this stage an order
17 was given (I cannot remember by whom) for the company
18 from 1 Para to deploy to fill the gap. I was still at
19 the battalion headquarters in the sand dunes overlooking
20 the action. I saw what I took to be an awful lot of
21 unnecessary violence by the Paras, including baton
22 swinging. I could also see that this was being captured
23 on TV by the cameras that were around and about.
24 I pointed this out to UNK166 who ordered me to go down
25 to the wire and to calm the situation down."
1 UNK166 is a cipher that has replaced the name of the
2 operations officer of the Royal Green Jackets.
3 Do you have any comment to make on that paragraph,
4 and in particular on the proposition that he saw what he
5 took to be an awful lot of unnecessary violence by the
6 Paras?
7 A. No, I have not any comment. It was something I could
8 not have seen myself because I was also up in the sand
9 dunes.
10 Q. In the next paragraph he says:
11 "I started running down towards the wire. I had in
12 mind that I would try to find the Para's company
13 commander, who I think was Major 221A [that is of course
14 you]. However, before I found him I came across
15 a couple of Paras, who were probably corporals or
16 privates, I cannot now say which. They were striking
17 a middle-aged man and a woman, whose age I could not
18 determine, as they lay on the ground. The Paras were
19 striking them with their batons. I physically stopped
20 the Paras from striking the civilians any further.
21 I was extremely angry at what I saw these Paras doing.
22 "9. I think I told the Paras to report to their
23 Company Commander. I saw other Paras misbehaving in
24 a similar way and I had words with them. I do not
25 remember whether I ever found the Company Commander.
1 I wanted to tell him to get a grip of his men. To me it
2 looked like the Paras had got out of control."
3 You have told us that you do not remember him being
4 there, this officer on that occasion. Does that bring
5 back any recollection of either him coming to you at
6 some stage that day to complain about the behaviour of
7 members of your company or of you hearing by any other
8 route, that he had been angry at what the paratroopers
9 had been doing?
10 A. I heard of no complaints that day whatsoever about the
11 behaviour of my company.
12 Q. Would you agree that he, as the adjutant of the Royal
13 Green Jackets and someone who was on the spot at the
14 time, would have been in a position to tell the
15 difference between a member of the Green Jackets and
16 a member of your regiment?
17 A. Yes, I do agree.
18 Q. In paragraph 10, if we go on, he says:
19 "There was a photograph of the incident in the
20 Londonderry Times on the following Sunday. In that
21 photograph it looks as if I am striking the civilian who
22 is on the ground, but in fact I was stopping one of the
23 Paratroops."
24 Is it possible that the reason why you thought that
25 a member of the Green Jackets had been responsible for
1 the kicking incident was that you had misinterpreted
2 a photograph or piece of film that in fact showed
3 a Green Jacket officer trying to restrain a member of
4 your company?
5 A. No, that is not correct.
6 Q. He goes on:
7 "The whole incident was publicised on national
8 television. I remember it was on the six o'clock news.
9 The Commander of Land Forces, General Ford, ordered an
10 inquiry into what had happened. It was a regimental
11 inquiry and I think it was convened in Holywood Barracks
12 on the Monday or Tuesday of the following week. I flew
13 by helicopter down to Holywood Barracks to give my
14 evidence. I remember that it turned into an inquiry,
15 not about why the Paras had acted as they had, but about
16 why I had struck a Para NCO with a baton. I was at
17 Holywood for about two or three hours. The NCO gave
18 evidence to the effect that I had struck him and I was
19 then given the opportunity to question him. It was
20 almost as if I was acting in my own defence. I cannot
21 remember having hit a Para with a baton but it was
22 alleged I had done so. I heard no more about this
23 incident. Usually the findings of a regimental inquiry
24 would be passed to the commanding officer, at that time
25 Colonel Wilford, but I do not know whether that, in
1 fact, happened in this case, nor what the findings were.
2 Proceedings and findings may have been passed up the
3 chain of command."
4 You have described to us the investigation that was
5 conducted by a senior officer that you attended and when
6 you viewed the film. Do you have any knowledge of what
7 this officer describes as "a regimental inquiry," to
8 which he apparently gave evidence and in which an issue
9 arose about whether or not he had struck
10 a non-commissioned officer in your battalion with
11 a baton; do you know anything about it at all?
12 A. No, I do not. This is the first time I have heard such
13 a thing, in this statement.
14 Q. Quite apart from the involvement of this officer,
15 INQ573, did it ever come to your notice at the time that
16 one of your men was claiming that a member of the Green
17 Jackets had hit him?
18 A. No, I think I would have heard.
19 Q. In paragraph 12 this officer says:
20 "I have a distant memory of asking the commanding
21 officer, Peter Welsh, what he thought about what had
22 happened and he also thought that the violence used at
23 Magilligan was unnecessary."
24 Did you ever learn at the time of any view held by
25 Colonel Welsh about the behaviour of your company?
1 A. No, I did not, and certainly nothing was said when
2 I left that location to return to Palace Barracks.
3 I would like to say that the incident you have described
4 about -- maybe the incident in the Times, if you go
5 back --
6 Q. Can we scroll up the page a bit, please.
7 A. Scroll up the page, yes.
8 Q. Paragraph 10.
9 A. The incident I am talking about, that I was shown on --
10 is an extract from a television footage that appeared,
11 was not of an officer restraining a soldier, but of
12 somebody putting the boot in. There was a boot on the
13 end of a leg that was clothed in disruptive pattern
14 trousers. That is what I am talking about. That cannot
15 be in any way muddled up with an officer trying to
16 restrain someone with a baton. It was a boot being put
17 in, as the expression goes, onto a civilian who is lying
18 on the ground, and it was not done by a member of the
19 Parachute Regiment.
20 Q. Could we come to the video footage. Could we have video
21 11, please, 3 hours and 11 minutes, approximately. What
22 we are going to see is some film footage of Magilligan.
23 I will just play it through once and then we will return
24 to the part that I want to ask you a question about
25 (Video 11 played)
1 Q. You saw just at the end the beginning of the
2 conversation with Mr Hume. Did you also see, in the
3 footage that preceded it, a sequence in which it
4 appeared that a soldier kicked somebody?
5 A. Yes, I did.
6 Q. May we go back and look at that once again, please.
7 (Video 11 played)
8 Q. If it is possible while I am asking the next question to
9 freeze the picture on that incident of the soldier
10 kicking somebody. I would be grateful.
11 Having seen that, Major, are you able to say whether
12 that is the incident that you saw when you went to see
13 General Ford?
14 A. No, that is not what I remember. I remember -- what
15 I was shown was a picture of an individual civilian
16 lying on the ground being kicked, not walking or being
17 pushed or moving, as was shown in that video you have
18 just shown.
19 Q. Perhaps we had better look at it again. Can we run it
20 through once more, please. There is the freeze-frame,
21 do you see a soldier with his left leg back with
22 a helmet with a visor on?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. May we go back about five seconds and then play it
25 forward, please.
1 (Video 11 played)
2 Do you see that there appeared to be somebody on the
3 ground at the point when he kicked?
4 A. Yes, but there is also a melee of people wearing
5 disruptive pattern trousers. The chap right in front of
6 the screen now is wearing, so far as I can see -- my
7 eyesight is not as good it as used to be -- wearing
8 disruptive pattern material. He is there on the left of
9 the screen now. There are others to the right of the
10 screen, I think, wearing DPM trousers.
11 Q. Can we focus on the individual who administered the
12 kick. I know it is not very easy to see, are you able
13 to tell from his clothing to which regiment he belonged?
14 A. Well, I have my doubts he is a member of my company
15 because I do not recall or remember that we had those
16 type of macron helmets on those particular helmets. We
17 tended to wear our airborne helmets, which were steel
18 helmets in those days and had a different visor concept,
19 in fact they did not have a visor at all.
20 Q. Would it be right to say that he is not wearing
21 disruptive pattern trousers?
22 A. It would appear so.
23 Q. Having looked at that now a number of times, does it
24 remain your view that this is a different incident from
25 the one that you saw when you were summoned to see
1 General Ford?
2 A. Yes, it does, that is the case.
3 Q. May we look next at the Widgery transcript, Day 11,
4 page 58. This is a part of the evidence that
5 Colonel Wilford, your commanding officer, gave to
6 Lord Widgery when he held his inquiry in March 1972.
7 I would like to draw your attention to a part of it,
8 beginning just by letter C, where Mr McSparran, who was
9 cross-examining Colonel Wilford, asked about allegations
10 that had been made in relation to Magilligan. He asked.
11 "Question: Was any action taken against the
12 soldiers concerned in that particular incident?
13 "Answer: I conducted an inquiry into the affair.
14 "Question: You did yourself?
15 "Answer: Yes, I did.
16 "Question: Just by yourself?
17 "Answer: My officers conduct the inquiry.
18 "Question: Who conducted the inquiry -- you or your
19 officers?
20 "Answer: My second-in-command and two other
21 officers conducted it on my direction.
22 "Question: Were there any findings resulting from
23 that inquiry?
24 "Answer: Yes.
25 "Question: What were they?
1 "Answer: That in that situation a soldier had in
2 fact kicked (because there was no argument about it)
3 a man on the ground but the circumstances were such that
4 he might easily and justifiably have lost his temper.
5 "Question: So no action was taken then either?
6 "Answer: Action was taken: the soldier appeared in
7 front of me.
8 "Question: Did he stay on in service?
9 "Answer: Of course."
10 Looking at those questions and answers, does any
11 memory come back of an inquiry taking place within your
12 own battalion into what had happened at Magilligan?
13 A. No, I cannot recall an inquiry.
14 Q. Would you accept that, if that is what Colonel Wilford
15 said at the time on a matter like this, then it must be
16 right?
17 A. Yes, I would accept that.
18 Q. Moreover, if such an inquiry had taken place within the
19 battalion, it is really inconceivable, is it not, that
20 you would not have been at least aware of it and,
21 presumably to some extent, involved in it?
22 A. Yes, I would have been but, as I say, I cannot remember.
23 Q. Having seen that, would you accept also that the
24 allegation that one of your soldiers had kicked
25 a civilian on the ground, so far from being a malicious
1 allegation, was an allegation that was found to be true
2 by senior officers within your own battalion?
3 A. Fine. But you are showing me something which I have not
4 seen before and I had no knowledge of and nor do I have
5 any memory of it.
6 Q. What were the means by which you would have expected
7 your soldiers to hold back the crowd at Magilligan?
8 A. This is purely speculation, by creating a physical
9 barrier.
10 Q. If necessary would you have expected them to use riot
11 control weapons of any kind?
12 A. It is an escalating process. The use of minimum force
13 is paramount in people's minds, but it is an escalating
14 process. You hope that you will use the minimum means
15 possible.
16 Q. But if necessary they would have been entitled to use
17 baton rounds; is that right?
18 A. If that was required by your orders in either protecting
19 life or property or to achieve the mission.
20 Q. Should they in any circumstances have used rifle butts
21 to club people or to threaten people?
22 A. No.
23 Q. I am going to send you another name of a soldier who is
24 known to this Inquiry as Lance Corporal INQ1970. Is
25 that a name that means anything to you?
1 A. It is a name I recollect, yes.
2 Q. Do you recall him being present at Magilligan, or not?
3 A. No, I do not.
4 Q. Do you recall that he was the battalion photographer of
5 1 Para at the time?
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. May we look, please, at part of his statement at
8 C1970.5. This is a statement he has made to this
9 Inquiry. Again he is describing Magilligan and he says,
10 this:
11 "Through the mist in the morning these guys came on
12 rowing boats. It was just like an armada. They were
13 singing Republican songs. They were carrying rocks and
14 as they got into the shallow water, the Green Jackets
15 tried to stop them. C Company were called in to do
16 a baton charge on the crowd. I took photographs of the
17 action. I have a copy of one that I believe that I took
18 which I produce marked 1, which shows the baton charge.
19 It turned nasty. The guys got stuck in; they were using
20 their rifle butts on the crowd and gave them a good
21 hiding on the beach, they put the boot in. A Green
22 Jacket officer hit a Para with a baton, shouting at him
23 that he was an animal. There was a photo of a Para
24 kicking a guy in the head and it was on the front of the
25 newspapers. Everyone was horrified at the brutality of
1 the Paras against stone throwers."
2 May we keep that on the screen and put beside it
3 page C1970.15, which is the photograph to which he is
4 referring, in which we can see a number of soldiers and
5 it appears, a police officer with batons.
6 First of all, are you able to say from looking at
7 that photograph, which I accept is not of very good
8 quality, whether the soldiers are members of the
9 Parachute Regiment or of some other unit?
10 A. It appears it could well be a mixture. Certainly, as
11 you say, there are two members of the RUC, it would
12 appear to me, the two people with their batons raised.
13 Q. What about the soldiers?
14 A. The soldier in the foreground without any headdress; um,
15 the soldier with the visor, I cannot comment, but I do
16 not recall wearing or having that item of headdress.
17 Q. The paragraph I have read out, as you will appreciate,
18 is an account given by a member of your battalion who
19 was present on the day of what he says happened in his
20 presence. Do you have any reason not to accept what he
21 says in this paragraph?
22 A. No, I do not.
23 Q. Do you recall whether you ever saw any photographs that
24 he had taken at the time?
25 A. No, I do not recall.
1 Q. He then goes on in paragraph 25 to say that he produces
2 another photograph. May we have that on the right-hand
3 side of the screen, please, C1970.16. In a moment we
4 will enlarge it, but let us see what he says about it.
5 He says:
6 "I think that this is a press photograph that I may
7 have cut out of a newspaper. Unfortunately we messed up
8 one of our films. The Paras got a terrible write-up
9 about Magilligan."
10 Could we now enlarge the photograph so it fills the
11 whole screen. You can read what the caption says and we
12 can see a soldier who appears to be holding a rifle from
13 the barrel end. Are you able to identify the regiment
14 to which he belonged?
15 A. Yes, he would be a member of my company.
16 Q. Is that an appropriate way for him to have been
17 behaving?
18 A. No, it is not.
19 Q. Was it ever brought to your attention that soldiers had
20 been behaving in that way?
21 A. No, not at all.
22 Q. Would you not expect it to have been brought to your
23 attention if such matters had been observed by NCOs on
24 the scene?
25 A. Yes, I would.
1 Q. As we have seen, this soldier, the photographer says
2 that people were horrified by the brutality of the
3 Paras. Are you sure that you do not recall any
4 awareness within the regiment that there was a concern
5 about misbehaviour by the Paras on that occasion?
6 A. I did not think there had been any misbehaviour at all
7 on that occasion.
8 Q. May we go back to what you say in your statement at
9 B2168.005. At the end of paragraph 33, which we were
10 looking at a little earlier, you say -- having said that
11 brutality was never tolerated, you say:
12 "The fact is to the contrary; we were one of the
13 very few units in Northern Ireland at that time who were
14 able to restore and maintain law and order without
15 resorting to the use of physical force."
16 Do you still consider that to be an accurate
17 statement?
18 A. There were times when that was so, yes.
19 Q. In the final sentence of the paragraph, you say:
20 "We were well regarded by all sectors of the
21 community for our professionalism and impartiality."
22 Whether their view was right or wrong, fair or
23 unfair, do you really believe that the nationalist
24 community in Northern Ireland at that time had a high
25 regard for the professionalism and impartiality of the
1 Parachute Regiment?
2 A. That had been the case. We had been there since 1969
3 and we were welcome, initially, by the Republican
4 elements, Republican side.
5 Q. Had that changed by the time that we are talking
6 about, January 1972?
7 A. Yes, situations hardened on both sides. I do not mean
8 between the Army and Republicans, I mean between
9 Protestants and Catholics, both those sides, the
10 situation had hardened considerably.
11 Q. I would like to come on now to the battalion order group
12 that appears to have taken place on 29th January 1972
13 and what you say in paragraph 4 of your statement at
14 2168.001. You explain that you have no direct
15 recollection of the specifics of the briefing but you
16 recall receiving some orders at Palace Barracks on
17 29th January and, at the end of the paragraph, you say
18 that the orders were very general and that was all they
19 could be as the operation would only become clear as the
20 situation developed in Londonderry during the afternoon.
21 May we, with that in mind, look at ED49.5, please.
22 These are some notes made by Colonel Wilford, or for the
23 use of Colonel Wilford in relation to the battalion
24 order group on 29th January. In paragraph 2 we can see
25 that the mission is summarised, as follows:
1 "The battalion is to arrest maximum number of
2 rioters."
3 At 3(a) the general outline says:
4 "The battalion is to move to Londonderry via
5 Drumahoe, taking up its position in Foyle College car
6 park by 1300."
7 That deals with D Company. Then:
8 "If the march takes place and confrontation becomes
9 hostile, the battalion will deploy forward to break up
10 the rioters and make the maximum number of arrests. At
11 this stage I cannot give a detailed tactical plan.
12 I will give the company deployment in our forming-up
13 position and then give my concept of how I think the
14 battle can go."
15 Broadly speaking, does that accord with your
16 recollection of the sort of thing you were told in
17 advance of travelling to Londonderry?
18 A. Yes, that is consistent. But I say the orders were very
19 much of a general nature.
20 Q. Further down the page at 3(g), he comes on to the
21 concept of the battle. I do not want to go into the
22 details of that just at the moment, but over the page
23 there is a note about "minor tactics." We see:
24 "Speak of Derry rioters. Background gas and
25 bullets."
1 Do you have any recollection of what you were told
2 about the Derry rioters?
3 A. No, I have not.
4 Q. Or of anything being said about background gas and
5 bullets, whatever exactly that means?
6 A. No, no recollection at all.
7 Q. One other passage on this page at h2, we have the
8 "arrest procedure" where these notes say:
9 "The arrest team of Royal Military Police with
10 Regimental Sergeant Major and paddy wagon and escort
11 will move forward to a location in Great James Street.
12 Normal arrest procedure then take prisoners and
13 documentation to Fort George or Craigavon Bridge.
14 (Sit)."
15 Do you know what "sit" means in this context?
16 A. No, I do not, know.
17 Q. What was the paddy wagon?
18 A. It is a derogatory term, a black Maria, if you want
19 another word.
20 Q. What is your recollection of the procedure that is
21 described here as "normal arrest procedure," what did
22 that involve?
23 A. Well, arrest and process through the RUC.
24 Q. What procedure were your soldiers required to follow
25 when making an arrest, do you remember anything in
1 particular?
2 A. No, I cannot say I do.
3 Q. Were there any formalities at all that they had to
4 comply with?
5 A. Can you elaborate on that?
6 Q. Was there any explanation required to be given to those
7 whom they were arresting at the time of arrest as to why
8 they were being arrested or under what power?
9 A. Do you mean, do they give a caution?
10 Q. No.
11 A. Or whatever the police term is?
12 Q. I mean, were they required to tell the person who was
13 being arrested what they were being arrested for?
14 A. I do not believe so at that time, no.
15 Q. Or under what power they were being arrested?
16 A. I do not believe so at that time.
17 Q. Do you remember giving any orders yourself to your
18 platoon commanders?
19 A. No, obviously I gave orders, but I cannot remember.
20 Q. I am going to send you another name to ask if you
21 remember this soldier. He is a soldier whose cipher is
22 Corporal INQ1799 and he was a corporal in C Company at
23 the time; do you remember him?
24 A. Yes, I know the name, yes.
25 Q. May we look, please, at part of his statement at
1 C1799.1. As you can see, this is a statement he has
2 made to this Inquiry. Can we highlight, please,
3 paragraphs 4 to 6. He says in paragraph 4:
4 "We deployed from Palace Barracks on
5 30th January 1972 and knew we were going to Londonderry
6 although we did not receive our formal briefing at
7 Palace Barracks."
8 He gives some details about the journey. In
9 paragraph 5, he says:
10 "We were formally briefed at the military camp of
11 Long Kesh. I remember the briefing was very early in
12 the morning. It was unusual to be briefed at Long Kesh
13 but then again it was unusual to be travelling to
14 Londonderry. We stopped at Long Kesh because it was
15 inside the county of Derry but not in the City of
16 Londonderry."
17 I pause there to say there must be something wrong
18 with that because Long Kesh was not in the county of
19 Derry, but never mind the exact location, he recalls
20 a briefing at a military camp. Then in paragraph 6, he
21 says:
22 "I would describe the briefing as a 'heavy-weight
23 briefing'. In the normal course of events we would be
24 briefed by our platoon commander or at section level but
25 this was a full company briefing given by the company
1 commander, Major 221A, and my impression was that he was
2 possibly supported by the adjutant or the intelligence
3 officer."
4 Seeing that, does that revive any recollection of
5 giving a briefing, or are you able to say whether or not
6 a briefing, such as he describes, of the whole company
7 was given by you?
8 A. No, it was not unusual for company commanders to address
9 the whole company, but nonetheless often detailed orders
10 would still be put down through the company platoon
11 commanders and through the section commanders. I cannot
12 recall that we visited Long Kesh. He says we did,
13 I assume we did; I cannot remember that.
14 Q. May we go on to the next page. In paragraph 8 he says:
15 "I do not remember exactly what was said at the
16 briefing at Long Kesh, but I remember coming away with
17 three distinct impressions. My first impression was
18 that this was a heavy-weight briefing and that meant
19 serious business."
20 You have said that it was not unusual for a company
21 commander to address the whole company. Do you have any
22 reason to think that an impression was given to your
23 company that this was serious business because of the
24 way in which they were briefed?
25 A. Sorry, I am just reading paragraph 8, give me a moment.
1 Q. Please read the whole paragraph.
2 A. Yes, I would like to, thank you. (Pause).
3 Sorry, could you ask your question again?
4 Q. He gives the impression in this paragraph that, as
5 a result of the way in which the briefing was conducted
6 and apparently specifically because the whole company
7 was briefed as a company, that the message was got
8 across to the soldiers that this was what he describes
9 as "a serious business" and that a serious riot might
10 take place. Is that a message that you would have
11 sought to get across to your company?
12 A. Yes, it is, but not necessarily because of Londonderry.
13 If I make a supposition here, because I cannot remember
14 the briefing itself, I make a supposition: you have
15 already mentioned that I was at Magilligan a week before
16 and we have already discussed that there were
17 allegations against the soldiers, which I claim to be
18 unfounded, but nonetheless allegations were made.
19 I probably would have been particularly concerned that
20 I did not wish a repetition of what had happened at
21 Magilligan, i.e. that allegations should be made against
22 the company. Perhaps I was reading the riot act to them
23 for all I know, but I honestly cannot remember.
24 Q. In paragraph 9 he says because of his impressions after
25 the briefing he remembered asking the colour sergeant if
1 they would have access to additional weaponry, should
2 the soldiers encounter defensive positions. He does not
3 say you were involved in that conversation, so I do not
4 think I need to ask you about it.
5 Paragraph 10:
6 "In Belfast, we all had our own laminated maps.
7 I am sure at the briefing we would have been shown a map
8 of Londonderry and the platoon commander would have also
9 had a map."
10 Are you able to say whether you gave a briefing by
11 reference to a map to your company, explaining where
12 everything was and where they would be going?
13 A. Well, it would have to have been, because we did not
14 know the area.
15 Q. Paragraph 11:
16 "We travelled from Long Kesh into Londonderry in the
17 armoured vehicles. I remember that as I was section
18 commander, I thought about how I would deal with
19 a situation if gunmen were to open fire. I was trying
20 to construct a mental picture of the area. My line of
21 thinking at that time would be that I would have two
22 roles. Firstly, to make sure that my men and innocent
23 civilians were okay and, secondly, to resolve the
24 situation decisively and to our advantage if possible.
25 Taking decisive action would be to either put the gunmen
1 out of action or alternatively to close on them and make
2 their position untenable."
3 Do you recall whether you had in mind a serious
4 possibility that gunmen would be encountered on that
5 afternoon?
6 A. No, as I have said. I cannot recall the details of
7 either receiving orders or of giving orders.
8 Q. It may be in the light of your recollection you are
9 unable to answer this, but can you say whether you would
10 have sought to brief either your company as a whole or
11 your platoon commanders about a risk that gunmen would
12 be encountered and the way in which they should deal
13 with that situation, if it arose?
14 A. We could well have talked it through, yes.
15 Q. Can we go back, please, to your statement, C2168.2,
16 paragraph 8. In that paragraph you refer to your
17 recollection of hearing a report over the battalion
18 radio net of shots that had been fired at the Army while
19 you were waiting in the Foyle College car park. You
20 cannot recall any more details than that.
21 Are you sure, first of all, that this was a report
22 that you heard over the battalion radio net as opposed
23 to any other radio net?
24 A. Well, I would only have had two radio nets, my company
25 net and the battalion net. As the shots were not fired
1 at us, it would not have come from our company, it would
2 have come from our battalion net.
3 Q. Are you sure this is something you heard at the stage
4 when you were waiting in the Foyle College car park?
5 A. To the best of my recollection, that is correct.
6 Q. As you say, this was not shooting at your company.
7 Should we understand, then, that it was a report from
8 some other unit that was being passed on to your
9 battalion over the battalion net?
10 A. That is what I would understand, yes.
11 Q. Do you have any recollection of which other unit it was
12 or where this shooting was supposed to have taken place?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Would you expect a report of that kind, namely, a report
15 of shooting apparently directed at another unit, but
16 transmitted over your battalion net, to be recorded in
17 the log of transmissions over your battalion radio net?
18 A. I would have expected it to have been recorded on the
19 brigade net, or the brigade log.
20 Q. What about the 1 Para battalion log?
21 A. (Pause). Yes, possibly.
22 Q. Possibly but not necessarily or --
23 A. Well, as the shots were not fired directly at us, this
24 would have been of significance to whoever reported it,
25 another unit perhaps. This is all supposition because
1 I do not know for a fact. I would have expected that
2 unit and brigade to have logged it, because it would be
3 of significance that there had been a live round shot;
4 it may have been an accidental discharge from another
5 soldier, who knows, but it would have been significant
6 and all we had received was a warning to that effect,
7 that a shot had been fired.
8 Q. In paragraph 9 you say:
9 "At the holding area (Foyle College car park)
10 information was relayed over the battalion radio net
11 about the progress of the NICRA march and the associated
12 build up of trouble which developed into rioting.
13 I received orders to move C Company to Waterloo Place
14 for possible deployment through barrier 14."
15 By the time you received those orders to move to
16 Waterloo Place, had you been given any more details of
17 the operation that you would or might be required to
18 carry out?
19 A. I do not know. I cannot recall.
20 Q. Can you say whether you knew at that stage where you
21 were going to deploy your company if and when the arrest
22 operation was launched?
23 A. If I have just been told to receive orders to move to
24 Waterloo Place for possible deployment through barrier
25 14, is what I have said in paragraph 9.
1 Q. Did you know where you were to go once you had gone
2 through barrier 14?
3 A. I cannot tell whether I was told at that stage or later.
4 Q. Do you know whether you were aware at this stage of what
5 orders had been given to the other companies in your
6 battalion?
7 A. No, I cannot recall.
8 Q. Did you know at this stage whether you would be going
9 through barrier 14, if you were deployed at all, on foot
10 or in vehicles?
11 A. Again, I do not know.
12 Q. Was it your decision whether to use vehicles or go on
13 foot, or was that a matter on which you either did or
14 would expect to have received orders from
15 Colonel Wilford?
16 A. That is my recollection, that it was my decision to go
17 in on foot, but I cannot recall whether I had received
18 specific orders to go in on foot, or in vehicles.
19 Q. You carry on in your statement to deal with the movement
20 to Waterloo Place. Can we go on to paragraph 12,
21 please. You say at the beginning of paragraph 12:
22 "Not long after I arrived at Waterloo Place, an
23 order came over the battalion net that C Company was to
24 prepare to go in to the Bogside to mount an arrest
25 operation through barrier 14. I therefore got ready to
1 send my vehicles through barrier 14."
2 Should we understand from that that at that stage,
3 after you had arrived at Waterloo Place, you were
4 planning to send your company through in vehicles?
5 A. That would appear to be the intention.
6 Q. You say "that would appear to be the intention," I mean
7 that is undoubtedly what is written in your statement.
8 Can you remember whether that was your intention, or
9 not?
10 A. No, I cannot.
11 Q. You say a little further on in paragraph 12, after
12 referring to the order being for C Company to move
13 simultaneously with Support Company:
14 "My recollection is that the intention was that both
15 companies would then carry out arrest and scoop-up
16 operations against rioters in the area around the
17 junction of William Street and Rossville Street and the
18 wasteground to the east of Rossville Street."
19 Do you have an actual recollection as you sit here
20 today, that the intention was as you have described it
21 in this paragraph?
22 A. No, I do not have an actual recollection, no.
23 Q. Did you have an actual recollection at the time when you
24 made this statement?
25 A. This is supposition, possibly, by the sequence of events
1 that followed, that is where I get the recollection
2 from.
3 Q. Leaving aside what is written in the statement and just
4 thinking back, are you able to help us as to who told
5 you or who decided and when you were told what the
6 intention was as to what your company should do when it
7 went through the barrier?
8 A. Right, we would have received orders from battalion
9 headquarters on the battalion net.
10 Q. Can you say at what stage in the proceedings you
11 received those orders, or not?
12 A. I would think whilst we were in the Waterloo Place, but
13 I cannot be sure.
14 Q. Would details really have been given over an open radio
15 net of the area into which your troops would be
16 deployed?
17 A. If it was an immediate move, yes.
18 Q. That would seem to indicate that they would only have
19 been given at the moment when the troops were being sent
20 in?
21 A. Yes, when I say "immediate" I am talking within half an
22 hour or so, immediate in that respect. Clearly if it
23 was the following day or much later on ...
24 Q. May we go back for a moment to a slightly earlier stage
25 and to the notes relating to the battalion order group
1 meeting on the 29th at ED49.5. We passed over earlier
2 on the paragraph 3(g), "Concept of the battle." This is
3 what Colonel Wilford appears to have been saying on the
4 29th:
5 "The parade will come into contact with security
6 force barricades at William Street. There are two
7 approaches."
8 The first approach "from Rossville" is contemplating
9 that the march might come up Rossville Street, which is
10 not in the event what happened. He says:
11 "First. From Rossville. This will cause the crowd
12 to attempt a bypass through to Waterloo Street. In this
13 event I would want to put a company down the Strand into
14 Waterloo Street and two companies in William Street from
15 Lower Road and the Presbyterian Church."
16 On that hypothesis, if the march comes up
17 Rossville Street, it is one company into Waterloo Street
18 and two into William Street.
19 Over the page he deals with the second approach,
20 which is what actually happened, that the march comes up
21 William Street. He says:
22 "We can take this the same way, except this time
23 putting two companies in from the church."
24 So at this stage he is contemplating, if the march
25 comes up William Street, he will put two companies into
1 William Street, in fact from the Presbyterian Church.
2 He then says something which ties in with what you have
3 said:
4 "You will appreciate that much will depend on the
5 view I can get of the crowd and once you get the order
6 to move you will have to move fast. I shall probably
7 bring you forward in anticipation."
8 So he recognises there is a degree of flexibility
9 that is necessary and no doubt it was always possible
10 that the plan would be changed. What I want to ask you,
11 is whether, at any stage, as far as you can recall,
12 before the operation was actually launched, anybody
13 suggested to you that an arrest operation would be
14 carried out on the wasteground to the east of
15 Rossville Street, as opposed to in the more immediate
16 vicinity of barrier 14. If to answer that question it
17 would help you to look at a map, please say so and
18 I will show you one?
19 A. It would help if I could see a map. It would also help
20 if you could rephrase that question, I have lost the
21 gist of it.
22 Q. Could we look at Q9, please. If we cannot have that,
23 can we have the map attached to one of the statements.
24 Can we enlarge the area in the top right-hand quarter,
25 please. William Street runs from northwest to
1 southeast. Just by the tip of my second arrow is
2 barrier 14. Rossville Street runs from northeast to
3 southwest, as you can see, and barrier 12, through which
4 Support Company came, is up at the top, more or less in
5 the centre. (Indicating) Do you recall the broad
6 details of the geography of this area?
7 A. From the map, yes.
8 Q. Can we take my arrows off, please. Do you also recall
9 that there was an area of wasteground to the north of
10 William Street and the east of Little James Street, just
11 where my arrow now appears?
12 A. No, I do not recall that. There could well have been,
13 I cannot remember that. I cannot remember ever being
14 that far to the north.
15 Q. Do you recall the larger area of wasteground to the east
16 of Rossville Street?
17 A. I can recall an area of wasteground, from memory, but
18 I cannot necessarily be specific as to whether it is
19 that area of wasteground we are talking about, I suspect
20 it was.
21 Q. The question I wanted to ask you -- please say if you
22 simply cannot remember -- was whether, at any stage
23 before the actual launching of the operation, either
24 Colonel Wilford or anybody else had suggested to you, as
25 a company commander who would be responsible for one of
1 the companies taking part in the operation, that the
2 arrest operation might take place in the area of the
3 wasteground to the east of Rossville Street, as opposed
4 to taking place in the area further north, around the
5 junction of William Street and Little James Street?
6 A. No, I cannot recall that.
7 Q. May we go back to paragraph 14 of your statement. You
8 describe waiting for the final order to go through
9 barrier 14 and the anticipation that your company was
10 about to be deployed to restore order in the immediate
11 vicinity and make arrests if necessary to achieve this.
12 Then you say:
13 "The riot had developed to such an intensity that we
14 expected petrol bombs and nailbombs to be the next line
15 of attack by the rioters who had spent quite
16 a considerable time hurling bricks, stones, iron bars
17 and anything else that they could get their hands on."
18 Should we understand from that second sentence,
19 therefore, that although you expected petrol bombs and
20 nailbombs to be the next line of attack, no petrol bombs
21 or nailbombs had in fact been thrown towards your
22 position before you went through the barrier?
23 A. To the best of my knowledge, that is correct, not in the
24 area of barricade 14.
25 Q. In paragraph 15 you say:
1 "As we were preparing to go through barrier 14, my
2 expectation was that my company would disperse rioters
3 and arrest those that it could, and restore law and
4 order. We were not going into the Bogside to open up
5 the area, although I expected that once we had made the
6 arrests, we would remain there for some time in
7 anticipation of other Army units and RUC officers
8 re-establishing themselves in at least part of this
9 'no-go' area."
10 Can you give some idea of what your expectation was
11 in terms of how long you would remain in the Bogside
12 while other Army units and RUC officers re-established
13 themselves; were you expecting to stay there for
14 a period of minutes or hours, or what?
15 A. I can only relate this to what had happened on previous
16 occasions in Belfast. When there had been rioting we
17 had been called in and we would be frequently required
18 to remain in the immediate vicinity, sometimes all
19 night, certainly for several hours, in case the rioting
20 should re-emerge. After all, we were dispersing
21 rioters; as the name implies, they have dispersed, they
22 had not necessarily gone away totally and could well
23 come back. That is what I am saying, I would expect,
24 having gone in there to have quelled the initial riot
25 and then to have hung around to ensure that people did
1 not come back again to the area of barrier 14 where the
2 rioting had taken place and start all over again.
3 Q. That is your description of your own expectation on the
4 basis of experience in Belfast. So far as this
5 particular operation is concerned, had anybody actually
6 told you that an attempt would be made to re-establish
7 security force presence in a no-go area or anything like
8 that?
9 A. No, they had not.
10 Q. Paragraph 16, you set out your recollection of the final
11 order given over the radio:
12 "Call sign 3, move now through barrier 14."
13 You also recall hearing the order:
14 "Call sign 5 move now into the area through barrier
15 12."
16 Were you aware of any order being given to
17 A Company, or not?
18 A. No, I cannot recall.
19 Q. Can you recall whether, at this stage, at the actual
20 moment of the final order, you were given any further
21 order about what you were to do or not to do once you
22 had gone through the barrier?
23 A. Again, I cannot recall.
24 Q. Do you recollect being given any order that you should
25 not conduct a running battle?
1 A. No, I do not. A "running battle" is not an expression
2 I would understand.
3 Q. Not an expression that was in general currency in the
4 regiment as having any particular meaning?
5 A. No.
6 Q. May we look briefly, please, at W90. This is part of
7 the, as you can see, 1 Para battalion log of
8 30th January. At serial 31 there is an entry at 1610,
9 which says "to 9" and then there is the sign for the
10 control station?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. "9," as I understand it -- correct me if this is
13 wrong -- is Colonel Wilford?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. It says:
16 "Move 3 now through K14."
17 A. That is C Company through barrier 14, yes.
18 Q. C Company through barrier 14:
19 "Also call sign 1. No running battles."
20 I appreciate that is a message apparently
21 communicated to Colonel Wilford, if the annotation is
22 right. If you or your radio operator was listening to
23 the battalion net, you would have heard that; is that
24 not right?
25 A. Yes, I expect so, yes.
1 Q. Looking at that, can you help us any more as to what "no
2 running battles" would have been understood to mean?
3 A. No, it is possibly a shorthand phrase used for the
4 battalion log where you can see that everything is
5 shortened to a minimum to portray an idea, but it is not
6 an order that I could have actually acted upon, because
7 I do not know what the definition of "no running
8 battles" is.
9 Q. At paragraph 17 of your statement, B2168.3, you describe
10 the reason for the delay at barrier 14 and the
11 conversation that you had with the officer in command of
12 the Royal Green Jackets. You say that:
13 "He was reluctant to expose his men to the ferocity
14 of the rioters as they could not move the barricades
15 aside whilst protecting themselves by their riot
16 shields."
17 As a result you told him firmly that if he would not
18 move the barriers aside, then you would go through on
19 foot. Do you have a clear recollection of this
20 conversation?
21 A. No, not a clear recollection, no.
22 Q. Are you sure that this is an accurate description of it?
23 A. As far as I can be, yes.
24 Q. You decided to send two platoons through the barrier on
25 foot; is that right?
1 A. That is correct.
2 Q. Was the barrier opened for them or did they have to
3 climb over it?
4 A. Climbed over it, through it or partially round it, but
5 it was not opened up for vehicles to drive through and
6 certainly we did not wish to go into the area in single
7 file. After all, we were facing rioters.
8 Q. Once two platoons had gone through the barrier, how many
9 platoons were left?
10 A. Well, there were three platoons in a company, so one.
11 Q. Did the third company go through the barrier in vehicles
12 or on foot?
13 A. No, I think I, um, I recall that only two companies went
14 on foot, the third platoon, I mean, remained mounted in
15 their vehicles.
16 Q. Is it right that the three platoons in question were 7,
17 8 and 9 platoons?
18 A. That would be correct.
19 Q. Do you recall in which order they went in?
20 A. No.
21 Q. May we look at B2166, please. This is the statement
22 that you made over the telephone on 31st January 1972.
23 We can see in your "diary of operations" at 1545 hours
24 the entry:
25 "Concentrated at Waterloo Place. Two platoons
1 prepared for foot assault, one platoon remaining
2 mounted."
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. At 1610:
5 "Ordered to assault rioters in east end of
6 William Street."
7 Looking at that, does it not appear that the
8 decision had been made up to 25 minutes before the
9 company went in that two platoons would be sent in on
10 foot?
11 A. It would appear so, yes.
12 Q. May your recollection of being in a vehicle waiting for
13 the barrier to be opened and having to get out and
14 remonstrate with the Green Jackets' officer about
15 opening the barrier not be accurate?
16 A. I do not recall having said that. I recall a moment ago
17 having said that we did not wish to go through the
18 barriers in single file. We would have preferred the
19 barriers to have been pulled aside so we could have
20 deployed tactically on foot.
21 Q. Paragraph 19, please, at B2168.3. You describe how the
22 two platoons went through on foot and how the rioters
23 quickly dispersed. Do you recall whether there was
24 really any significant number of rioters in the area in
25 front of the barrier at the time when your troops went
1 in?
2 A. No, I cannot really recall, but I have an impression
3 that there were, yes.
4 Q. I would like to look now at some of the actuality
5 footage of this part of the sequence of events. May we
6 look at the BBC film at video 1 at approximately 4
7 minutes and just play it through, please. This will
8 show the soldiers going through the barrier. This is
9 the end of the sequence with the water cannon and now we
10 see soldiers going forward and through the barrier.
11 (Video 1 played)
12 We can see that a group of soldiers appear to go up
13 William Street, followed fairly quickly by a vehicle and
14 then some soldiers go down Chamberlain Street. Can we
15 stop there, please. Can we go back to that last
16 sequence with the soldier standing on the corner.
17 The soldier there appears to have some sort of
18 special sight on his rifle; can you tell us what that
19 is?
20 A. No, I cannot. I do not know whether they called them
21 starlight scopes, whether it was a night vision aid, or
22 ... it certainly is not a telescopic sight, anyway.
23 I think it is a low visibility or a scope used for night
24 use.
25 Q. You saw the sequence of the soldiers coming through the
1 barrier and the vehicle; does that help you to recall
2 any more details about the sequence of events here and
3 the way in which your troops were deployed?
4 A. Well, yes it does.
5 Q. Can we carry on, please, with the video.
6 (Video 1 played)
7 This is showing the junction of Chamberlain Street
8 and Eden Place. Could we stop there, please. Do you
9 recognise either of those two soldiers?
10 A. No, I do not.
11 Q. Carry on, please.
12 That is the wasteground. We now have a sequence of
13 film in which Father Daly comes up Chamberlain Street in
14 front of the body of Jackie Duddy, who had been shot.
15 You were in the area of Chamberlain Street; did you see
16 that happening?
17 A. No, I did not.
18 Q. Do you know where you were when that happened?
19 A. No, I do not, no.
20 Q. We can stop that video there, please. May we look at
21 a portion of the other film, the ITN film, video 3 at 4
22 minutes.
23 It is much the same scene, but we get a little more
24 detail. That portion we are seeing now may be slightly
25 out of sequence, but do not worry about that, we will
1 come back to the barrier at William Street. We see
2 soldiers going in
3 (Video 3 played)
4 What then happens is that we see some vehicles
5 following. We see three Pigs overtaking a fourth Pig
6 that had stopped, apparently, and then a line of Pigs in
7 William Street. Can we pause there, please.
8 Can you explain what was going on there with the
9 movement of the vehicles?
10 A. Do you want me to make a supposition? Because I cannot
11 remember. Well, it appears to me as if we are about to
12 withdraw. If you go back to the sequence of the four
13 Pigs lined up on the pavement, the one Pig overtaking
14 the other, there are four of them in a row, this is not
15 part of a tactical deployment, it looks as though we are
16 about to get into the vehicles as we are preparing to
17 leave. That is what it appears to me.
18 Q. Can we go back and look at it one more time, please.
19 Can we go back to the bit where the soldiers are coming
20 through on foot.
21 Is what you are saying, that this is the deployment
22 of the soldiers and there is then a break in the film?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. So that the next sequence showing vehicles must be at
25 a later stage, when the vehicles are coming into pick up
1 the soldiers; is that what you think is happening?
2 A. Yes, you look at those two sequences, I am just looking
3 at what the soldiers are doing. In the second
4 sequence -- you have gone too far now -- in the second
5 sequence --
6 Q. Can we stop there, please. Do you need to see the
7 second sequence again?
8 A. Yes, in the second sequence where the vehicles are
9 parked up -- and we can look at it again after -- there.
10 Have a look at the soldiers. Hold it there. You have
11 gone too far, but still. The soldiers are not now
12 moving tactically as they had been just a moment before,
13 and this is not a moment before, because this film is
14 out of sequence. The soldiers are now gathered as if
15 they have been called in, ready to be picked up to be
16 taken away. You see here they are moving quite
17 differently. Now they are not. They are stopped as if
18 the whole whole thing is over and they are about to go
19 home. That is my interpretation.
20 Q. That is helpful. Can we go on to the next little bit.
21 The camera swings round in a moment and we see the Pigs
22 lined up in William Street. Then there is a little
23 section in which these soldiers are crouched down on the
24 north side of William Street and cross the road over
25 towards the Pigs.
1 Do you know what they were doing there, or not?
2 A. Well, I cannot say, but it does not appear to be the
3 same group. It may be the same group, but there again
4 they are not moving as if they are anticipating trouble
5 or -- they look as if they are -- they are looking, they
6 are watching, but they are actually moving jauntily
7 across the road to get into the vehicles or to get over
8 towards the vehicles.
9 Q. Thank you. Can we go to paragraphs 20 to 22 of your
10 statement at B2168.3, please. You describe here your
11 own movements as your company had been deployed and you
12 explain that you moved down Chamberlain Street and down
13 Eden Place and stepped out on to the wasteground to see
14 what Support Company were doing. At this stage, is this
15 right, you were accompanied by your radio operator? Do
16 you recall who that radio operator was -- of course,
17 please do not mention his name?
18 A. No, regrettably, I cannot.
19 Q. You say in paragraph 21 that you were immediately aware
20 that Support Company had taken up defensive positions,
21 and at the beginning of paragraph 22, that you were
22 initially surprised to see them adopting a defensive
23 stance as you had not expected to encounter aggression
24 on that scale.
25 What do you mean by "aggression on that scale"; on
1 what scale?
2 A. Well, the defensive positions I am referring to are --
3 it is as if the soldiers were defending themselves from
4 the prospect of live rounds being fired at them, or were
5 being fired at them, um, as opposed to the way my
6 company was moving, which was more overtly; they were
7 being cautious, they were covering each other, but they
8 were standing up and were in full view, they were not
9 sort of, what we call, taking cover.
10 Q. Is the position, in the light of the amendment that you
11 made to your statement at the beginning of your evidence
12 this afternoon, that really you just have no
13 recollection of any firing that you heard that afternoon
14 that you can give to the Tribunal?
15 A. Not now, this particular date, no, I have not.
16 Q. May we look at the paragraph that you did amend, which
17 is paragraph 30, where you had said in your statement
18 originally that:
19 "In addition to the low velocity (handgun) shooting
20 I heard on the wasteground, I believe I heard an M1
21 carbine shooting at some time during the day."
22 May we put that alongside the statement you made at
23 the time, at B2166. When you made your statement to
24 this Inquiry, were you relying upon what appeared in the
25 statement that you made at the time for the purposes of
1 your paragraph 30?
2 A. Yes, I was.
3 Q. We can see the reference to the M1 carbine, both in your
4 paragraph 30 and in the statement on the left-hand side
5 in the entry for 1610 to 1620. When you referred in
6 your statement to this Inquiry to low velocity handgun
7 shooting, where had you taken that from?
8 A. I had not. Regrettably, these were words that were put
9 into my mouth when this statement was formulated.
10 Q. Were they?
11 A. To some extent.
12 Q. How did that come about?
13 A. Because I would have said -- and I would have had a copy
14 of my 1972 statement. We would have talked about an
15 M1 carbine, but that is why I now, regrettably, in
16 retrospect, from March 1999 when I made that statement,
17 this statement we are looking at, it was signed
18 admittedly a year later, but I am not happy with that
19 particular paragraph. But I have no reason to doubt
20 what I wrote in 1972 to be correct.
21 Q. We do see in the statement that you made in 1972
22 a sentence preceding the reference to the M1 carbine,
23 which says:
24 "I heard gunfire from my right. I quite definitely
25 heard an M1 carbine ..."
1 First of all, do you know whether, in 1972, you were
2 seeking to describe two different kinds of gunfire,
3 namely gunfire from your right and an M1 carbine firing
4 from the Rossville Flats, or whether that was two
5 sentences referring to the same thing?
6 A. No, I cannot really comment. I cannot really recall
7 that.
8 Q. If we go back to your statement at 2168.4, you say that
9 it was clear -- this is paragraph 24:
10 "It was clear that Support Company were reacting to
11 live fire."
12 To avoid confusion and loss of control you ordered
13 your men to remain in the area of Chamberlain Street,
14 High Street and Harvey Street. Where did you personally
15 go after your visit to the area of the wasteground where
16 Support Company were?
17 A. I cannot honestly remember.
18 Q. I am going to send you the name of another soldier who
19 is known in this Inquiry as Lieutenant N. He was the
20 lieutenant in command of the Mortar Platoon of Support
21 Company. Does that name mean anything to you?
22 A. Yes, I recognise the name.
23 Q. Do you remember the individual?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Do you remember whether you saw him on the wasteground
1 when you went to see what Support Company were doing?
2 A. I cannot honestly recall whether I did or not.
3 Q. May we look at a photograph, please, EP2.4. This is
4 a photograph taken of the wasteground to the east of
5 Rossville Street. The photographer is looking down
6 towards the Rossville Flats. The entry we can see on
7 the left-hand side of the photograph is the opening into
8 Eden Place from which you came out into the wasteground
9 yourself. Do you follow that description --
10 A. Yes, I see what you are referring to.
11 Q. We believe that the soldier standing just at the opening
12 with his rifle pointing into the opening is in fact
13 Lieutenant N, whose name I have just sent to you. His
14 evidence is that he fired three live rounds over the
15 heads of a hostile crowd that was advancing towards him
16 from the area of Chamberlain Street and Eden Place.
17 Were you there when that happened?
18 A. No, I was not, no.
19 Q. Did you know at the time that it had happened?
20 A. No, I did not.
21 Q. After the events of that afternoon, did you conduct any
22 sort of debriefing of your platoon commanders, or of
23 anyone in your company?
24 A. I would have expected, yes, but I cannot recall.
25 Q. Do you recall whether you received any reports from
1 soldiers in your company of sightings of gunmen or of
2 any shooting incidents in which they had been involved
3 on that day?
4 A. None of my soldiers were involved in shooting incidents
5 and none were reported to me.
6 Q. What about sightings of gunmen?
7 A. Not that I recall, no.
8 Q. Is that something that ought to have been reported to
9 you if it took place, if gunmen were seen?
10 A. Yes, yes, I think so. It is not an everyday occurrence.
11 Q. May we look, please, at another portion of the statement
12 of INQ1799, it is page C1799.4. The soldier whose
13 statement this is is someone I have already identified
14 to you. If you look on the screen to your right, he is
15 the corporal; do you see his name?
16 A. Yes, I do.
17 Q. In paragraph 31 of his statement, he describes his
18 movements when C Company was deployed and records that
19 he turned left into Chamberlain Street. He says:
20 "When I was in about position A [we will look at
21 that in a moment] on the attached map, I remember seeing
22 a civilian gunman directly in front of me. I cannot be
23 certain but I believe that I had zig-zagged to the
24 left-hand side of Chamberlain Street at this point."
25 I can omit the next sentence:
1 "I closed on the crowd to within about five feet of
2 them. The people were not in distinct rows, but the
3 gunman I saw was about two or three people deep into the
4 crowd. I cannot position the gunman on the map but he
5 was further south than my position and to my front in
6 Chamberlain Street."
7 He goes on in paragraph 32 to give a description of
8 what the gunman was wearing and to say that he remembers
9 seeing the gunman lift an automatic pistol with both his
10 hands:
11 "The gunman was pointing the pistol in my general
12 direction. I could see the ball shape of his clasped
13 hands around the automatic pistol."
14 He goes on to say:
15 "It would have been very difficult to engage the
16 gunman as he was surrounded by other civilians and
17 therefore the Yellow Card prohibited" the soldier from
18 shooting.
19 He wondered whether to fire a rubber bullet, but
20 instead took cover in the doorway of a house.
21 Did any report of that incident ever reach you, so
22 far as you can remember?
23 A. Not that I can remember, no.
24 Q. If we carry on to paragraphs 35 and 36, please. He goes
25 on to describe, as he was taking cover in the doorway,
1 hearing gunfire and, in particular, paragraph 36:
2 "Hearing two distinct bursts of automatic fire from
3 a Thompson sub-machine-gun."
4 You have told us that you do not now recall what
5 firing you heard, but may we take it that if you had
6 heard automatic fire yourself, that is something that
7 you would have recorded in the statement that you made
8 at the time?
9 A. Yes, that is correct.
10 Q. Can we go on in this same statement to another incident
11 that this soldier describes at paragraph 43 on page 6.
12 He describes going down to the south end of Chamberlain
13 Street, that is the end closest to the Rossville Flats.
14 He says:
15 "On arriving at point B at the south end of
16 Chamberlain Street, I took cover behind a large
17 boulder."
18 He describes checking the windows of the flats for
19 snipers. He says:
20 "As I was located at position B, behind the boulder,
21 the company commander, Major 221A, and his radio
22 operator were also with me. I have no idea why Major
23 221A was there."
24 Do you have any recollection of going down to the
25 south end of Chamberlain Street to a position from which
1 you had a good view of the Rossville Flats, and if it
2 would help you, please look again at the map at Q9?
3 A. Yes, I have a map here, thank you.
4 Q. If you have the map there let us keep the statement on
5 the screen. What he is describing is going to
6 a position at the south end of Chamberlain Street which,
7 as you will see from the map, is a position where
8 Chamberlain Street opens out into the car park area
9 between the three blocks of the Rossville Flats. Do you
10 remember whether you went down there or not?
11 A. I cannot remember, but I do remember appearing suddenly
12 in front of the flats. It could well be the case.
13 Q. Let us carry on, then --
14 LORD SAVILLE: I think we will take a short break.
15 (3.05 pm)
16 (A short break)
17 (3.15 pm)
18 MR ROXBURGH: May we have on the screen, please,
19 a photograph P279. Major, I hope the photograph will
20 help you to see the geographical location that I am
21 going to be asking you about. This is a photograph
22 taken from the Embassy Ballroom observation post, but it
23 shows Chamberlain Street running down the centre of the
24 photograph, with the three blocks of the Rossville Flats
25 in the background and, as you can see, the end of
1 Chamberlain Street opens out into the car park of the
2 Rossville Flats; do you see that?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. You may just be able to see that, although there are not
5 any boulders shown in the photograph, there are four
6 bollards at the end of Chamberlain Street to prevent
7 traffic moving from the car park into Chamberlain
8 Street; do you see those?
9 A. Yes, I do, yes.
10 Q. This soldier, INQ1799, the corporal, gives a description
11 in his statement of being somewhere near those bollards
12 at the end of Chamberlain Street with you and your radio
13 operator and your evidence, I think, is that you just do
14 not recall being there with him; is that right?
15 A. Yes, I cannot recall that, no.
16 Q. I need to show you what he says happened when the three
17 of you were there. May we go back, then, to his
18 statement at C1799.6. In paragraphs 45 onwards he says:
19 "As I was at this position by the boulder,
20 I remember thinking there was insufficient cover for the
21 three of us. By this time I could hear lots of single
22 rounds being fired. The gunfire was fairly intense.
23 I heard distinct slow automatic fire which I would say
24 came from a Bren gun or an LMG."
25 Should that be SMG, do you think, or does LMG mean
1 something in military parlance?
2 A. An LMG is a Bren gun.
3 Q. Possibly the .303 version. He says:
4 "Both of these weapons were in the possession of the
5 IRA at that time. In and amongst the gunfire I also
6 heard SLR fire.
7 "The next thing I remember is seeing a gunman at
8 about position C on the attached map."
9 I will show you that position in just a moment:
10 "My intention was drawn to this man as I was looking
11 south towards the low wall and the line of the wall was
12 broken by the M1 carbine sticking out around the east
13 edge of the wall."
14 Then he describes what an M1 carbine is. He says
15 he:
16 "... could see that the gunman was lying in the
17 prone position."
18 He released the safety catch on his rifle with the
19 intention of taking aim at the gunman.
20 Before we go any further we had better look at the
21 plan he is talking about. C1799.10, if we turn that
22 round. He is asserting that he and you and the radio
23 operator were standing at about point B and that this
24 gunman was behind a low wall at point C and was pointing
25 his M1 carbine in the direction of the arrow marked on
1 the map, that is to say towards block 3 of the
2 Rossville Flats.
3 If we then go back to his statement, C1799.7, we see
4 how his narrative goes on. He says in paragraph 48:
5 "As I released the catch on my rifle and was taking
6 aim at the gunman, another man stood up to the left of
7 the gunman."
8 He describes the other man shouting and yelling
9 something. He says that he decided not to fire at the
10 gunman because of the proximity of the other man. In
11 paragraph 51, he says:
12 "Just after I had been taking aim at the gunman
13 I remember hearing Major 221A say 'do not fire'.
14 I assumed that he was speaking to me but by then I had
15 no intention of firing. I then remember seeing the
16 gunman pull back and crawl towards a pillar-type object.
17 I did not see him or the other man after that."
18 Having seen what this corporal has said in his
19 statement, do you have any recollection of being present
20 yourself when a gunman with an M1 carbine was sighted in
21 the car park of the Rossville Flats?
22 A. No, I cannot remember that.
23 Q. Do you think that if this had happened in your presence,
24 it is an incident that would have stuck in your memory,
25 or may it be that it did happen but you have forgotten
1 it?
2 A. I think it could well have happened. I do remember
3 appearing right up in front of the Rossville Flats;
4 I have a vision of that in my mind, um, the rest of it
5 I have no memory of, but it could well have happened.
6 Q. If it did happen, is it not something that you would
7 have recorded in the statement that you made at the
8 time, even if you had forgotten it many years later?
9 A. Well, the statement at the time was very brief; it was
10 taken over the telephone, um.
11 Q. But if you, as the company commander, had been right on
12 the spot when one of your soldiers had seen a gunman not
13 very far away from you and you had had occasion to say
14 "do not fire," surely that is something that would have
15 been sufficiently important to record it in a statement
16 made at the time, whether it was over the telephone or
17 not?
18 A. Yes, but I have not said I saw a gunman. This is the
19 corporal has said he has seen a gunman. It is not to
20 say that I necessarily saw what the corporal saw. I may
21 have seen the corporal taking up a position as if he was
22 about to fire and shouted at him "do not fire," I cannot
23 recall.
24 Q. If the corporal had seen a gunman, let us say, assume
25 for the sake of argument that you had not seen the
1 gunman but he had, is that something he ought to have
2 reported to his platoon commander and that ought to have
3 been reported up the chain from the platoon commander to
4 you?
5 A. My answer to that is: yes, but life is not quite like
6 that. There was an awful lot of things going on, um --
7 Q. In view of the controversy that immediately developed
8 about the events of that afternoon, the fact -- if that
9 is what it was -- that a man with an M1 carbine had been
10 seen in the car park of the Rossville Flats, would have
11 been pretty important; would it not?
12 A. Yes, it would.
13 Q. And in the light of its importance, it surely ought to
14 have been reported, ought it not?
15 A. Yes, it should have done. In fact, going back to my
16 statement of 1972, although I have not said I saw a
17 gunman, I have made a statement to the effect I heard
18 gunfire from my right, I quite definitely heard an
19 M1 carbine firing from the Rossville Flats. Perhaps
20 I should have added -- I do not know, it is now
21 speculation, which I am not prepared to do.
22 Q. Very well. The next matter is the question of arrests.
23 May we go back to your statement at B2168.4. In
24 paragraphs 25 and 26 you say that your company had been
25 very effective in the Chamberlain Street area and had
1 made 22 arrests in the space of about 10 minutes:
2 "That would have taken at least 44 members of the
3 company and probably more. The snatch squads tended to
4 work in teams of three, with two arresting soldiers
5 being covered by a third carrying a rifle."
6 Did you yourself see any arrests being made by your
7 company?
8 A. Not the arrests themselves, but I saw the aftermath;
9 I saw civilians lined up about to be taken away to be
10 processed by the RUC.
11 Q. Do you know what the people arrested by your soldiers
12 were arrested for?
13 A. Well, all those arrested that day would have been for
14 rioting.
15 Q. Do you know whether they were arrested for rioting at
16 the moment of their arrest or was the position that
17 people were arrested in Chamberlain Street for rioting
18 that had been going on earlier in William Street?
19 A. I think the latter.
20 Q. How, in those circumstances, were your soldiers to know
21 whether the people they arrested in Chamberlain Street
22 were the same people as had been rioting earlier on in
23 William Street?
24 A. I can only make a supposition: they did not, that was
25 a process -- that was the reason for processing them by
1 the RUC.
2 Q. So they did not know whether the people they arrested
3 had been rioting earlier on; is that what you are
4 saying?
5 A. No, I am not saying that.
6 Q. Then I will ask my question again: if the position is
7 that your soldiers arrested people in Chamberlain Street
8 for rioting that had been going on earlier in
9 William Street, how were they to know that they were
10 arresting people who had in fact been involved in
11 rioting in William Street?
12 A. I do not recall any arrests in Chamberlain Street. My
13 recollection is the arrests were made in
14 Harvey Street/High Street.
15 Q. How were your soldiers to know that the people they
16 arrested in Harvey Street and High Street were the same
17 people as had been rioting earlier on in William Street?
18 A. My recollection is that they chased them round the
19 corner and those were cul-de-sac, dead end roads. I may
20 be I wrong in that recollection, but that is how
21 I remember it.
22 Q. Is it right that the figure you give in paragraph 25 of
23 your statement, of 44 members of the company being
24 required, is arrived at on the basis that you need two
25 arresting soldiers to make each arrest?
1 A. That is correct.
2 Q. Is there any particular reason why an arrest has to be
3 made by two soldiers, rather than just one?
4 A. It is extremely difficult for one man to restrain
5 another man without using force.
6 Q. That presupposes that the arrest is one that is being
7 resisted by the person being arrested. You would only
8 need one man to arrest someone who was not resisting
9 arrest; is that not right?
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. Indeed, it is possible, is it not, that a single soldier
12 could have made more than one arrest in the space of
13 about ten minutes?
14 A. I do not think so.
15 Q. Why not?
16 A. Because what is he going to do with the arrested person?
17 Q. There is evidence before the Inquiry that of the people
18 arrested that afternoon and ultimately handed over to
19 the Royal Ulster Constabulary, soldiers of your company
20 arrested 13 people. Do you know where your figure of 22
21 people came from?
22 A. No, I cannot, I cannot tell you.
23 Q. Would it surprise you to learn that, according to the
24 papers, the 13 arrests made by members of your company
25 were effected by just three soldiers?
1 A. Yes, that would surprise me.
2 Q. Indeed, that all of those 13 arrests were made, not in
3 Harvey Street or High Street, but inside a house in
4 Chamberlain Street; did you know about that?
5 A. No, I did not.
6 Q. Do you recall any complaint being made about the
7 treatment of people who were arrested by soldiers in
8 your company and about abusive language being used and
9 so on?
10 A. No, I did not -- I cannot recall that.
11 Q. I am going to send you the name of a soldier who is
12 known to us as INQ12; he was a private in C Company.
13 Does that name mean anything to you?
14 A. I know that name.
15 Q. Do you remember the individual?
16 A. No.
17 Q. May we have on the screen, please, JB12.1. This is
18 a report by a police sergeant in the RUC, Police
19 Sergeant Boyle. It is dated 10th February 1972. The
20 subject is "a complaint against the Army" and the
21 complainant is a man named George Stephen Nelis,
22 33 years. It is a report addressed to the
23 Superintendent, Victoria police station.
24 In this report the police officer sets out the
25 complaint that had been made to him by Mr Nelis about
1 the circumstances of his arrest in his mother's house at
2 No. 33 Chamberlain Street. What had happened was
3 apparently that two injured people had been taken into
4 the house. I can pick it up in the next paragraph:
5 "Within minutes, an armoured personnel carrier, with
6 six soldiers aboard, arrived and parked outside the
7 house. Nelis approached the person in charge and
8 requested medical assistance for the injured people.
9 Two soldiers were sent into the house, at his request;
10 both of whom, examined the injured. A civilian
11 ambulance was summoned and the injured removed to
12 hospital."
13 Pausing there, did it ever come to your attention
14 that some of your soldiers had gone into a house where
15 two injured people, wounded by gunfire, were located?
16 A. No, it did not, no.
17 Q. "Nelis then alleges that all the male members, about 20
18 in all, who had taken shelter in the house, as trouble
19 had broken out, were taken out of the house, stood
20 against the wall, searched, and then marched to
21 a portion of wasteground, near the junction of
22 Chamberlain Street with William Street. They had been
23 marched there by members of the Army who had parked
24 outside his door.
25 "When they reached the waste ground, they were
1 forced to sit on the ground facing a wall. One of the
2 soldiers, whose name he alleges to be [then the name has
3 been blanked out, but the soldier we are talking about
4 is INQ12, and he gives a description of the soldier]
5 threatened to shoot him that night. [the soldier, it is
6 the same soldier] also boasted of having shot four
7 people in Belfast, relating in which part of the anatomy
8 he had placed his shots."
9 Does that bring back any recollection of a complaint
10 coming to your notice about the behaviour of this
11 particular soldier on the day?
12 A. No, I have never seen that before in my life.
13 Q. If anything like that was said, would you agree that it
14 was really the opposite of the professionalism and
15 impartiality that you have claimed for your battalion?
16 A. Quite so.
17 Q. May we next go to paragraph 31 of your statement at page
18 B2168.004. You refer here to certain stories that began
19 to circulate in the days and weeks that followed
20 Bloody Sunday, about whether in fact more people had
21 been killed on the day and then spirited away or,
22 alternatively, that fewer people had been killed on the
23 day and other bodies taken to the mortuary.
24 One question about that: did you ever discover
25 whether or not there was any truth in the stories that
1 began to circulate?
2 A. No, I did not.
3 Q. May we have on the screen page B2168 and beside it may
4 we have B2166. The document on the right of the screen
5 at 2166, is the statement you made over the telephone
6 that we have looked at a couple of times now?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. On the left-hand side of the screen we have a document
9 entitled "Notes by O/C, C Company 1 Para." The next of
10 that is very similar to the first part, in fact I think
11 it is identical, of the statement on the right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. It goes down to the "Mission" and "Execution" and
14 "Orders for opening fire. As given in the Yellow Card."
15 But it does not contain the diary of operations that
16 appears in the statement on the right. Have you ever
17 seen the document on the left before?
18 A. I cannot recall I have.
19 Q. We can see at the top right-hand corner of that document
20 that it formed appendix 1 to annex L to a document dated
21 5th February 1972. We know that that document, dated
22 5th February, was a report prepared by Colonel Overbury
23 who was a member of the Army legal services involved in
24 preparing the Ministry of Defence's case in relation to
25 the Widgery Tribunal.
1 If we could have on the right-hand side of the
2 screen CO1.112, that is the first page of
3 Colonel Overbury's report and if we can go on to
4 CO1.119, we find a paragraph in the report which
5 explains that the Company Commander's orders, including
6 (b), the orders of yourself, as O/C, C Company, were
7 attached to his report as annex L, and that is the
8 attachment we have on the left?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Do you know how it came about that a version of your
11 telephoned statement was prepared that omitted the
12 "diary of operations"?
13 A. No, I cannot say I do know.
14 Q. Lastly, Major, do you remember being involved in any
15 discussion about whether or not you would be called or
16 should be called to give evidence to Lord Widgery's
17 Inquiry?
18 A. No, I do not. I think I had left the battalion by that
19 stage, by the time of the Lord Widgery Inquiry.
20 Q. Thank you very much.
21 Questioned by MR ELIAS.
22 MR ELIAS: Major, I am over to your right. My name is
23 Elias, I represent a number of former soldiers.
24 Two matters generally I want to ask you about, if
25 I may. Firstly, can we go back for a moment to INQ1799,
1 you remember who that soldier is, he is the corporal in
2 C~Company, you remember you were given the name earlier
3 on. He is the soldier who says that you suddenly
4 appeared with him at the end of Chamberlain street.
5 I just want to ask you a little more about that.
6 Have you had any contact with that soldier since 1970s?
7 A. I may have done, but I cannot actually recall.
8 Q. Have you discussed, for example, the evidence that
9 either of you would give to this Inquiry?
10 A. No.
11 Q. So when he made his statement, as we know he did
12 in June 2000, he was making it without any input or
13 discussion of any kind with you, was he?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. Before we took the break this afternoon, you began to
16 say, I think -- if we get the transcript back -- you
17 were asked whether you had gone down to the end of
18 Chamberlain Street. You said this, according to the
19 transcript:
20 "I cannot remember, but I do remember appearing
21 suddenly in front of the flats, it could well be the
22 case."
23 Mr Roxburgh then intervened and then we broke.
24 You were shown photograph P299. I want you to look
25 at photograph P280, if you will. The end of Chamberlain
1 Street, do you see?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. You saw that, in the centre of P279 but we now see it
4 slightly more in close up. Coming out of what is
5 a narrow street, I think all of us probably will have
6 walked down it now, you do come out into open ground,
7 the car park and part-open playground, with the flats
8 starkly in front of you?
9 A. Quite.
10 Q. Is it possible you could have been there, at point B at
11 the end of Chamberlain Street, as Soldier 1799 says that
12 you were?
13 A. It is possible. It is not quite how I recall it.
14 Q. I understand that. When you made your diary, if we can
15 look again at 2166, you rightly pointed out to
16 Mr Roxburgh some minutes ago, that of course 1799 did
17 not say that you saw the gunman with the carbine; he
18 simply says that you popped up, perhaps a little behind
19 him, but in the same vicinity. He does not suggest you
20 saw it and you have no recollection of seeing it. What
21 you have said in this diary:
22 "I quite definitely heard an M1 carbine firing from
23 Rossville Flats across the open ground to the north."
24 It would appear, would it, to be something which you
25 were then timing at 1620?
1 A. I think that is 1610 to 1620, I think there is a hyphen
2 after the 1610, it is a 10-minute -- "during the assault
3 22 persons" and so it goes on. It is covering 10
4 minutes of action, if you like, to use another word.
5 Q. That is understood. In that 10-minute period what is
6 set out in that short paragraph, "during assault" down
7 to "Rossville Street/William Street," that is to say
8 persons were arrested, you heard gunfire, you quite
9 definitely hear the carbine firing from Rossville Flats
10 to the north and you saw the strike of several rounds in
11 the Rossville Street/William Street area, presumably as
12 you were moving back?
13 A. Yes, that is correct.
14 Q. Although I understand you cannot recall any of that now,
15 it is the fact, is it, you would not have said it then,
16 had it not been the truth?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. If you were saying it then, 1799 is saying it in 2000,
19 there has been no collaboration between the two of you?
20 A. There has not been.
21 Q. Can I move to the other topic I want to ask you about,
22 and it is a little more detailed, if you can give it to
23 us, a little more detail as to your state of mind as you
24 went through the barriers with your men on this day.
25 Can I take you back to the briefings: would you have
1 had sight of the brigade operation order?
2 A. No, I would not, sir, no.
3 Q. So you would not have seen that or received any copy of
4 it at any stage?
5 A. No.
6 Q. If that expected that the arrest operation would be
7 conducted on foot, is that something that you would have
8 expected to have been handed down to you?
9 A. I would have expected that to have occurred, again, in
10 the commanding officer's orders.
11 Q. Is it your position that you simply cannot remember now
12 whether you did have an order to carry out the arrest
13 operation on foot?
14 A. I cannot remember the orders at all.
15 Q. Can you remember whether, on the day, you carried out
16 any reconnaissance of the ground at all?
17 A. No, I did not.
18 Q. So it follows, does it, that you were relying on a map?
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. And your men would have been relying on a map?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. Did you receive any assistance as to the terrain or the
23 likely movement of rioters, matters of that kind?
24 A. Can you expand on your question?
25 Q. If you were going to go into arrest rioters, did anyone
1 tell you, for example, "As soon as you appear they will
2 disappear down this gully, down that alleyway," so on?
3 A. No, I cannot recall receiving that sort of information.
4 Q. Do you recall whether this was to be an arrest operation
5 of the kind that you had carried out in Belfast, as
6 I understand it, therefore what might be called a snatch
7 operation; no different?
8 A. No different.
9 Q. Was there any concept, as you understood it, that
10 companies of the Parachute Battalion would encircle
11 rioters and arrest them in that way?
12 A. Not encircle them, but possibly two companies working,
13 co-ordinated together, pushing -- I mean, it was never
14 the case to encircle people so that there is nowhere for
15 them to disperse. The whole point about riot control or
16 dispersing a riot situation is that there should be
17 somewhere for the people to disperse to.
18 Q. That was why, Major, I asked you the question, because
19 in paragraph 19 of your statement you do talk about
20 going into disperse the rioters and arrest them. Would
21 you like to look at that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. 2168.003, paragraph 19?
24 A. Yes, I have it here.
25 Q. "Two platoons went through the barrier on foot. The
1 First Platoon intended to confront the rioters with the
2 rest of the company following in support. The lead
3 platoon chased the rioters west ..." and so on.
4 Your recollection now anyway is that the intention
5 was to confront the rioters and disperse them by making
6 them run away and catch as many as you could?
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. Could it be that your memory today is entirely faulty
9 and that there was in fact a known plan which you would
10 have known, to encircle the rioters and, as it were,
11 draw them back towards the barricades of the soldiers
12 and arrest them in that way?
13 A. No.
14 Q. It is not a lapse of memory, you say that certainly was
15 not the position as far as you were concerned?
16 A. That is correct.
17 Q. So in the planning, even if it was only on the morning
18 of the day, did the plan, in your mind, envisage the
19 troops would go in in vehicles or by foot?
20 A. I cannot recall.
21 Q. Does it also follow from your account of the plan and
22 its execution that there were no geographical boundaries
23 to the operation, to the arrest operation. That is to
24 say, the rioters would be pursued so long as they were
25 still arrestable, if you follow me?
1 A. Yes, I think there would have been clear limits of, what
2 we call limits of exploitation.
3 Q. Do you recall what they were?
4 A. No, I cannot.
5 Q. Or who laid them down?
6 A. They would probably have been laid down by the
7 commanding officer.
8 Q. Do you have any idea what those limits of exploitation
9 would have been; would they have been geographical
10 limits, that is to say on a map, "do not go further than
11 this point"?
12 A. It may have been as simple and as broad as "stay in the
13 immediate vicinity," by that meaning this street and the
14 next street and no more than that, not to be drawn in
15 any further. But I cannot honestly recall.
16 Q. If your soldiers, as it appears they did, some of your
17 soldiers went to the end of Chamberlain Street, we
18 should assume, should we, that the probability is that
19 at least that far it was envisaged the arrest operation
20 would go?
21 A. Yes, possibly, but I cannot recall.
22 Q. Mr Roxburgh has talked about the house where arrests
23 were made. We know that house was at the far end of
24 Chamberlain Street, just to the photograph I showed you
25 a moment ago?
1 A. I did not know that.
2 Q. Would there have been any instruction to the men before
3 they went in as to the geographical limitations being
4 put upon their movement or would that have been
5 something to assess from minute to minute as the arrest
6 operation was going on?
7 A. Yes, it would be normal for the battalion to lay down
8 limitations and boundaries between companies in much the
9 same way as the company commander would lay down limits
10 and boundaries between platoons, otherwise everybody
11 ends up in the same place and there is a general scrum.
12 Q. The scoop-up operation has no particular meaning to you,
13 does it?
14 A. It is a term I do not recognise, but I understand what
15 it means, but I do not really recognise it.
16 Q. What do you understand it to mean, Major?
17 A. To disperse rioters in the immediate vicinity and arrest
18 those who have left that immediate vicinity, but who
19 were -- clearly had been involved in the rioting.
20 Q. You were asked a little earlier about the phrase
21 "running battles," I think you said you did not
22 recognise the phrase. Would you look at paragraph 26 of
23 your statement, page 2168.004. I appreciate this is
24 a statement that is taken down by those acting on behalf
25 of the Tribunal and maybe not all the words are
1 therefore those of the witness, but did you say:
2 "I recollect that there was no real running battle
3 with the rioters."
4 And if so, what did you mean by it?
5 A. Or words to that effect. Um, there was not
6 a continuous, a continuing of the action. The riot was
7 dispersed and that was the end of that.
8 Q. And only those in the vicinity were arrested?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And matters did not go further; is that what you meant
11 to say?
12 A. That is right.
13 Q. If that be right, it would have been the case, would it,
14 from your recollection, that anyone, as it were, still
15 standing or confronting the troops on the wasteground
16 would have been, if I can put it in the vernacular and
17 straightforwardly: game for arrest?
18 A. I think that is the case.
19 Q. Thank you very much.
20 Questioned by MR A HARVEY
21 MR HARVEY: My name is Arthur Harvey and I appear on behalf
22 of a number of the families of the deceased and injured.
23 There are a number of matters I would like to cover
24 with you. When you were shown the video footage of what
25 occurred at Magilligan Strand the week before, there was
1 one episode which was clearly depicted, of a man on the
2 ground, 1 Para apparently holding him, another Para
3 coming in to hold him and another paratrooper kicking
4 him.
5 You seemed to doubt that that was a paratrooper,
6 based upon the fact that the visor on his helmet was not
7 as you recollect. Having seen the video footage of
8 C Company going through barrier 14, do you still hold to
9 that?
10 A. I would need to refresh my mind and have a look at it
11 again.
12 Q. If you want to firstly look at video 1, the BBC footage,
13 at 3.30.
14 (Video 1 played]
15 A. Is this what we are referring to here?
16 Q. No, it is just a little ahead of this, you will see
17 there are a group of paratroopers lined up behind this
18 barrier. Those soldiers are quite clearly wearing --
19 a number of them are wearing helmets with visors, are
20 they not, similar to the visors that could be clearly
21 seen on the soldier who is doing the kicking at
22 Magilligan Strand?
23 A. Yes, that is correct.
24 Q. Therefore, would you like to revise the reservations
25 that you had that the person on Magilligan Strand doing
1 the kicking was in fact a paratrooper?
2 A. No, the definition of the picture was not good enough
3 for my eyesight to be able to determine one way or the
4 other. I would accept there is a likelihood it could
5 well have been.
6 Q. Would you also accept that when you made your statement
7 in 2000, that your belief in relation to Magilligan
8 Strand, that the behaviour of the paratroopers had been
9 no different on that particular occasion than it would
10 have been in Belfast and any other occasion?
11 A. Broadly that is correct, but every circumstance -- every
12 situation is different.
13 Q. The video footage we have shown -- we have seen also
14 shows soldiers firing baton rounds virtually at point
15 blank range into persons mingling in a crowd. Is that
16 an acceptable method for the discharge of a baton round?
17 A. No, it is not.
18 Q. In fact, soft sand is an utterly inappropriate area in
19 which to discharge a baton round; is it not?
20 A. Sorry, I did not hear the first --
21 Q. Soft sand is an inappropriate surface into which to
22 discharge a baton round?
23 A. I do not know, I honestly do not know.
24 Q. Baton rounds are meant to be fired at the ground?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And it is the spring from the ground that projects them
2 into the bodies of persons at whom they are aimed; you
3 are not meant to fire them into people; is that not
4 right?
5 A. That is correct.
6 Q. Because they are potentially lethal when used in that
7 way. Was it also your opinion that, far from the
8 situation being at Magilligan Strand, that the
9 paratroopers were out of control, that in fact they were
10 behaving in precisely the manner that you would have
11 expected and anticipated of them?
12 A. No, I do not go along with that at all.
13 Q. Would you accept, therefore, that it is wholly
14 unacceptable for a soldier to wield his rifle as
15 a club --
16 LORD SAVILLE: I think the witness has already dealt with
17 that, Mr Harvey.
18 MR HARVEY: In relation to the statement you made concerning
19 the use of vehicles, I think it is fair to say now that
20 you have no real distinct recollection of that, that
21 that appears to be a surmise in paragraphs 12 and 17.
22 Perhaps if you care to look at paragraph 12. It is at
23 2168.002, paragraph 12:
24 "Not long after I arrived at Waterloo Place, an
25 order came over the battalion net that C Company was to
1 prepare to go in to the Bogside to mount an arrest
2 operation through barrier 14. I therefore got ready to
3 send my vehicles through barrier 14."
4 Do you accept now that that could be wholly
5 inaccurate?
6 A. You have missed out part of the sentence which says:
7 "Although I cannot recall the exact details."
8 Q. Exact details of an arrest operation is different from
9 the statement:
10 "I therefore got ready to send my vehicles through
11 barrier 14."
12 Do you accept that could be wholly inaccurate?
13 A. Not necessarily, no.
14 Q. I wonder if you could look at the 1 Para battalion log.
15 It is at W90 --
16 LORD SAVILLE: Before you do, Mr Harvey, it may, I think, be
17 fair to this witness to refer him to his contemporary
18 statement and the entry for 1545 hours.
19 MR HARVEY: I do intend to.
20 LORD SAVILLE: Because your suggestion that it is wholly
21 inaccurate, I think probably if you are going to put
22 that or maintain that, ought to bear in mind what he
23 appears to have said --
24 MR HARVEY: I do intend to come to it. Could we look at
25 W90. At 1515 you can see the head of the crowd -- this
1 is at serial 22, the second entry from the top:
2 "Head of the crowd at junction St Columb's Walk,
3 Lecky Road."
4 Immediately under 22, 1516, this is to the Tac
5 headquarters from, it would appear, Colonel Wilford, it
6 is B5, B1, B3 move in 15 minutes. The very next entry
7 that is relevant, if you get serial 25, 1530:
8 "1, 3, 5 moving now."
9 If one comes down to 28, 1530, this is to the 2IC.
10 It is from the Tac headquarters, serial 16:
11 "Road block 12 and 14 be prepared for move."
12 At 1530 we know that the crowd had not actually
13 reached the barrier at William Street, they were still
14 approaching it. If you look at the Porter log, W123,
15 serial 286, 1538:
16 "Hello 90, this is 65. Can you be prepared to lift
17 your barriers 12 and 14 should we require to push
18 through them to disperse these crowds. Over."
19 If you look at the next line:
20 "Hello, Zero, this is 90 Alpha. Currently Rucsack
21 is talking to the crowd at serial 14. As far as the
22 crowd is concerned, William Street and Creggan Street
23 are completely blocked at the moment and we get reports
24 of continued movement from Lone Moor Road into the area.
25 Over."
1 At that time there could have been absolutely no
2 question of moving through barrier 14 in vehicles
3 because the crowd was pressed up against barrier 14
4 right the length of William Street up into Creggan
5 Street. You got the order to be prepared to move at
6 1530. Surely, as a matter of common sense, it could not
7 have been conceivably your intention to use vehicles at
8 that time; it would have caused mayhem to drive through
9 those barriers with vehicles with a crowd that densely
10 packed; would it not?
11 A. Yes, what I cannot follow is what is on the screen at
12 the moment. I mean, there are no timings with this.
13 Q. If you look to the final column, it is 1539?
14 A. The time is on the right.
15 Q. I am sorry, I should have pointed that out to you, and
16 the actual message from Colonel Wilford to the
17 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment is between 1538 and
18 1539. You have been told to be prepared at 1530 from
19 your own log, at which time the crowd was not even
20 there.
21 On reflection, does it not look as though you were
22 mistaken when you indicated that your troops had been
23 intended to be put through in vehicles?
24 A. No, I cannot comment. All I can say is that when
25 I first appeared in Waterloo Place there was -- the main
1 march had gone past, it was not in that vicinity; there
2 was, as was shown on the television footage which you
3 have shown me this afternoon, some major aggression.
4 There is a very distinctive photograph of a rioter
5 throwing a long metal pole, which looks heavy, straight
6 towards the camera. That is the sort of incident that
7 was going on and that is the sort of incident that I had
8 been -- that I recollect, that is what I was expecting
9 to disperse; that riot situation.
10 Q. Perhaps if we could look at your original statement, it
11 is at 2166, this is the contemporaneous document. You
12 can see this document appears, certainly 1516 is the
13 time that appears in the battalion log:
14 "I received orders to move from my forming-up
15 position in Foyle College car park to an assault
16 position in Prince's Street behind A Company.
17 "1530. Rioting going on in Francis Street and
18 Little James Street. I was ordered to be prepared to
19 move through barrier 14 on left flank of Support
20 Company."
21 That is in fact the report that occurred at 1530 in
22 the battalion log, because it was a direction to both
23 Support Company and yourself, to be prepared to move
24 through barriers 14 and 12. Then at 1545:
25 "Concentrated at Waterloo Place. Two platoons
1 prepare for foot assault, one platoon remaining
2 mounted."
3 1610:
4 "Ordered to assault rioters in east end of
5 William Street."
6 That tends to suggest that the assault was intended
7 to take part on foot, as in fact it did; does it not?
8 A. Well, you have said it tends to suggest and I, I cannot
9 recall. I can only say that what was -- my statement at
10 the time, in 1972, to the best of my knowledge, is
11 correct.
12 Q. It also, unlike the entry at 1530, there is absolutely
13 no mention of preparing to move through the barrier on
14 the left flank of Support Company. This looks to be an
15 order directed at C Company and C Company alone, to
16 mount an arrest operation; is that not correct?
17 A. Not necessarily. This is a correct of my log. I am not
18 recording here orders given to Support Company.
19 Q. If you want to look at what the brigade net recorded,
20 could we look at W47. W47 says, if one looks at serial
21 No. 159, 1609:
22 "Orders given to 1 Para at 1607 hours for one
23 sub-unit of 1 Para to do scoop-up Op through barrier 14.
24 Not to conduct running battle down Rossville Street."
25 Your entry is consistent with that?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Is it not?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. If one then also goes back to look at the 1 Para
5 battalion log at W90, that message would have been
6 received by -- the previous message recorded on the
7 brigade net would have been received by the tactical
8 headquarters of 1 Para and would therefore be
9 transmitted on the battalion net; is that right?
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. And the battalion net records, as you can see, if one
12 looks at 31:
13 "Move 3 now through 14. Also call sign 1: no
14 running battles."
15 There is absolutely no mention in that of Support
16 Company going through barrier 12; is that not correct?
17 A. That is -- I have not seen this before so I am just
18 looking really in detail for the first time this
19 afternoon, um. Well, if you look at serial 30 --
20 Q. Yes, serial 30 is an indication to brigade from the Tac
21 headquarters that all call signs are now forward for
22 orders; is that not right?
23 A. That is what it says, yes.
24 Q. That is at 1600, but if one comes to your paragraph 17
25 and if one goes back to your statement at 2168.3:
1 "I was in the second or third vehicle lined up to go
2 through barrier 14. We did not move. I quickly
3 realised that there was a problem. I therefore got out
4 of the vehicle and walked up to barrier 14 and spoke to
5 the officer in command of the Royal Green Jackets at the
6 barrier. He was reluctant to expose his men to the
7 ferocity of the rioters as they could not move the
8 barricades (knife rests) aside whilst protecting
9 themselves by their riot shields from the barrage of
10 missiles. I told him firmly that if he would not move
11 the barriers aside then we would go over them on foot."
12 Can you actually recollect such a conversation?
13 A. I can recollect the situation whereby I went up to the
14 barrier and remonstrated to ask for the barriers to be
15 moved aside, yes.
16 Q. You see, what it then tends to indicate is that, "I was
17 concerned because I knew my company had been held up and
18 would now be later than Support going in through barrier
19 12." That is predicated upon an understanding that
20 Support Company were to go through barrier 12, when
21 there is not one log, on any of the logs, or any of the
22 nets that you would have been listening to that Support
23 Company were to go through barrier 12; do you see that?
24 A. Or that the order was not logged.
25 Q. The brigade order is quite clear on the brigade log
1 which was recorded by the brigade major.
2 Be that as it may:
3 "I therefore decided immediately that the first two
4 platoons of my company should go into the area on foot
5 and made it clear to him that that was what we were
6 going to do. The troops immediately got out of their
7 vehicles and ran through barrier 14."
8 We can see from the video, Major, that that simply
9 did not happen; the paratroopers were lined up behind
10 this barrier for some minutes before the order to go in
11 was given; they did not immediately get out of their
12 vehicles and go through barrier 12?
13 A. I think --
14 Q. Sorry?
15 A. I will let you finish.
16 Q. What did you want to say?
17 A. I will let you finish the question first.
18 Q. Does that not indicate again, after a passage of
19 30 years, for whatever reason, you are simply mistaken
20 in your suggestion that this assault, on those persons
21 who were rioting at the junction of Chamberlain Street
22 and William Street, was to be launched in vehicles?
23 A. No, I do not accept that.
24 Q. General Ford and his ADC were present behind that
25 barrier and they have given evidence that the
1 paratroopers were lined up some five minutes before they
2 went through the barrier. Does that shake your
3 confidence in your suggestion that the paratroopers
4 immediately got out of their vehicles and ran through
5 barrier 14?
6 A. No, it does not.
7 LORD SAVILLE: Major, I am getting a bit puzzled. Can we go
8 back to your contemporary statement, 2168.006, the entry
9 for 1545:
10 "Concentrated at Waterloo Place. Two platoons
11 prepared for foot assault, one platoon remaining
12 mounted."
13 Tell me I am wrong, but I read that as meaning in
14 effect precisely what it said, that at least two of the
15 three platoons would be going in on foot?
16 A. That is correct, sir.
17 LORD SAVILLE: And one of them would remain mounted, whether
18 that was intended to go through as a mounted vessel does
19 not perhaps seem as clear as it might do. At all
20 events, on the face of it, it looks as though there were
21 preparations for two platoons to go in on foot; am
22 I reading that correctly?
23 A. That is correct, sir.
24 LORD SAVILLE: Where I get puzzled, it is no doubt my fault,
25 is you then, saying as I thought you did a few minutes
1 ago, that it is still your recollection that the
2 intention was for them all to go in on vehicles.
3 Perhaps I have misunderstood you.
4 A. Yes, sir. Can I just say, I think maybe I am confused
5 as well, I think we are muddling up between what is on
6 the screen at the moment, which is a diary of
7 operations, and other logs which are a factual log taken
8 at the time.
9 This diary of operations is a bit like a war diary,
10 I would not go so far as to say it is a war diary as
11 such, but it is a diary of operations. It is clearly
12 written after the event, whereas the radio logs are logs
13 which are recorded at the time of the event and you
14 build it up as you go along; you write it minute by
15 minute as those radio messages are sent.
16 This, what we have on the screen at the moment, i.e.
17 diary of operations, is looking back.
18 LORD SAVILLE: I follow that entirely. It is looking back,
19 according to the date, only 24 hours later or less.
20 A. Correct, sir.
21 LORD SAVILLE: I repeat, what I do not understand is -- and
22 I also repeat it is probably my fault -- that this
23 virtually contemporary account by you seems to suggest
24 that at quarter to 4.00 on 30th January, two platoons of
25 your company were preparing to make an assault on foot.
1 My puzzlement comes from the fact that you seemed to be
2 saying to Mr Harvey that your recollection is that the
3 intention was that everybody would make the assault in
4 vehicles. Have I misunderstood and if I have, could you
5 please clarify it for me? What is your recollection?
6 Is it you were going to send them all in in vehicles or
7 that you were going to send two platoons in on foot, or
8 what? Or perhaps you have no clear recollection at all?
9 No-one would blame you for that, because we are talking
10 of 32 years ago. Can you help me?
11 A. Perhaps I have no clear recollection, but my feeling is
12 that I -- and I have always felt this -- I had expected
13 to go in with the vehicles and that I was held up when
14 barrier 14 would not or could not be moved aside and
15 therefore I had to quickly think of something else, i.e.
16 go in on foot.
17 LORD SAVILLE: But then what I find difficult is how that
18 fits in with the 1545 entry about preparing them for
19 "foot assault," unless, of course, the difficulties in
20 moving barrier 14 had arisen before 1545.
21 A. I am sure it had.
22 Q. You think it had?
23 A. It could well have done. I was not expecting I was
24 going to come back to Mr Harvey when I had finished
25 talking -- Mr Harvey was talking about immediately
1 deploying on foot. My recollection is you are not going
2 to get out of the Pigs and immediately start running
3 forward. You are going to get out of the Pigs, form
4 yourself up into some sort of order, which might take
5 you five minutes, um ...
6 LORD SAVILLE: The trouble with that in turn, if we go to
7 your statement, 2168.003, paragraph 17:
8 "I was in the second or third vehicle lined up ...
9 I quickly realised that there was a problem ... I told
10 him firmly that if he would not move the barriers aside
11 then we would go over them on foot."
12 All that is after the order to go in?
13 A. Correct, sir.
14 LORD SAVILLE: And the order to go in is many minutes after
15 1545.
16 A. That is correct, sir.
17 LORD SAVILLE: If we go back to your contemporary statement,
18 2168.006, the two platoons preparing for a foot assault,
19 on the face of it, are not being prepared for a foot
20 assault because you cannot get through the barrier, but
21 for some other reason; do you see what I am saying to
22 you?
23 A. Mmm.
24 LORD SAVILLE: Again, we are not trying to put words into
25 your mouth, we are trying to get your recollection.
1 Mr Harvey has suggested to you that you are wrong about
2 this intention to go through the barriers in vehicles
3 and that the intention was at least for some platoons
4 always to go in on foot.
5 A. I do not think so, sir. I still stand by -- I still
6 think, our initial intention was to go in in vehicles.
7 MR HARVEY: If it was the initial intention to go in in
8 vehicles, that initial intention had changed by 1545; it
9 had changed some 25 minutes before your company actually
10 assaulted through barrier 14; did it not?
11 A. It would appear so.
12 Q. Also if you look at W127, again which is a contemporary
13 log, it is the Porter transcript of what was said on the
14 brigade net. If one looks at serial 343, this is at
15 1555, it is to brigade; it is from Colonel Wilford --
16 from the Tac headquarters:
17 "65 from my Sunray. Would like to deploy one of his
18 sub-units through the barrier 14 round the back and the
19 area of William Street, Little James Street. Reckons if
20 he does this he will be able to pick up quite a number
21 of yobbos."
22 That is again some 10 minutes after you have been
23 prepared to deploy your company through, using two
24 platoons, on foot?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Again, there is only mention of C Company, there is no
2 mention of Support Company; is that not correct?
3 A. That is what it appears, yes.
4 Q. And if one --
5 LORD SAVILLE: Sorry to interrupt, Mr Harvey, I think in
6 that regard we are getting really rather close to
7 a debate or submission on these documents. So far as
8 going through on foot or going through in vehicles is
9 concerned, I think perhaps you and I between us have
10 pointed out everything that can be pointed out. This
11 witness still says he has a recollection. I am not sure
12 we can really take it very much further with him, we
13 will have to assess the whole of the material at the end
14 of the day.
15 MR HARVEY: There is one further matter I would like to draw
16 to your attention, it is at W128. At W128 there are
17 a series of exchanges between the Parachute Tac
18 headquarters and the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment.
19 If you look at the time, at 1609, that is actually one
20 minute before it would appear on the battalion net that
21 you were given orders to go in, and if you look at 369:
22 "Hello 90, this is 65. Can you lift barrier 14
23 where our call sign will be coming through? Over.
24 "90 Alpha. Wait. Out.
25 "Hello, 65, this is 90 Alpha. Serial 14 now being
1 lifted. Over."
2 In other words, the instruction to lift barrier 14
3 was not given by you, it was given from Colonel Wilford
4 to the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment directly, and
5 they have directly complied with it. Again, that is not
6 consistent with you having your soldiers mounted in
7 vehicles, going up, having a discussion and the
8 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment being reluctant to lift
9 the barrier, is it?
10 A. Well, we are looking at 1609. I had already gone in by
11 then, had I not?
12 Q. No.
13 A. Had I not?
14 Q. You did not go in until a minute after that or
15 approximately a minute after that. In fact --
16 A. But it is quite clear on the television footage we have
17 seen that the barriers were still in place and my
18 soldiers are going in in single file round the barriers.
19 So whatever time is on the logs, the television footage
20 shows the real events, that the barriers were in place
21 when my soldiers went in.
22 Q. Quite simply because at first the intention was to
23 launch this arrest operation on foot through barrier 14;
24 is that not so?
25 A. It is not so.
1 Q. When you did go through barrier 14, we have seen the
2 video pictures; were you able to identify yourself in
3 any of these video pictures?
4 A. Yes, I was.
5 Q. Can you say which group of video pictures it was.
6 Perhaps if we look at them again, video 1?
7 A. Well, I --
8 Q. Sorry, do you have a problem?
9 A. I think I do. I think --
10 Q. The problem being?
11 A. That I did not particularly want my identity and my face
12 given public airing and if I identify myself in the
13 picture, I am not sure about my anonymity status.
14 LORD SAVILLE: Is there another way you could approach it,
15 Mr Harvey?
16 MR HARVEY: Perhaps, yes. Quite simply, it is the timing
17 I am interested in. Did you go through on the first
18 wave of paratroopers or were you behind?
19 A. I cannot recall there being waves, I was right up at the
20 front, early on.
21 Q. You were early on. Were you among some of the first,
22 therefore, to reach the corner of Chamberlain Street and
23 William Street?
24 A. I cannot recall, maybe.
25 Q. You say you were right up at the front. When you went
1 up Chamberlain Street were you among that group in the
2 vanguard?
3 A. Sir, you asked me the question when I went through the
4 barrier, where was I. I was early on. I may have
5 stopped just the other side of the barrier and was
6 supervising my company deploying forward. I did not
7 necessarily stay at the head of my company leading the
8 assault personally right up the road and I cannot say
9 what I did when I passed through barrier 14.
10 Q. Did you know that Support Company had already gone
11 through barrier 12 before your company deployed?
12 A. I cannot now say for certain whether I knew or not.
13 Q. You have already been directed towards the position
14 concerning Lieutenant N. Lieutenant N fired three shots
15 from the wasteground area of Eden Place, across Eden
16 Place and struck the corner of a building at
17 Harvey Street and Chamberlain Street. Did you not hear
18 three distinct high velocity shots as your men deployed
19 through the barrier or very shortly thereafter?
20 A. I think I have already said this afternoon that I have
21 no recollection of hearing -- no audio recollection of
22 hearing any shots that afternoon. Clearly there were
23 shots, but I now have no recollection of hearing any.
24 Q. Have you have heard shots at the time, that is on
25 Sunday, 30th January 1972, coming from the direction of
1 the wasteground off Rossville Street, is that not
2 something which would have caused you concern for your
3 men entering that area?
4 A. I cannot comment.
5 Q. You also, it would appear, while in the vicinity of
6 Chamberlain Street -- did you go into -- you must have
7 gone into Chamberlain Street to go into Eden Place.
8 Again, can you recollect whether that was -- were you
9 among the first troops to arrive at Eden Place or had
10 your troops already established a foothold at the corner
11 of Chamberlain Street/Eden Place?
12 A. No, I think we have already established that I was --
13 I had gone to see what Support Company's position was;
14 that my company was not there; my company was further
15 back, my recollection in Harvey Street and High Street,
16 and that my intention was, and having realised there was
17 a shooting battle on the wasteground, which I had
18 observed presumably by looking down around the corner of
19 Eden Place, that I was not going to let my company get
20 involved in that area and so restricted any movement to
21 the southeast side -- I am not sure where the northern
22 point on this map is, on the eastern side of Chamberlain
23 Street, in other words, kept them well away from any
24 live firing that was going on. So my company was not on
25 the corner of Harvey -- Chamberlain and Eden.
1 Q. When you went into the wasteground, did you actually go
2 on to the wasteground?
3 A. I have a recollection of, of going in far enough to be
4 able to see and of being exposed and of doubling
5 several, several metres, 10, 15 metres perhaps across
6 open ground to get from one position to another, but
7 I cannot now recall which positions these were.
8 Q. Do you have any recollection of seeing any civilian on
9 the wasteground or in the vicinity of the car park of
10 Rossville Flats?
11 A. No.
12 Q. When you say you have no recollection of any civilian,
13 that means you just do not recollect seeing any civilian
14 there at all?
15 A. I can hardly recollect seeing any Army people there.
16 I mean, to be honest I really cannot recollect any real
17 detail on this particular day.
18 Q. One of the most dramatic events of this day was the
19 carrying of the body of a young boy called Jackie Duddy
20 from the car park down Chamberlain Street and up
21 Harvey Street. You have simply no recollection of that
22 event at all, though you must have been in the vicinity
23 of William Street?
24 A. I have already stated this afternoon when that was
25 pointed out, the photograph was shown this afternoon,
1 I have already said I did not see that. This is the
2 picture with Father ...
3 Q. Father Daly?
4 A. Father Daly.
5 Q. It is not just the one picture. The boy's body was
6 carried across the car park. You have no recollection
7 of seeing that when you looked up towards
8 Rossville Flats?
9 A. No, I have not.
10 Q. The boy's body was carried all of the way down
11 Chamberlain Street past your troops, and you have no
12 recollection of seeing that?
13 A. I do not think it was past my troops.
14 Q. I think it was. Do you want to look at some photographs
15 that may assist you?
16 LORD SAVILLE: Again, I am not sure where we are getting.
17 This witness says he does not recollect this, Mr Harvey.
18 MR HARVEY: You do recollect going to the top of
19 Rossville Street at one stage -- sorry, the top of
20 Chamberlain Street, the southern end and seeing
21 Rossville Flats, what is block 2. Can you recollect how
22 far into these events that would have been?
23 A. No, I cannot. My recollection is that I was only, from
24 the time we went through barrier 14, that we were only
25 in there for about 15, 20 minutes all told, but I may be
1 wrong in that.
2 Q. When you went to the southern end of Chamberlain Street,
3 do you have any recollection of seeing anyone in the car
4 park of Rossville Flats?
5 A. No, I have not.
6 Q. It is not just simply a matter of not a recollection of
7 seeing a gunman, you have no recollection of seeing
8 anyone there; is that right, no civilians?
9 A. As I have said, I do not have a clear recollection of
10 the day. There are certain parts of the day I have
11 a recollection, um, I remember coming out and suddenly
12 appearing with the Rossville Flats to my front and
13 seeing them for the first time, seeing the flats there.
14 Whether that was from the end of Chamberlain Street or
15 not, I am not prepared to say, I do not know.
16 But I was not very close, I do remember that, I was
17 not that close to Rossville Flats. So, looking at the
18 photographs in comparison to the map, when you stand at
19 the end of Chamberlain Street, it would appear that you
20 are right at the -- right in front of Block 2, according
21 to the photograph. That is not my recollection. My
22 recollection is that I was further away.
23 Q. Can you recall how long you remained in Chamberlain
24 Street; did you remain, from the moment your men went
25 through the barrier -- if I get this right, and correct
1 me if I am wrong -- it would appear you went into Eden
2 Place ahead of your men to check out whether or not it
3 was safe for them to advance further up Chamberlain
4 Street?
5 A. No, I did not say that. I said I went into Eden Place
6 to liaise, if you like, visually to see what Support
7 Company were doing. I did not go there with the
8 intention of leading my company there.
9 Q. How did you know Support Company were there?
10 A. I cannot answer, I do not know. Presumably from the
11 plan, from the orders on the radio, I do not know.
12 Q. It would appear -- it is certainly not recorded on the
13 radio -- that they were anticipated being there; the
14 plan, unfortunately, in terms of the detail, does not
15 provide a great deal of co-ordination between the
16 movement of Support Company and C Company. Could it
17 have been that you heard the firing from the SLRs?
18 A. I have already told you I do not recall hearing firing
19 that day at all. Mr Harvey, all I can say is that I did
20 go on to the wasteground and I did see Support Company
21 and in my statement I have said I did not wish my
22 company -- it would not have been helpful to the
23 situation for my company to be involved in what was
24 already some live firing going on and, therefore,
25 restrained my company and kept them within the area they
1 were already operating, which was Harvey Street,
2 High Street and back up William Street, the east end of
3 William Street.
4 Q. I have no further questions.
5 Questioned by MR PURVIS
6 MR PURVIS: Major, I represent five individuals who are
7 members of the Official IRA, including the officer
8 commander. I am at the rear of the room, can you see
9 me?
10 I wonder if I could have your previous statement
11 from January 1972 on one side of the screen, 2166,
12 page 2 of your current statement, that is 2168.002,
13 those together. Dealing firstly with the diary of
14 operations. It says:
15 "1516 I received orders to move from my FUP in
16 Foyle College car park to an assault position in Princes
17 Street behind A Company."
18 So at that time you would have been moving off, or
19 round about 1516 you had been moving off from the
20 college car park?
21 A. Yes, it would appear so.
22 Q. Paragraph 8, it is the second paragraph on the page on
23 the left of the screen, it says:
24 "Whilst waiting at Foyle College car park,
25 I remember hearing a report over the battalion radio net
1 of shots that had been fired at the Army. I do not
2 recall any more details than that."
3 You still hold to that statement today?
4 A. Yes, I do, I would put "shot" rather than 'shots,"
5 I think.
6 Q. A single shot?
7 A. A single shot.
8 Q. You have no other detail as to who it came from, who it
9 was at?
10 A. It was a report over the radio, something to the
11 effect -- I do not know the exact words, simply the
12 effect, you know, somebody reported a shot, a live
13 round.
14 Q. If we tally the two statements together, we can make the
15 assumption that it must have occurred about 1516?
16 A. Oh, before -- before because --
17 Q. 1516 at the very latest, because that is when you move
18 off?
19 A. That would be the latest, yes, we were in the Foyle
20 College car park for some time, I cannot remember how
21 long. But it could have been half an hour, it could
22 have been more.
23 Q. That could be almost an hour before you moved through
24 barrier 14 and up Chamberlain Street?
25 A. It could well have been.
1 Q. Did you ever hear any more detail about that shot or --
2 A. No, I did not, no.
3 Q. On the left side of the screen if we could have the next
4 page of your present statement, 2168.003. At the bottom
5 of that page, paragraph 22, you describe moving into
6 Eden Place. You have come through Chamberlain Street,
7 I presume?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. You state that you spoke briefly with members of the
10 Mortar Platoon of Support Company who were taking cover
11 behind their Pig on the wasteground near Eden Place?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. "They explained briefly to me that they were under fire
14 from the rear of the Rossville Flats."
15 You did not experience this yourself?
16 A. I did not, no.
17 Q. They had to tell you this?
18 A. Correct, and I do not believe when I say "they," the
19 company, not necessarily the soldiers I was talking to,
20 that they themselves were coming under fire but that the
21 Support Company was coming under fire.
22 Q. It may not have been at Eden Place that they were coming
23 under fire?
24 A. Sorry?
25 Q. It may not have been at Eden Place that they were coming
1 under fire?
2 A. No, it may not have been.
3 Q. Where else would it have been?
4 A. I do not know.
5 Q. You heard nothing at that point?
6 A. I cannot recall.
7 Q. You would have walked, as you said, just a few moments
8 ago, 10 to 15 metres across open ground?
9 A. I have a recollection of doubling -- sprinting doubled
10 up, you know how one does --
11 Q. That would have been from the rear yard of one of the
12 houses --
13 A. In other words, I was exposed.
14 Q. To the Pig?
15 A. To whatever.
16 Q. I presume you went to the rear of the Pig to talk to
17 this member --
18 A. No, I think I shouted across to them, I do not think
19 I got that close to them.
20 Q. You were exposed in open ground, you say, doubling up?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You did not come under any fire; you did not hear
23 anything; you did not locate any firing position?
24 A. No, but I was, I was clearly -- my recollection is that
25 I was clearly aware that I and my radio operator were in
1 a vulnerable position with no protection and therefore
2 I had to move. That is why we were moving the way we
3 were, so as not to present a larger target, in other
4 words zig-zagging.
5 When I say moving across the open ground, my
6 recollection is I was moving from one corner to another,
7 a distance of maybe 10, 15 metres at the most, something
8 like that, before I was then covered from view by
9 buildings or whatever it was or disappeared down another
10 road.
11 Q. Though you were recollecting doubled up or running
12 zig-zagged, you do not recollect any shots or any notion
13 of shots at that time that would cause you to run at
14 that time?
15 A. No, as I say, my feelings were that I was vulnerable.
16 Q. It was only when you got across to speak to a member of
17 Support Company that you were then told that there was
18 somebody coming under fire?
19 A. I think that may be correct.
20 Q. And it may not have been at that exact position?
21 A. No, I am not suggesting it was at that position.
22 Q. Why would you have been running in a zig-zag manner in
23 the first place if you were not even aware there was
24 shooting until you had got to that point?
25 A. I do not think I was. This was -- if you can visualise,
1 you come out of some open ground. You see in front of
2 you troops from your own battalion from a neighbouring
3 company and they are all in the prone position, taking
4 cover behind a vehicle or vehicles or any other cover
5 that is around, um, you are not going to then walk up to
6 them as if nothing is happening; that is what I am
7 trying to say. Perhaps I am not saying it very well.
8 Q. If you turn to the next page of your statement,
9 2168.004 -- before we touch on that: did any of the
10 soldiers at that position on the open ground, did they
11 refer to an M1 carbine?
12 A. I cannot recall.
13 Q. You do not recall if they referred to any particular
14 weapon?
15 A. No, I cannot recall that.
16 Q. When you arrived, did you ask about the shots that had
17 come from their direction across Chamberlain Street to
18 Harvey Street?
19 A. I do not think -- I have said I did not know of shots
20 being fired from Chamberlain Street to Harvey Street.
21 Q. Even though they would have come directly into the area
22 where your men were deployed?
23 A. Well, if that is the case, but I cannot recall.
24 Q. It would not have been the reason you would have gone
25 over there in the first place to Eden Place?
1 A. It would not, no.
2 LORD SAVILLE: You have to be a bit careful; "even though
3 they would have come into the area where your men were
4 deployed," I am not sure that is in any sense a settled
5 fact.
6 MR PURVIS: I was basing that on the location that they
7 struck on the corner of Harvey Street joining
8 Chamberlain Street and the Major's men were moving up
9 into that area.
10 LORD SAVILLE: They may well have been, but it is not
11 entirely certain as to whether --
12 MR PURVIS: I appreciate that, sir.
13 LORD SAVILLE: We have all to be a little bit careful in
14 stating as assertions of decided established fact that
15 that which, unfortunately, may be an issue, and it is
16 not entirely fair to the witness to do that either.
17 MR PURVIS: Paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 you go on to describe
18 moving back into Chamberlain Street, maintaining your
19 company in that area and then an arrest operation was
20 effected in that area between High Street, Harvey Street
21 and the Chamberlain Street area; is that correct, Major?
22 A. I think that is the case.
23 Q. In your diary of operations in your previous statement
24 you refer to a timescale of 1610 to 1620, "during
25 assault 22 persons were arrested." That is the one and
1 the same arrest operation referred to at paragraphs 23,
2 24 and 25?
3 A. Yes, it is.
4 Q. So I presume in that time you were in the Chamberlain
5 Street area, High Street, Harvey Street area with your
6 men as they conducted that operation, because you go on
7 to describe the nature of the operation in your current
8 statement; would that be fair to say?
9 A. Sorry, can you be more specific?
10 Q. In the ten-minute period of 1610 to 1620 when the 22
11 people were being arrested, you were with your men as
12 they made those arrests?
13 A. No, I was not necessarily with them when they made the
14 arrests, no.
15 Q. Were you not containing them in the Chamberlain Street
16 area?
17 A. Yes, but there were 60-plus soldiers, they were not all
18 in one large group, I mean, they were -- the soldiers by
19 now are between the east end of William Street, the top
20 end of Chamberlain Street, come down High Street, some
21 down into Harvey Street.
22 Q. I appreciate they are spread over a reasonably-sized
23 area. You were with them in that general area, is that
24 correct?
25 A. With some of them.
1 Q. You did not go off into Eden Place again?
2 A. From the one time I told you I went across the open
3 ground, that was one incident only.
4 Q. And you did not go back down to the area of barrier 14
5 during that ten-minute period, did you?
6 A. No.
7 Q. So you would have remained in or about the location of
8 the arrest operation?
9 A. I have a vague recollection, but I would not be certain,
10 but I would probably have stopped at the top end of
11 Chamberlain Street where it joins William Street, in
12 that sort of area there, but it was about this sort of
13 time, I recall, that we received the orders to withdraw.
14 Q. Yes. But in that ten-minute period, when you say you
15 heard gunfire from your right, you were in the
16 Chamberlain Street area?
17 A. That would be correct.
18 Q. In that terraced street?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. How do you know, being located in that area of streets,
21 that it came from your right in the first place?
22 A. (Pause). Well, all I can say is that is what was in my
23 statement in 1972. I do not have a recollection now of
24 the gunfire and so I cannot really answer your question.
25 Q. You did not hear Lieutenant N's shots?
1 A. I have told you I have not any recollection now,
2 30 years on, of any shots.
3 Q. It would appear you did not have that recollection the
4 following day when you made this first statement?
5 A. Why would you say that?
6 Q. Because it is not in the statement?
7 A. I think, it says "I heard gunfire from my right," it is
8 there under the 1610, 1620, the penultimate sentence.
9 Q. I think you were asked previously whether there were two
10 sequences of gunfire. I heard gunfire from my right and
11 then I definitely heard an M1 carbine, you could not
12 state whether that was the same sequence or two
13 separate --
14 A. I cannot now state that, because I have said I cannot
15 remember.
16 Q. And you cannot tell us anything from reading this first
17 statement?
18 A. I can only see what is there.
19 Q. How were you able to distinguish that it was M1 carbine
20 fire?
21 A. How could I in those days?
22 Q. Yes. There was no description given of its sound in
23 that previous statement?
24 A. No, there was not, but that is how one would have known,
25 from the sound of the M1 carbine, very low (inaudible)
1 velocity, thump, thump, thump as opposed to the high
2 crack of a high velocity weapon. Most weapons have
3 a distinctive sound.
4 I could not act now as an expert witness on that,
5 but at the time, 30 years ago, I had a considerable
6 knowledge about these things.
7 Q. You have put, "I quite definitely heard," and you did
8 not add by saying, "I know it was that because of the
9 sound, the low thump, thump, thump as opposed to the
10 high velocity rifle"?
11 A. Well, I --
12 Q. You did not go on to describe it --
13 A. I am sorry, what we see is what was dictated over the
14 telephone on 31st January 1972, I cannot comment on what
15 is not in the statement.
16 Q. The final sentence of that diary entry is:
17 "I saw the strike of several enemy rounds in the
18 Rossville/William Street area."
19 Are you referring to the junction of Rossville and
20 William Street?
21 A. I cannot say. I cannot say.
22 Q. Is there anywhere else that that could refer to?
23 A. Well, if I say I saw the strike of enemy rounds, then it
24 would have to be somewhere in an area where I could have
25 observed, and therefore, by definition, it would have to
1 have been in the wasteground, Chamberlain Street, Eden
2 Place, that sort of area, but this is now supposition.
3 This is not memory.
4 Q. If I could put it to you that if you were within the
5 Chamberlain Street area when the arrest operation was
6 being effected, it would be impossible to see down to
7 the Rossville Street/William Street junction or to see
8 bullets striking.
9 A. I did not -- (Pause). Yes, I accept what you say.
10 Q. You would need to be on the open ground looking down
11 towards that junction at that very time?
12 A. Yes, I accept you would need to be on the open ground.
13 Q. If I could finally put it to you, Major, that the
14 evidence of my clients will be there was no M1 carbine
15 fired.
16 LORD SAVILLE: Is that the case of all your clients?
17 MR PURVIS: Yes it is, sir.
18 LORD SAVILLE: Does it follow from that that they were in
19 the area of where it is suggested that this carbine was
20 fired?
21 MR PURVIS: It is based on a combination of their individual
22 recollections and also the evidence that will come from
23 the O/C and the adjutant as to their follow-up
24 procedures and the evidence they garnered and the
25 knowledge they garnered following a review of the day
1 later on.
2 LORD SAVILLE: If you are going to put things like that to
3 witnesses, then I think certainly next time you may have
4 to be in a position more exactly to describe what it is
5 you are putting on the basis of what instructions.
6 MR PURVIS: I appreciate that. I have no further questions
7 for this witness, sir.
8 MR HARVEY: Sir, I have no question for the witness, but
9 I do seek the Tribunal's guidance on one point.
10 You will recall, sir, that when my learned friend
11 Mr Arthur Harvey was questioning the witness the Major
12 expressed a preference for not identifying himself in
13 the video. He is the first witness so far, I think, to
14 come into the Tribunal and simply say that he would
15 rather not do that and I understand my learned friend
16 did not need to press the point there, but I was just
17 anxious that no precedent should be thought to be
18 established today that witnesses can at any stage
19 decline to answer a question of that nature, certainly
20 so far --
21 LORD SAVILLE: I do not think any questions have been set in
22 any direction at all. I suggested to Mr Harvey that he
23 could put the matter a different way. Mr Harvey put the
24 matter a different way and the problem resolved itself
25 in that manner.
1 Certainly, as we have always made clear, as indeed
2 the Court of Appeal made clear on the question of
3 anonymity, if, if it is required in order for us to seek
4 to get to the truth of what happened on Bloody Sunday,
5 that anonymity, identity or anything else is revealed,
6 then, subject to problems with Human Rights Acts and so
7 on, we will do our best to reveal the truth.
8 I do not think you need concern yourself that
9 a precedent has been set either one way or the other.
10 MR HARVEY: Thank you.
11 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Roxburgh, do you have any further
12 questions?
13 MR ROXBURGH: No, I do not, sir.
14 LORD SAVILLE: I am afraid it has been a long haul. Thank
15 you very much indeed for coming here to help us.
16 9.30 tomorrow morning, please.
17 (4.55 pm)
18 (Proceedings adjourned until 9.30 am
19 on Thursday, 6th February 2003)
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5 LORD ARMSTRONG, sworn ........................ 2
6 Questioned by MR CLARKE ...................... 2
7 Questioned by MR LAVERY ...................... 28
8 Questioned by MR R HARVEY .................... 81
9 Questioned by MR MACKIE ...................... 92
10 Questioned by MR R HARVEY .................... 94
11 Questioned by MR CLARKE ...................... 95
12 INQ221A, sworn ............................... 97
13 Questioned by MR ROXBURGH .................... 97
14 Questioned by MR ELIAS. ...................... 178
15 Questioned by MR A HARVEY .................... 187
16 Questioned by MR PURVIS ...................... 213
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25