1 Wednesday, 16th October 2002
2 (10.05 am)
3 Soldier 027, sworn
4 Questioned by MR CLARKE
5 LORD SAVILLE: I will address you as 027. If you look
6 across here you can see who is talking to you. I say
7 this to all the witnesses, I am going to say it to you:
8 I am the Chairman of the Tribunal. The questions will
9 come from the lawyers, the people in front of me. Could
10 I ask you to remember to keep pretty close to that
11 microphone in front of you, you can pull it towards you
12 a little if you like to make it more comfortable, and
13 then we will all be able to hear what you have to say.
14 MR CLARKE: Sir, I should record before we start that 027 is
15 represented by my learned friends Mr Ben Emerson, who is
16 not present here today but will be here tomorrow, and by
17 my learned friend Mr James Laddie, who is here, and
18 Sir Basil Hall and Mr Heritage are represented by my
19 learned friend Mr Hugo Keith, who is here.
20 I should also say that Mr Emerson and Mr Laddie have
21 produced to the Inquiry on behalf of 027 the draft of
22 a book, or rather those passages of the draft of a book
23 to be written by him which contain references to the
24 events of Bloody Sunday, or may otherwise be relevant
25 thereto.
1 That has been redacted overnight and will be
2 available for circulation as soon as copies can be made.
3 I do not think in fact, from a quick perusal of it, that
4 it adds a great deal to the bulk of the material we
5 have, but as soon as it can be available, it will be
6 available.
7 Could we have on the screen B1565.026. This is the
8 first page of your statement to this Tribunal of
9 7th June 2000. May we have on the screen B1565.113.
10 This is a further statement of yours, signed on
11 31st August 2000. Are the contents of those statements
12 true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
13 A. If you would excuse me just for one moment while I read
14 this. (Pause) Would you mind repeating the question
15 you asked?
16 Q. Are the contents of these two statements signed by you
17 in the year 2000 true to the best of your knowledge and
18 belief?
19 A. Yes, they are.
20 Q. Can we go back to 1565.026. The soldiers to whom you
21 refer or may be likely to refer are almost without
22 exception soldiers who are entitled to anonymity, just
23 as yourself, in these proceedings. Have you been
24 provided with a list of ciphers of soldiers in the
25 Anti-tank Platoon with their respective names and also
1 the names and their respective ciphers?
2 A. Yes, I have.
3 Q. Can you be sure to refer only to ciphers. If you want
4 to refer to someone who is not on the list, who is
5 a soldier, please do not do so by name. There is
6 a computer to the right of you in which you can type in
7 the name and if we recognise the cipher, we can give it
8 to you; do you follow?
9 A. Yes, I understand.
10 Q. I should explain, however, there are certain names that
11 are in the public domain, including: General Ford,
12 Brigadier McClellan, Colonel Wilford and Major Loden, so
13 do not worry about ciphers in relation to them.
14 We have all had the opportunity to read both of your
15 statements and the attachments to them. I want,
16 therefore, to ask you supplementary questions that arise
17 out of them.
18 Could we please highlight paragraphs 1 to 4. You
19 describe in paragraph 1 how you joined Support Company
20 in 1971 when you were 19, you were initially a member of
21 the signals platoon and in January 1972, were a radio
22 operator in the Anti-tank Platoon.
23 Do you recall whenabouts in 1971 it was that you
24 joined?
25 A. I believe it was March.
1 Q. You describe in paragraph 4 how you first arrived in
2 Belfast in August or September 1971 and the contrast
3 that that was to life in England.
4 Would I be right in thinking that you arrived in
5 Belfast after internment had been introduced?
6 A. It was a few weeks after internment had been introduced.
7 Q. Can we come, please, to the next page and in particular
8 paragraphs 7 and 8. You describe in paragraph 7 how in
9 Belfast you were joining men who had seen a lot of
10 violence and how 1 Para was probably more involved with
11 developing a street knowledge of Belfast and systems of
12 coping with outbreaks of violence than any other
13 regiment.
14 You describe in the next paragraph how, joining this
15 unit as a 19-year-old, there was, as you put it three
16 lines up from the bottom of the paragraph:
17 "... an element of enjoying the violence of the
18 situation. We adapted to it and the abnormal became
19 normal ... Depending on our individual natures, we were
20 all to various degrees brutalised by it."
21 Is there anyone in your platoon as at the date of
22 Bloody Sunday to whom that observation particularly
23 applied?
24 A. No, it is a general observation.
25 Q. Can we come, please, to paragraph 11. You describe
1 there how:
2 "It now seems apparent that the majority of the
3 first hundreds of internees picked up (sometimes not too
4 gently ...) had no involvement in paramilitary groups."
5 But that was not clear at the time. You go on to
6 say:
7 "The general feeling was that we had been given
8 power to do some sorting out, plucking troublemakers
9 from the community, and we just did our job. Our
10 Colonel told us we should conduct ourselves as if the
11 opposition was an organised, well equipped Army, and
12 that is the way we proceeded."
13 When you say "our Colonel" that is presumably
14 Colonel Wilford, is it?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. And this is speaking about the opposition in Belfast, is
17 it?
18 A. I am sure what I am speaking about is the organised
19 paramilitary groups that were opposed to us.
20 Q. Whether in Belfast or anywhere else, is that the
21 problem?
22 A. Yes, I would say that is correct.
23 Q. You say in paragraph 12:
24 "This situation would have been less tense and
25 frustrating had we been able to distinguish our allies
1 from potential enemies, but the situation was not like
2 that. We became as much exposed to violence from
3 Protestants as we were from Catholics. I have never
4 heard mention of the fact that a couple of weeks before
5 Bloody Sunday, bombs were planted in the
6 Palace Barracks, which it turned out later had been
7 facilitated by someone working in the cookhouse, who had
8 nationalist sympathies. The fact that we were trying to
9 engage an enemy who was capable of coming from our own
10 cookhouse affected our attitudes and outlooks further,
11 and increased our frustration and our wish to get to
12 grips with a tangible opposition. There was nothing
13 1 Para wanted more than for the IRA to come out into the
14 open and to take us on."
15 This planting of bombs in the barracks a couple of
16 weeks before Bloody Sunday; were these bombs that
17 exploded or were they discovered before they exploded?
18 A. They exploded.
19 Q. How significant should we take this incident to have
20 been? Was it just one of several factors contributing
21 to 1 Para's frustration and wanting the IRA to come out
22 in the open and take them on, or was it of some
23 particular significance?
24 A. I think I am using it as an example to illustrate the
25 point that we were living in a state of frustration.
1 Q. Could we then come, please, to paragraphs 15 to 17 at
2 the bottom of the page. You refer to one of your first
3 patrols in response to a report of sniper fire in
4 Andersonstown and the situation that you faced as you
5 walked down what you describe as corridors of hatred,
6 responding to a report of sniper fire, not finding
7 anything but during the incident a woman was blinded.
8 Is this the lady who was blinded by a rubber bullet?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. Is that an incident you witnessed?
11 A. No, I did not witness it, but I was present in that
12 action.
13 Q. May we come over the page, please, to paragraph 20. You
14 are dealing in paragraphs 18 to 20 with riots and how
15 they came about. What you say in paragraph 20 is this:
16 "Riots were generally a sort of ritualistic game;
17 people were playing out their roles. People on both
18 sides learnt how far they could go in a particular
19 situation. What made Bloody Sunday so significant, was
20 that the rule book was torn up and the accepted game
21 plan, developed through precedent, was thrown away."
22 We will obviously come on to the details of
23 Bloody Sunday in a moment, but can you tell us what you
24 meant in that paragraph by saying that:
25 "The rule book was torn up and the accepted game
1 plan ... thrown away"?
2 A. I believe it is self-explanatory really. I think people
3 from precedent get used to how far they can go in
4 a situation and on Bloody Sunday something different
5 occurred.
6 Q. We will come to the detail of that in a moment. Could
7 we come, please, to paragraph 21 to 23. You describe
8 there how:
9 "The constant threat of sniper fire was a major
10 factor in a soldier's life, as was contempt for an
11 opposition that would not reveal itself."
12 And how you were under sustained stress, playing
13 mind games with an ephemeral enemy. You say in
14 paragraph 22:
15 "Living in this environment gave rise to the
16 expression 'going ape'."
17 Does that in effect mean losing all control?
18 A. I do not have an accurate definition for this, I think
19 it is more along the lines of adapting to the prevailing
20 situation and conditions.
21 Q. "Another term used was 'beasting', when pent up tensions
22 were released on whoever happened to be in the wrong
23 place at the wrong time."
24 Does that mean in effect taking out your
25 frustrations on someone by beating him up, whether
1 justified or not?
2 A. It refers to a beating, certainly. I am not making the
3 connection with attributing it to frustration. Anyone
4 who received a beating, it was just a slang term to
5 describe that.
6 Q. You say you are not making a link, but you say here "the
7 term used was 'beasting' when pent up tensions were
8 released"; is that not letting out your frustrations by
9 beating somebody?
10 A. You could say that, yes.
11 Q. When you say that the expression "going ape" meant
12 adapting to the prevailing conditions, what does that
13 mean, "adapting" in what sense?
14 A. It probably means leaning towards an aggressive
15 attitude.
16 Q. These activities, either going ape or beasting, was this
17 something that when it happened, happened out of sight
18 of senior officers?
19 A. I am sure that is the case, yes.
20 Q. May we come, please, to paragraph 29. You say there:
21 "Personally, I do not consider myself an aggressive
22 or violent person, however, I did things that I was
23 ashamed of in Belfast, for example, striking the odd
24 individual. I remember a situation where we were
25 investigating a report of a machine-gunner in a dark
1 street. Someone opened their front door, placing me in
2 a pool of light. I told repeatedly to go in, but they
3 would not understand the situation from my perspective
4 so I asserted myself physically. Morally, the rights
5 and wrongs of that situation are arguable."
6 What does "I asserted myself physically" mean?
7 A. I hit the individual in the face to send him back into
8 his house and pulled the door closed.
9 Q. Is that right? Could we have a look at B1565.024. This
10 is part of your account of events in Northern Ireland
11 that was sent to Sean Patrick McShane. It describes an
12 occasion in which somebody would not close his door,
13 which was allowing light to come on to the street where
14 you were. What is recorded in that account, is this:
15 "A second later he opened it [that is the door]
16 again and I was standing there. He said 'this is my
17 house and I will stand here if I want.' I did not have
18 time to stand around and argue with him so I hit him and
19 shoved him back inside and close it again. Then for
20 a third time he opened it and I did not wait. I rammed
21 my rifle as hard as I could into his stomach. He
22 doubled over in front of me on the floor and I left him
23 to it. The door stayed closed."
24 Is this the same incident?
25 A. Yes, I believe it is.
1 Q. Is that an accurate account of what happened?
2 A. I no longer recall that detail.
3 Q. What, about ramming your rifle into his stomach, is that
4 the detail you do not recall?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Is there any reason to suppose this account, that
7 appears to have been written in 1975, was inaccurate
8 when made?
9 A. No, I have no reason to doubt that it was a reflection
10 of what I believed at the time it was written.
11 Q. I should have said, this is a part of your interview,
12 what is described as an interview in 1975. Does the
13 same response apply; is this what you believe to have
14 happened when you were asked about it?
15 A. I have no reason to doubt that this would have been
16 correct at the time or it reflected what I believed at
17 the time.
18 Q. Thank you. Could we come, please, to B1565.031,
19 paragraph 33. You describe there how:
20 "Soon after arriving in Belfast I received a beating
21 at the hands of UNK180."
22 You say he lived in a world that you could not
23 comprehend, he had all the positive attributes of
24 a Para, he was very efficient, an excellent shot and top
25 recruit, but totally lacking in the attributes usually
1 associated with a normal human being. On a day off with
2 a colleague, he took a sub-machine-gun from the barracks
3 and attempted to rob a Post Office in Belfast and was
4 given five years and during his trial, he threatened to
5 kill the prosecuting officer.
6 Is this something that happened before Bloody Sunday
7 or after?
8 A. I am quite confident to say that it is before.
9 Q. Was he present on Bloody Sunday, this soldier?
10 A. He was in a different sub-unit from myself so I do not
11 know his whereabouts on Bloody Sunday.
12 Q. Had he been arrested or convicted before Bloody Sunday,
13 do you know?
14 A. I cannot recall the timings of that incident.
15 Q. Is this right, that you think the attempt to rob
16 a Post Office took place before Bloody Sunday?
17 A. I think it must have occurred after Bloody Sunday
18 because I did see him in Derry in the unit as a whole
19 after the event.
20 Q. When did you see him in Derry?
21 A. On the evening of the day, I believe it was.
22 Q. When you say "on the evening of the day", on the day
23 before Bloody Sunday?
24 A. No, of Bloody Sunday.
25 Q. Of Bloody Sunday. Do you know in which company he was?
1 A. No, I do not.
2 Q. Do you know that he was not in Support Company or do you
3 not even know that?
4 A. I would be guessing to say now.
5 Q. You say that:
6 "He was dishonourably discharged and later became
7 a notorious mercenary."
8 Is this the soldier who was reputedly shot dead in
9 Africa?
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. Could we have a look at paragraph 34 and paragraph 35.
12 You recount, in paragraph 35, a story concerning
13 Corporal 036, that he shot a Chinese restaurant waiter
14 following a dispute over the bill. You describe it as
15 a story that you heard but cannot speak first-hand
16 about, that it was told, duly applauded and laughed at
17 and went down in the platoon's folklore.
18 Is this a story that was circulating before
19 Bloody Sunday?
20 A. I really do not recall.
21 Q. You tell us that you cannot speak first-hand for the
22 accuracy of it. I would like to look at how it appears
23 in the account of events that you gave in 1975. Could
24 we please have on the screen B1565. This is page 12 of
25 the typewritten account of events in Northern Ireland --
1 this is not the interview, but the typewritten account
2 of yours -- of events in Northern Ireland in 1971 and
3 1972 and, if we look to the very bottom of the page,
4 what is recorded is this:
5 "A corporal in my platoon named," there is then
6 a blank. That is because a name has been blanked out,
7 but there should be inserted the cipher 036:
8 "A corporal in my platoon named 036 [over the page]
9 after having eaten in a Chinese restaurant in Bangor
10 decided he was going to walk out without paying the
11 bill. As a result a Chinese waiter followed him out of
12 the door, brandishing a chair [there should be inserted
13 the cipher 036] shot him with a 9mm Browning, ran to
14 a pub where he knew some friends were drinking, gave
15 them the pistol and continued with his night out."
16 Two ciphers should have been inserted, they do not
17 seem to be in this version, it should read:
18 "G and F, who had been given the weapon, returned to
19 barracks, the Armourer brushed it through and the
20 consequent investigation in the face of solid denials
21 and no evidence came to nothing. I could recite many
22 stories of a similar nature ..."
23 You appeared there to have given a fairly detailed
24 account of the incident, including the fact that the
25 shooting took place with a 9mm Browning, but 036 ran to
1 a pub and gave the weapon in question to G and F, who
2 returned to barracks with it and the consequent
3 investigation came to nothing in the face of solid
4 denials from all concerned.
5 Did you have any personal knowledge of any of that?
6 A. No, I was relating a story here, I think.
7 Q. The story, is that simply the story that went the
8 rounds; do you know who you had heard it from?
9 A. It was barrack room talk current at the time.
10 Q. At the bottom of the same page you wrote in the same
11 document, this:
12 "For although we had been in more dangerous
13 situations more often we had not suffered a casualty,
14 and many of the blokes were getting rich from the
15 wallets of the people we searched in hundreds daily. In
16 fact, they often, as soon as they were asked to go up
17 a back alley, would produce all the money they had and
18 offer it to us by way of appeasement. Although I am
19 sensible enough to have realised then and now the
20 immorality and baseness of the situations we created,
21 I confess to being filled with the martial spirit of
22 power along with everyone else."
23 Is this the sort of behaviour you yourself witnessed
24 or is this soldiers' stories?
25 A. I believe what I wrote at the time reflected probably
1 a mixture of both.
2 Q. Then you went on to say this:
3 "As I tried to explain after the training we had
4 been through, we were a family, dependent on each other
5 and above everyone and out to prove it at every
6 opportunity. More men than I can remember took the
7 severest of beatings at our hands."
8 Is that a result of personal experience?
9 A. One was aware of scuffles and beatings within a fairly
10 close proximity, even if you were round a corner or in
11 a vehicle, these things -- you were just aware that they
12 were happening.
13 Q. "On one occasion while in the back alley a suspect was
14 placed against the wall and a Scottish Corporal, while
15 pointing a pistol at his face, said he was going to
16 shoot him and instructed him to open his mouth. What
17 the bloke did not realise was that the Corporal had not
18 pushed the magazine fully home and so when he made
19 a loud noise of cocking the weapon, no round went into
20 the chamber. The man, petrified with fright, refused to
21 comply with instruction and had the barrel of the
22 Browning thrust into his face breaking his teeth. To
23 the words of 'this is where you get yours Jimmy' he
24 pulled the trigger. Only a click occurred, but the
25 bloke's eyelids fluttered, he gasped, slid down the wall
1 and died of a heart attack."
2 Is that something you personally witnessed or is
3 this a soldier's story?
4 A. I have no recollection of it now, so ...
5 Q. Can you help us as to whether it is likely to be
6 something you had witnessed or simply an account that
7 you had heard?
8 A. I have a memory of something similar to the first half
9 of that statement, but I have no memory of them --
10 anybody dying of a heart attack in those circumstances.
11 Q. Is it possible the description of somebody dying of
12 a heart attack in those circumstances is simply an
13 embellishment of a tale or an embellishment of an
14 incident which occurred, in the beginning, as you
15 described it, but did not have the result that you give
16 to it in this account?
17 A. I am not in a position to say as I -- I do not have
18 a recollection of at this point in time.
19 Q. Could we have B1565.31, paragraphs 36 to the end. You
20 describe in these paragraphs the command structure, how:
21 "Three sections made up a platoon. A second
22 Lieutenant or a full Lieutenant was in charge of
23 a platoon and a Company Major, or perhaps a Captain, was
24 in charge of a company."
25 We understand that on Bloody Sunday there were about
1 16 men, together with a lieutenant, operating in the
2 Anti-tank Platoon. Would that accord with your
3 recollection, the approximate number of people in the
4 platoon on that day?
5 A. Approximately that seems about right, yes.
6 Q. And on Bloody Sunday was the Anti-tank Platoon in fact
7 deployed in sections and, if so, how large were the
8 sections?
9 A. Our groupings were determined by -- a section would fit
10 into one vehicle and that would tend to influence how
11 troops were deployed.
12 Q. We know there were two Anti-tank Platoon Pigs on the
13 day. Would that suggest that the platoon was operating
14 in two sections on Bloody Sunday?
15 A. I do not know, I doubt it was as clearly defined as
16 that.
17 Q. You say in paragraph 39:
18 "Lieutenant 119 was not a controversial figure and
19 was a perfectly acceptable bloke." You say at the
20 bottom of the page:
21 "I can no longer remember who was our Lieutenant
22 in January 1972; it may have been UNK241."
23 I think it is pretty clear, if I may tell you, that
24 Lieutenant 119 was the lieutenant in charge of the
25 Anti-tank Platoon in January 1972 because he gave
1 evidence to Lord Widgery to that effect and is to give
2 evidence to this Inquiry to the same effect. I assume
3 there can only have been one lieutenant in command of
4 the Anti-tank Platoon on the day; is that right?
5 A. That is correct.
6 Q. We know you were a radio operator on the day. Were you
7 the platoon Commander's radio operator on the day?
8 A. Not that I remember.
9 Q. If you were not the platoon Commander's radio operator,
10 would you be attached to anybody else; would you be
11 attached to a sergeant, for instance, or would you just
12 be another radio operator?
13 A. Who you were attached to could vary from situation to
14 situation and day-to-day, so I do not know specifically
15 what my function was that day, other than being, at
16 least, a section operator.
17 Q. May we come, please, to page 1565.033. This is
18 a passage in your statement, headed "General restraint."
19 If we look at paragraph 50, you say:
20 "My overall impression of our battalion on the
21 streets is one of remarkable self control and self
22 restraint. I was incredibly impressed by the way in
23 which the Army, and specifically the Parachute Regiment,
24 conducted itself in Northern Ireland. I do not believe
25 that any other Army in the world, in the circumstances
1 in which we operated, would have conducted itself in
2 a such a way."
3 Then in the next paragraph, under the heading "The
4 frustration of the Paras", you say:
5 "A prevalent feeling amongst the troops in Ulster
6 by December 1971/January 1972 was that we were operating
7 with our hands tied behind our backs, reacting to the
8 initiative of others."
9 You describe that in further detail. Then in
10 paragraph 53, you describe how 1 Para policed some of
11 the more volatile areas in the city. You say in the
12 last two sentences:
13 "We were generally young men, with a good opinion of
14 ourselves (which was probably justified in soldiering
15 terms) and we were not able to perform to our potential,
16 in the way that we had been trained. We faced
17 constraints in the face of all provocation. If
18 presented with an opportunity to do our stuff, we would
19 certainly take it. It was our raison d'etre."
20 Could you help me with what you meant by using the
21 expression "an opportunity to do our stuff"; what does
22 "our stuff" mean in that context?
23 A. To engage a tangible enemy, I would say, I think
24 employed the skills that we had learnt in our training.
25 Q. May we come, please, to paragraphs 57 and 58 on
1 1565.035. You describe in these paragraphs the briefing
2 on the night before Bloody Sunday. You say in
3 paragraph 57:
4 "I have a clear memory of my section, the seven or
5 eight of us, being in barracks in our denims and
6 T-shirts. Our platoon Lieutenant came in, whose
7 identity I cannot now recall. It was not a formal
8 briefing, it was more in the manner of a group chat.
9 The Lieutenant stood and we sat, as we had a discussion
10 about Derry. We were talking freely amongst ourselves,
11 expressing the views on Derry that I have set out above.
12 "58. I cannot remember precisely all that was said
13 at that briefing ..."
14 Pausing there, this briefing that you are
15 describing, was this the platoon order group or was it
16 something different?
17 A. My impression now is that it was a fairly informal
18 discussion.
19 Q. Do you have a recollection of there having been, either
20 before or after this discussion, a more formal order
21 group session?
22 A. I have no recollection of one now.
23 Q. The reason I ask is this: could we have a look at B2217.
24 This is a part of the statement to Lord Widgery's
25 Tribunal of Major Loden. One can just see at the top of
1 the page that the statement includes this:
2 "Platoon commanders held their orders from
3 2200 hours. I attended all three order groups. I did
4 not attend the Composite Platoon order group which was
5 also held at this time ..." then he gives the reason:
6 "Every soldier in the company attended these platoon
7 order groups and thus knew what was required of him."
8 That appears to suggest that there was, as I say,
9 a platoon order group, attended by Major Loden at some
10 time after 2200 hours on 29th January. You have no
11 recollection of that; is that what you say?
12 A. I do not remember it now, no.
13 Q. May we go back to B1565.035, paragraph 58. You say you
14 cannot remember precisely all that was said at the
15 briefing. I will come on to the next part of the
16 sentence in a moment, but were you aware, as a result of
17 this briefing, that there was going to be a civil rights
18 march in Londonderry the following day?
19 A. Excuse me, are you referring to this "informal briefing"
20 in the barrack block that is described here?
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. I believe so, yes.
23 Q. Did you know what the civil rights march was about?
24 A. I cannot recall what my understanding of it would have
25 been at the time.
1 Q. If we look at 1,565.036, paragraph 62, the expression
2 you use there, is this:
3 "To us, at the briefing, the march was a gathering
4 of IRA supporters, the enemy in a no-go area."
5 Is that correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. "If there was a problem, we were to go in and arrest
8 people."
9 You understood, did you, you may be involved in an
10 arrest operation?
11 A. Yes, that is correct.
12 Q. If we go back to paragraph 60, page 1565.035, you say:
13 "When we were informed that we were going to Derry,
14 the fact that it was a civil rights march was neither
15 here nor there."
16 You say:
17 "I do not think any one of us would have had
18 a single sensible thing to say about the civil rights
19 movement. To us, what was more important was that it
20 was an illegal march. As squaddies, our perception was
21 that probably all the people in Republican areas were
22 IRA supporters."
23 Is that the cast of mind that you would have had at
24 the time?
25 A. I believe that is pretty accurate, yes.
1 Q. If we go back to paragraph 58, you say:
2 "I cannot remember precisely all that was said at
3 that briefing, but I do remember the remarks revolving
4 around the possibility of getting kills the following
5 day. I cannot now remember whether these events were
6 first voiced by the Lieutenant, but I do remember the
7 comment being repeated by the soldier sitting next to me
8 to my left."
9 Can we have what is your recollection about what was
10 said in relation to "kills"?
11 A. In the context of entering no-go areas?
12 Q. I would like you to tell us what you recollect was said
13 at this informal meeting about the possibility of
14 "getting kills" the following day?
15 A. I believe that we were talking about the idea that it
16 was quite likely that there would be shooting incidents
17 the following day which would result in us getting
18 kills.
19 Q. Is that all that it amounted to: there may be shooting
20 incidents and that could result "in us getting kills"?
21 A. There was a general discussion about the situation in
22 Derry and the nature of the IRA in relation to Derry and
23 the no-go areas, and we were assessing the -- what the
24 ramifications would be for us and the likelihood of
25 shooting incidents occurring, or being engaged. As
1 a result of, growing out of that discussion the
2 expression about "getting kills" emerged.
3 Q. I am trying to discover what the expression about
4 "getting kills" was; can you help us?
5 A. Specifically it means if a gunman engages you, you shoot
6 the gunman.
7 Q. Can you remember the gist of the expression that was
8 used by whoever used it?
9 A. I have a memory of that phrase.
10 Q. Which phrase?
11 A. "Getting kills".
12 Q. "Getting kills" is just two words. Can you be any more
13 precise about the phrase that was used?
14 A. At this point in time I am afraid I cannot.
15 Q. Can we look, please, at 1565.036, paragraph 65. The way
16 in which you put it in this statement is:
17 "The comment 'we want some kills tomorrow' needs to
18 be put into the context in which it was made."
19 Do you actually recall someone saying "we want some
20 kills tomorrow" as opposed to someone discussing the
21 possibility of "getting kills" if Paras were attacked
22 and became engaged in a gun battle?
23 A. At this distance of time I cannot be dogmatic about
24 a precise form of words here.
25 Q. Do you know who it was who used the expression, whatever
1 that expression precisely was?
2 A. I have a memory of the chap sitting beside me
3 acknowledging the general sentiment of what was passing
4 amongst us.
5 Q. That is somebody acknowledging the sentiment, but do you
6 know who expressed the sentiment?
7 A. No, I do not.
8 Q. If we look at paragraph 66, you say, this:
9 "At that time we were involved in a vicious, violent
10 conflict. There were men out there who were trying to
11 kill us with all the ingenuity they had available. When
12 there was talk about wanting some kills tomorrow it was
13 said against that background. I am clear in my mind
14 that what was meant was that if we confronted gunmen, we
15 would come out on top."
16 Was that what you understood the sentiment to amount
17 to?
18 A. My current standpoint it makes sense to me, I would say
19 that is correct.
20 Q. If we go back to paragraph 58 on 1565.035, you say
21 there:
22 "... I do remember the comment being repeated by the
23 soldier sitting next to me to my left. I have a clear
24 memory of him nodding his head in acknowledgment and
25 repeating what was said, as if he had made his mind up."
1 This is F, is it not?
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. "Because he was the first individual I noticed from our
4 platoon who fired a shot on the day, the memory of his
5 reaction during the discussion the previous evening
6 stayed in my memory."
7 You still have a recollection of that, do you?
8 A. Yes, I do.
9 Q. Can we go to 1565.003. This is your account of events
10 in relation to Bloody Sunday. In it you record the
11 events of the night before. You say:
12 "One night in January 1972, I was sitting with the
13 rest of my 'muckers' of the Anti-tank Platoon in the
14 barracks when our Lieutenant [there should be inserted
15 the cipher 119] came in and informed us that we were due
16 for an operation in Londonderry the following day. He
17 said that the heart of Derry had been bombed out.
18 Several hundred soldiers had been hospitalised and that
19 not one arrest had been made."
20 I omit the next three sentences:
21 "As I looked at my friends I could see that after
22 all the abuse and nights without sleep, frustrations and
23 tensions, this is what they had been waiting for. We
24 were all in high spirits and when our Lieutenant said
25 'let us teach these buggers a lesson -- we want some
1 kills tomorrow', to the mentality of the blokes to whom
2 he was speaking, this was tantamount to an order, i.e.
3 an exoneration of all responsibility."
4 Then you deal with setting off in a convoy across
5 Northern Ireland on the day itself. When you wrote this
6 in 1975, you attributed the comment to Lieutenant 119,
7 and the comment was:
8 "Let us teach these buggers a lesson, we want some
9 kills tomorrow."
10 Do you think that was an accurate recollection or
11 was this an embellishment in your mind of something that
12 was less dramatic than this account appears to make it
13 seem?
14 A. I have no way to know the answer to that at this point
15 in time.
16 Q. Can I ask you this: do you have any recollection of
17 understanding that what you were being told was an
18 exoneration of your platoon from all responsibility?
19 A. Excuse me, could you repeat that, please?
20 Q. Do you have any recollection now of understanding what
21 you were being told on the evening of January 1972 as
22 amounting to exonerating your platoon from all
23 responsibility?
24 A. At no time have I thought that our platoon was being
25 exonerated from responsibility.
1 Q. If at no time you thought that, how can it be that you
2 wrote in this account:
3 "... this was tantamount to an order, i.e. an
4 exoneration of all responsibility"?
5 A. The way I read that as I look at it now, it is my
6 impression of how it might affect people's minds, it is
7 not a literal thing.
8 Q. Is what you are saying: people may have understood it in
9 a sense other than that in which it was meant?
10 A. At this distance of time I can only hazard a comment.
11 It is easier for a private soldier to lean in a
12 particular direction if he believes the authority of
13 figures above him are in concert with his ideas.
14 Q. You have told me when I have asked you questions in
15 relation to other passages in the 1975 material, either
16 your account or the interview that you gave, that you
17 had no reason to doubt that they represented your
18 recollection at the time, but how confident can we be
19 that you actually recalled, in 1975, that this remark
20 came from the Lieutenant who was in charge of the
21 platoon?
22 A. I have no reason to doubt that this was -- this reflects
23 an accurate impression of how I understood the situation
24 at the time.
25 Q. Let me explain why I am asking the question. Could we
1 have on the screen B1752.012. This is a portion of
2 Lieutenant 119's statement to this Inquiry. Could we
3 highlight, please, paragraph 15:
4 "I have been specifically asked whether I remember
5 going to the platoon room prior to our deployment to
6 Londonderry when the men were standing around in their
7 vests and trousers and briefing them about the coming
8 march in Londonderry. I have no recollection of that.
9 I have been asked whether on such an occasion, or at any
10 time, I said to my platoon words along the lines of 'let
11 us teach those buggers a lesson -- we want some kills
12 tomorrow'. An alternative suggestion, which
13 I understand is now offered by Soldier 027, is that
14 I said something along the lines that the march would
15 consist of 15,000 people who were all essentially
16 terrorists and that we should take great care not to let
17 them get us before we got them. I utterly refute either
18 version. I would not have said any such things as they
19 do not reflect how I felt then or now. In addition,
20 they would have suggested a breaking of the Yellow Card
21 and possibly even a criminal offence."
22 Does that paragraph cause you in any way to doubt
23 whether your state of mind and recollection in 1975 was
24 accurate?
25 A. Well, I could make the comment that, "is that I said
1 something along the lines that the march would consist
2 of 15,000 people who were all essentially terrorists",
3 and the rest of that sentence, I do not know where that
4 comes from, I do not recollect making those comments
5 myself. So he is refuting something that does not
6 originate with me.
7 If he says he does not remember discussing it the
8 evening before in the barrack room, well, that may be,
9 but that, such a get-together in a group chat, certainly
10 occurred.
11 Q. The critical point is his denial of saying something
12 along the lines of "Let us teach those buggers
13 a lesson -- we want some kills tomorrow"; does that
14 cause you to doubt your recollection in 1975, to doubt
15 the accuracy of your recollection?
16 A. I have no reason to doubt that that is an accurate
17 reflection of what I believed to be the case at the
18 time.
19 Q. Could we go back to B1565.036. Could we highlight
20 paragraphs 65 and 66. You say this:
21 "We were going into the Bogside, a no-go area,
22 a piece of British territory that had been taken over by
23 terrorists. We were told to be prepared for any
24 eventuality and there was a strong impression that we
25 would encounter gunmen ... The following day, we were to
1 go in strength into their stronghold, the Bogside, and
2 for once they would have to come out and face us. They
3 would have nowhere else to go. We were sure that
4 a confrontation was going to occur and that we were
5 about to face gunmen."
6 Did you know or were you told anything about the
7 geography of the Bogside, the place into which you were
8 to go?
9 A. I do not have a recollection of information like that
10 being passed to us.
11 Q. Do you have any recollection of being told how far into
12 the Bogside, if you were to go into it, you would be
13 going?
14 A. Personally, no.
15 Q. The impression that you have is that you were to be
16 going in strength into the Bogside and for once the IRA
17 "would have to come out and face us". What caused you
18 to think that the IRA would have to come out and face
19 you?
20 A. I believe that is based on the idea that our impression,
21 the no-go areas were home bases for the IRA and if, if
22 they were entered, then they would have no alternative.
23 Q. I do not entirely follow. There is a large march.
24 Assume that there is trouble in it. The Paras go in and
25 break up the riot, if there is one, and arrest
1 troublemakers. Why should that mean that the IRA would
2 have to come out and face the Paras?
3 A. I just think it is a natural expectation that if you --
4 if we were on their doorstep, that there would be
5 confrontation.
6 Q. By "confrontation," do you mean you were expecting the
7 IRA to come out and shoot at the Paras, or something
8 different?
9 A. I think there was a high expectation that we would be
10 shot at, yes.
11 Q. And these impressions and expectations that you are
12 describing, they are derived, are they, or they were
13 derived, were they, from the informal discussion in the
14 barrack room the night before?
15 A. That I am sure brought already existing impressions into
16 a clearer focus, yes.
17 Q. Could we come, please, to B1565.004. This is another
18 part of your account of the day. In a portion of it,
19 you say this:
20 "I shall now say rather belatedly that the purpose
21 of our trip was in anticipation of trouble during
22 a massive pro-IRA rally, which had been publicised for
23 some days. Such inspired troublemakers as
24 Bernadette Devlin were on hand to stir things up, plus
25 several top IRA leaders who had made the short trip
1 across the border from the Republic."
2 Do you know where you had received that notion from,
3 that several top IRA leaders had made the short trip
4 across the border from the Republic?
5 A. No, I do not.
6 Q. Could we come, please, to B1565.037, paragraphs 68 to
7 70. You describe travelling to Derry in convoy, your
8 section travelling in the back of a Pig with the doors
9 partially open and it was a crisp sunny morning.
10 Do you recall at what time, approximately, of the
11 day or night you set off from Belfast?
12 A. I may be mistaken with this, but I think it was the
13 crack of dawn.
14 Q. But it was light, at any rate, was it?
15 A. I believe it was, yes.
16 Q. You describe entering Derry and parking in the back
17 streets. Did you stop just outside Derry before you
18 entered it?
19 A. I do not remember.
20 Q. When you say "we travelled to Derry in convoy," would
21 that be the whole of the battalion that was going to
22 Derry or just Support Company?
23 A. No, there were various elements of the battalion
24 assembled on this occasion.
25 Q. You describe in paragraph 70 how you were monitoring the
1 radio on various nets, the C42 radio would have been on
2 the battalion net and you also carried a subsection A41
3 radio on the company net. You say:
4 "I cannot remember now if each section had a radio
5 operator or if I was the only one for the Anti-tank
6 Platoon."
7 We know that there was in fact at least one other
8 radio operator for the Anti-tank Platoon. Could there
9 have been any more than two radio operators for
10 a platoon of about 16 people?
11 A. I would not have thought so, no.
12 Q. The A41 radio is the one you carry on your back; is that
13 right?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. Do you recollect what call sign you had on the day?
16 A. At this moment in time I cannot, no.
17 Q. I would like to show you a document that I think you may
18 not have seen before. It is the log of the battalion
19 net. Could we have on the screen, please, W90. This,
20 as appears from the top, is the log for
21 30th January 1972 for the 1st Battalion of the Parachute
22 Regiment. Is that a document that you have ever seen
23 before?
24 A. No.
25 Q. It may be that you cannot help us, but I would like your
1 assistance, if you can. There is a control section or
2 control source, marked I think "+" in this log, and the
3 battalion is communicating, I think, with various
4 companies, for instance there is a reference to B1, B3
5 and B5.
6 Do you know what those refer to?
7 A. I am afraid not, no.
8 Q. May we come, please, to B1565.037, paragraphs 71 to 73.
9 You describe how, during the course of the wait in the
10 back streets of Londonderry, dumdum bullets were passed
11 around the back of your section's Pig. These were 7.62
12 rounds with a deep cross filed into the tip through the
13 copper sheath. You say in paragraph 72:
14 "I remember holding one of the dumdums in my hand
15 and looking at it."
16 Can you recollect approximately how many of these
17 bullets were passed round?
18 A. No, I cannot.
19 Q. Can you give us no idea? Are we talking about somewhere
20 between 1 and 5 or are we talking about a large number
21 or something in between?
22 A. I can only say that I personally handled one.
23 Q. Did you see others?
24 A. I do not now recall.
25 Q. Are you saying that you can only now recall seeing one
1 dumdum bullet being passed around?
2 A. I can only remember the one that I held, it was passed
3 to me and I looked at it and passed it on.
4 Q. Why was it being passed on; why was it being circulated?
5 A. I do not know.
6 Q. Did nobody say something about it?
7 A. Not that I recall, no.
8 Q. Did it appear to be part of somebody's supply for use on
9 that day?
10 A. I cannot speculate on that.
11 Q. Do you know whose bullet it was?
12 A. No, I do not.
13 Q. I do not think this is an incident that appears in the
14 1975 material, your account of Bloody Sunday and the
15 interview given in 1975. Indeed, I think the first time
16 reference to circulating a bullet or bullets which had
17 been tampered with prior to the entry of the
18 paratroopers into the Bogside, appears in these
19 paragraphs.
20 How clear are you about your recollection of this
21 taking place?
22 A. I am slightly confused by your comment just now. My
23 recollection of giving this statement is that I was
24 specifically asked about them by the statement-takers,
25 so I believe it must have been in an earlier statement.
1 LORD SAVILLE: Lord Gifford, yes.
2 LORD GIFFORD: Page 1565.008 refers to "dumdums" in
3 a slightly different context, but that is the reference
4 I have.
5 MR CLARKE: Yes, that is quite different. If you look at
6 1565.008, this is part of your 1975 statement. Could we
7 have the second half, please. You do indeed say that:
8 "Several of the blokes had fired their own personal
9 supply of dumdums. [Then there should be inserted
10 cipher INQ635] for one fired 10 dumdums into the crowd."
11 That I doubt not, I will be corrected if I am wrong,
12 but I do not believe there is any reference in your
13 statement, other than your statement to this Tribunal,
14 to the circulation of a dumdum bullet or bullets for
15 inspection, as it were, whilst people were waiting to go
16 in in the back streets of Londonderry.
17 Do you still have a recollection now of that having
18 happened?
19 A. Yes, I do.
20 Q. May we come, please, to B1565.38, paragraph 74. You
21 describe how, at some stage, you moved from the back
22 streets to a churchyard and you say that you think that
23 you were:
24 "... standing around in the cement covered yard by
25 the church and the vehicles were parked outside. As
1 I was standing at approximately the point marked A on
2 the map attached ..." you "saw a puff of dust and
3 fragments on the ground some metres in front of me, near
4 the northeast corner of the church", and at point marked
5 B.
6 You say you think you mentioned it to people around
7 you at the time without realising what it was and it did
8 not dawn on you until some time later that it was, in
9 all probability, an incoming strike hitting the ground.
10 When did it dawn on you that what you saw might be
11 a bullet?
12 A. I think it was -- I cannot be precise, but --
13 timewise -- but it was after leaving that location.
14 You.
15 Q. You say in the last sentence:
16 "I cannot remember hearing any incoming shots while
17 we were there, nor hearing any outgoing SLR shots before
18 we went in."
19 You saw a puff of dust but you heard nothing, either
20 coming in or going out, which appeared to be a shot;
21 does that appear to be the position?
22 A. At this point in time I cannot remember, but I presume
23 it was.
24 MR TOOHEY: Mr Clarke, would you clarify for us, please, the
25 reference to "location," is that a reference to the
1 churchyard?
2 MR CLARKE: Yes.
3 MR TOOHEY: If it is, could you please clarify the movement
4 from the churchyard to wherever the soldiers went.
5 MR CLARKE: Can we have on the screen B1565.095. At this
6 stage, as I understand it, you recollect being at the
7 point that is marked A on your map and seeing the puff
8 of dust at the point that is marked B; is that right.
9 A. This representation does not mean very much to me, so --
10 Q. Let me try a photograph. Can we have P199. This is an
11 aerial photograph of the centre of Londonderry. This is
12 a street called Great James Street. Here is
13 a Presbyterian Church and in front of the entrance to
14 the church is a cement-covered yard, and there has been
15 a lot of evidence that at a stage in the proceedings
16 before the Paras went in, a shot hit a drainpipe on this
17 church. That sounds very like the incident that you are
18 describing.
19 Is it possible to lighten the photograph a little?
20 Does the photograph help you at all with your
21 recollection as to where you were?
22 A. Yes, there is a logic, I can -- visualising my
23 perspective from the time, it would fit into this
24 churchyard, yes.
25 Q. If one were to convert the notations you have made on
1 the map to the photograph, that would appear to suggest
2 that you saw what appears to have been the strike of
3 a bullet somewhere around where I am pointing; is that
4 about right?
5 A. Approximately, I would say that is correct.
6 Q. Could we have the whole photograph, please. As
7 I understand it, at this stage the Anti-tank Platoon and
8 its vehicles were somewhere around the area of the
9 church. We know that in the events which happened,
10 Support Company, including the two vehicles of the
11 Anti-tank Platoon, went down what is Little James Street
12 through a barrier that is about where I am pointing in
13 green, and then on down to at least the junction between
14 Rossville Street and William Street.
15 Does that fit in with your recollection; can you
16 orientate yourself by reference to this photograph?
17 A. Yes, I can.
18 Q. Thank you very much. Could we come, please, to
19 B1565.038. You describe in paragraphs 75 and 76 how, at
20 some stage, you could hear the very loud noise of the
21 crowd and you could hear yells, bangs and clatters of
22 rioting, and you describe how the men in the yard with
23 you were talking and waiting with anticipation, itching
24 to be called forward; is that right?
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. You then describe how you were slightly affected by gas
2 which came over the nearby building and at that stage
3 you put your gas masks on, with some indignation that
4 gas had been used by some "crap hat" at the barricade,
5 which was not something that the Paras would have done;
6 is that what it amounts to?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. May we have a look, please, at paragraph 78. You say
9 you have a memory of Major Loden over the radio
10 "ordering us forward" and as a result of which you
11 mounted up. Do you know where Major Loden would have
12 been at the time when he gave the order?
13 A. I do not remember now.
14 Q. Do you remember that there was an armoured control
15 vehicle looking rather like a Pig but slightly
16 different, in fact with a raised perspex screen at the
17 top of it?
18 A. I remember that the Major was in a Saracen.
19 Q. Do you know whether he would have been in that vehicle
20 at this stage or not?
21 A. I do not know where he was at this stage.
22 Q. An order given by him over the radio, which net would
23 that have been on?
24 A. I would imagine it would have been on the company net.
25 Q. And that is an open net; is that right?
1 A. Well, to the best of my recollection there would have
2 been a frequency peculiar to our company.
3 Q. But anybody who can tune in to that frequency can hear
4 what is being transmitted; is that right?
5 A. Presumably, yes.
6 Q. You say that there would be a frequency peculiar to your
7 company. That would have the effect, would it not, that
8 anybody in the several platoons that make up the company
9 who was tuned into that frequency would be able to hear
10 whatever Major Loden was saying?
11 A. If that was the situation that existed, that would be
12 the case, yes.
13 Q. You would have received and heard this order on your A41
14 radio; is that right?
15 A. Yes, yes.
16 Q. Can you recall with any greater precision exactly what
17 it was?
18 A. I cannot be precise about that now.
19 Q. Could we have a look, please, at B1565.004. The bottom
20 half of the page. This is your account in 1975, where
21 you said this:
22 "Before I could get my gas mask on I caught a couple
23 of breaths which filled me with nausea and sickness, my
24 eyes streamed with water. I was not alone with this,
25 and as the gas had been thrown by the crowd we were
1 raring to get at them. Then I heard Major Loden's voice
2 crackle on the radio 'machine-guns and anti-tanks mount
3 up and move in'."
4 Can we take it that that was your recollection in
5 1975 of the gist of the order that Major Loden had given
6 on the radio?
7 A. I have no reason to doubt it, although subsequently it
8 has been pointed out to me it cannot be correct because
9 it was the mortar and not the machine-guns.
10 Q. Undoubtedly so. It looks as though you had no
11 recollection of anything more specific than that
12 relatively short and simple order having been made; is
13 that right?
14 A. There may have been supplementary comments, I do not
15 recall.
16 Q. Having received that order which you had heard on your
17 radio, would you have communicated it to others?
18 A. I do not remember now how the -- perhaps I relayed it to
19 a sergeant who would have shouted it to others, I do not
20 recall.
21 Q. Your recollection in 1975 was that the order is
22 "machine-guns and Anti-tanks mount up and move in."
23 Assume that we correct "machine-guns" so as to read
24 "mortar and Anti-tank mount up and move in," that still
25 leaves the Composite Platoon or Guinness Force. Do you
1 know whether they were the subject of Major Loden's
2 order at the same time?
3 A. No, I have no idea.
4 Q. Could we go to B1565.038, paragraph 79 at the bottom of
5 the page. You say there:
6 "We knew we were going through a barricade and
7 I have a memory of passing through the barbed wire of
8 the barricade, which was drawn back for us. I remember
9 seeing crap hats with shields and the intense feeling of
10 adrenaline as we were swept along by events. I do not
11 think that anyone at any level of authority knew exactly
12 what we were going to do after that. I think it was
13 pretty clear that we were there for a special occasion
14 and that we were going to be used for what we were good
15 at, going forward. We knew we were heading into
16 something but, in practical terms, no-one could have had
17 a clear idea of what. There was just the idea that we
18 were going forward to move as a scoop-up operation."
19 What exactly is a "scoop-up operation"?
20 A. The object is -- perhaps terminology is misleading or
21 incorrect, we are talking about snatch squads going
22 forward to arrest rioters here.
23 Q. Had you any means of knowing whether the people whom you
24 might encounter had been rioting or not?
25 A. Our first -- my first view of the crowd was when we left
1 the vehicles.
2 Q. If you came upon somebody, is it right that you would
3 not have a clue as to whether or not he was somebody who
4 had previously been throwing a stone, or worse?
5 A. Well, not on an individual basis.
6 Q. You say "not on an individual basis," was there some
7 sort of assumption that anybody who you would meet would
8 have been involved in rioting?
9 A. There is a logical progression here. We had heard
10 rioters. We had encountered gas. It was fairly natural
11 to anticipate, when we left our vehicles, there would
12 be -- it would be in a hostile environment.
13 Q. Who did you think you had to scoop-up, anybody you met
14 as soon as you stopped or something more specific?
15 A. I cannot offer an all-embracing rationale for that, I am
16 afraid. Because there had been rioting, we were
17 directed in that direction to arrest rioters.
18 Q. Speaking for yourself, how did you reckon that you would
19 judge whether somebody was a rioter?
20 A. If people were offering defiance.
21 Q. Defiance meaning what, exactly?
22 A. The usual thing would be facing you holding offensive
23 weapons or throwing missiles.
24 Q. We know that there were two Pigs carrying the Anti-tank
25 Platoon that passed through the barricade down
1 Little James Street towards the junction between
2 Rossville Street and William Street. Do you happen to
3 recall whether you were in the first of those Pigs or
4 the second and last of those Pigs?
5 A. No, I do not recall.
6 Q. Should we understand that by this stage the members of
7 the platoon were in a state of some excitement?
8 A. I think the blokes would have been pretty focused and --
9 yes.
10 Q. Can we see how you put it in 1975. Look at B1565.005:
11 "Army vehicles of all descriptions behind which were
12 huddled large groups of 'crap hats'. 'Cannot handle it
13 eh?' is the best way I can describe our feelings on
14 seeing these blokes who could not manage the elementary
15 rudiments of soldiering, i.e. spreading out. We were
16 about to show them how. With visions of gross
17 Deutschland on a wave of excitement to the point of
18 shouting, we swept past them and on into
19 Rossville Street."
20 Is that an accurate description or is there an
21 element of exaggeration in it?
22 A. At this point in time I am not in a position to say.
23 Q. Could we have 1565.039, paragraphs 80 and 81. You
24 describe how, as you moved south down Rossville Street,
25 the Mortar Platoon turned left, that is to say towards
1 the east, and your Pig stopped on the right-hand side of
2 Rossville Street in roughly the area which you have
3 marked C on your map, which is at the north end of
4 Rossville Street:
5 "We de-bussed in a hurry. After a lengthy
6 confinement, we had no clear idea of what we were
7 jumping into. We found ourselves in front of a crowd,
8 which was further south down Rossville Street."
9 You describe in paragraph 81 how you pulled off your
10 gas mask almost immediately. If we look in
11 paragraphs 82 and 83, you describe turning to run
12 towards the crowd with about half a dozen men from your
13 section, you think in the leading group, and running
14 towards a small wall surrounding a garden in front of
15 Kells Walk, with a crowd of people facing you to the
16 south of the rubble barricade.
17 I would like to take you, if I may, through some
18 photographs which may assist. Could we have on the
19 screen EP23.5. This was a photograph that was taken on
20 the day. It is very heavily foreshortened and therefore
21 compresses Rossville Street into a much shorter distance
22 than it has in reality.
23 What it does show is the vehicles of Support Company
24 arranged down Rossville Street. We can see here in the
25 front Major Loden's armoured control vehicle with what
1 I described as the perspex screen at the top and the
2 Ferret scout car to the left.
3 Further behind it there is, I think, one and
4 probably two Pigs. I will come back to them in
5 a moment.
6 Behind them are the soft-covered lorries which had
7 the Composite Platoon or Guinness Force in them, and
8 behind them what we understand presently to be the last
9 two vehicles of the convoy carrying the Anti-tank
10 Platoon within.
11 Do you recollect some convoy rather like that being
12 one which you were in?
13 A. No, I do not.
14 Q. Do you mean you do not recall there being that number of
15 additional vehicles or --
16 A. I do not recall seeing lorries to the fore like that.
17 There is photographic evidence, that is just I did not
18 notice.
19 Q. Do you have any recollection now of there being lorries
20 there at all?
21 A. No, I do not.
22 Q. Do you have a recollection of the front of the convoy,
23 apart from the two Pigs in the Mortar Platoon that had
24 gone off to the east, which is over in this direction,
25 being Major Loden's control vehicle and the Ferret scout
1 car?
2 A. My experience is that you could see very little from
3 inside one of these Pigs and that the moment of
4 de-bussing we turned to face the crowd, and looking
5 backwards to see this command vehicle and so forth is
6 not something that occurred.
7 Q. In order to get towards the crowd, you would have come,
8 I think, from one or other of these Pigs, along this
9 west side so you would at least have passed the convoy
10 at its side, but you have no specific recollection of
11 that; is that the position?
12 A. No, I do not have a recollection of that.
13 Q. I am now going to show you another photograph. Can we
14 have a look at EP27.6. This is a photograph also taken
15 on the day. It is taken from behind the rubble
16 barricade which went across Rossville Street. You can
17 see the stones and debris constituting the barricade in
18 the photograph. It has actually been taken from a pram
19 ramp which looks on to the barricade. We can see --
20 again there is an element of foreshortening -- that on
21 the left there is the gable end of Glenfada Park North,
22 but we can see the two leading Army vehicles,
23 Major Loden's control vehicle there and the Ferret car
24 to the left, and a substantial expanse of
25 Rossville Street where there is nobody and then
1 a group -- in this photograph there are about 40, but
2 there are no doubt further people to the left and
3 further people further over to the right-hand side -- on
4 the east side of the photograph, behind the barricade.
5 As you came down the west side of Rossville Street,
6 over here, you would have faced the people whose backs
7 we can see here and you would have seen not their backs
8 but their fronts, unless they were turned to the side.
9 Looking at this photograph, does that tally with
10 your recollection of the sort of number of people that
11 were at the barricade?
12 A. No, my impression was of a considerably larger number of
13 people.
14 Q. You are not necessarily wrong about that, the precise
15 timing of these photographs is difficult and they are
16 obviously only snapshots. I want to ask you to look at
17 another photograph. Can we have a look at EP23.6.
18 This is a photograph taken from the east side of
19 Rossville Street. We can see, if you look carefully,
20 a number of soldiers, I think, in the top right-hand
21 corner, though that is not absolutely definite.
22 This is the Kells Walk building and the little wall
23 that abuts out of it, is here (indicating). One of
24 these -- this image here is, we think, of a soldier in
25 front of the Kells Walk wall. The photograph next taken
1 in sequence, EP23.7, shows two soldiers. One is at the
2 apex of the pram ramp, which is this thing here
3 (indicating) and one is in a corner constituted by the
4 junction between the pram ramp and this low wall here
5 and the next photograph in the same series, EP23.8,
6 shows that by this stage a number of soldiers have come
7 down on the west side of Rossville Street and have gone
8 in front of the low wall and reached the junction
9 between the low wall and the pram ramp, with some
10 soldiers coming along behind.
11 At EP23.9, the next photograph in the sequence, some
12 of the soldiers who were previously in front of the wall
13 have come back in order to get behind the wall.
14 Do those photographs bring back any recollection of
15 events?
16 A. I recognise the location. The particular configuration
17 of the soldiers does not fit in with my recollection of
18 a sequence of events.
19 Q. You do not have any recollection of soldiers going to
20 this corner and then coming back from it?
21 A. No, I do not.
22 Q. It looks to us -- but this may be wrong -- as if this is
23 the Anti-tank Platoon because it appears to be the
24 soldiers who first came to the little low wall. Is it
25 right that the Anti-tank Platoon overtook the
1 Composite Platoon?
2 A. I have not any doubt that it was Anti-tank Platoon
3 soldiers who were the first to arrive at this piece of
4 low wall.
5 LORD SAVILLE: We have reached 12.05, Mr Clarke, this may be
6 a convenient time to stop. We will stop now for lunch.
7 Can you come back at 12.55. I say this to all the
8 witnesses, I will say it to you: please do not discuss
9 the evidence you are giving until you have completely
10 finished giving it.
11 A. Yes, sir.
12 (12.05 pm)
13 (The Short Adjournment)
14 (1.00 pm)
15 MR CLARKE: Could we have B1565.039 on the screen,
16 paragraph 83. You say in that paragraph:
17 "We ran towards a small wall surrounding a garden in
18 front of Kells Walk ..."
19 That is the little wall that comes out on the
20 photographs we were looking at before lunch; is that
21 right?
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. "A crowd of people were facing us. They were south of
24 the rubble barricade, slightly to the east towards the
25 Rossville Flats. As [the cipher that should be inserted
1 there is F] of my section reached the pavement by the
2 end of the small wall, he went down into a kneeling
3 position beside it, raised his rifle to his shoulder
4 and, without pause or hesitation, commenced firing
5 towards the centre of the crowd."
6 Is that something that you personally saw?
7 A. Yes, it is.
8 Q. How far away from him were you when you saw it,
9 approximately?
10 A. As we came to a standstill, I was immediately behind
11 him.
12 Q. You go on to say:
13 "I reached the pavement by the small wall
14 immediately behind him and was standing behind him as he
15 fired. I remember the barricade as being quite low and
16 made up of a jumble of masonry [as indeed it was] ..."
17 As F commenced firing towards the centre of the
18 crowd, can you tell us what the position of the crowd
19 was? Firstly, in what way predominantly were they
20 facing.
21 A. My impression of the crowd was a frontage stretching
22 from one side of the road right across to
23 Rossville Flats and in some depth and the people you
24 could see in the front were facing in our direction.
25 Q. Were the crowd standing or were they in some other
1 position?
2 A. I think they were standing.
3 Q. Could you see any reason for F to be firing?
4 A. I am not sure at what stage I commenced looking in
5 detail because I adjusted my position at this time.
6 Q. What do you mean, you adjusted your position at this
7 time?
8 A. My main recollection of being in that location is,
9 during the period of the firing, was of standing at the
10 junction of that small protruding wall and the main
11 block of building that it was attached to.
12 Q. Is that the place that you first went to, that junction?
13 A. I cannot be precise about this. I recall once the
14 movement forward had come to a stop at this wall, that
15 the firing commenced and I remember being in this
16 position, that is where I was -- that is the thing that
17 is prominent in my memory.
18 Q. You describe yourself to us a moment ago as having been
19 immediately behind F as everybody came to a standstill.
20 He then goes down into a kneeling position and fires,
21 had anything happened before you came to a standstill
22 which would have justified firing on the crowd?
23 A. Not that I can recall, no.
24 Q. How soon was it that you directed your attention
25 specifically to what F was firing at?
1 A. I did not direct my attention specifically to what F was
2 firing at. I recall there was an outburst of shooting
3 from a number of individuals and whether I was looking
4 earlier or not, I do not remember, but from the position
5 I mentioned of the junction of the wall, I spent some
6 time scanning the crowd and looking at that point to see
7 what they were engaging.
8 Q. Could we have on the screen EP2.8. This is a photograph
9 taken on the day, but I think at a stage later than that
10 which you are currently describing. What we can is the
11 wall as it comes out of Kells Walk; you see it here.
12 (Indicating).
13 The position of the junction between the wall and
14 the building itself, appears to be where my yellow arrow
15 is and the soldier at the far right is -- is that the
16 position that you came to adopt, or something like it?
17 A. I am virtually certain that that is the position.
18 Q. You describe being immediately behind F as you came to
19 a standstill and you describe F as reaching the pavement
20 by the end of the small wall and then going down into
21 a kneeling position. Here is the small wall; here is
22 the end of it and here is a pavement on which the
23 soldier in this photograph is standing.
24 Do you mean that F went down into a kneeling
25 position in approximately the spot where the soldier
1 standing on the far left of this photograph is to be
2 seen?
3 A. Perhaps a little behind that soldier, but that is
4 correct, yes.
5 Q. Please tell me if I have misunderstood this: you are
6 immediately behind him at that stage, but at some stage
7 you get to the position where the soldier is on the far
8 right?
9 A. Within seconds.
10 Q. Within seconds?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. May we go to B1565.039. You say in paragraph 84:
13 "Within seconds, other soldiers came on the scene,
14 some kneeling and some standing, joined in the firing.
15 I could see strikes on the barricade."
16 These soldiers who came on the scene, were they
17 soldiers from the Anti-Tank Platoon or from the
18 Anti-Tank Platoon and the Composite Platoon, or what
19 were they?
20 A. After a short period of time, I think they were both.
21 Q. And you say that you could see strikes on the barricade
22 and:
23 "Two people towards the centre of the barricade, who
24 had been facing us, fell within a few seconds of each
25 other in the opening burst of firing."
1 If we go back to EP2.8, this is the view from the
2 low wall. We have also got an aerial photograph, P209,
3 could we have that on the screen, which shows the low
4 wall which you are talking about and the barricade
5 between the two buildings, Kells Walk and
6 Rossville Street.
7 Ignore the presence of the people in
8 Rossville Street, which is on a different occasion. Are
9 you able, by reference to either of those photographs,
10 to indicate approximately where you saw two people fall
11 in the opening burst of firing?
12 A. If this rubble indicates the barricade, it would, yes,
13 I was attempting to mark it with an arrow.
14 Q. Can we give 027 control of the screen, please?
15 A. Somewhere in there, I would say, just perhaps to the
16 left a bit, sir.
17 Q. Would you like to have another go?
18 A. (Marked with mauve arrow - B1565.275).
19 Q. Where the mauve arrow is, is that about it?
20 A. I would say so, yes.
21 Q. May we take off the yellow arrow, please, and can we
22 preserve that image as B1565.275. We may need to come
23 back to this image and put something else on it a little
24 later.
25 If we may go back to paragraph 84, 1565.039. You
1 describe how others joined in the firing; do you
2 recollect who else apart from F fired at this moment?
3 A. At this particular point in time, I am not sure enough
4 to say, so I cannot, no.
5 Q. Can we look, please, at B1565.005, the bottom half of
6 the page. This is how it appears in your 1975 account:
7 "I was with the leading group of half a dozen as we
8 reached a small garden at the corner of Kells Walk. At
9 this point approximately 100 yards short of the crowd,
10 [there has been omitted the cipher] F went into the
11 kneeling position and fired at the centre of the crowd
12 from behind a low wall some two feet high, which ran
13 around the garden."
14 The cipher which should be inserted is:
15 "G immediately jumped down beside him and also
16 opened fire. Just beyond the wall on the pavement
17 INQ635 also commenced firing. Looking at the centre of
18 the barricade, I saw two bodies fall."
19 Do I take it that you now have no recollection which
20 would enable you to identify G and INQ635 as persons who
21 commenced firing at this stage?
22 A. Excuse me, I am just looking --
23 Q. For ciphers, by all means.
24 A. The sheet I have been given does not appear to have
25 INQ635 on it.
1 LORD SAVILLE: It is 635.
2 A. Oh, right.
3 MR CLARKE: Six down in the list by reference to ciphers.
4 A. Yes, I have it now, thank you. My memory now will not
5 allow me to state with any certainty that particular
6 individuals were firing.
7 Q. Does your memory now enable you to say whether or not,
8 in addition to F, G and INQ635 were present at the
9 wall -- at or near the wall -- at the time of the
10 initial firing?
11 A. I believe they were, yes.
12 Q. Do you have any reason to doubt that what you wrote in
13 1975 constituted your recollection of who had fired at
14 this wall in 1972?
15 A. I believe it is an accurate account of what I believed
16 happened at the time.
17 Q. There is, if we go to the bottom of the previous page,
18 1565.005, a difference between what you wrote there and
19 your present recollection, because what you wrote in
20 1975 was this:
21 "At this point approximately 100 yards short of the
22 crowd, F went into the kneeling position and fired at
23 the centre of the crowd from behind a low wall ...
24 "G immediately jumped down beside him and also
25 opened fire, just beyond the wall on the pavement.
1 INQ635 also commenced firing ..."
2 You appear in this statement to have put F when he
3 commenced firing as being behind the wall, rather than
4 on the pavement. How confident are you of your
5 recollection that he was in the position that you
6 described a moment ago, which was, in one sense, behind
7 the wall, but in effect on the pavement to the side of
8 it?
9 A. My memory of that is fairly clear. I noticed in the
10 photograph which you showed me that there was a wall
11 adjoining the pavement which I did not recollect,
12 I thought that the wall running out from the main
13 building was freestanding, in my memory. So
14 I appreciate the difference that you are pointing out.
15 Q. Sorry, what is your clear recollection?
16 A. Of Soldier F firing while I stood behind him.
17 Q. And of his being, where?
18 A. At the end of that wall.
19 Q. In the position of the man, the soldier on the far left
20 of the photograph we looked at a moment ago?
21 A. Obviously there is a degree of error in my memory here
22 as to the exact location, but we are talking about
23 a couple of feet here.
24 Q. Can we go to 1565.039, paragraph 85. This is the
25 paragraph where you describe moving to your right,
1 behind the wall, and standing at the junction between
2 the wall and Kells Walk with other soldiers to your
3 left, some standing behind the wall and some, including
4 Lance Corporal F, kneeling beyond the far end of the
5 wall, closer up to the road.
6 If we could have back on the screen EP2.8, in fact,
7 as we now know and can just see in this photograph,
8 there are two walls. There is a wall which you first
9 see on which the soldier on the far right is leaning.
10 There is then a little passageway and there is the other
11 side of the wall in front of the passageway, upon which
12 two other soldiers, one with a visor up, are also
13 leaning.
14 Can you recollect now whether the soldiers who
15 congregated at this spot at the time we are talking
16 about, were behind the wall we first see, where the
17 soldier on the right is standing, or whether they went
18 so as to be behind the wall that is in front of that?
19 A. One has to bear in mind this is a very dynamic situation
20 and the focus is not particularly on what the troops --
21 individuals are doing around you. But I do have
22 a memory of, from the position I indicated here,
23 soldiers being behind both walls simultaneously at some
24 stages.
25 Q. Could we have the virtual reality, please, hot-spot 8.
1 This is the building as it is today, that is looking up
2 what is now Rossville Street and we can see the first of
3 the walls here and there is the junction between that
4 wall and the Kells Walk building. As we can see, there
5 is an alleyway in front and there is the wall in front
6 of the alleyway. (Indicating)
7 You have told us that you have a recollection of
8 soldiers being behind both walls. You would have been
9 standing approximately at this junction here. Do you
10 have a recollection of soldiers being behind the front
11 wall in the part of the alleyway which is bounded by the
12 gable end of the Kells Walk building? (Indicating)
13 A. Sorry, you will need to explain where you mean by that.
14 Q. Yes, it is rather difficult to explain my meaning in
15 words. Can we save that as an image. We know that you
16 were approximately here and there were people behind
17 this wall. As I have understood it, you have
18 a recollection of people being behind this wall. What
19 I am wondering is whether you have a recollection of
20 people being in the position presently on the left-hand
21 side of the photograph, that is to say on the east side,
22 as it were, or whether also they were ranged along the
23 wall further to the west as the alleyway leads in
24 towards the back of Kells Walk; is my question
25 intelligible?
1 A. Looking at this situation, I am quite confident that the
2 red arrow marking the location which is my main memory
3 during the period of the shooting at the barricade, it
4 would appear that my view would be masked to the right,
5 so I have no conscious memory of soldiers being there.
6 It was a fluid situation and people were coming up
7 all the time. The alleyway between the two walls, the
8 memory I have during this period of shooting was of not
9 many individuals being here, just two or three, perhaps
10 standing.
11 Q. That is in the alleyway between the two walls?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Can we go back to B1565.040, paragraph 86. You say:
14 "One chap from Guinness Force, I think a full
15 corporal (whose name I cannot recall) ran up beside me
16 pushing his way between two other soldiers who were
17 firing, so that he could commence firing himself. He
18 indicated to me that he thought what was happening was
19 great. He was exuberant."
20 Do you recall whether he in fact fired?
21 A. I remember the incident quite clearly; whether he fired
22 his weapon, I cannot say.
23 Q. We have a list of the corporals, and indeed the lance
24 corporals whom we believe were in Guinness Force
25 in January 1972. Do you think if we showed you a list
1 of their names, you might be able to recall his name?
2 A. I do not think so, no.
3 Q. May we come, please, to paragraph 87. You say there:
4 "I stood at the wall and put my rifle to my
5 shoulder. I looked through my sights, scanning across
6 the crowd. I was as keen to find a target as anyone,
7 but I just could not identify a target that appeared to
8 justify engaging. I did not see anyone with a weapon or
9 see or hear an explosive device. I was looking across
10 the crowd with some concentration, aware of the firing
11 immediately around me. I lowered my weapon and looked
12 at the guys firing and tried to locate what they were
13 firing at. I still failed to see what I could identify
14 as a target and it caused me some confusion. I have
15 a clear memory of consciously thinking 'what are they
16 firing at?'"
17 By this stage, as I understand it, you had seen two
18 people fall; is that right?
19 A. Yes, I believe that is correct, yes.
20 Q. After you had seen those two people fall, what was the
21 crowd doing?
22 A. I believe I say a little further on in my statement that
23 it crossed my mind that they were slow to react to the
24 situation. There seemed to be an irrational pause
25 before they started to turn -- move away.
1 Q. May we then go to paragraph 88. You say:
2 "I cannot remember exactly who was there at the
3 small wall. I was concentrating on my job rather than
4 those around me and had no reason to acknowledge
5 particular individuals at that time. I do know that all
6 the characters in my section were there and others too."
7 We know that you were there. We know F was there
8 and you told us a moment ago that you had a recollection
9 of G and INQ635 being there. Who, apart from those
10 already mentioned, if any, are the characters in your
11 section who were there?
12 A. At the time of giving this statement to the Inquiry, it
13 became apparent to me that there were people in my
14 section that I no longer had a memory of in any
15 circumstance. So it is difficult for me to answer that.
16 Reading this now I would have to say there is an element
17 of assumption, we came out of the same vehicle and ran
18 as a group together.
19 Q. Can you remember now who else was with you in your
20 vehicle?
21 A. Not precisely, no.
22 Q. If we look at paragraph 89, you say:
23 "I had the distinct impression that this was a case
24 of some soldiers realising this was an opportunity to
25 fire their weapon and they did not want to miss the
1 chance."
2 Can you tell us what it was that gave you that
3 impression?
4 A. One example was the reference to the Corporal from
5 Guinness Force that we were just speaking about.
6 Q. Anything else that gave you that impression?
7 A. It was a matter of personal interpretation, I think.
8 Q. You say in paragraph 90:
9 "I would estimate that we were at that position for
10 a number of minutes, which is a long time in this
11 context. I cannot say how many rounds each individual
12 fired. It all merged into a general outburst of
13 shooting. Initially, when there were just two or three
14 soldiers firing, I would say that there were steady
15 shots being fired at intervals of a second or two. The
16 level of shooting grew as more soldiers arrived."
17 I know it is difficult to estimate how many rounds
18 have been fired. Can you give us any idea of the sort
19 of number that your memory tells you were fired in toto
20 at this stage?
21 A. I have to agree with you, I think it is notoriously
22 difficult to estimate specific numbers, I think it is
23 more a general experience of noise and I -- the figures
24 I have given here, I am giving them a best estimate, but
25 I would concede that they would be imprecise.
1 Q. I am not sure what your best estimate is of the sort of
2 number of shots which at this stage were fired in all?
3 A. I really would not like to say, it would be a guess.
4 Another thing that would confuse the issue is that
5 firing was taking place on the -- from the
6 Mortar Platoon's position and it is difficult to
7 register that sort of thing.
8 Q. Can we have a look, please, at B1565.006. Could we
9 highlight the middle of the page. One of the reasons
10 for me asking you these questions is because, in your
11 1975 account, after you posed to yourself the question,
12 "What are they firing at," you went on to say, this:
13 "I could see members of the machine-guns, helmeted
14 and black faced, in a standing position, also pumping
15 off rounds at quite a rapid rate."
16 Machine-guns, I think we have established, is
17 a mistake for Mortar Platoon:
18 "In the initial 30 seconds I would say that 100
19 rounds were fired at the crowd."
20 That is an estimate that you gave in 1975. Should
21 we understand from that that you were including, not
22 only rounds fired from the Kells Walk wall, but also
23 whatever firing was taking place by the Mortar Platoon
24 on the east side of Rossville Street.
25 A. Well, it seems that is a reasonable conclusion, yes.
1 Q. May we come, please, to 1565.40, paragraph 91. You say:
2 "I have an image in my mind of INQ635 of my section
3 firing from the small wall, but with the passage of
4 time, I cannot now be sure and it may be that he did not
5 fire at all. I think I can also remember Soldier G
6 firing from the wall."
7 Should we take it that at the time this statement
8 was taken, in June 2000, you did have that image of
9 INQ635 firing from the wall and that memory of Soldier G
10 doing so also.
11 A. I have to repeat what I said earlier, that I am not
12 confident enough in my memory to state in any clear way
13 that the particular soldier was firing.
14 Q. That is your position today, hence the form of my
15 question. I was wondering whether it was correct, as it
16 prime facie appears to be, that when you signed this
17 statement, you had, as you say, an image in your mind of
18 INQ635 firing from the wall?
19 A. Well, the way I read this, there is a good deal of doubt
20 expressed in what I am saying there.
21 Q. Absolutely. Do these first two sentences accurately
22 reflect your state of mind at the time when you signed
23 this statement?
24 A. Yes, I believe that when I made this statement, it was
25 an accurate reflection of what I remembered then, yes.
1 Q. Could we go to paragraph 91 and can we look at the last
2 sentence of paragraph 91, where you say this:
3 "My impression has always been that the two of them,
4 Lance Corporal F and Soldier G, had a preconceived idea
5 of what they were going to do that day and set about
6 doing it as a pair of oppos."
7 What did you think their preconceived idea was as to
8 what they were to do that day?
9 A. I emphasise this as a personal impression, but I think
10 if there was an opportunity to fire their weapons, they
11 were in a mood to exploit that opportunity.
12 Q. What you have described so far in your statement is
13 a situation in which you had been at the position in
14 which you were for a number of minutes and initially
15 there had been two or three soldiers firing and shooting
16 then grew in level as more soldiers arrived and steady
17 shots became fired at intervals of a second or two.
18 During that period, did you see anything that
19 appeared to justify that sort of firing?
20 A. No, I did not. I think I was fairly baffled by what was
21 happening.
22 Q. Were you in a position, standing at the corner of the
23 wall and the building, to see whether or not there was
24 any justification?
25 A. I was standing up. I think I could see the whole
1 frontage of the crowd, though not the entire width of
2 the street and, no, I did not see anything that appeared
3 to justify firing.
4 Q. Did you see anybody throw anything from the barricade or
5 from the crowd at the barricade?
6 A. Not that I noticed, no.
7 Q. Did you see anybody with what was or appeared to be
8 a weapon or a bomb?
9 A. No, I did not.
10 Q. Could we have a look again at 1,565.005, the second
11 half, please. This is your 1975 account, where you say
12 this:
13 "There were only two platoons involved in the main
14 conflict. The Machine-guns [that should read Mortars]
15 on the left-hand side of the street advanced leap-frog
16 fashion to the base of the Rossville Flats. I was in
17 the Anti-tanks which skirmished through broken bottles
18 and bricks down the right-hand side of the road. As we
19 moved along the wall towards the crowd I noticed several
20 strikes in the roadway beside us. I was with the
21 leading group of half a dozen as we reached a small
22 garden at the corner of Kells Walk."
23 Do you have any recollection now of noticing several
24 strikes in the roadway beside you as you ran towards the
25 wall at Kells Walk?
1 A. No, I have no recollection of that now.
2 Q. Can we go back to P209. You end up at Kells Walk. The
3 barricade is here. You are telling us of firing,
4 broadly speaking, in that direction, and we know there
5 was firing from the Mortar Platoon in that direction.
6 (Indicating).
7 Were you, do you recall, ever conscious of firing
8 coming from the east, that is to say coming in that
9 direction, from east to west, at any stage?
10 A. No, I do not recall that.
11 Q. May we go, please, to B1565.041, paragraphs 93 and 94.
12 You say:
13 "A number of soldiers continued to come forward.
14 They would have seen and heard our shooting and that is
15 what they would have based their impressions on. A lot
16 of them probably thought we were engaged in a firefight
17 with gunmen. Only those at the immediate front were in
18 a position to have any idea of what happened."
19 Should we suppose that fairly soon the whole of the
20 Anti-tank Platoon would have ended up at or somewhere
21 near to the wall?
22 A. Yes, I believe there was a large number of soldiers
23 there quite quickly, yes.
24 Q. Should we also assume that in addition to the Anti-Tank
25 Platoon, there were some members of the
1 Composite Platoon who landed up there?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Do you recollect anybody either explaining why they were
4 shooting or what they were shooting at?
5 A. No, I do not.
6 Q. Or giving a warning, such as, "Man with a weapon," or,
7 "Man with a bomb".
8 A. No, I do not.
9 Q. Thank you. You say in paragraph 94:
10 "I have no specific recollection of any of the
11 individuals in the crowd which was no more than
12 40 metres or 50 metres away from me. The initial
13 impression of the crowd was just a large amorphous mass
14 of thousands."
15 I appreciate the crowds may look differently from
16 according to the spot from which you look at them; but
17 was the impression literally of a mass of thousands of
18 people?
19 A. I think that impression might have been created by the
20 fact that it was -- the front of the crowd was fairly
21 dense and then there were many other people in great
22 depth going for hundreds of metres further back,
23 I think, and that probably created the impression of the
24 crowd being larger overall than it was, although there
25 was certainly many hundreds of people, I thought.
1 Q. May we come down to paragraph 97. You say:
2 "After appearing to be immobile for the initial
3 moments, the crowd broke and people tried to flee the
4 area as fast as they could. Suddenly there was a lot of
5 confusion, wailing and commotion. As the crowd at the
6 barricade dispersed, block 1 of the Rossville Flats
7 became exposed. Certain individuals on the pavement
8 stood out to me more. I saw people crouching and
9 immobile and others crawling. One was apparently
10 prostrate and one was kneeling by him."
11 You say:
12 "I saw some people crawling south, along the length
13 of the Rossville Flats, trying to get away. They were
14 in the region of point G on the map."
15 Could we go back to the photograph that was saved
16 a moment ago which will become 1565.275. Thank you.
17 The pink arrow is the spot where you think you saw two
18 people fall.
19 Are you able to tell us where you saw somebody who
20 was apparently prostrate with another kneeling beside
21 him?
22 A. I had a little confusion with this, because I -- my
23 impression, until it was pointed out to me fairly
24 recently, was that the front entrance to Rossville Flats
25 was in the centre of the block and I see -- it was
1 pointed out that it is actually at the end. So --
2 Q. Is your recollection that you saw the person prostrate
3 at the centre of the block or at the entrance; which is
4 the dominant recollection?
5 A. I am not clear. The people crawling, that image was
6 certainly at the base of the flats in front of the
7 flats, but it may even have been forward at the
8 barricade, I cannot recall now.
9 Q. It is somewhere, is this correct, somewhere near the
10 flats, in the area between the barricade and the
11 entrance to the flats; it may be at either end?
12 A. I would think so, yes.
13 Q. You have a recollection of seeing some people crawling
14 south along the length of the flats. Do you recollect
15 where they were?
16 A. I cannot say. It was not in relation to anything, these
17 are just flashes of image and people in different
18 positions.
19 Q. Can we come, please, to 1565.041, paragraph 98. You say
20 there:
21 "By the time I saw these people [that is people
22 crawling south along the length of the flats] I think we
23 must have moved further south down Rossville Street,
24 possibly to the point marked E on the map, bus I have
25 a recollection of looking almost immediately to my left
1 at approximately 90 degrees to me and seeing
2 a Mortar Platoon Pig by the northern-most corner of
3 block 1 ... at the point marked F. There were soldiers
4 standing by the Pig. I remember seeing one soldier was
5 standing in the open, near the corner of block 1, at
6 approximately point F ... his weapon was at his
7 shoulder, parallel to the floor, and he was aiming south
8 down the length of block 1. I saw a muzzle flash and
9 a smoke discharge as he fired."
10 In order to understand what you are referring to,
11 may we have 1565.095. You say there that you think you
12 must have got down as far as E and that you recollect
13 a Pig at the point marked F at the north of block 1.
14 How confident are you that you did in fact go down
15 as far as point E?
16 A. It is the only rational explanation for the subsequent
17 memories that I have. The memory which you have just
18 described of a soldier shooting from point F --
19 Q. Could you not have seen him from where you were at
20 Kells Walk?
21 A. I could have seen him, but the, the vision I have, the
22 angle would not have been sensible and the subsequent
23 movement would not have made sense if I had been back at
24 Kells Walk at that time.
25 Q. Do you know who the soldier was whom you saw fire from
1 point F?
2 A. No, I do not.
3 Q. Could we have on the screen P27. Can you highlight the
4 top. There is a soldier who gave evidence to
5 Lord Widgery that he fired from exactly the position
6 that you describe. This is a soldier called Soldier U,
7 whose evidence was that he fired from the north of
8 block 1 at a target to the south of the Rossville Flats.
9 Did you ever see what that soldier was firing at, or
10 the soldier whom you saw fire, what he was firing at?
11 A. No, I did not.
12 Q. I do not entirely follow your point about why you think
13 you went down as far as your point E, which is about
14 there. (Indicating). You could, from the Kells Walk
15 spot where you were, undoubtedly have seen someone fire
16 from the north of block 1, could you not?
17 A. I could, but I remember seeing the -- I was more square
18 on to the front face of the Rossville Flats.
19 Q. May we then come, please, to B1565.42, paragraphs 99 and
20 100. You say:
21 "As the crowd dispersed, the volume of the firing
22 subsided. I received a ceasefire order over the radio
23 from Major Loden, who was in an armoured vehicle some
24 way to our rear. I clearly recall him shouting
25 'ceasefire, ceasefire'. I shouted out the order several
1 times and moved from my position to the soldiers near
2 me, tapping some men on the shoulder and shouting the
3 order. My memory of receiving and relaying the order is
4 vivid in my mind."
5 Do you still have that memory?
6 A. Yes, I am certain that occurred.
7 Q. He was in an armoured vehicle. Do you know what view he
8 was able to take of what was happening on the ground,
9 I mean literally what he could see, or do you not know?
10 A. I do not think I had taken a backward glance throughout
11 this event so far.
12 Q. Between the time when you received the original order
13 from Major Loden over the radio to start the operation,
14 and the time when you received this order to cease
15 firing, had you had any communication to you on the
16 radio, any other communication?
17 A. Not that I recall, no.
18 Q. Had you yourself made any radio communication?
19 A. Not that I recall, no.
20 Q. Can you recall where you were when you received the
21 order over the radio?
22 A. Had I not seen these aerial photographs and maps I would
23 have thought I was at the Kells Walk place, but it only
24 makes sense that it would have been at a similar feature
25 further up the road, I think.
1 Q. You do not have any recollection, do you, of receiving
2 any order given face to face by the company sergeant
3 major?
4 A. No, I do not.
5 Q. May we then, please, look at paragraph 101. You say:
6 "Almost immediately after the cessation of fire,
7 Lance Corporal F and Soldier G, who worked in concert in
8 all that they did, turned and ran to our right (west),
9 closely followed by Soldier E and Soldier H ... I have
10 a memory of jumping over a small wall and following on
11 behind. There may have been others following behind me,
12 I do not remember. Following them was probably just an
13 automatic reaction."
14 Can you help us as to how many members of the
15 Anti-Tank Platoon you recall ending up in Glenfada Park
16 North? We know that F and G did; we know that E and H
17 did; we know that you did. Do you recall any other
18 members of that platoon or indeed any other soldier who
19 ended up in Glenfada Park North?
20 A. No, I have no memory of particular individuals, although
21 I have become aware in recent times that other soldiers
22 were there.
23 Q. Do you have any recollection of the Lieutenant who was
24 in charge of the Anti-Tank Platoon ending up in
25 Glenfada Park at some stage?
1 A. No, I have no recollection of that.
2 Q. Leaving aside the identity of individual soldiers, do
3 you have any recollection of the approximate number of
4 soldiers who ended up in Glenfada Park North?
5 A. At the time prisoners were escorted from Glenfada Park,
6 I do not recall seeing more than six or seven soldiers,
7 perhaps.
8 Q. If we look at paragraph 102, you say:
9 "As we ran towards Glenfada Park North there was
10 a metre or two between each man. My recollection is of
11 running through an enclosed roofed passage at ground
12 level, into what I now know to be Glenfada Park North.
13 Before I entered Glenfada Park North, shooting had
14 already recommenced."
15 If we go back to 1565.275, that is the photograph
16 that you marked, we can see that there are two routes
17 that you could have taken. One is that you go in
18 a sense through Kells Walk, that is to say in the
19 alleyway between the two walls in front of Kells Walk
20 and then down here and then into Glenfada Park North
21 from the northeast corner.
22 The alternative is that you go partly to the east of
23 the pram ramp at Kells Walk and then turn right and then
24 come through the northeast entrance. Do you follow
25 those two possible routes?
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. Do you know which one it was?
3 A. I cannot be certain. The likelihood is it was the
4 latter. I would be pretty sure it was the latter one.
5 Q. And you are pretty sure of that, because?
6 A. I must have been in that more forward position. And
7 I do not remember such a lengthy approach through the
8 buildings.
9 Q. Had you given F and G and E and H the order to ceasefire
10 before they took off into Glenfada Park?
11 A. It was not addressed to any specific individual, it was
12 a -- just generally given to our group and it was normal
13 procedure that something like that would be passed from
14 one to another.
15 Q. Do you know why they were going into Glenfada Park?
16 A. In precise terms I did not know what they were aiming to
17 do, no.
18 Q. Did you know in any terms?
19 A. Well, we were on an arrest operation and, presumably,
20 they were continuing with that.
21 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Clarke, I want to get back to this
22 question as to when the order to ceasefire came through
23 because I am not sure -- I am not sure 027 actually
24 dealt with it.
25 The Chairman speaking: you heard this order coming
1 over directly to ceasefire. Are you able to recall
2 whether you received that order on the radio before
3 these soldiers went into Glenfada Park?
4 A. Yes, sir, I certainly was.
5 LORD SAVILLE: You were.
6 A. Mmm.
7 LORD SAVILLE: Presumably the moment you received that
8 order, you started to inform those around you of it; is
9 that right?
10 A. It was an automatic reaction, sir, you get the message
11 and you pass it on.
12 LORD SAVILLE: How did you do that, shout it out, or ...
13 A. I shouted it out and I have a recollection of tapping
14 some men on the shoulder who were in kneeling positions
15 and so on.
16 LORD SAVILLE: Are you able to say whether or not those
17 soldiers who you recollect went into Glenfada Park,
18 heard that order before they went in.
19 A. I cannot know that, but the -- it is not something I can
20 know, I would have an opinion, but that is all.
21 MR CLARKE: You had better tell us what your opinion is.
22 A. I think all the soldiers in our group would have heard
23 the ceasefire order.
24 Q. Why do you think that?
25 A. Because it had its effect, the silence testified to it
1 being received.
2 Q. Did any of those who went into Glenfada Park say
3 anything which indicated what they were doing or why
4 they were going there?
5 A. Not that I recall, no.
6 Q. Lieutenant 119 gave evidence to Lord Widgery that he
7 ordered some or all of those who went into Glenfada Park
8 to go there to cut off somebody who had been seen to be
9 firing at soldiers with a pistol from the barricade.
10 Do you recollect the lieutenant in charge of the
11 Anti-Tank Platoon ordering anybody to go into
12 Glenfada Park?
13 A. No, I do not.
14 Q. Do you recollect the lieutenant being there at this
15 stage?
16 A. I did not notice the lieutenant being there, no.
17 Q. You say, if we may go back to B1565.042, paragraph 102
18 and paragraph 103, you say in paragraph 102, in the
19 third line:
20 "Before I entered Glenfada Park North, shooting had
21 already recommenced. It was as though Lance Corporal F
22 and Soldier G had encountered something the moment they
23 entered Glenfada Park North and had carried on in the
24 same vein as they had at the small wall in Kells Walk."
25 You say in paragraph 103:
1 "As I initially entered Glenfada Park North, within
2 a very short space of time there were some 10 or 15
3 rounds fired in a series of rapid staccato shots which
4 came in a burst. They were followed by more
5 intermittent firing."
6 Firstly, can you tell us how far behind F, G, E and
7 H you were?
8 A. I cannot be precise about that, I was following on.
9 Q. I am sure you cannot be precise. Are you talking about
10 literally being a yard or two behind or much further or,
11 what?
12 A. I think we are talking about a matter of metres, perhaps
13 10 metres behind them, something in that order.
14 Q. When you say in paragraph 102:
15 "Before I entered Glenfada Park North, shooting had
16 already recommenced ..."
17 Could you tell what sort of shooting it was?
18 A. I believed it to be Army weapons firing.
19 Q. When you say in paragraph 103:
20 "As I initially entered Glenfada Park North, within
21 a very short space of time there were some 10 or 15
22 rounds fired in a series of rapid staccato shots, which
23 came in a burst."
24 Which type of shooting did that appear to you to be?
25 A. I thought I was hearing SLRs, military Army weapons.
1 Q. When you say that as you initially entered there were
2 these rounds being fired, did you see firing taking
3 place or did you merely hear the sound of the rounds?
4 A. I have no current recollection of seeing rounds being
5 fired, no.
6 Q. Your current recollection is of, what?
7 A. Hearing the burst of firing on approaching the park and
8 after that things become unclear in my mind, I cannot
9 speak with any precision.
10 Q. You say in paragraph 104:
11 "As I came on the scene, there was at least one body
12 down. I saw a crowd of about 40 shocked and terrified
13 people along the south side of the car park, trying to
14 get away. They were in the process of exiting the
15 southwest corner of the car park when, in the presence
16 of the shattering noise of the SLRs, they became
17 submissive and acquiescent. Some froze in a static
18 huddle. I saw no civilians with weapons, no threatening
19 gesture, neither could I see or hear any explosive
20 devices during the entire situation."
21 Is that accurate?
22 A. Yes, I believe that is accurate.
23 Q. Then you say in paragraph 105:
24 "My memory of the next few minutes is currently
25 unclear. I am not exactly sure where I went in the car
1 park, but one of my first images is of seeing a man in
2 a pale grey suit, who had been shot, lying in the
3 pavement or gutter that ran along the left-hand side of
4 where I was standing. I also remember seeing a woman in
5 a black coat in the crowd. It seized up my senses.
6 I was thinking, 'What the hell is going on?'"
7 Do I understand from what you have said a moment ago
8 that your memory is still unclear about events in the
9 car park?
10 A. That is correct, yes.
11 Q. Do you know why your memory is unclear?
12 A. I cannot specify, I am just aware that I have no clear
13 recollection.
14 Q. Could we have on the screen photograph P428. This is
15 a photograph that was taken at some stage on
16 Bloody Sunday. It is taken looking towards the east
17 face of the east side of Glenfada Park North, which is
18 where I am pointing with the arrow, and it shows in the
19 background, the southwest alleyway and it shows the
20 south of Glenfada Park and it shows quite a number of
21 people close to the gable wall of Glenfada. One can
22 just see the rubble barricade off to the right.
23 (Indicating)
24 The soldiers, yourself included, who came into
25 Glenfada Park would have come from the northeast corner,
1 which is off the photograph. Making allowances for the
2 difference in view, when you came into the park, did you
3 see something like this scene at the southwest alleyway,
4 of people attempting to get through a bottleneck out
5 into the alley?
6 A. I have a -- this particular scene as represented here
7 does not ring a bell, but ...
8 Q. Can you give us any idea of how many people there were
9 in the park at all? You refer to there being a crowd of
10 about 40 along the south side of the car park. This is
11 the south side of the car park. Do you have
12 a recollection of seeing about 40 people in all in the
13 square, or were there --
14 A. I think -- no, I think that was about correct.
15 Q. Looking at this photograph, does that bring back any
16 recollection of the two motorcars that we see in the
17 bottom left-hand corner; do you remember seeing them?
18 A. I do not remember precisely those vehicles, no.
19 Q. Do you remember any vehicles in the park?
20 A. I cannot say with any certainty, I am afraid, no.
21 Q. You have a recollection of seeing a man in a pale grey
22 suit lying in the pavement or gutter that ran along the
23 left-hand side of where you were standing. Can you
24 indicate in which side of the square you recall seeing
25 the man in a grey suit lying on the pavement or gutter?
1 A. It is awkward or difficult to orientate it to the shape
2 of Glenfada Park because it is not a square, is it, but
3 my recollection of that is that he was lying, on
4 entering the car park, he was on the left side.
5 Q. Could we have EP21.2, please. It is an aerial
6 photograph of the square. You would have entered it
7 from the northeast corner. Do you mean by that that
8 your recollection is that he was on this side, the east
9 side?
10 A. It is to the left side, the angle I remember looking at,
11 unless I had moved my position further south, in which
12 case he might have been on the pavement on the south
13 side. It may well have been that, because I believe
14 that that is the way that eventually his body was
15 removed, out through that southwest exit.
16 Q. Let me show you another photograph. Can we have on the
17 screen P439. This is a photograph which was taken from
18 the northwest corner. Could we have P439 on one side of
19 the screen and the photograph we had a moment ago,
20 EP21.2, on the other side.
21 The photograph we see on the left-hand side was
22 taken from this entrance, the northwest entrance and you
23 can just see, on the right-hand side of P439, some legs,
24 which are the somebody at that southwest corner and you
25 can also see two people lying to the left who are
1 further over to the east of the square.
2 Have you got your bearings?
3 A. I believe so, yes.
4 Q. If we could have P439 back on the screen. Whatever you
5 saw you saw from a different angle, because you came in
6 from the northeast, as opposed to the northwest
7 entrance. Is it possible that the man in a grey suit
8 lying in the pavement or the gutter whom you recollect
9 seeing is one of the bodies that we see here?
10 A. My memory of that individual is that he was not in
11 a group like that.
12 Q. Do you remember seeing a group of bodies like this, two
13 close together and one further removed?
14 A. I do not have a clear recollection of this, no.
15 Q. Could we have on the screen AO35.7. I am sorry, try
16 AO35.37. This is a photograph that was marked up by
17 a witness called Patrick O'Donnell who has given
18 evidence to this Tribunal.
19 What we are looking at in this photograph is the
20 west side of the east block of Glenfada Park North. So
21 Rossville Street is there and the west side of Glenfada
22 Park North is here. (Indicating)
23 His evidence --
24 LORD SAVILLE: It might be clearer -- do you see the car on
25 the right-hand side of the picture?
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 LORD SAVILLE: Behind that car used to be the
3 Rossville Flats. This is a modern photograph.
4 MR CLARKE: Mr O'Donnell gave evidence that he was shot at,
5 as he supposed, by a shot which hit the wall where this
6 blue arrow is, and probably ricocheted off and hit him
7 in the shoulder, but he was a man who was not taken off
8 in the sense of being carried off, he was one of those
9 who was rounded up and arrested at the gable end which
10 we see on the photograph.
11 Your recollection, as I understand it, is of seeing
12 someone on the gutter or in the pavement on this side of
13 the square, but also seeing them carried away; is that
14 right?
15 A. I have no certainty it is on this side of the square.
16 What I said was, at some point, wherever I was in the
17 car park, to my left side, was an individual partially
18 in the gutter, partially on the pavement.
19 Q. Go on.
20 A. I mean, this grey suit, how accurate a description that
21 is I am not sure, but that is the impression that has
22 stayed with me.
23 Q. Was the individual whom you saw on your left-hand side,
24 wherever that was, somebody whom you subsequently saw
25 carried away?
1 A. Yes, it was.
2 Q. Can you recollect how far into the car park you ever
3 went?
4 A. No, I cannot.
5 Q. Can we come back, please, to B1565.042, paragraph 103.
6 This is the paragraph in which you describe how, after
7 you initially entered Glenfada Park North, there was
8 some 10 or 15 rounds fired in a series of rapid staccato
9 shots. You say:
10 "These were followed by more intermittent firing."
11 Do you have any idea approximately how many shots
12 were fired in Glenfada Park?
13 A. I cannot be precise about that, no.
14 Q. You have told us that you have now no present
15 recollection of seeing any firing, as opposed to hearing
16 it, but if you now have a recollection of hearing 10 or
17 15 rounds fired followed by more intermittent firing,
18 should we understand that at the time you must have seen
19 some of this firing?
20 A. I am afraid I do not have an explanation for that
21 apparent inconsistency, no.
22 Q. Do you think you did see it or did not?
23 A. I have no recollection of seeing the soldiers firing
24 shots in Glenfada Park, no.
25 Q. Did you see anything happen in Glenfada Park which would
1 have justified a soldier firing a shot?
2 A. No, I do not recall anything that would have justified
3 firing a shot.
4 Q. May we come to 1,565.043, paragraph 109. You say there:
5 "I find it very difficult to explain my experience
6 of the very shocking and unspeakable incidents that
7 unfolded in Glenfada Park North. I did not know how to
8 feel. I was mentally overloaded and siezed up. It was
9 surreal, as if the events took place outside normal
10 time. The only thing that I can say with confidence
11 about Glenfada Park is that I believe four soldiers
12 fired rounds while I was there."
13 Is that something that you can say with confidence?
14 A. Yes, I believe that was the case.
15 Q. How are you able to say that you believe that four
16 soldiers fired rounds whilst you were there if you have
17 no recollection of seeing anybody fire at all?
18 A. I cannot attribute particular shots to particular
19 individual soldiers and it is -- something like this,
20 I do not wish to be hazarding guesses. If I had more
21 clarity in my mind I would speak, but perhaps some
22 legacy of my experience 30 years ago has stayed with me
23 and other aspects of it have disappeared, but I really
24 do not have a clear memory of events in that park now.
25 Q. I just wondered why you felt able to say with confidence
1 that four soldiers fired rounds there?
2 A. Well, perhaps that phraseology is ...
3 Q. It happens to be right because E, F, G and H all gave
4 evidence to Lord Widgery that they did so, but we are of
5 course interested in what you yourself can give evidence
6 about as a result of what you saw or heard?
7 A. Well, whatever I saw and heard, I do not have the
8 clarity of recollection to say anything precise now,
9 I am afraid.
10 Q. Could we have a look, please, at B1565.006. Could we
11 highlight the bottom of the page. This is how you put
12 it in your statement in 1975, where you said, this:
13 "I shouted the order 'ceasefire' and ran along the
14 line, tapping them on their shoulders. The firing
15 slacked and died as the crowd dispersed. E, H, G and F
16 and myself then leapt the wall, turned right and ran
17 down Kells Walk into Glenfada Park, a small triangular
18 car park within the complex of flats."
19 Pausing there, that reference to "leaping the wall,"
20 that looks, does it not, as if that means the Kells Walk
21 wall?
22 A. It does seem to be the case, yes.
23 Q. If you then immediately turned right and then ran down
24 Kells Walk into Glenfada Park, that would look as if you
25 went through the alleyway immediately in front of the
1 wall at Kells Walk; would it not?
2 A. Yes, I agree that would make sense.
3 Q. Then you say this:
4 "A group of some 40 civilians were there, running in
5 an effort to get away. H fired from the hip ..."
6 It is a bit difficult to read. What it says is:
7 "At a range of 20 yards. The bullet passed through
8 one man and into another and they both fell, one dead
9 and one wounded.
10 "He then moved forward and fired again, killing the
11 wounded man. They lay sprawled together, half on the
12 pavement and half in the gutter. [The cipher that
13 should be inserted is E] E shot another man at the
14 entrance of the park, who also fell on the pavement.
15 A fourth man was killed by either [it should read] G or
16 F. I must point out that this whole incident in
17 Glenfada Park occurred in fleeting seconds and I can no
18 longer recall the order of fire or who fell first, but
19 I do remember that when we first appeared, darkened
20 faces, sweat and aggression, brandishing rifles, the
21 crowd stopped immediately in their tracks, turned to
22 face us and raised their hands. This is the way they
23 were standing when they were shot."
24 Does re-reading that which you wrote in 1975 bring
25 back any recollection of what you saw on the day?
1 A. I have no clear memory of these events now.
2 Q. Again, should we regard this as a recollection that you
3 genuinely had in 1975 as to what had occurred in 1972 or
4 as a tale of events of which you have no real
5 recollection at all?
6 A. I have no reason to doubt that this description of
7 events is what I thought occurred at the time or
8 believed to have occurred at the time.
9 Q. Could we come, please, to EP21.2 again. This is the
10 aerial photograph of Glenfada. We know that soldiers
11 came through the northeast entrance to Glenfada Park.
12 Were you aware one way or the other as to whether any
13 soldiers came through the other entrance, the northwest
14 entrance?
15 A. No, I do not know.
16 Q. What we have been looking at is Glenfada Park. To the
17 west of Glenfada Park there is what is known as Abbey
18 Park and if you go through the southwest alleyway from
19 Glenfada Park where my yellow arrow is, it leads you out
20 into Abbey Park. (Indicating)
21 Do you have any recollection of any soldiers going
22 through that alleyway, the southwest alleyway of
23 Glenfada Park?
24 A. No, I do not.
25 Q. Can we have this on the left-hand side and could we have
1 on the right-hand side P700. The reason for my asking
2 the question is that we know for a fact that one of
3 those who died on Bloody Sunday was a man called
4 Gerard McKinney. This photograph is a photograph of
5 people surrounding his body. You can just see his legs
6 on the left-hand side and he is lying on some steps,
7 very shallow steps next door to a pebbled part of the
8 road. (Indicating)
9 We can tell exactly where that is, it is
10 approximately there on the aerial photograph and there
11 is a lot of evidence that he was shot at the same time
12 as another young man called Gerard Donaghy, who was
13 close to him and in whose body was found a bullet which
14 was attributed to the rifle of Soldier G.
15 Do you have any knowledge, either as a result of
16 seeing things in Glenfada Park or of hearing things
17 being talked about afterwards, of G or any other soldier
18 going into or shooting into the Abbey Park area?
19 A. I have no memory of that now, no.
20 Q. May we come back, please, to B1565.043, paragraph 106.
21 You say:
22 "After not too much time had elapsed, the people in
23 the crowd were fairly rapidly being rounded up and
24 cajoled to walls to be spreadeagled. They were made to
25 put their hands on their heads, were put in file and
1 escorted out of the Glenfada Park North car park by the
2 northeast exit, towards Kells Walk."
3 If we go back to EP21.2, we know from a lot of
4 evidence from soldiers and civilians alike, that a group
5 of civilians were huddled at the gable end of the east
6 block of Glenfada Park North and were subsequently taken
7 up through Glenfada Park North through Columbcille Court
8 and the back of Kells Walk, up in that direction.
9 Is that an incident that you recall happening,
10 people being arrested at the gable end and then being
11 taken up through Glenfada, Columbcille Court and Kells
12 Walk?
13 A. Yes, I do recall the prisoners being taken in hand and
14 escorted to the rear, yes.
15 Q. Do you recollect a Catholic priest being there?
16 A. No, I do not.
17 Q. A vociferous woman in black?
18 A. I do recall a woman in a black coat, yes.
19 Q. Can we go back to B1565.043, paragraph 107. You say
20 that you remember being on your own in the car park and:
21 "By then, as a result of the shooting, there were
22 other bodies on the ground, but I do not now recall the
23 positions of them. The bodies were carried away by
24 civilians."
25 You describe them as being carried away towards the
1 southwest exit. The Tribunal has heard evidence that
2 after people had been shot in Glenfada Park, a lady
3 Knight of Malta came in from the southwest alleyway and
4 was shot at by a soldier in the park, but not hit, and
5 had to shout, "Do not shoot, I am a first-aider," or
6 words to that effect.
7 Did you see any incident of that kind occur?
8 A. No, I did not.
9 Q. Is that something that may have happened but which you
10 do not recall?
11 A. I just have no recollection, it does not ring any bells.
12 Q. What was it that caused the soldiers who were in the car
13 park, apart from yourself, to leave it?
14 A. I think events seemed to have reached a natural
15 conclusion, some prisoners had fallen into our hands and
16 they were spreadeagled for a time before being escorted
17 to the rear. I do not recall a specific instruction
18 being given of how to behave at that point.
19 Q. You describe being on your own in the car park and then
20 in paragraph 108, leaving the car park and catching up
21 with the prisoners who had been taken away. You say in
22 paragraph 109:
23 "I find it very difficult to explain my experience
24 of the very shocking and unspeakable incidents that
25 unfolded in Glenfada Park North."
1 In what respects were they "very shocking" and
2 "unspeakable"?
3 A. It is not something I can articulate or express in
4 words, it is something I carry with me.
5 Q. Can you not tell us or explain to us why that is a sense
6 that you carry with you?
7 A. I am afraid not, it is not something I can explain.
8 Q. Can we come, please, to paragraph 116 at 1565.045. You
9 describe there how you emerged from Glenfada Park North
10 and caught up with the prisoners who were being escorted
11 to the rear, and it appears as if the events in Glenfada
12 Park North had been a private affair from which others
13 had been excluded.
14 You describe how a lot of other soldiers who had not
15 been involved in the shooting incident came forward
16 looking for something to do and were interfering and
17 putting prisoners who had already been searched up
18 against the wall, a lot of aggression, people struck
19 with rifle butts and:
20 "... a guy hit while he had his hands on his head,
21 with blood flowing from his cheek."
22 Could we have a look, please, at EP2.10. Is that
23 a familiar scene to you? Can I tell you what it is;
24 this is a group of people who were at the gable end of
25 Kells Walk and who were arrested there and who were
1 taken from Glenfada into the back of Kells Walk. This
2 photograph is taken when they have their hands on a wall
3 at Columbcille Court.
4 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Clarke, you said this was a group of
5 people who were at the gable end of Kells Walk --
6 MR CLARKE: The gable end of Glenfada Park North. Thank
7 you.
8 A. It is a familiar-looking picture, but I do not remember
9 this precise image.
10 Q. Do you know who the soldiers are on the right-hand side?
11 A. No, I could not -- I would be guessing.
12 Q. Have a look at EP2.11. There is the same group being
13 marched off. Would you be able to identify any of those
14 soldiers?
15 A. No, I cannot, no.
16 Q. EP2.12, I think the same must go for that, must it not?
17 Could we go back, please, to 1565.045, paragraph 119.
18 You say:
19 "I think I was just human for a short time, rather
20 than a soldier. Some instinct in me prompted me to act
21 and I grabbed a press man nearby, indicating for him to
22 come with me, saying, 'You have got to see this'. It
23 has since dawned on me how illogical that was. There
24 was probably nothing to see by then, as the bodies had
25 been taken already."
1 Do you know who the press man was?
2 A. No, I do not.
3 Q. How did you know that he was a press man?
4 A. I am afraid I do not remember that either.
5 Q. Do you recall whether he was Irish or English or some
6 other nationality?
7 A. No, I do not. He must have had some distinguishing
8 feature in order for me to identify him as someone to
9 approach in that way, but I do not now recall it.
10 Q. You then say in paragraph 120:
11 "A plain clothed man then turned to me and asked
12 what I was doing. I have no explanation for who that
13 person was. I assumed from his demeanour and manner
14 that he was an officer and that he had heard what
15 I said. It was like a douche of cold water. My antenna
16 picked up that there was a problem and I joined the rest
17 of my section."
18 Did you ever discover who the plain clothes man was?
19 A. No, I did not, it was a fleeting incident. I was
20 encouraging the one individual to come with me and in
21 a very short few moments this other man interceded.
22 Q. What happened to the press man? You tell him: you have
23 got to see this. Someone else says: what are you doing.
24 What happened to the man whom you told he had to see
25 what had happened?
1 A. I am afraid I do not have any further memory of that
2 incident there.
3 Q. So far as you know, was there any reason why he should
4 not have gone off into Glenfada from which you had just
5 come?
6 A. I am not sure where this group of people were. I think
7 it was probably some way back from Glenfada. It was not
8 sort of immediately round the corner or anything like
9 that.
10 Q. We have a photograph -- we have some actuality footage
11 of the prisoners being taken from Kells Walk upon which
12 I believe that you are able to identify yourself and
13 possibly others. I would like if we could now play the
14 end of video 3. I should explain this is part of the
15 ITN actuality footage of the day and I would like you to
16 tell me in due course, if and when, you identify
17 yourself.
18 (Video Played)
19 Did you see yourself on that video?
20 A. Yes, I did.
21 Q. Can we run it through again and could you say at the
22 appropriate moment, "that is me," or words to that
23 effect.
24 (Video played)
25 A. That is me on the right.
1 Q. On the right as we look at it now?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Can we roll it back slightly? You are still on the
4 right, are you not?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. That is to say on the right of the clip in video 3 of
7 the man with fair hair who turns round to look at the
8 man behind him.
9 Do you know which soldier that is with blond hair?
10 A. Not at this point, no. I have not got a clear image to
11 look at.
12 Q. Can we run it again.
13 (Video played)
14 Did that give you any clearer image?
15 A. I am not certain who that is.
16 Q. Do you have any idea who it is?
17 A. No, I am afraid I would -- if I spent some time with
18 this video I might be a little more successful in
19 identifying people, but not from that.
20 Q. Can we roll the video on?
21 (Video played)
22 Can you pause there. In this clip of the video
23 these prisoners appear to be being directed to a space
24 underneath the stairway up to Kells Walk. Do you know
25 why that was?
1 A. No, I have no idea. I had obviously already passed by
2 then.
3 Q. Sir, I see the time is now 3 o'clock, I am in your hands
4 as to --
5 LORD SAVILLE: I think we will go on for 10 minutes or so.
6 MR CLARKE: Could we then, please, come to paragraph 122 on
7 1565.046. You say in your statement:
8 "I have seen a section of footage of Bloody Sunday,
9 showing a number of prisoners being escorted ... I have
10 identified myself in that video. I am carrying an A41
11 radio and wearing a helmet by that stage. I appear to
12 have a stunned expression on my face. I am walking
13 behind INQ1237 (who I remember as a decent bloke). He
14 is on the right-hand side of a pair of soldiers who are
15 walking towards the camera."
16 You appear to have been able to identify INQ1237
17 when you gave this statement. Were you able to do so by
18 looking at the footage?
19 A. If I had a little more time to look at it carefully,
20 I probably could remember it.
21 Q. I think if we may, we will give you access to the
22 footage overnight and we will see if it is possible to
23 identify him or indeed anybody else, including in
24 particular the person UNK243, to whom you refer in
25 paragraph 122.
1 You describe in paragraph 123 how your next memory
2 is of being at the north of block 1, standing near
3 Major Loden with his Saracen, which had moved to the
4 point that you mark as K on your map, which is in
5 Rossville Street near the north of block 1. You say
6 that you remember seeing Soldier G leaning over the
7 angled bonnet of the Saracen and firing a shot into
8 block 1 of the Rossville Flats and you believe that he
9 was shooting four or five storeys up into the block.
10 Do you recall whether anybody else was firing at the
11 time?
12 A. There may have been, this is the only specific shot at
13 that time I recall.
14 Q. You say you became aware for the first time that
15 Colonel Wilford and Sergeant Major 202, the company
16 sergeant major, were nearby. You were standing in the
17 open and were not being fired on. As Soldier G fired,
18 Sergeant Major 202 immediately turned to him and, with
19 a note of agitation, said, "That is enough, that is
20 enough".
21 Where were you at this stage? You say your memory
22 is of being at the north of block 1, but were you
23 just -- why were you standing near Major Loden at this
24 stage?
25 A. On a number of occasions I had been Major Loden's
1 personal operator. As a radio operator you gravitated
2 to where the HQ vehicle was. I would imagine that was
3 the reason.
4 Q. Did he not have his own radio operator on that day?
5 A. I do not know. I mean, there were a number of vehicles
6 and quite a lot of blokes around at that point.
7 Q. Where was the rest of your platoon at this stage?
8 A. Well, quite close-by, I would imagine. The soldier
9 I refer to, Soldier G lying over the bonnet, was
10 a matter of metres away.
11 MR TOOHEY: When a platoon was split in the way that your
12 platoon was split in the course of what happened that
13 day, was there some standing instruction as to how you
14 re-grouped or to whom you reported so that the platoon
15 came together?
16 A. I have no recollection of that.
17 MR TOOHEY: I am not speaking just specifically of that day,
18 but was there some form of instruction by which the
19 soldiers would know how they would come together
20 following any sort of incident which divided them? For
21 instance, would you look for a senior officer to whom
22 you would report?
23 A. I think in an urban situation, that ultimately it would
24 be an officer or someone who would, over the radio, give
25 instructions as to where to rendezvous and re-group and
1 whether to go back to your vehicle at a particular
2 location.
3 MR TOOHEY: In a situation, as here, where apparently there
4 was an expectation that prisoners might be taken, was
5 there some instruction given to you as to where those
6 prisoners were to be taken.
7 A. It is something I am not aware of personally.
8 MR CLARKE: Soldier G -- you describe him as leaning over
9 the angled bonnet of a Saracen. That was Major Loden's
10 Saracen, was it.
11 A. I think so. If it was not, it was the next one in line,
12 because people were standing beside the vehicle, it was
13 not far away.
14 Q. You say in paragraph 124:
15 "I have a memory which, although vague, is still
16 distinct, of Sergeant Major 202 and Colonel Wilford
17 talking about Lance Corporal F and Soldier G.
18 I remember Colonel Wilford saying that they had better
19 be packed off to the SAS."
20 What do you recollect Sergeant Major 202 and
21 Colonel Wilford said about F and G before
22 Colonel Wilford made this observation?
23 A. I cannot add to this. I have no memory of -- or detail
24 of the conversation. My memory is of this suggestion,
25 that the SAS would be something that these two
1 characters might be directed to. The precise words
2 I cannot remember, but I am quite confident that this
3 general thinking here is correct.
4 Q. Did you get any inkling or understanding as to why
5 Colonel Wilford was suggesting that they would be better
6 packed off to the SAS?
7 A. I have no particular knowledge of that, no.
8 Q. Could we have a look, please, at B1565.008. This is
9 again your 1975 account. Could we have the second half.
10 You said in 1975:
11 "A lot of the prisoners, 57 in all, had been beaten
12 and a lot were bleeding from head wounds. I remember
13 seeing one marched to the rear of Major Loden's APC and
14 then, to my astonishment, the Major leaning out of the
15 back of the vehicle and smacking the character on top of
16 the head with a baton. A hushed silence filled the
17 area, apart from one or two more shots fired by us from
18 the street at Rossville Flats."
19 Do you have any recollection now of that incident?
20 A. No, I do not.
21 Q. Again, should we suppose this to be what you recalled in
22 1975 as something that you yourself had seen, or is it
23 something else?
24 A. I am afraid I cannot offer an explanation for why it is
25 there.
1 Q. May we come, please --
2 LORD SAVILLE: Are you moving to another topic?
3 MR CLARKE: Yes, we are.
4 LORD SAVILLE: We probably will stop now. 027, the Tribunal
5 would be very grateful to you if you would look again at
6 this video some time before tomorrow to see if you can
7 help us identify any more of the soldiers. If you want
8 you are welcome, of course, to have your legal advisor
9 with you while you are doing that, because it will be
10 arranged by the Inquiry staff.
11 Mr Laddie, if your client would like you to be
12 present while we show him that video again, I hope you
13 or your instructing solicitor would be able to be there.
14 MR LADDIE: I am grateful for the opportunity.
15 LORD SAVILLE: I am quite sure you understand, as I believe
16 027 understands, that there must be no discussion of the
17 evidence he is giving. This exercise is exclusively
18 devoted to seeing whether, on a further viewing of that
19 video, 027 can recognise any of the soldiers that are
20 shown in it.
21 We will start again at 9.30 tomorrow morning,
22 please.
23 (3.15 pm)
24 (Proceedings adjourned until 9.30 am
25 on Thursday, 17th October 2002)
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4 Questioned by MR CLARKE ................... 2
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