1 Tuesday, 11th September 2001
2 (9.40 am)
3 MR DAVID PHILLIPS, sworn
4 Questioned by MR CLARKE
5 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Phillips, if you look to
6 your right you will see who is talking to you. I am
7 the Chairman of the Tribunal. In the main the
8 questions will come from the barristers who sit in
9 front of me. All I would ask you to do at this stage
10 is to remember to keep fairly close to that microphone
11 in front of you -- I think where you are at the moment
12 is ideal -- and then we will all hear what you have to
13 say.
14 MR CLARKE: Mr Phillips, do you have with
15 you, amongst other things, your statement to this
16 Tribunal, which effectively incorporates your statement
17 to the Widgery Tribunal, which you signed on 23rd
18 February of this year?
19 A. I do.
20 Q. Are the contents of that statement true to
21 the best of your knowledge and belief?
22 A. They are.
23 Q. What I am going to do, because we have all
24 had the opportunity to read all your statements, both
25 in 1972 and made last year, is to pick up various
1 passages in it in which we would welcome further
2 assistance without going through every paragraph
3 statement.
4 If we could have on the screen, please,
5 M66.17. In paragraph 3 of your statement to this
6 Tribunal, you described what happened on the Friday
7 before Bloody Sunday, which was that you went to an
8 army observation post at the Embassy Ballroom and while
9 there heard what seemed to you to be a significant
10 noise from a machine-gun, asked the army officers what
11 the noise was and they identified it as a Thompson
12 sub-machine gun.
13 How familiar are you now with the geography
14 of the Bogside?
15 A. I am up-to-date.
16 Q. Can you remember whereabouts the sound of
17 what was identified to you as a Thompson sub-machine
18 gun was coming from?
19 A. Yes, from the area of the Rossville Flats --
20 not specifically the Rossville Flats, I would say from
21 the area of the Rossville Flats.
22 Q. When that firing took place on the Friday,
23 did the army return fire?
24 A. There was a single sniper shot.
25 Q. From a soldier --
1 A. From a soldier.
2 MR TOOHEY: Mr Phillips, to your right: what
3 time of the day was it that you made this visit?
4 A. That was, sir, 3.30 to 4.30 in the afternoon.
5 LORD SAVILLE: Sorry to interrupt again,
6 Mr Clarke: you say a single shot, from where?
7 A. From the army observation post, which was on
8 top of the Embassy --
9 LORD SAVILLE: From the Embassy Ballroom?
10 A. I think it is Echo observation post.
11 MR CLARKE: If we could have on the screen
12 paragraphs 4 and 5. You describe in paragraph 4
13 getting the impression when you were in Derry on the
14 Friday that the march on Sunday would be a likely flash
15 point and you explain that there was no specific event
16 that caused you to sense this, but you just felt it was
17 going to be something more than just a civil rights
18 march?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. Was there anything more than a sort of
21 feeling in the air that caused you to think that, or
22 was there anything more concrete?
23 A. No, it was the, the atmosphere in Londonderry
24 on the Friday and having been up on the observation
25 points where there was Aggro Corner going on down in
1 the Creggan and Bogside and from the background buzz of
2 talking to people. But what crossed my mind was that
3 when I heard on the Friday that the Paratroopers would
4 be called up in reserve, it was then I thought that
5 there could be trouble.
6 Q. You describe in the next paragraph how you
7 returned to Belfast on the Saturday to chat to the ITN
8 team and the new crew, set off for Londonderry on the
9 Sunday morning and your crew were Gerald Seymour, Peter
10 Wilkinson as cameraman and Robert Hammond as soundman
11 and there was another team who were going to be with
12 the marchers.
13 I think we know from other evidence we have
14 had that the other crew either was or included Martin
15 Lewis, the reporter and two people called Frank Watson
16 and David Roy, does that ring any bells?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. If we could come over to the next page and
19 paragraph 9, we have come on in time to the noise of
20 the march approaching as you were at what we are
21 calling barrier 14 at the east end of William Street.
22 You say in the penultimate sentence that once they got
23 to the bottom of William Street, you recall seeing the
24 banner and when they came round the corner, that is
25 when missiles started being hurled almost immediately.
1 Did you mean by that to say that missiles
2 were being hurled before the march got to the front --
3 got to the barricade itself, or were you meaning to say
4 that as soon as they had got to the barricade, missiles
5 started to be hurled?
6 A. Well, the sequence as I recall it was we
7 heard the hubble bubble of the march and then there
8 appeared at the barricade what I would describe as
9 hooligans who immediately started throwing a variety of
10 missiles.
11 Q. What I would like now to do is to go back to
12 the statement that you made contemporaneously for the
13 purposes of the Widgery Inquiry, which for our purposes
14 we will find at M66.1 and I hope is in the bundle of
15 papers that you have. We can pick it up, if we can
16 have the paragraphs, beginning from the second full
17 paragraph to the end, in other words the paragraph
18 beginning:
19 "At about 3.35 ..."
20 You describe the appearance of a crowd of
21 youths around the bend with the civil rights banner in
22 front and chanting, included chants "IRA, IRA".
23 The crowd comes up to the barrier and started
24 to throw bricks, bottles, blocks of wood, some of which
25 were nail studded, and pieces of metal. You presumably
1 had seen all that at the time and hence it is included
2 in your statement?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. If we could go to the last paragraph on this
5 page, of course we have seen quite a bit of this on the
6 actuality film which we will look at in a moment, but
7 you describe how, after about 10 to 15 minutes of the
8 bombardment, you had to go back to get a lead for the
9 camera and it was just before you went that you saw the
10 water cannon drive down to the barrier and spray the
11 crowd. The street cleared, and General Ford, who was
12 nearby, remarked out loud that they will be back. Can
13 you remember where General Ford was at this stage?
14 A. Yes, I can.
15 Q. Where was that?
16 A. Well, at the top of William Street, okay,
17 there was a group of us, observers and that is
18 William Street and I think it is Waterloo Place --
19 Q. Could you speak a little closer to the
20 microphone, you are slightly fading?
21 A. The top of William Street, okay, where it
22 edges into Waterloo Place, there was a group of us
23 there, observers.
24 Q. You describe then how after a short while the
25 youths returned to the barrier and threw missiles and
1 you became aware of a cloud of white smoke which you
2 took to be CS gas and General Ford remarked that it was
3 not gas that had been fired by his soldiers; is that
4 right?
5 A. That is right.
6 Q. Troops then pulled back from the barrier for
7 a few yards until the smoke cleared. Do you recall
8 what had happened at this stage to the water cannon?
9 A. I am not clear, it either had been pulled
10 back or pulled up the street, I am not sure.
11 Q. You went off to get the lead for the camera.
12 Did that involve going back to the hotel where you were
13 staying?
14 A. Either to the hotel or to where the crew had
15 parked the car, I cannot recall.
16 Q. Was the hotel the City Hotel?
17 A. It was.
18 Q. Do you recall where the crew had parked the
19 car?
20 A. No.
21 Q. Anyway, you were away for approximately how
22 long, do you recall?
23 A. I would have thought five minutes.
24 Q. You return and the soldiers are back on the
25 barrier and the crowd is facing them again. You say
1 that Gerald Seymour had noted in your book whilst you
2 were away, the use of the water cannon and the CS gas
3 to which you have referred. Is that a note he made at
4 your request?
5 A. Yes, I asked him to jot down anything while
6 I was away.
7 Q. Was he noting down what had happened whilst
8 you were away or what had happened just before you went
9 away?
10 A. It would be, um, what had happened just
11 before I went away.
12 Q. You describe how, after you returned, you
13 heard rubber bullets being fired, but did not make
14 a note of that, but did note that at 4 pm more rubber
15 bullets were fired and that the Paratroopers were being
16 brought up in reserve and they came round on foot from
17 Waterloo Place into the bottom of William Street.
18 Had you noticed them before this happened;
19 had you noticed that they were around in Waterloo
20 Place?
21 A. Yes, because we were standing, you know, at
22 the junction at the top of William Street and Waterloo
23 Place and they were back off somewhere.
24 Q. The next item is that the water cannon
25 reappears and fires again at 4.05 because the crowd had
1 obtained an iron shield behind which they were
2 advancing. Should we understand by that that the water
3 cannon was aimed at the shield and the crowd behind it?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Rubber bullets also fired, we can see them on
6 the film. Then those with the shield retreated round
7 the bend, but at 4.09 returned with the same or
8 a similar shield and at 4.12, the barrier was pulled
9 aside in the centre and the Paratroopers went in
10 amongst the crowd.
11 Can you help us on this: you describe the
12 retreat of those behind the shield at 4.09 and the
13 barrier being pulled aside three minutes later at 4.12;
14 what was the position in front of the barrier at the
15 east end of William Street leading up to
16 Chamberlain Street between those two times, 4.09 and
17 4.12?
18 A. I would say a general melee.
19 Q. Can you recall how big it was, the melee?
20 A. Well, it had thinned down from the original
21 200, I mean they had -- some had retreated out of it.
22 Q. But there were still some left. Were those
23 people still throwing stones?
24 A. I cannot recall specifically, I think they
25 had the feeling that a move was about to be made and
1 I think it was a question of getting ready to cut and
2 run.
3 Q. When a move was made, did they cut and run?
4 A. They did.
5 Q. You then describe how the Paratroopers went
6 in amongst the crowd, one of them had captured the blue
7 and white civil rights banner, which he put into an
8 armoured car. Do you recall seeing vehicles going
9 through the barrier at this stage?
10 A. I did not see any vehicles going through that
11 barrier.
12 Q. You describe how at this time you were
13 standing at the corner of Waterloo Street and
14 William Street, which is a little way back from the
15 barrier, is it not?
16 A. Yes, it would be somewhere in the region of
17 100 yards.
18 Q. Were you there when the Paratroopers went in;
19 is that the spot you were at?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. You describe how, when you were there, you
22 heard a deep and long burst of automatic firing which
23 you identified as coming from a Thompson machine-gun.
24 Do I understand that you made that identification as
25 a result of what you had heard on the previous Friday
1 or on some other basis?
2 A. No, from the Friday, definitely.
3 Q. You say that immediately afterwards you heard
4 a volley of single rifle shots from the same point.
5 You say that your impression was the firing was coming
6 from a point about 300 to 400 yards away at an angle of
7 about 45 degrees to the line of advance of the troops.
8 I am sure you will recall that when you were
9 giving evidence at the Widgery Tribunal, there was
10 a model and you were asked to point on the model?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. As to where the sound was coming from. As we
13 have not got the model and because the transcript is
14 not wholly clear in parts because it simply refers to
15 "there" and "that", I would like your assistance to
16 see if you can indicate by reference to a map the
17 approximate position where you thought the firing was
18 coming from.
19 Could we have upon the screen Q8? Perhaps we
20 could enlarge the middle of that. You, as I understand
21 it -- tell me if I am wrong -- were somewhere around
22 there, that is to say the junction of William Street
23 and Waterloo Place? (Indicating).
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. As you can see from this map, the
1 Rossville Flats are down here; that is Glenfada Park;
2 the walls are up here. Would you be able to indicate
3 if we give control of this screen and take all the
4 arrows away from where the sound which you identified
5 as a Thompson appeared to be coming?
6 A. Yes, I can, okay. We were watching the
7 Paratroopers go through the barrier 14 and up to the
8 top of William Street, okay, when the sound came from
9 45 degrees from where we were standing. (Indicating).
10 I cannot do it properly, down to block --
11 Q. Down to block 1?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. So, approximately from where block 1 is?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Could I have on the screen M66.12? Could we
16 highlight between C and D. Can I explain what this is:
17 this is part of the transcript of your evidence to
18 Lord Widgery and it is a part where you were being
19 asked questions by Mr Hill, who was one of the Counsel
20 appearing for the relatives. It is, I think, the only
21 part of the transcript that seems to give an
22 indication, an intelligible indication of where you put
23 your pointer at the time, because the question, if
24 I could have control of the screen, that was asked, was
25 this:
1 "Question: The direction you pointed to on
2 the model from where you heard the firing is a line
3 from the bottom of William Street, it would really go
4 along Derry Wall past Walker Monument: would you agree
5 that is the rough line you indicated?
6 Answer: Towards those High Flats.
7 Question: Would you agree the pointer was
8 almost resting on the Derry Wall?
9 Lord Widgery: No, it was resting on the
10 easterly of the High Flats.
11 Mr Hill: I accept that. Could it equally
12 have come from the east wing of the flats and Derry
13 Wall?"
14 This is one of those exchanges in which
15 Counsel and Lord Widgery speak but you do not, but it
16 appears to record that Lord Widgery understood that the
17 pointer you had used rested on the easterly of the High
18 Flats, which is what we are calling block 3. Your
19 recollection is that it came from the westerly block,
20 is it?
21 A. No, I cannot be specific as to that, shall we
22 say from the flats, and Lord Widgery had got it right
23 as to where it was.
24 Q. You say that you heard a deep and long burst
25 of automatic firing which you identified as a Thompson
1 and immediately afterwards a volley of single rifle
2 shots from the same point. Could you tell in which
3 direction either or both of those sets of shots were
4 travelling?
5 A. No.
6 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Phillips, when you heard
7 this sound that you identified as automatic firing, are
8 you able to help on this: had the Paratroopers gone
9 through the barrier at that time, or were they going
10 through when you heard this sound?
11 A. They were -- the tail end of them were still
12 going through, okay, some had already gone up
13 William Street.
14 MR CLARKE: At this stage you personally were
15 still at the corner of Waterloo Street and
16 William Street?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Is that right?
19 A. Uh-huh.
20 Q. What had happened to the cameraman and the
21 sound recordist, were they with you?
22 A. No, they had been lower down William Street
23 filming from there.
24 Q. Thank you for that answer, because that
25 explains a little because, if we look -- could we have
1 on the screen M82.1, this is Mr Wilkinson, the
2 cameraman's statement to the Widgery Tribunal. If we
3 look at the next page, 82.2, and could we highlight,
4 please, paragraph 5, what he said there was this:
5 "The water cannon was then again fired at the
6 crowd and then I saw the Paratroopers move up behind
7 the barricade, and when the barbed wire was out and
8 they went through. My team also went through several
9 yards behind the first Paratroopers, who were on
10 foot."
11 Then I can skip to the next sentence:
12 "We followed the Paratroopers down
13 William Street and I took film on the corner of
14 William Street and Little James Street of the snatch
15 squad. These pictures appears on the teams' film. At
16 about this time I heard a Thompson sub-machine gun open
17 fire and from that moment on there was intense gunfire
18 (ball fire) for three or four minutes, from the
19 direction of the open ground by Rossville Street."
20 That entirely fits with your recollection
21 that they had gone ahead and taken film on the corner
22 of William Street and Little James Street, some way
23 away of you?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. If we go back to your statement to
1 Lord Widgery at M66.2, you describe at the bottom of
2 the page how after you had heard the firing you have
3 just told us about, General Ford, who was looking in
4 the direction said "That is awfully heavy firing", then
5 said "We know they have 70 gunmen in there" and you
6 took him to mean that there were 70 gunmen in the
7 Bogside and Creggan area; is that right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. May we come to the next page, M66.3. Could
10 we highlight the second paragraph. You describe then
11 how you rejoined the camera crew on the corner of
12 Rossville Street and William Street where the
13 Paratrooper Colonel -- that is Colonel Wilford, is it?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. His adjutant -- is that who is now General
16 Sir Mike Jackson or did you not know who that was?
17 A. I did not know that at the time.
18 Q. And radio operator were grouped. Could we
19 have photograph EP4.41. I think you have helpfully
20 identified in this photograph Gerald Seymour, yourself
21 and Mr Hammond; is that right?
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. And this gentleman with a lot of hair and a
24 moustache, is we think a Japanese stills cameraman; is
25 that right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. We can see obviously a soldier here and one
3 down at the corner. One can also see, at this stage,
4 in this photograph, there is at least one vehicle in
5 William Street behind you. Were you conscious of the
6 presence of vehicles in William Street by now?
7 A. No.
8 LORD SAVILLE: Help us, Mr Clarke, this
9 photograph is taken in which direction?
10 MR CLARKE: This is taken looking eastwards
11 up the east end of William Street. This is, at least
12 I assume this is the corner of the junction of
13 William Street and Rossville Street?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. May we then, please, go back to M66.3,
16 highlighting the second paragraph. You describe how
17 you crossed Rossville Street to the wall of what
18 appeared to be a garage and noticed a Volkswagen and
19 two people who had been wounded being helped into it.
20 We will see in a moment there is some film which has
21 survived taken by your team which shows such a
22 Volkswagen and at least one person being helped into
23 it. Do you remember that pictures were taken of the
24 Volkswagen that you are talking about in this
25 paragraph?
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. Were you conscious of the presence of a man
3 who appeared to be a priest there?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. You then say that you saw about 20 men and
6 one woman marching towards some army vehicles,
7 apparently under arrest. Then you met the second
8 camera crew and sent them back to the hotel for more
9 film because they had run out.
10 Just before I go any further, can you help me
11 as to how long you stayed at the junction with
12 William Street and Waterloo Place before going down to
13 the junction of William Street and Rossville Street;
14 you see Paratroopers go in, did you then immediately go
15 down William Street or did you wait for a while until
16 they had all gone through barrier 14, or what did you
17 do?
18 A. I followed in immediately after hearing
19 General Ford's remarks, okay, because by then I knew
20 I had to get a move on to catch up the crew.
21 Q. At that stage were there Paratroopers still
22 going through barrier 14, or had they all gone through?
23 A. They had gone through and I was on the tail
24 end.
25 MR TOOHEY: Mr Clarke, the block of flats
1 that Mr Phillips has referred to in line 4 of what is
2 on the screen is not the Rossville Flats, having regard
3 to what follows; could we just get some identification
4 of what flats are being referred to?
5 MR CLARKE: Yes. Could we have on the screen
6 EP21.2? This is an aerial photograph taken some time
7 around Bloody Sunday, but not obviously on the day
8 itself. You describe crossing Rossville Street, which
9 is here (indicating), to the wall of what appeared to
10 be a garage. We know that there are four garages where
11 my arrow is presently pointing. You describe also
12 noticing a Volkswagen parked outside a block of flats.
13 Would I be right to infer that the Volkswagen was
14 parked somewhere outside these garages or the block of
15 flats to the left of them as we look at the photograph?
16 A. I cannot be sure at the moment, it was in
17 the, this sort of area.
18 Q. In the area of those garages?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Could you tell where the person or persons
21 who were brought to the car had been brought from?
22 A. No.
23 Q. We know from a lot of other evidence that
24 there were two people who were wounded who were taken
25 separately, that is to say in two different journeys,
1 having been brought previously to a flat which is just
2 off the picture, but is about there. (Indicating). As
3 I understand your evidence what you saw would be
4 consistent with people having come from there, but you
5 did not actually see where it was that they came from?
6 A. That is right.
7 Q. May we go back to M66.3. You describe in the
8 second half of the second paragraph sending the camera
9 crew back for some more film, then running diagonally
10 across the road to the Rossville Flats, arriving at the
11 corner of the block and hearing a loud single rifle
12 shot above your head and being ordered to get down in
13 a corner by a Paratrooper. As you ran across the road
14 to the Rossville Flats, do you recall, firstly, whether
15 you saw anything happening at the barricade which ran
16 from the Rossville Flats to the maisonettes on the
17 opposite side called Glenfada Park?
18 A. No, I was concentrating on catching up with
19 the crew, they had moved off again and I was aware they
20 had moved and headed towards them and that was the
21 first -- that first block of Rossville Flats.
22 Q. You say in your statement here that you do
23 not know the direction from which the shot came, but it
24 was certainly coming towards you; is that right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. You then see a priest approaching one of two
2 armoured cars which were in Rossville Street by the
3 corner of the flats speaking to a soldier and telling
4 Gerald Seymour that there were three bodies in the
5 second armoured car and there were other bodies
6 elsewhere and Peter Wilkinson looked into the armoured
7 car and confirmed this was true, but was not allowed to
8 film them.
9 When you say he was not allowed to film them,
10 did somebody tell him he could not or prevent him from
11 doing so or what?
12 A. I understood from Peter he had gone and
13 looked to check out the bodies and that the army had
14 said, you know, no filming.
15 Q. You say that after the priest had left the
16 scene and before the withdrawal of the Paratroopers
17 there was another single rifle shot, louder than the
18 last one, passing over your head, again certainly
19 coming towards you, but you could not tell from which
20 direction; is that right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You speak here of two loud single rifle shots
23 coming towards you and an interval in between, do you
24 recollect now what was the interval between the two
25 shots that you heard?
1 A. Um, not precisely, I would say within I would
2 have thought three minutes.
3 Q. You describe how that second shot was
4 answered by two single shots from two Paratroopers
5 crouching by the first armoured car. Were you
6 conscious of just the two armoured cars in
7 Rossville Street?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Do you recall in which direction they were
10 facing?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Or how close they were to the north end of
13 the block which looks on to Rossville Street?
14 A. They were close.
15 Q. Those soldiers who answered the fire by two
16 single shots were told to cease fire by an officer who
17 added a further order to only fire on order or at
18 identifiable targets. That incident is, I think,
19 caught on your team's film?
20 A. Yes, it is.
21 Q. Could we pause and think a little about the
22 overall timescale? Because you made notes we have some
23 very exact times for some of the events by your watch.
24 You timed the moment when barrier 14 was pulled aside
25 as being 12 minutes past 4.00. Can you give us any
1 idea of the total time that elapsed between the
2 Paratroopers going through barrier 14 at 4.12 and the
3 last event that you describe, namely, an order to only
4 fire at identifiable targets; obviously one cannot be
5 exact, but can you give us any idea of the sort of
6 total time that this whole episode took?
7 A. I would have thought it was all over by 4.45,
8 or 20 to.
9 Q. There are a number of other matters that
10 I would like to go through. Firstly I would like your
11 assistance with your contemporaneous notebook. Then
12 I would like to look at a particular passage in the
13 evidence of Mr Hammond and then I would like your
14 assistance to look at what remains of the film that was
15 taken that day.
16 Firstly could we have on the screen M66.4.2.
17 This is what has come out very badly in photocopy, but
18 it is, is it not, a photocopy of the notes made in your
19 notebook of which we have the original?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. On the day, you have it in your left hand?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. I think the quickest way of acting is for me
24 to read out what it says, assisted by the fact that you
25 have very kindly provided us today with a more legible
1 copy of what it is that you said. Can I read it into
2 the transcript and correct me if I make any mistakes.
3 What I think this records, is as follows:
4 "General Robert Ford, GOC Land Forces. Army
5 here to see the law is respected. There will be no
6 march beyond the barricades. He said he hoped his
7 soldiers would not have to use CS gas because of the
8 effect on innocent people. 1300 troops ringing the
9 Bogside backed up by police. This included two
10 companies of Paratroopers."
11 Pausing there, that, I assume, reflects a
12 discussion that you had at some stage with
13 General Ford?
14 A. It was a small background briefing given to
15 the media by General Ford.
16 Q. Do you know when that briefing was given?
17 A. I cannot recall now, some time in the
18 morning.
19 Q. Sorry, some time --
20 A. Some time in the morning.
21 Q. In the morning?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Do you know where it took place?
24 A. I cannot recall now.
25 Q. I think the note goes on to read:
1 "100 feet of the area around William Street.
2 GVs", meaning "general view", "of Embassy building."
3 What is that all about?
4 A. That was film taken by Peter Wilkinson before
5 the action started. That was 100 feet of film of the
6 area around William Street, just general views, GVs of
7 the Embassy building which we refer to as where the
8 army had their OP.
9 Q. As I understand it these are notes you take
10 because you have later to piece the film altogether, it
11 is important to know what was filmed when?
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. If we go over the next page, which is even
14 more difficult to read from the photocopy, what you
15 have told us it says, is this:
16 "3.35, when the first bricks were thrown.
17 Blue and white civil rights banner appeared around the
18 corner at the bottom of William Street 100 yards from
19 Waterloo Place? They planned to meet"?
20 A. It could be where they planned to meet.
21 Q. The question means even you cannot decipher
22 it?
23 A. Quite.
24 Q. "Crowds rushed at the barricades. Glass
25 bottles, bricks and bits of wood. Chant 'IRA, IRA'."
1 Is that right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. The next word is unclear, something "water
4 cannon held in reserve"?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And then I think it is 10 indecipherable
7 words "water cannon."
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. "CS gas used by" and the next word is
10 indecipherable, is that right?
11 A. "Used by crowd" -- "used by [something]
12 crowd".
13 Q. "Used by [something] crowd"?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Then on the right-hand page it reads:
16 "4 pm more rubber bullets. Paras brought up
17 in reserve."
18 That is the note you referred to in your
19 statement to Lord Widgery?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. "4.05 water cannon up after rioters bring up
22 corrugated iron shield."
23 Is that right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And then you have deciphered the word "Paras"
1 but not what follows?
2 A. No, I cannot, it is, it is too hazy.
3 Q. Then you can decipher "4.09" but not what
4 follows?
5 A. It is "4.09" and I think it refers, looking
6 through a magnifying glass at that, it was to the
7 return of the corrugated iron shield.
8 Q. That is certainly what you said in your
9 statement at the time:
10 "4.12 Paras in. Captured flag."
11 Is that what it says?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. If we go over to the next page, does it then
14 say "Real firing"?
15 A. "Real firing".
16 Q. Does that mean live as opposed to rubber
17 bullets; is that what live firing meant?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. "4.15. About 70 gunmen."
20 That is presumably a reference to what
21 General Ford said, is it?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Father Anthony Mulvey, who we now know to
24 have been the priest whom Gerard Seymour interviewed.
25 Then I think it says "two acid bombs". Then is there
1 something that is not decipherable?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. The next thing I would like to do, is this:
4 could we please have on the screen M37.21? This is the
5 statement made by Robert Hammond, your sound recordist
6 in your team, to Lord Widgery. I do not want to go
7 through it in any detail. What I do want to look at is
8 something that appears at M37.22, the next page, could
9 we have the third paragraph. There is a passage in his
10 statement in which he says this -- he is speaking at
11 a time after you have met the second film crew. What
12 he says, is this:
13 "Peter Wilkinson and I ran across
14 Rossville Street (after meeting Barry and Peter
15 Fox) ..."
16 That is another film crew:
17 "... behind the army vehicles which had
18 advanced and crouched against the northern end wall of
19 Rossville Flats. I am not certain if there was firing
20 as we crossed. We were there for five or 10 minutes
21 and I saw an army vehicle with a turret machine-gun
22 which was about 15 yards north of the Rossville Flats
23 on what appeared to be wasteground, fire several single
24 shots with its machine ..."
25 I think must mean machine-gun:
1 "... in the direction of what seemed to me
2 to be the area of Glenfada Park and Columbcille Court.
3 The gun barrel was slightly elevated and seemed to be
4 pointing to the first or second floor height. While
5 the firing was taking place, I heard one single duller
6 sounding shot, but I am not able to say from where it
7 was fired, but it did not seem as though it was very
8 far away."
9 Do you have any recollection of seeing
10 anything that appeared to be the firing from
11 a machine-gun in the direction of Glenfada Park or
12 Columbcille Court from a turret of an army vehicle?
13 A. No, none.
14 Q. The last two things I want to do: I want to
15 run a part of the surviving ITN footage and ask you
16 just a few questions about it and then look at a small
17 passage of the BBC footage. Could we therefore have on
18 screen the passage in video 3 that I indicated earlier,
19 and I may stop it from time to time and ask you
20 questions.
21 (Video played)
22 Pausing there, this is a very small shot of
23 soldiers running north or northwest across
24 Rossville Street. What we are looking at on the film
25 is, on the left-hand side of the image on the screen,
1 the north side of block 1 with an army vehicle, indeed
2 the vehicle with the turreted machine-gun parked to the
3 north of it. Do you have any recollection of why that
4 was being filmed or what was going on?
5 A. No, I do not, sorry.
6 Q. Can we continue, please.
7 (Video played)
8 Can we pause there. That is a shot of at
9 least four army vehicles going into William Street
10 after the Paratroopers have gone through and soldiers
11 coming from the wasteland to the north of the east end
12 of William Street and crossing over to those vehicles.
13 Do you recollect ever seeing anything of that kind?
14 A. No, because when we went in chasing after the
15 Paratroopers, I do not recall any of the APCs being
16 ahead of us, they must have come up behind us.
17 Q. That is just a little puzzling, because your
18 cameraman went ahead to the corner of William Street
19 and Rossville Street, so that if they all came behind
20 you, it is difficult to see how he could have taken
21 those shots?
22 A. Well, whether other APCs came in from another
23 direction, from another barrier, perhaps they are those
24 APCs.
25 Q. They must be APCs that I think the cameraman
1 who was in your team took photographs of?
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. And he had gone ahead of you?
4 A. Yes, but if there had been, from the other
5 Rossville Street barrier, APCs coming in, they could
6 have been there ahead of it.
7 Q. If one looks at these photographs, they are
8 clearly coming round the bend at the end of
9 William Street past Chamberlain Street?
10 A. If you say so.
11 Q. Yes, I agree. Anyway, you have no
12 recollection of seeing such vehicles?
13 A. No, I do not.
14 Q. Can we continue.
15 (Video continued)
16 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Clarke, if we could stop
17 this film, those vehicles which we are shown on the
18 earlier sequence, are we sure they were coming up
19 William Street?
20 MR CLARKE: I am not sure of anything in this
21 case. Can we go back to them? Go forward slightly.
22 Stop there. The answer to your question is that I am
23 sure because above the APC you can see McLaughlin's
24 shop.
25 LORD SAVILLE: But the photographer had gone
1 ahead of Mr Phillips, he not?
2 MR CLARKE: Yes.
3 LORD SAVILLE: Where is the puzzle?
4 MR CLARKE: You are quite right, the
5 photographs are being taken from the Rossville Street
6 end.
7 LORD SAVILLE: The photographer goes up
8 there. He is taking the photographs. Mr Phillips's
9 recollection is that you went in probably before the
10 APC, is that right, or at least the APCs coming through
11 barrier 14?
12 A. Yes, sir.
13 LORD SAVILLE: That would fit, would it not?
14 MR CLARKE: In that case, you get to the
15 junction of William Street and Rossville Street and the
16 photographer must have been taking pictures of
17 something that happened after you got there, behind
18 you?
19 A. I think, I mean, as I was saying, I was
20 catching up on the crew. He would have taken, I am
21 sure, have taken those shots which we are talking about
22 ahead of my arrival. There was a time lag, okay. So
23 my own feeling is, is that those armoured cars had come
24 in from the Rossville Street barrier, that is my own
25 feeling.
1 LORD SAVILLE: I think, as Mr Clarke says,
2 Mr Phillips, I do not think that can be right, because
3 we can recognise the names on the shops, and they are
4 shops further down William Street towards barrier 14?
5 A. Yes, but, sir, those two could have come in
6 behind me, okay, and Peter would be ahead, put it this
7 way, so you have got the armoured cars coming up behind
8 me. Peter who had been -- had a good, you know, two
9 minutes on me, probably was filming the others, we were
10 talking about where the shot came from. I think these
11 two here are different from the one we are seeing with
12 the soldier shooting.
13 LORD SAVILLE: That may well be, yes,
14 I follow that, yes.
15 MR CLARKE: I am almost certain that is
16 correct. I think the ones we see in Rossville Street
17 are almost without question the ones that came down
18 Little James Street into Rossville Street?
19 A. Fair enough.
20 Q. The only as yet not completely unresolved
21 puzzle is when the armoured vehicles that we see here
22 on the screen that came through barrier 14 into the
23 east end of William Street, (a) when they came and (b)
24 where they went, but it is possible that they came
25 after you had arrived at the junction, is what
1 I understand you to be saying, and therefore were
2 behind you. They happened to be photographed by your
3 cameraman, but you did not notice them because you had
4 other things to look at as well?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. I follow. Can we roll on.
7 (Video played)
8 Pausing there: the slip we have just seen is
9 of vehicles in Rossville Street with a soldier with his
10 rifle up behind the vehicle closest to the camera.
11 Then the vehicles move off to the left as you look at
12 the screen, to the east geographically, so as to be in
13 the lee of block 1 of the Rossville Flats. Do you
14 recall seeing that scene?
15 A. No, I do not, sir.
16 Q. Let us roll on with Gerald Seymour, who is
17 presently on the screen.
18 (Video played)
19 Pause there, can we? To my ear there
20 appeared to be audible on the film two shots followed
21 by the words "Cease firing", followed by three shots,
22 followed by "Do not fire unless you can identify
23 a target", or whatever precisely the words were; is
24 that what you heard?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. The officer who shouted those two commands,
2 did you see him when he did it?
3 A. Well, just briefly, because I was looking --
4 just a face shouting.
5 Q. Do you know who he was?
6 A. No, I do not.
7 Q. There seems to be some issue as to who that
8 may have been. If it had been Colonel Wilford, would
9 you have recognised him?
10 A. It was not Colonel Wilford.
11 Q. It was not?
12 A. No.
13 Q. May we roll on with what we now know to be
14 Father Mulvey.
15 (Video played)
16 This is, I think, the photograph of a man
17 being taken into the Volkswagen motorcar; is that
18 right?
19 A. Yes, it is.
20 Q. I think it is somewhat out of sequence in the
21 place where it happens to appear on this collection of
22 clips; is that right?
23 A. Yes, it is.
24 Q. Could we roll back a bit on the screen. Can
25 you roll forwards, sorry. I do not think it is helpful
1 to ask you any further questions about that.
2 Thank you very much, those are the questions
3 that I want today ask.
4 MR TOOHEY: Mr Clarke, before you sit down,
5 when you say that that clip is out of sequence, you say
6 that because of Mr Phillips' oral evidence or because
7 technically it is possible to say that it is out of
8 sequence?
9 MR CLARKE: No, because of Mr Phillips'
10 written and oral evidence and also because I believe it
11 to be either John Johnston or Damien Donaghy being put
12 into Father Carolan's Volkswagen and I anticipate that
13 would have happened some time before Father Mulvey was
14 there to be interviewed, having seen three bodies in
15 one of the Saracens.
16 Questioned by MR LAVERY
17 MR LAVERY: My name is Lavery and I appear
18 for some of the families of the deceased and some other
19 persons. Mr Phillips, could I ask you how you came to
20 be in the Embassy observation point on the Friday
21 before Bloody Sunday?
22 A. Yes, because I had gone up to Londonderry to
23 assess the situation there to get au fait with the
24 geography and the situation on the streets and I had
25 requested the army press people for permission to go up
1 on to their observation post.
2 Q. Were you the only journalist there at that
3 time?
4 A. Um, no, I remember, um, a Japanese stills
5 photographer, not the one that has been shown at the
6 top of William Street, but there was another one there.
7 Q. Actually when you heard the firing of the
8 sub-machine gun; is that right?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Can you remember the officers who were
11 present at that time?
12 A. They were just officers.
13 Q. What time had you arrived in Derry that
14 morning --
15 LORD SAVILLE: When you say "just officers",
16 Mr Phillips, I do not suppose you can remember their
17 names, can you?
18 A. No, I do not, sir.
19 LORD SAVILLE: Any idea of their rank?
20 A. I would say at least rank of captain, major,
21 senior officers in charge.
22 MR LAVERY: You had arrived in Derry that
23 morning; is that correct?
24 A. Yes, I had come up by train from Belfast.
25 Q. Had this been your first time in
1 Northern Ireland?
2 A. Yes, it was.
3 Q. Obviously then your first time in Derry?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. When you arrived, did you travel alone or
6 with your crew?
7 A. I travelled alone.
8 Q. With whom did you make contact, then, when
9 you arrived in Derry?
10 A. I made contact with the army.
11 Q. Had you had any previous contacts with them
12 or did you just go up to the press office?
13 A. I had had contacts with the army in Belfast;
14 I went to wherever I had been told was the army press
15 office.
16 Q. Was there anybody in particular that you had
17 already established a contact with that you went to
18 that morning?
19 A. I cannot recall.
20 Q. But there may have been?
21 A. I cannot recall.
22 Q. How did you spend -- you have already
23 described a briefing by General Ford. You cannot
24 remember where that took place, I think you have told
25 us?
1 A. The briefing by General Ford was on the
2 Sunday, you are talking about the Friday, I think.
3 Q. Yes, I am sorry, you are quite right,
4 I think, forgive me.
5 Could I ask you, then, how you spent the
6 Friday morning after you had got off the train?
7 A. Yes, I took -- at some stage I took a taxi
8 ride into the Creggan and Bogside area to get a look at
9 the geography in there.
10 Q. Did you talk to any people in there?
11 A. No, I did not.
12 Q. Apart from the officers that you were talking
13 to in the observation post, did you talk to any other
14 soldiers in the course of that day?
15 A. No, during the taxi ride, the car was stopped
16 by an army patrol. I had to get out and my personal
17 papers were looked at. I was allowed to get back in
18 and waved on.
19 Q. Was your contact in the observation post the
20 only contact you had with soldiers or police officers
21 during that day?
22 A. Well, no, because I had to set the facility
23 of going up to the OP, I had to set that up and I would
24 have talked to army people then.
25 Q. You talked to army people then. What I am
1 merely trying to establish, Mr Phillips, is how many
2 army people you spoke to?
3 A. At this stage I cannot recall. A few.
4 Q. During the course of the day you would have
5 had contact and discussions with army people; is that
6 right?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. With any police officers?
9 A. No.
10 Q. With any Bogsiders?
11 A. No.
12 Q. In the course of these discussions I presume
13 that the topic of the march came up and why you were in
14 Derry; is that right?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. Did you have a general conversation with them
17 about how they were getting on or what they were doing?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Did they explain to you the difficulties that
20 they had been having in maintaining law and order in
21 Derry during the previous weeks and months?
22 A. Previous weeks, I would say.
23 Q. So there was, then, discussion with the
24 soldiers about the problems that they were currently
25 facing in Derry and the problems that they might expect
1 to face on the Sunday; is that right?
2 A. Yes, in my notebook -- and I have
3 a translation of it, of the background briefing from
4 the press people which I have handed in this morning to
5 the Tribunal.
6 Q. May we take it that also at the briefing that
7 questions were asked of the General; is that right?
8 A. The General was there not on Friday morning,
9 sir.
10 Q. I keep forgetting that, I am sorry, I will
11 come to that in a moment. If we finish then with the
12 Friday. So understandably enough you were coming to
13 Northern Ireland as a stranger; you were aware, of
14 course, from the television and news, that there had
15 been a considerable amount of trouble in
16 Northern Ireland and you were discussing this with the
17 soldiers. Was there any discussion on that day about
18 the IRA being in the Bogside or the Creggan?
19 A. Not specifically.
20 Q. I beg your pardon?
21 A. Not specifically.
22 Q. What do you mean by that?
23 A. I mean, I would imagine during the press
24 briefing a reference would be made to the IRA, but not
25 to any specific goings-on.
1 Q. It would be surprising in the course of the
2 day, in discussing with the soldiers why you were there
3 and what was going to happen on Sunday and what had
4 been happening, if the topic of the IRA had not come
5 up, would it not?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. Did you get the impression from the soldiers
8 that they thought that the IRA were very active in the
9 Bogside and the Creggan?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Did you establish any empathy with the
12 soldiers?
13 A. What do you mean by empathy?
14 Q. Did you feel sympathy in the plight -- they
15 presumably were explaining to you what a hard time they
16 were having?
17 A. I was neutral about it all.
18 Q. You were neutral?
19 A. I was neutral about it all.
20 Q. Then as between the army and the marchers,
21 then, would you have regarded yourself as being
22 neutral?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Did you maintain that neutrality throughout?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Even after you saw them being, the army being
2 "bombarded", to use your own expression, at
3 William Street?
4 A. I was there as on observer, sir, I felt
5 neutral about it.
6 Q. Feeling neutral and acting neutrally are two
7 different things, Mr Phillips. I am merely asking you
8 about your personal feelings?
9 A. I was not taking sides.
10 Q. Even in your heart of hearts? You were able
11 to view it with detachment, is that right?
12 A. I could view it with detachment. I thought
13 the army under the missile bombardment at barrier 14
14 acted professionally and I admired the way they took
15 the battering that they were taking.
16 Q. Let me now come to the rest of the Friday,
17 and I will return in a moment to the Embassy Ballroom.
18 After you left the observation point, then, what did
19 you do?
20 A. I left the observation point around about,
21 I would imagine, 4.00 to 4.30 and I would then be
22 making preparations to get back to Belfast.
23 Q. And any further contact with the army or with
24 the police?
25 A. No.
1 Q. We then come to Sunday morning when you
2 arrived in Derry and the briefing took place by
3 General Ford?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Were questions asked at that?
6 A. They would have been, yes.
7 Q. Was there an opportunity to mix with army
8 officers and army personnel at that briefing?
9 A. No, I think it was all pretty short and
10 sharp.
11 Q. Was there any discussion during that morning
12 with any of the soldiers as to what they thought was
13 going to happen or what you thought was going to happen
14 --
15 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Lavery, could I go back to
16 a point: Mr Phillips, in your statement M66.17,
17 paragraph 5, it says "on the Saturday I returned to
18 Belfast", is that wrong, did you go back on the Friday
19 evening?
20 A. I went back on the Friday, sir.
21 LORD SAVILLE: That is wrong, is it?
22 A. I am afraid so, yes.
23 MR LAVERY: May I ask, then, how you spent
24 the Saturday; did you have any contacts with army or
25 military or security personnel during the Saturday?
1 A. The Saturday, as I recall it, during the
2 morning while we were waiting for the second crew to
3 come in, was spent chasing car bombs in west Belfast,
4 and around there.
5 Q. The question I asked really was whether you
6 had any contact with soldiers or police officers during
7 that day?
8 A. No, we were too busy chasing car bombs.
9 Q. If we may come, then, to the Sunday morning:
10 you arrived there and you said the briefing was very
11 short, but I take it there must have been some
12 conversation, small talk, if you like, with army
13 personnel at that time; is that right?
14 A. If there was, I did not indulge in it.
15 Q. How did you spend the time from the morning,
16 then, until you arrived at the scene of the march?
17 A. We arrived at the City Hotel, it was then
18 a question of phoning London, telling them we were in
19 position. It was then a question of getting the gear
20 organised and it was then, we reckoned we would have to
21 be up to William Street round about 2 o'clock when the
22 march, as far as I can remember, was due to start.
23 Q. Your impression which you had formed by this
24 stage was that there could be trouble really at this
25 march; is that right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And you mentioned that earlier on in the
3 context once you heard the Paras were coming, you
4 thought that?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Was that because you thought the Paras would
7 make trouble or because you thought that the
8 authorities would not have brought the Paras in unless
9 they thought there was going to be trouble?
10 A. No, I thought the IRA would want a crack at
11 the Paras.
12 Q. This was the conclusion that you had come to
13 after discussions with military personnel during the
14 day?
15 A. Overall, yes.
16 Q. Would that have been the view of the, as far
17 as you could judge, of the soldiers that you were
18 talking to?
19 A. No, I did not put that question to them, it
20 was my own personal private view.
21 Q. When you discussed the IRA with them, did you
22 ask them what they thought the IRA would do on the
23 Sunday?
24 A. No.
25 Q. You said you discussed the IRA generally,
1 what did you talk about then?
2 A. That was the, the daily aggro. When we were
3 up on the OP, they were explaining to me that down
4 below was Aggro Corner, it was Aggro Corner, that there
5 was sniping from down there and that daily, hooligans
6 would gather and goad the Security Forces.
7 That, sir, was the mainstream of the
8 conversation --
9 Q. You knew that you were there to cover the
10 march on the Sunday, did you not ask them: "What do you
11 think the IRA will do on Sunday?"
12 A. No, I did not.
13 Q. Why was that?
14 A. I saw no reason to, I do not see the point of
15 asking them.
16 Q. Were you not curious to know what the IRA
17 might do on Sunday?
18 A. I -- it did not cross my mind to
19 cross-examine the officers on the top of the OP about
20 what the IRA may get up to on the Sunday.
21 Q. Why do you use the word "cross-examine",
22 Mr Phillips?
23 A. Well, to question.
24 Q. A casual question: here the IRA have just
25 made an attack with a sub-machine gun, you are there,
1 as you know, to cover a march on Sunday; you have
2 already said that the perception of these officers were
3 that the IRA were strong in the Bogside and you do not
4 casually say to them "Is this a bad sign?", or "What do
5 you think they will do on Sunday?"
6 A. No, I did not, sir.
7 Q. Can you remember anything specific that you
8 did say about the IRA, or that they may have said about
9 the IRA?
10 A. I thought I had already gone into that. What
11 they were pointing out to me was the geography below
12 the OP, how there was a daily gathering around about
13 that time of hooligans, okay, and there would be sniper
14 fire.
15 Q. I think in fairness, Mr Phillips, you have
16 said that.
17 Do you know whether this incident with the
18 sub-machine gun was logged?
19 A. I did not see it logged by the army. I am
20 not saying it was not logged, I did not see it logged
21 by the army.
22 Q. We do not know. We have not been able to
23 find any record of it being logged. That is not to say
24 it was not logged and that is really a matter for
25 somebody else I am sure, Mr Phillips.
1 Did you think that the fire was being
2 directed at your observation post?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Did you see what the soldier was firing at?
5 A. No, the firing had come from the direction of
6 the Rossville Flats, but from where we were standing,
7 I could not see a machine-gunner operating a Thompson
8 machine-gun, I could hear the sound.
9 Q. I take it the soldier who fired the shot was
10 in the observation post; is that right?
11 A. Of course.
12 Q. But you saw him?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Did he have a better view than you?
15 A. Well, I would hope so.
16 Q. The officers did not seem to realise it was
17 a Thompson sub-machine gun until they asked the person
18 that fired the shot; is that right?
19 A. They queried the rifleman as to what -- he
20 had fired off a shot and they began, then, to quiz him
21 about the reason he had fired the shot.
22 Q. They had heard the noise, they had heard the
23 shooting to which he was responding. Would they not
24 have been in as good a position as he or anybody else
25 to judge whether it was a sub-machine gun?
1 A. They are army officers, they have a right to
2 quiz their army rifleman about why he is letting off a
3 shot.
4 Q. That is rather different questioning as to
5 why he let off a shot as to what he thought -- as to
6 trying to identify the type of firing, is it not?
7 A. I think what they were asking him was to get
8 it on record and clear as to why he had fired the shot,
9 what had prompted him, what he was aiming at.
10 Q. Get it on what record?
11 A. Their record. I mean they are army officers,
12 they would want to know what he is doing firing a shot.
13 Q. Could you just remind me, Mr Phillips, when
14 did you arrive at William Street on the Sunday?
15 A. On the Sunday? 2 o'clock in the afternoon.
16 Q. And you arrived with your crew, I take it?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. There was considerable time when very little
19 was happening; is that not right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. During that period were you mixing with army
22 officers?
23 A. We were just standing at the top of
24 William Street waiting for the march to approach.
25 Q. When you say "we", you are talking about
1 yourself, I take it, your crew, other journalists
2 perhaps, and military personnel?
3 A. Yes, the crew, reporter; there were I imagine
4 other journalists there; there were some army officers
5 as well.
6 Q. Were you passing the time with making
7 conversation with your colleagues and with the
8 soldiers?
9 A. With my colleagues.
10 Q. Did you not speak to the soldiers at all?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Why was that?
13 A. There was not any reason to, I mean, the
14 reason we were there then was waiting and getting
15 prepared for the march to come towards and see whether
16 they would get through the barrier.
17 Q. There does not have to be a reason, does
18 there, Mr Phillips, to engage in what I may call
19 conversation with somebody that you are spending
20 a considerable amount of time with, does there?
21 A. I am sorry, I do not get the drift of your
22 questioning.
23 Q. You said the reason you did not speak to the
24 officers was that there was not any reason for speaking
25 to them --
1 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Lavery, with respect, you
2 did ask Mr Phillips the reason why he did not speak to
3 the soldiers. He then answered that there was not any
4 reason to.
5 MR LAVERY: I am really asking him, does one
6 have to have a reason to engage in a civil and casual
7 conversation with someone who happens to be standing
8 beside you.
9 LORD SAVILLE: If I understand Mr Phillips,
10 his answer to that is that there was nothing which
11 occurred to you to ask any of the soldiers who were
12 around you; is that right?
13 A. Correct, sir.
14 MR LAVERY: As time went on the march
15 approached the barricade and then began the
16 bombardment, as you call it, and then the crowd was
17 dispersed with water cannon?
18 A. Well, I think you have elided that pretty
19 much, I mean it was a greater sequence of events than
20 that.
21 Q. I am sorry, I am trying to telescope and come
22 to the point. I am trying to come to the point where
23 the water cannon dispersed the crowd for the first
24 time, the first use of the water cannon, you remember
25 that?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. The crowd were dispersed as a result of that
3 and General Ford said "They will be back"?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Does that suggest that he did not have
6 a great deal of confidence in the water cannon and what
7 other methods were available to him to subdue the riot?
8 A. No, I think that he knew that the hooligans
9 would be back at the first opportunity.
10 Q. The reason, then, that they were coming back
11 was because, whatever methods were available to him,
12 were not going to be effective to control them, is that
13 not right?
14 A. I do not know, I mean they are hooligans,
15 I imagine they saw an opportunity to come back and came
16 back in.
17 Q. In the meantime you had gone back to the
18 hotel and when they came back, they came back, if I may
19 say so, equipped like Roman legionnaires with a testudo
20 and thus raising their capability for aggro, is that
21 not right?
22 A. Well, I do not agree with your description of
23 the army.
24 Q. I am talking about what you call the
25 hooligans?
1 A. Could you please rephrase, well, put the
2 question again?
3 Q. I am saying when you came back, after you had
4 been to the hotel, this time they have got a corrugated
5 shield with them?
6 A. Oh, yes.
7 Q. Which enhanced their capabilities of
8 attacking the army effectively?
9 A. Not attacking, of getting up towards the army
10 without getting sprayed by the water.
11 Q. And also, this would be useful in repelling
12 or at least protecting them from rubber bullets, is
13 that not right?
14 A. Repelling, yes.
15 Q. Can you say what happened to General Ford
16 after you left and when you came back? My
17 understanding is that you did not notice him
18 immediately when you came back from the hotel?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. When you did notice him, would he have been
21 in the same spot that he had been earlier on?
22 A. Yes, he was basing himself at the top of
23 William Street where it meets Waterloo Place, I pointed
24 that out on the map earlier.
25 Q. Yes, you were standing really at the junction
1 of Waterloo Street and William Street, both you and he?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And there were other people there, I take it,
4 at that time as well?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. Quite a number of other people?
7 A. I would say a group -- a sizeable group of
8 us, yes.
9 Q. They included soldiers, journalists, and
10 possibly even members of the public?
11 A. Maybe.
12 Q. It was shortly after, or was it, that the
13 corrugated iron was brought into play that the
14 Paratroopers were moved in?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Did you hear the General say anything as they
17 were going in, any words of encouragement, anything
18 like that?
19 A. No.
20 Q. At that stage you were not aware that he was
21 close to you?
22 A. No.
23 Q. And you then said that you saw the
24 Paratroopers going on foot through barrier 14 and
25 turning down Chamberlain Street?
1 A. I did not say that.
2 Q. I am sorry, what was the position, then?
3 A. I saw them going through the barrier and up
4 William Street.
5 Q. You saw them turning down --
6 A. I did not see them turning down
7 Chamberlain Street. I saw them, from where I was,
8 going through the barrier and heading up
9 William Street.
10 Q. Did they disappear out of your sight?
11 A. Of course, there is a bend in the road there.
12 Q. So they disappeared out of your sight, did
13 they, before they went into Chamberlain Street?
14 LORD SAVILLE: I do not think Mr Phillips has
15 mentioned Chamberlain Street in the course of his
16 evidence at all, written or oral.
17 MR LAVERY: I am sure that is right, I am
18 just assuming he had seen them, obviously wrongly,
19 going down. In any event, wherever they went, they
20 disappeared out of your sight?
21 A. The first batch did. I went, as I explained,
22 I had to catch the crew up and then I sprinted down
23 William Street and went on the tail end of the
24 Paratroopers.
25 Q. I am talking at the point now before you
1 heard any shooting, do you understand me?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. The question I am trying to elucidate now is
4 whether any Paratroopers were in your view at the time
5 the shooting broke out or not?
6 A. Paratroopers were going through the barrier
7 at the time of the shooting.
8 Q. You did say today that some of them had gone
9 out of your view, but that some were still in your
10 view?
11 LORD SAVILLE: I think Mr Phillips told me --
12 and you can correct me, Mr Phillips, if I have got it
13 wrong, I asked you about this -- the time you heard
14 what you identified as a Thompson sub-machine gun, the
15 last of the Paratroopers were going through barrier 14?
16 A. That is correct.
17 LORD SAVILLE: My recollection is correct, is
18 it?
19 A. It is, sir, yes.
20 MR LAVERY: I am not sure a great deal turns
21 on this, but in fact you told Lord Widgery that they
22 had gone out of sight before you looked at the
23 shooting?
24 A. Sorry, it is a company of Paratroopers, okay,
25 they were going mainly in Indian file. Some would go
1 ahead and I would lose sight of those and I would be
2 looking at those who were chasing them up.
3 Q. I am merely trying to establish, Mr Phillips,
4 whether they had gone out of your view before you had
5 heard the shooting or not?
6 A. As I said, some had.
7 Q. I am not sure really whether a great deal
8 turns on this. Perhaps we could have M66.12 on the
9 screen. Could we enlarge paragraph B? If you look at
10 the question there:
11 "Question: But the position is at 4.15
12 General Ford was in a position to suspect that some
13 three dozen shots or so had been fired by the IRA: is
14 that the position as you see it?
15 Answer: Yes. His demeanour to me, he looked
16 concerned, and he certainly did not think it was his
17 own men firing. We had just seen them go round the
18 corner of the street out of sight, and I was puzzled.
19 I could not understand if they were going that way the
20 firing should come from the direction from which we
21 heard it."
22 A. I am sorry, what is your question?
23 Q. The question is, which I have been asking --
24 and I am not going to spend a great deal more time on
25 it -- the question is whether all of these Paratroopers
1 had disappeared out of your sight before you heard
2 firing or whether some of them were still in view when
3 you heard the firing?
4 A. Some were still in view when we heard the
5 firing.
6 Q. So what you said at Widgery was not, strictly
7 speaking, correct, is that right?
8 A. I think what I said at Widgery and what I am
9 saying now are the same things.
10 Q. It is a matter for the Tribunal.
11 A. Of course it is.
12 Q. At that point in time the General made his
13 remark about firing -- he says, incidentally, that he
14 said "awfully heavy firing", not "awful heavy firing"?
15 A. It is a quibble, is it not?
16 Q. I am sorry?
17 A. I said that would be a quibble.
18 Q. I was merely, for the sake of accuracy,
19 saying what he said. He is unlikely to have misused
20 the English language, is he?
21 A. I heard him as saying "that is awful heavy
22 firing". If the General corrects me on the use of the
23 (indistinct) chamber, fair enough.
24 Q. Your assessment of the situation, which you
25 understood was shared by the General, was that at that
1 point in time these soldiers had been attacked by the
2 IRA, is that right, had been fired upon by the IRA?
3 A. No, that is not correct.
4 Q. The IRA had fired at whom, then?
5 A. The -- I had heard the Thompson and the
6 fusillade of shots. What puzzled me at the time, okay,
7 was why, when the Paratroopers were still going through
8 barrier 14 and up William Street, why the shooting had
9 occurred then. I was not aware from where I was
10 standing of the motorised Paratrooper unit coming in
11 from down Rossville Street from the other barrier; you
12 cannot see the action from where we were standing. You
13 could hear the noise, but you could not see who, the
14 Thompson and the single shots, the fusillade, who they
15 were firing at; that was the puzzle.
16 Q. First of all, you assumed that this was
17 firing from the IRA, is that not right?
18 A. The Thompson machine-gun, yes.
19 Q. And the other shots?
20 A. The other shots, there was a puzzle to me was
21 were the single shots IRA, was it a mixture of IRA and
22 of the Paratroopers; no way of telling.
23 Q. It would have been a reasonable assumption,
24 would it not, to have assumed that the IRA were
25 shooting at soldiers?
1 A. That could be an assumption, yes.
2 Q. And they were shooting at soldiers; you say
3 you did not know what soldiers they were shooting at?
4 A. I could not -- sir, I repeat again -- I could
5 not see from that position who they were firing at,
6 what the target was.
7 Q. You must have assumed that they were
8 soldiers?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. There was very heavy firing going on at that
11 time?
12 A. Yes, there was the Thompson machine-gun and
13 a fusillade of shots.
14 Q. Have you ever said before now that the firing
15 which followed the sub-machine gun firing might not all
16 have been IRA firing?
17 A. I was not asked at the Widgery Tribunal to go
18 into it in detail.
19 Q. Again that is a matter for the Tribunal who
20 will have read the Widgery Report. I may have to take
21 you to that in a moment, we will look at that.
22 I suggest the thrust of your evidence is that the
23 sub-machine gun firing and the firing that took place
24 afterwards, both came from the same direction?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. How then, could you assume -- and the
2 direction was clearly -- and it was that that made you
3 believe that both sets of firing came from the IRA?
4 A. I have said that I knew that the Thompson
5 machine-gun was IRA. What puzzled me was, okay, there
6 were the fusillade of shots: were they all from the IRA
7 or was it one load of shots and being answered by
8 another load of shots from the Paratroopers.
9 Q. I suggest, you see, Mr Phillips, that you are
10 anticipating the question that I will be coming to
11 shortly?
12 A. I am anticipating nothing, sir.
13 Q. Why I asked you, then, what you said at
14 Widgery about this mixed shooting, you said you were
15 not asked about that, it was not gone into in any great
16 detail in Widgery; is that not right?
17 A. Certainly not in the way you are going into
18 it.
19 Q. Let us have a look and see what you did tell
20 Lord Widgery and see whether it is fair to suggest, as
21 I am doing very clearly, that your case to Widgery was
22 that all the firing at that time was hostile and you
23 now say, if that interpretation is correct, you say
24 that is wrong?
25 A. I had no way of knowing that it was all IRA
1 firing, I could not see the Thompson and those who were
2 shooting; I was hearing it.
3 Q. You are saying that now, I suggest,
4 Mr Phillips, for the first time. Let us have a look,
5 perhaps, and see what you actually did tell Lord
6 Widgery on this. Perhaps the most convenient place
7 might be if we could have M66.11 on the screen.
8 Mr Hill asked you, if you go to the top of the page:
9 "Would that imply that at least some 12 or 15
10 rounds?
11 Answer: I would have thought so.
12 Question: How many rifle shots did you hear?
13 Answer: It would be very hard to say."
14 LORD SAVILLE: I think we are looking at the
15 top of the next page, 66.12. You have that,
16 Mr Phillips, have you?
17 A. Yes, sir, I have, yes.
18 MR LAVERY: "It would be very hard to say, to
19 try to put an estimate on it. Say a dozen, two dozen.
20 Question: So it might have been upwards of
21 three dozen shots you heard fired at that stage?
22 Answer: Yes."
23 Question: And whether you are right or not,
24 did you think that those shots had been fired by the
25 IRA?"
1 A. I thought that --
2 Q. Forgive me for a moment -- unless you want to
3 answer that question --
4 LORD SAVILLE: I think Mr Phillips thought
5 you were asking him a question. Mr Phillips, what in
6 fact Mr Lavery was doing was quoting from the
7 transcript.
8 MR LAVERY: As I am reading the transcript,
9 are you following it on the screen?
10 A. Yes, I thought you were putting a question to
11 me.
12 Q. I read the question from the transcript
13 itself.
14 A. My apologies.
15 Q. Do you want to change the answer you gave to
16 Lord Widgery at that time?
17 A. No, I do not.
18 Q. I will read on, if I may:
19 "Answer: I was puzzled as to why the fire
20 had come from that direction at that moment.
21 Question: But the position is at 4.15
22 General Ford was in a position to suspect that some
23 three dozen shots or so had been fired by the IRA: is
24 that the position as you see it?
25 Answer: Yes.
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. "His demeanour to me was he looked concerned.
3 He certainly did not think it was his own men firing.
4 We had just seen them go round the corner of the street
5 out of sight, and I was puzzled. I could not
6 understand if they were going that way the firing
7 should come from the direction from which we heard
8 it."
9 You go on to talk about the direction. It is
10 quite clear, is it not, from that, that there was not
11 a hint from you or indeed anybody else that some of the
12 firing which took place after the sub-machine gun
13 firing might have come from the army?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. When I was asking you about this earlier on,
16 you said you were not asked at Lord Widgery about that
17 --
18 A. No, I said I was not asked to go into the
19 detail of the rifle shooting in the manner in which you
20 have been putting it this morning.
21 Q. You have had an opportunity, and I am sure
22 you have read very carefully all of the papers relating
23 to you in the case before you came to give evidence?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. You were given an opportunity to correct
1 anything that you wanted, were you not?
2 A. Well, yes.
3 Q. And you did not feel that you should make
4 clear that some of this firing might have come from the
5 army before I asked?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Could you describe the sound of the firing
8 after the sub-machine gun fire?
9 A. A fusillade of rifle shots.
10 Q. Were they high velocity or low velocity?
11 A. High velocity.
12 Q. High velocity?
13 A. Uh-huh.
14 Q. Are you aware or has anybody ever told you
15 how many shots the army admit to firing on this
16 occasion?
17 A. It is in the Widgery Report.
18 Q. Do you know the number, do you?
19 A. 108.
20 Q. That is all I was asking, Mr Phillips. If
21 the version that I am suggesting is the only version of
22 the evidence that you gave to Lord Widgery is correct,
23 you describe a number of incidents of firing, is that
24 not correct; you describe -- I will take you through
25 them, if I have to, I am trying to shorten the -- you
1 describe first of all the sub-machine gun firing?
2 A. (Witness nodding).
3 Q. You then describe the fusillade that took
4 place immediately after that?
5 A. (Witness nodding).
6 Q. You then describe how a single shot was fired
7 as you were going towards Rossville Flats, if I have
8 understood --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Then another shot was fired and then two
11 shots were fired by the army?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Of all the shots that you heard and that you
14 described to Widgery, you only attributed two of those
15 shots to the army?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And the only two you attribute to the army
18 were shots that you actually, if I have understood you
19 correctly, that you actually saw the soldiers firing?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. So, if that is correct, then, there must have
22 been over 100 shots fired by the army that you did not
23 hear; is that not right?
24 A. Well, going back to the film, there was a
25 general cacophony of noise as we went from
1 William Street across Rossville Street, but in no way
2 could I estimate how many shots were being fired then,
3 but I mean I honed in on the two shots that went over
4 me, okay, coming towards and over, I mean I have never
5 forgotten those, and on the second shot, the two shots
6 fired by the soldiers in reply, followed by the orders
7 of the ceasefire.
8 Q. I am not clear exactly, Mr Phillips, what you
9 are saying. Are you saying you heard these shots but
10 did not record them, or are you saying you did not hear
11 these shots?
12 A. You have me confused now.
13 Q. I am talking about the balance of shooting.
14 We can go back to it again. You have already agreed,
15 I think, that there are 100 army shots that you have
16 not described?
17 A. There are up to -- perhaps up to 36 shots in
18 the fusillade. There were two shots which went over my
19 head, two shots by the Paratroopers in reply to the
20 second of those two shots; there was, judging from that
21 film, there was other noise of shooting going on. As
22 I say, there was a general melee going on. In no way,
23 though, was I in a position to see and hear 108 rounds
24 fired on that afternoon.
25 Q. Mr Phillips, there are two ways of answering
1 my question: one is, "Yes, the shots took place and
2 I did not hear them for the reasons that I am giving",
3 the other that, "They took place and I did not record
4 them". To get to the point, Mr Phillips, you see: it
5 must have occurred to you at some time that on the bald
6 account that you gave to Lord Widgery where only two
7 shots were attributed to the army that there was going
8 to be a large deficit of shots which called for
9 explanation, shots from the army; did that occur to
10 you?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Never?
13 A. No.
14 Q. It has occurred to you, I take it, since
15 I questioned you? You are telling, then, the Tribunal
16 that it is the first time that it occurred to you that
17 there was a large number of shots which you either did
18 not hear or did not record?
19 A. I was only aware that 108 shots had been
20 fired when I read the report by Lord Widgery.
21 Q. So it was not until the report actually came
22 out that you got that figure?
23 A. Well, quite, I mean, in no way was I to know
24 that 108 shots had been fired on the day until
25 Lord Widgery revealed it.
1 Q. There would have been evidence, presumably at
2 Lord Widgery's Tribunal, which I take it you were
3 following?
4 A. No, I was not, I went in, gave my evidence,
5 and got back to London. There was no detailed
6 reporting of that trial.
7 Q. Do you remember 108 from 30 years ago or have
8 you read the report recently?
9 A. I read the report recently.
10 Q. That is where you are getting the figure of
11 108 from?
12 A. Yes, it was in the report recently and when
13 it first came out.
14 Q. Even if in order to make up this deficit you
15 take into account some of the shots that were fired at
16 the time of -- just after the sub-machine gun, there is
17 still a large deficit in army shooting that you did not
18 hear?
19 A. Yes, quite correct.
20 Q. Can you explain that?
21 A. Well, I could not be all over the place. We
22 were operating in a specific area: William Street,
23 across the road, across Rossville Street to where we
24 met the second crew; from there up to the block of
25 flats; that was the area we were working in; we were
1 only one crew.
2 Q. Could it be, Mr Phillips, that you had
3 subconsciously programmed yourself or tuned yourself
4 only to hearing sounds that supported the army?
5 A. In no way.
6 Q. Many, many people must have had the same
7 opportunity as you to hear the Thompson sub-machine
8 gun?
9 A. Of course.
10 Q. And in particular General Ford?
11 A. There would be very few people who were
12 around General Ford at the time.
13 Q. But the sub-machine, the audience to the
14 shooting of the sub-machine gun was not confined to
15 those who were around General Ford. If it came from
16 the flats, as you say, it must have been heard by the
17 people who were around the flats at that time; is that
18 not right?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. If you could hear it up at Waterloo Place,
21 there must have been vast numbers of people between you
22 and the Rossville Flats who must have heard this?
23 A. Well, I do not know about vast, but, yes,
24 a large number, yes.
25 Q. Can you explain why General Ford never
1 mentions hearing low velocity fire at all at that time?
2 A. He said, "That is awful" or "awfully heavy
3 firing".
4 Q. Yes, but in the statements he made
5 subsequently, never once does he refer to the fact that
6 there was sub-machine gun fire when he was talking
7 beside you?
8 A. I am sorry, I have not seen the transcript of
9 the General's evidence.
10 Q. I can take you to that.
11 A. Fine.
12 Q. If you want me to. I am sure I will be
13 corrected if I am wrong, but I think in fairness, then,
14 perhaps I should give you an opportunity --
15 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Lavery, I am not sure. You
16 have made the point to Mr Phillips that you are
17 suggesting to him General Ford does not say in any
18 statement that he heard the sub-machine gun fire, but
19 I am not sure Mr Phillips can help, other than listen
20 to that observation. If you have a question for him,
21 by all means put it.
22 MR LAVERY: That was the way I intend to deal
23 with it, rather than take him through line by line
24 through what General Ford and other witnesses have
25 said.
1 LORD SAVILLE: You have told Mr Phillips that
2 General Ford does not, you say, say anything in any of
3 his statements about hearing this sub-machine gun. You
4 have told Mr Phillips that. What is your question,
5 then, to Mr Phillips?
6 MR LAVERY: Does it occur to you, then,
7 perhaps you might be mistaken, are you prepared to
8 admit that possibility, that you might be mistaken?
9 A. I was not mistaken.
10 Q. But are you surprised that -- and again this
11 is a matter for the Tribunal -- that so few people have
12 recorded any sub-machine gun fire, and I do not think
13 -- again I will be corrected if I am wrong -- that
14 there is any description of Thompson sub-machine gun
15 fire that dovetails neatly with your account; would
16 that surprise you?
17 LORD SAVILLE: I think one has to be a little
18 bit careful about that, Mr Lavery.
19 MR CLARKE: -- at least one civilian witness
20 who said he heard a machine-gun and everybody else must
21 have heard it as well.
22 MR LAVERY: Again, this is a matter for the
23 Tribunal to look at, any of the descriptions of
24 machine-gun fire do not dovetail, as I understand it,
25 exactly, but this is a matter --
1 LORD SAVILLE: I think that is more a matter
2 of comment, because the same comment can be made about
3 a great deal of evidence in this Inquiry.
4 MR LAVERY: Before we leave General Ford, he
5 does not even put himself in the same position as you
6 put him when he heard firing for the first time?
7 A. I would not know that.
8 Q. And he claims that the remark was made to an
9 adjutant, did you see any adjutant near General Ford?
10 A. I saw General Ford.
11 Q. But no adjutant with him?
12 A. I was not studying the scene, sir. I had
13 seen General Ford at the press briefing; I knew who he
14 was; in no way would I have known who he was
15 surrounding himself with.
16 Q. There were other officers with him as well?
17 A. I do not actually know for sure that.
18 Q. You claimed, Mr Phillips, during
19 Lord Widgery, to be "pretty accurate", I think was your
20 own word, about determining where fire was coming from?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Do you still maintain that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. The basis you gave for that was the training
25 that you had received in the army?
1 A. That helped.
2 Q. And you discount the difficulties that firing
3 was in a built-up area; you discount that, do you?
4 A. If I can explain it this way, I think I have
5 before, we were at the top of William Street, it is
6 slightly raised, you come up a sort of a small incline
7 and there the sound was coming in quite clearly, it was
8 not blocked at that stage by buildings.
9 Q. You only saw -- of all the firing you have
10 described, you only saw the source really of two
11 bullets, namely the Paratroopers; is that not right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. May I just take you up on another matter.
14 When my learned friend played the video to you and
15 described five shots being heard on the video, you
16 agreed that that is what you heard. Again, up until
17 today you have never claimed to have heard more than
18 two shots -- well, a total of three?
19 A. I was not asked about the five shots at the
20 Widgery Tribunal.
21 Q. But the question is, Mr Phillips, were you
22 just simply agreeing with my learned friend Mr Clarke
23 when he said there were three shots, then there were
24 two shots and that is what you heard, or was your
25 recollection, as you have given it to Lord Widgery and
1 as you have given in the statements before you, that
2 you heard one shot, then a further shot, then two
3 shots?
4 A. It is true --
5 Q. Which do you remember hearing; what you heard
6 on the video today or what you recorded and gave
7 evidence about to Lord Widgery, which?
8 A. The first, the Widgery.
9 Q. Why did you agree with my learned friend
10 Mr Clarke, then, when he?
11 A. He played the video and I was responding to
12 what was on the video.
13 MR CLARKE: That was my question.
14 MR LAVERY: Anyway, we have clarified the
15 matter. You obviously then did not hear all of the
16 shots which were recorded on the video; is that right?
17 A. Yes, I cannot recall on the day hearing those
18 shots which Mr Clarke drew my attention to on the
19 video.
20 Q. On two occasions the soldiers were ordered to
21 stop firing?
22 A. One occasion.
23 Q. According to the video there seemed to be two
24 occasions?
25 A. It was all in one. It was "Cease firing" and
1 he then added to that the remark "Until you can
2 identify a target".
3 Q. My memory is as frail as anybody else's,
4 Mr Phillips, and probably a great deal frailer, but
5 there was a perceptible -- there was shooting. There
6 were two orders, as I remember, from the video: to
7 stop shooting and in between these two orders there had
8 been further shooting?
9 LORD SAVILLE: If there is a dispute about
10 this, I suggest we listen and watch the video again.
11 Would you like to do that, Mr Lavery?
12 MR LAVERY: Perhaps.
13 MR CLARKE: It is video 3, if you can put it
14 on the screen, I can tell you whether to go forward or
15 backwards.
16 (Video played)
17 MR LAVERY: Having heard the video again,
18 what do you say to my suggestion that there were two
19 orders, effectively, to stop firing and that there was
20 a perceptible gap between them?
21 A. Yes, that would be correct.
22 LORD SAVILLE: It may well be, Mr Lavery,
23 that they are the wrong way round in time on this
24 video.
25 I do not know whether you can help on that,
1 Mr Phillips? One would have thought that the Gerald
2 Seymour interview was after the first occasion. You
3 may not be able to help?
4 A. Well, sir, the sequence of events is that
5 Gerry had gone off, okay. We were grouped by the APC
6 at the flats, okay.
7 LORD SAVILLE: A little nearer the
8 microphone?
9 A. We were grouped as a team by the flats, okay,
10 but the crew -- at some stage Gerry went off to one
11 side to a safe position to make that into-camera piece,
12 okay. So, as -- the point is the cease firing behind
13 Seymour when he makes the into-camera, but the crew
14 would be back when we heard the reference to identified
15 targets. For me, as I recall it, crouched down by the
16 APC, okay, there had been the shot where I was told to
17 get down, okay; two shots by the Paratroopers and
18 I recall a cease firing definitely by an officer to my
19 right and then he went on to say his remarks about
20 identifiable targets. That is the sequence as I got
21 it.
22 LORD SAVILLE: So it may well be that the
23 correct time sequence is shown on the video?
24 A. Yes.
25 LORD SAVILLE: With the cease firing order we
1 can hear preceding the next command that we can also
2 hear?
3 A. Yes.
4 LORD SAVILLE: Clearly you have agreed
5 clearly there must be a time gap between the two
6 because in the first Gerald Seymour is being
7 photographed and in the second the cameraman is back
8 behind the APCs?
9 A. Yes.
10 MR LAVERY: In fairness, my learned friend
11 Mr Clarke, did, when he was opening the case, I am not
12 sure whether it was about this video or not, suggest
13 that some of the clips may not be in sequence.
14 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Phillips is assisting us
15 here because his recollection would put those clips in
16 the correct sequence. We know probably the Volkswagen
17 pictures are probably not in the correct sequence.
18 MR LAVERY: Normally -- you are a former
19 soldier, indeed a former officer yourself, Mr Phillips,
20 and, if I may try and summarise: soldiers ought not to
21 shoot unless somebody's life is in danger; is that not
22 right?
23 A. I am sorry, I cannot go into that.
24 Q. Why not?
25 LORD SAVILLE: I am not sure that is an
1 appropriate question for Mr Phillips. He is really
2 here as a witness as to what he saw.
3 MR LAVERY: Did it occur to you that when the
4 officers were urgently or pre-emptorily or whatever
5 word one wants, were ordering these men to stop firing,
6 they cannot have thought their lives were in danger?
7 A. I do not see why not. I mean, we had had --
8 that single shot came in over our heads and they slung
9 a couple back from the direction they thought it had
10 come from. I would have thought they thought like
11 I did, that one was in some sort of danger.
12 Q. Some sort of danger or in some sort of battle
13 situation?
14 A. Well --
15 Q. Let me put this to you and ask you for your
16 views on this: when one is engaged in what I may call
17 a military activity, one is not required to be too
18 fussy about whether you fire or not. If you hear
19 shooting generally you are entitled to return it in
20 a military situation, would that not be right?
21 A. I do not know, sir, that is your view.
22 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Phillips, am I right in
23 understanding that your military experience consists of
24 national service?
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 MR LAVERY: I am sure you have been following
2 the Troubles before and since and there has been a
3 great deal of time and energy spent in the courts and
4 elsewhere discussing when and where a soldier is not
5 entitled to open fire, is that not right?
6 A. Why yes, the argument over the Yellow Card.
7 Q. All I am asking you, would you be aware of
8 a difference in enforcing civil order and in
9 a battlefield situation?
10 A. Yes, of course there is a difference.
11 Q. In a battlefield situation of course one is
12 not required to be too fussy about returning fire, if
13 you hear someone shooting, you are entitled to shoot in
14 that general direction?
15 A. Of course.
16 Q. Was that what was happening here, just that
17 they hear firing and since they are in enemy territory,
18 they just return the fire?
19 A. I cannot speak for what the soldiers saw.
20 I heard the shot go loudly over my head. They fired
21 back. All I can assume at the moment, that they
22 identified a target and were firing at it.
23 Q. That is not quite what you said a few minutes
24 ago, Mr Phillips. What you said is they heard a shot,
25 they fired back in that direction, it should be on the
1 transcript, and you assumed they must have been in some
2 sort of danger?
3 A. Of course, if a shot is whistling over your
4 head that high, I mean, I thought even a civilian, let
5 alone a soldier, would regard themselves as somewhat in
6 danger.
7 Q. Did you think that you were in danger?
8 A. Yes, I damn well did.
9 Q. Did you wonder, then, why the officer was
10 withdrawing the protection of soldiers far from you?
11 A. I do not understand the question.
12 Q. You are in danger; somebody is shooting; you
13 are obviously afraid that he might shoot again and
14 instead of permitting his soldiers to deal with this
15 person, the officer tells him to stop?
16 A. They had dealt with it, they had fired two
17 back.
18 Q. What do you mean they had dealt with it?
19 A. Shot came in, they replied, they dealt with
20 it.
21 Q. They dealt with it; did they hit anyone?
22 A. I was not in a position to see.
23 Q. Do you think that the officer might have been
24 shouting at them to stop firing because they had hit
25 their target?
1 A. He did not say so.
2 Q. Let me return again to the question of lines
3 of fire. As is clear from reading the Widgery
4 transcript, you claimed to be pretty accurate in being
5 able to determine where firing was coming from?
6 A. Specifically the Thompson and the fusillade,
7 yes.
8 Q. I am now asking a general question.
9 LORD SAVILLE: Well, I think the part of the
10 transcript to which you refer is specifically related
11 to what Mr Phillips has described as the Thompson
12 machine-gun and fusillade of fire while he was standing
13 at the end of William Street.
14 MR LAVERY: Perhaps I will ask the general
15 question: as far as other firing is concerned, would
16 you claim to be able to identify where it is coming
17 from?
18 A. No, because it was a different situation.
19 Once you got from William Street on to the wasteground,
20 the noise was confusing because of the echoing.
21 Q. Yes, but as far as the other firing was
22 concerned, although you were not able to say what
23 direction it was coming from, you were quite satisfied
24 that it was coming in your direction?
25 A. Oh, yes.
1 Q. How did you know that?
2 A. Well, it is an incoming, what is called an
3 incoming shot.
4 Q. You see, you may -- you probably do not know
5 this, and I am not going to take up a great deal of
6 time on this, but the Tribunal have in fact
7 commissioned a report on the ability of individuals to
8 recognise where firing is coming from; you did not know
9 that, did you?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. I mention what the substance of the report is
12 to see if you are willing to qualify your views as to
13 where firing, and my learned friend Mr Clarke
14 summarised it at Day 9 -- perhaps if we could have that
15 up, Day 9, page 93. Perhaps if I could summarise,
16 hopefully accurately, what Mr Clarke was saying. He
17 was saying that the report seemed to show that all you
18 could tell basically was that firing was coming close
19 to you, but that you could not tell whether it was
20 coming from behind you or in front of you; would you
21 agree?
22 A. No, I do not, I say that it was coming over
23 one's head; I am sure I have said that.
24 Q. Yes, I know you have said that; that is the
25 point that I am asking you to think again about in the
1 light of this report:
2 "... whether it tells us anything about the
3 ability of a listener who is in front a firearm, in the
4 sense that he is not standing behind the firearm, to
5 distinguish a shot fired from a source which he is
6 facing from a shot fired from a source that is behind
7 him."
8 LORD SAVILLE: If you look at the transcript
9 of Widgery, when Mr Phillips is being asked questions
10 about the single shot, Mr Stocker said:
11 "Could you tell the direction from which that
12 shot came?"
13 His answer was: "I could not frankly know",
14 although the evidence he gave then and the evidence he
15 has given today is that it was a shot that was above
16 your head.
17 MR LAVERY: He certainly, and I accept that,
18 said that he could not tell the direction that it came
19 from, but perhaps I would ask him now, then: is it
20 possible this shot may have come from behind you?
21 A. I would like to get clear on your
22 questioning, sir -- there were the two shots you are
23 talking about. The shot that I definitely knew was
24 coming over my head, okay, was the one when the burly
25 Paratrooper told me to get down.
1 Q. I certainly got the impression from reading
2 your evidence at Widgery what you were saying was the
3 gunman was certainly in front of you. You could not
4 pinpoint where the shot came from, but what you did
5 know was that it was coming towards you?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And from in front of you?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. I am asking you, in the light of this report,
10 how you could tell whether the shot was coming from in
11 front of you or from behind you if you did not see the
12 source of the fire?
13 A. I say that the author of this report should
14 have been in my shoes at Rossville Street on the
15 Bloody Sunday afternoon; perhaps he would put
16 a correction into that.
17 Q. What you are saying is you are not prepared
18 to qualify your views at all in the light of this
19 report?
20 MR TOOHEY: Mr Lavery, is it useful to put to
21 a witness in the position of Mr Phillips some expert's
22 report when he does not pretend to have expertise on
23 the subject? You can ask him as you have asked him on
24 what footing he says that the bullet was coming in his
25 direction and the Tribunal can look at that in the
1 light of whatever evidence it hears of an expert or
2 otherwise and draw its own conclusions. It does not
3 seem to me to be helpful to put an expert opinion to
4 a witness who does not pretend to be an expert in the
5 area in question.
6 MR LAVERY: But he does claim to have
7 expertise. He says he was trained and part of his
8 training was to detect where shots were coming from.
9 And if one reads Widgery, the only fair reading of it
10 is that he was very confident about his expertise and
11 his accuracy. But I take the point and I was merely --
12 it is a matter whereby you can test his evidence --
13 I was merely giving him the opportunity to say whether,
14 in the light of that, he was prepared to think again
15 about his answer. If his answer is no, then I will
16 leave it at that. That is all I am doing.
17 I gather anyway, Mr Phillips, you are --
18 irrespective of what the expert, indeed any other
19 witness may have said, you are quite satisfied that you
20 are able to give the evidence that you have given about
21 the direction of these shots?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Thank you very much.
24 Questioned by Ms McDermott
25 MS MACDERMOTT: Mr Phillips, my name is
1 McDermott. I appear for the family of Patrick
2 Doherty. Just a couple of things, please.
3 First of all, can you tell the Tribunal
4 whether, so far as you know, what you have described as
5 the sound of Thompson sub-machine gun on the Sunday
6 appears on any of the film that has been recorded?
7 A. It was not recorded on the ITN film.
8 Q. It was not picked up?
9 A. No.
10 Q. You say. So far as you know does it appear
11 on any other film, or be heard, I should say on any
12 other film?
13 A. I am awfully sorry, I would not know.
14 Q. Not so far as you know, then?
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. When you were making your notes on the day,
17 you have been good enough to bring the Tribunal through
18 those and decipher them. The note you make between
19 4.12 and 4.15, at 4.12 I think your note reads:
20 "Paras in, captured flag." Is that right?
21 A. Yes, it is.
22 Q. There has been no shooting of any kind up to
23 that point?
24 A. None, madam, that I had heard of.
25 Q. Your next note, then, your first reference to
1 any shooting is "real firing"?
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. You have told us that is what that says.
4 Might I ask you, Mr Phillips, why, if you thought when
5 you heard this sound that it was the sound of
6 a Thompson sub-machine gun, you did not note that?
7 A. Simply one was scribbling it down because
8 things were starting to happen. I mean, I was making
9 the notes, I think, as I have explained at my
10 deposition as simply a spot sheet, it is -- had I been
11 there as a newspaper reporter, I would have written
12 a longer paragraph.
13 Q. But you wrote down the first thing that
14 occurred to you when you heard the firing; is that
15 right?
16 A. Yes, "real firing".
17 Q. "Real firing", not "IRA firing"?
18 A. "Real firing" as opposed to the rubber
19 bullets that we had heard and seen being shot earlier
20 in the afternoon.
21 Q. It did not occur to you to write "non-army
22 firing" or "firing at army" or anything like that?
23 A. No, no, I just banged it down because things
24 were starting to happen.
25 Q. Does Mr Seymour make any reference in his
1 report -- I take it that we have only heard a small
2 portion of it, but did he make any reference to the
3 Thompson sub-machine gun firing you say you heard --
4 LORD SAVILLE: Sorry, what report is this --
5 MS MACDERMOTT: Making his --
6 LORD SAVILLE: The thing we see on the
7 video?
8 MS MACDERMOTT: Yes.
9 LORD SAVILLE: In the sense of saying was it
10 edited or anything like that?
11 MS MACDERMOTT: Yes.
12 LORD SAVILLE: Can you help, Mr Phillips?
13 A. It is years since, it is 29 years since
14 I heard Gerald Seymour's commentary. At this stage
15 I do not recall him referring to the Thompson
16 machine-gun because we had not got it on picture.
17 MS MACDERMOTT: I am sorry, had not got what?
18 A. We had not got the sound of the Thompson
19 machine-gun on film, so my recollection would be, it
20 would be very doubtful that Mr Seymour would therefore
21 refer to it. I mean, in television terms, you have to
22 be able to refer and show.
23 Q. Did you tell him that you had heard it?
24 A. I honestly cannot recall that we would be in
25 the cutting room, but if we had not got it on the film,
1 then it goes to one side, one is writing a commentary
2 to the pictures that you have.
3 Q. Is this the correct sequence of events: that
4 you were standing with him immediately before he did
5 his piece to camera that can be seen on the video?
6 A. I was in the vicinity.
7 Q. Were you not standing with him?
8 A. I do not think so, I was still at the APC.
9 Q. Was he not with you?
10 A. I do not think so. I had said to Gerry, "It
11 is about time we got a stand-upper done" and he and the
12 crew then shot off to as safe position as they could
13 find to do it.
14 Q. Perhaps I can ask it in this way,
15 Mr Phillips: is the first recorded reference to your
16 having heard a Thompson sub-machine gun at this point
17 in the statement that you made on 8th February?
18 A. In the deposition? Yes, the deposition.
19 Q. I am not sure it is a deposition or
20 a statement that you made to Mr Leonard?
21 A. That is right.
22 Q. It is at M66.1 to 4?
23 A. Yes, it is there.
24 Q. It is in there, I agree. I am asking you
25 whether that is the first recorded reference to your
1 having heard a Thompson sub-machine?
2 A. The real firing, madam, refers to the
3 Thompson machine-gun and the fusillade, but the first
4 recorded note of it, yes, is in the deposition to
5 Mr Leonard.
6 Q. One peripheral matter: my learned friend
7 Mr Lavery was asking you if you could remember to whom
8 you had been speaking when you arrived here first and
9 contacted the army press office; do you remember being
10 asked that?
11 A. Yes, I do.
12 Q. And you said you could not remember?
13 A. It was the army press team, but --
14 Q. Was it Mr Colin Wallace, does that ring
15 a bell with you?
16 A. Not after all these years, no.
17 Q. Were you ever back in this jurisdiction after
18 Bloody Sunday?
19 A. I came back with another company, NBC,
20 several years ago when there was another angle on
21 violence or marching up here, but I cannot be specific
22 about the date.
23 Q. Did Bloody Sunday form any part of the
24 subject matter of that programme?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Were you involved in making any other
2 programmes at the time of Bloody Sunday about the
3 events of that day?
4 A. No, I was not.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 Questioned by MR MANSFIELD
7 MR MANSFIELD: Mr Phillips, I represent three
8 of the families. I want to first of all ask you
9 a little bit about the background as far as you are
10 concerned of your visit to Derry. Could we have
11 M66.17, please, in particular the second paragraph,
12 where you speak about producing the News at Ten in
13 January 1972 and that you thought, and others, that you
14 ought to acquaint yourself with what was going on on
15 the ground. It is in that context I want to ask you
16 some questions.
17 First of all, when was it that you went to
18 Belfast for a long weekend to begin the process of
19 finding out what was going on on the ground, was it in
20 January?
21 A. Yes, it was on the Thursday before
22 Bloody Sunday.
23 Q. It is not a separate weekend, it is part of
24 the same sequence of days?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Before you came, did you have a briefing by
2 researchers at the News at Ten on the background to
3 civil rights marches in the north of Ireland?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Why not?
6 A. Well, as I say, I was producing News at Ten,
7 and had been for at least two or three years, okay,
8 since the start of the Troubles in '69. There were,
9 you know, countless reports coming out in Northern
10 Ireland, there was no need for our researchers to sit
11 me down and brief me before I went.
12 Q. In the light of that answer, I want to ask
13 you this question: was there any single occasion that
14 you can recall where a civil rights march was used by
15 the IRA to shoot at the army?
16 A. I cannot recall that.
17 Q. It is quite an important factor, I suggest,
18 in this whole matter. So you are unable to recall --
19 I appreciate it is now 30 years ago -- but you do not
20 have any specific instances that you can put before the
21 Tribunal of any march being used in that way, civil
22 rights march?
23 A. No.
24 Q. So you come on the Thursday to Belfast?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And then because of what is said there about
2 an impending civil rights march, you come to Derry on
3 the Friday?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Pausing for a moment, again in the light of
6 your previous answer: were you aware of what had
7 happened the weekend before all this?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Do you now have any memories of the weekend
10 before all this?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Does Magilligan camp mean anything to you?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Or what the Paratroopers or how they were
15 deployed at Magilligan camp the weekend before were
16 used?
17 A. No.
18 Q. So you knew none of the background of what
19 had happened within the week before these events?
20 A. I cannot recall Magilligan camp, no.
21 Q. The reason I ask you is, it is not just a
22 local event, it was on the national news; do you
23 remember watching it?
24 A. No. I am sorry, I have a blank about it,
25 I do not recall Magilligan camp.
1 Q. When you came on the Friday to Derry, it
2 would follow, then, that when you met representatives
3 of the army you did not ask them any questions about
4 the use of the Paratroopers in the north of Ireland,
5 and in particular in or about Derry?
6 A. As I recall, when I saw the army press people
7 in the morning, it had not been announced at that
8 stage, as far as I recall, that the Paratroopers were
9 going to be used in reserve; I think that information
10 came later that afternoon, or anyway that is when I got
11 hold of the information.
12 Q. On the Friday afternoon?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. But when you got hold of the information on
15 the Friday afternoon, did that seem a significant piece
16 of information?
17 A. Well, yes. Yes, I thought that bringing
18 Paratroopers up would be -- was significant, yes.
19 Q. Who did you ask about why they were being
20 brought in?
21 A. I did not ask, I think it was part of a
22 briefing.
23 Q. Please think carefully. Here you are trying
24 to find out on the ground. You see, you thought it was
25 sufficiently significant to have an extra film crew
1 brought in, did you not?
2 A. I did.
3 Q. I want to ask you again: did you not ask why
4 Paratroopers were being brought up in reserve?
5 A. I think that when I got the information it
6 was so that they were being brought -- just that, being
7 brought up in reserve.
8 Q. For what purpose in reserve?
9 A. To deal with -- if the marchers broke through
10 the William Street barrier and got into town, it would
11 be to halt that attempt.
12 Q. So your recollection of your understanding of
13 what you were being told on the Friday is that
14 Paratroopers were in reserve to prevent marchers
15 entering the city beyond the barriers, that is your
16 understanding?
17 A. It is, yes.
18 Q. So you must have been very surprised when you
19 saw them going through the barriers, then, on the
20 Sunday?
21 A. Why would I be surprised?
22 Q. Because you had been told they were only in
23 reserve to prevent the barriers being breached, if the
24 barriers were breached, then to be brought up; do you
25 follow?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. On the Sunday, were any barriers breached in
3 your presence?
4 A. No. They came near to it, though.
5 Q. Were any barriers actually breached?
6 A. No.
7 Q. So you must have been surprised to see the
8 Paras going in on the Sunday through the barricades
9 that had not been breached?
10 A. I would not use the word "surprised".
11 Q. What would you use?
12 A. I would say that part of the sequence of what
13 was going on, that it had been felt that the hooligans
14 had done enough and the snatch, the snatch squad would
15 go in.
16 Q. Did you get the feeling there was, "We will
17 teach them a lesson"?
18 A. No way.
19 Q. No way?
20 A. No way.
21 Q. Well, let us look at that; what did you think
22 a snatch squad was going to do, had you ever seen one
23 before?
24 A. We had seen it, I am sure, on film out of
25 Northern Ireland in which troops are used to go into
1 get hooligans after they have had their fun chucking
2 missiles.
3 Q. Of course if this is going to be a legitimate
4 operation, then you would expect the people doing the
5 snatching to be arresting the people who had been
6 throwing missiles?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Who were identifiable as throwing missiles?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. When the Paratroopers first went through this
11 particular barrier which we have been talking about,
12 you watched them going through?
13 A. I did.
14 Q. Into the crowd?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Who did they arrest?
17 A. I did not see arrests at that stage.
18 Q. Did not look like a snatch squad, did it?
19 A. Yes, it did, it looked as though they were
20 going in for a snatch.
21 Q. Yes, did they snatch a single person?
22 A. Not from my view from standing at the top of
23 William Street.
24 Q. So it did not look as though they were
25 a snatch squad out to snatch hooligans throwing things
1 at the barrier where you had been standing, did it?
2 A. I disagree.
3 Q. In fact, you never saw them arrest anybody in
4 the William Street or Rossville Street, in the bit that
5 you were, did you?
6 A. I did not see an arrest, no.
7 Q. Pausing for a moment to go back to your
8 visit, as it were, on the Friday: you made notes of
9 what you were told on that day; is that right?
10 A. Yes, some notes.
11 Q. As I understand it, you said earlier, the
12 notes you have handed in today?
13 A. I handed in my notebook at the deposition
14 taken by Mr Leonard; it was handed to me this morning,
15 it is the first time I have seen it since then. I have
16 seen smudgy photostats attached to the deposition,
17 Lord Widgery's examination and my deposition in January
18 this year.
19 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Mansfield, if we are
20 getting on to the notebooks, it is just striking 12, we
21 have had quite a long morning and everybody, including
22 no doubt the lady taking the LiveNote, could do with
23 a rest. I think we will stop now, if that is
24 convenient.
25 MR MANSFIELD: May I clarify one point so
1 I can look at it, if it exists.
2 LORD SAVILLE: By all means, but at
3 a convenient moment we will stop as soon as possible.
4 MR MANSFIELD: Mr Phillips, what I want to
5 get clear is: are there any more separate notes that
6 you made that relate to the Friday as opposed to the
7 Sunday?
8 A. No, all the notes are in this notebook.
9 There are no separate notebooks or any other notes.
10 Q. Sir, I wonder if it is possible to look at
11 the notebook just to check that he is talking about
12 what we have got photocopied?
13 LORD SAVILLE: I am sure that will be
14 possible, Mr Mansfield. We will come back to this at
15 ten to one.
16 Mr Phillips, we will stop now and give us all
17 a rest, particularly the lady to your right. Could you
18 come back at ten to one? Please do not discuss the
19 evidence you are giving until you have finished giving
20 it this afternoon.
21 A. Certainly.
22 LORD SAVILLE: Thank you very much.
23 (12.05 pm)
24 (The luncheon adjournment)
25 (1.45 pm)
1 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Phillips, the Chairman
2 speaking to you. Sorry for the delay, I am sorry we
3 have had an administrative delay, we had a problem with
4 your notebook, the nature of which my learned friend
5 Mr Clarke will explain to all.
6 MR CLARKE: We photocopied over the lunch
7 interval the notebook and circulated it to the parties,
8 whereupon it became apparent that on the first two
9 pages and on the inside back cover there are names
10 which are subject to or appear to be subject to the
11 Tribunal's anonymity ruling. The effect of that is
12 that we have taken back everything that was
13 distributed, removed pages 1 and 2 so that all that
14 follows is not something that is subject to the
15 anonymity ruling, recirculated the document with the
16 first two pages removed. My learned friend
17 Mr Mansfield has indicated to me that he has no
18 problems in asking whatever questions he wishes to ask
19 on the pages other than those that have been removed.
20 What will happen is that, in the course of
21 the next half hour there will appear redacted versions
22 of pages 1 and 2 and the inside back cover and they
23 will be circulated, and if anybody wants to ask
24 questions on those pages when they are circulated in
25 redacted form, no doubt they will be able to do so.
1 I am afraid these things take a little time to
2 organise.
3 Questioned by MR MANSFIELD, continued
4 MR MANSFIELD: Sir, it might be convenient
5 with regard to the pages which have been copied if you
6 think that it is appropriate if I first of all
7 establish through the witness what he has actually
8 written on these pages, and there are a number of them
9 that have not prior to today as far as I know been
10 translated, a few have and then if I subsequently ask
11 questions about what he says is written down and then
12 I will leave the question of the other pages to the
13 end, if that is convenient.
14 LORD SAVILLE: It sounds a good way of
15 proceeding, Mr Mansfield, yes.
16 MR MANSFIELD: Mr Phillips, do you have the
17 notebook itself in front of you?
18 A. It has been handed to me.
19 Q. If you would open it kindly, thank you.
20 Leaving aside the back cover and the first two pages
21 where there are names, I want to take it up -- they are
22 not paged in the book, but on screen could we have
23 M66.25, it is a page which is headed "January, 28th,
24 Derry".
25 Over the lunch break, have you had a chance
1 to look at these pages or not?
2 A. Yes, the situation is I spent two or three
3 days last week, okay, using a magnifying glass to
4 transcribe the photostats of the pages which had been
5 sent to me attached to depositions and to the
6 cross-examination at Lord Widgery's Tribunal.
7 Q. Perhaps it will be less onerous on you if
8 I ask you, dealing with this particular page, M22.25,
9 could you read out what is written on this page, for
10 us?
11 A. Yes, I can:
12 "January, 28th, Derry.
13 "Army say there will be a march on Sunday and
14 they have drawn up plans to contain it with the minimum
15 of force. They are bringing in two extra battalions to
16 contain the march as well as two companies of Paras in
17 reserve. The soldiers are being told to use tear gas
18 [I translated that as 'sparsely', may be 'sparingly']
19 and to rely on dispersing marchers with rubber
20 bullets. The aim is to contain the march to the
21 Bogside to the William's [I think that should
22 be William's Street line] where there is daily aggro
23 from hooligans backed by gunmen. Saturday will
24 probably see a preview warmup, especially if weather
25 stays bright and dry."
1 Q. We have another page, it is another page of
2 the notebook, M66.26, starting with the words:
3 "If Echo OP", if you could read this page,
4 please?
5 A. Yes, Mr Mansfield. May I point out, though,
6 this page was not -- I did not get a photostat of this,
7 so I am seeing it for the first time and I do not have
8 a magnifying glass with me. I will do my best reading
9 it off the notebook:
10 "If Echo OP was used as a camera position it
11 could show in perspective the 'big picture' the army -
12 marchers, confrontation."
13 If I can interject here to explain what this
14 is, this was my TV appreciation of the situation based
15 on my visits to Derry:
16 "Confrontation, the stopping of them in
17 William Street, if that is the route they take. It is
18 thought it will [it should be and 'be' is missing] and
19 that there could be aggro there.
20 "There would also be picture of army and, if
21 gas shells are fired and even rifle bullets, we would
22 have sound of that and picture as well. The other side
23 of Echo [by that I mean what the army call the Embassy
24 Ballroom] also looks down on the square where they
25 [that is the marchers] hoped to hold a meeting and
1 where [I think that says] Paisley plans a counter
2 meeting/march.
3 "Sunday's march could mark a deliberate swing
4 back to civil rights marches as a means of confronting
5 the army because the gunmen have lost the fight with
6 the army and the IRA need to buy time to train more,
7 but still tie up the Security Forces.
8 "The army is aware of the situation and very
9 keen that it does not come out badly in the television
10 coverage. It does not want to look as if it has
11 overreacted towards supposedly peaceful marchers."
12 Q. M66.27, there is a date at the top here, is
13 it January 28th?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. If you could read what you have written in
16 relation to this page, or these two pages?
17 A. Okay:
18 "Incident in William Street. Young
19 hooligans, 16 and under, setting up small road blocks,
20 throwing bricks [I cannot read] at corner shop
21 [and I think in brackets] (damaging property); army
22 fire, CS gas; troops in Pig fire rubber bullets;
23 soldiers on Echo roof fire live bullet after seeing
24 automatic flashes coming from empty house, upper
25 window.
1 "[Something] a hit. Army doubtful and not
2 credited. Youngsters always forming and reforming."
3 "[I cannot read, something] garage max [or]
4 Mexx garage post there to maintain a presence; stop
5 sealing off the road; jumping off point into Bogside
6 and Creggan.
7 "Overlooked by good sniper positions --
8 cemetery, hill and trees and in foreground empty
9 prefabs. Shot and [something] 20 rounds, 7 minutes
10 after I left.
11 "Army in cramped conditions in old building
12 used to house milk floats. Made hospitable by sapers.
13 Use radar centre and pictures to track snipers."
14 Q. M66.28, again it has "Derry" at the top
15 left-hand corner; could you read what is on this page?
16 A. Yes, this was my note to myself comparing the
17 situation in Derry vis-a-vis the situation in Belfast:
18 "Derry, different to Belfast because:
19 "1. Two/third Catholic -- the majority.
20 "2, self-contained areas where army do not go
21 unless to lift [that would be in reference to snatching
22 as in snatch squad].
23 "3. Near the border -- near Ireland.
24 "4. Permanent road blocks which do not exist
25 in Belfast.
1 "5. [That looks like] river troops a new
2 element." I do not know what that refers to now.
3 LORD SAVILLE: Is it "river troops" or "river
4 brings a new element"?
5 A. "River brings", good. Then, um below:
6 "Army has 4 posts, saw, Mexx and Echo, 'you
7 can set your watch by the aggro around 3.30 to 4.00'."
8 I do not know what the word to the side, but
9 the quotation is:
10 "'Watch for trouble coming out of the
11 sun'."
12 Q. And the next page, please, for the moment if
13 you would not mind reading what is written there?
14 A. There is an army name, am I allowed to say
15 what it is?
16 Q. Yes, I think you are. Where names are not to
17 be mentioned, they have been on the other sheets
18 redacted and I think the name you have written there
19 for you to say is a name that is not redacted, so you
20 can mention the names on this page.
21 LORD SAVILLE: Yes, it is all too easy to
22 miss one, you are right to be careful, Mr Mansfield,
23 yes.
24 MR MANSFIELD: If you could read what you
25 think you have written.
1 LORD SAVILLE: Are we on 66.29 now; the
2 right-hand side of 66.28?
3 MR MANSFIELD: Yes. It is in slightly
4 different form and you have on the right-hand side at
5 least two names, maybe three, and then you have a text
6 in a column alongside. If you read from left to right
7 what you have written here.
8 A. You could just bear with me, Mr Mansfield,
9 while I look through the magnifying glass. (Pause).
10 To the best of my knowledge, what I am about
11 to read out or try to read out is an interview given
12 by, I think his rank was Colonel Tugwell on the Monday
13 after Bloody Sunday. I think it goes:
14 "A lot" --
15 Q. Can you first of all read, one is assuming
16 that the first name is Tugwell on the left?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. You have something underneath that, which is
19 what?
20 A. It looks like "no bones what is" and I cannot
21 read the next little squiggle.
22 Q. So "no bones" and then something else.
23 On the top is written in even smaller writing
24 something else, "an order to", is it?
25 A. "In order to bring about alienation", then "a
1 lot here prepared to believe [blank, blank]. Crowd had
2 gone away so no clash. Their arrest operation -- three
3 high velocity rounds. Thompson [something, something]
4 fire [or firing)."
5 Then the 1.46, and I would imagine from that,
6 prompting myself, that this could be a filmed interview
7 we were looking at and the 146 would be marking where
8 he had made that sound bytes.
9 By 146, it is:
10 "25 included [cannot read the next thing] yes
11 poor build-up of snipers. We certain" --
12 Q. Just pause, would you mind?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. When you have written "poor build-up of
15 snipers", do we understand from the left-hand side
16 someone else is saying this and you have put the name
17 there?
18 A. It has got "Ford" and I cannot read
19 underneath what it says.
20 Q. So alongside "Ford" -- can I go back:
21 underneath the letters 25?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Can you decipher what is written there?
24 A. I am afraid I cannot, it is too bad.
25 Q. Then we have "the poor build-up of snipers";
1 is that right?
2 A. Yes, "poor build-up of snipers".
3 Q. Just pause: is this meant to indicate that
4 this was said by Ford, or you do not know, or is it
5 still Tugwell?
6 A. To be frank I do not know, but putting "Ford"
7 by the side there, it could be that we had finished
8 with Tugwell at 146 and then Ford had given the remarks
9 that followed, that is a possibility.
10 Q. So under the word "snipers" what do we have
11 next?
12 A. "We certain" and "were fired on"; what is
13 left out is "we certain we were fired on":
14 "They did see gun removed". To the left
15 I cannot make out my note as to what was going on
16 there. "Intelligence report or reports that armed",
17 and then it goes on:
18 "No reason to suppose that other -- "
19 Q. Then we are on to the next page, M66.29. So
20 the sentence you have just started does not finish?
21 A. That is right, it does not finish.
22 Q. M26.29, is that a name on the left-hand side
23 at the top?
24 A. I cannot read it.
25 Q. Perhaps you better read it again, what has it
1 got?
2 MR TOOHEY: Before you do, Mr Mansfield:
3 Mr Phillips, are we to understand from M66.28 the
4 reference to forward on 146, that you had a further
5 interview with General Ford on the Monday following
6 Bloody Sunday?
7 A. Yes, sir, it was not -- I was not present at
8 it, I was back down in Belfast there. From looking at
9 the layout of that page, I had been asked to stay on to
10 help with the team in Belfast and I am assuming from
11 the layout of that page that they were translations of
12 an interview given by senior soldiers there.
13 MR TOOHEY: Given?
14 A. By senior soldiers.
15 MR TOOHEY: By whom, to you?
16 A. No, no, sir, not to me, to ITN. I mean I was
17 then in a cutting room situation, I was not out in the
18 field. ITN, ITN's reporters would do those interviews.
19 MR MANSFIELD: M66.29, you do not know who is
20 written, whether it is a name on the left-hand side?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Is it people?
23 A. "People using", and it looks like "pick" --
24 no "people using pistols. First shot went over
25 demonstrators." Then I think it says to the left
1 "where sniper [there is no question mark] cannot give
2 you exact location."
3 Then the word "murder" and what I imagine
4 going down the left-hand side here, it is just quick
5 wording of what the questions were and it says:
6 "Protect [is that protect or protest
7 something, something] account for each and every shot
8 fired by the army."
9 It may be looking at that, it could be short
10 for "protesters hurled something and crowds [there we
11 are, it is written] we [something] account for each and
12 every shot fired by the army."
13 Q. On the other side of this page headed with
14 the number 37, there are two names here, again both of
15 which can be mentioned. So, starting with the first
16 one.
17 A. I am afraid I cannot read his name.
18 Q. Is it Lynch?
19 A. Yes, that is just a scribbled note, I think,
20 of a sound bytes from Mr Lynch and saying "[something]
21 what now required is from Britain". I am sorry,
22 I cannot read the next.
23 LORD SAVILLE: It could be British Government
24 with Government abbreviated?
25 A. Good, yes, Government:
1 "What is now required from the British
2 Government" and I cannot read that next one.
3 MR MANSFIELD: Is it imminently or
4 immediately, or you cannot say?
5 A. No, but I think you are close.
6 Q. Underneath that is the name Wilford on the
7 left-hand side. What is against his name?
8 A. "A man with a Thompson".
9 Q. There is a line and then underneath that?
10 A. "200 shots, something hit -- moved swiftly.
11 Absolute concern."
12 Q. It looks like "absolute nonsense"?
13 A. "Absolute nonsense", yes, good, that is it.
14 Q. Just on clarification, is that, one imagines
15 not something that Wilford said, is it, or was it some
16 comment by you?
17 A. No, it would not be a comment by me, just a
18 recap, this would be on the Monday. I was no longer
19 out field-producing, I was in-house. I would be
20 watching interviews that had been filmed by ITN people
21 for the Monday follow-up broadcasts.
22 Q. So to whom must we attribute those words at
23 the end of that page?
24 A. I am afraid because there is a line under
25 Wilford, I do not know, sir.
1 Q. The next page it may be there is little on
2 it, M66, does it relate -- I am not concerned about
3 anything that does not relate to Derry and the
4 happenings on Bloody Sunday -- to that or not?
5 A. I will take a look, if I may. (Pause) It
6 does, but I am afraid, inefficiently on my behalf, my
7 notes were not in order. I had dipped into and out of:
8 "Draw fire? Put army in a bad light".
9 LORD SAVILLE: I think it is the page before
10 which we have as 66.30.
11 MR MANSFIELD: This is what the page looks
12 like.
13 LORD SAVILLE: Do you have that one, if you
14 look at the next page?
15 MR MANSFIELD: I think it is the page before
16 the one you are about to read?
17 A. Excuse me, yes. I am with you, yes. I do
18 not know, it says "Mr Taylor after [something]
19 regarding a rewrite" and I cannot read underneath
20 that. I, frankly, do not think it is --
21 Q. I will not take time on that.
22 Can we go to the page which you were about to
23 read, which is M66.31, whereas on the left-hand side
24 there was something you were about to read. Before you
25 read it out, can we just establish what this is; are
1 these again notes to yourself or what?
2 A. Can I just take a look at these? (Pause)
3 I cannot recall, sir.
4 Q. It is headed "TB", then on the left-hand
5 side, "draw fire?" Is what you were beginning to
6 read? What does the rest say?
7 A. "Put army in a bad light [something] indoors;
8 searching arrests".
9 The last paragraph on that page:
10 "If we had had TV in World War 1 [something,
11 something] some staff officers would have been able to
12 see what the conditions were like".
13 Q. Right-hand side?
14 A. There is "TV constraints" --
15 I do not know, it looks to me like
16 "Mars/Middle Ages". I do not know what I was on about
17 then:
18 "But does the army feel we hamper them in
19 internal security, would it prefer us to be excluded
20 altogether. A limited exclusion (one denied by
21 politicians). Does it feel we give a firm reflection
22 of army activities?"
23 LORD SAVILLE: Could that be "fair"?
24 A. Yes, correct, "fair reflection of army
25 activities. Do we give a fair reflection of the
1 situation as a whole? It must annoy to see [something,
2 something] on TV?"
3 Q. "Internees"?
4 LORD SAVILLE: Or "interned"?
5 A. "Interned", yes.
6 MR MANSFIELD: Is it Maidstone?
7 A. It could well, be, yes.
8 Q. A ship by that name?
9 A. I do not recall.
10 Q. With internees on it; does that help?
11 A. No, but I agree that that -- it looks like
12 Maidstone, but it does not connect now why Maidstone is
13 in there:
14 "[Something] by report of army conditions.
15 Issue [something, something] bomb disposal query.
16 Compare with Aden", and that refers to the British Army
17 situation in Aden a few years before.
18 Q. 66.32 is a continuation of this: "Has the
19 army at last contained the situation? Is it urging a
20 political initiative? (Holding the ring -- but make it
21 smaller exclamation mark).
22 "Internment has brought this about -- or
23 better intelligence -- or both:
24 "Why that sudden switch to the police -- and
25 the -- promises"?
1 A. No.
2 Q. "Provinces"?
3 A. "Provinces (Newry):
4 "Is the army concentrating more on the
5 border?
6 'First war in which violence supports the
7 propaganda and not vice versa.' Are IRA escape routes
8 sophisticated as resistance ones in World War (II)?
9 "If Belfast situation contained more troops
10 for border patrols in secluded areas".
11 LORD SAVILLE: Could that be "selected
12 areas"?
13 A. Yes, it is "selected areas":
14 "After 2 and a half years here does the army
15 see a solution?
16 "Loss of morale if one does not come soon?
17 Any aspect of army activities here [something] have not
18 shown -- or not enough of."
19 Q. I am not going to trouble you with M66.33
20 which appears to be historical. M66.34 is, sir, what
21 we had before so I am not going to ask you to read any
22 of that out. There is only one other page I would like
23 you to deal with at the moment, that is M66.38. Again,
24 it has a name on it which is not redacted,
25 "General Ford".
1 I want to establish before you read it out:
2 can you assist as to whether this is an interview you
3 had with him and this is what he said, or what?
4 A. Can I just study it for a moment, please?
5 (Pause) Judging by the last paragraph, that has "SOF
6 begins". (SOF is shorthand for "sound on film".) From
7 that I would take it that it was a quick note on an
8 interview that had come in from General Ford.
9 Q. Can you read out kindly what is written here?
10 A. It says:
11 "1. Stewards -- at this [it could be] stage
12 [and I cannot read, it begins ME, it could be Martin's
13 dash] two arrests [and then there is a big cross
14 beside] and in a balloon, no.
15 "3. Successful [dash underneath March].
16 (How did the [I cannot read the next word] stand?)", it
17 looks as though it follows --
18 LORD SAVILLE: Could that be "start"?
19 A. Yes, yes, it is. "How did the [something]
20 start?
21 "Sound on film begins. The trouble ...
22 scratching out scratching out ... that is what it
23 appeared to be."
24 The "56" underneath would refer to the length
25 of the sound byte in seconds.
1 MR MANSFIELD: I am sorry it has taken a
2 little time to go through it, but it is safer while you
3 are here to have your input on it since it is your
4 writing.
5 There are now provided the three other pages
6 which come at the beginning. I am going to deal with
7 those now and go back to the chronology I was trying to
8 follow with some questions based on these notes and
9 other points.
10 When you went to Belfast on the Thursday, do
11 the notes that we now have in these additional three
12 pages, that is M66.22.1 and M66.23 and M66.24. M66.21
13 is what I have for the first page.
14 MR CLARKE: It is not the first page, it is
15 the inside of the back cover. It is misleadingly
16 ordered.
17 MR MANSFIELD: Can we leave that page for the
18 moment and deal with M66.23, which shows the front
19 cover or inside of it and then the first page of your
20 notebook with, again "Derry" at the -- do these notes
21 that are on this page relate to your visit to Belfast
22 on the Thursday?
23 A. No, sir, that would be Derry top left. This
24 note would be a reference to the visit to Derry on the
25 Friday.
1 Q. On the Friday?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. I will try and keep this in order. I will
4 leave that for a moment. Going back to the Thursday
5 for a moment: when you are in Belfast, do you only
6 talk to representatives of the army and the police in
7 Belfast?
8 A. Me personally?
9 Q. Yes, you.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. What I am going to ask you is whether ITN
12 news regarded itself as a mouthpiece for the army at
13 that time?
14 A. I am sorry, is that a question?
15 Q. Yes, did it?
16 A. No.
17 Q. So on the Thursday only the army and the
18 RUC. On the Friday, which we now come to M66.23, these
19 are notes made on that day, are they?
20 A. M66 --
21 Q. The Friday?
22 A. Is that January 28th and Derry underneath?
23 LORD SAVILLE: I think you are looking at the
24 wrong page.
25 MR MANSFIELD: M66.23.
1 LORD SAVILLE: If you look on the screen,
2 that is the page we are talking about and then if you
3 can find it in your notebook itself?
4 A. Of course.
5 MR MANSFIELD: There is a later page with a
6 date and Derry, and I will obviously have to come to
7 that. I am now on the Friday; do the notes on this
8 page, that is 66.23, that is the first page in the blue
9 notebook, does this relate to Derry on Friday, 28th
10 January?
11 A. It does.
12 Q. Some names have been redacted and plainly
13 I do not wish to know what the names are that are
14 there, but there are some names that are not redacted.
15 For example at the bottom, Tugwell and Ford; do you see
16 that?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Are those gentlemen that you spoke to in
19 Belfast?
20 A. I did not speak to any army officers in
21 Belfast.
22 Q. Who did you speak to in Belfast?
23 A. Specifically, if I am allowed to read them
24 out, General Tugwell and General Ford I did not speak
25 to in Belfast. I had an army briefing in Belfast, but
1 I did not speak, and I thought you were asking me that,
2 to General Tugwell and General Ford.
3 Q. Just before we get to the names that are
4 dealing with the Friday in Derry, the briefing in
5 Belfast, which was an army briefing, was given by a
6 press officer, was it?
7 A. Yes, it would be.
8 Q. You have been asked about that before, I do
9 not repeat it. Coming therefore to the Friday: on the
10 Friday in Derry to which these notes relate, did you
11 speak to Tugwell or Ford?
12 A. No, I did not. I think that I can explain,
13 that I was getting the names of the senior officers who
14 would be in Derry for the march, i.e. who was in
15 command and the overall picture in that sense.
16 Q. Does that apply to all the names on that
17 page, some of which we cannot read now? You do not
18 have to read them out. I want to know whether that
19 observation applies to all of them; you were just
20 writing down names of soldiers, officers who would be
21 present in Derry on the Sunday?
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. Does the same observation apply to the next
24 page, M66.24?
25 A. Yes, it does.
1 Q. Those two pages, then, are notes that you
2 made in relation to conversations with the army on
3 Friday 28th in Derry.
4 Who were you talking to on Friday 28th to get
5 this information?
6 A. It would be the army press office.
7 Q. Press office again, but this time in Derry?
8 A. In Derry, yes.
9 Q. If we can link it up with M66.25, please:
10 this is the page you have already translated for us, a
11 page which begins "January, 28th Derry, army say ...".
12 So once again the army saying, it is the army
13 press office in Derry, is it?
14 A. Yes, it would be.
15 Q. The general question, I want to ask you about
16 the Friday, is this: looking at your notes in relation
17 to the Friday, it would appear that the only people you
18 spoke to were representatives of the army; is that
19 right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Why?
22 A. Well, I had, if I can just recap, is that
23 I had been taking the opportunity to visit
24 Northern Ireland to see on the ground what our crews
25 were having to go through and I, on their advice, they
1 said it is a different sort of scene up in Derry and
2 I went up there and -- to get a briefing as to what was
3 going on, I approached the army press office.
4 Q. What was this march going to be all about,
5 did you understand that?
6 A. I did.
7 Q. Which was?
8 A. That it was going to be a civil rights march.
9 Q. What was the civil right that you understood
10 that people were exercised about?
11 A. I would say that their civil rights, the
12 feeling that they were second class citizens.
13 Q. Was there anything in particular that you
14 recall was the main concern and trigger for this march?
15 A. Yes, the marchers wanted to get into the
16 centre of Derry and hold their meeting or demonstration
17 there.
18 Q. Yes, but I am asking you not so much about
19 where they wanted to get in order to make the point,
20 what was the point that they wanted to make, as you
21 recall it?
22 A. That they had the right to march into the
23 City of Derry in defiance of the ban which there was on
24 marches.
25 Q. What about internment, did that feature?
1 A. I cannot recall at this moment.
2 Q. Were you interested in what the march was all
3 about, or only interested in filming violence?
4 A. (Pause) I was interested in covering the
5 march as it was coming towards the barricades and the
6 security situation facing them.
7 Q. Did you speak to anyone who was organising
8 the march?
9 A. I did not.
10 Q. Why not?
11 A. Well, I had limited time there and by the
12 time I had got in, seen the army press office, had been
13 granted the facility to go up on the Echo observation
14 post, it would then be coming up to 4.30 or more and
15 I would be having to head back to Belfast, which is at
16 least a good couple of hours.
17 Q. Did you even attempt to arrange anyone who
18 was organising this march to find out what they thought
19 was going to happen?
20 A. No, I did not.
21 Q. So it follows, of course, besides not
22 approaching anyone on the civil rights march
23 organisation side, you did not talk to any other
24 civilians or responsible members of the community, for
25 example like priests?
1 A. No, I did not.
2 Q. Is it fair to say that you got a very
3 one-sided picture of what was being expected on the
4 Sunday?
5 A. Um, well, yes, I agree.
6 Q. And this is most unfortunate since you are
7 supposed to be there with a balanced, objective and
8 independent view?
9 A. I disagree with that. We were there -- I had
10 telephoned in and said that the news of the
11 Paratroopers were going to be brought in, I was
12 prepared to cover the situation. My assessment of the
13 situation that a second crew was necessary one-on-one
14 side of the barrier, the other with the marchers.
15 Q. You knew that the army were very concerned
16 about their image, were they not; you have made two
17 notes to that effect in this notebook?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. What did you say when the army said that to
20 you, "well, never mind what you are worried about. If
21 you shoot people, we will show it"; did you say that?
22 A. In no way.
23 Q. Why not?
24 A. It is not the kind of remark one would make.
25 Q. Why not, if it is the truth?
1 A. I am saying I did not make the remark.
2 Q. I am not suggesting you did, I am just asking
3 you effectively, when the army expressed, as they
4 appear to have done on at least two occasions that they
5 were concerned about their image, were you concerned to
6 ensure that their image was sanitised?
7 A. No, their image was not sanitised, we showed
8 events as they took place.
9 Q. I am dealing with page 66.25 and your
10 dealings with the press office on Friday 28th.
11 Did you understand what the plans were to
12 contain this march, according to the press office?
13 A. I am sorry, which page are we now looking
14 at?
15 Q. 66.25 in our bundle, for you in the notebook,
16 it is headed "January 28th, Derry", and it is four or
17 five pages in: "Army say there will be"?
18 A. I am with you, yes.
19 Q. And that they had plans to contain it.
20 Did you discover on the Friday what the plans
21 were?
22 A. No.
23 Q. Did you ask?
24 A. No, they did not -- I did not ask and they
25 did not, they were not more explicit than that.
1 Q. You agreed before lunch you would have known
2 on the Friday about the use of the Paras and there is a
3 reference to it on that page?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. But the press office were telling you
6 effectively what you have in the next paragraph, that
7 they were to use tear gas sparsely or sparingly, and
8 also rubber bullets?
9 A. And to rely on dispersing marchers with
10 rubber bullets.
11 Q. No-one in the press office suggested that
12 anybody was going to use, as it were, live ammunition
13 on behalf of the army?
14 A. No.
15 Q. There is another paragraph in relation to
16 containing the march at Aggro Corner and what normally
17 happens there.
18 Would it be right to say that nobody in the
19 press office indicated to you that the history of civil
20 rights marches did not include the use of gunmen over
21 the heads of marchers; did anybody say that to you?
22 A. No, they did not.
23 Q. And you did not think to ask because you did
24 not know about the history; is that right?
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. You talk about a "warm-up", I will leave
2 that.
3 Can we go to the next page, 66.26? We are
4 still on the Friday.
5 Was the Echo OP position used by ITN?
6 A. No, it was not.
7 Q. Why was that?
8 A. I asked for a second crew and one was
9 scrambled. There was no hope of getting a third one.
10 Q. I thought Echo OP was going to give you the
11 best view of the overall picture?
12 A. If you had the third crew, yes.
13 Q. Because there is a paragraph on this page,
14 I want to ask you about. There would be a picture of
15 the army, do you see that paragraph:
16 "There would also be a picture of the army
17 and if gas shells are fired and even if rifle bullets"?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Whose rifle bullets were you meaning to refer
20 to there?
21 A. That would be army.
22 Q. Army?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. What led you to believe that the army would
25 fire rifle bullets on what you had been told?
1 A. As I am trying to explain earlier, I had got
2 a certain amount of information. What triggered my
3 call to ITN to ask for the second crew was the news on
4 Friday (I think it was in the afternoon) that
5 Paratroopers had been brought up as a reserve.
6 I saw in my bones or news sense, or whatever
7 you want to call it, that bringing up the Paratroops
8 and with the IRA in command of the Creggan and Bogside,
9 that that could lead to an explosive situation, put it
10 that way.
11 Q. On that, as it were, hunch that you had, did
12 you say anything to the army about the press office
13 that bringing up the Paras might lead to an explosive
14 situation; did you, as an independent journalist, say
15 anything about that?
16 A. No, I did not.
17 Q. All of that is based on a supposition that
18 the IRA gunmen might be present on the march or near
19 the march?
20 A. Well, it was going through -- the march was
21 going through the Bogside and the Creggan and that is
22 where IRA gunmen were hold (inaudible).
23 Q. That is according to who?
24 A. Well, when I was -- I mean, I was up on the
25 Echo OP and looking out towards those two areas on the
1 Friday afternoon and there was aggro and gunfire then.
2 Q. But there was not a march, was there?
3 A. There was no march.
4 Q. No. Just continuing, if I may, with what --
5 so the use by the army of bullets was a sort of
6 intuition by you that that is what might happen?
7 A. Yes, that they could come under fire and
8 return fire.
9 Q. And that really was the trigger for asking
10 for an extra crew as far as you were concerned, was it
11 not?
12 A. Yes, I thought that it could get nasty.
13 Q. And can you explain how the crew that you
14 called in or any of the crews from ITN failed to
15 capture the actual action of Paratroopers shooting and
16 killing civilians?
17 A. Well, as to the second crew, um, they were
18 not, so I understood from them when I met them up on
19 Rossville Street, that they had run out of film, that
20 --
21 Q. Run out of film?
22 A. Run out of film.
23 Q. When did they run out of film?
24 A. I did not go into it; I was annoyed that they
25 had "run out of film" and that they had not taken
1 sufficient in with them and I told them to go to the
2 hotel and get more, but by then, of course, it was too
3 late.
4 Q. I want to know from you when it was on that
5 day, that is the Sunday of course, shooting forward for
6 a moment, when on the Sunday did you understand they
7 had run out of film?
8 A. When I crossed from the corner of
9 William Street/Rossville Street and met up with them
10 just across that piece of wasteground.
11 Q. I will have to come back going through the
12 barricade in a moment. I will move on, if I may, to
13 the right-hand side of this page, 66.26. The paragraph
14 you have written there about Sunday's march marking a
15 swing back to civil rights marches, is this something
16 you were told or an assessment by you?
17 A. I would put it as based -- a distillation of
18 what I had been hearing.
19 Q. The distillation of what you had been given
20 was essentially -- this was going to be a civil rights
21 march per se, nothing more?
22 A. No, it says here "civil right marchers as a
23 means of confronting the army".
24 Q. Yes, confronting the army, with what?
25 A. Confronting the army, that the civil rights
1 march would be used as a blind for IRA gunmen to have a
2 go at the army.
3 Q. That you are getting from the army, are you?
4 A. I would say that I was getting it as an
5 overall, sitting down working out what I had been told
6 and from which specific source at this stage 29 years
7 later, I cannot help you on that, but that would be
8 just pulling it altogether, put it that way.
9 Q. "The army is aware of the situation", is that
10 what is written there, the next paragraph?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. "And is very keen that it does not come out
13 badly in the television coverage".
14 What does that mean?
15 A. I think that the army -- from what
16 I understood that they were saying was that they knew
17 television was going to be there, that they wanted to
18 keep things -- to contain the march, to keep it low
19 level with television around that they did not want --
20 they wanted to show that they were containing at least
21 force and in no way overreacting.
22 Q. On the next page of the notebook you have a
23 whole series of notes under the heading "TV".
24 Did you get the impression that the press
25 office would have preferred it if the television
1 cameras were discreetly withdrawn or kept at a
2 distance?
3 A. No.
4 Q. You did not?
5 A. No.
6 Q. They laid no constraints on you at all?
7 A. No.
8 Q. So in the middle pages when you have an
9 observation -- you can turn them up if you like --
10 "draw fire, put the army in a bad light"; why were you
11 making that note?
12 A. I cannot --
13 Q. It is the middle pages, it is M66.31,
14 please. On the left-hand side, you read it out
15 earlier:
16 "Draw fire", then you have got "put army in
17 a bad light".
18 Is that an observation by you or a question?
19 A. It looks like a question. I do not know
20 where that is -- I cannot put that in context.
21 LORD SAVILLE: (inaudible) when this is
22 likely to have been written, Mr Mansfield.
23 MR MANSFIELD: Yes, I will.
24 Could I ask you in relation to this page
25 which is in the notebook, when did you write these
1 notes under the heading "TV"?
2 A. Frankly, I do not know. I cannot help you on
3 that.
4 Q. Going back to the question about any
5 constraints being put on you by the army press office,
6 the question is: "put army in a bad light". There is
7 not a question mark (maybe it is meant to be a
8 question); can you help us about that?
9 A. There is not a question, no.
10 Q. It looks as though it is an observation by
11 you?
12 A. I think what "put the army in a bad light",
13 and the brackets are, meaning the army is put in a bad
14 light when they are seen smashing in doors searching
15 and making arrests.
16 Q. Or shooting people?
17 A. It does not say that there.
18 LORD SAVILLE: I think what Mr Phillips was
19 doing was repeating the words that are in the brackets.
20 MR MANSFIELD: Does it mean if that is what
21 they are doing, you would not want to show them on
22 British television screens?
23 A. No, they had been shown on British television
24 screens over the years since the start of the Troubles
25 in '69.
1 Q. Could we go over the page to 66.26, please,
2 which is the first reference to the army being very
3 keen that it does not come out badly?
4 On the next page, 66.27, I am not going to
5 read it all out, that is where you have already read
6 out a description. Is this a description of something
7 you witnessed on the Friday in Derry? It starts:
8 "January 28th, incident in William Street"?
9 A. Bear with me while I look it up, please.
10 (Pause).
11 Q. It is towards the beginning of the --
12 A. Yes, I have it.
13 Q. Is that a note that you wrote in relation to
14 something you had seen when you were in Derry?
15 A. Certainly while I was in Derry, yes.
16 Q. While you are in Derry on the Friday, is it
17 something you have seen?
18 A. Re-reading it here, yes, I do think that.
19 Q. On the next page we move to a slightly later
20 time, so I am not going to -- it appears, and please
21 check so I have it right, that we have now covered all
22 the notes that you made in relation to Friday 28th?
23 A. Can I just clarify your question, please,
24 that we have covered all the notes that we have been
25 referring to in this book?
1 Q. I do not know whether there are other notes,
2 I am obviously concentrating on the book.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. In relation to the notebook, have we now
5 covered all the notes you made in relation to what you
6 discovered about the impending march and anything else
7 you saw on the 28th; is that fair?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. I want to ask you this question: where in the
10 notebooks is there any reference on the Friday to a
11 Thompson sub-machine gun?
12 A. There is not.
13 Q. Can you explain that?
14 A. No. I would have expected -- put it this
15 way, I would have expected it to be in there. I am
16 surprised that it is not.
17 Q. The only way you are going to be able to deal
18 with the apparent use of a Thompson sub-machine gun on
19 a Sunday, as you put in your Widgery statement, is
20 because you had heard one on the Friday and been told
21 what it was?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Of course if you had not heard one on the
24 Friday and been told what it was, you would not have
25 been able to recognise one on the Sunday, could you?
1 A. No.
2 Q. Do you think you could be mistaken?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Can you explain the omission?
5 A. No.
6 LORD SAVILLE: There is a reference to
7 automatic flashes, is there not, on the left-hand side
8 of 67.27?
9 MR MANSFIELD: Sir, there is. 67.27: the
10 context in which you do mention some fire is halfway
11 down:
12 "Army fire CS gas, troops and so on. Rubber
13 bullets, Echo roof and then --
14 LORD SAVILLE: What, "soldier on Echo roof"?
15 MR MANSFIELD: "Fire live bullets after
16 seeing [is it] automatic flashes coming"; that is what
17 appears to be written, and that is what you read out?
18 A. Yes, that the sniper when I was up there
19 fired a shot immediately after the sound of the
20 Thompson machine-gun and that does not use the word
21 "Thompson", but from the fact of the sniper returning
22 the fire, that would be the incident.
23 Q. The point I am on about is slightly more
24 discrete than that, namely the question of identifying
25 a weapon as a Thompson sub-machine gun.
1 Do you agree there is no reference in your
2 notes to being told that the gun being fired at the
3 army on the Friday was a Thompson sub-machine gun; is
4 there?
5 A. No.
6 Q. I want to move on, if I may, now; the
7 Saturday you are back in Belfast. On the Sunday you
8 are returning to Derry. There is a note of a briefing
9 that took place on that day with General Ford.
10 Do I take it -- it is 66.34, it is further on
11 in your notebook headed with the name "General Ford"?
12 A. I am with you.
13 Q. I want to clarify with you that that is all
14 you can say about this briefing, nothing else was said
15 of any real consequence?
16 A. No.
17 Q. So in particular no reference was made about
18 how the Paras would be deployed or in what
19 circumstances?
20 A. May I just read? (Pause) Yes.
21 Q. You position yourself near to a barrier and
22 you have described all of that. I have just a few
23 general questions about what you saw or did not see.
24 First of all, of the marchers that you saw, would it be
25 right to say that you never on any occasion when you
1 were on the street saw a marcher with a weapon of any
2 kind?
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. Nor did you see any marcher carrying or
5 throwing a petrol bomb?
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. Nor did you see any marcher carrying or
8 throwing a nail bomb?
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. I want to go one stage further than that: nor
11 did you hear the sound of nail bombs exploding, did
12 you?
13 A. No.
14 Q. When you went from the barrier, just on the
15 same topic, would it be right to say you would be, as
16 in charge of or at least supervising a film crew, you
17 would be interested to film, if you had enough film
18 left, any nail bombs, petrol bombs, acid bombs that
19 were on the street, that littered the street where the
20 soldiers had been, would you not?
21 A. I can describe the -- the crew followed the
22 troops in. What they were doing was chasing after the
23 troops to see where that would lead them to. That is
24 why I followed them in to see, you know, what the
25 troops were then going to do. I mean, there was -- it
1 never went through my mind to be sort of running up
2 there and taking a look to see what sort of debris was
3 lying around. Our focus of our attention was: what
4 will the Paratroopers now do.
5 Q. On your account by the time you got to the
6 corner of William Street and Rossville Street, it was
7 virtually all over?
8 A. We were on the tail end of the action.
9 Q. Yes, quite, so by the time you had got there,
10 the action, the majority of it, on your account, was
11 over?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. So this would be the time to see, if you
14 could, what had been happening in Rossville Street?
15 A. Which is what we did, it is on film.
16 Q. I understand that. Would it be fair to say
17 as you went down Rossville Street, you did not find
18 yourself ankle deep in petrol bombs, nail bombs and
19 acid bombs, did you?
20 A. Ankle deep?
21 Q. Yes, littered all over the road?
22 A. Not ankle deep and not littered all over the
23 road.
24 Q. You did not see any, did you?
25 A. I never claimed to.
1 MR TOOHEY: Can I establish, Mr Mansfield:
2 Mr Phillips, on the notes we saw earlier this morning,
3 66.4.4, you do make a reference to two acid bombs.
4 Can you pick up the page that I am referring
5 to?
6 A. Yes, I think.
7 MR TOOHEY: I take it, then, from what you
8 have said that that was not a result of anything that
9 you yourself observed; is that correct?
10 A. Correct.
11 MR TOOHEY: Can you tell us the source or the
12 basis upon which that note was made?
13 A. No, I cannot, it comes immediately -- I had
14 scribbled down the fact, the name of police we had
15 spoken to. I do not know whether he referred to that
16 in his interview, if not him, I do not know where the
17 source of that information was, sir.
18 MR TOOHEY: You have a line under the
19 priest's name as if it is a different note?
20 A. Quite.
21 MR TOOHEY: You cannot help us at all on that
22 note?
23 A. I am sorry, no.
24 MR MANSFIELD: On the same theme: you did not
25 see any soldiers or casualties or injured in any way?
1 A. Any soldiers injured, no.
2 Q. Did you see any Saracens that looked as
3 though they had come under a hail of fire or anything
4 like that and were damaged?
5 A. No.
6 Q. I have one last area I wanted to ask you
7 about, that is just going back a fraction to behind the
8 barrier and the Paratroopers going in, do you follow?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. You have already been asked questions and
11 I hope I have fairly summarised it. What you say is
12 that, obviously, there was a gap made in the barrier
13 and the Paratroopers went in and they came back with a
14 civil rights barrier and they did not, as far as you
15 are concerned, arrest anybody.
16 But the firing of the submachine gun that you
17 identified as a possible Thompson you have already
18 indicated occurred at the tail end of the Paratroopers
19 going in, is that fair?
20 A. No, it is not fair.
21 Q. That is what you were asked this morning?
22 A. I disagree with you, Mr Mansfield. The
23 firing of the -- what is down as real firing, which is
24 the Thompson and the fusillade, okay, occurred on my
25 notes, ahead of the C Company, which I now know as
1 C Company, going in on our barricade. So it was not at
2 the tail end, I was talking about the tail end of when
3 we got up to Rossville Street and I have described the
4 two shots and the Paratroopers shooting; that was
5 basically what I would call the tail end, what had gone
6 on before was the main action.
7 Q. Therefore you are saying what you heard as
8 the submachine fire occurred before any Paratrooper
9 went through the barrier?
10 A. On our barrier, yes.
11 Q. On your barrier?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And so where was the film crew when you say
14 you heard that, your film crew, the second one staying
15 near you?
16 A. Lower down William Street towards the
17 barricade.
18 LORD SAVILLE: I must have been
19 misunderstanding you earlier, Mr Phillips, I thought
20 you had told me you recall hearing what you have
21 described as machine-gun fire as the last of the
22 Paratroopers went through the barrier?
23 A. Can I refer myself back to the note, sir,
24 which I have logged, okay? (Pause) I beg your pardon,
25 yes, the sequence is definitely down:
1 "4.12" Paras in; that is the first single
2 file going in, capture flag. At 4.15 "real fire".
3 I am sorry, that is the correct sequence.
4 MR MANSFIELD: That is what I was putting to
5 you, Mr Phillips. That is what you said this morning,
6 I appreciate it is 30 years ago. Do you have
7 difficulty remembering this?
8 A. No, I do not at all.
9 Q. You do not at all?
10 A. Sir, it was a snapshot of history. This
11 Tribunal does call itself the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.
12 Q. If you do not at all have the difficulty,
13 when I asked the question a few seconds ago, why did
14 you contradict what I was putting to you, that you
15 heard the sub-machine gun as the tail end of the
16 Paratroopers went through the barricade; why did you
17 contradict that a minute ago if it is so clear in your
18 mind?
19 A. I am sorry, it was not intentional, I was
20 confused.
21 Q. What I am suggesting to you is: you have not
22 got a clear memory, have you?
23 A. I am sorry, you are wrong. I have got
24 snapshot clear memory of major parts of that day, not
25 that afternoon, not all of it, but some of it. I mean,
1 I think one would be pretty much of a cretin if one did
2 not.
3 Q. My point is a further one to all of this:
4 the film crew were in William Street when the
5 Paratroopers went through the barricade, were they not?
6 A. (Witness nodding).
7 Q. And they were still filming as the last of
8 the Paratroopers went through the barricade, were they
9 not?
10 A. First Paratroopers went in, okay, film crew
11 got in, okay, other Paratroopers came up, I came up.
12 Q. And they are filming, are they not?
13 A. They are filming that way (indicating), yes.
14 Q. Can you explain if they are filming why the
15 sound of a sub-machine gun is not recorded?
16 A. Yes, I can.
17 Q. Which is?
18 A. Because you are shooting in those days on
19 film and you have only got a limited amount of film in
20 the camera. You cannot squirt off the film -- you
21 cannot be running all the time, okay, you can only have
22 the X number of feet in the can and we are carrying
23 spares and that is, in any situation, the crew cannot
24 be shooting all the time, so I imagine that
25 Peter Wilkinson was switched off at that moment, okay,
1 and then would catch up with the action.
2 Q. My last question on this and everything else
3 is related to the video. Could we have video 3 again,
4 please, the section at the beginning which deals with
5 the entry through the barrier. Could you watch this
6 again, please?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Go back to the beginning, yes?
9 LORD SAVILLE: More or less where Mr Clarke
10 started us?
11 MR MANSFIELD: That is right.
12 (Video played)
13 It appears -- I will put it carefully -- it
14 appears as though the camera crew is right by the
15 barrier filming the Paratroopers going through the
16 barrier; do you agree?
17 A. Oh, yes, yeah.
18 Q. And it looks as though they are still there
19 when the armoured vehicles come up behind?
20 A. No, I do not agree with you.
21 LORD SAVILLE: I am not sure, Mr Mansfield,
22 myself about that.
23 MR MANSFIELD: I will leave that part of it.
24 LORD SAVILLE: I do not want to stop your
25 questioning, but I am not sure your premise is
1 necessarily correct.
2 MR TOOHEY: Also, of course, and I think the
3 distinction needs to be kept in mind between vehicles
4 coming up William Street and those that were coming up
5 Little James Street.
6 MR MANSFIELD: Two questions on this: was
7 there more film than has actually been kept, in other
8 words other film that was just not used of this
9 section, or you cannot now remember?
10 A. I would say that we would have used all the
11 action in the Paratroopers going in and us going up to
12 the corner of William Street. I do not see any being
13 left to one side, I mean the point there was we were
14 there to show what was going on, not leave it out.
15 Q. What you are suggesting is that what we now
16 have is really the totality of what was filmed at the
17 point at which Paratroopers were going through the
18 barrier?
19 A. Yes, I do.
20 Q. The last question on this topic is this: did
21 you ask anyone whether in fact although they had not
22 filmed it because it was not on the film and could not
23 be heard on the film, whether they themselves had heard
24 this important burst of sub-machine gun fire, any of
25 your crew?
1 A. No, I did not.
2 Q. You did not?
3 A. No.
4 Questioned by LORD GIFFORD
5 LORD GIFFORD: My name is Anthony Gifford and
6 I represent the family of James Wray. First of all,
7 just a technical question on what you have just been
8 talking about: in those days how much time footage
9 would a reel of film produce?
10 A. If I can recall, it was 400 foot to a can.
11 Q. And 400 foot, if filmed without a break,
12 would be how many minutes?
13 A. I cannot recollect now, sir. It would be
14 around about, I would say stopping and starting,
15 between 5 to 10 minutes, I would reckon.
16 Q. I was positing that you do not stop at all so
17 as to get the entire run?
18 A. I cannot recall now, sir.
19 Q. Just a few questions on the notes you
20 produced this afternoon: if you would look at page
21 M66.24, on the left-hand side, do you see the name
22 David Gilliland?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. And under it the word "Stormont ER Security"?
25 A. Yes, I do.
1 Q. Did you seek a briefing from Mr Gilliland?
2 A. I do not recall seeking one or having one.
3 I may just have made a note there of who the head of
4 security was.
5 Q. You were not informed of any meeting that had
6 taken place the previous day, on 27th January, of the
7 Joint Security Committee in Belfast?
8 A. No, sir.
9 Q. Staying with your notes, can we move to page
10 66.26, on the right-hand side: in answer to
11 Mr Mansfield you gave an explanation of this upper
12 paragraph which refers to a briefing you had about the
13 -- or notes taken of the army's views of the impending
14 civil rights march and its significance?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And you were suggesting that what you were
17 being told was that the IRA gunman might use the march
18 as a blind.
19 Can I ask you to read the whole passage:
20 "Sunday's march could mark a deliberate swing
21 back to civil rights marches as a means of confronting
22 the army because the gunmen have lost the fight with
23 the army and the IRA need to buy time to train more but
24 still tie up the Security Forces."
25 Were you not being told that, according to
1 the army, the IRA gunmen were going to use marches as a
2 tactic in itself to confront the army with marches
3 rather than with guns at that point?
4 A. As I understood it, that there would be
5 marches which they would use as a blind.
6 Q. The reference to training more gunmen would
7 appear to mean that the army were of the view that the
8 IRA, as it were, were in some disarray, had lost the
9 fight and were therefore using marches as a tactic?
10 A. That is marches in the future, okay, and this
11 march in particular.
12 Q. Yes, as it were, to confront the army by
13 force of the popular numbers rather than by force of
14 gunfire?
15 A. Well, to use your word, to use the march as a
16 blind so that gunmen can take shots at the army,
17 Security Forces undercover of the march.
18 Q. I am asking you to look at a different
19 interpretation of your notes.
20 A. Of course.
21 Q. Of course, it is difficult at this stage to
22 now remember exactly, but it looks as if to me you were
23 being told that the marches would be used, as it were,
24 not as a blind, but as a means of tying up the army by
25 confronting them with a force of numbers?
1 A. Yes, I agree with you, there is the
2 alternative interpretation.
3 Q. In any event, whichever interpretation we use
4 it would appear that those briefing you were very much
5 of the view that the civil rights movement was under
6 the heavy influence of the IRA; manipulated, one might
7 say?
8 A. Well, listening, when you say the marchers,
9 we are not talking about 5,000 marchers. Those
10 organising the march would be in contact with the IRA
11 about it.
12 Q. And influenced by them?
13 A. Um, yes.
14 Q. In the army's view?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Turning from the army's view of the gunmen,
17 the IRA, can I go to a word you have used a number of
18 times, which is the word "hooligans"? I think, if we
19 were talking neutrally, it would be more apt to talk
20 about young men who rioted, but was "hooligans" the
21 term being used to you by the army?
22 A. I think that it was referred to on the --
23 when we were watching the proceedings in the -- at what
24 is called Aggro Corner, the word "hooligans" was used
25 then to say that that was a daily gathering.
1 Q. Indeed, I was coming to that. On the Friday
2 you had seen rioting going on at what was called
3 "Aggro Corner"?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Was it clear that anyone from the army
6 briefing you was concerned about the freedom with which
7 these young people were able to riot?
8 A. No.
9 Q. When General Ford spoke about his intention
10 to maintain law and order, which was, I think, his
11 words on the Sunday: "here to see the law is
12 respected"?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Was anything in what he said directed to the
15 so-called hooligans that they were breaking the law and
16 had to be restrained?
17 A. Well, in reading the paragraph as a whole in
18 context, "army here to see the law suspected. There
19 will be no march beyond the barricades", okay, "he said
20 he hoped no soldiers would have to use CS gas because
21 of the effect on innocent people"; I understood it
22 that General Ford was anticipating rioting at that
23 barricade.
24 Q. And wished to, not only to contain it, but to
25 address it in any other way?
1 A. No, he was -- I really genuinely believe that
2 Brigadier Ford wanted as quiet as possible a civil
3 rights march/demonstration, his demeanour was that.
4 Q. You think so?
5 A. Yes, I do.
6 Q. Did he ever brief you that there was to be an
7 arrest or scoop-up operation?
8 A. No, not specifically, but with the -- the
9 reference to the Paratroopers being held in reserve,
10 one -- myself, one sort of felt that if they had to go
11 in for to make arrests, then they would be used to do
12 so.
13 Q. Going back to the observation point: were
14 rubber bullets heard by you when you were up there?
15 A. Refreshing my memory from the notebook just
16 today, I think it does refer to rubber bullets being
17 fired, but I had not -- if I had not seen the notebook
18 after all these years, I myself would not have been
19 able to say "yes, it happened", but I stand by the
20 notes in the book.
21 Q. Going now to Sunday and your position behind
22 the barricade at the time the Paras began to go in.
23 Can we first just check with the map where you were;
24 can we look at Q8? Can we look at the junction of the
25 right-hand side of Waterloo Place and William Street?
1 If Mr Phillips could have control.
2 Could you point to the point at which you
3 were standing when the Paras went in and the noise of
4 real fire was heard?
5 A. Yes, just here (marked with a blue arrow).
6 Q. You are in William Street, on the north side,
7 just below the corner with Waterloo Place?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Of course, between you and the flats there
10 are several rows of houses?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Ahead of you going up the hill is
13 Waterloo Street?
14 A. It is, yes.
15 Q. And you recall, do you, that that rises quite
16 steeply towards the walls?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Certainly the sounds, whatever was going on
19 in, let us say, the wasteground by Eden Place and
20 Pilot's Row or indeed in front of the flats would be
21 muffled from you by the houses between?
22 LORD SAVILLE: I am not sure that is a
23 question to which Mr Phillips can give an answer.
24 LORD GIFFORD: That may be true, sir, I will
25 not press it.
1 LORD SAVILLE: I understand why you ask it.
2 I am not sure he can help us on that, as to whether or
3 not a sound there would or would not be muffled.
4 LORD GIFFORD: We are going to have some
5 expert help.
6 LORD SAVILLE: Exactly, yes.
7 LORD GIFFORD: Do you say the noise that you
8 describe as a Thompson machine-gun and which you wrote
9 down in your notebook as "real fire" was the first
10 sound of any kind of fire that you had heard after the
11 Paras went in?
12 A. Yes, it was.
13 Q. Did you in particular hear any noises of
14 rubber bullets being fired before you heard that real
15 fire?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. You did?
18 A. Yes, I made note of it.
19 Q. I am not talking about the rubber bullets
20 used against the rioters in William Street?
21 A. I am sorry, I thought you were referring to
22 that.
23 Q. I am saying after the Paratroopers went in,
24 after they went through the barrier and before you
25 heard the real fire, did you hear any rubber bullets?
1 A. No.
2 Q. Or any rifle fire?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Did you hear the noise of a helicopter at any
5 time that you recall?
6 A. I think I recall a helicopter over to our
7 right, but I was not paying any particular attention to
8 it.
9 Q. I want to match what you say with what we
10 anticipate General Ford may say. Could we look at a
11 chronology which General Ford has drawn up? It is at
12 B1126.
13 Before asking you about this, may I just test
14 your memory, you had been --
15 LORD SAVILLE: Could you remind me of the
16 provenance of this document, Lord Gifford?
17 LORD GIFFORD: This is the chronology of
18 events which General Ford put his name to; it is
19 five-pages; it is headed "My Movements in Londonderry
20 on Sunday, 30th January".
21 LORD SAVILLE: It is a contemporary
22 document?
23 LORD GIFFORD: A contemporary document.
24 LORD SAVILLE: That is all I wanted to know,
25 it is some time since we looked at it.
1 LORD GIFFORD: The last page of it says:
2 "The above was dictated by Sergeant [so and
3 so], my personal assistant, on 31st January".
4 Before we come to it, to get this in context,
5 you had been in the company of General Ford during the
6 time of the rioting?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. All the time or off and on?
9 A. Off and on, because, to explain why, was that
10 for part of the time I would go down to where the crew
11 were which were, on the whole, because of the amount of
12 missiles coming over, were back off the barrier, so say
13 halfway down William Street, see them, then go back up
14 to the higher vantage point which I pointed out, and it
15 was there that General Ford appeared to have based
16 himself at that time.
17 Q. Where was General Ford's vantage point?
18 A. When you asked me where I was at
19 William Street, that was his vantage point.
20 Q. During the period of the rioting, what was
21 General Ford doing?
22 A. Well, I have to explain it this way: I was
23 not concentrating on General Ford, sir, okay, I was
24 keeping a close eye on the situation at the barricade
25 because the news angle then was: would the barricade be
1 breached; would they get through and what then? I was
2 only aware of General Ford, okay, when he made his
3 remarks and then I turned round and he happened to be
4 right by me; I had not positioned myself by him, nor
5 was I observing him.
6 Q. You cannot help us as to whether he was
7 taking any part in directing events?
8 A. I would say he was -- well, I would say he
9 was not directing events, he observing, like me.
10 Q. Communicating by radio?
11 A. I did not see a radio with him at all.
12 Q. Going to what he says about the period about
13 which you have given evidence. Can we take the top
14 half of the second paragraph:
15 "The mob, having been subjected to baton
16 rounds and the water cannon and now seeing snatch
17 squads of 1 Para in readiness, began to break up
18 Chamberlain Street and William Street. At about 1610
19 barrier 14 was lifted and Coy 1 Para went in after the
20 mob in a 'sweep-up' operation."
21 Pausing there, that would coincide with your
22 note which you had put at 1612, "Paras go in"?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. "I followed 1 Para as far as just behind the
25 junction of Chamberlain Street/William Street."
1 Do you recall General Ford leaving your
2 position and following the Paras out of your sight?
3 A. I do not because there was the firing,
4 General Ford made his remarks, okay, but I was off and
5 running and chasing after the crew, I did not see him
6 after that.
7 Q. Let us just follow what he is saying: he is
8 saying that after the Paras went in, but before the
9 firing he followed up round the corner; do you say that
10 that may be right, or do you think that is wrong?
11 A. I cannot say one way or another, I was not
12 observing General Ford's movements after his remarks.
13 Q. "It was at this stage that I heard shots
14 fired from the direction of the Rossville Flats.
15 I returned at once to the OP on Embassy Ballroom ...",
16 and he talks about meeting Lieutenant Colonel
17 Ferguson.
18 Did you observe that General Ford was, as it
19 were, en route to the OP when he was making his remark?
20 A. No, sir, I say that after he made his remark
21 about the heavy firing and the 70 gunmen. I just left
22 immediately, I was not concerned about General Ford's
23 movements.
24 Q. You would accept, of course, that
25 General Ford has considerable more experience of
1 hearing the sounds of battle than you have?
2 A. Oh, of course.
3 Q. I want to put to you the description he gave
4 of the firing in the Widgery Tribunal. Could we have
5 B1168, please, at letters C and D? You can read the
6 question and answer starting at C:
7 "Question: What was had an incident?
8 "Answer: I had just heard the firing again
9 as I approached that corner and I was turning round or
10 about to turn around to go to the OP. There were
11 several people about. I spoke to my ADC and said 'That
12 was awfully heavy firing', or words to that effect, and
13 the remark was apparently overheard by I think he was a
14 BBC reporter"; that is clearly referring to you?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. I continue:
17 "Question: What sort of firing was it you
18 were referring to -- single or other firing?
19 "Answer: It was single rounds, about 15 to
20 20, I thought -- single rounds fired in fairly rapid
21 succession, but I must stress that there appeared to me
22 to be an echo down that road. I was running round the
23 corner and therefore it was very difficult for me to
24 speak authoritatively of exactly what type of firing it
25 was.
1 "Question: It seemed to be rapid single
2 firing rather than automatic?
3 "Answer: Yes."
4 In view of that evidence given by the General
5 with his experience who heard clearly the same firing,
6 would you accept you may well be mistaken in
7 considering that that firing came from a Thompson
8 sub-machine gun?
9 A. The sound of the Thompson on the Sunday
10 afternoon, the low, deep rumble was precisely the same
11 and seemed to go on longer than the sound I heard on
12 top of the OP on the Friday.
13 There is also a point about the General's
14 evidence here:
15 "I was running round the corner and therefore
16 it is very difficult for me to speak authoritatively of
17 exactly what type of firing it was."
18 When he was made his remark he was anchored
19 right by me, he was not running round a corner.
20 Q. He was standing by you when the firing was
21 heard?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Mr Phillips, I have to suggest to you you are
24 wrong about that, that he was in fact further up
25 Chamberlain Street when the firing started and he got
1 back to you at the time he made the remark?
2 A. I am afraid not, sir.
3 Q. You say he was just standing there when the
4 first firing broke out?
5 A. He was there along with a number of us as
6 observers. I heard -- okay, we were there, I have
7 explained my movements; we were there watching the
8 barricade; the firing; he makes the remark and my head
9 went round to check who had said it. It was
10 General Ford standing beside me.
11 Q. Are you saying he was there from the time
12 that the Paras went in to the time the remark was made?
13 A. He was there then, yes.
14 Q. Next to you?
15 A. Yes, now -- I was not aware that he was next
16 to me, but after he made the remark and I turned round,
17 he was there.
18 Q. If he is to tell us that he went up to
19 Chamberlain Street after the Paras went in, but before
20 the remark was made and came back to you, that would be
21 wrong?
22 A. I am afraid so, yes.
23 Q. Or your memory just may be playing you
24 tricks?
25 A. Not playing me tricks at all, I have always
1 remembered that.
2 LORD SAVILLE: We are proceeding on the
3 assumption that General Ford made only the one remark.
4 LORD GIFFORD: I context it through the
5 Widgery evidence as being the remark made to
6 Mr Phillips, which it clearly seems to have been.
7 You of course anchor your confidence about
8 the Thompson and you are prepared, it would seem, to
9 pit your confidence against the opinion of General Ford
10 because of what you heard on the Friday?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Mr Mansfield has taken you to the evidence
13 that you have given about the Friday. I am not going
14 to repeat it, but I just want to ask you this: at
15 M66.27, on the left-hand page you made notes about that
16 incident. Halfway down the page, you said this:
17 "Soldier on the Echo roof. Fired live rounds
18 after seeing automatic flashes coming from empty house,
19 upper window."
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. You have also given evidence that one of the
22 officers asked the soldier why he fired?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And if this note is accurate, it would seem
25 that his reply was "because I saw automatic flashes
1 from a window"?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. So neither the question nor the answer
4 identified the sound of a Thompson at all, did it?
5 A. No.
6 Q. May I suggest once again that you are totally
7 mistaken in claiming that a Thompson was fired at about
8 4.12 on the Sunday afternoon?
9 A. Sir, I have never forgotten the sound of it
10 then because it was totally outside my army
11 experience. I heard the sound; officers quizzed the
12 army marksmen as to why he had let off his shot, a
13 discussion on that, and I asked, okay, after they had
14 finished, what was that sound, okay, and I was then
15 told, it was identified to me as a Thompson
16 machine-gun.
17 Q. By who?
18 A. By officers, an officer or officers.
19 Q. I wonder if you heard a volley of rubber
20 bullets?
21 A. A low, deep very distinctive growl, something
22 that made you start as to, what was that, not rubber
23 bullets.
24 Q. Finally, on the issue of the Thompson, you
25 met up with your team on the ground, and no doubt
1 stayed with them later in the day?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Did you compare notes with them as to what
4 you and they had seen and heard?
5 A. No, we were just running around in that very
6 short space taking in -- trying to take in as much of
7 what was going on amid the considerable confusion that
8 there was there.
9 Q. Did you tell him that you had seen a
10 Thompson?
11 A. No, I did not refer to a Thompson to them,
12 there was action going on. Thompson by then, that was
13 over, it was with the crew, what was going on now --
14 Q. I am just cutting you off to say, not
15 necessarily when you were still on the ground and the
16 action was going on, but in the aftermath?
17 A. No, I -- no, I did not.
18 Q. I will make the suggestion directly because
19 I am sure it will be pointed out, that your colleagues
20 and the crew also speak of hearing a Thompson
21 sub-machine gun and I am going to suggest by way of
22 comment, and you may comment on this, that they did so
23 having been influenced by you, or vice versa, you being
24 influenced by them?
25 A. Not correct, sir.
1 Q. Briefly about the second area of shooting
2 about which you have given evidence. Could we, again,
3 go back to Q8, please? Could we this time look at the
4 flats themselves? You have told us about the single
5 shot which caused you great alarm and after which you
6 were ordered to get down.
7 Where were you when you heard that shot?
8 A. It would be -- we were close to the
9 Rossville Flats, and I would --
10 Q. If you could have control, you can point to
11 where you were.
12 A. I would suggest, it was pretty much there.
13 Q. Could you now be given control so it marks?
14 A. A bit further back there, the second one, on
15 that corner, sir (marked with a blue arrow).
16 Q. Can the first arrow be removed? The tip of
17 that arrow is about halfway along the block?
18 A. I cannot be that precise at this stage, it
19 would be from the corner of that block to, say, halfway
20 up, I really could not pinpoint it more than that for
21 you.
22 Q. There are some photographs which may assist.
23 Look at EP4.43, please.
24 LORD SAVILLE: Lord Gifford, we are talking
25 about the first of the shots that Mr Phillips told us
1 about, or the second or both?
2 LORD GIFFORD: The first, we are dealing with
3 the first.
4 A. I am sorry, I thought you were referring to
5 the one --
6 Q. The first shot after you had got into
7 Rossville Street and had run across?
8 A. Yes, when I was ordered to get down. I am
9 sorry, I beg your pardon, I confused your question with
10 the second shot. The first shot was further back,
11 okay, therefore, it was corner of
12 William Street/Rossville Street, over to meet the
13 second crew, after that discussion and before we,
14 I think before we ran further forward, there was the
15 first of the two shots.
16 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Phillips, we have had quite
17 a long day. I was looking at M66.3, which is part of
18 the statement you gave to the Widgery Tribunal. If you
19 look in the middle of that, about six lines down:
20 "At this point I also met our second camera
21 crew ... we then ran diagonally across the road ... as
22 I arrived at the corner of the block, I heard a loud
23 single rifle shot above my head and a Paratrooper
24 ordered me to get down in a corner."
25 Further down the page, take the bottom part
1 of the page, talking about, I think the interview with
2 Gerald Seymour:
3 "After the priest had left the scene and
4 before the withdrawal of the Paratroopers there was
5 another single rifle shot ...".
6 A. Yes, sir, you are correct. I stand by the
7 evidence to the Widgery Tribunal as here, that is the
8 correct sequence.
9 LORD SAVILLE: It does sound from this
10 account that you gave that you were at the corner of
11 the Rossville Flats at the first shot?
12 A. Yes, sir, I mean.
13 LORD SAVILLE: Were you still there with the
14 second shot or do you recall being in a different
15 place?
16 A. Um, we may have moved over slightly after
17 that and got into another position using the, I think
18 the armoured car there as shelter. I cannot really be
19 more specific than that.
20 LORD GIFFORD: Finally, where was the
21 Paratrooper who fired back in relation to the flats?
22 A. They would be crouching by the APC.
23 Q. The APC was in the street or --
24 A. On that corner.
25 Q. On that corner?
1 A. Yeah.
2 Q. Have we seen now EP4.43; does that indicate
3 the sort of scene that you came to when you ran to the
4 corner?
5 A. Well, yes, I mean that is generally, but
6 whether that is block 1, 2 or 3, I cannot --
7 Q. Can I help you, what we see towards the right
8 of the photograph is block 1, the block that runs along
9 Rossville Street, and the foreground of the photograph
10 is Rossville Street and the block to the left, it is
11 further back, is block 2, which is the one in the
12 middle?
13 LORD SAVILLE: The shot is very foreshortened
14 so that the flats you see on the left, that is block 2,
15 they look closer to the photographer than in fact they
16 are. We also I think to be a bit careful with these
17 photographs because some of these vehicles were moving
18 around and whether they were all there when you were
19 there is perhaps something you cannot help us on?
20 A. I cannot.
21 LORD GIFFORD: So do not assume that the cars
22 are in the right position, but the armoured car from
23 the vicinity of which the Paratrooper fired was, as far
24 as you can remember, in what position?
25 A. Well, it would be in that general melee that
1 is going on.
2 Q. What, somewhere where the right-hand car is,
3 for instance?
4 A. Yes, towards the -- okay, you have got the
5 lamppost, it would be going over right, somewhere in
6 there.
7 Q. Perhaps you could be given control to
8 indicate the area that you are trying to tell us about?
9 A. Yes, okay. (Marked with pink arrows). Sir,
10 I was saying it is somewhere in this area.
11 Q. Putting it generally, to the north of the
12 flats, somewhere to the left of Rossville Street -- to
13 the east of Rossville Street?
14 A. Yes.
15 LORD SAVILLE: Again, you know, we have to be
16 very careful with this because it is very difficult to
17 tell. If you take, for example, the two vehicles that
18 one can see with their backs to the cameramen, they may
19 well have a clear view down Rossville Street --
20 LORD GIFFORD: I was not going to ask for the
21 image to be saved.
22 LORD SAVILLE: I am not sure Mr Philips can
23 do more than say in relation to this photograph that
24 his impression is -- tell me if I am getting it wrong,
25 Mr Phillips -- that the soldier shooting was, if
1 anything, towards the right of the vehicles -- towards
2 the right-hand side of the group of vehicles depicted
3 in this photograph? If you can do better than that,
4 please do.
5 A. I cannot, sir.
6 LORD SAVILLE: Can we take it much further
7 than that?
8 LORD GIFFORD: No, sir. After the officer
9 had given the order to cease firing and not to fire
10 unless identified targets, that was the end of the
11 firing that you were aware of for that day?
12 A. Oh, yes, certainly.
13 Q. There was nothing after that?
14 A. No -- well, not that I heard.
15 Q. Not that you heard. I am going to suggest to
16 you that, whatever your understandable fear and shock
17 at the time may have been, in fact for all you know all
18 those shots that you heard when you were at the end of
19 the block in Rossville Street could have been shots
20 coming from soldiers?
21 A. No, sir. The one when the Paratrooper told
22 me to get down, in my mind and has always lived there,
23 was incoming, i.e. coming towards me over my head.
24 I suppose one could use the phrase "life threatening".
25 Q. I appreciate that was in your mind, but I am
1 going to make the comment in due course that in fact
2 your mind was understandably mistaken as to the
3 provenance of that fire?
4 A. That is your privilege, sir.
5 Q. Thank you very much.
6 Questioned by MR O'HANLON
7 MR O'HANLON: Mr Phillips, can you hear me?
8 A. Yes, I can.
9 Q. Mr Phillips, my name is O'Hanlon and
10 I represent the Northern Ireland Civil Rights
11 Association. I would like to ask you a few questions.
12 You were a producer with the News at Ten on
13 ITN?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And you came to the north of Ireland
16 to acquaint yourself with the position on the ground as
17 it affected your units, your TV crews?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. It was your first visit to the North
20 of Ireland?
21 A. It was.
22 Q. You have indicated to the Tribunal that your
23 contacts during your visit composed primarily spokesmen
24 for the army and army personnel; is that correct?
25 A. It is correct, yes.
1 Q. You indicated that you had the telephone
2 number of Mr David Gilliland, but that you did not
3 actually meet him?
4 A. I do not recall meeting him, no.
5 Q. Did you meet any Unionist politicians when
6 you were in Belfast?
7 A. I do not recall that, no.
8 Q. Could you have met some Unionist politicians?
9 A. Meaning -- it was, if one had made the
10 request, though I do not recall ever making the
11 request, sir.
12 Q. You have no notes to that effect?
13 A. No, sir.
14 Q. When you were in Derry on the Friday, did you
15 meet any local Unionist MPs?
16 A. I did not, no.
17 Q. In relation to your visitation to Derry on
18 the Friday, you stayed in the city that day and that
19 night; is that correct?
20 A. No, my recollection is after leaving the OP,
21 I headed back that night back down to Belfast.
22 Q. Could I refer to M66.17, paragraph 5, in your
23 Eversheds statement, please?
24 A. I am sorry, it was said earlier, "on the
25 Saturday I returned". I mean, Lord Saville asked me
1 about that, I think, and that is a mistake from the
2 deposition, "on the Friday I returned to Belfast".
3 Q. You returned to Belfast on the Friday night?
4 A. Yes, I did.
5 Q. And after leaving the OP there was an
6 opportunity if you had so chosen to meet or try to make
7 contact with the Northern Ireland Civil Rights
8 Association; is that not correct?
9 A. Well, in the timescale, no, I mean I was at
10 that stage concerned about getting back to Belfast
11 because it is an extra, at least 2, 2 and a half hours
12 from there.
13 Q. I understand about the journey to Belfast,
14 but you were a producer with ITN. In that
15 circumstance, seeing as you had ordered or asked for a
16 second unit to come to the north of Ireland, going to
17 cover the march both sides of the barricade, was there
18 not an obligation or a duty on you to get both sides of
19 the story?
20 A. I do not think so, sir, the point was there
21 was going to be a march.
22 Q. I have to suggest to you that you failed in
23 your duty by not getting both sides of the story when
24 you came to the north of Ireland on that occasion?
25 A. Well, can you help me, I mean you say
1 I missed the story, perhaps you can enlighten me what
2 you think I should have been finding out; what was it
3 that the marchers maybe used as a blind by the IRA?
4 Q. I would suggest to you that as a producer who
5 had overall organisation of the units on the ground on
6 the day that it would have been an appropriate exercise
7 for you to contact the Northern Ireland Civil Rights
8 Association seeing as you contacted the army?
9 A. Well, just to recap: I had been sent to get a
10 feel of what our crews were going through on the
11 ground, and I took advantage of that to see what they
12 had to put up with, okay.
13 When I was in Derry on Friday I had expected,
14 okay, to go to Derry, back down to Belfast on the
15 Saturday and then home, possibly, on the Sunday. It
16 was at the time that I heard, sir, about the
17 Paratroopers coming in that I felt that it altered the
18 situation, and I rang ITN in London and I volunteered
19 to stay.
20 Q. In the context of your remark to this
21 Tribunal that you took a neutral stance in relation to
22 the circumstances in Derry on 30th January, should you
23 not have contacted NICRA?
24 A. I do not see why, I mean what are you sort of
25 wanting me to say as to what I should have asked them?
1 Q. I am saying that it was not an even-handed
2 approach to the situation that was about to emerge in
3 Derry on 30th January?
4 A. Okay, I can explain that. If I had gone to
5 Northern Ireland, okay, specifically sent from London,
6 specifically to cover the march, yes, you would be
7 correct. As it happened around about -- after 4.30
8 when I had heard -- somewhere between 4.00 and 4.30
9 when that news was available, I then offered to stay
10 and then it was a question of getting back to Belfast.
11 I mean, there is a difference between those
12 two positions.
13 Q. I move on, sir, to another topic which is on
14 M66.18, paragraph 9, which takes us to the beginning of
15 events in William Street on the day. Just before
16 I relate to that, could you indicate where you were
17 located -- it is indicated in your statements both to
18 the Widgery Tribunal, particularly in the statement to
19 the Widgery Tribunal, that you were some 15 yards away
20 from your camera unit?
21 A. Yes. When you are at the top of
22 William Street, okay, looking down towards the barrier,
23 camera crew was about halfway down there just outside
24 of missile range.
25 Q. And you were 15 yards behind that?
1 A. I would say -- that would be more than
2 15 yards looking at the map.
3 Q. You were something more than 15 yards?
4 A. 15 yards?
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. Yes, I would have thought it was a greater
7 distance than that.
8 Q. As you looked up the street there were two
9 armoured vehicles as well as numerous military
10 personnel in the street before you; is that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Plus the camera crews, assorted crews, not
13 only your own, but other camera crews?
14 A. I was only, frankly, concentrating, keeping
15 an eye on my camera crew to see that they were okay and
16 not being thumped by missiles.
17 Q. Would it be fair to say that was your focus
18 of attention?
19 A. My focus of attention, what was going on in
20 William Street from where I was standing down to the
21 barricade where the action was, that was the focus of
22 my attention.
23 Q. Subject to the limitations that were placed
24 on your view by your distance back, the number of
25 personnel in the street and the armoured vehicles?
1 A. I mean there was quite a clear view down
2 there.
3 Q. You indicate in your Widgery statement that
4 there was some confusion about a lead for a camera; is
5 that not correct?
6 A. I was asked to get a piece of equipment for
7 the crew which they had left either in the crew car or
8 back at the hotel.
9 Q. And there were obviously discussions about
10 that, you obviously were annoyed that the lead had been
11 left behind and there were questions about whether the
12 lead could be located?
13 A. I do not recall being annoyed at all, I mean
14 --
15 Q. Were you occupied with this; was it in your
16 mind as the march came down through the junction of
17 Chamberlain Street and William Street?
18 A. I had gone down to see the crew. They then
19 asked me, okay, okay, as I was not a member -- I was
20 not filming, if I could go back and get that particular
21 piece of equipment. In no way could I see myself as
22 saying no. If they needed the piece of equipment and
23 I could get it, then a quick sprint there and back,
24 then, fine, there was nothing to argue about.
25 Q. Could I put it to you, therefore, that the
1 missile throwing you saw was after the water cannon
2 went in for the first time?
3 A. Sorry, I would like to refer to my notes
4 logged at the time as to what went on. (Pause).
5 I have it logged on the note as, "4.05, water cannon up
6 after rioters bring up corrugated iron shield".
7 Q. That is the stone-throwing mob that you were
8 referring to in your statement?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. I wonder could you possibly help me with just
11 two pieces of film that may be either used by ITN, the
12 shot by ITN or may have been left on the floor in ITN
13 and used by other people who got the same image on
14 their cameras? Some of this might be your footage.
15 Could I have video 7, part 1 at 840, please?
16 This is as the march came round the corner at
17 approximately the junction of Chamberlain Street and
18 William Street because you mentioned the civil rights
19 banner in your statement. I hope this is the right
20 section, sir, sometimes there is a check in the
21 middle.
22 Perhaps while that is being sought, because
23 there is part 1 and part 2 of video 7, could I ask you
24 this question, Mr Phillips: at no stage, sir, in your
25 evidence either to the Widgery Tribunal or in your
1 Eversheds statement do you mention stewards, stewards
2 on the march?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Why was that?
5 A. Well, I did not see any.
6 Q. Is that probably because when you returned to
7 the scene, the corrugated iron shield was in the
8 streets and that is your major recollection of the day
9 rather than the initial stages of the march when it
10 arrived at William Street?
11 A. No.
12 Q. You did not see any stewards at any stage?
13 A. I am sorry, I cannot recall seeing any
14 stewards down at the barricade.
15 Q. And you did not see any stewards at the
16 junction of Chamberlain Street/William Street?
17 A. Well, you cannot see the junction there from
18 where we were standing.
19 Q. In those circumstances, sir, the question
20 I was going to ask about that particular piece of
21 footage is superfluous because if you could not see it,
22 you could not possibly comment upon it.
23 You did not see stewards at any stage that
24 day?
25 A. I am afraid not, sir.
1 Q. At the barricade at any other time during the
2 course of your attendance at the scene in
3 William Street?
4 A. I am afraid not.
5 Q. Thank you, sir.
6 My apologies, that is the piece of film.
7 Possibly we could look at it, sir.
8 (Video played)
9 That in effect was the situation as the march
10 arrived at the junction. Possibly, could we play it
11 one more time.
12 (Video played again)
13 You did not see this scene, but it is quite
14 clear in the video footage and the photographs that the
15 march actually stopped there and a line of stewards
16 formed. That was the only point I was going to make in
17 relation to it, sir, and I leave it at that. I would
18 not have mentioned it except it came up on the screen.
19 LORD SAVILLE: I think the answer is
20 Mr Phillips would not have seen this scene.
21 Questioned by MR GLASGOW
22 MR GLASGOW: Mr Phillips, my name is Glasgow,
23 I represent many of the individual soldiers, I should
24 tell you, including General Sir Robert Ford. I have a
25 very few questions for you.
1 Could I just ask you about the question of
2 bias reporting that has been put to you and ask you to
3 look again at the first page of your Widgery statement
4 which we have as M66.17?
5 LORD SAVILLE: I think that is the statement
6 to us, Mr Glasgow.
7 MR GLASGOW: I want M66.1, it is the
8 statement to Eversheds, Mr Philips -- I am sorry,
9 paragraph 4. You there gave an explanation to this
10 Tribunal, which I think you have repeated, as to your
11 reasons for wanting a second crew.
12 Would you like to refresh your memory of
13 that?
14 A. Yes, certainly. (Pause).
15 Q. Was it your intention, sir, that one of your
16 crews should see the march from the same point of view
17 as the marchers and one from the army?
18 A. Yes, definitely.
19 Q. Why did you consider that an important step
20 to take?
21 A. Well, it all kicked off with a civil rights
22 march, okay, therefore -- and then we have the army
23 side of the situation. In no way could one crew cover
24 both, you had to have the second crew if you wanted to
25 show the march.
1 Q. Could I ask you, in all ignorance, if I may
2 say so, is there a risk when you have film crews in
3 a situation like this, of real physical danger, that a
4 crew that is on the receiving end of some crowd
5 violence is going to have a different perception than
6 the crew that is working with the crowd, or does that
7 not happen, in your experience?
8 A. Well, I can only talk about the events of
9 Bloody Sunday, but obviously the two crews would have a
10 different perception: one was with the marchers, okay,
11 and the other one was on the thick end of the missiles.
12 Q. You were asked, for example, by my learned
13 friend Mr O'Hanlon who has just asked you some
14 questions, whether you saw or reported about stewarding
15 at all and you said no?
16 A. No, from my side of the barrier from the top
17 of William Street down to the barrier, I am afraid
18 I did not see stewards.
19 Q. Were you aware of the fact that the other
20 crew that you had brought in to watch the march from
21 the marchers' perspective commented on the fact that
22 the march was well-conducted and orderly; did you know
23 that the other ITN crew had specifically given evidence
24 to that effect?
25 A. No, I did not.
1 Q. Am I right in thinking that the two crews --
2 we have the names of your crew, I think on your
3 statement and I will not bother to repeat that -- the
4 other crew I think were: Martin Lewis with Frank Watson
5 and David Roy?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Have you actually seen the statements that
8 those gentlemen made?
9 A. No, I have never seen them.
10 Q. Never seen them at all?
11 A. No, I have not.
12 Q. Were you aware that throughout that day
13 Watson, Roy and Lewis were reporting the events that
14 they saw from the marchers' point of view?
15 A. Well, that is why they were there.
16 Q. That was your intention?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. You are the producer and in overall
19 responsibility for what goes out as the end product,
20 Mr Phillips, or am I wrong about that?
21 A. The bulletin report by Mr Seymour -- I was
22 the producer in the edit room, he was the reporter, so
23 I would say there was the joint responsibility.
24 Q. Joint responsibility?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Was it your intention -- you are the only man
2 here giving evidence on oath, I have to ask you about
3 this, because I understand we may not hear from any of
4 the others -- was it your intention to give a biased or
5 a fair report of what the ITN crews had seen on
6 Bloody Sunday?
7 A. Definitely a fair report.
8 Q. Have you had the opportunity of reading the
9 transcript of what Gerald Seymour actually said and
10 seen in the film that was broadcast again, of which we
11 have seen extracts again?
12 A. Sorry, do you mean his evidence to
13 Lord Widgery's Tribunal?
14 Q. No, sir, I meant his broadcast, statement to
15 camera and his interviews on that night?
16 A. I was shown the film we see here at my
17 deposition.
18 Q. I wonder if the quickest way I think for us
19 just to refresh our memories is if we just look at the
20 extracts from the pages. We have them because the
21 experts have them as E3.0098. Could I take you through
22 those very quickly?
23 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Phillips, you have had
24 quite a long day. If at any stage you would like a
25 break, do let me know.
1 MR GLASGOW: I will take it very shortly if
2 I may, sir: on E3.0098, this is the point at which the
3 transcript, someone has typed-up the noises and the
4 speaking on the film, do you see, and GS is
5 Gerald Seymour.
6 I think you recall from the film we have
7 already seen that his first face-to-camera statement is
8 at the top of that page:
9 "The organisers of this civil rights march
10 promised that they would be non-violent. The army said
11 throughout the day that they hoped to use minimum
12 force, but three hours later ..."; do you remember that
13 statement, that broadcast?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. This is the broadcast for which you take
16 joint responsibility?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. If we go over the page to 0099, is it right
19 that Mr Seymour then interviewed Father Mulvey, I think
20 we know?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And talked to him about the number that were
23 dead and what had happened apparently at the Saracen?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. If we go over the page to page 100, did he
1 then interview Derek Wilford?
2 A. Yes, he did.
3 Q. Do you recall that he put to him the numbers
4 of casualties that were alleged to have been suffered,
5 the fact that there were a number?
6 A. Yes, I think so, yes.
7 Q. Do you recall in the middle of the page that
8 your reporter put to Colonel Wilford what local people
9 were saying about the use of excessive force?
10 A. Mr Seymour did put that question to him, yes.
11 Q. In broadcasting those matters that we have
12 just looked at, were you and/or Mr Seymour intending to
13 give a pro-army propaganda biased account of what had
14 happened on that day?
15 A. No, a balanced, impartial fair account of
16 what had gone on.
17 Q. You have been asked, sir, about the views of
18 your own crew, the team that was with you and you were
19 asked two different questions, first by my learned
20 friend Mr Mansfield and then by my learned friend
21 Lord Gifford. The first question was: whether or not
22 any of the other members of your crew had told you that
23 they had heard automatic fire; do you remember?
24 A. Yes, I remember --
25 Q. And you said that you did not think they had?
1 A. No, they did not.
2 Q. And equally properly you were asked by my
3 learned friend Lord Gifford whether or not you had told
4 them about the automatic fire, and specifically so that
5 it was clear and proper for you to consider whether or
6 not you might have put the idea in their minds?
7 A. I did not put the idea -- I did not discuss
8 it with them.
9 Q. You remember the two questions?
10 A. I do.
11 Q. I can take it very shortly because it is
12 common ground, and the Tribunal has it, but it is right
13 you should know. Mr Seymour has made a statement,
14 Mr Wilkinson has made a statement and Mr Hammond has
15 made a statement. It has very rightly been put to you
16 that they all refer to having heard automatic fire at
17 approximately the same time as you did?
18 A. Fair enough.
19 Q. What I want to ask you is: whichever way
20 round the conversation took place, do those statements
21 result from some conversations between you or, so far
22 as you are aware, are they independent recollections?
23 A. They would be independent recollections.
24 Q. Are you sure of that?
25 A. I am sure, I did not discuss that particular
1 firing with the crew, I mean --
2 Q. At any time, sir?
3 A. At any time.
4 Q. Again, the Tribunal has the advantage of the
5 transcript of all the questions that were asked of all
6 of you at Widgery?
7 A. Yes, of course.
8 Q. I need not put those to you, they speak for
9 themselves perhaps.
10 May I ask you this: until today had anybody
11 ever suggested to you that you were wrong in saying
12 that you had heard automatic fire, or is today the
13 first time that suggestion has been made to you?
14 A. I am certain, I am pretty certain, I would
15 have to go back, but I do not recall it being put to me
16 at Lord Widgery's Tribunal.
17 Q. We have the transcript of that and we know it
18 was not put to any of you. What I am asking you is, of
19 this highly important significant event: over the last
20 29 years has anybody -- your view has been fairly
21 well-known and you being a well-known man -- has
22 anybody suggested to you before that you were wrong in
23 what you had said about automatic fire?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Can I ask you one matter on behalf of General
1 Sir Robert Ford --
2 LORD SAVILLE: Could I interrupt, Mr Glasgow:
3 how much longer are you going to be?
4 MR GLASGOW: About 2 minutes, sir.
5 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Elias, Sir Allan, do you
6 have any questions?
7 MR ELIAS: I have no questions.
8 SIR ALLAN GREEN: I have no questions.
9 LORD SAVILLE: We will carry on then. If it
10 looks like being longer than that, I will ask again.
11 MR GLASGOW: You are being very fair, and
12 I in turn will be as quick as I can. I am conscious
13 for the length of time you have been there as well,
14 sir.
15 This matter on behalf of Sir Robert Ford: you
16 are conscious, and I accept you are right, that he was
17 standing close to you when he made the remark about
18 awfully heavy fire?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Until you became aware of him standing beside
21 you and speaking those words, had you seen him
22 immediately before then?
23 A. No, not immediately before because I am
24 saying I was wrapped up in what was going on down
25 William Street.
1 Q. Do you know where he had been immediately
2 before he spoke those words to you?
3 A. No, sir, I am ...
4 Q. Could I, I think, lastly, sir, take you to
5 the incident that took place in the centre of the
6 wasteground when Gerald Seymour was talking about what
7 had happened with the bodies in a Pig?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Simply setting the scene so as to remind you
10 at the end of a long day, if I may, where we are. You
11 recall that there was conversation about bodies in
12 a Pig?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And I think you recall that was the single
15 inhibition that was placed upon you, that he was told
16 that --
17 A. Peter Wilkinson was told.
18 Q. I do apologise, the cameraman was told that
19 he could not film that?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Is it your recollection that that was the
22 only restriction that was placed upon your filming that
23 day?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And it was clear and firm, they did not want
1 bodies in a Pig being filmed?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. As you were a group, may I say, of obvious
4 journalists with television cameras standing by that
5 Pig while that conversation took place, did anybody
6 approach you at all, a civilian or a priest or anybody
7 else with any complaints about what was going on at
8 that Pig?
9 A. No, I do not recall that.
10 Q. Thank you for your patience with me.
11 Questioned by MR CLARKE
12 MR CLARKE: Could we have on the screen
13 M66.27? These are your notes in relation to
14 28th January. You refer on the left-hand side to a
15 soldier on the Echo roof seeing automatic flashes
16 coming from, was it "last house, upper window"?
17 A. "Empty house".
18 Q. From "empty house, upper window"?
19 A. From "empty house, upper window".
20 Q. Do you have any recollection of seeing those
21 flashes come from an empty house, upper window?
22 A. No, I did not see the flashes.
23 Q. When you made a note that flashes came from
24 an empty house, upper window, is that something that
25 you must have been told?
1 A. Yes, it is.
2 Q. And do you know who told you?
3 A. The only source for that would be from one or
4 more of the officers on the OP.
5 Q. On the opposite side of the same page there
6 is a reference to -- it appears as "Max garage post".
7 We know there is or was at the time an army post at the
8 Mexx garage down in the Brandywell.
9 Did you visit that?
10 A. No, I do not recall visiting.
11 Q. Could we have M66.31? This document looks to
12 me, at any rate so far as the right-hand side is
13 concerned, to be notes about a series of questions that
14 you had it in mind to ask somebody, the army or
15 somebody connected with them, about various constraints
16 they felt and as to whether or not the press coverage
17 hampered them or was irksome in some other way; would
18 that be right?
19 A. Yes, sir, it would.
20 Q. Do you have any idea why this appears now in
21 your notebook at this place in your notebook?
22 A. No, I think it is inefficiency on my part and
23 not keeping, you know, in correct sequence. You know,
24 I just grabbed it out and --
25 Q. Should we suppose that this relates to either
1 28th, 29th, 30th or 31st January 1972?
2 A. Yes, I think what I am putting down there and
3 it may have been on the trip back to Belfast or at some
4 stage on the Saturday, was that, having been put in the
5 picture of the situation in Belfast and Derry, trying
6 to stand back from the scene and thinking of questions,
7 you know, to put in an interview at some stage, okay,
8 if we wanted to say: well, is the situation changing in
9 Northern Ireland, okay, and the army's role there,
10 et cetera, then those would be the sort of questions
11 that we might put to whoever we were going to
12 interview.
13 Q. There are a series of questions on the
14 right-hand side of the page. On the left-hand side of
15 the page there is the slightly cryptic sentence "draw
16 fire, put army in bad light" and the second part on the
17 left-hand side, there is the reference to what would
18 have been the effect of having television in World War
19 One.
20 Should we suppose these two are somehow
21 linked with what is on the right-hand side, or are they
22 independent?
23 A. To me on the layout, it would look as though
24 they were independent.
25 Q. Do you have any idea what they are all about
1 and how they come to be in --
2 A. I am awfully sorry, I cannot help you on
3 that.
4 Q. The last question but two that I wanted to
5 ask you is this: you were asked about where the
6 armoured vehicle was from which two single shots were
7 fired by Paratroopers crouched down by that vehicle
8 when you were down at the north end of block 1 of the
9 Rossville Flats. We can see in the film clip when the
10 officer shouts "cease firing" and "do not fire unless
11 you can identify a target" a number of vehicles in the
12 background of the clip; do you remember?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Would we be right to suppose that the shots
15 were fired from one of those vehicles or not
16 necessarily, from near one of those vehicles?
17 A. I would have thought it would be from one of
18 those vehicles.
19 Q. My penultimate question: I think you said
20 rather a long time ago today that there was some other
21 programme you had been involved in which had something
22 related to Bloody Sunday?
23 A. Yes, it was after I had left ITN and I was
24 working for an American company, NBC News.
25 Q. Do you know what the programme was and when
1 it was broadcast?
2 A. I think it was to do with one of the
3 anniversaries of Bloody Sunday, and I cannot be precise
4 now.
5 Q. It was NBC News, was it?
6 A. Yes, National Broadcasting --
7 Q. Do you recollect whether that had any footage
8 in it which we have not got on the ITN footage that we
9 have?
10 A. No. No, it would not have --
11 Q. It would not?
12 A. No.
13 Q. The last matter I wanted to deal with is not
14 in fact a question, but I think I ought to show you in
15 fairness to you: you were asked some questions by my
16 learned friend Mr Lavery -- could we have on the screen
17 the transcript for Day 9, page 92 -- you were asked
18 some questions by reference to a summary that I gave of
19 some expert evidence that the Tribunal has received
20 which prompted you to make a comment that "if that is
21 what the expert was saying, he ought to have been
22 present on Bloody Sunday".
23 I think in fairness to you, I ought to show
24 you what I am actually recorded as saying, because
25 I think there appears to have been a misunderstanding
1 as to what that was. If we look at where it appears on
2 line 9, page 92, I was referring to the summary of the
3 expert evidence that the Tribunal has received. That
4 includes this passage at 3.2 of the conclusions:
5 "Recordings we have made using individual
6 microphones and also a dummy head system are consistent
7 with and support the above assertion. We therefore
8 conclude that it would be possible for an experienced
9 person to deduce from hearing the crack that a shot
10 from a high velocity firearm had been fired in their
11 general direction.
12 "3.3. We do not know how close a listener
13 needs to be to the bullet's trajectory in order to be
14 able to hear the crack sound from the shock wave."
15 There follows a sub-paragraph which is not
16 presently material. That was what I quoted from the
17 report. If we go to the bottom of the page what I said
18 was this:
19 "What is not however clear from this research
20 is in fact whether it tells us anything about the
21 ability of a listener who is in front of a firearm, in
22 the sense that he is not standing behind the firearm,
23 to distinguish a shot fired from a source which he is
24 facing from a shot fired from a source that is behind
25 him. In other words, to continue the example I was
1 using a moment ago, if it be assumed that I am firing
2 in the direction of Lord Saville, and that a listener
3 is 45 degrees away from the angle of fire and five
4 metres to the side of the line of fire, this research
5 will tell us, as I understand it, that an experienced
6 listener (that is to say somebody who has heard the
7 sound of gunfire before) will be able to tell that a
8 shot is being fired in his general direction and he
9 will be in a different position from somebody who is
10 sitting behind the firer, for instance somewhere behind
11 my back.
12 "But it does not seem, to me at any rate,
13 unless I have misunderstood it, that this research in
14 fact tells us whether the person who is sitting close
15 to the line of fire can distinguish whether the firing
16 is going in the direction from myself to Lord Saville
17 or from Lord Saville to me. Therefore although the
18 report in question was commissioned in order to
19 discover whether one could find whether people were
20 able to distinguish between a shot going over their
21 head in one direction and a shot going over their head
22 in the other direction, I do not believe (unless I have
23 misunderstood it) that it [meaning thereby the report]
24 casts any light on that question and it may be that
25 scientific experiment and investigation can cast no
1 such light."
2 I draw your attention to that in fairness to
3 you. As I made plain in opening, I may have
4 misunderstood what the experts were saying, but in any
5 event my understanding of the report was that it simply
6 told one nothing at all as to whether or not a person
7 is or is not able to distinguish whether the shot that
8 goes above him is coming from in front of him or going
9 from behind him. I thought you might like to see at
10 least my understanding, which might be wrong, of the
11 expert's evidence does not appear to suggest one way or
12 the other, whether it is or is not possible to tell
13 that direction.
14 A. I do have a comment on that, sir, it is this,
15 to go back to one's National Service: that throughout
16 the two years you are required to keep up your
17 marksmanship on what was then the .303 and you do your
18 spell at shooting at targets, and then later it is your
19 turn down at the butts, okay, to be putting the targets
20 up for the other chaps.
21 The sound of the shots going out, okay,
22 towards the target is certainly different to when you
23 are in the butts, okay, and the shots are whistling
24 over your head, and the one that went over my head and
25 the burly Paratrooper, who obviously thought it was the
1 same thing and told me to get down, that was the type
2 of shot that one will hear when you are in the butts
3 and the rifle bullets are coming your way.
4 Q. Thank you, I did not want to ask you any
5 further questions, unless there was anything you wanted
6 to add?
7 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Phillips, thank you very
8 much indeed for coming here to assist this Inquiry,
9 thank you.
10 My information as far as tomorrow is
11 concerned, we have the same witnesses that were already
12 listed, but they are in a slightly different order
13 because we are going to start with Thomas Heaney
14 followed by Gerald McEleney and then Denis Bradley, is
15 that right?
16 MR CLARKE: I understand that, yes.
17 Meanwhile some rather dramatic events have been taking
18 place in the United States of America.
19 LORD SAVILLE: So I gather, yes. We will
20 come back to this at 9.30 tomorrow.
21 (4.30 pm)
22 (Proceedings adjourned until 9.30 am on
23 Wednesday, 12th September 2001)
24 MR DAVID PHILLIPS, sworn
25 Questioned by MR CLARKE.............................. 1
1 Questioned by MR LAVERY............................. 36
2 Questioned by Ms McDermott.......................... 87
3 Questioned by MR MANSFIELD......................... 103
4 Questioned by LORD GIFFORD......................... 150
5 Questioned by MR O'HANLON.......................... 174
6 Questioned by MR GLASGOW........................... 183
7 Questioned by MR CLARKE............................ 194