

Submission to the Government Communications Review Group
Commercialisation of government communications

May 2003

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Much of the debate around government communications has focused on the use of special advisers, the lobby system and the centralisation of the system under Alastair Campbell. This is a legitimate focus and much has been said on this topic which is borne out by our own research.² However the purpose of this submission is to raise a different set of issues which are less often discussed. These relate in particular to the organisation of the civil service and government communications and to the increased role of commercial agencies and commercial criteria in running and evaluating government communications. I wish to concentrate on six aspects. These do not fit very neatly under the headings of the review but are most relevant to the issues of context, politicisation and organisation.

The six aspects are:

- 1. The increasing role of commercial criteria in government communications**
- 2. The effects of market reforms on the civil service**
- 3. The roster of PR consultants**
- 4. Potential conflict of interest.**
- 5. Questions of Propriety**
- 6. Data on government communication**

1. The increasing role of commercial criteria in government communications

PR consultants have historically been very rarely used in government. This has not been for want of trying on behalf of the PR industry, but their attempts to breach a clear hole in the conventions by and large failed. Michael Rice records his biggest regret as chair of

¹ David Miller has written on a variety of aspects of government information and communication. This submission is based on extensive research on the development of the Government Information Service over more than a decade. It has benefited from access to a variety of documentation and interviews with more than one hundred current and former GICS staff as well as journalists, special advisers and trades union representatives. Interviews and data gathering have been undertaken at central government departments (such as DoH, DSS, DETR, MAFF, FCO, MoD), at territorial departments (such as the Welsh Office, Scottish Office and Northern Ireland Office), within devolved administrations such as the Scottish Executive and in agencies such as the COI, the HEA and others. Relevant publications include: *Don't Mention the War: Northern Ireland, propaganda and the media* (Pluto, 1994). *The Circuit of Mass Communication: Media strategies, representation and audience reception in the AIDS crisis* (co-author, Sage 1998); *Open Scotland?: journalists, spin doctors and lobbyists* (co-author, Polygon, 2001). He is currently writing a book on Corporate public relations and lobbying.

² I would point in particular to the arguments put by Stuart Weir in his evidence to the Select Committee on Public Administration. <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmpublicadm/303/2022810.htm>

the Public Relations Consultants Association in 1972-74 as his failure 'to persuade Mrs Thatcher to privatise the Government Information Service' (cited in Charles, 1994). Wholesale privatisation of the GIS (now GICS) has not happened, but the intervening years have witnessed a number of conflicts over the role and function of government information, which have allowed commercial consultancies ever greater access to government publicity service and have commercialised the very culture and structure of information provision. In particular we can point to two episodes at the beginning and end of the Thatcher administrations. In the first MPs with links to the PR industry and some ministers favoured radical reform of the GIS. But this plan was rejected following robust defence by the GIS (Cameron 1997). Ten years later Bernard Ingham, the No.10 press secretary and head of the Government Information Service vetoed a well advanced plan to appoint named PR advisors to three government ministers (Castle, 1990a). Ingham reportedly faxed Party Chairman Kenneth Baker that the proposal was 'an insult to the Government Information Service' (Castle, 1990b: 6; Ford, 1990:2). Just over a month later an adviser was reported as being 'lined up' to work within the civil service for SoS for Employment Michael Howard after he had talks with Martin Sorrell chief executive of WPP (Castle and Judd, 1990). The move was opposed by Information Officers within the Department of Employment (O'Sullivan, 1990) and seems to have come to nothing.

In 1988 Margaret Thatcher commented that:

there is increasing pressure from the public relations industry for Ministers to employ their services in a consultancy capacity. Again it has been the stated policy of successive administrations to rely upon the expertise and experience of the government's own advisers... I consider that the well established conventions in this area should also continue to be observed (cited in IOMU, 1992).

There were fairly clear guidelines in Whitehall on the conventions for using outside PR consultants. These were contained in an annex to the 'Red book' officially titled *A working guide for Government Information Officers* produced by the Information Officer Management Unit (IOMU). This emphasises that 'a high degree of sensitivity' is attached to the engagement of PR agencies and that they should only be employed on 'overt publicity and communications campaigns' (IOMU, 1992: 65) and should not be engaged in 'image building or opinion forming in political support of Ministers' or in building up the image or corporate identity of the Department'. PR consultants should be kept to a 'closely defined and controlled' brief and 'should not be permitted to extend their remit into other areas' (1992: 65).

These restrictions were put in place to safeguard the public interest. In practice, though PR consultancies were able to prise open the conventions via the privatisation of nationalised companies. Throughout the Thatcher years (1979-90) communication and public relations became more important than ever before and the government spent more money on PR and communication advice than any previous administration. This

tendency was especially associated with the privatisation of publicly owned industries and provided a key boost to the PR industry (Miller and Dinan 2000).

2. The effects of market reforms on the civil service

The second key development is the commercialisation of government communications as a result of civil service reforms starting with the Next Steps initiative. This resulted in most Whitehall staff moving into agencies (By 1997 77% percent had been moved). Between 1980 and 1987 the number of higher civil servants leaving for jobs in business increased by 147% (McLean, 1988; Rose, 1988). This is one indication of the 'sea change in the structure and operating procedures of Whitehall' brought on by market reforms (Richards, 1997:44).

The effect of the reforms can be seen by looking at two examples. First the Central Office of Information and second the communication activities of agencies. In both cases the market reforms weakened the public service remit of government communications and led to the erosion of public service standards and the progressive importation of private sector techniques of spin and manipulation.

The Central Office of Information

Until 1984 the COI provided all government publicity as a centrally funded resource. The first of the Conservative reforms of the civil service, the Financial Management Initiative, transformed it into a repayment agency which would eventually compete with outside contractors. As part of this the COI was required to break even. In 1990 the COI was given agency status allowing ministries to look elsewhere for publicity services and in 1992 ministerial responsibility was shifted from the Treasury to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. The changes in the COI meant there was less central co-ordination of publicity services and departments (and their ministers) were responsible for matters of propriety and budgeting in the first instance, thus weakening public service controls.

Indeed according to one insider, the COI often has to resist advertising agency ideas which cross the party political line. "Occasionally an agency comes up with a powerful idea which has to die as soon as COI people see it," the source said. "It may be a good idea but it could be interpreted as party political rather than strictly government. Agencies sometimes try to feature politicians and don't realise that personal publicity for a minister is not allowed." (cited in Walker, 1996)

The slashing of COI staff, the increasing role of market criteria in the COI and the increased contracting out of publicity tasks, all contributed to a decreasing ethos of public service and increased commercial PR techniques in government.

In April 1997 one of the last acts of the Major government was to sell off the COI archive of 12000 publicity films to a private company. As the Independent noted: 'Ironically one of the films passing into the private sector contains an icon of the radical 1945 Labour

government - cycling Charlie. Charlie was created by the left-wing animators Halas and Batchelor to introduce the welfare state to the public' (McCann, 1997:3).

Under Labour the rebranding of the Central Office of Information as COI Communications is a further case in point. In 1996, the new director of the COI, Tony Douglas, a former advertising executive was the first to come from a promotional industry background (Walker 1996). His appointment seems to have set a precedent as his successor, Carol Fisher, was formerly marketing director at Courage, the brewers (Lee 1999). The increasing role of market criteria in advertising campaigns seems set to continue. In September 1997 the COI was ordered to make a profit for the first time (*Campaign* 5 September 1997). In 2002 the new chief Executive Alan Bishop, also came from industry, having been chairman of Saatchi and Saatchi.³

Next Steps and Agencies

According to the COI's director of marketing, Peter Buchanan the 'growth in the number of executive agencies has increased the demand for PR' (cited in Garside, 1998). Agency status removes the rules governing PR and promotional spending, allowing agencies to engage in their own promotional work. This was the case both in terms of employing PR consultants and in relation to whether they remained members of the GICS.

In an early example, Good Relations was hired by the Countryside Commission to reposition itself as an agency outside the civil service (Grantham and Seymour-Ure, 1990: 74). One key rationale for leaving the GICS was that it allowed a breach in pay and conditions structures. There are examples of government press officers leaving post on a Friday and returning as 'consultants' to the same desks the following week at markedly increased salaries. Historically, NHS press officers have not been members of the Government Information Service and with the increased commercialisation of the NHS have resisted incorporation into the GICS partly because their pay rates would be depressed.⁴

Furthermore there has been an increasing tendency for PR or lobbying professionals to be seconded to or work in government departments such as Stephen Sherbourne, (formerly Mrs Thatcher's political secretary, 1983-88) managing director at Lowe Bell who was seconded to Number 10 in 1992 (Hollingsworth, 1997) or Mike Craven of GPC Market Access who worked for free for John Prescott in the Dept of Environment, Transport and the Regions (Castle, 1998). This trend has increased markedly since the Blair government came to power. Labour reforms of the GICS have meant a marked increase in appointments made from outside the civil service, especially from the PR and media industries, coupled with a breach in the pay structures in Whitehall departments. This has

³ <http://www.epolitix.com/bos/epxnews/0000004CCD32.htm>

⁴ Information from Helen McCallum, Director of NHS Corporate Communications, November 1997; Charles Skinner, IOMU, March 1998.

resulted in some very large pay rises for incoming Directors of Information.⁵ The salary of the chief executive of the COI doubled between 1990 and 2000.

Both trends together had a marked impact on the culture of the civil service. As one Director of an ad agency working for government in the late 1980s put it:

In the 1970s the people at the top of a ministry wouldn't be interested in what they saw as 'dirty commercial stuff'. But now, because of the increased use of advertising techniques by politicians, they are much more aware (cited in O'Reilly, 1987)

The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the question of politicisation is not simply a question of special advisers running the GICS, but of a sea change in the culture and organisation of the civil service, which have progressively breached the standards and criteria of operation associated with public service criteria in information provision. This general move is well recognised in the literature on public administration. Here it is noted that the infusion of 'market norms' such as 'individual self-interest, productivity and efficiency' into public administration displaces 'public norms' such as 'accountability, representativeness, equality and responsiveness' (Shamsul 1996). In our research on government information and devolution we obtained documentation on Scottish Office/Scottish Executive media training programmes for ministers and civil servants. This material gave little indication that trainees were being reminded of their responsibility to the public interest and truth. Instead it appeared they were being encouraged to answer selectively: 'the key phrase or message... should be used in answer to the very first question and hopefully also the last... if... the interviewer has asked inappropriate questions... you can try and change or remove questions'. They were also advised that the appearance of sincerity trumped 'facts': 'viewers will be more impressed by sincerity than by a pedantic recital of the facts' (cited in Schlesinger et al, 2001: 146). Such techniques have more similarity to spin tactics than public service.

The conflict between public service and market values is still being played out in the GICS, as is noted by the COI in the outline of its function published as Review Paper 7. Here it is said that 'COI's activities also include the general provision of objective publicity advice (which on occasions, might not necessarily be in COI's own commercial interests)' (p3). This is a clear indication of the difficulties involved in upholding public values such as neutrality in the face of commercial realities.

3. The roster of PR consultants

In 1998, the COI drew up a list of accredited PR companies for the first time (Garside, 1998) and the incoming Labour government made significant use of PR consultants in their first year, employing, for example, a PR agency to sell the New Deal for lone

⁵ Information from Charles Skinner, IOMU, July 1998.

parents for the DSS.⁶ In 2001 eleven new PR firms were added to the list making a total of thirty seven.

There are a number of issues to raise about the roster. First of all the roster is not a public document and the COI refuse to release it. This should be a public document. (It should also be noted that there are now also rosters for other PR and marketing disciplines such as sponsorship. These rosters should also be public).

We have been able to obtain the names of a number of the companies on the roster. We have also traced a number of PR companies which already have government contracts. Again information on these contracts and on their value is not made public. It should be available as a matter of openness and transparency. We assume that many of the companies with government contracts are on the PR roster, but it may be the case that some have been hired without reference to the roster as government agencies are not required to use the COI. In either case it is clear that government bodies are now making extensive use of PR consultancies in their work. Furthermore many of the companies appear to be owned by a small number of multinational communication conglomerates (WPP, Havas, Incepta, Omnicom, Chime). Furthermore government departments have quietly hired lobbying/public affairs firms to engage in activities which go far beyond information or publicity work as defined in the official guidelines cited above. GJW, for example, worked for the DTI on behalf of the Major British Exporters Group and was retained by the Transport and Environment departments to 'defuse opposition to the Okehampton bypass project in Devon' (Rose, 1988). The data in Appendix 2 suggests that this trend - first identified in the late 1980s - has continued. For example lobbying firm Citigate public affairs lists contracts with eleven separate UK government agencies.

The extent to which the work of either lobbying or PR consultancies is properly bound by government conventions on impartiality is an open question as is the extent to which there is proper oversight of their work. This needs full investigation and reform if public confidence is to be rebuilt.

4. Potential conflict of interest.

⁶ PR or other publicity agencies are awarded contracts for particular pieces of publicity work (such as the contracting out of press cuttings services by the Scottish Office and the Department of Health or of corporate design by the Scottish Office (Douglas, 1988; McAskill, 1989)), or for more general public relations work. Profile PR set up and ran the press office of the Audit Commission (later run by Shandwick Public Affairs) and administered the Council of Europe press office (Rose, 1988). But PR advisers have also been retained to advise Ministers in more politically contentious areas. For example, Shandwick and others advised the Foreign Office on public relations activity during the Gulf War in 1991 ('Ministers get marketing advice', *The Guardian*, 14 January 1991); Lowe Bell were also secretly employed as special advisors to the Energy Secretary on Water privatisation in addition to the joint industry/government PR advisors in breach of the official guidelines cited above (Hollingsworth, 1997). Furthermore government departments have quietly hired lobbying/public affairs firms to engage in activities which go far beyond information or publicity work. GJW, for example, worked for the DTI on behalf of the Major British Exporters Group and was retained by the Transport and Environment departments to 'defuse opposition to the Okehampton bypass project in Devon' (Rose, 1988).

There is a further issue about the roster, which is that the Government communications review group includes four members working for or associated with PR companies. This raises the issue of conflict of interest since their firms may be bidding for work on government contracts in the future and they are thus not disinterested actors. As far as we are aware, the group has not made any declaration of interests, or of conflict of interest in this regard. This point is strengthened by the data revealed in Appendices 2 and 3. This shows that two members of the review group work for (or have been associated with) PR companies which have either directly or indirectly (through subsidiaries) a financial interest in government communications. Chime Communications (Rupert Howell) owns Good Relations (David Hill). Good Relations, along with other Chime owned companies Bell Pottinger PR and the Quentin Bell Organisation all have government PR contracts. Government clients include the COI, DfES, DTLR, Royal Mail and Crown Estates. At best this is a problem of public perception in that the PR firms in question already benefit from financial relationships with government and stand to gain significantly should such relations continue or expand.

5. Questions of Propriety

Some of the PR consultants on the government roster have been associated with public scandal and alleged wrongdoing. Without prejudging these cases, the contrast between these areas of concern and the problems reportedly found in the GICS is notable. None of the concerns about Alastair Campbell, the Jo Moore/Sixsmith affair or the selective use of briefing, have come near the seriousness of the allegations made against some of the agencies on the roster or represented on the communications review group. To name only the most well known; the role of Hill and Knowlton in deceptive PR for the tobacco industry, in relation to the 1991 Gulf War and in working for a wide range of regimes with questionable human rights records (e.g. Turkey, Indonesia).⁷; the role of Beattie Media in both the lobbygate scandal in Scotland and in the monitoring of health and safety campaigners for a US Semiconductor company⁸; the involvement of the Maitland Consultancy in 'dirty tricks' for British Gas⁹; The criminal conviction against the name of Sir Tim Bell of Chime Communications together with the allegations of involvement in at best questionable public relations activities.¹⁰ Whether these allegations are true or not, the point is that employing such consultancies in the public service surely raises questions of propriety of a quite different sort to those raised by the conduct of either special advisers or Government Information Officers. Furthermore the extent to which standards appropriate in the service of the public are either understood by, or enforceable against consultancies, is rather hazy.

⁷ J. MacArthur (1992) *Scound Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War*, University of California Press.

⁸ P. Schlesinger, D. Miller and W. Dinan (2001) *Open Scotland*, Edinburgh: Polygon, Ch 10-13; 'Microchip firm spied on union man: National Semiconductor hired PR girls to dupe BBC investigation into health record. By Neil Mackay Home Affairs Editor', *Sunday Herald*, 19 August 2001 <http://www.sundayherald.com/17662>

⁹ David Michie, (1998) *The Invisible Persuaders*, London: Bantam Press: 104-148.

¹⁰ Mark Hollingsworth (1997) *The Ultimate spin doctor: The life and Fast Times of Tim Bell*, London: Hodder and Stoughton.

6. Data on government communication

The question of how communication across government as a whole can be organised requires us to understand the range of activities currently undertaken by government and to have a sense of the numbers and roles of staff involved. In some of the Review documents (Especially document 2) there is a confusion between the Government Information and Communication Service and communication activities across government. The two are not the same and treating the former as if it were the latter is unhelpful in analysing organisational structures and how they might be reinvented. To put it clearly: The GICS is an organisation to which only a proportion of government communication staff belong. It is difficult to know precisely what proportion, since figures appear not to be publicly available, but GICS members may well make up less than half of such staff involved in communication. Appendix 3 compares the figures for GICS members in government departments and associated bodies with data derived from the IPO booklet. This suggests that GICS members make up a third to a half of government communication staff. Discrepancies are marked in part because of historical patterns such as the lack of GIS/GICS members amongst Northern Ireland information staff, but also because of the reforms of the GICS. This discrepancy is notable in the COI where only around one sixth of staff are GICS members and perhaps most bizarrely in the GICS Development Centre where only 102 staff out of 165 appear to be members of the GICS. The Review team should have comprehensive data on government communications before it in order to be able to recommend how its organisation should change. If evidence based policy is the accepted norm, there should be accurate and up to date information available to the review team.

Similar questions arise over the extent of spending on outside PR and lobbying consultants and in relation to the numbers of people now working full time in the private sector on government information and PR activities. This is especially the case in areas where whole units of government publicity work have been contracted out to the private sector. One key example is overseas publicity. Paid for by the Foreign Office, this used to be undertaken by the COI but is now contracted out. A full account of this work including the activities of the London Radio Service¹¹, London Television Service¹² and the newer British Satellite News¹³ is necessary.

Given the general need for transparency and openness in government information work, the extent to which these services are allowed to operate in a semi covert fashion should also be on the agenda. These are publicity operations wholly paid for by the tax payer and yet they seem curiously reluctant to state that this is the case in their online presence.¹⁴ According to COI documents the 'distinguishing feature' of this kind of

¹¹ <http://www.lrs.co.uk/user/default.cfm>

¹² <http://www.londontv.com/>

¹³ <http://www.bsn.org.uk/>

¹⁴ See for example:

- 'London Radio Service (LRS) is an international producer and syndicator of sponsored radio programmes. LRS supplies high quality, free to air, audio programming content in several languages to radio stations, Internet sites, journalists and audio broadcasters all over the world. Produced by

service is that the material is 'broadcast by a station as if it were its own'. COI sources have disclosed that some foreign broadcasters are not aware that the material - which is given away free - is British government publicity material (Cited in Miller 1994:127-8).

Conclusions

There is a need for the review to examine the question of commercialisation of government information as it can and does conflict with issues of propriety. A full review of government information services run by private agencies should be instituted to examine both the extent of such work and the practical application of rules on propriety. In particular FCO funded overseas publicity operations are currently run on a less than open and transparent basis. It appears that the lack of openness is used to deliberately mislead potential users of the service about its British government orientation, agenda and funding.

There is a need for much more openness in the area of government communications, both in terms of communications activity and in terms of information about government communications activities. Full data should be available on

- The numbers of staff engaged in communications activities throughout government
- How much they cost
- The identities of all PR and other marketing consultants on government rosters and with government contracts.
- The value of each contract should be published

There is a need for more effective oversight of government publicity activities.

- There is a need for a radical reshaping of the rules on propriety to ensure the quality and impartiality of information provision is safeguarded and to remove the elements of spin and manipulation which appear to have been imported into the GICS. In general there should be a presumption in favour of public service and against the use

Medialink, LRS is used by thousands of radio broadcasters in more than 120 countries.'

<http://www.lrs.co.uk/user/default.cfm>

- 'In addition to TV sales LTS has unique experience of licence free or sponsored TV distribution. We have distributed and produced the monthly half-hour TV magazines UK Today and Contact for many years. As a result of our marketing campaigns the number of stations broadcasting UK Today increased by 60 % over 5 years reaching 600 in August 2002. We have contact details and station profiles for all these stations. The estimated global annual audience reach for UK Today and Contact is 300 million. UK Today is also used by 432 non-broadcast outlets including the British Council and airlines for inflight entertainment.' <http://www.londontv.com/>
- ' About BSN: British Satellite News (BSN) is a free television news and features service, which provides you with coverage of worldwide topical events and stories from a British perspective. Our dedicated team of experienced television journalists specialise in producing topical stories that inform and entertain a global audience. '[http://www.bsn.org.uk/80256A1600613794/\(httpPages\)/8FDEF4E8B0BB010580256A1B004419BD?OpenDocument](http://www.bsn.org.uk/80256A1600613794/(httpPages)/8FDEF4E8B0BB010580256A1B004419BD?OpenDocument)
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of private sector bodies as their use will only lead to further public distrust of government.

- There is a need for all government information activities to be regulated by this code.
- No consultant should be employed in government communication without being on the rosters.
- The criteria for access to the rosters should include a binding code of conduct for PR consultants. They should be required to sign up to the highest standards of the public service as if they were public servants. The code should also include stringent provisions in relation to conflict of interest between government and private clients. There should also be a public interest test which would exclude consultants which engage in deceptive practices and those who engage in activities or work for clients which are contrary to the public interest such as non-democratic regimes or unethical firms. Punishment for breaches of the code would include removal from the roster.
- The rules on the use of PR and lobbying consultants should be tightened to ensure that image making and lobbying (public affairs of government affairs) are not undertaken as these are contrary to public service ideals and often involve deceptive PR techniques.
- There should be independent oversight of these questions. One obvious way for this to be done would be to make this job the responsibility of the Freedom of Information Commissioner. This would of course entail full power of disclosure. Alternatively a separate government information commissioner could be appointed.

There should be organisational reform of government information to bring all government information staff under the protection of the reinforced code of conduct. This process should be undertaken in full consultation with the relevant trades unions.

The review team should declare all of their financial interests in government information work including those held by their own companies or other companies in the group. If there are confirmed conflicts of interest - as there appear to be - then the relevant members of the review team should withdraw from the review.

Appendix 1 The COI PR Roster

COI PR roster	Parent company	Source
August.One Communications		http://www.coi.gov.uk/whatsnew/press/20010903b.shtml
Band & Brown		http://www.coi.gov.uk/whatsnew/press/20010903b.shtml
Beattie Media		http://www.coi.gov.uk/whatsnew/press/20010903b.shtml
Cohn and Wolfe	WPP	JOE LEPPER 'MAJOR OVERHAUL AS COI REVIEWS POUNDS 35M ROSTER' <i>PR Week</i> , April 13, 2001, Pg. 1
Consolidated Communications		JOE LEPPER 'MAJOR OVERHAUL AS COI REVIEWS POUNDS 35M ROSTER' <i>PR Week</i> , April 13, 2001, Pg. 1
Daniel J Edelman		http://www.coi.gov.uk/whatsnew/press/20010903b.shtml
Financial Dynamics	Cordiant	http://www.coi.gov.uk/whatsnew/press/20010903b.shtml
Fishburn Hedges		http://www.coi.gov.uk/whatsnew/press/20010903b.shtml
Forster Lamond		http://www.coi.gov.uk/whatsnew/press/20010903b.shtml
GCI	Grey Global	JOE LEPPER 'MAJOR OVERHAUL AS COI REVIEWS POUNDS 35M ROSTER' <i>PR Week</i> , April 13, 2001, Pg. 1
Geronimo		http://www.coi.gov.uk/whatsnew/press/20010903b.shtml
Good Relations	Chime	http://directories.mad.co.uk/mw/ccs/index.asp
Hill and Knowlton	WPP	JOE LEPPER 'MAJOR OVERHAUL AS COI REVIEWS POUNDS 35M ROSTER' <i>PR Week</i> , April 13, 2001, Pg. 1
Ketchum		http://www.coi.gov.uk/whatsnew/press/20010903b.shtml
Kinross and Render*		http://www.kinrossrender.com/aboutus/history.php
Luther Pendragon		http://www.coi.gov.uk/whatsnew/press/20010903b.shtml
The Red Consultancy		http://www.coi.gov.uk/whatsnew/press/20010903b.shtml

Appendix 2

Selected PR companies with government contracts	Parent company	Government clients
AS Biss	Emborough	Civil Aviation Authority
Beattie Media**	N/A	COI Scottish Enterprise
Bell Pottinger PR	Chime	COI Communications Heritage Lottery Fund
Biss Lancaster Euro RSCG	Havas	COI (DEFRA/DCMS)
Citigate Communications Ltd	Incepta	Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission
Citigate Northern Ireland	Incepta	Industrial Development Board for Northern Ireland Department of Education and Learning
Citigate Public Affairs	Incepta	Audit Commission for England and Wales Audit Scotland British Transport Police British Waterways Countryside Council for Wales English Heritage English Nature Environment Agency Highlands and Island Enterprise Scottish Natural Heritage Strategic Rail Authority European Commission
Clear	N/A	Department of Health Economic and Social Research council Electoral Commission East Kent Hospital NHS Trust The Home Office South Buck Health Authority Surrey Ambulance Service Surrey and Sussex Health Trust Sussex Police West Kent Health Authority Worthing Health Authority
Cohn and Wolfe	WPP	Cabinet Office Consignia: Royal Mail Parcelforce The Post Office

The Communication Group	N/A	The Crown Estate Welsh Development Agency
Countrywide Porter Novelli	Omnicom	Department of Trade and Industry Department of Health
Flagship Group	Flagship Group	Department of Trade and Industry
Golley Slater PR	Golley Slater Group	COI Companies House National Assembly for Wales National Museum for Wales Territorial Army Wales Tourist board WDA Food Directorate Welsh Development Agency
Good Relations	Chime	Commission for Health Improvement* Crown Estates Meat and Livestock Commission New Opportunities Fund* Royal Mint
Grayling Group	Havas	Welsh Development Agency Investors in people Financial Services Authority Food Services Agency
Harrison Cowley	Huntsworth	DfES UK Atomic Energy Authority
Hatch Group	N/A	Scottish Arts Council Scottish Enterprise Scottish Qualifications Authority
Hill and Knowlton	WPP	Department for Education and Skills
Kinross and Render	N/A	DfES - Connexions MAFF The Radiocommunications Agency
Ogilvy PR	WPP	Royal Mail
Quentin Bell Organisation	Chime	COI communications Countryside Agency DfES DTLR Parcelforce Royal Mail Royal Mail Special Delivery
Rowland Communications	Saatchi and Saatchi	The British Army The Territorial Army

Source: Unless otherwise stated the source for this data is *The PRCA Yearbook 2002*, London: PRCA.

* <http://www.goodrelations.co.uk/political.asp>

** <http://www.beattimedia.co.uk/clientList.asp>

Appendix 3

Members of the Government Information and Communication Service compared with information staff in various departments.

Key departments	*	**
Prime Minister's Office	17	26
Office of the DPM	28	56
HM Treasury	8	29
Lord Chancellor's Department	14	33
Foreign Office	31	37
DEFRA	35	100
DFID	6	14
Department for Transport	38	89
DOH	41	110
Northern Ireland Office	4	14
MOD	111	199
DCMS	12	17
DFES	66	112
GICS Centre in the Cabinet Office	102	165
Total	503	1000
Other organisations with 10 or more GICS staff		
COI	57	335
Health and Safety Executive	35	57
HM Customs and Excise	14	36
Office for National Statistics	12	15
Scottish Executive	45	71
Total	173	514
Organisations with more than ten staff not included in Review Paper 2		
British Waterways	-	14
Buckingham Palace	-	11
Commission for Health Improvement	-	12
Food Standards Agency	-	29
Devolved NI Depts	-	40

* Review Paper 2, **Government Communications Review Group**

** **IPO Directory January 2003, COI Communications.**

Explanatory note:

This table compares the figures for members of the GICS given in Review paper 2 with those derived from the COI booklet Information and Press Officers in Government Departments (the IPO Directory). The figures in the IPO directory are not thought to be an accurate count of the numbers of staff working in communication in the selected departments. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that they are an underestimate. This is because there are a number of government agencies which are not included. There are a large number of information staff working in the National Health Service who are not included in the figures, the data on the Royal mail understates their extensive staff. Additionally the IPO does include some support staff, though a comparison with Written Answers in *Hansard* often reveals staff numbers greater than are listed in the IPO Directory. The overall conclusion is that there is a need for reliable data in this area.

References

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