THE REVIEW OF POLICING
BY SIR RONNIE FLANAGAN
FINAL REPORT
In the 9 months since I was commissioned to review policing in England and Wales, I have met, worked with and consulted the widest possible range of people from both within the policing family and the wider world. I am grateful for the range of experience and expertise that they have offered to me and could not be more impressed by the enthusiastic desire of all parties to make a contribution to better policing in England and Wales.

In September 2007, I presented the Home Secretary with my interim report, which focused largely on reducing unnecessary bureaucracy and embedding Neighbourhood Policing. In doing so I highlighted the importance of understanding the way in which ‘risk aversion’ drives so much unnecessary bureaucracy and the crucial role which working in partnership with other agencies to develop effective neighbourhood management has in fulfilling the police service’s role in community safety.

Now, as I present this final report to the Home Secretary, I have reflected on the ways in which the job of ‘policing’ has changed since I became a constable almost 40 years ago. From research and discussion with senior colleagues and, most of all, by visiting the frontline and talking with officers carrying out the day to day work of modern policing, I have been struck by the far greater range of demands which the police service now faces.

Many of these tasks, such as helping to manage offenders in the community and engaging in vital child protection work, would once not have been seen as ‘police work’. Some of those that would, such as combating the renewed but different terrorist threat and dealing with serious and organised criminality, have still been areas of significantly enhanced responsibilities. Whilst all of these tasks must be undertaken, each of them places demand upon our resources and time.

In considering how best we can meet these challenges, I have sought to use my professional experience to look more than just a few years ahead and instead to offer a vision for what policing well into the 21st century should look like. Its most fundamental principle is that policing must deploy its resources to fight the threats which the public face; to minimise the harm which crime causes and to manage the risks which the police services manages on behalf of the public. Given the range of the demands on policing and the changing nature of our world, this will mean dynamic and flexible policing which can prioritise and respond to changing needs.
In this report, I discuss how we can build this sort of policing and make recommendations about the sorts of changes which are needed to deliver it. But, of course, this report is not an end in itself. I look forward to the Home Office’s forthcoming Green Paper, due in the spring, which will be an important opportunity to take forward the debate about how to reform policing.

Furthermore, so that the findings of this review are taken forward and implemented successfully, I will be reporting on the progress which has been made on my recommendations in 6 and 12 months time and, where there is ongoing work still underway, I will be publishing a series of further papers.

Most importantly of all, since, as I have always felt, policing is much too important, and too impactive on all our lives to be left to the police alone, I look forward to the informed public debate that we need to have about the sort of policing we want for the future.

Sir Ronnie Flanagan GBE QPM
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THE CHALLENGES OF POLICING ENGLAND AND WALES IN 2008

Introduction
Policing over recent years has undergone significant change. While resources available to the police service have increased considerably, the threats and tasks the police have to manage have also considerably expanded, just as the social context in which policing is conducted has changed. In this introduction, I seek to examine the most important changes that have occurred over the last decade; to highlight the successes that have been achieved, and the challenges which policing faces today, if it is to deliver a high quality service and to continue to meet the demands placed upon it.

Resources and Performance
Over the last decade, policing in England and Wales has seen major increases in both funding and performance. In ten years central spending on policing has risen by nearly £5 billion (an increase of 39% in real terms). This extra funding has resulted in a 25% growth in the overall police workforce and a 10% increase in the number of police officers, which now stands around 140 000.

These additional resources have undoubtedly contributed to a significant improvement in performance, with crime falling by a third since 1997 and public confidence in the police, which had been falling consistently since 1982, rising since 2003/4. These improvements have been supported by a greater emphasis on performance management, both centrally from the Home office and internally within individual forces. Developments such as the Police Performance Assessment Framework have played a role in creating robust comparative data and focusing on many important areas of delivery.

Despite these achievements, of which the service can rightly be proud, challenges remain to be overcome in the coming years. The Home office’s Comprehensive Spending Review settlement of inflation-only increases will translate to tougher police funding settlements, which will demand greater efficiency and productivity if the service is to continue to deliver high quality policing to the public. Similarly, the service must strive to increase the public’s trust and confidence and to ensure that fewer people are victims of crime (especially serious crime) and, to do so, will require a performance management system which creates the right incentives for success.

Demands and complexity
The role of the police service has expanded and the range of issues it manages has diversified. As public expectations have grown and policy priorities have multiplied, the service now not only takes responsibility for its ‘traditional’ functions, but also for many new ones, which require different skills and different ways of working.

These developments mean that policing now ranges from counter terrorism and civil emergencies, to child protection; to the management of sex offenders in the community; to anti-social behaviour; to community policing. As the interim report sought to indicate, this diverse portfolio is bound together by the key goal of protecting the public. These new challenges have been met with innovative approaches. The development of Neighbourhood Policing and the creation of the
role of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) being two such examples. However, in other areas the strains are visible, with, for example, the Police Federation stressing that officers engaged in ‘response policing’ face increasingly difficult conditions due to the volume of issues that now fall to them.

These increased demands contribute to the deeper complexity of policing in England and Wales today. Officers at all levels must be able to mix the disciplined and hierarchical working culture of a uniformed service, with the sorts of skills required to work cooperatively in partnership with colleagues from other agencies. Public attitudes to risk have become more acute. The legal context has developed, with a greater emphasis on the duties of care which the service owes to the public and which individual forces owe to their officers.

One particular area of change in the area of delivering modern policing and managing the additional complexities has been the increased role and responsibility of the superintending ranks. With the advent of the Basic Command Units coming to the fore in terms of delivery of frontline policing services, the role of superintendent has never been of greater significance.

Neither these increased demands nor the additional complexities are negative in themselves. It is in many ways a tribute to the capabilities of the service that both the public and policy makers look to it to solve or manage new problems as they arise. Increased complexity can be the outcome of positive developments elsewhere in society, or a reflection of clearer understanding of previously ignored factors. In combination however, these factors make providing high quality policing more difficult, because they place further claims on finite resources and because they challenge the service to develop new ways to manage and succeed.

**The Public Debate about Policing**

Policing is far too important to be left to the police alone. It is a public service and one that can only be effectively carried out with the support and consent of the public. Using and developing this engagement with the public is one of the most important challenges in modern policing and it is a challenge that must be met at all levels.

At the local level, the police service needs to engage with communities to understand their needs and respond to them. At the national level, it will require all of those who contribute to the public debate about policing – in political parties, in the media and within the ‘policing family’ – to engage in an honest discussion about the future of policing.

To deal with the range of challenges that policing faces, difficult questions, such as where should the police service do less and where might public expectations be unrealistic, must be discussed in an informed way that reflects the importance of making the right, rather than the easy, decisions for the future.

**Conclusion**

This Review has considered the evidence of recent times and the challenges which policing now faces. Its conclusion is that the collective impact of these challenges over the coming years will require a radically new approach to policing which I seek to address in the next section.
A VISION OF SUCCESSFUL 21ST CENTURY POLICING

Overview

Policing in England and Wales finds itself 'at a crossroads'. The range and scale of the challenges which it faces means that very serious decisions must be taken, not simply by the police service itself but by everyone involved in policing, about how we can best succeed over the next decade and beyond. One option would be to match the growing complexity of modern policing by seeking to specify every outcome and control and bureaucratise every aspect and process, from the centre to the force and within the force from the chief constable to the constable, in an attempt to cover every risk and meet every demand. To me, however, such a response would fail to acknowledge that a fundamentally different, more dynamic model is essential.

This report sets out an alternative vision of what successful 21st century policing should look like. At its centre is the argument that, as the demands placed on policing become more complicated and stretching, the service’s ability to fight the threats which the public face, to minimise the harm which crime causes and to manage the risks which it faces, is critically important if it is to both combat serious crime and build local confidence. This section explores how this simple operational goal must be incorporated into all aspects of modern policing to create a flexible, effective way of delivering public protection in the 21st century and highlights the key reforms that are required to achieve the simplest – but best – test of success: the right people in the right places at the right times, doing the right things, in partnership, for the public.

The right people in the right places at the right times

The report provides a comprehensive account of how the systems and structures of policing in England and Wales must adapt, at all levels, to ensure that police officers and staff are in ‘the right places at the right times’ to protect the public.

This will require the redesign of the central structures which support policing; more strategic vision from the Home Office; more effective support from such bodies as my own Inspectorate¹, from the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), and a performance system (APACS)² that focuses much more on key outcomes such as trust and confidence, so to create the space for entrepreneurial and innovative solutions from the leaders of the police service at all levels. These must in turn be supported and challenged by better training and development in resource management and tougher testing of their skills. Similarly, the funding formula used to distribute central funding to individual forces should, in future Spending Reviews, objectively and transparently allocate resources to have the maximum impact on what I later define as ‘threat, harm and risk’.

¹ Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC).
² The Assessment of Policing and Community Safety, currently subject to consultation.
At force level, this will involve in depth assessment of both where officers and staff can make the biggest difference on the streets and of where the greatest risks to the public lie. It will also mean concentrating on high impact areas where efficiencies can be found, such as better demand management and procurement and fully exploiting the benefits of new technology, such as global positioning systems, to maximise the resources to be deployed on the frontline in the most effective ways possible.

Doing the right things

It is vital, given the range of tasks the police service now carries out, that opportunities are found to reduce the needless drain of unnecessary bureaucracy and free up space so that officers and staff can concentrate on the important parts of their jobs. The report addresses both the systemic drivers of unnecessary bureaucracy and brings forward concrete recommendations to reduce it in ways equivalent to more than 3,000 additional officers.

First and foremost, this means that better understanding of risks to the public is matched by a better understanding of the dangers of risk aversion, within the service and in wider society. This acknowledgement must be translated to a more proportionate approach to crime recording with serious offences comprehensively recorded and lower level offences dealt with in a more streamlined way. It must be complemented by better processes for the important work which the police service carries out with the criminal justice system, using virtual courts to free up police time and rationalising processes like case file preparation.

In partnership

Policing is not simply the preserve of the police. Modern policing is carried out in partnership with a wide range of local agencies, from councils to primary care trusts to schools. The success of Neighbourhood Policing demonstrates how productive this approach can be in building trust and confidence and combating so-called 'low level' crimes that can blight people’s lives and causes significant harm.

The report’s recommendations highlight how this success can be used to support the development of the effective local partnerships which are critical not only to successful Neighbourhood Policing but policing at all levels: from well-designed central support from the NPIA; to building skills in those who work in these areas; to encouraging leadership from the most appropriate person working in a partnership, regardless of which organisation they come from.

For the public

The public must always be the single most important aspect of policing. Not just because their protection, trust and confidence are the key outcomes that policing must achieve but, crucially, because it is only by engagement with the public that the police service can truly know where its targets and priorities should be. The report’s research demonstrated that for most people, accountability, in practice, means how their local streets are being policed and how the police are treating them.
The report builds on this finding by making a number of recommendations to improve citizen focus and community engagement to ensure that the police service is doing all that it can at this very local level to respond to the public, and to give them the sort of high quality service they should expect and demand. It also considers the question of how governance structures can best match the complexity of modern policing, in order to integrate the importance of local issues with serious crime and the need for regional and national responses to some problems, and it analyses options for how formal local accountability structures could be changed.

**Conclusion**

The original commission of this Review was to examine four separate issues namely (a) making most efficient use of resources, (b) embedding neighbourhood policing, (c) reducing bureaucracy and (d) enhancing local accountability. The interim report was indeed written in these separate sections. As was indicated in that report however, these are so over-lapping that it is felt that they are best addressed in this ‘final report’ in a different structure. The following chapters are thus:

- **Chapter 1 – Threat, harm and risk**
- **Chapter 2 – Central structures and systems that support 21st century policing**
- **Chapter 3 – Improving performance at force level**
- **Chapter 4 – Developing the police workforce**
- **Chapter 5 – Freeing up space**
- **Chapter 6 – Delivering in partnership**
- **Chapter 7 – Involving local people**
CHAPTER 1 – THREAT, HARM AND RISK

Introduction

1.1 The key question within this report is how the police service can best deploy its resources between three fundamental - and often conflicting objectives - which lie at the heart of policing:

- The need to minimise the threats facing the public;
- The need to reduce the harm which crime causes; and
- The need to have contingencies in place to manage any residual risks.

1.2 This approach is not only about how forces themselves make decisions on performance and productivity. Taking these objectives as our starting point gives us a wider view of the policing terrain that we are likely to face in the 21st century.

1.3 I do not mean to suggest that this approach has not been at the heart of the best of policing for years. From frontline, operational situations to chief constables making strategic decisions, an appreciation of shifting priorities and changing environments has always been critical to effective policing. However, in acknowledging this, I also want to emphasise that, in light of the range of challenges that policing now faces, we must do more to support this approach and ensure that all of the systems and structures, from the national to the force to the local, are supporting its delivery.

Definitions and Application

1.4 Modern policing needs to make decisions between competing objectives, new demands and changing circumstances. Against this backdrop, a well developed understanding of how these decisions can best be made is critical to making the right decisions and providing the best possible service to the public.

1.5 The table below briefly describes what each element of ‘Threat, Harm and Risk’ means in the context of policing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Threat’</th>
<th>The scope and intensity of the demands which a force’s intelligence leads it to believe it faces.</th>
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<tr>
<td>‘Harm’</td>
<td>The total cost to society from the these demands being unmanaged by the police service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Risk’</td>
<td>The residual risk that remains when all of a force’s resources have been allocated and deployed to mitigate the threat. This risk then remains to be managed and will require resilience and flexibility in forces’ workforces and strategies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.6 This ‘Threat, Harm and Risk’ approach is not only a way of allocating policing resources in a way that maximises police productivity and performance by focusing on the right things. If done properly it also highlights important areas for development in the other areas which the Review was asked to consider: reducing unnecessary bureaucracy, mainstreaming Neighbourhood Policing and improving local accountability.

1.7 As I have explained in my vision for 21st century policing, it is not only important that we have the right people in the right places at the right times but that they are doing the right things. An important component of this is freeing up the space which officers need to focus on priorities and, as chapter 5 of my report details, this will involve reducing unnecessary bureaucracy and improving processes.

1.8 Similarly, Neighbourhood Policing and the wider area of local accountability are critical to ‘Threat, Harm and Risk’ because we can only fully understand what matters to the public, what their local priorities and concerns are and how policing can best serve them by engaging with them and responding to their views. In chapters 6 and 7 of this report I highlight how the police service can build on the progress which Neighbourhood Policing has made and improve its engagement with the public to develop its understanding in these areas and generate greater trust, confidence and cooperation from communities.

1.9 I also make clear in several areas that some of the challenges which the police service faces, for example serious and organised crime and terrorism, require management and capabilities at a national or regional level. We must ensure that these important priorities, which have the capacity to do serious harm to the public, are properly incorporated into the overall delivery of policing in England and Wales.

Context

1.10 The increased public spending on policing in recent years has been largely manifest in increased numbers of those involved in policing. It is now clear however that this growth cannot continue indefinitely and the funding settlement for the next three years holds resource at a level point. However, public expectations of the police and the high-level Public Service Agreements which set out our priorities on crime remain demanding.

1.11 If forces are to meet these expectations, or want to do something different with essentially the same level of resource, then they will have to look at how they can use their resources more efficiently. This is the essence of improving productivity – it is about doing more with the same resources – making them go further by improving their deployment to deliver better outcomes.
1.12 To achieve this the police service needs a more convincing and coherent productivity case than we have now and fully realising the benefits from the ‘Threat, Harm, Risk’ approach is a crucial way in which this can be done. Within this approach, there is significant scope for improving productivity. In order to do this the service must also be aware of some of the issues which have previously hampered such attempts. The debate about policing has often had too great a focus on inputs, such as the growth of police officer and PCSO numbers, rather than a focus upon what those staff are actually doing and what outcomes they are supporting through their work. Similarly, the police performance regime has not always adequately dealt with all of the issues that go to make up police productivity.

1.13 As awareness of the productivity agenda increases there is a danger that the issue will be split into two separate challenges – one focusing on achieving outcomes, and the other on the level of resource spent. However, these two issues are inter-dependent and there needs to be one conversation about productivity and performance, in the context of the overall approach of mitigating and managing threat, harm and risk. In doing so, we can move the debate away from discussing inputs such as officer numbers, to what those officers are achieving and how.

1.14 At the same time we need to recognise that our knowledge base about productivity is less developed than in other sectors, as this has not been an area of high priority. The process of reducing crime is not straightforward with many variables which the police do not necessarily control (such as wider, societal changes and the state of the economy). This is of course not unique to policing. Both health and education, for example, have to address challenges presented by issues such as the social-economic background of their service users which have a huge impact on outcomes. What is essential is ensuring that best practice is identified and shared, and that there is sufficient flexibility and understanding at the local level to maximise how resources are used to address these challenges.

**Solutions**

1.15 I believe that we must incorporate the mitigation and management of threat, harm and risk at all levels if we are to achieve significant improvements. In the rest of this report I develop proposals for how these ideas can be put into practice across policing. At the strategic level this includes how:

1. We might better match resources to the underlying drivers of police demand, in particular those related to the threat from serious and organised crime and the need for greater public protection.

2. The Home Office could take a more strategic approach by concentrating on setting the framework, clarifying the roles and responsibilities of central bodies.
3 Mandatory comparative information in the shape of a Force statistical profile, could provide a valuable set of diagnostic tools. This would enhance the ability of Forces and other central bodies to identify areas where productivity could be improved, while strengthening bottom up accountability by Police Authorities.

4 We can apply the benefits from a handful of “high potential areas” of the sort currently underway in projects such as ‘QUEST’ more widely across the service.

5 More can be done in terms of training and development of officers and staff, particularly in the area of financial & resources management, together with due recognition in their promotion and selection processes.
CHAPTER 2 – CENTRAL STRUCTURES AND SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT 21ST CENTURY POLICING

Overview

2.1 This section sets out how the central structures and systems available to support policing in England and Wales can best assist in the delivery of 21st Century policing. It explains firstly how the central bodies with a role to play in this process should reconsider how best to combine their roles and responsibilities into an effective overall system. It then goes on to analyse the part that a central performance management system should play and the ways in which better, standardised force level data can help both individual forces and the central bodies achieve a deeper understanding of what is driving performance at the local level. It also considers how central resources are allocated to fund local policing and the issue of central limits on the resources that can be raised at the local level.

Introduction

2.2 If we are to make the best use of police resources then it is essential that the supporting structures in the world of policing drive this behaviour. Policing resources need to be aligned around priorities, such that they reduce the threat to the public, mitigate the harm that communities and individuals experience and manage effectively the risks that the police service is asked to bear. Some enabling factors need to be in place at the national level, to facilitate delivery of appropriate tools and techniques for improved deployment of resources at force level.

2.3 A system which is successful in improving productivity and performance has a number of key factors:

1) It needs to be aspirational to encourage change across all delivery agents to aspire to be the best, not the average. At present, with current performance compared with a historic baseline many forces are incentivised to ‘coast’ rather than to excel and deliver the best that can be achieved in current circumstances. As private consumers we do not go out of our way to buy an average product. We aim to buy the best that we can afford, and this principle should apply equally, if not more so, to the public sector, especially in light of the additional investment in policing in recent years;

2) A system which sets high aspirations also needs to create sufficient pressure on the bulk of suppliers to deliver a better product. As we do not have the option to ‘buy our policing services’ from another supplier we need to find other ways to apply this pressure;
3) However, this pressure must be balanced by sufficient support for those working in the policing family so that they know what is expected of them and how they can best achieve it;

4) National and local stakeholders also need to know that they are getting value for money and so need to hold the ‘suppliers’ of policing accountable for performance and productivity. This requires transparent, consistent and directly comparable information.

2.4 A functioning system that delivers all of this is essential not only for making best use of police resources, but for providing a framework for policing more generally. The policing world can be a confusing one with a number of organisations involved that have potentially over-lapping remits; but these organisations must collectively agree their roles and deliver on them in order to create the right balance of central control and local pressure and support for forces to deliver significant improvements.

Roles and Responsibilities

2.5 The governance of the police service in England and Wales is operated through what is commonly termed ‘the tripartite relationship’ between:

1 The home secretary, responsible to Parliament for the overarching efficiency and effectiveness of the service as well as the maintenance of minimum service standards;

2 Individual police authorities which are responsible for the efficiency and effectiveness of the police force for their areas and for consulting with the public on policing matters, collectively represented by the Association of Police Authorities (APA);

3 Chief Constables who are responsible for the operational effectiveness of individual police forces, collectively represented by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO).

2.6 Representatives from each of these bodies sit on the National Policing Board which decides the strategic direction and development of the police service. The Home Office implements these decisions at a national level, setting the strategic direction through PSAs and ensuring that there are adequate arrangements to track progress and take remedial action if necessary.

2.7 The four main central bodies which work with the Home Office in this role are: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Association of Police Authorities (APA) and the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA). They work with the Audit Commission, the independent public body responsible for ensuring that public money is well spent in local service provision. (There are of course many other bodies involved in oversight of the policing function, such as the Health and Safety Executive and the Office of Surveillance Commissioners).
2.8 It is important that each of these organisations reconsiders how it can best contribute to the delivery of overall police performance.

**The Home Office**

2.9 Ultimately the home secretary is responsible to Parliament for policing in England and Wales. It is for government to set its strategic priorities, for example on crime, through the Public Service Agreements (PSAs). These translate directly to forces through the performance framework (PPAF/ APACS).

2.10 Within the Home Office there exists the Police and Crime Standards Directorate (previously the Police Standards Unit). In recent times this directorate has shifted its focus from individual police forces to concentrating on where it can assist partnerships such as Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships. This I see as a welcome change in emphasis.

2.11 **Part of the strategic role for the Home Office is to ensure that there is appropriate information on how individual forces are performing so as to not only have an understanding of police performance 'across the board', but also in respect of which forces are doing particularly well or are struggling. This information can be used to recognise forces that are doing well, to support those forces which are struggling and ultimately to intervene where forces are failing to improve.**

2.12 In the spirit of a more strategic, ‘hands-off’ approach, the Home office should ensure that its own staff (including those in Government Offices) can best align their work with that of the inspectorates in order to maximise the benefit to forces and minimise the potential for overlap, confusion or duplication.

**HMIC**

2.13 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary exists with a legislative responsibility to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in policing. Where it identifies areas for improvement in this regard, the NPIA (see below) acts to bring about this improvement.

**ACPO**

2.14 The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) is an independent, professionally led strategic body. In the public interest, and in equal and active partnership with Government and the Association of Police Authorities, ACPO leads and coordinates the direction and development of the police service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In times of national need, ACPO – on behalf of all chief officers – coordinates the strategic policing response.
APA

2.15 The Association of Police Authorities provides input into strategic decision making at a national level in relation to inspection programmes and performance management frameworks affecting the police service. It provides support through training and guidance to police authority members and staff to assist them in their roles holding chief officers to account for the delivery of effective performance outcomes for local communities.

NPIA

2.16 The National Police Improvement Agency is also an important part of this picture, balancing HMIC’s role of challenging forces on their performance with support that identifies what works and spreads good practice amongst forces.

2.17 The NPIA already assists the police service by providing expertise in areas as diverse as information and communications technology, support to information and intelligence sharing, core police processes, managing change and recruiting, developing and deploying people.

2.18 In order to build on the valuable work it is already doing and to fulfil the enhanced role envisaged by the Review, the NPIA should learn from similar organisations in other parts of the public sector whose guidance is implemented as standard. To drive up performance in the police we need to make best practice expected practice, and the NPIA has a key role in driving and facilitating this culture shift.

2.19 In order to achieve this development, the NPIA, which is commissioned and held to account by the Home Office, ACPO and the APA, will need a tighter, better focused mandate from the tripartite bodies. I realise that the Agency does not have infinite resources at its disposal so recommendations in the report directed to the NPIA should be examined and prioritised by the tripartite Policing Portfolio Group of the National Policing Board.

2.20 The Audit Commission and the Wales Audit Office are independent bodies responsible for ensuring that public money is spent economically, efficiently and effectively in the delivery of high-quality local services for the public. They have a valuable part to play and it is important that they and other regulators work effectively together as described in the recent joint inspectorates’ consultation on the new performance framework, Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA).
2.21 The Audit Commission has also published proposals for a new approach to the annual Use of Resources assessment for all local public services including policing. This gives greater and welcome emphasis to value for money achievements and outcomes for local people, with less focus on process. Welcome too is the Commission’s commitment to continue to work closely with HMIC to ensure that the Use of Resources judgements for policing (PURE) better incorporate HMIC’s extensive knowledge of operational policing.

**Delivering Change**

2.22 Much has been done by the individual bodies above and indeed others, to clarify their roles and to avoid duplication of effort but I remain unconvinced that the police service is clear on the various distinctions of role. Much more, I feel, needs to be done in this regard.

2.23 There should be a process of clarifying and re-designating roles and responsibilities, to remove duplication and sharpen incentives and accountability for performance and productivity. Within this framework:

1. The Home Office should lead a process to re-design roles and responsibilities, making a clearer distinction between the need for strategic control by the Home Office and the need for more effective local monitoring by regulators and police authorities;

2. HMIC, working in partnership with the Audit Commission and the Home Office, should address duplication by other bodies carrying out inspection functions; and

3. A product of the process should be that the Home Office sets clear reporting expectations of regulators and the NPIA against which they can reasonably be held accountable.

**Recommendation 1**

The Home Office, HMIC, ACPO, APA and the NPIA should clarify and re-design their roles and responsibilities to remove duplication and sharpen incentives and accountability for performance and productivity. They should set out their proposals to the National Policing Board in July 2008.
Information

2.24 In order for the system to function effectively, all the key stakeholders will need the right sorts of information on how a force is performing – both at the central level for bodies such as the Home Office, HMIC, NPIA, Audit Commission, and at the more local level for forces and their authorities. It is also important that this information is presented in an accessible way to the public so that they can hold their forces to account for the service that they receive.

2.25 The type of information that each of these organisations needs will be different, reflecting their different roles. At the national level, the Home Office needs high level, outcome information to track progress on its PSAs, down to force level. It will also need more qualitative assessments on risk and, more generally, an assessment of how well resources are being deployed. They will also need to be able to compare performance between forces to give them a sense of what forces should be achieving; therefore at least some data will have to be collected in a consistent way across forces.
2.26 Police authorities and forces on the other hand will need to balance the achievement of national with local indicators, while managers and their staff will require more fast-time information on the key drivers of performance in order to make operational decisions.

Performance Management systems

2.27 The way in which the forthcoming Assessment of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) is finalised and implemented will be a key test for this new approach; it will be APACS that gives us the information we need for forces and organisations at the centre to assess how well forces are performing. APACS is also one way of providing the public with a clear and accessible judgement on the performance of their local force. In order to deliver policing that uses judgment and discretion to deal with the numerous, competing demands that it faces and to reflect local priorities and is vital that APACS supports these objectives. Furthermore, its design must create the space for the more strategic behaviour needed from central organisations such as the Home Office and HMIC and greater sense of ownership and flexibility that forces need to have in order to contribute fully to improving productivity and performance.

Background

2.28 The issue of how best to structure and to use central performance systems has been the topic of considerable debate in public policy for more than a decade, both within the policing world and beyond. On one hand there is a clear need for a performance system that:

1. captures the information that central government legitimately needs to have, creates a means for communicating its policy priorities to those delivering services and also a way of monitoring and incentivising actual delivery;

2. similarly, brings some standardisation to the performance management systems that local delivery bodies and their local accountability bodies need in order to manage and scrutinise their organisations; and

3. gives the public worthwhile information about the quality of the services they are receiving so that they can too can hold all of those responsible for delivery properly accountable.

2.29 On the other hand there is a risk that such systems can create the wrong incentives, can be overly rigid and fail to reflect local differences and can be overly bureaucratic to administer. The way in which the forthcoming assessment of policing and community safety (APACS) is finalised and implemented will be a key test for this new approach.
2.30 In the specific context of policing, the Policing Performance and Assessment Framework (PPAF) prototype was published in 2004. PPAF is a framework created by the Home Office, in consultation with ACPO and the APA, and has as its base a range of domains and indicators that are populated by performance data from individual forces. It was used to carry out the annual Police Performance Assessment conducted by the Home Office and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabularies (HMIC), with advice and support from the Association of Police Authorities (APA) and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). This assessment has as its central descriptive tool, rankings of force performance in key areas such as Tackling Crime and Satisfaction. Forces were categorised as Excellent, Good, Fair or Poor relative to the performance of other ‘most similar forces’ facing comparable demands and also, in some areas, graded as to whether the trajectory of their performance in these areas was ‘Improved’, ‘Stable’ or ‘Deteriorated’.

2.31 Prior to PPAF we had Best Value Indicators but these were more ad hoc, developed over a decade or so, and did not reflect extant policing priorities. PPAF was a great leap forward because it was based on robust comparative data and the domains largely reflected where most effort was directed, with the exception of Protective Services. It did bring significant benefits and was an important part of the process of focusing on the outcomes policing should be delivering and the ways in which performance can be improved. However, criticism and concerns were also voiced that PPAF is too reliant on quantitative indicators, and thus was not an accurate reflection of performance in light of local conditions since it did not take account of threat, harm and risk or the relative resource bases of different forces, and that the number of indicators it included prescribed so much of policing that little scope was left for professional discretion and instead created perverse incentives.

The Assessment of Policing and Community Safety

2.32 The Home Office announced in 2006 that it would be replacing PPAF with a new system of performance assessment, the Assessment of Policing and Community Safety (APACS). This change was a recognition that as policing became ever more delivered in partnerships with local government and other partners a new system was needed. A principal rationale for APACS is that it draws together three pre-existing frameworks, covering policing, Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership performance and drugs, and reflects the fact that policing is not simply a task for the police. Forces felt that PPAF held them to account but other agencies slipped away from scrutiny.

2.33 This re-evaluation of the national performance system offers a significant opportunity to everyone involved in policing, to both build on the successes that PPAF was able to deliver and to learn from the experience and expertise that has been developed over the last decade. As noted in the section above, to meet the challenges which it faces over the coming years policing in England and Wales must be both supported and challenged in better, more
sophisticated ways by central organisations with an interest in productivity and performance. This will require more strategic direction from the Home Office, more support from the NPIA and more effective, proportionate, risk-based scrutiny from HMIC and the Audit Commission.

2.34 A major part of this process, explained in more detail in the following section, will be creating better diagnostic tools and comparative information about force performance for everyone involved in police performance to develop their understanding of where searching questions should be asked – from the centre, by force themselves and from the local level – and where efficiencies may be found. These measures need not, and indeed should not, be part of the performance system itself since doing so would encourage a uniform approach across forces, ignoring the significant of context and expertise in deciding where priorities should lie.

2.35 These changes must also be reflected in the design of APACS if they are to be successfully achieved. Crucially, it must be recognised that better functioning structures at both the national and the local levels will be able to provide more intelligent challenge and scrutiny, understanding the impact of context on force performance and scrutinising local priorities. To allow these improvements to be realised APACS itself must, correctly, be recognised as just one part of the system for delivering better performance rather than the sole means of doing so.

2.36 In order to achieve these goals APACS should focus on supporting the four key performance outcomes set out in the 2007 Public Service Agreements, and some high level means of comparing force productivity, since this clearly makes an important overall contribution to performance. Such an approach will hold forces accountable for their overall delivery and identify areas of inadequate performance.

2.37 APACS should avoid performance indicators which can become further unofficial targets (for example measures targeting individual types of crime) or which unduly influence the mechanism that forces use to deliver (for example the use of Automated Number Plate recognition). Such indicators risk creating perverse incentives and compromise local innovation, efficiency and accountability.

2.38 To reflect the above changes, the Statutory Performance Indicators set out in APACS should focus on monitoring the Government’s PSA priorities, and should avoid setting indicators which unduly influence the means adopted by forces in meeting these priorities.

2.39 APACS should properly understand and reflect the difficulty of measuring performance in areas such as public protection, counter terrorism and level two and three crime. These areas are often less amenable to quantification and are also often best understood and combated at the regional level by cross-force capabilities, meaning that force level comparisons can be hard
to make meaningful and can be potentially misleading. Thus in these areas, a small number of suitable designed indicators should be supported by local monitoring and reporting by HMIC.

2.40 In respect of efficiency, APACS should limit itself to identifying those forces whose productivity differs significantly from other similar forces by comparing spend per 1,000 population on a like for like basis, and by triangulating relative performance with relative resources.

**Recommendation 2**

APACS should centre on the Government’s high-level priorities, drawing its indicators directly from the PSAs, supported by a small number of high level indicators on areas not covered in the PSA suite such as productivity and some suitably defined performance indicators on serious crime and counter terrorism. HMIC should collaborate with the Home Office to develop high level productivity measures for use in the 2010 APACS assessments.

In conjunction with these measures, by 2010 forces should develop data useful for them to understand their performance and productivity.

**Diagnostic Information**

2.41 With APACS taking a high level, outcome focus on performance there is a need for additional information to support the work of HMIC in providing challenge and for forces to assess performance and productivity at a more detailed functional level. Crucially, this information must be used in an informed and diagnostic way by HMIC, as the basis for challenging questions and the consideration for local context, rather than as the basis for further targets or the simple classification of individual scores as ‘pass’ or ‘fail’. This section discusses the current model of Activity Based Costing used in England and Wales and recommends alternative ways in which better outcomes can be achieved.

**Activity Based Costing (ABC)**

2.42 The ABC process is a costly national exercise which has been undertaken for several years. It relies on accurate recording of time spent by mainly front line staff of the activities they are undertaking. Like all data collected in this way it is subject to errors, but it is potentially a rich source of comparative information. Indeed, the Review’s work on reducing unnecessary bureaucracy has used activity analysis data in assessing time spent on paperwork. But, in view of the need to reduce bureaucracy, the issue is whether there are more efficient ways of achieving the same ends. ABC serves two main purposes:

1. it attempts to relate all input costs to outputs; and

2. It is a factor used by the Home Office as a way of distributing grant.
2.43 As a way of relating inputs to outputs, ABC should be a fruitful source of productivity information. Some Forces have used ABC as descriptive information, but there is little convincing evidence of ABC being successfully applied by Forces to improve productivity – despite significant effort by some, such as the MPS. There are several reasons why:

1. **Difficulties in establishing an effective denominator** – using crime as the denominator would result in Forces with high crime rates reporting low costs per crime. It is clearly perverse to consider such a Force as being more productive based on this fact alone. Furthermore, police are also concerned with increasing detections among other activities. But a comparison of detection rates for the “average” crime could also lead to the wrong conclusions principally because detection rates are not independent of crime rates. More crime usually results in more detections.

2. **ABC is not user friendly** – experience suggests that the credibility of good comparative information depends upon it being useable by managers running the police service, and be based on the key questions they need to ask. ABC often requires an expert to extract and interpret the data and frequently cannot answer specific queries.

3. **High risk of spurious variations** – due to methods of collection. Information is only collected on a snapshot basis – 2 weeks per annum – and confidence in it decreases, the more detailed the analysis. Comparisons of costs of crime and detections by type in particular can be subject to these sorts of errors.

2.44 The system also imposes a significant bureaucratic burden. It collects much redundant information, since it collects the same level of detail everywhere rather than only where it needs to be collected. The principle of efficient data collection is to collect high level comprehensive information to highlight key variances and then collect additional information to investigate the reasons for difference.

2.45 Furthermore it is not suitable for making assessments in APACS because **Activity analysis results can be open to manipulation** and the incentive to do so is greater if they are included in APACS or PPAF. This is a concern with the Front Line Policing Measure where the incentive is to account for staff in such a way as to maximise the PPAF score.

2.46 It is hard to conclude that ABC as a comparative tool for improving productivity represents good value for money. However, there is evidence that **local activity analysis** has proved useful in evaluating new initiatives – such as swift and speedy justice. Locally based activity analysis may also have a role in those forces which lack adequate IT systems to assess whether activities by key staff such as response officers and community support officers’ are aligned with objectives.
2.47 ABC is also used by the Home Office to inform its decisions on the allocation of police funding. The issue is whether more efficient ways to meet these requirements can be found. There are two options. Either the Home office finds an alternative means, independent of ABC to meets its need or, if this is not possible, considers whether a much reduced ABC method could be adopted which relied on stratified sampling and which reduced the frequency of collection to every three years so that it aligns with changes in CSR settlement.

**Recommendation 3**

The Home Office should urgently examine its requirement for each force to undertake Activity Based Costing with a view to this requirement being replaced with an alternative which costs less, is easier to use and has greater impact on productivity.

It should also assess alternative ways of meeting its information requirements regarding the allocation of police funding.

**Force Profiles**

2.48 The current system of ABC should be replaced by a system of ‘force profiles’, collections of data on the performance of an individual force comparable with ‘Most Similar Forces’ which can be used by forces themselves, police authorities, HMIC and the Audit Commission as the basis for challenge, scrutiny and accountability. This approach has been used successfully in local government, the Health Service and the private sector and experience shows that one of the most critical components of success is the creation of data which are clearly comparable and transparent and that data quality improves year on year as a result of use by managers, members and regulators.

2.49 The precise details of these diagnostic profiles should be developed by the Home Office and HMIC and supported by the efforts of forces to improve the quality of their own management information. Once a system has been agreed the Home Office should mandate collection across forces to ensure that comparability is achieved.

2.50 This Report does not seek to devise the system itself. However, the sorts of data which could provide useful information to all parties are:

- **Staff type and numbers by function** including, for instance, response, call handling, neighbourhood policing, investigation, intelligence, Criminal Justice. Custody, Finance, HR, IT, policy and planning. This information is already collected but is of poor quality. It should be possible to fairly quickly establish a comparative database of staffing numbers by function, in advance of the work required to produce costs by functions (see below the description of the proposed objective costing methodology) to allow some early benchmarking to take place.
• **Productivity ratios** within each function such as call handling staff per 100 calls, calls for police response per 1000 of population, non operational staff per 100 staff.

• **Objective costing and analysis.** There is currently limited comparative financial information by function allowing forces to benchmark against each other or for regulators and other bodies to make judgements, other than the Best Value Accounting Code of Practice, which is unwieldy and unsuited to this purpose, or activity-based costing (ABC).

• Traditionally, the total cost of policing has been broken down by expenditure type, salaries, supplies, transport etc, a methodology known as **subjective** analysis and published by CIPFA. This type of analysis does very little to inform the debate about cost, efficiency and results.

• **Objective** analysis breaks the costs down by function and, if this were implemented for police forces in a consistent and mandated format, would provide, for the first time, a basis of comparison between forces that would allow an informed debate to take place about costs, staffing numbers and performance, in each of the major policing functions. Questions could then start to be asked about the relative levels of staffing and costs invested in, say, Intelligence or Neighbourhood Policing and the relative levels of performance and satisfaction achieved in those areas.

• Objective analysis includes the total cost of bought-in services as well as salaries, and therefore allows direct comparison between organisations providing in-house services and those which contract out.

• Objective analysis is a much simpler methodology than ABC and less costly to produce. Unlike ABC, it is a high level analysis of the cost of various policing functions, not an attempt to analyse and cost, in minute detail, the activities undertaken by individual officers. As such, it can be produced in a common format across all forces with relatively little administrative effort required.

• Objective analysis and costing would shed light on the cost of back-office functions such as finance and estate management far better than ABC or traditional subjective accounts and this will be increasingly important, given the focus on efficiency and the national interest in shared services.

2.51 A methodology for objective analysis is being developed by force finance directors, led by West Midlands Police, and I strongly support this work.
Recommendation 4
The Home Office should support HMIC, the Audit Commission, forces and police authorities in developing a statistical profile for each force, similar to those used successfully in local government and the health service, which would include comparable high level data on staff numbers, objective costs and key management ratios. Prototypes of these profiles should be prepared by autumn this year, with final versions available by autumn 2009.

Implementing the funding formula
2.52 While the police service has seen a substantial increase in funding since 2002, and will see an average 2.7% annual increase until 2011, there are still some outstanding anomalies and legacy issues which I feel merit attention.

The impact of legacy issues
2.53 The legacy issues go back as far as 1994 when the Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act, (later subsumed by the Police Act 1996) created free-standing police authorities. At that time, it was left to local politics and negotiation as to what assets were transferred to the new police authorities by their former hosts. As a result, some authorities began life with reasonable reserves, little or no debt and a relatively good infrastructure of estate, fleet and IT; while others were burdened with high debt and/or a crumbling infrastructure.

Levels of council tax precept
2.54 The impact of these legacy issues has been reduced by successive funding settlements and by the actions of Authorities themselves. Some have managed to improve their situation by raising council tax or borrowing. Others did not and are struggling with little in the way of accumulated reserves to fall back upon and are now constrained by the 5 percent cap on council tax increases.
The graph above shows that there has been significant variation in council tax increases over the last 10 years. Northumbria’s precept level, for instance, has increased by less than 20 percent while Surrey’s has almost tripled. The 5 percent cap on annual increases simply freezes this variation.

**Distribution of government grant funding**

Government grant is distributed by means of a complex formula and includes an element to reflect relative need. When the formula was first introduced, it suggested that considerable shifts in resources would be required, better to reflect relative need between forces. In the interests of financial stability however, the formula has never been fully applied. Instead, a system of floors and ceilings has been used to damp down its impact.

The graph below shows which forces currently receive less than the needs-based formula would suggest, and those which receive more. The graph also shows that most forces are within five percent of their formula share, however nine forces in 2007-08 would gain or lose more than five percent were it not for the application of floors and ceilings, while three would gain or lose more than ten percent.
2.58 Taken together with the impact of council tax precept, the application of floors and ceilings can alter the balance between resource and need significantly. West Midlands, for example, currently receives nearly 11 percent less than the funding formula would allocate, some £48 million, and also has one of the lowest records on council tax increases, a position which, under the present capping arrangements, it can never make up. On the other hand, Northumbria has a similarly low record on council tax increases, but it currently gains over 12 percent or nearly £29 million in grant from the application of floors and ceilings.

**A staged approach towards change**

2.59 No system for the allocation of resources is without its pitfalls and problems, however I do think that the funding formula approach provides an independent yardstick against which resource allocation decisions can be made. And while I recognise the need for financial stability, I also recognise the importance of other side of the equation, which is that some forces are not receiving the funding they need to meet the risks they face.

2.60 If we are to get the best performance return for our investment over the lean times ahead, we must start to deal with these anomalies. And while it may be unrealistic to expect any changes until the next spending round, I think it prudent that, from that point on, there should be a staged relaxation of the “floors and ceilings” factors which dampen changes in allocations, possibly
combined with special consideration for those few Forces which would face the most significant reductions in funding. Furthermore, whilst the funding formula does take account of many of the demands on policing and of the socio-economic context within which a force operates, it is very limited in the way that it reflects protective services work.

2.61 The ability of the Funding Formula to predict aspects of complex protective services, such as serious and organised crime, needs to be considered more closely and I would urge the Funding Formula Working Group to review this further. Some aspects of the funding of protective services, whether analysis such as the organised crime group mapping or specific organised crime operations, could perhaps be managed outside the existing funding arrangements, by top-slicing and ring-fencing the relevant funds, which could be managed by the National Policing Board’s steering group on protective services without the need to create additional structures. In the longer-term, however, the Funding Formula will need to ensure that the capacity to deal effectively with protective services in terms of deterrence, intelligence-gathering and specialist, proactive capability is built into funding arrangements.

Temporary relief from capping for voluntary mergers

2.62 I am also aware that funding and precepts issues have been the main barrier in preventing some Forces from further consideration of a voluntary merger. Where there is a sound business case for merger based upon improved performance, productivity and better resilience, I think that there could be scope to consider and facilitate such a change and that ways could be found to allow temporary relief from capping while the merger was implemented.

Recommendation 5

The allocation of grant funding to police authorities should be based transparently on objective need in order to better match resources to threat and demand.

To achieve this, the Home Office should move towards a fuller application of the funding formula in future Spending Reviews, phasing out the existing damping mechanism of floors and ceilings.

To better address the demands of protective services, the protective services steering group should consider top-slicing funding. In the longer term, the Home Office should seek agreement with ACPO and APA on a revision to the funding formula that better deals with the shifting demands of protective services.

Recommendation 6

Where police authorities determine that a sound business case exists for voluntary merger, every effort should be made by Government to facilitate this process.
CHAPTER 3 – IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AT FORCE LEVEL

Overview

3.1 Embedding the idea of allocating resources against threat, harm and risk at the force level is essential to delivering clear benefits at the front line. This section explains how Chief Constables can ensure that they make the best allocations possible. It also highlights a number of specific areas where efficiencies can be found and processes improved to maximise the resources which are available to the police service.

Allocating resources against need

3.2 Over the last year several pieces of work have been undertaken by a range of bodies (Home Office, ACPO, HMIC) to assess the threat from organised crime. Intelligence mapping has revealed a picture of organised crime that, once it is confirmed by further analysis over the next six to twelve months, will require serious new effort to address it. For example, one region appears to have a significant number of organised gangs, some of which are using firearms, that are not currently subject to police attention. In order to address these threats within the existing resource envelope some difficult decisions will have to be made about local, regional and national threats and their relative priorities.

3.3 As the threat from organised crime is more clearly articulated it will be necessary to factor this in to the funding formula so that the national allocation for policing resource is appropriately allocated. In these circumstances we would have to understand and take consideration of the nature and demographics of the threat and ensure that any changes to the funding formula are properly modelled and forces and authorities given adequate time to prepare for any shifts.

3.4 We are encouraged by the impending legislative change that will create a duty on police authorities to balance local interests against regional and national ones, however we would like to see them aided in this by more research into the costs of organised crime. We know that organised crime impacts on the costs of goods and insurance, and there have been some estimates of the size of this at the macro level, but there does not seem to be much at the level of individuals and families. This kind of information would help police authorities and chief constables to understand their role and set priorities, and also to explain decisions to communities about where resources have been allocated.
Recommendation 7

Forces should review their demand profiles, taking account of more detailed information now available, to ensure that resources are deployed to areas of greatest risk and priority. HMIC should use this information in its inspections from 2009-10.

3.5 **Efficiency Plan** submissions to the Home Office have been required from each force for many years. These are checked to see if the savings claimed comply with Treasury definitions of a saving and whether they meet the nationally set targets. At best these submission may document real improvements which would have taken place regardless of the need to return a submission, at worst they create wasteful bureaucracy, with staff being asked to take the rules and see whether any changes in expenditure could be construed as a ‘saving’.

3.6 I therefore take the view that the requirement to submit efficiency plans is wasteful. Efficiency sits locally as part of a Force’s normal planning process and should be reviewed locally by the external auditor and HMIC. I therefore welcome the fact that the Home Office has already removed the requirement to submit separate Efficiency Plans and that they are now seen as “... an integral part of local policing plans” in the Home Office Efficiency and Productivity Strategy for the Police Service 2008-11.

**Doing what works**

3.7 Too often, good work is undertaken in some forces but not picked up in others. If the service is to really make best use of its resources, we need to get much better at spreading the learning from what works and ensuring that the benefits are gained across the police service.

3.8 QUEST is a derivative of LEAN thinking, an approach developed by Toyota car manufacturers to improve productivity, and other approaches to process improvement. It seeks to eliminate wasteful processes and blockages by looking at the system from ‘the bottom-up’, identifying issues from the frontline. QUEST was initiated by the Home Office supported by KPMG, and has had two phases, each with a slightly different emphasis.

3.9 The first phase in 2006 focused on four BCUs (two in London, one in Suffolk and one in Merseyside) and sought to identify improvements in the process of operations. Results included significant improvements in police response to calls for service in Merseyside and an 84% improvement in victim satisfaction with the police in Suffolk’s Southern Area.
3.10 The current phase, based in four forces, seeks to engender and embed a culture of continual improvement, where cultural change is of the essence in successful process improvement work. Preliminary results include:

1. 40% improvement in response times to Grade 2 incidents, and 96% customer satisfaction with a new system of surgeries and scheduled appointments in Lancashire;

2. 10 percentage point improvement in Actual Bodily Harm detections and 8 day reduction in the time to contact reported victims of assault, in Avon & Somerset’s pilot; and

3. 10% increase in ‘Urgent’ incidents attended within the target time in Thames Valley.

3.11 QUEST’s next stage is currently being planned and seeks to provide a ‘tipping point’ whereby understanding of how and why to achieve these kinds of improvement, in practice and culture, spreads throughout the service.

3.12 The early findings from QUEST are encouraging. In the current round there are several initiatives to improve incident management and to embed graded, scheduled responses; there are also improved processes around briefing, investigation and custody.

3.13 Over the next few months the Review will be continuing to look into how QUEST is developing with a view to production of a fuller note as part of a ‘what works’ discussion paper to follow in the wake of this report. We are particularly interested in two similar initiatives to take crime reports over the phone directly, onto the force crime reporting system, whilst the officer at the scene conducts an initial investigation and makes an assessment as to whether other officers need to attend. This could hold a number of improvements, from better use of evidence and specialist skills to freeing up officer time. We understand that the next phase of QUEST will include explicit focus on trying to capture these kinds of generally applicable solutions.

Case study: shift patterns
Merseyside

This force has designed the VSA99 shift system which takes the fundamental principle that maximising health and safety for officers is achieved by ensuring the optimal deployment of officers relative to demand and risk. The system is a marked improvement on the 12 hour shift pattern that some forces continue to use – 12 hour shifts create risks as officers are overly tired towards the end of their shifts and on night shifts, and are not as efficient.

The area of response policing clearly has some scope for improvement in efficiency as research from the Midlands suggests that one third of officers in response teams are picking up two thirds of the work.
**Case study: shift patterns (continued)**

**Leicestershire**

This force has been using a commercial system, iR3 to improve how they map their response units more closely to demand. The system is an IT tool that maps in real time where incidents are taking place. This is linked to command and control incident data, duty rotas and skills/accreditation data; which is in turn linked to automatic tracking devices for vehicles and Airwave radios. The tool can also look retrospectively at where a vehicle has gone throughout a shift.

Early evaluation of the pilot suggests that there has been a dramatic reduction in self-deployment, substantially reducing multiple deployment and improving response times through automatic identification and deployment of the nearest available unit. Officer time spent in priority areas has significantly increased, and there are sizable savings in mileage and through the disposal of underused vehicles. Focus group findings suggest that, in addition to managers and supervisors, officers are convinced by the system. They are happy that workloads are more evenly shared, and safety is improved (units can be deployed more quickly to support officers in need of back-up).

**Procurement**

3.14 Research work has been carried out for the Review, identifying what forces need to ensure that they have the most effective procurement strategy, which identified the following factors:

**Buyer power**

- Being able to make a real commitment, guaranteed to lead to sales, to suppliers
- True understanding of the suppliers market and its cost drivers
- Presenting an attractive proposition to industry

**Commitment**

3.15 Sponsorship at the highest level

- commitment from the ‘customer’ to let it work – to let go of some of the central control and trust the centralised organisation
- commitment from the central organisation to do follow through on the work
- commitment from all involved to seek continuous improvement
**Customer service – remembering that customers have a choice**

- Treating internal customers as you would external customers
- Respecting what the customer has already achieved
- Speed of response
- Provide something that is better than the customer can do themselves
- Demonstrate and deliver

**Resources, skills and ability**

- Ability to develop effective procurement strategies
- Realisation that contracts require ongoing management and action between competitions
- Strong supplier and customer relationship management

**Process and procedures**

- Appropriate, but only the necessary, procedures and processes to support the organisation
- Strong management information systems to support informed decision making

3.16 There are also examples of good collaborative practice, such as in the Chiltern vehicle consortium, based in Thames Valley. There is no single template for police procurement – optimum procurement partnerships will vary with different products and different markets. The NPIA, which is developing a procurement strategy, should consider whether the service can meet the conditions outlined above and what role the Home Office, NPIA and the APA can play in making it easier for authorities and forces to meet these success factors.

**Recommendation 8**

Forces should focus effort on 'high potential' areas for improved productivity, such as demand management (where QUEST has highlighted areas for improvement) procurement, and flexible working. HMIC will be looking for evidence of using best practice in inspections from 2009–10.

**Problem solving and evidence based policing**

3.17 As well as considering how best to deploy existing resources to protect the public in the best possible ways, the police service should also analyse where it can focus its efforts to reduce the demands it faces by solving the
underlying problems that lead to individual offences. Learning from evidence that has been evaluated in the field of criminology can clearly assist in developing an understanding of what works best.

3.18 In both areas significant progress has been made in recent years. Problem solving has been a crucial part of the development of neighbourhood policing and there are signs that it is becoming part of the service’s approach more widely. Similarly, in the field of criminology, the recent work of Professors Sir Anthony Bottoms, David Farrington and Larry Sherman and others points to areas in which police practice can be improved to maximise its impact.

3.19 There will be a much fuller discussion of the lessons to be learned from problem solving and criminology and the ways in which such expertise can be supported within the service in a follow-up discussion paper linked to this report.

**Income Generation**

3.20 North Wales Police and Kent Police have both used the strength of their corporate brand to generate significant income by selling driving courses to other organisations and, so far on a limited basis, direct to the public. In each case this enterprise makes use of existing resources during downtime, and employs commercial managers to run the training business rather than cut into the time and energy of police managers. Important ethical considerations include ensuring that internal needs are not put behind commercial considerations and competing at the appropriate level in the marketplace so as to offer a valid distinctive product rather than undercutting local small businesses for basic-level products. Kent Police is also exploring the IT training market for equivalent commercial opportunities.

3.21 There also appears to be scope for development of more funded or part-funded OCUs. The Metropolitan Police Transport OCU, paid for by Transport for London, is an excellent example of a fully funded OCU. Such arrangements would make sound templates for airport policing arrangements once a review is completed on the question of designation.

**Recommendation 9**

Chief constables should ensure that they are taking an entrepreneurial approach to policing, not just in ethical income generation through private sector sponsorship and business enterprise, but also through encouraging finance directors to create and exploit ‘business opportunities’.

**Information technology**

3.22 Over the past 20 years, frontline officers have enthusiastically embraced better technology and equipment. However, we have not acted corporately in the implementation of these new technologies. For instance, new databases
are constantly being introduced, none of which currently link across forces. The result has been a large amount of duplication in the work we do. As a result, up to 70% of information is entered into police systems more than once.

3.23 Multiple trials of differing pieces of hardware are currently underway across the service. The total cost to a force of equipping a police officer with mobile IT is estimated to be between £3,000 and £6,500 per officer over 5 years. This cost would be driven down if we took a more joined up approach to the introduction of business processes enabled by new technologies.

3.24 There are considerable benefits to be gained from the use of mobile technology. One force estimate they have saved 51 minutes per frontline officer through the use of handheld PDAs. Another, which was the first to trial body worn cameras, estimate a 22% reduction in officer time spent on paper work and file preparation. A Scottish force is developing an electronic notebook which will be able to retrieve information from force/national systems and use this to populate forms.

**Body worn cameras**

In October 2006 a force in the south west began a six month BCU pilot on the use of body worn digital recording devices. The potential benefits of these devices are considerable, with the ability to significantly improve the quality of evidence provided by police officers at incidents. Body worn cameras have also reduced the amount of officer time spent on paperwork and file preparation by 22%. This has allowed officers to spend more time on patrol, the equivalent of up to 50 minutes per officer per shift. In additional, no complaints were recorded against officers who used the cameras. A survey of members of the public found that 73% of respondents knew what the cameras were, and noted a reduction in disorder and anti social behaviour around the city. The Home Office is currently working with forces to trial the use of body worn cameras more widely across the police service. As with all new technology, this trialling will need to consider the wider costs and benefits across policing and issues such as re-engineering back office processes and any impact on the relationship between the police and local communities.

3.25 Overcoming the issues set out above, and maximising the potential of mobile information solutions, will require us to act corporately:

3.26 Each force must take responsibility for overhauling the way their existing databases and systems interact. I am aware of several forces who have removed the need for duplicate entry of information for stop and search through mobile technology. Other forces have changed their Crime Recording system to allow them to pre-populate a CRIME form with the relevant details and reduce the need for officers to ask the same questions again. We
must ensure our existing processes and systems are efficient, and do not waste officer time. Once we have got this right, we can begin to see the true benefits of mobile technology.

3.27 The service must act corporately in the implementation of mobile information solutions or we will waste millions of pounds on 43 different but similar IT solutions for operational processes which are all based on the same criminal law. Similarly, we have yet to make the progress that is required to reduce bureaucracy by standardising forms and data-sets.

3.28 If we can achieve a credible challenge to other parts of the Criminal Justice chain to use new technology instead of existing bureaucracy (eg videos from body cameras instead of written statements) we will make real progress – the nightmare scenario is that we invest heavily in technology and become even more bureaucratic.

**Recommendation 10**

Building on recommendation 5 of the interim report, the NPIA should also begin building standard processes for use across forces. They should address the issue of double entry of information and be used as a precursor to the use of standard IT systems and mobile devices across all forces.

This work should include the creation of minimum standards for forces in areas such as GIS mapping and AVLS corporate performance information. Forces should explore the benefits of software systems and using partners’ data to identify priority areas.

**Corporacy**

3.29 Over the course of the review, it has become increasingly obvious that one of the largest barriers to sustaining reduced levels of bureaucracy over time is the structure of the police service.

3.30 The existence of 43 separate forces, each led by a chief officer team and police authority who are charged with acting in the best interest of their individual force, means that common solutions are rarely introduced service-wide as the favourable conditions required rarely arise at the same time in 43 places.

3.31 Mobile technology is an excellent example of the benefits that may be lost from new initiatives if we do not adopt a force wide approach. Five forces have tested different pieces of hardware, all with different capabilities and operating platforms. It would appear that each force is more than content with their individual trial so there is a competition starting over which is best. Some believe that local market forces are healthy and that each force should choose the ‘best’ solution for their particular circumstances (and thus fulfil their duty to run an effective and efficient force). I think this is missing the point. Adopting disparate IT solutions across 43 forces is a potentially
huge loss of opportunity and is only likely to further complicate the range of processes and systems currently operating service wide. The criminal law that we are all working to uphold is the same, so why can we not agree common processes to deliver it?

3.32 I also think it may inhibit the service from accessing the full benefits of the technology because we will be failing to speak with one voice. If body camera footage for instance is to be truly valuable it should ultimately replace written statements, if hand held terminals are to really free up officer time then we should be aiming to withdraw pocket note books. However, to achieve this we have to win support from other parties in the CJ chain (CPS, Courts Service, etc) and they are unlikely to agree to major changes to the evidential process if we the service cannot act corporately.

3.33 Acting corporately will mean that, on occasions, some forces will have to make compromises for the good of the service. Currently though, there is no central body or indeed person, who has the ability to make decisions or mandate solutions “for the good of the service”. Airwave is an example of an initiative that demonstrated service wide benefit but was met with considerable resistance. The lack of ability to compel forces to adopt this new technology meant it took almost 10 years to implement a project which is now demonstrating real benefits.

3.34 I believe that encouraging, and if needs be, mandating common approaches on non operational issues is genuinely the only way to reduce bureaucracy and maintain its reduction. This would be a significant shift in the way forces currently operate. The home secretary currently has power to compel forces to collaborate and while much good work is currently underway in operational collaboration – in some instances across government regions even across national boundaries (eg North Wales/Merseyside) – I feel much could be achieved by requiring administrative collaboration possibly government region by region in areas of procurement and nationally in securing common practices in bureaucracy. The forthcoming Home Office green paper is an excellent opportunity to consult more widely on this issue. I am clear however that the outcome of this consultation cannot be the status quo if we are to make progress on both making best use of our resources and in reducing unnecessary bureaucracy across the service.

**Recommendation 11**

The Home Office should include in its forthcoming Green Paper consultation on the establishment of service-wide consistency of the implementation of standard systems and processes. The Green Paper should also specifically consult on the issue of whether the Home Office should mandate regional collaboration on issues such as procuring IT systems, Air Support, Fleet, Uniform etc.
CHAPTER 4 – DEVELOPING THE POLICE WORKFORCE

Overview

4.1 We spend approximately 80% of the police budget on the workforce; therefore we cannot talk about making the best use of our resources without addressing the issue of the workforce. This is an issue I looked at specifically several years ago in my thematic report 'Modernising the Police Service'; many of the issues I raised then are equally applicable today.

4.2 The amount of our resource that is dedicated to people in the police reflects the importance of their role; it is officers and staff that make policing happen. It is individuals that build relationships with communities, and provide reassurance to victims of crime; and seek to bring the perpetrators of crimes to justice. To use our greatest resource in the most effective way we have to understand the challenges a 21st century police force will face and how we want to address those challenges. As the risks that society faces change, and the expectations of the public increase, and as technology moves on we need to be able to adapt.

Workforce reform

4.3 Meeting these changing demands will require strong and effective leadership from all those involved in policing – from the Home Secretary and chief officers, right through to sergeants and individual officers. In any sector where people form the core of a business leadership is key; ensuring that the ‘central nervous system’ of our forces is operating to the best of its potential is vital. To complement this we also need to enable and support our frontline officers to act autonomously where appropriate, making sound decisions and feeling responsible for those decisions.

4.4 In terms of more ‘macro’ leadership issues for the police, I have noted the considerable effort already being made to overcome the current difficulties with the police workforce governance arrangements, such as the recommendations from the Review of Officer Pay Arrangements carried out by Sir Clive Booth. It is not my intention to cover the same ground, particularly as Sir Clive was able to consider these matters in far more detail and over a longer timescale than I. In addition, I have noted the Government’s exploration of three year pay settlements in the public sector, which could provide clarity and enable better planning for individuals, police authorities and the government.

4.5 There is currently no agreed medium to long-term strategy for workforce reform. Reforms have been delivered piecemeal and with a lack of consistency. This is in part due to the variety of bodies and groups with an interest in this area, for example, just in relation to agreeing police terms and conditions, the Police Negotiating Board, Police Advisory Board for England...
and Wales and the Police Staff Council (each of whom have a number of working parties and sub-committees). In addition the Home Office, NPIA and other stakeholders (ACPO, APA) all have an interest.

4.6 Some activity is already underway, including the Workforce Modernisation pilots carried out in Surrey and the MPS which showed great promise, leading to the second phase of the programme with a further 11 demonstration sites to be evaluated. However, in the interim, whilst we await the results of the pilots, forces are looking to make the best use of their resources and correctly identifying their workforce as an obvious target. There is a need to provide clarity over direction of travel for workforce reform. This would ensure that individual reforms and initiatives sit within the context of an overarching narrative and context.

**Recommendation 12**

The NPIA should produce an interim evaluation report from the workforce modernisation pilot sites by autumn 2008 so that the service is not denied valuable learning pending the final report.

**Recommendation 13**

The Home Office should set out its strategy for workforce reform in the forthcoming Green Paper, and the NPIA should facilitate the development of a ten-year workforce plan for the service. Both of these pieces of work should emphasise the importance of matching skills and aptitudes to roles and tasks.

4.7 Different interpretations have been made of ‘workforce reform’ for the police. This review has used the following definitions, and we suggest that partners continue to use this in taking forward the recommendations in this report.

"Workforce reform involves joining officers and police staff in a strategic framework providing clear career pathways through accreditation of skills and competencies, whilst improving demand management and workforce planning, particularly in relation to recruitment and deployment, in order to mitigate risks and ensure operational resilience."

4.8 These pieces of work will need to consider the nature of the challenges the police is likely to face in the medium to long-term and whether the current model provides us with the skills and flexibility to address these. For example, it might be more useful to talk about a ‘policing family’. The evidence from the workforce modernisation pilots is that only a small proportion of the tasks that are carried out by the police actually require sworn officer powers. Duties such as taking statements can be carried out by staff; furthermore the evidence suggests that when staff are trained specifically to carry out such a role they can do so more effectively than a police officer trained in a wider range of more general competencies. We have to ask ourselves whether it is an appropriate use of a valuable (and expensive) resource to use police
officers to carry out tasks that can be better performed by others. This option could be taken further with powers designated to specific roles rather than individuals, as happens in the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). However, further work would be required to explore the consequences of such an approach to ensure that the service continued to exercise its duty of care towards its officers and staff and its responsibilities under Health and Safety legislation.

4.9 Forces are already starting to explore some of these issues as they embed Neighbourhood Policing, creating a clear need to think more strategically about the career paths that could be forged for both officers and staff. For example, with the introduction of other agencies providing policing services (e.g. SOCA) and as roles become more specialised we might want to think about multiple routes of entry into the police. Under the current arrangements the only route of entry is as a probationary officer, which fails to recognise the number of jobs outside of the service with strong parallels to police work and the benefits to the service from the wider experience that an individual could bring to the police (such as management of people or resources). This is off-putting for many who may wish to join the policing family but do not want to lose pay and status to do so. Therefore we will need to think about how we can attract the best people into the police service – both as staff and officers – to ensure that we make the most of our biggest resource.

4.10 In theory the Integrated Competency Framework (ICF) should allow police authorities and forces to set out the skills and competencies required for each role in the service and assess candidates against the role profile; it should not matter how the candidate came to possess those skills and competencies. However, during the course of the Review I have been told by many practitioners that the way the ICF has been implemented is too bureaucratic and requires too technical an understanding of HR principles and concepts.

4.11 Whilst I accept that a tool as critical as the ICF has to be underpinned by a sound and robust principles and information, in order to be of value it must also assist practitioners rather than burden them. The ICF is a crucial tool, not only for ensuring that the right appointments are made, but for recognising those who are performing particularly well and those that are underperforming. I therefore urge the tri-partite partners to commission a piece of work to simplify the ICF to ensure that it is a helpful device for managers and staff across the service, perhaps utilising a group of people similar to the Police Practitioner Group who assisted in shaping the recommendations to this report.

**Recommendation 14**

The NPIA should conduct a review of the Integrated Competency Framework on behalf of the tripartite partners to ensure that it is a useful and accessible tool for police managers and staff.
Equality and diversity

4.12 Encouraging the development of staff within the police service, and allowing greater flexibility for those coming into the policing family should facilitate better diversity within the service. There is greater diversity amongst police staff (including PCSOs) than officers, and it will be important to learn lessons from these areas as we strive to ensure that our police service represents the community that it serves, for example those outlined in the Metropolitan Police Authority research 'Reflecting London'.

4.13 Workforce reform can also address some other areas of diversity. At present there are some issues around equal pay. Under the current system a uniformed officer who is unable to continue to carry out frontline duties could be moved to a support function on ill-health grounds. If they are retained in the service their terms and conditions and powers are fixed as if they were still an officer ready to be deployed anywhere, which are considerably better terms than police staff in comparable roles. In addition, the structure of the current pay scale is based on time in post (including 14 different points on the pay scale for constables) in contrast with the principle that pay should be based on competence and performance, which can have a considerable impact on morale. Thinking on workforce reform should take this into consideration and look at how, for example, pay can be made to reflect performance and the role being undertaken rather than length of time in post.

Vertical and Lateral Career Progression

4.14 In addition to simplifying the ICF to make it more practitioner focussed we should pay attention to how police staff and officers can plan their careers – both to move upwards through the ranks, and to make the most of their skills and experience if they remain at the same level. I am particularly concerned that traditionally insufficient attention has been given to identifying career paths for members of police staff. Thought therefore needs to be given to how we can develop individuals and help them plan for their careers. There are a number of different options that can be explored in this area, from mapping out clear specialisms and pathways between specialisms in the police service, to developing and supporting sergeants and other front-line supervisors so that they can in turn develop and make the most of their staff.

4.15 HMIC’s forthcoming thematic report on frontline supervision will make specific recommendations in these areas, which will seek to focus more supervisory effort on personal interaction and to reduce the importance of process driven management.

4.16 In thinking about how we support and develop our frontline officers we need to think about the supervision that they receive. The majority of officers will have a sergeant as their line manager, who will typically manage 5 or so constables. To ensure that we are getting the maximum from our officers, and identifying their strengths and development needs sergeants will need to see what their officers are doing in practice. Observing officers whilst
they are performing their duties, in both a formal and informal capacity is an important part of this. Accompanying officers for part of their shift could be one way to do this (in a similar way to teachers having lessons observed by their line managers), and should build into the PDR system. Sergeants would also need to be supported, such as through training and a stronger focus on their development with their line managers. This should give them the skills and confidence to challenge their officers and push them to fulfil their potential. In order to support this sort of progression, the Home Office, ACPO and the APA, collectively the Official Side of the Police Negotiating Board, should consider how forces can enhance the incentives to specialise in a particular field independent of advancing through the rank structure.

**Recommendation 15**

The NPIA should provide guidance and assistance to police staff and officers to allow them to progress their careers within the police service through better management of their professional development.

**Flexible Working**

4.17 In my interim report I highlighted the integral role that PCSOs are playing in the implementation of Neighbourhood Policing and the range of problem-solving and life skills, together with the very rich diversity, which has enhanced service delivery and reputation within communities. I am encouraged that following my report the NPIA has been commissioned to lead a tripartite review of PCSOs which includes looking at their roles and responsibilities, recruitment and training, and career development. This review is expected in February 2008 and will also comment on the interim recommendation that the NPIA should research the feasibility of a volunteer PCSO scheme. The Review welcomes this piece of work and will return to revisit the potential for a volunteer scheme in six months time.

4.18 However, I do feel the need to make comments now regarding the real potential for greater flexible working for staff within the neighbourhood context. Women make up 23% of police officer ranks, whilst they constitute 44% of the economically active population. Historically, the proportion of women officers resigning has been twice as high as for men. Research on resigning officers found that over a quarter of women mentioned domestic responsibilities as a key reason for resigning, while this was not the case for men. Studies on rostering and flexible ways of working have shown that many forces have continued to deal with individual requests for flexibility, rather than taking a strategic and proactive approach to resource management which might improve retention, work-life balance, efficiency and/or quality of service.

4.19 In addition, working within a local community context has been found to appeal to people from minority ethnic backgrounds in terms of the police service as a career, particularly for women and this appears to be borne out by research which has highlighted the greater ethnic diversity and higher
proportion of women amongst Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), compared to police officers. Examination of the PCSO profile found that a much lower proportion of PCSOs than other police staff were working part-time, and the proportion of women working as PCSOs was also lower than for other police staff. These differences suggested greater potential for the application and take-up of flexible working practices in the PCSO role. The combination of a neighbourhood team role as a PCSO or police officer and flexible working options might have a strong appeal for female potential recruits and those from minority ethnic backgrounds.

**Recommendation 16**

Chief constables should conduct a review of their forces' working practices within Neighbourhood Policing to ensure flexible working options exist. HMIC will, as part of its inspection process, consider what progress has been made in this area from 2009/10.

**Training and development**

4.20 The current model requires officers and staff to be provided with adequate training to carry out their role, but this tends to be on a 'one size fits all' approach, rather than tailored training according to an individual's development needs and the nature of a specific role. Further work should be carried out to allow for accreditation of prior learning to avoid duplication (this is especially so for PCSOs who become officers and currently have to repeat some of the same training). A more streamlined ICF that forms the basis of recruitment and development for officers could facilitate this, enabling individuals to take greater ownership of their professional development. We could look to other sectors for comparisons, for example in education and social care the individual takes responsibility for their pre-employment training completing relevant degree programmes at their own expense before being eligible for employment.

**Flexibility in the pension**

4.21 In addition to providing greater flexibility of entry to the policing workforce it is important to provide the opportunity to move on from the police and gain experience in other sectors. For the vast majority of officers there are significant financial penalties involved in leaving the service and becoming either a member of police staff or joining an external organisation. This is in large part due to the conditions of the police pension scheme, which has a shorter maturity rate than most pension schemes (30-35 years compared with 40 years), in addition there is accelerated accrual for most officers after 20 years service.

4.22 There are clear financial disincentives for any individual that might want to leave the police having spent a reasonable period of their working life there; this can have a negative impact on staff morale as there is a danger that
officers feel ‘trapped’ in a role that they no longer enjoy. In addition, the service as a whole and individuals are unable to benefit from officers spending some time out of the policing world. As the police are increasingly required to work with partners in other agencies in a range of policing activity, from Neighbourhood Policing to planning a response to a terrorist attack, and skills such as financial management are increasingly important, it would be even more helpful for officers to have some experience of working in another organisation. However, there are currently strong disincentives for individual wishing to take a break from the police for a few years to, for example, work in a local authority. Whilst there have been significant improvements in the new police pension scheme, and negotiations on this area are clearly complex and delicate, it is also clear that there would be significant benefits from a greater amount of flexibility in exiting the scheme or taking a break.

**Barriers to implementation**

4.23 There has in the past been an unhelpful party political debate around police officer numbers, which has been taken as the sole measure of police success rather than one important contribution to the truly central question of the outcomes which policing can deliver. This debate can overshadow the discussion of workforce reform and in the future I hope that discussions will not be tied to officer numbers but seen as part of the process of determining how the service can balance flexibility and capability as part of a formalised process of threat, harm and risk assessment.

4.24 Signs of progress are promising as there is widespread recognition amongst the leadership of the service that maintaining police numbers at their current level is not sustainable over the course of the next three years. It is pleasing to note that in recent times major political parties have recognised this fact, as well as the opportunities presented by workforce reform. Given the emerging evidence of the workforce reform pilots, I am persuaded that we would not be making the most effective use of the resources dedicated to the police if police officer numbers were sustained at their current level.

**Resilience**

4.25 Despite the significant increases in the numbers of officers and staff over recent years, the service’s resilience remains a crucially important issue in light of the range of risks which it is asked to manage at the local, regional and national level. Discussions of further workforce reform and some of the potential implications, such as a change in the mix between officers and staff, raise the issue of what level of officers we need to ensure that we can deal with emergencies as and when they arise. The number of officers we need is a careful balance between the risks we face, and ensuring that we don’t simply have officers forming large standing armies for the majority of the time, deployed only if there is a major incident of some kind.
4.26 Whatever type of incident our officers are asked to respond to it is clear that we need careful workforce planning and demand management. On a macro scale as the workforce reform debate develops it will be important to consider what kinds of skills are needed to respond to different incidents, and what the risks are of these events occurring and so on. Whilst there are clearly issues that will need to be worked through it is not necessarily the case that by reducing the basic number of officers, or by making roles more specialised, we will reduce our capacity to deal with these kinds of events. For example, we could develop a more specialised role for event policing, with a core resource (at force or regional level) that can be deployed to specific occasions – from sporting events to emergencies. Officers, and indeed staff, with specialised skills can also be trained to deal with basic public order issues, following the experience in Neighbourhood Policing where PCSOs can be pulled in to secure a crime scene to help with a major incident.

4.27 At a more ‘micro’ level – from force to BCU to individual teams we also need to develop sophisticated systems for mapping demand for policing services and ensuring that our officers are available when they are most needed. There is clearly a greater demand for response services from the police on Friday and Saturday evenings than on a Tuesday morning, therefore it is important that the number of officers on duty reflect this demand pattern. In addition to the number of officers on shift at different times we also need to think about how the structure of the shift pattern enables us to respond to demand. There are some interesting examples of forces that have looked at this issue, and have had considerable success in improving productivity, as well as the morale of officers. Significant benefits can be gained from a shift pattern that accurately reflects when officers need to be there; minimising the demand for overtime, ensuring that officer’s time is maximised when they are on shift, and ensuring that officers are properly rested and able to perform their duties as effectively as possible.

**Recommendation 17**

Detailed modelling of the impact of workforce reform on local, regional and national resilience should be incorporated into the ten-year workforce plan to be coordinated by the NPIA.

**Probationer training**

4.28 The area of workplace assessment and accreditation has also proved controversial across the service. The importance of both these areas is high but there is a real risk that we turn them into a bureaucratic nightmare some of which is self-imposed. One example is the Student Officer Learning Assessment Process (SOLAP) – the national replacement for the Probationer Development Portfolio (PDP) which has been built around evidencing against National Occupational Standards (NOS).
4.29 Most, but not all, forces are using SOLAP to assess their students. The SOLAP process of assessment is not radically different from that of its predecessor – the PDP. However its construction and its requirement to assess against NOS as opposed to competencies is very different.

4.30 The SOLAP is constructed of 4 areas of assessment:

1. Learning Diaries
2. Police Action Checklist (PAC)
3. 22 National Occupational Standards (NOS)
4. Learning Development Review (LDR)

4.31 The 22 NOS and the Learning Development Reviews form the main body of assessment whilst the student officer is on independent patrol. These parts of the SOLAP are problematic primarily for the following reasons:

1. The language used is academic in nature
2. Some NOS have been taken from other public sector organisations and are not ideally suited to the police service
3. There is onerous duplication of evidence/cross referencing required
4. There is an unwieldy requirement for full witness (i.e. supervisory or other officer) testimony

4.32 A study by a metropolitan force has identified that on average supervisors:

1. Spent 11.5 hours per probationer under the PTP system completing PDP paperwork
2. Now spend at least 35.2 hours per student officer under the SOLAP system

This triples the amount of supervisor time required (an additional 10,000 hours per annum completing assessment paperwork in one force)

4.33 Similarly, on average Student Officers:

1. Spend 1.9 hours per working week in duty time completing NOS paperwork
2. Spend 5.4 hours per working week off duty time completing NOS paperwork
3. Spend 3.4 hours in total in duty time completing self assessment

4. Spend 7.9 hours in total off duty time completing self assessment

Total student officer time spent completing assessment paperwork in this (reasonably large) force is 129,000 hours per annum.

Recommendation 18

The NPIA should work with forces on a post implementation review of the SOLAP workplace assessment and accreditation process, which the Greater Manchester Police has offered to lead.
CHAPTER 5 – FREEING UP SPACE

Introduction
5.1 Given the growing number of challenges the police service is asked to manage and the range of tasks with which officers can be confronted in their day to day work, it is vitally important that officers are focusing their time on doing the right things and using the right processes. As my interim report explained, the unnecessary bureaucracy which can consume officers’ time and divert them from more pressing priorities is very often a consequence of risk aversion. In this section I make further recommendations about how everyone involved in policing can work to reduce risk aversion and address the systemic causes of excessive bureaucracy and make specific recommendations to free up space in the working days of police officers.

Background
5.2 The 2002 O’Dowd report made 52 recommendations to reduce the administrative burden on frontline police officers. Most of these ‘change proposals’ were implemented, yet five years on officers still spend 20% of their time on paperwork.

5.3 In the interim report I described bureaucracy as having both necessary and unnecessary elements, much like good and bad cholesterol. Max Weber, a sociologist and economist, gives us one of the earliest known descriptions of bureaucracy, which he characterised as organisations with a division of labour, authority structures, positions and roles for individual members, and a set of rules and regulations which govern the interactions between members of the organisation.

5.4 Weber did not see bureaucracy as entirely negative. He did however highlight the potential for it to lead to duplication, and become rigid, without consideration of individual cases and scenarios. This has been expanded on by modern theorists such as Dr Max Travers who have pointed to the increasing complexity of bureaucracies, and the concentration of power resulting in rank and file members being unable to participate in the making of decisions.

5.5 The impact of bureaucracy on staff is significant and we have an obligation to manage it as effectively as possible. Responding to this challenge means we need to look beyond the reform of individual forms, and address the systemic drivers of bureaucracy. These drivers include risk aversion in society at large, increasing reliance on heavily prescriptive processes inside the service, a subsequent decrease in professional discretion, and an absence of effective personal accountability amongst officers.
5.6 I believe this is because there is often a 'single issue' focus in the way we approach things. When something is not right or we see an opportunity to innovate we form a group and set about building the perfect solution – one former chief constable called this the 'tyranny of experts'. Well intentioned specialists, focused on a single issue without due regard to the overall impact. This approach is prevalent in all members of the tripartite relationship and is well intentioned but leads to bureaucratic processes designed for the ‘worst case scenario’ which then have to be applied to volume activities on a daily basis.

5.7 The late 1990s through to the early millennium saw a number of significant issues impact upon the police service; the introduction of the Police (Health and Safety) Act 1997; the landmark Inquiry into the Death of Stephen Lawrence chaired by Sir William Macpherson which reported in 1999; the extension of the role of the Crown Prosecution Service, and the publication of the Bichard Inquiry in 2004. As a consequence, the social and judicial environment in which the police service operates changed considerably, as discussed later in the report.

Figure 4: Risk Aversion, Accountability and Discretion

Addressing the drivers of bureaucracy

5.8 Police workload has increased significantly over the past 25 years. In certain cases we need to acknowledge that we have undergone changes which have improved the service. For example, 25 years ago domestic violence was not generally seen as a police matter. Officers might attend to a partner dispute but would withdraw (provided no-one was badly injured) once words of advice had been given. Today this has changed – forces have a positive arrest policy, significant responsibilities around victim welfare, engagement of other agencies and take detailed statements of what has occurred in order that trends can be identified.
5.9 However in the process of improving the service, we have also become process bound. As highlighted in the interim report, process in itself is not bad. For less experienced staff, a defined process provides confidence and can act as a tool for learning. But when police personnel feel they have to follow process, regardless of circumstances, then we run the risk of becoming bureaucratic. However, there are alternatives – in the commercial sector, organisations with devolved structures adopt a model which sets out the general direction and preferred approach clearly but recognises that the way it is delivered should vary according to local context.

5.10 Sir David Phillips (former ACPO president and chief constable) made an important contribution to improving the police service by introducing the discipline of recording policy as doctrine. It is clear that the police service mission is both widening and deepening – the role is becoming both broader and more complex at the same time. Consequently, doctrine and process are important.

5.11 However, since its introduction, the service has become prolific in its drafting of doctrine, which includes regulations, codes of practice, operational policing manuals, and practical advice on best practice in the police service.

5.12 Over the past 2 years alone, 41 new pieces of doctrine have been introduced and an additional 22 are currently under development. What is even more concerning is that at an individual level, doctrine is growing exponentially. The service tends to adopt an ‘additive approach’ so that when an individual policy is reviewed, additional detail is added – rarely does the review lead to a complete re-think and a shorter policy. If we are not careful, the 21st century police service is in danger of becoming a slave to doctrine and straitjacketed by process.

**Recommendation 19**

All existing doctrine, which includes regulations, codes of practice, operational policing manuals and practical advice on best practice in the police service, should be reviewed and consolidated so the total impact can be assessed and overlaps in individual documents removed by the end of 2008.

This process should be led by ACPO, with support from the NPIA, on behalf of the service. The NPIA should play an ongoing role in considering all proposals to enhance doctrine. Their focus should be on the combined impact of changes to the service and the development of a protocol of ‘review and replace’ rather than continually adding to existing doctrine.

5.13 Our use of processes has become disproportionate. The answer partially lies in our current approach to risk. Our processes are designed to ‘Rolls Royce’ standard, which we then struggle to implement and use efficiently on a day to day basis. This is underpinned by two drivers:
1 Internally – a ‘just in case’ mentality, which leads to every process being designed to the worst case scenario without regard to how it will be handled by thousands of officers on a day to day basis.

2 Externally – a public approach, vocalised by the media and politicians, that ‘this must never happen again’ – which results in the same outcome. Over recent years we have started to see an even more insidious extension; the expectation that the service should have anticipated events and incidents that are well beyond their control.

5.14 The police service is not solely to blame for our current predicament. Increasingly, the public, media, and ultimately politicians have developed an unwillingness to accept error. The Better Regulation Executive’s Report Whose risk is it anyway highlighted the need for a public debate on risk stating that incentives and culture need to change. The present culture encourages the state – ministers, councillors, officials and regulators – to feel that they must take total responsibility and impose new systems to neutralise all potential hazards. The this must never be allowed to happen again mentality is worthy but leads to the implementation of hefty processes which are modelled on worst case scenario. Officers and staff then struggle to apply them to volume tasks on a daily basis.

5.15 We must face up to a choice. Heavy handed, bureaucratic and burdensome processes or a more proportionate approach which matches resource to risk and harm. An on-going public debate needs to take place about what sorts of risk are acceptable in the police service. This debate must take place on two levels – within central government, as this is often where the pressure to neutralise all hazards emanates, and at individual force level, as it is individual chief constables who must take on a leadership role in this debate.

**Recommendation 20**

The government’s recently established Risk and Regulation Advisory Council should examine the role of risk within the police service, and begin a national debate on risk aversion and culture change at a central government level. Ministers, senior police leaders and stakeholders from the wider judicial system all need to engage in and take forward this debate.

ACPO and the other tripartite members should facilitate regional events on risk in the police service to engage staff and officers from all ranks in the debate on managing risk, and enhancing professional discretion and accountability. These events should include a practical discussion on existing processes in the police where little or no discretion exists.

The NPIA should take forward and ‘mainstream’ the outcome of these events as a ‘golden thread’ in the way it designs training, education and doctrine for the police service.
5.16 A new emphasis must be given in this to the importance of supervision (including provision to equip line managers at all levels with the necessary skills both to support and to challenge the staff they are responsible for), along with a systematic approach to ensuring they are used regularly and effectively – for example by regular, random dip-sampling, observation and meaningful routine performance appraisal. This is the key to a meaningful approach to improving performance.

5.17 We must focus on building a more confident police service – one which emphasises individual professionalism and which is founded upon strong standards and team values. This means we need to move away from training towards education. In order to do this we need to embed clear organisational standards & values, provide decision making frameworks for our staff, and ensure that staff are trained appropriately.

5.18 Within this enhanced approach to professional development, the police service must also ensure that proper attention is given to the importance of professional ethics as a crucial contributory factor to the fair and effective use of an officer’s discretion. Police officers and police staff will have to use greater professional judgement, take greater risks in their decision making, and to use their discretion in order to achieve the highest levels of trust and confidence in policing. In doing so they will need to know that they will have the support of their force and that there are clear and consistent standards against which their behaviour will be judged. This can be achieved by ‘value based’ or ‘principle based’ decision making, where discretion and judgement are implemented in a way that is consistent with the values of the organisation.

5.19 ACPO have already instigated a piece of work being undertaken by Adrian Lee, Deputy Chief Constable of Staffordshire, to develop a new body within ACPO to provide leadership to the service on police ethics, which the Review supports and which will support many of the proposals and developments recommended and supported by this report.

5.20 We have seen service-wide processes introduced when individual officers haven’t discharged their professional discretion appropriately – for example Stop and Account. If we reinstate and re-emphasise professional judgement, we must look at accountability also. Currently, it is difficult to hold individual members of the police to account. We have a duty of care to protect our staff from malicious complaints, but on the other hand, if a person is at fault it is often hard to determine responsibility due to the top to bottom involvement of multiple people in a process.

5.21 We need to enhance public trust in the police service – and we must begin with accountability. Strengthening accountability is not only key to rebuilding public confidence; it is also a necessary precursor to any initiatives to reinstate professional discretion. I do not advocate increased discretion without an increase in the accountability of officers and staff.
5.22 Increasing accountability means building a profession where individuals are held to account for their actions, and the service places greater emphasis on active supervision as part of the mechanisms to hold staff to account. This review advocates that sergeants and other supervisors stop checking and counter-signing everything and replace these activities with more practical hands on supervision.

5.23 The training implications of more active supervision are:

1. Practical training for sergeants on how to manage performance and the managerial powers they have.
2. Individuals who are licensed and then dip sampled.
3. There must be consequences for police officers who are not meeting the expectations of the service.

5.24 Finally, we must move away from being risk averse, to risk conscious. This will require a mature debate about the role of the police.

5.25 In order to progress this difficult subject confidently we need to identify risk, quantify it, and determine reasonable steps to mitigate (as opposed to eradicate) the risk. We need to do this in a way which doesn’t generate even more bureaucracy – we need to become more confident at making assumption based projections, which are not blame orientated when genuine mistakes are made but are equally, tough on negligence and ignorance.

5.26 The Better Regulation Executive (a unit within the department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform) has a range of tools it encourages government departments to use to assess the cost of implementing new regulations and processes. This includes the standard cost model, which is used to assess the number of people a new process will impact, the time it will take to be completed, and the total cost.

5.27 Robust cost benefit analysis provides the basis on which to assess whether an option’s benefits meet or exceed its associated costs. It also allows alternative options to be compared in a meaningful way. Currently, I do not believe that centrally, or as individual forces, we take into account the full impact of the processes we implement. Whilst the business of modern policing means we are dealing with difficult and dangerous issues, we must still be willing to assess the cost of managing risk in a more proportionate way.

5.28 Responding to the systemic drivers of bureaucracy requires a fundamental rethink about the way we currently operate across the service. If we are to make significant and sustainable improvements, we must start by:

- introducing greater proportionality; and
- acting more corporately in non-operational matters.
**Detailed Examples**

5.29 Although I believe it is important for this review to look at the systemic drivers of bureaucracy, I also want to look at the practical examples of what could be achieved if we tackle these drivers. In the following sections I address a number of the most important issues which have been raised with me during the course of my work and propose ways in which the burden of unnecessary bureaucracy can be reduced.

**Crime recording**

5.30 In April 2002, the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) was adopted by all police forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland to promote greater consistency between forces in the recording of crime and to take a more victim orientated approach to crime recording. The result has been an overall improvement in the quality of crime recording with the Audit Commission assessment in autumn 2007 stating that the police now produce ‘better quality crime data than ever before’.

5.31 The potentially unintended consequence of improvements to crime recording is that in some cases, we have lost proportionality. Whilst it is crucial that all crime is recorded to ensure compliance with NCRS, this does not mean the same level of detail must be recorded for all levels of crime, but in many cases it is. Activity analysis data from the Home Office suggests that we spend the same amount of time on paperwork regardless of the severity or seriousness of the incident or crime.

5.32 Clearly, a new approach to crime recording is needed which continues to properly record crime allegations reported by the public, but recognises the need for proportionality and properly reflecting public needs and expectations. This report recommends a new, two-tiered approach to crime and incident recording based on the following areas.

**Serious:** These offences represent around 20% of all crime, and are set out in the government’s Public Service Agreement (PSA 23). These must continue to be fully recorded. Changes detailed below will mean earlier prioritisation of these more serious offences and improved service quality to victims. Success will be measured by bringing offenders to justice and supporting victims’ needs.

**Local:** This broad category accounts for the vast majority, around 80%, of all crimes not captured by PSA 23. I recommend that these matters are recorded in a much more concise way, which would avoid the need to complete the long reports that are used in some forces to record a crime. The approach would be transparent and accountable, measured by resolutions, public satisfaction and confidence rates and encourage proportionate decision making and constructive solutions.
5.33 The benefits of ensuring proportionality are significant. Reducing the amount of non essential information we are capturing has been estimated in a medium sized force to free up approximately 40,000 hours per year, which if mirrored in other forces would represent a huge saving that could be reinvested in frontline policing. This is the equivalent of reducing a typical 16 page form, to a one or two sided form to record a crime or incident. There will also be further savings (as yet unquantified) in back office support activity.

5.34 Obviously, there will be a reduction in the overall data available with this new approach and, whilst I do not believe it will impact on central government, it will require careful management at a local level with both partners and the wider policing family. The Home Office has indicated that the shortened reporting format will still allow forces to fulfil all existing annual data requirements. I call on central government to show support for this initiative to reintroduce proportionality into the system and if the pilots are successful, to consider revising these requirements.

5.35 The administration costs of recording a crime is only the beginning of a process. Whilst in this report I am advocating a recording system which captures all crimes and incidents proportionately, we must also examine the end to end process once a record is taken. There are two issues here which are impacting on forces’ ability to provide the service the public expect; the notifiable offence list, and sanction detection performance management arrangements.

5.36 I touched on the issue of the Notifiable Offence List (NOL) in my interim report. The NOL defines all of those crimes which should be recorded by the police and notified to the Home Office. Additions to this list in 1998 have meant that in 2006/07 around 720,000 new offences were captured, and around half of all crimes recorded as violent involved no injury to the victim.

5.37 The Notifiable Offence List has a considerable knock on effect. Once an offence is included on this list, it is often captured by performance management targets, either set nationally or locally. This artificially constrains officers when faced with trying to resolve an incident and gives the appearance that the police are inflexible and clumsy in the seemingly rigid use of criminal justice sanctions against what the public sees as a varied basket of minor offences. Local crime, as proposed in this report, should allow the service to exercise a proportionate response in a new performance context which truly reflects the value of citizen-focused resolutions.

5.38 The Home Office has realised the perverse incentives caused by sanction detection rates and Public Service Agreement 24 provides the opportunity to reduce the use of “offences brought to justice” targets. The centre must ensure that these targets are not reinstated and ACPO must ensure that this behaviour no longer manifests at force level. There are also further opportunities to look at the issues surrounding sanction detections.
measures. Other resolutions that have more public utility could both reduce bureaucracy and improve victim satisfaction. We must tackle this complex and often highly politicised area if we are to meet the individual requirements and expectations of the public we serve.

5.39 My research has consistently highlighted examples where the service could improve its professional judgement and adopt a more proportionate response in responding to lower level crimes. The consequence of poor professional judgment, combined with existing performance management arrangements, are that officers are encouraged to criminalise people for behaviour which may have caused offence but the underlying behaviour would be better dealt with in a different way. Complainants are dissatisfied because they want help rather than a criminal justice outcome that generates huge bureaucracy.

5.40 The public expectation is that an officer should use a proportionate response to deal with the situations he or she encounters. We must ensure that, within reason, the combination of the Notifiable Offence List, recording practices and local performance regimes allow this to happen, whilst allowing the flexibility needed to maintain public confidence.

Recommendation 21
To achieve the dual goal of public trust and confidence in crime statistics by ensuring all incidents and crimes are recorded and proportionately responded to, I recommend that;

(a) A new streamlined recording process is trialled from the beginning of 2008, for a four month period. This new process will ensure that crimes are subject to proportionate recording, with reduction in the information recorded for many crimes down to that required to meet national standards but with more comprehensive recording for the more serious crimes;

(b) A structured project is undertaken to address the lack of proportionate response in the service and to create a community focused performance regime for local crime;

(c) These proposals are implemented initially by Staffordshire, Leicestershire, West Midlands and Surrey forces who have volunteered in this regard; and

(d) The NPIA undertake a focused evaluation of these pilot sites.
Recommendation 21 (continued)

Over this trial period, service wide data collected centrally may not be comparable. Any NCRS/NSIR audit and inspection regime must acknowledge the nature of the pilots and the potential wider benefits of more proportionate crime recording.

The Home Office should use its forthcoming Green Paper as an opportunity for public debate and consultation on proposals to amend the Notifiable Offences List, and complete a comprehensive review of it by the end of 2008.

Inspection, audit and external scrutiny

5.41 Inspections are another area where I believe there is room for greater proportionality. As I discussed in the interim report, the police service has never been so comprehensively reviewed and scrutinised as it is today. The effect of this has been to considerably drive up standards, but it also means that forces invest large amounts of resource and energy in servicing inspection and audit requirements. A range of reviewers can descend upon a force at any time, with insufficient formal mechanisms for coordinating and managing the related workload for forces. (There are clear parallels between this area and the discussion on the performance regime – individual good intentions overtaken by the total impact).

5.42 It is therefore not just important to challenge the inspection requirement from any one organisation but also to work together, to clarify the roles and responsibilities of inspection and audit bodies, as discussed earlier in this report. Progress has already been made in better coordinating the work of the five Chief Inspectors (including myself) responsible for Policing, Prisons, Probation, Crown Prosecution and Courts’ Administration but more can be achieved on a wider basis.

5.43 In my capacity as Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary I intend to continue discussions with all the relevant bodies in the hope of radically streamlining these processes and thereby easing the administrative burden which falls upon forces in this regard.

Criminal Justice System

5.44 The criminal justice system is an example of multi-agency bureaucracy. Some good work has been undertaken by both the police and the Crown Prosecution Service but it is only the tip of the iceberg. Over the past 25 years the sheets of paper an officer is required to complete within an average case file have more than doubled.

5.45 Over the course of the review, I have looked at the following multi agency initiatives:
1 Simple Speedy Summary Justice initiative (CJSSS)
   The CJSSS initiative was introduced to reduce the number of wasteful hearings and improve the speed with which cases are progressed at court.

2 The Streamlined Process (formerly known as the Directors Guidance Quick Process)
   This procedure involves replacing Prosecution Team Manual of Guidance (MG) forms with a simplified form and developing a proportionate approach to case file building for those cases which can be disposed of at the magistrates’ court. The use of only the simplified form for anticipated guilty pleas in summary cases involves potentially a considerable reduction in the amount of paperwork required from the police.

3 Virtual Courts
   A Virtual Court is a first hearing held in a magistrates’ court in which the defendant appears in court by means of a video link from the police station, and for which the documents required are electronically stored and shared between the agencies involved.

4 Integrated Prosecution Teams
   Building on recommendations by Sir Ian Clidewell in the late 1990s around establishing closer relationships with the CPS, Integrated Prosecution Teams involve the co-location of CPS staff in police stations where a new end to end process is introduced. This removes duplication, improves efficiencies and involves, crucially, the adoption of a single case file. The police staff in the criminal justice unit are re-deployed, either performing a role in the Post-Prosecution Team in terms of resulting and archiving activity, or in a new role as Case Builders, building case files alongside investigating officers at the pre-charge stage. The enhanced case-file build produced significantly reduces the amount of remedial work and activity required at the post-charge stage.

5.46 Each of these pilots has demonstrated considerable benefits. Based on the figures for the Metropolitan Police Service, the potential maximum national total savings in terms of officer hours is approximately 1.3 million or over 650 police officers.

5.47 Taken collectively, these four pilots also encourage improved communication between criminal justice agencies, and create more space for victim and witness care through greater efficiencies.

5.48 By discussing the benefits of the current CJS pilots, I hope to smooth the way for the national roll out of these initiatives. This does not mean there are not drawbacks to some of these streamlined systems and processes. There is a need for investment in terms of time and money in the initial set-up of projects, and we will also need to overcome barriers to organisational change. But on balance, the pros certainly outweigh the cons, justifying service wide adoption.
5.49 In response to my interim report, the Home Office has developed a new PSA to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the criminal justice system. The development of this PSA must address two issues (1) its core objective must be convicting the guilty (2) all existing performance indicators between the police and CPS must be brought into alignment.

5.50 Currently, the CPS has 15 key performance indicators. One of the key CPS targets relates to the reduction of attrition, which is defined as an acquittal, a discontinuance or a dismissal. Those CPS targets that centre around attrition rates conflict with the drive amongst police forces to increase sanction detections. CPS performance data suffers if a case which has been charged does not result in a conviction. This leads to the CPS Duty Prosecutors feeling compelled to seek more evidence than is necessary and delaying charges, thereby involving an increased amount of paperwork. Risk aversion, in this instance on the part of the CPS, leads to delay and the denial of charging decisions which can be contrary to the drive by the police to realise sanction detections.

5.51 The introduction of a single case file process would also produce significant pan agency savings. The business case for Virtual Courts indicates that the administrative cost incurred solely in relation to the copying of case files across London alone is estimated at 65,000 hours for police staff.

5.52 I believe there are further efficiency gains to be made by streamlining the criminal justice system. Following on from the national roll out of the four pilots, the Office of Criminal Justice Reform (OCJR) should seek new opportunities to achieve the governments PSA target to 'increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice system' in the form of a radical review.

5.53 As a first step, the police service needs to make full use of the charging powers they currently have. This is not happening in all forces due to the complexity and lack of clarity around existing guidance. Improving this guidance and the quality of supervision could substantially reduce the time officers currently spend waiting for charging decisions from the Crown Prosecution Service, allowing them to return to their primary function of patrolling and investigating at an earlier stage.

5.54 Further efficiencies could be made by extending police charging powers to include all summary offences, regardless of plea, and to additional offences subject to trial at either magistrates or crown court. This could enable the CPS to concentrate on more serious and difficult cases. Making this change would require a valid charging decision making process and appropriate supervisory structures. Consideration should also be given to expanding the role of the courts to include community justice, which would enable them to support Neighbourhood Policing priorities through focused community sentences.
**Recommendation 22**

I support the roll out of the Simple Speedy Summary Justice Initiative, and recommend that the Streamlined Process, Virtual Courts and Integrated Prosecution teams, be implemented nationally by 2012, taking into account lessons learned from each pilot and the local business case for implementation.

(a) The Crown Prosecution Service and ACPO should jointly work towards a single case file system within the framework of the Integrated Prosecution Teams.

(b) The Home Office, OCJR and Attorney General should work together to ensure that targets and performance indicators for the Police and Crown Prosecution Service are brought into alignment and set against the core objective of convicting the guilty. This should be achieved through the next spending review process.

(c) I welcome the news that the NPIA is putting better working between the police and the criminal justice system at the centre of its plans and that OCJR will continue with their comprehensive and radical review of the criminal justice processes. Further opportunities to achieve the government’s new PSA target to ‘increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice system’ should include consideration by these bodies of:

(1) the proportionality of current disclosure rules;

(2) simplifying current guidance on charging powers for the police; and

(3) the extension of police charging powers to all cases heard at the magistrates’ court, and to additional offences subject to trial, either at the magistrates’ or the crown court.

**The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000**

5.55 The processes which surround the use by the police of investigatory powers have, as I noted in my interim report, been raised with me by a large number of individual officers and forces throughout my review. Whilst I am clear that the use of surveillance techniques is an area where this is a clear need for regulation and authorisation processes, I am concerned that in some instances excessive bureaucracy is created by a combination of misunderstanding and sometimes over-interpertation of the relevant rules. Often to the service’s credit, this is driven by the best motives. I have had a number of conversations with the Chief Surveillance Commissioner, Sir Christopher Rose, as to how best greater clarity and understanding can be brought about in this important area. I believe that the best way ahead for the service is for the Codes of Practice which cover the implementation of RIPA to be reviewed with a view to delivering greater clarity...
and proportionality around the recording of investigative powers, whilst still maintaining critically important public safeguards. On a separate but related point, I further believe that the current legislative requirement that an applicant for an ‘authority’ and the authorising officer are from the same organisation is a barrier to inter agency co-operation and indeed police cross-boundary co-operation. The forthcoming Green Paper should be used to consult on removal of this stipulation.

**Recommendation 23**

The Home Office should urgently initiate a review of the RIPA Codes of Practice. Once initiated I see no reason why with determination and commitment from the interested parties involved such a review could not be conducted over a 3 month period.

\[5.56 \text{ ‘Stop and Search’ and ‘Stop and Account’} \]

In the immediate days and weeks before publication of this report much public and political debate has ‘raged’ about police processes in relation to what is commonly called Stop and Search. Some of the debate has been around a call for increased police power to engage in more of this activity and some has been about the bureaucracy surrounding the activity. In fact as a result of the *Stephen Lawrence Inquiry*, carried out by Sir William Macpherson into the murder of Stephen Lawrence, a recommendation was accepted that the existing police recording practice for intrusive searches of people (Stop and Search) should be applied to all stops and checking of people in public places (Stop and Account) i.e. where people are asked to account for such things as their presence, for what is in their possession or for their movements etc. The recommendation was given life by a change in the codes of practice relating to the Police and Criminal Evidence legislation. I made clear my intention in my interim report to consider how Stop and Account and Stop and Search might be better administered. Having discussed this with Sir William Macpherson, I am convinced that in respect of Stop and Account this is an example of where the police have gone further bureaucratically than was intended by his eminently sensible recommendation to protect the police the public and the relationship between them.

5.57 What has evolved is a manually recorded system of Stop and Account which takes on average 7 minutes per individual encounter and which, as I witnessed, however careful an officer is in explaining the purpose of the process, usually leads to suspicion on the part of the member of the public involved. In London alone, it has been estimated that Stop and Account consumes over 48,000 hours annually of officers’ time. This does not include the time taken to log each form once it is returned to the station, or the time supervisors spend checking and countersigning each form.
5.58 I do not believe that what we have developed as the Stop and Account process is fulfilling the need identified by the *Stephen Lawrence Inquiry*. The process has become bureaucratic rather than focusing on what I believe is most important in the one to one interactions between the police and members of the public – courtesy, respect and accountability. I do, however, remain convinced that there is a need for officers to demonstrate accountability to individual members of the public. This purpose could be best be served through an overhaul of the current Stop and Account process.

5.59 Stop and Search however, is a statutory power available to the police, and is a much more invasive process. I have long believed and remain convinced that for this process a more formal and comprehensive process is both proportionate and appropriate. In this area I believe there are savings and gains to be made by streamlining the existing process through the use of mobile data systems.

5.60 I have consulted widely in considering potential reform to the Stop and Account regime. Some community representatives have presented a concern that the removal of Stop and Account would no longer allow disproportionality to be considered nationally. I have considered this argument at great length. I agree that building a national picture of our behaviour and actions as police officers is crucial. I therefore advocate that Stop and Search figures be given the weight they deserve at force level as set out in the government’s Public Service Agreement. I do however, believe that for Stop and Account, greater emphasis should be placed on the accountability an individual officer displays each time they stop a member of the public.

5.61 I believe this is best served not by filling in a lengthy form to be used for statistical analysis, but by ensuring our officers are aware of the responsibility they must exercise when they ask someone to account for themselves. I have explored with ‘Airwave’ the practicality of an officer digitally recording the details of the encounter verbally rather than manually in writing. I am assured that this can be done in a way that ensures there is as good a record of the individual encounter as presently exists and that such a database can be subsequently interrogated to ensure proportionality etc. Having consulted with such eminent people in this field as Lord Adebowale and Mrs. Doreen Lawrence I am convinced that this approach will accommodate their legitimate concerns should the practice of abandoning the procedure be contemplated.
5.62 This could be complemented by the officer simply giving the member of the public a record of their identity and the date time and place of the encounter. Sir Paul Scott-Lee Chief Constable of West Midlands Police has helpfully offered to trial such a scheme and I recommend an urgent amendment to PACE Codes of practice to enable this to take place. A period of 3 to 4 months should be sufficient to validate the new process which should be then rolled out nationally. Indeed, its application at that stage could then be considered also for 'Stop and Search' albeit with the current level of data for 'Stop and Search.'

**Recommendation 24**

The current comprehensive form for Stop and Account should be removed and replaced with the following measures:

(a) Any officer who asks an individual to account for themselves should provide that individual with a 'receipt' of the encounter in the form of a business card or similar, and use Airwave to record the encounter, including the ethnicity of the person subject to the encounter to enable disproportionality monitoring; and

(b) Supervisory officers should 'dip sample' these recordings.

These proposals should be piloted in the West Midlands and evaluated by the end of summer 2008.

**Conclusion: What does all this mean?**

5.63 The police service needs to move from being 'risk averse' to 'risk conscious'. This is certainly not about being reckless; rather it is about continuous (internalised) business risk identification, quantification and proportionate mitigation measures. However, if we are to move to a new culture where we manage business risk for the public good (rather than trying to always eradicate it) the police service need public support for this process. It does require an on-going national debate if we are to re-balance the police culture and public expectations – I believe the police service are ready to listen.

5.64 We do not wish to break figures down too, far as the reducing bureaucracy approaches identified here are yet to be tested widely, but we believe the sorts of efficiencies that should be released. If applied across the service, I believe that we should be able to release not less than 5–7 million hours. This time gained is equivalent to 2,500 – 3,500 officers.
CHAPTER 6 – DELIVERING IN PARTNERSHIP

Introduction

6.1 The development of Neighbourhood Policing is a crucial part of the police service’s response to the challenges it faces. By creating teams of officers dedicated to building strong links with local communities, responding to their needs and working in partnership with other parts of government it can build trust and confidence in policing and make a major contribution to tackling problems like anti social behaviour and vandalism that can blight people’s lives. As importantly, by firmly rooting policing in our communities and building better relationships between the police and the public, it can play a vital role in creating the support and channelling the information which is needed to tackle serious criminality. Within the Review’s vision for policing that effectively responds to the threats the public face, both of these aspects offer real benefits.

6.2 The Review was asked to consider how to build on the excellent work of the national Neighbourhood Policing Programme team, which was set up in 2005 to roll out Neighbourhood Policing across England and Wales, by finding ways to embed and mainstream the approach and to move it from an innovative approach to an established and everyday part of policing. The Review’s interim report, published in September 2007, made 13 recommendations to achieve this goal and emphasised the value of integrating Neighbourhood Policing into a broader neighbourhood management approach, which involves the fully coordinated delivery of local services to improve the quality of local residents’ lives. To clarify, this approach to partnership working and community safety does not simply mean the merging of the CLG Neighbourhood Management Pilots with the Neighbourhood Policing Programme, but rather signifies a shift toward a more collaborative approach to wider service delivery across the public services. A number of these recommendations, have already begun to help achieve these goals.

What is ‘successful’ Neighbourhood Policing?

6.3 Since the creation of the National Neighbourhood Policing team in 2005, significant progress has been made in establishing successful Neighbourhood Policing teams throughout England and Wales. Over 3,600 teams are now operating in 43 forces, 16,000 PCSOs have been recruited and 13,000 Sergeants and PCs are dedicated to Neighbourhood Policing teams.
6.4 The implementation is underpinned by a strong evidence base from the National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP). The NRPP evaluation showed that when implemented at a local level, Neighbourhood Policing was found to have a significant positive impact on a wide range of outcome measures, including criminal victimization, perceptions of anti-social behaviour, and public confidence in the police. Follow-up research showed that the vast majority of these improvements were sustained in the longer term. Both this research and more recent findings from the evaluation of the national implementation show the critical importance of three delivery mechanisms – foot patrol, community engagement and problem-solving.

6.5 In addition, according to the results of rigorous summaries of international evidence the only community or Neighbourhood Policing model with significant positive results in terms of crime and anti-social behaviour reduction and improvements in public perceptions is a close match to the modern UK definition of Neighbourhood Policing. As part of the Coordinated Community Policing intervention in Newark officers became more visible in order to engage with the public to find out their priorities and then tackle them in partnership. The design and scale of the work and the evaluation was very similar to the National Reassurance Policing Programme suggesting that these programmes lead to, as a minimum, twice the improvement compared to sites without neighbourhood policing, or can manage to improve when comparison sites’ results are deteriorating.

6.6 The Review has been careful not to seek to prescribe what Neighbourhood Policing should look like, recognising that a key strength of the approach is the flexibility to adapt to the needs of enormously varied local communities and that many of the outcomes it helps to deliver, such as confidence and longer term reductions in crime and the fear of crime, go beyond narrow success criteria or simple measures of output. There is consistent evidence from various areas of public policy, both nationally and internationally, that engagement should be tailored to communities’ needs and preferences and that there is no ‘one size fits all’ model or strategy. Regular public meetings, especially those that are police-led, are effective in some areas; but are poorly attended in others. They need to be used as required, and supplemented by more innovative engagement methods that increase representation. It is important to properly profile the neighbourhood and to develop a range of engagement methods. A neighbourhood profile brings together information about an area and the people who live in and use it from a wide range of sources, enabling a plan of engagement to be tailored to fit local need. Evidence from the NRPP showed that forces that used non-traditional engagement methods such as street briefings, panel meetings, door knocking and environmental visual audits to inform problem-solving activity had more successful outcomes. Therefore, the embedding of neighbourhood policing should avoid the standardisation of engagement activity.
6.7 The Review’s interim report did identify three elements which are of critical importance in delivering successful Neighbourhood Policing:

- Officers and PCSOs in neighbourhood teams should be visible and accessible to local people.
- Communities must be involved in identifying local priorities, which must then be tackled by targeted action and problem solving; and
- Community safety and quality of life issues must be addressed through the development of strong relationships and joint working with local partners.

Challenges in the next phase of Neighbourhood Policing

6.8 Following on from the interim report and the recommendations made there to support the embedding of Neighbourhood Policing, the Review has carried out further work to understand where the development of Neighbourhood Policing will create new challenges and new opportunities for improving the service that can be delivered. These are:

1. Creating effective partnerships
2. Spreading the learning and improving delivery without stifling flexibility and innovation
3. Engendering a joined up approach to citizen focused policing and promoting community cohesion

6.9 In the following sections, this report outlines how policing can go further to meet these challenges and details specifics measures which should be taken to continue the development of Neighbourhood Policing.

Creating Effective Partnerships

6.10 My vision for the future of Neighbourhood Policing is that it exists within a wider context of collaboration and joint working, with all local partners and staff dedicated to identifying and resolving the problems that face communities. This wider neighbourhood management approach should be fully integrated wherever possible through such means as joint-tasking, co-location and the direction of an appropriate neighbourhood manager to ensure seamless, joined up delivery of local priorities. Identifying and tackling local issues encapsulates the intelligence led, problem solving approach of Neighbourhood Policing. Neighbourhood Policing should be viewed as the catalyst for a shift across the police service toward a problem solving rather than responsive culture, which draws on the capabilities and resources of both the police service and its partners. Community safety is no longer the sole preserve of the police and must instead be at the heart of local partnership working, bringing together different agencies in a wider neighbourhood management approach.
6.11 The Review welcomes the production of an action plan for the integration of the Neighbourhood Policing within a wider neighbourhood management approach in response to the recommendation of its interim report. In developing this plan, in line with a further recommendation from the Interim Report, the Home Office worked with CLG and the NPIA to produce a summary of the evidence on the benefits of embedding Neighbourhood Policing within a neighbourhood management approach. I am encouraged that the NPIA, HO and CLG researchers are identifying opportunities to further develop the cross-discipline research base required to assess the full benefits to society of partnership approaches. The next area which should be considered is how to ensure that partnerships have all of the key capabilities needed to deliver effective community safety.

6.12 The capability to provide drug and alcohol treatment, offender management, family support and management and anti social behaviour and licensing services are critical to a local partnership capacity to deliver. Similarly, prioritising vulnerable neighbourhoods is crucial to success and there is much research to support the view that interventions in these areas may be particularly effective. In some areas, such as two tier authorities, local partnerships may not be large enough to effectively provide all of these services. There should be an expectation that in such circumstances all relevant agencies should collaborate and better share key services in order to establish these essential capabilities.

6.13 The Review has received considerable feedback from police, police authorities, local authorities and partners that community safety partnership working is also considerably more difficult in areas with two tier as opposed to unitary authorities. The difficulties faced are largely the result of the multilayered range of responsibilities for community safety in areas with two-tier authorities, which frequently results in perceived dominant upper tier influence in matters such as LAAs and funding.

6.14 Partnership working is essential to the successful delivery and sustaining of Neighbourhood Policing and in order to make this easier the Home Office and CLG should look to develop a strategy for best supporting community safety partnerships that operate within a two tier environment and ensure that arrangements are in place to support the delivery of neighbourhood community safety outcomes in the new Local Area Agreements.
Recommendation 25
The Home Office and CLG should consider how best to support improved community safety partnership working in two-tier areas, in particular encouraging greater collaboration between local partnerships to enhance their capacity to deliver key community safety services.

As the new Local Area Agreements are rolled out, the Home Office and CLG should also consider how best to support the delivery of tailored neighbourhood community safety outcomes.

6.15 Building upon my vision and drawing on the principles outlined in the cross-governmental action plan, the Review has identified a set of overarching principles that aid the implementation of successful neighbourhood management. Within a community safety context.

Principles of the neighbourhood management approach.

- Strong CDRP leadership and priority setting.
- Understanding local neighbourhoods:
  - Information sharing and analysis.
  - Profiling, mapping and prioritisation of neighbourhoods and resource allocation.
- Strong community engagement in priority setting and problem solving.
- Dedicated, multi agency teams, with a neighbourhood manager and accommodated in the same place where possible.
- Joint tasking arrangements and prioritisation to deal with local problems.
- Better information and feedback to the public.
- Joint performance measures, monitoring and improvement processes.
- Financial planning and pooling of budgets to support outcomes.

6.16 There are also further opportunities for better coordination between agencies involved in community safety and I hope that the review led by Louise Casey looking at how front line agencies can get their communities better engaged in the fight against crime will consider the potential for further integration.

6.17 It is also, of course, important that local performance management systems support and promote the neighbourhood management approach and give clear accountability to different partners. This can be hard to achieve given the number of different agencies involved in local service delivery. However, the development of Local Area Agreements (LAAs) should ensure
that all partners are working towards the same agreed objectives. The new Comprehensive Area Assessments will also focus on the delivery of successful partnership outcomes and HMIC and Audit Commission will jointly assess how effectively local councils and their partners are delivering community safety.

6.18 What is clear to me is that for this integration to happen there needs to be a strengthened cross-departmental focus on promoting effective partnership working. The National Crime Reduction Board, which brings together Ministers and senior stakeholders from departments and organisations with responsibilities that affect neighbourhood management, could have a valuable role to play in providing this high level support and policy integration. The board should appoint a programme board of senior officials to implement the action plan and receive quarterly updates on progress. The Home Office should also work with the Welsh Assembly Government to ensure that full account is taken of matters for which responsibility is devolved in Wales.

**Recommendation 26**

The Home Office, CLG and WAG should put in place proper governance and programme support arrangements to deliver the action plan which will promote the closer integration of Neighbourhood Policing with a neighbourhood management approach. These arrangements should be in place by autumn 2008.

6.19 It was acknowledged in the interim report that there are potentially significant benefits associated with participatory budgeting. The Review welcomes the decision made by CLG to use participatory budgeting as a mechanism for community engagement and is aware of the good work being carried out. The Home Office and CLG have both shown commitment to these ideas and are working with partners to identify suitable areas which where participatory budgeting for community safety could be trialled, possibly within the wider plan for integrating Neighbourhood Policing within neighbourhood management. This work and the anticipated benefits it will bring to the neighbourhood management partnership approach and community engagement are fully supported by the Review.

**Partnership Learning and Development**

6.20 Developing the right skills in the right people is clearly a key part of developing effective partnerships. There is now a need to consider how to build the capacity to work in effective partnerships, not just in the police service but across local agencies. It is vital that this training mirrors the sorts of working which it is preparing people for. It cannot be solely carried out within individual organisations but instead should be delivered jointly across them so those who will build effective partnerships have the opportunity from the outset to develop their knowledge and understanding with their future colleagues from the outset. This joint training should be augmented by
the sharing of analysis and research capacity across the sector and the service should demonstrate its commitment to supporting the development of its colleagues in other agencies by sharing training facilities in order to provide, for the first time, sites where joint community safety training, learning and development can take place.

6.21 The Review welcomes the positive approach the NPIA and the Improvement and Development Agency (iDeA) have taken to developing this thinking. In addition, there is real potential for some of the £185m earmarked for Regional Improvement and Efficiency Partnerships (aimed at supporting councils to improve local services, meet the rising expectations of their local communities and unlock efficiency savings) to fund a national centre of excellence that all local partners can access and benefit from.

6.22 To realise the benefits partnership learning and development offers and to achieve, as importantly, the cultural change across sectors that it will foster, the Home Office and CLG will need to support this endeavour.

Recommendaion 27

To promote improved partnership working and the closer integration of Neighbourhood Policing within a neighbourhood management approach, the relevant local government and policing agencies (NPIA, iDeA, LGA, Welsh LGA and Regional Improvement and Efficiency Partnerships (RIEP)) should develop a national leadership and training resource through a joint excellence programme. These bodies should explore whether the REIPs can provide funding for the programme.

This national resource will build local partners’ capacity to deliver shared community safety outcomes through joint training and development for both leaders and practitioners.

Learning the lessons from successful partnership working – the Single Non-Emergancy Number

6.23 Alongside building the capacity for effective partnership working through formal training and development, it is clearly important that lessons are learnt from successful projects and programmes that have helped to make it happen in practice. One particularly noteworthy example was the piloting of the Single Non-Emergency Number 101 Programme, a project which was commenced in 2006, with 5 initial live sites covering 10% of the population in England and Wales and offering to local residents in these areas a single point of contact which they could use to report a wide range of local problems such as noisy neighbours and drunk, rowdy behaviour.

6.24 It had been anticipated, in light of the success of the initial live areas, which have now received more than 900,000 calls from the public, that the scheme would be rolled out nationwide. However, in November 2007 the Home
Office announced that it would not be directly funding the continued roll out and that central funding for the initial live areas would be discontinued. However, funding will continue to be provided to support the national 101 infrastructure to enable police forces and councils across England and Wales to independently sustain or develop locally funded 101 services, informed by and building on the learning and benefits demonstrated to date. The Review welcomes the recent decision taken by the Greater London Assembly, Metropolitan Police, London councils and London boroughs to work toward piloting a new 101 service during 2008 in selected London boroughs.

6.25 From the point of view of developing an effective neighbourhood management approach, the decision taken in November 2007 was regrettable. The Single Non-Emergency Number has acted as a catalyst for effective partnership working, bringing partners together to work on projects which require them to cooperate with one another and also provided clear evidence of the mutual benefits which this type of working could generate for the individual organizations and the public. It has also helped to recalibrate public expectations by giving a clear signal that some issues and problems were best dealt with outside policing and has facilitated beneficial cooperation in the areas of data sharing and information technology.

**Recommendation 28**

Recognising that the Single Non-Emergency Number programme has acted as a catalyst for improved partnership working, the Home Office and CLG should ensure that learning from the programme is shared with all community safety partners and identify how to encourage and incentivise the mainstreaming of this approach into local operations. This process should be completed by August 2008.

**Effective leadership and control in partnership working**

6.26 Successful partnership working not only rests on cooperation between organisations but also on the ability of individuals from these organisations to work effectively with one another on a day to day basis. Any group involved in work of this nature requires leadership, tasking and direction to set its goals and drive their delivery and it is important that those working in partnership have a clear understanding of these management structures despite the fact that they come from different organisations.

6.27 This issue is particularly important for the police service, which, because of some of the tasks it undertakes, places great store on both the ‘operational control’ of chief officers and of the chain of command. Experience from successful partnerships shows that neither of these essential principles is compromised by police officers working under the leadership of colleagues from partner organisations. With appropriate delegation and a common sense approach to exceptional situations there is much that can be gained from police officers and PCSOs receiving direction from other community safety
partners. Similarly the reverse can also be true and senior leaders from all agencies should choose the most appropriate individual to lead a partnership irrespective of their organisation.

6.28 Many partnerships already have well developed systems for generating the necessary clarity about roles and remits required to harness fully neighbourhood resources and this area is one where local agreement, rather than central dictation, is essential to success.

**Recommendation 29**
Chief constables and senior community safety partners should ensure that effective leadership, tasking and direction of neighbourhood resources are vested in the most appropriate individual, irrespective of the organisation for which the individual works.

6.29 A significant amount of noteworthy partnership working is already underway. Essex and London, for example, are currently piloting a new Neighbourhood Policing Youth Toolkit which seeks to identify children and young people at risk of future involvement in criminality using information and intelligence held by the police and their partners. Identification of those at risk leads to the creation of multi-agency action plans with clear lines of agency accountability for individual children, young people and their families. This often entails police involvement in home visits, ensuring school attendance and working with parents. Early signs have been encouraging and it is hoped this will continue to help target crime and anti-social behaviour in young people.

**Spreading Learning and Improving Delivery**
6.30 As Neighbourhood Policing progressively moves from being a valuable new approach to delivering community safety to a well established part of what high quality modern policing is, its importance needs to be recognised and incorporated throughout force planning and business support processes.

6.31 The central bodies that support policing, such as the Home Office, APA, HMIC and the NPIA, and individual forces must focus on promoting and supporting the visibility, engagement and problem solving that are central to successful Neighbourhood Policing and enabling and underpin the delivery of these outcomes. As the interim report demonstrated training and development, continuity of staff and workforce mix, deployment practices and budget setting all impact upon the successful delivery of Neighbourhood Policing.

6.32 In the area of training, development and recruitment, proper recognition must be given to the fundamental importance problem solving skills play in Neighbourhood Policing and the significance of ensuring the right people with the potential to acquire the appropriate skills are recruited. Developing these skills needs to be made a core part of the training and development opportunities offered to officers and PCSOs. To achieve this aim, the interim
The Review of Policing – Final Report

The report recommended that chief constables should ensure Neighbourhood Policing is suitably emphasised in recruitment campaigns. The NPIA review of training, learning and development proposed in the interim report has commenced and will report in April 2008 and the Review welcomes the decision taken by the NPIA to extend the remit to include Citizen Focus policing requirements.

6.33 Similarly, developing strong and effective relationships with partners and the local community requires that police officers and staff spend a sufficient period of time in post. As the Interim Report recommended, Chief Constables should strive to ensure that all of those appointed to posts dealing with Neighbourhood Policing, up to and including BCU commanders, should whenever possible remain in post for at least 2 years. The importance of continuity was also supported by a recommendation that PCSOs who choose to become police officers should be given recognition for the skills they have already acquired in the form of a reduced training commitment that allows them to return more quickly to Neighbourhood Policing roles.

Programme support

6.34 Although Neighbourhood Policing has made good progress, a large amount of work remains to be done to deliver the full value it can offer. Neighbourhood Policing involves significant changes to and improvements on the traditional model of policing, the development of new skills in areas such as problem solving and the fostering of a new culture that properly values its long term commitment to building trust and confidence with communities.

6.35 Previous attempts at creating better, more responsive community policing approaches, such as ‘sector’ and geographic policing did not embed because they did not operate within a performance framework or environment supportive of the importance of long term engagement and problem solving. As a consequence attempts have not been effectively mainstreamed to deliver the changes to policing practice that were required for them to become self-sustaining and were crowded out by more immediate short term demands such as performance systems focusing on detections and serious crime.

6.36 Ensuring an effective resource base for Neighbourhood Policing is critical and the decision by the home secretary to implement the interim recommendation to ring fence PCSO funding for a further year is welcome. There is an appreciation across the Home Office, ACPO and the APA that Neighbourhood Policing must be embedded and sustained with continued support from the NPIA. This should include measures to support forces in the delivery of Neighbourhood Policing, such as ongoing research and evaluation, sharing of good practice and the improvement of learning and development products.
Recommendation 30
The NPIA should, by April 2008, have agreed a funded programme for the next three years to continue to support forces to embed Neighbourhood Policing.

Abstraction

6.37 As Chapter 3 of this report argues in more detail, abstraction is best considered as one aspects of the importance of demand management across policing, an area where the Review believes significant improvements can be made to better match resources to the demands on the police service.

6.38 In the particular instance of abstraction from Neighbourhood Policing teams, the Review has considered the case for central guidance to resolve the problem. Its conclusion is that the recommendations made for better demand management are a critical part of dealing with this problem and that central guidance in one specific area would not necessarily help the police service improve its overall performance. It is important to be clear that developing the service’s ability to minimise abstraction should not at all involve curtailing the ability of chief constables to react to threat, harm and risk and to move resources at short notice when operational conditions require flexible solutions.

6.39 Instead, to provide practical support while demand management is improved in the longer term and to share knowledge of what works well across forces, a set of broad principles should be developed by ACPO, the APA and the NPIA.

Recommendation 31
ACPO, the APA and the NPIA should develop a broad set of principles for minimising abstraction from neighbourhood policing teams by April 2008. These should be adopted by all forces no later than June 2008.

Police authorities

6.40 Police authorities have a valuable role to play in supporting the embedding of Neighbourhood Policing. As this report makes clear in Chapter 2 and Chapter 7, robust scrutiny and challenge from Police authorities should be an important driver of performance across policing and an important mechanism for relaying the views of the public to a force about priorities. Both sections also make recommendations about how this capacity can be enhanced.

6.41 The following table illustrates the sorts of questions which an authority should consider when assessing how well it is working with the force to embed and sustain neighbourhood policing outcomes.
### Strategic Direction
- Do your force’s priorities include Neighbourhood Policing? Are Neighbourhood Policing outcomes measured?
- Do you have a long term strategy for sustaining Neighbourhood Policing and is funding in place?
- Have you actively engaged with the LAA process and does it include outcomes promoting Neighbourhood Policing?
- Does your force have learning and development arrangements in place to support Neighbourhood Policing? How effective are they?

### Community Engagement
- Does your force profile neighbourhoods and how does it use this information to set priorities and allocate resource?
- How do you determine local priorities and how is your community engaged in this?
- How actively do you ensure all voices in the community are heard?
- How do you ensure information is shared between the force, partners and the authority to identify local priorities and deliver community safety?

### Performance
- Do you routinely monitor force performance on Neighbourhood Policing? Do you compare BCU performance? How do you secure improvement?
- Does your force have an abstraction policy and do you routinely monitor abstraction rates?
- Do you monitor the continuity in post of BCU Commanders, neighbourhood managers and neighbourhood staff?

### Value for Money
- How do you assess if your force is delivering value for money on Neighbourhood Policing?

6.42 In order to ensure the issues represented in these questions are properly addressed, and to provide forces and police authorities with suitable clarity, the APA should work with the NPIA to produce clear guidance for promoting and sustaining neighbourhood policing. The effectiveness of police authorities in this regard should be considered as part of the police authority inspection process to be undertaken jointly by HMIC, the Audit Commission and the Wales Audit Office.
Recommendation 32

The AFA, with the support of the NPIA, should develop guidance for police authorities on how they can promote and sustain Neighbourhood Policing. This guidance should be completed by July 2008.

HMIC, the Audit Commission and the Wales Audit Office should assess, as part of police authority inspection, how well police authorities contribute to embedding and sustaining Neighbourhood Policing and its outcomes.

Engendering a Joined Up Approach to Citizen Focused Policing and Promoting Community Cohesion

Community cohesion

6.43 The increasing diversity of communities in England and Wales strengthens the growing importance of community cohesion. In June 2007, the Commission on Integration and Cohesion published Our shared future, which presents a number of recommendations to build more integrated, cohesive societies. As the report identified, Neighbourhood Policing has an important role to play in achieving this at a local level.

6.44 There is a clear connection between the four principles underpinning Our Shared Future and the importance of Neighbourhood Policing to building stronger, more harmonious communities. Neighbourhood Policing encourages communities to invest in the Commission’s vision of a shared future and the proposed new model of rights and responsibilities by engaging local people in problem identification and giving communities ownership of the solutions. Neighbourhood Policing staff often act as catalysts for building relationships between different groups, which increases mutual respect and civility. The broader range of diversity amongst Neighbourhood Policing staff and the opportunities for improvement noted in Chapter 7, also present real opportunities for neighbourhood policing teams to visibly represent the communities they work with.

6.45 The Review fully endorses the vision of neighbourhood policing and community cohesion detailed in Our Shared Future and recommends that in order to ensure this approach is taken forward, suitable provision for support and guidance for police and partners should be provided by the new Cohesion Delivery Framework. The need for joint training, learning and development should also be considered involving agencies such as the IDeA and NPIA.

Recommendation 33

CLG’s Cohesion Delivery Framework (to be published in Summer 2008) should provide support and guidance to local partners on the key role Neighbourhood Policing teams play in improving cohesion, and on how that role can be developed further locally.
Value for money

6.46 In a similar vein and as with any public initiative, it is vital to ensure that proper value is being gained from public investment. The benefits of Neighbourhood Policing are widely acknowledged but with a significant amount of money invested in the programme each year, it would be prudent to assess cost against benefit. Completion of the national roll out of Neighbourhood Policing is scheduled for March 2008 and there is still much work to be carried out to successfully embed and realise the full potential of Neighbourhood Policing. Such measures include the implementation of the recommendations put forward by this Review. The current timing is therefore not ideal for a value for money review of Neighbourhood Policing but this should be revisited when sufficient time has been allowed for the programme to fully embed and mature.
CHAPTER 7 – INVOLVING LOCAL PEOPLE

Introduction
7.1 The Home Office's most recent statement of role places great emphasis on public protection. I am certain that the police service understands the necessity of this and in this report I have sought to stress the handling of threat, harm and risk as the key and consistent theme both now and in the long term. It follows that governance and accountability must be capable of enhancing public protection and providing the necessary scrutiny of delivery. This chapter briefly describes the current mechanisms for formal accountability in British policing; sets out the principles that I believe should inform discussion about accountability; the problems (real and perceived) about accountability; what we found in our public consultation on the issues; options for changes; and the benefits and otherwise of structural reform.

Current Arrangements for Accountability
7.2 Until 1964 policing was much the domain of the local authority under the direct control of the elected Watch Committees. The existing ‘tripartite’ structure was established under the Police Act 1964, following on from deliberations of the Royal Commission on the Police in 1962. It distributes responsibilities between a police authority, a chief constable and the home secretary. The home secretary is responsible to Parliament for the overarching efficiency and effectiveness of the service in England and Wales, as well as the maintenance of minimum service standards. Individual police authorities are responsible for the efficiency and effectiveness of the police force for their areas and for consulting with the public on policing matters; and chief constables are responsible for the operational effectiveness of individual police forces.

7.3 There is, however, some suggestion that the tripartite system of governance is no longer accurately descriptive of governance arrangements for policing. This is partly because it does not recognise the role of partners and the fact that forces have some accountability to these and other bodies. It is also felt by many that the structure has become unbalanced, with the role of the Home Office over the years having become too directly involved in the delivery of policing at the local level.

7.4 Under current legislation the Home Secretary must approve any appointment of chief constables, made by a police authority. They may also require them

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3 Lustgarten (in: The Governance of Police (London.Sweet and Maxwell) 1986) noted that ‘the tripartite structure is a very lopsided thing’. Harefield (in: SOCA: a paradigm shift in British Policing, (British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 46 no. 4, p.743-761) 2006) and Bowling (in: SOCA: the Serious and Organised Crime agency, (The Centre of the Crime and Justice Studies number 63 Spring) 2006) also suggest that with the formation of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) that the Police Authority and its influence are being sidelined in the tripartite structure. SOCA is not a ‘police force’ it is argued, and thus therefore does not need a police authority and the governing board of SOCA is almost totally under the control of the Home Secretary.
to retire or resign in the interests of efficiency. The Police Reform Act 2002 gave the home secretary powers to ensure delivery and application of good practice through codes, regulations and guidance. It is felt by many that the raft of Home Office national performance indicators have also driven local priorities further down the scale for chief constables who have to perform to these national indicators or risk the potential of intervention.

7.5 As indicated earlier in this report, funding for policing is provided both by central government and to a lesser extent by police authorities through a precept on council tax. While this arrangement continues it is perhaps self evident that those bodies responsible for funding policing should indeed continue to play some role in the arrangements for accountability.

**The Context**

7.6 The last two decades have seen persistent attempts at public sector reform to meet legitimate public expectations. Thus the pressure has been on the police to deliver on public protection. This has been over a period when the authority traditionally exercised informally by such as teachers, parents, park keepers, bus conductors, shop keepers, Ministers of Religion etc. has eroded. There is then pressure on the police to fill the resulting ‘authority vacuum’. Small wonder that there has been such relentless pressure to increase the number of police officers.

7.7 While it is true that local authority services do now pick up on a number of areas where formerly the police were the first port of call, police officers and staff now face a new level of complexity in their jobs – from the requirements relating to case preparation, duties under health and safety and equality legislation, to dealing with hi-tech crimes, new duties around the monitoring of serious offenders post-release, the end-to-end approach of a successful anti-social behaviour strategy and the resources needed to meet the current terrorist threat. In this context, the police service feels that the sweeping suggestion made recently by the Home Affairs Select Committee that increased public spending on policing has not been matched by proportionate increased performance is grossly unfair, taking no account of these increased responsibilities.

7.8 Research by ICM/Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust showed 57% of the public feel they have no influence over the police and little say in decisions about policing. Other research identifies a lack of knowledge of police activities and a rationale for them with knowledge being accrued through friends/family/personal experience/local media rather than policing partners. Contact points are also sometimes unknown, closed, or not available at the time people

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4 See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhaff/1092/1092.pdf for more detail.


want to access them (e.g. patrols are often made during daylight hours when residents are based elsewhere). A lack of customer awareness can also lead to ‘hidden’ barriers. Public satisfaction in the police declined in the police in the 1990s although it has shown gains since.

Figure 5: Public confidence in the police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public Confidence in the Police (47, 49, 50, 51)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>51</td>
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7.9 Attempts to address delivery and scrutiny have included national priorities, delegation of finance to chief officers and reform of police authorities (1995). Prior to that police authorities were not free-standing independent corporate bodies but were either a committee of a local authority or a joint committee of a number of local authorities. More recent innovations include a national performance management framework (2003) and more powers to enable the home secretary to intervene to secure the existing statutory obligations to ensure an efficient and effective police service. Centrally derived targets have generally been found by forces to be extensive and onerous. While crime has gone down, public confidence has only marginally improved. Both ACPO and APA regard top-down direction as inefficient, creating anomalies and disincentives. Their view is that properly scrutinised localism with much fewer national priorities would improve matters. The national media tend to characterise policing issues and crime as being within the gift of solely national solutions, thereby escalating problems to the door of government.

7.10 It is my view that an increase in local accountability will only generate an increase in public confidence if the roles of government, police and accountability bodies are understood; if people feel they have the opportunity to comment and influence what happens locally; and if the police are enabled to deliver improved performance; and if those charged with scrutiny and accountability ensure that they do.

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7 E.g. a consultee was asked to fill in a form to report lost property headed ‘name of loser’.
7.11 Greater freedom to determine local priorities and having a direct say in how the police deliver these services requires local people to take more responsibility themselves and requires the police to make the necessary provision for effective engagement to take place. Currently, notwithstanding the extensive efforts of forces and authorities to engage and consult communities, there is insufficient evidence that people know what to do if they believe the police are not sufficiently addressing their needs beyond making a complaint against a specific officer.

7.12 Currently, the local accountability body for policing in England and Wales (outside of partnership activities) is the police authority. The consultation exercise for the Review indicates that police authorities could benefit locally from a higher profile. Membership is a mixture of appointment (the most diverse part) and then selection from the membership of local authorities. No direct public participation is made in selection. There are some concerns in police authorities themselves, in respect of the selection of some councillors to sit on police authorities, in terms of their aptitude and skills. The low level of voter participation in local elections does not help in building a sense of citizen involvement. If a body of citizens is dissatisfied with the service they receive or the scrutiny of it, they have little means of redress. What some thus describe as a ‘gap’ in accountability may be one factor behind the development of proposals for elected commissioners.

7.13 Some police authorities are well regarded by local partners for their competence. Others are identified by stakeholders as not fully having the skills or capacity to do the job. In looking at this area, a key question is whether there is a better model? Or is there more of a need to address the obstacles to the success of current arrangements?

7.14 It does not make matters simpler that both police forces and their police authorities now operate in a complex local delivery landscape – with national indicators, but also local area agreements (in England) under local strategic partnerships where the local authority is in the lead, whilst still operating with Crime & Disorder Reduction Partnerships and Criminal Justice Boards; and the developing local service agreements (in Wales) under local service boards, working with Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs). Such complexity does not increase public understanding and participation.

7.15 In referring to accountability, I refer to a mix of the three elements identified in the interim report – responsiveness, answerability and (structural) accountability – where:

1. **responsiveness** refers to behaviour (actions and their conduct); which should be driven by priorities and need.

2. **answerability** is the process through which those held to account are required to explain (and justify) their actions; and how they relate to local people’s concerns and input; and
3 **structural accountability** is the formal set of institutionalised relationships that should help to bring about appropriate responsiveness, and answerability; *governance and scrutiny arrangements*.

7.16 There is a significant caveat to all of this. While national politicians have focused on structural reform, I am convinced (as with so much that is touched on in this report) that it is **cultural change** which is most likely to make the biggest difference to confidence, trust and satisfaction in policing.

**Figure 6: Feedback from the Review’s public consultation**

"If the police made more effort to engage with the community, listen to local concerns, and, most importantly, react to local demands, then those efforts would be greatly appreciated – but they can’t expect us to make the first move, we’re paying for their services after all...."

"Having a local point of contact that is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week is crucial – otherwise faith in the service is lost... there’s nothing worse than being diverted somewhere else, or the station being closed..."

"I think a bit more transparency would be good for us, it’s nice to know where all our money is going – but I must confess that I have never made any effort to get to know more. I don’t even read the stuff that comes with my council tax bill...."

"The idea of going out to a community policing meeting on a November evening like this isn’t very appealing at all. If I really thought that my family, my home and my community would be safer as a consequence then I might consider it – but I don’t. I expect that it would be lots of talking and lots of admirable plans, but nothing would come of it...."

"When there was a burglary on our street, we got a letter from the police through our door about it, things like that are really helpful and instil confidence in the service...you have a sense that somebody is doing something about problems and that the authorities actually care..."

**What Do The Public Want?**

*Issues identified from the Review’s public consultation.*

7.17 To find out what the public actually wanted and were prepared to do, we undertook a public consultation though a statistically valid telephone ‘omnibus’ survey and focus groups across England and Wales.

7.18 What we found was that people are most interested in issues at the very local (their own street) level and in how they are treated. They are not actually so concerned to participate in more formal accountability mechanisms and structures, although feel that they should have the opportunity to do so. There is obviously room for improvement in the structural accountability side of policing, although stakeholders felt that some structures might achieve some of the change wanted if they were left to settle. But, from consultation,
it is the answerability and responsiveness elements which would seem to be the key to changing the way policing is both delivered and perceived.

7.19 Where government has so often focused on the question of how to deliver against priorities identified locally and looked to amend partnership arrangements and performance regimes to address that perceived delivery gap, it would seem that the real focus should be on the treatment of individuals during the processes that exist. This it seems would have the biggest influence on confidence and satisfaction, which would, in turn, have the biggest impact on trust and the credibility of delivery agents (police or other partners).

7.20 A genuinely enhanced customer service approach would help increase trust, confidence and satisfaction, (and may even remove some of the calls for more formal accountability!) Overall confidence is driven by contact and information. Police courtesy is crucial; e.g. 93% of witnesses treated in a courteous manner were satisfied with the police compared to 27% of those who were not. Better information provision saw 85% of those with very little confidence in the system improve their opinion after such an intervention.8

Figure 7: Feedback from the Review’s public consultation

“In order to feel involved, you want to hear about what the police have been doing, especially if they’ve been making a big impact in the local area. It’s OK to read about it in the local paper, but it would be more personal if the local police were talking to us directly about it.”

“I see police doing all sorts of things and getting away with it. They have a lot of power and not many people can really put them on the spot and get them to answer for the mistakes they make – people die in custody or get shot by mistake and nothing really happens. So how can I hold my local police to account?”

7.21 Embedding a customer service and citizen focused approach to policing, including embedding neighbourhood policing and community engagement, is therefore crucial, and should lead to greater public involvement (including information about crimes etc) and fewer complaints and calls for redress or change, including to and from national government. In turn, this should then allow the police more freedom to adopt ‘a risk aware’ approach so as to be able to take more sensible and thought through risks without losing the confidence of the communities they serve.

Source: Angle et al (2003) Findings from the Witness Satisfaction Survey; Crime in England and Wales Supplementary Volume 2; NOP research into public confidence in the criminal justice system.

ibid.
What Therefore Needs to Change?

**Answerability and responsiveness**

7.22 It is clear, simple fact that people want to live in a safe and secure environment and be assured that the police are doing a good job – that they are listening to people’s concerns and expectations and feeding these into local priority setting, and then explaining decisions and reporting on progress. A commitment to provide a high quality service which recognises that ‘every contact leaves a trace’\(^{10}\) needs to be at the core of day-to-day activity.

7.23 To effect this kind of cultural change, I believe the most critical shift which needs to occur is to enhance the responsiveness and answerability of policing services in local communities. To achieve this, we must bring about an acceleration in fully adopting a citizen-focused approach to policing; putting customer service and the interests and needs of local people at the core of priority setting. There is emerging evidence that neighbourhood policing is successful when this approach is adopted and combined with problem solving, for example. It is unsuccessful when it does not. Citizen-focused policing increases victim satisfaction and general confidence in the police.

**Citizen-Focused policing: a customer service approach**

7.24 Undoubtedly successful businesses in the private sector are those with a true Customer Service approach and it has long been acknowledged that policing and other elements of public service need also to exemplify this. Since November 2006, the police service in England and Wales has had a Quality of Service Commitment\(^{11}\) (QSC) which addresses these issues in a systematic way. Since last April, delivery of QSC has been supported by the National Policing Improvement Agency. For some, the route to achieving citizen focused policing lies with neighbourhood policing, in which so much progress has been made. For me however, citizen focus needs to inform all areas of policing activity. A step change in this area will both inform and win public support for police resourcing to be dedicated to dealing with threat, harm and risk. For the purposes of accountability alone, it will provide the vital elements of answerability and responsiveness, whether or not the government and Parliament opt for structural reform of accountability.

7.25 The experience of the victim in their involvement with the police and the criminal justice system is well understood and a comprehensive service should be available to them when subject to serious crime. What is less well researched is the average citizen’s experience when coming into contact with the police for reasons other than being a victim of crime. It holds true that the quality of the service that the general public experience is likely to be improved if learning and development opportunities are more widely available to those engaged in public facing roles. Furthermore, getting the ‘customer

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\(^{10}\) Cited from interim report (s4.18).

contact' right and ensuring that this contact is a positive one, should lead to a more effective and broader scope of communication with communities. This in turn encourages community engagement supporting and informing the provision of neighbourhood policing and neighbourhood management. This represents a significant opportunity for effective citizen focus. Consideration should be given to the tripartite partners working together to produce a plan of research and support activity for forces which is prioritised against performance need and considers how best to support forces in the provision of training, learning and development.

7.26 Moving public satisfaction in a positive direction is a key challenge. There remains, in terms of the perception of the service they receive, a gap between most black and minority ethnic citizens and the population at large. Much research already exists in relation to this issue, and the findings provide various reasons for this disparity, not least the complicated and complex nature of understanding communities and their needs. Effective community engagement can help meet some of these challenges. The way in which it is carried out is critical. I have discussed some of this under the 'Delivering in Partnership' section (chapter 6) and, as part of that I would immediately encourage forces to focus improvement on follow-up and feedback in the areas previously identified as important in increasing user satisfaction. Understanding the make-up and needs of the specific area with which you are trying to engage is key – the most effective approach is one which is tailored to the needs of specific communities.

7.27 Further on citizen focus, I would want to see great improvement around information provision. If engagement is to be effective, and people are to participate effectively in shaping priorities and delivery, there needs to be a range of information provided on opportunities to engage, and on the delivery of services that local people have said are important to them. That information needs to be easy to access and understand, timely, accurate and relevant, ensuring that:

1. The details of how people can access police services in the local area are widely known, with regard being paid to the needs of different communities and individuals

2. Local people know how to contact the local police and how and where to access crime information for their area

3. Additional information is provided where appropriate on activities, funding, expenditure, outputs and outcomes.

7.28 While I acknowledge what is already being done by forces and authorities and also that a good deal is being encouraged in this area by government, it is, not surprisingly, piecemeal, as different agencies and their partnerships are all encouraged to be outward-focused and to be transparent about what they
are doing. The police service already has a duty of providing local policing summaries but I do not feel these currently provide what people actually want. What I feel is needed at the ward level is a provision of information on neighbourhood management (or as a minimum, neighbourhood policing) – activities and outcomes – which is accessible and relevant to local residents and businesses. Not only local data on trends in crime, but how priorities are established, with more anecdotal information around action taken to address issues and relevant news and events – a crack house closed, night club licence information, after school clubs, a new service at the leisure centre, key voluntary events, court news etc. This could be web-based and if genuinely multi-service, provided by the local authority.

7.28 The Home Office crime strategy, ‘Cutting Crime – A New Partnership 2008-11’\(^{12}\), also sets out an intention to work with ACPO and APA to make crime data available nationally to all people on a monthly basis. This ‘Local Crime Information Project’ is in its infancy, with public impact and feasibility studies still to report. However, the project will need to be flexible enough to allow for differentiation between communities and their local issues. Some members of the public have expressed the view that local tailored information, not just statistics, would be their preference.

7.29 A useful initiative in this area is also underway under the auspices of the National Policing Board. Its ‘Responsiveness and Accountability Strategy Group’ is addressing this to ensure a ‘bottom up’ approach to determine exactly what local people want to know. I fully endorse this important piece of work. Consulting stakeholders and research during this review unearthed a strong awareness of the need for tailoring information to the citizen, but also the opportunity for bespoke information packs for institutions such as schools.

Options For Structural Accountability

7.30 Regardless of what structural change (if any) is made, it is important that we establish a proper inspection regime for police authorities (or any successor accountability bodies). Such inspection will go beyond the partial responsibility that currently exists in law under Best Value legislation. The Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill 2007 has a provision to ensure that HMIC undertake these inspections, a role for which preliminary agreement has already been reached that it will be undertaken in partnership with the Audit Commission. Such inspections will be able to assess the additional and clarified duties given to police authorities under the Police and Justice Act 2006 and regulations issued under the Act – principally in the promotion of diversity in the force, compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998, co-operation with other forces, and the functions of chief officers. This development was in itself intended to strengthen accountability. The Review endorses these (and other related) developments.

\(^{12}\) see http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/crime-strategy-07/ for more detail.
7.31 As I have indicated earlier, public consultation for this review has demonstrated an appetite for greater responsiveness by the police at a very local level. There is an interest in having greater information and interest but with some wariness about greater levels of actual public engagement. In relation to structural mechanisms for accountability, the planned Green Paper in the spring presents an ideal opportunity for further consultation in this regard. To hopefully inform this process I outline hereunder some possible options for change.

The Options for Change

Introduction

7.32 As always a possibility is not to opt for change and to retain the status quo. This option would allow time for changes already in the pipeline (particularly in respect of Neighbourhood Policing), to bed in. Neighbourhood Policing and citizen focused policing offer a good deal in terms of elements of local accountability around responsiveness and answerability. The consultation for this review indicates that the public are more interested in positive outcomes than how these are delivered or overseen. It is important that community engagement is not limited to Neighbourhood Policing in terms of policing activity. It is further important that as partnership grows that the capacity of partners, particularly in local authorities to map data on the local area is not missed, nor that their own activities for community engagement are ignored.

7.33 This Review does, however, acknowledge the potential for positive change that structural reform beyond specific models of community engagement can bring and that positive change is needed in some areas.

7.34 The question of increased democratic legitimacy was not directly identified within the Review’s public consultation as a significant way in which the public would like to see accountability strengthened. It is however, an area which has been the subject of national political debate. The question, therefore, is whether more democratic accountability is the best route for delivering the improvements in outcomes that people want. There are two main ways in which this might be achieved – either by introducing a directly elected element into policing or by strengthening local authorities.

OPTIONS

(1) Introduce directly elected elements into policing

(All of these options would require changes to primary legislation)

Elected ‘commissioners’

Benefits

7.35 The elected commissioner model, which has been formally the subject of significant recent public debate, would result in each force having an elected...
individual who would be directly accountable to the electorate. He/she would have the power to hire and fire chief constables, who they would hold to account for the performance of their force. They would set their own local targets and policing plans. They would still be subject to national performance assessment through measurement, priority setting and the activities of an inspectorate. Consideration would need to be given under this model as to whether to assign this role to the Mayor of London in respect of the Metropolitan Police District. There is considerable potential to offer redress in this option, although in reality the capacity of the commissioner to deal with issues affecting individuals will be limited. Such a model would also enhance transparency and performance assessment against local priorities.

**Drawbacks**

7.36 This is certainly not a problem-free solution. Historically we have in the United Kingdom, generally shied away from anything that might issue even a remote threat of politicisation of policing. This may seem to some as too risk averse, but there must be real concerns about a single person with a political mandate exerting pressure that too readily conflicts with operational judgement. It may also be an impediment to collaboration since the vote for this post will be on localised issues rather than the largely unseen issues of cross border collaboration. Ironically, such a development may lead future home secretaries to be more prescriptive about issues around serious and organised crime to ensure that effective action is taken. Since collaboration with other forces and bodies is key to efficiency, this may also be hampered. A post whose future is determined by the performance of policing may not readily make the compromises necessary to the delivery of effective partnership outcomes with local authorities (who have an electoral mandate of their own). And the competing electoral mandates in one area may also add to ‘voter fatigue’.

**Elected chairs of CDRPs or local policing boards**

**Benefits**

7.37 Electing a chair of a CDRP would require putting the partnership structure itself on a different statutory footing. The chair would require some statutory function in terms of direction of partners or a requirement to report to him/her on specific issues. The chair may participate as the representative of agreed local priorities (e.g. in LSPs and LAAs – which might simplify the community safety partnership landscape). Such a person would certainly be operating at a more local level than a body responsible for the whole force area.

7.38 A locally elected board at district level would similarly be nearer the localism that some call for. It would have the dynamic of electoral challenge to give incentive to its success. It could have a role (with other boards) in the appointment of the BCU commander (unless it was set at BCU level – less
local. BCU would require a legislative vehicle to set their boundaries. It would lead in setting priorities for local policing. Direction and control of officers and staff would remain with the chief constable who would certainly need to be able to redeploy in event of emergency or public order matter.

**Drawbacks**

7.39 However, as with all solutions that operate below the force-wide area, the main danger is fragmentation of policing. A good deal of local crime may be driven by drugs, the supply of which goes well beyond the CDRP area. The increased focus at district level may impede police action on issues that require the co-ordination across a force (or several forces). An elected chair may find themselves in tension with other partners in the CDRP who owe their place to appointment. The force itself may be reluctant to commit resources to a BCU if it feels that those resources may be permanently committed. This becomes a problem once the pattern of policing need changes across the force area. A further difficulty would be the need for chief constables to engage with a multiplicity of chairs to agree priorities, budgets etc. (in London for example in respect of 32 different Boroughs.)

**Elected police authorities or elected chairs of police authorities**

**Benefits**

7.40 A fully elected police authority of the same size as currently (or smaller) would face an electorate for delivery of a single service (policing) and judged by a single criterion (the reality and experience of public protection in the area). This could provide a dynamic in the current functions assigned to police authorities, a greater sense of initiative, more responsiveness to public views (and the forming of them) and an openness to the sanction that an election brings.

7.41 Alternatively one may have an elected chair of the police authority. This would require more reform of how police authorities work in that such a post would require a statutory set of functions of its own. S/he would be the principal initiator of the police authority function while the rest of the membership would essential fulfil the role of a board to support or check the chair. The issue of removing a chair would have to be addressed.

**Drawbacks**

7.42 Even an elected police authority faces the problem of remoteness from its electorate. The experience of councillor members of police authorities thus far gives little comfort in the cause of diversity (the appointed independent members are more diverse). A single elected chair presents the same issues as an elected commissioner, but with added the tension of appointed colleagues. There is further the undoubted risk of real voter apathy.
**(2) Strengthen local authorities**

7.43 There are two main options for strengthening local authorities:

1. Draw back police authority functions into local authorities, which would mean integrating police authority functions with that of top tier authorities in the non-metropolitan areas of England and Wales.

2. Make local authorities fully responsible for community safety, able to commission policing services from the force in a ‘sole provider’ relationship, perhaps via Local Strategic Partnerships.

**Benefits**

7.44 Focus groups consulted by the review identified that they wanted the police and their local authorities to work together to reduce crime and make communities safer. Local councillors already react to crime and concerns about anti-social behaviour because their electorate expect them to. As part of the electoral and political process, they can lay out visions for their areas which can be endorsed or rejected by local people and by including local policing in this, they can make local priorities more visible, link policing into an overall strategy for an area that includes all local authority services and, through the Local Strategic Partnership, the services of partners as well. Greater accountability is achieved simply because local people have the opportunity to withdraw their consent through elections where they feel there is failure.

7.45 Putting policing closer to the heart of council activity may also encourage councillors, leaders and cabinet members to show leadership in this area and would increase the likelihood of effective joint working. Local authorities can provide a useful resource for the police in community engagement work, mapping of data and bring with them legitimate and accountable community leaders in the form of ward councillors who are advocates of their community and provide a way into local communities.

7.46 These options could be combined with a slim-lined police authority model for oversight of policing issues force-wide (serious crime) or (if police authorities were to be abolished) a regional body that would set priorities and monitor performance in respect of serious crime in a group of forces. Alternatively, this role could be given to the government and subject to Parliamentary scrutiny. Home Office responsibility towards much of local policing would be minimal under such a model.

**Drawbacks**

7.47 Such options do require the introduction of compensatory features to address the lack of identity between local authority and policing boundaries. There are 410 local authorities in England and Wales and 43 police areas each with its own force and police authority. The special position of London and the other large metropolitan areas would have to be addressed. It is not easy to drive
the latter through the agency of the former. It could also be argued that, since the majority of police authority members are drawn from local authorities, some of the skills/capacity issues identified earlier would continue to exist. The loss of independent members of police authorities presents an issue. They are selected according to skill base and with regard to diversity. They tend to be more representative of local communities in terms of diversity than elected members.

7.48 A local authority option also raises the issue that funding for policing and community safety may be re-routed to other purposes. This was a significant factor that contributed to the police reforms of the 1990s. As a result, police authorities were made free-standing from local government in 1995. One remedial action could be for Government to ring-fence grant and be prepared to set minimum budgets. However, such an approach could scarcely be called localism.

(3) Strengthen police authorities

Benefits

7.49 Another principal option is to recognise that a good deal of experience and expertise resides in police authorities and any major change risks losing that, at least in the short term. This option builds on the commitment, knowledge and skills already present. Lack of investment in police authorities has been cited as one of the main reasons for current shortcomings. Research carried out by South Yorkshire Police Authority shows that where police authorities have dedicated resources, particularly at a senior level, they are more effective in carrying out their role. And there need to be agreed standards of performance. A voluntary compact by police authorities to meet various minimum standards agreed by the APA and the Home Office may be one way through. The use of statutory codes of practice by the home secretary would be another. There are also existing principles of governance (developed by CIPFA and adopted by the APA) which police authorities have ratified.

7.50 Police authorities might also be given responsibility for ensuring there are (rather than doing) annual surveys containing information on crime, victimisation, anti-social behaviour, fear of crime and public attitudes on, for example, customer satisfaction, trust and confidence, engagement and quality of service provision, and that these are used to best effect in helping to determine policing priorities. These would be more specific responsibilities than the old section 96 duty under the Police Act and could be mandated by secondary legislation.

7.51 Some have suggested that police authorities might have a role in the appointment of BCU commanders. The suggestion is that this would help to increase local accountability and would be viewed favorably by local authorities. My strong personal view however is that such appointments should remain a matter for chief constables but that it would be good practice for them to consult – explain their thinking to police authorities in this regard.
7.52 There is also potential for increasing and improving central support by, for example, providing the APA with the necessary funding for holding a cadre of analysts to assist police authorities in challenging performance. This could be funded either by government grant, top slicing police grant or an agreed levy on police authorities. This would not be a substitute for some local analytical capability independent of the force.

7.53 The accountability gap identified above force level (i.e. at regional level) could be addressed by giving the APA responsibility for commissioning and producing shared objectives with police authorities on collaboration, and by ensuring collaboration issues are included as part of the police authority inspection process. A legislative opportunity may be sought to allow police authorities to assign certain functions to joint committees representing several police authorities in a region (or across region) to secure collaboration and value for money.

Drawbacks

7.54 The profile of police authorities was, as earlier stated, found to be low in the response to our consultations which also found that they are not considered to be truly ‘local’. Further, the membership is not directly accountable to local people, since the membership is either selected from the community, from local councillors and local magistrates. Currently, there are limited powers to deal with individual members who are poorly performing. Removal on grounds of performance may provoke claims of partisan action. Reforms around member selection (including councillors) may be contentious, but are more feasible. There are similar issues with the mandating of an appraisal system, albeit without sanction, on the basis of the initiative in a number of police authorities already.

(4) Below force level (local bespoke accountability)

Benefits

7.55 There is certainly scope to improve accountability at BCU level and below. We examined several models introduced in other countries as well as the Northern Ireland model, but found none that could be simply ‘transposed’. There are, however, already examples of where forces and police authorities have sought to introduce a type of enhanced localism (for example in Thames Valley and West Mercia). These and our research during the Review all point to the need for such arrangements to be tailored to the needs of the particular community/area they serve. Statutory provision may be sought to allow accountability bodies to draw up schemes for devolving or delegating functions to very localised areas (e.g. a town) according to whatever structure they deem best. The intention would be that there would be no uniformity of such arrangements. I do not see a ‘one size fits all solution’. Under this option, a police authority (or similar body) could decide that a citizens’ forum in a town or an elected board, a large public meeting or some other arrangement would be the appropriate structure to engage with and represent local people in policing, and this body could be given a budget and functions.
Drawbacks

7.56 The chief drawback is this introduces yet another structure in a complicated landscape and one that may not be skilled to deliver what is required of it. Such localised arrangements may be captured by specific interests and conflict then build with the local police and the police authority. It is important that very localised initiatives are more than a plethora of meetings that simply sap energy and divert police officers.

(5) Force-wide solutions

7.57 Whether by something like the status quo or by another model, such solutions do not readily yield up the sort of closeness to community views or ease of redress that seem to animate so much of the need for change. At the same time, an accountability gap is growing at the other end of the spectrum in terms of accountability in terms of regional counter-terrorism arrangements and the initiatives to deliver protective services and efficiencies on a collaborative basis. Some of the legislative changes I have suggested may enable this to be partially dealt with.

Principles of Local Accountability

7.58 Regardless of which option is pursued in future, any programme of reform in this area designed to lead to enhancement of local accountability should in my view be informed by the following principles. In particular, the behaviours described will need to be owned locally for success to be achieved on the ground.

Participative and inclusive

7.59 Everyone should at least have the opportunity and capacity, including access to sufficient and appropriate information, to actively and constructively participate, through a variety of channels, in informed discussions about their concerns and therefore their views on policing priorities in their areas. (But see following section on what our survey showed in respect of what the public actually want)

Credible and legitimate

7.60 Force personnel, and persons or bodies responsible for holding police organisations and individual officers to account should have clearly defined functions, roles and responsibilities and the necessary skills, knowledge, capacity, powers and, where appropriate, independence to carry these out. Such persons or bodies should be accessible to, as well as representative of their local communities and their performance should be regularly assessed.

Clear, open and transparent

7.61 Each and every police officer and policing organisation and partner should be able to clearly understand to whom they are responsible for what, with members of the public equally able to clearly understand who or which body
is responsible for what. Decision-making by persons or bodies responsible for governance should be clear, open and transparent, as well as subject to scrutiny, with a strong link to the public, and a democratic element where appropriate (especially if they are raising taxes).

**Responsive and equitable**

7.62 Mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that the police are fully responsive to the needs and concerns of local communities, taking account of the need to distribute resources fairly and equitably between different groups and individuals with different levels of need.

**Balanced and proportionate**

7.63 In holding the police to account, the right balance must be struck between different and sometimes competing interests. Thus local concerns must be balanced with regional and national priorities, the views and concerns of the disaffected and excluded must be considered alongside those of the majority and responses to different problems should be proportionate to their frequency and seriousness.

**Efficient and effective**

7.64 Mechanisms must be put in place to ensure that the police and partners are held to account for delivering effective, efficient, timely, high quality services that meet locally agreed objectives and targets and provide value for money. Boundaries between governance and operational responsibility must be made clear.

**Offer Redress**

7.65 Clear and accessible mechanisms must be put in place to trigger action, including redress, where local policing priorities are not being addressed or are being addressed inappropriately. Everyone should be easily able to find out how and where to lodge a complaint or to challenge incompetent, unlawful, disrespectful or unreasonable service delivery.

**What Might Success Look Like?**

7.66 It is my belief that the aspirations set out in my terms of reference will be met if the following is achieved.

1. The police service and the policing landscape would be understood by, and be visible and accessible to local people.

2. The service (and forces and individual officers, staff and volunteers) would have customer service at its core, and value above all else the trust citizens have in it.

3. Local priorities would have sufficient space and weight in policing objectives and performance frameworks.
4 Ownership of issues would be clear to individuals, partners, partnerships and local people.

5 People would feel listened to, and believe that the police and others work for them and are ‘on their side’.

6 Partnerships would be operating around outcomes with tasking and performance measurement/management situated with the most appropriate individual/body.

7 Contact with the police would see confidence rise.

8 A clear avenue of redress. People would know where to go to get action and believe they will be taken seriously and that their contribution would count.

9 There would be a sense of ultimate sanction where there is complete failure.

Conclusion

7.67 There is a good deal of contemporary political interest in structural accountability of public services and this Review has produced a number of options which may be considered for policing. The home secretary has made it clear that she wishes to consider the report of this Review in deciding on the contents of the Green Paper later in the spring. Because of this impending Green Paper I feel it is best not to opt for a single solution in this area but rather to facilitate the further consultative process and the opportunity for debate offered by the Green Paper.

7.68 There are plenty of options, and all (including the present arrangement) present both problems and opportunities when it comes to how you deliver services at the level of neighbourhood, district, county or metropolitan area or region with a genuine level of popular scrutiny.

7.69 However, some things are clear if we wish to achieve the fundamental changes we are looking for, to increase trust, confidence and satisfaction with policing, and to meet the criteria for success suggested earlier. The first of these is that it is evident, from all of our consultations, that the greatest gain to be made is from improving the quality of interactions between individuals involved in delivering policing services (including officers, staff and volunteers) and members of the public. And the second is that, in some areas, we need, at the very least, to better support the capacity of accountability bodies to fulfil the functions expected of them. The standards of citizen focused policing and the principles of accountability I have laid out above should act as a benchmark against which to assess both behaviours and whatever structural options exist in the future.
### Recommendation 1:
The Home Office, HMIC, ACPO, APA and the NPIA should clarify and re-design their roles and responsibilities to remove duplication and sharpen incentives and accountability for performance and productivity. They should set out their proposals to the National Policing Board in July 2008.

### Recommendation 2:
APACS should centre on the government’s high-level priorities, drawing its indicators directly from the PSAs, supported by a small number of high level indicators on areas not covered in the PSA suite such as productivity and some suitably defined performance indicators on serious crime and counter-terrorism. HMIC should collaborate with the Home Office to develop high level productivity measures for use in the 2010 APACS assessments.

In conjunction with these measures, by 2010 forces should develop data useful for them to understand their performance and productivity.

### Recommendation 3:
The Home Office should urgently examine its requirement for each force to undertake Activity Based Costing with a view to this requirement being replaced with an alternative which costs less, is easier to use and has greater impact on productivity.

It should also assess alternative ways of meeting its information requirements regarding the allocation of police funding.

### Recommendation 4:
The Home Office should support HMIC, the Audit Commission, forces and police authorities in developing a statistical profile for each force, similar to those used successfully in local government and the health service, which would include comparable high level data on staff numbers, objective costs and key management ratios. Prototypes of these profiles should be prepared by autumn this year, with final versions available by autumn 2009.
Recommendation 5:
The allocation of grant funding to police authorities should be based transparently on objective need in order to better match resources to threat and demand.

To achieve this, the Home Office should move towards a fuller application of the funding formula in future Spending Reviews, phasing out the existing damping mechanism of floors and ceilings.

To better address the demands of protective services, the protective services steering group should consider top-slicing funding. In the longer term, the Home Office should seek agreement with ACPO and APA on a revision to the funding formula that better deals with the shifting demands of protective services.

Recommendation 6:
Where police authorities determine that a sound business case exists for voluntary merger, every effort should be made by Government to facilitate this process.

Recommendation 7:
Forces should review their demand profiles, taking account of more detailed information now available, to ensure that resources are deployed to areas of greatest risk and priority. HMIC should use this information in inspections from 2009-10.

Recommendation 8:
Forces should focus effort on 'high potential' areas for improved productivity, such as demand management (where QUEST has highlighted areas for improvement), procurement and flexible working. HMIC will be looking for evidence of using best practice in inspections from 2009-10.

Recommendation 9:
Chief constables should ensure that they are taking an entrepreneurial approach to policing, not just in ethical income generation through private sector sponsorship and business enterprise, but also through encouraging finance directors to create and exploit ‘business opportunities’.
**Recommendation 10:**

Building on recommendation 5 of the interim report, the NPIA should also begin building standard processes for use across forces. They should address the issue of double entry of information and be used as a precursor to the use of standard IT systems and mobile devices across all forces.

This work should include the creation of minimum standards for forces in areas such as GIS mapping and AVLS corporate performance information. Forces should explore the benefits of software systems and using partners’ data to identify priority areas.

**Recommendation 11:**

The Home Office should include in its forthcoming Green Paper consultation on the establishment of service-wide consistency of the implementation of standard systems and processes. The Green Paper should also specifically consult on the issue of whether the Home Office should mandate regional collaboration on issues such as procuring IT systems, Air Support, Fleet, Uniform etc.

**Recommendation 12:**

The NPIA should produce an interim evaluation report from the workforce modernisation pilot sites by autumn 2008 so that the service is not denied valuable learning pending the final report.

**Recommendation 13:**

The Home Office should set out its strategy for workforce reform in the forthcoming Green Paper, and the NPIA should facilitate the development of a ten-year workforce plan for the service. Both of these pieces of work should emphasise the importance of matching skills and aptitudes to roles and tasks.

**Recommendation 14:**

The NPIA should conduct a review of the Integrated Competency framework on behalf of the tripartite partners to ensure that it is a useful and accessible tool for police managers and staff.

**Recommendation 15:**

The NPIA should provide guidance and assistance to police staff and officers to allow them to progress their careers within the police service through better management of their professional development.
### Recommendation 16:
Chief Constables should conduct a review of their forces’ working practices within Neighbourhood Policing to ensure flexible working options exist. HMIC will, as part of its inspection process, consider what progress has been made in this area from 2009/10.

### Recommendation 17:
Detailed modelling of the impact of workforce reform on local, regional and national resilience should be incorporated into the ten-year workforce plan to be coordinated by the NPIA.

### Recommendation 18:
The NPIA should work with forces on a post implementation review of the SOLAP workplace assessment and accreditation process, which the Greater Manchester Constabulary has offered to lead.

### Recommendation 19:
All existing doctrine, which includes regulations, codes of practice, operational policing manuals and practical advice on best practice in the police service, should be reviewed and consolidated so the total impact can be assessed and overlaps in individual documents removed by the end of 2008.

This process should be led by ACPO, with support from the NPIA, on behalf of the service. The NPIA should play an ongoing role in considering all proposals to enhance doctrine. Their focus should be on the combined impact of changes to the service and the development of a protocol of ‘review and replace’ rather than continually adding to existing doctrine.
Recommendation 20:
The government’s recently established Risk and Regulation Advisory Council should examine the role of risk within the police service, and begin a national debate on risk aversion and culture change at a central government level. Ministers, senior police leaders and stakeholders from the wider judicial system all need to engage in and take forward this debate.

ACPO and the other tripartite members should facilitate regional events on risk in the police service to engage staff and officers from all ranks in the debate on managing risk, and enhancing professional discretion and accountability. These events should include a practical discussion on existing processes in the police where little or no discretion exists.

The NPIA should take forward and ‘mainstream’ the outcome of these events as a ‘golden thread’ in the way it designs training, education and doctrine for the police service.

Recommendation 21:
To achieve the dual goal of public trust and confidence in crime statistics by ensuring all incidents and crimes are recorded and proportionately responded to, I recommend that:

(a) A new streamlined recording process is trialled from the beginning of 2008, for a four month period. This new process will ensure that crimes are subject to proportionate recording, with a suitable minimum standard for all crimes and more comprehensive recording for serious crimes;

(b) A structured project is undertaken to address the lack of proportionate response in the service and to create a community focused performance regime for local crime;

(c) These proposals are implemented initially by Staffordshire, Leicestershire, West Midlands and Surrey forces who have volunteered in this regard; and

(d) The NPIA undertake a focused evaluation of these pilot sites.

Over this trial period, service wide data collected centrally may not be comparable. Any NCRS/NSIR audit and inspection regime must acknowledge the nature of the pilots and the potential wider benefits of more proportionate crime recording.

The Home Office should use its forthcoming Green Paper as an opportunity for public debate and consultation on proposals to amend the Notifiable Offences List, and complete a comprehensive review of it by the end of 2008.
Recommendation 22:
I support the roll out of the Simple Speedy Summary Justice Initiative, and recommend that the Streamlined Process, Virtual Courts and Integrated Prosecution teams, be implemented nationally by 2012, taking into account lessons learned from each pilot and the local business case for implementation.

(a) The Crown Prosecution Service and ACPO should jointly work towards a single case file system within the framework of the Integrated Prosecution Teams.

(b) The Home Office, OCJR and Attorney General should work together to ensure that targets and performance indicators for the Police and Crown Prosecution Service are brought into alignment and set against the core objective of convicting the guilty. This should be achieved through the next spending review process.

(c) I welcome the news that the NPIA is putting better working between the police and the criminal justice system at the centre of its plans and that OCJR will continue with their comprehensive and radical review of the criminal justice processes. Further opportunities to achieve the government’s new PSA target to “increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice system” should include consideration by these bodies of:

(1) the proportionality of current disclosure rules;
(2) simplifying current guidance on charging powers for the police; and
(3) the extension of police charging powers to all cases heard at the magistrates’ court, and to additional offences subject to trial, either at the magistrates’ or the crown court.

Recommendation 23:
The Home Office should urgently initiate a review of the RIPA Codes of Practice. Once initiated I see no reason why with determination and commitment from the interested parties involved such a review could not be conducted over a 3 month period.
Recommendation 24:
The current comprehensive form for Stop and Account should be removed and replaced with the following measures:

(a) Any officer who asks an individual to account for themselves should provide that individual with a ‘receipt’ of the encounter in the form of a business card or similar, and use Airwave to record the encounter, including the ethnicity of the person subject to the encounter to enable disproportionality monitoring; and

(b) Supervisory officers should ‘dip sample’ these recordings.

These proposals should be piloted in the West Midlands and evaluated by the end of summer 2008.

Recommendation 25:
The Home Office and CLG should consider how best to support improved community safety partnership working in two-tier areas, in particular encouraging greater collaboration between local partnerships to enhance their capacity to deliver key community safety services.

As the new Local Area Agreements are rolled out, the Home Office and CLG should also consider how best to support the delivery of tailored neighbourhood community safety outcomes.

Recommendation 26:
The Home Office, CLG and WAG should put in place proper governance and programme support arrangements to deliver the Action Plan which will promote the closer integration of Neighbourhood Policing with a neighbourhood management approach. These arrangements should be in place by autumn 2008.

Recommendation 27:
To promote improved partnership working and the closer integration of Neighbourhood Policing within a neighbourhood management approach, the relevant local government and policing agencies (NPIA, IDeA, LGA, Welsh LGA and Regional Improvement and Efficiency Partnerships (RIEP)) should develop a national leadership and training resource through a joint excellence programme. These bodies should explore whether the REIPs can provide funding for the programme.

This national resource will build local partners’ capacity to deliver shared community safety outcomes through joint training and development for both leaders and practitioners.
Recommendation 28:
Recognising that the Single Non-Emergency Number programme has acted as a catalyst for improved partnership working, the Home Office and CLG should ensure that learning from the programme is shared with all community safety partners and identify how to encourage and incentivise the mainstreaming of this approach into local operations. This process should be completed by August 2008.

Recommendation 29:
Chief constables and senior community safety partners should ensure that effective leadership, tasking and direction of neighbourhood resources are vested in the most appropriate individual, irrespective of the organisation for which the individual works.

Recommendation 30:
The NPIA should, by April 2008, have agreed a funded programme for the next three years to continue to support forces to embed Neighbourhood Policing.

Recommendation 31:
ACPO, the APA and the NPIA should develop a broad set of principles for minimising abstraction from neighbourhood policing teams by April 2008. These should be adopted by all forces no later than June 2008. Progress will be reviewed in.

Recommendation 32:
The APA, with the support of the NPIA, should develop guidance for police authorities on how they can promote and sustain Neighbourhood Policing. This guidance should be completed by July 2008.

HMIC, the Audit Commission and the Wales Audit Office should assess, as part of police authority inspection, how well police authorities contribute to embedding and sustaining Neighbourhood Policing and its outcomes.

Recommendation 33:
CLG’s Cohesion Delivery Framework (to be published in Summer 2008) should provide support and guidance to local partners on the key role Neighbourhood Policing teams play in improving cohesion, and on how that role can be developed further locally.
Annex C: Notes of thanks

Throughout the course of the Review a high number of extremely valuable contributions were submitted by a wide range of individuals and organisations, all of which were considered as the process developed. I would like to thank the individual police officers and staff, police forces, members of the public, police organisations and associations, government departments, local authorities and their organisations and associations, police authorities, charities and private businesses that made these important contributions and helped to identify specific trends and areas of interest.

The Review has also been supported by a number of reference groups and advisors, including a group of police practitioners, a cross governmental group, several groups of specialist advisors and a group representing all areas of the police service. I would like to thank the individuals, forces, organisations and departments that contributed to these groups and to the 2007 Strategic Command Course for their assistance.

I have also been given considerable support by a number of organisations, including police forces, who have provided resources to assist with the research and running of the Review. I would also like to make a special note of thanks to the Better Regulation Executive, KPMG, Deloitte, the Institute for Public Policy Research (ippr) and the Work Foundation for their assistance on specific research projects. I am also particularly grateful to ACPO, the APA, the Police Federation, the Superintendents Association and Unison for the detailed submissions which they made to the Review, which I hope they can see reflected in parts of this Report.
Annex D: Results of the Review’s public consultation

What did the public say about policing?

"More police" would seem to be the most popular way of increasing trust and confidence, followed by a quicker response following calls for service and more information.

The majority support working in partnership and, in theory at least, the majority of people (other than the young) say they favour greater involvement in local policing. In practice, however, the majority of people are constrained by many barriers to greater involvement, such as not having the skills, the confidence or the time or feeling that their contribution will not be taken seriously.

Some members of the public are more interested in working more closely with the police than others. The most interested seem to be the elderly, who have more time on their hands, and the least interested are young people. Those who have had contact with the police, whether as victims, witnesses or suspects, expressed a greater interest in working more closely with the police than those who had had no contact, although those from lower socio-economic status (SES) groups tend to be rather cynical about working together with the police.

For most people, the idea of “local” covers little more than their street and its immediate surrounds. People do value greater visibility and accessibility; they want to know who their local bobby is and how to contact him/her and they want local police stations to be accessible 24/7. The police are seen as doing a good job when dealing with serious incidents but as doing a poor job when dealing with less serious, more local incidents.

The young and those from lower SES groups tend to distrust the police and see them as heavy-handed; older people and those from higher SES groups see them as ill-directed, focusing too much of their time on what they consider to be trivial problems, such as speeding and parking. Those with little contact tend to view the police as over-burdened, and not responsive to local concerns.

Most people know little about how local policing works, are cynical about the value and purpose of public meetings (especially the young and those from lower SES groups) and are sceptical about whether local communities would be able (let alone willing) to hold the police to account. However they would appreciate more information about what the police do in their local area and many would like to have a say on local issues, how they should be policed and what should be prioritised.

Annex E – Alternative models for local accountability

**Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS)**
The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) was introduced in 1993 to increase the responsiveness and effectiveness of police problem solving by linking these efforts directly to a broad range of city services and involving the public in identifying and seeking solutions to neighbourhood problems. While it has had some success, there is debate about to what extent this is directly attributable to CAPS and whether the structure has been as effective in relation to planning and assessment. Also, that the boards have had stable membership which may be unrepresentative of the wider community.

**Northern Ireland Partnership Boards**
These were established in 2001 and replaced the police authority. Whilst the arrangements provide strong directional accountability at national and district level, with the chief constable maintaining operational responsibility for policing, and the board having the power to require a report on any issue, including an explanation of operational decisions. There is, therefore, strong governance accountability (process of oversight), answerability to the public and an emphasis on partnership between the police and community in terms of the effectiveness of community safety. However, the arrangements were designed and aimed at better integration of the police service into the normal life of Northern Ireland and fitted to the unique context there. This is not felt to be a directly transferable model and, indeed, Northern Ireland are currently conducting a review of their own policing arrangements.

**New York Police Department (NYPD) – Mayor led democracy**
Most commentators on the success of the New York Police Department in reducing crime agree that moves to a flexible, accountable and localised policing structure, combined with a multi agency approach and support of elected politicians has contributed to its success. In particular, the compstat management tool developed, gives senior officers week by week real time crime statistics broken down by precinct, which is used to move resources to where the priorities are. Data is fed back to senior officers at meetings (attended by the mayor and other non policing officials) where files are pulled on individual boroughs of concern, and beat officers are made to account for responsiveness to community concerns. Precinct commanders also attend borough council meetings to deal with concerns and discuss performance. The general public is kept up to date with weekly crime rates and strategies to reduce crime via a compstat web site. The public certainly know who is responsible for ‘pulling everything together’ and the mayor has the power over all services with much stronger linkages between public service departments. Strong local accountability drives public services to concentrate on things that local
communities care about and increases public satisfaction with the police. Active community involvement is a key element of compstat and has played a part in reducing crime and increasing civil regeneration.

However, there is again some debate on how much is attributable to these moves, and the inter-dependence of politicians and senior police officers has given rise to claims of bias and interference in particular cases.
# Annex F – Glossary of terms

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<th>Acronym/term</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Further information/website</th>
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<tr>
<td>All Wales Community Safety Forum</td>
<td>The purpose of the Forum is to enable community safety issues to be addressed between key partners on a strategic and all Wales basis and to provide an arena through which best-practice and innovation can be disseminated across Wales.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.wlga.gov.uk/content.php?nID=331;lds=1">http://www.wlga.gov.uk/content.php?nID=331;lds=1</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>APA</td>
<td>Association of Police Authorities</td>
<td><a href="http://www.apa.police.uk/apa">http://www.apa.police.uk/apa</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Better Regulation Executive</td>
<td>A unit within the department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform</td>
<td><a href="http://bre.berr.gov.uk/regulation/">http://bre.berr.gov.uk/regulation/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>BCU/OCU</td>
<td>Basic Command Unit/Operational Command Unit</td>
<td>A territorial division of a police force, which typically coincides with one or more local authority boundaries. It is usually organised under the command of a chief superintendent.</td>
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<td>CDRPs</td>
<td>Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships</td>
<td><a href="http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/regions/regions00.htm#1">http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/regions/regions00.htm#1</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>CLG</td>
<td>Communities and Local Government</td>
<td><a href="http://www.communities.gov.uk">http://www.communities.gov.uk</a></td>
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<td>CSR</td>
<td>Comprehensive Spending Review</td>
<td><a href="http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/spending_review/spending_review/spend_index.cfm">http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/spending_review/spending_review/spend_index.cfm</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>DATs</td>
<td>Drug action teams (DATs) are the partnerships responsible for delivering the drug strategy at a local level.</td>
<td><a href="http://drugs.homeoffice.gov.uk/dat/">http://drugs.homeoffice.gov.uk/dat/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>DGQP</td>
<td>Directors Guidance Quick Process (now known as The Streamlined Process)</td>
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<td>HMIC</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary</td>
<td><a href="http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/">http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Home Affairs Select Committee</td>
<td>The Committee is charged with examining the expenditure, policy and administration of the Home Office and its associated public bodies.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/home_affairs_committee.cfm">http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/home_affairs_committee.cfm</a></td>
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<td>HSE</td>
<td>Health and Safety Executive</td>
<td><a href="http://www.hse.gov.uk/">http://www.hse.gov.uk/</a></td>
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<td>IDEA</td>
<td>Improvement and Development Agency</td>
<td><a href="http://www.idea.gov.uk/idk/core/page.do?pageId=1">http://www.idea.gov.uk/idk/core/page.do?pageId=1</a></td>
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<td>LEAN thinking</td>
<td>An approach developed by Toyota car manufacturers to improve productivity, and other approaches to process improvement. It seeks to eliminate wasteful processes and blockages by looking at the system from the bottom-up, identifying issues from the frontline.</td>
<td>E.g. see CIPFA paper: <a href="http://www.cipfanetworks.net/fileupload/upload/Lean_briefing1912007311331.pdf">http://www.cipfanetworks.net/fileupload/upload/Lean_briefing1912007311331.pdf</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Service Agreements (in Wales)</td>
<td>a manageable, agreed programme of work which captures the priorities for adding value to the delivery of the Community Strategy</td>
<td><a href="http://wales.gov.uk/topics/improvingservices/localserviceboards/localserviceagreements/?lang=en">http://wales.gov.uk/topics/improvingservices/localserviceboards/localserviceagreements/?lang=en</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Service Boards</td>
<td>Local Service Boards (LSBs) are Wales’ new model for engaging the whole of the Wales public service in a new way of working by integrating services and responding more effectively to citizens’ needs.</td>
<td><a href="http://wales.gov.uk/topics/improvingservices/localserviceboards/?lang=en">http://wales.gov.uk/topics/improvingservices/localserviceboards/?lang=en</a></td>
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<td>LSPs</td>
<td>Local Strategic Partnerships</td>
<td><a href="http://www.communities.gov.uk/localgovernment/performanceframework/partnerships/localstrategicpartnerships/">http://www.communities.gov.uk/localgovernment/performanceframework/partnerships/localstrategicpartnerships/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Service</td>
<td><a href="http://www.met.police.uk/">http://www.met.police.uk/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Policing Board (NPB)</td>
<td>The National Policing Board was established in July 2006 to help strengthen the governance of policing in England and Wales. (Includes steering groups, e.g. on Protective Services )</td>
<td><a href="http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/police-reform/nat-policing-board/?version=7">http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/police-reform/nat-policing-board/?version=7</a></td>
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<td>NOL</td>
<td>Notifiable Offence List</td>
<td><a href="http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/counrules.htm">http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/counrules.htm</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>NPIA</td>
<td>National Policing Improvement Agency</td>
<td><a href="http://www.npia.police.uk/">http://www.npia.police.uk/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>OCG</td>
<td>Office of Government Commerce</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ogc.gov.uk/">http://www.ogc.gov.uk/</a></td>
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<td>OSC</td>
<td>Office of Surveillance Commissioners</td>
<td><a href="http://www.surveillancecommissioners.gov.uk/">http://www.surveillancecommissioners.gov.uk/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCSOs</td>
<td>Police Community Support Officers</td>
<td><a href="http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/community-policing/community-support-officers/">http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/community-policing/community-support-officers/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Police Advisory Board for England and Wales</td>
<td>The Police Advisory Board for England and Wales (PABEW) advises the home secretary on general questions affecting the police in England and Wales; and considers draft regulations which the Home Secretary proposes to make under section 50 or section 52 of the Police Act 1996 – except for matters such as pay and negotiable conditions of service which fall within the remit of the Police Negotiating Board – and to make such recommendations as it sees fit.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ome.uk.com/review.cfm?body=9">http://www.ome.uk.com/review.cfm?body=9</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Police Grant/ Funding formula</td>
<td>The police grant is the funding given by the Home Office to police authorities based on the Police Funding Formula, which is designed to assess the relative need for resources between forces.</td>
<td>See <a href="http://www.local.odpm.gov.uk/finance/stats/lgfs/2005/lgfs16/annex%20g.pdf">http://www.local.odpm.gov.uk/finance/stats/lgfs/2005/lgfs16/annex%20g.pdf</a> for more terms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police Negotiating Board</td>
<td>The Police Negotiating Board (PNB) was established by Act of Parliament in 1980 to negotiate the hours of duty; leave; pay and allowances; the issue, use and return of police clothing, personal equipment and accoutrements; and pensions of United Kingdom police officers, and to make recommendations on these matters to the Home Secretary, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and Scottish Ministers.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ome.uk.com/review.cfm?body=1">http://www.ome.uk.com/review.cfm?body=1</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Police Staff Council</td>
<td>The Police Staff Council (PSC) is a voluntary negotiation body — unlike the Police Negotiating Board — and negotiates for 50,000 police staff in England and Wales, excluding the Metropolitan Police. The national agreements of the PSC are only binding if police authorities and chief constables agree to incorporate them within the contracts of employment of their employees.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.lge.gov.uk/lge/core/page.do?pageId=54123">http://www.lge.gov.uk/lge/core/page.do?pageId=54123</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Care Trusts</td>
<td>Primary care trusts (PCTs) covering all parts of England have taken control of local health care while strategic Health Authorities monitor performance and standards.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Policyandguidance/Organisationpolicy/Primarycare/Primarycaretrusts/index.htm">http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Policyandguidance/Organisationpolicy/Primarycare/Primarycaretrusts/index.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective Services</td>
<td>Terrorism, serious crime and other major challenges to public safety.</td>
<td><a href="http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/police-reform/protective-services1/?version=1">http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/police-reform/protective-services1/?version=1</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>PSA (including e.g. PSA 23)</td>
<td>Public Service Agreement</td>
<td><a href="http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/public_spending_reporting/">http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/public_spending_reporting/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>PURE</td>
<td>Use of resources judgements for policing by Audit Commission and the Wales Audit Office. (PURE involves auditors assessing whether police authorities and forces are achieving value for money, effective financial management)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/reports/NATIONAL-REPORT.asp?CategoryID=&amp;ProdID=7ABBC86D-3E9E-4ec6-9E60-A60C799BA437">http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/reports/NATIONAL-REPORT.asp?CategoryID=&amp;ProdID=7ABBC86D-3E9E-4ec6-9E60-A60C799BA437</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Improvement and Efficiency Partnerships</td>
<td>Regional Improvement and Efficiency Partnerships support councils to deliver priority outcomes for their communities</td>
<td><a href="http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/core/page.do?pageid=18437">http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/core/page.do?pageid=18437</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCA</td>
<td>Serious Organised Crime Agency</td>
<td><a href="http://www.soca.gov.uk/">http://www.soca.gov.uk/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Streamlined Process</td>
<td>(see Directors Guidance Quick Process)</td>
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