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Hearing transcripts

3 October 2007 - Morning Session

1 Wednesday, 3rd October 2007
2 (10.00 am)
3 Opening remarks by LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER (continued)
4 (Jury present)
5 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Good morning, members of the
6 jury.
7 The ring: Mohamed Al Fayed's claim is that Dodi and
8 Diana went together to the jeweller, Repossi, in
9 Monte Carlo whilst they were on holiday on the Jonikal
10 and selected a specific engagement ring. The selected
11 ring was sent to Italy for sizing by Mr Repossi and was
12 later collected by Dodi in Paris at Repossi's shop in
13 the Place Vendome on Saturday 30th August 1997.
14 There is conflicting evidence about the ring and you
15 will have to consider carefully whether the evidence as
16 a whole supports Mr Al Fayed's view. It appears clear
17 that a ring was collected from Repossi's Paris shop on
18 30th August and that that ring was retrieved by
19 Rene Delorm, the butler, on the Sunday or the Monday
20 following Dodi's death. The ring is from a range known
21 as "Dis-Moi Oui", "Tell Me Yes".
22 It is made of gold and has a number of diamonds
23 forming the shape of a star. CCTV footage from Repossi
24 shows Dodi in the shop for about seven and a half
25 minutes between 5.30 and 6 pm on the Saturday evening

1

1 and then returning to the Ritz.
2 All he appears to be carrying is a Repossi brochure.
3 Claude Roulet, the assistant to the president of
4 the Ritz, says that Dodi viewed a number of items of
5 jewellery and left the shop without any of them. He
6 says that he, Roulet, returned later in the day and
7 collected a number of rings for Dodi to consider,
8 whereupon Dodi selected the 'Dis-Moi Oui' ring.
9 His evidence will be tested in due course.
10 The issue is whether this was in truth an engagement
11 ring chosen by Dodi and Diana together at Repossi in
12 Monte Carlo and collected by Dodi from Repossi in
13 Place Vendome on 30th August 1997 or whether it was
14 chosen by Dodi alone that day, to give to Diana on the
15 night they died, perhaps in the hope that she would
16 agree to marry him or perhaps just as a present.
17 The evidence suggests that the only opportunities to
18 visit Repossi in Monte Carlo were on 5th and
19 23rd August. Those were the only occasions when
20 the boat was there. Bodyguards say that Repossi was not
21 visited on either occasion. Mr Delorm thinks they did
22 go to the shop on the first occasion,
23 ie 5th August 1997. You will need to consider two
24 points: first, that would have been very early in
25 the relationship and you will need to consider whether

2

1 Dodi or Diana had engagement in mind at that stage.
2 Secondly, Mr Delorm never mentioned the visit in
3 the book he wrote because, he says, he did not remember
4 until afterwards.
5 There is one further point I should make about the
6 ring. At a press conference at Harrods on
7 5th September 1997, Michael Cole, Mr Al Fayed's press
8 officer, had this to say:
9 "Incidentally, we did not leak the news of the ring
10 which Dodi gave to the Princess only hours before their
11 deaths. What that ring meant we shall probably never
12 know and if the planet lasts for another thousand years,
13 I am quite sure that people will continue to speculate
14 about its significance."
15 Members of the jury, that is a very different
16 picture from the one later painted by Mr Al Fayed, that
17 there was an engagement ring and that the engagement was
18 to be announced on the Monday. Were that the true state
19 of affairs, why was the experienced Michael Cole saying
20 what he did on 5th September?
21 Mr Repossi has made a number of statements, some of
22 which support the view that this was an engagement ring.
23 However, his statements conflict and you will need to
24 test them against the CCTV evidence. It may be that he
25 has difficulty in remembering the relevant details.

3

1 Pregnancy: no indication was given of pregnancy by
2 Diana to her doctor, family, friends or associates.
3 Mohamed Al Fayed has said publicly he believed Diana was
4 pregnant with Dodi's child. In the past he has referred
5 to a photograph allegedly showing she was pregnant.
6 The photograph in question is the one that I showed you
7 yesterday that was taken on 14th July 1997, before
8 the relationship with Dodi began [Photo produced - Sunday People 15-02-1998].
9 Be that as it may, pregnancy is suggested to be
10 relevant in two respects. First, her pregnancy or
11 suspected pregnancy is said to have provided the motive
12 or part of the motive for killing Diana. Secondly, her
13 body was embalmed by the French and it is said that
14 the purpose of this was to conceal that she was
15 pregnant.
16 I shall come to deal with embalming as a separate
17 topic, but for the moment let us just concentrate on
18 the question of pregnancy. I mention pregnancy or
19 suspected pregnancy in relation to motive because it may
20 be that Mohamed Al Fayed's original position that Dodi
21 and Diana were engaged and that she was expecting his
22 child has changed to one in which, even if she was not
23 engaged and/or pregnant, those monitoring their
24 movements may have believed that to be the case. We
25 shall have wait and see.

4

1 No pregnancy test was carried out when the doctors
2 were trying to save Diana. There was no reason to and,
3 anyway, there were far more important things to do.
4 Following Diana's death, Professor Lecomte carried out
5 an external examination of Diana's body. She did not
6 test for pregnancy. Again, in her view, there was no
7 reason to do so.
8 Later the same day, after her body had been returned
9 to England, a Home Office pathologist,
10 Dr Robert Chapman, carried out a full post-mortem
11 examination at the Hammersmith and Fulham Mortuary.
12 During this examination, he saw no visible signs of
13 pregnancy. Later that evidence was reviewed by another
14 Home Office pathologist, Dr Richard Shepherd. He
15 concluded:
16 "There are no pathological features to support
17 the suggestion of a pregnancy."
18 You will hear evidence concerning the extent to
19 which a post-mortem examiner can see physical signs of
20 early pregnancy. For obvious reasons, there would not
21 be much to see. You will also hear evidence that Diana
22 was taking a contraceptive pill. Any blood sample taken
23 at post-mortem was going to be unreliable because of
24 the transfusion Diana had received.
25 Members of the jury, it is likely that pregnancy is

5

1 not a matter that can be proved one way or the other in
2 scientific terms in this case. You will of course
3 consider the scientific evidence, such as it is, but you
4 will also hear evidence from several sources about what
5 Diana had to say to her friends as well as intimate
6 details of her personal life.
7 You will hear, among other things, the evidence of
8 Myriah Daniels, a masseuse and holistic healer, who was
9 travelling on the Jonikal on the second trip in August.
10 Ms Daniels says this:
11 "National newspapers were speculating that Diana
12 might be pregnant. She was really disturbed about what
13 was said in one newspaper, commenting, 'Now they have me
14 pregnant'."
15 In due course, you will have to weigh up all
16 the evidence on pregnancy, decide what you accept and
17 where it points.
18 You must also bear in mind that it is central to
19 the conspiracy claim that the death of Diana was
20 precipitated by what MI6 learned through monitoring
21 telephone calls. You will need to consider whether
22 Diana made a telephone call which alerted the
23 authorities to her alleged pregnancy.
24 Mohamed Al Fayed says he received a call to this
25 effect on the afternoon of 30th August, 1997. You will

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1 need to consider his evidence in order to decide whether
2 it is right on this point.
3 Embalming: what is said here is that Diana's body
4 was unlawfully embalmed to cover up pregnancy.
5 The presence of embalming fluid in her body would
6 corrupt any pregnancy test and, therefore, prevent
7 a test being performed. If a test had been carried out,
8 any positive result could have been attributed to the
9 presence of the embalming fluid rather than a true
10 pregnancy. It is said that the actions of the French
11 authorities were orchestrated by the British Ambassador
12 in Paris and MI6.
13 Embalming is the preservation of a dead human body
14 by the introduction of chemical compounds that delay
15 putrefaction. The normal purpose of embalming is to
16 preserve the body against decomposition and present it
17 as normally and naturally as possible. In Paris,
18 embalming can take place at the mortuary, also known as
19 the Institut Medico-Legal, IML, a hospital, a funeral
20 parlour or the deceased's home.
21 In France, embalming cannot proceed without
22 the authority of the Mayor of the area where the death
23 took place or the embalming is to take place.
24 Diana was pronounced dead at 4.00 am, following
25 emergency surgery at the Pitie-Salpetriere Hospital in

7

1 Paris. Her body, after an external examination by
2 a court-appointed medical expert, was taken to a private
3 room within the hospital close to the emergency
4 representation area. It is said that Diana's body was
5 not taken to the hospital mortuary as it was felt
6 inappropriate to transfer her body across the hospital
7 grounds, bearing in mind media interest. The hospital
8 mortuary and the emergency representation area are at
9 opposite ends of the hospital grounds.
10 Efforts were made to keep the room cool on a very
11 warm night by the introduction of air conditioning
12 units. Further, the French funeral directors asked for
13 ice to be placed near Diana's body in an attempt to keep
14 it cool. Neither action was successful.
15 The process of embalming was carried out between
16 2.00 pm and 4.30 pm on 31st August 1997; in other words,
17 not until ten hours after death. A French company of
18 embalmers carried out the work in accordance with their
19 standard operating procedures. After Diana's body was
20 viewed and respects paid by members of her family and
21 other dignitaries, it was returned to the United Kingdom
22 that evening. Dodi's body was taken to the IML mortuary
23 direct from the scene. No request was made to have his
24 body embalmed and it was repatriated to the
25 United Kingdom later that day on a private flight.

8

1 The issues regarding embalming Diana's body are: was
2 it legal? Who authorised it? Who carried out the
3 embalming process? And was there an ulterior motive for
4 the embalming in relation to the alleged pregnancy of
5 Diana?
6 Dr Riou was part of the team that carried out the
7 emergency surgery on Diana. It was he who pronounced
8 her dead at 4.00 am. He signed a certificate containing
9 a declaration that there was a medico-legal obstacle
10 associated with the body. This was because, in his
11 view, death was due to an accident rather than natural
12 causes. It did not mean he thought there were any
13 suspicious circumstances.
14 Accordingly, a pathologist appointed by the Public
15 Prosecutor's Office, Professor Lecomte, carried out an
16 external examination of Diana's body about ninety
17 minutes after her death; that is about 5.30 am. She
18 declared there were no suspicious circumstances relating
19 to the injuries on the body and that those injuries
20 appeared to be consistent with a road traffic accident.
21 Dr Riou was therefore authorised to certify death,
22 which he did on a form that certified there was no
23 medico-legal obstacle to embalming. Professor Lecomte
24 had no involvement in the decision-making or any
25 procedural link in the embalming of Diana.

9

1 Maud Coujard was the Deputy Public Prosecutor in
2 Paris on call that night. As I have mentioned, she
3 attended the scene and made the first judicial decisions
4 relating to the crash. She proceeded in the ordinary
5 way, ordering an autopsy of the driver but external
6 examination only of the bodies of Diana and Dodi as they
7 were passengers. It was she who asked Professor Lecomte
8 to examine the bodies and she who issued burial
9 certificates, thus clearing the bodies for funeral
10 arrangements and ending the involvement of
11 the Justice Ministry. She was not, as I have said,
12 involved in the decision to embalm.
13 Dr Steiner is an expert on French criminal law. She
14 will give evidence that the process of embalming is
15 prohibited in circumstances where, following medical
16 examination, the doctor appointed by the authorities
17 finds that there are suspicious circumstances relating
18 to the injuries necessitating further investigation of
19 a medical/forensic nature.
20 If there were no suspicious circumstances relating
21 to the death, then there was no legal prohibition on
22 embalming, provided that the necessary consents were
23 obtained.
24 You will hear the following accounts given of
25 the decisions about embalming: Jean Monceau claims to

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1 have been the adviser in the embalming process. He was
2 the assistant commercial director of the funeral
3 directors BJL Service Parisien d'Hygiene Funeraire. His
4 initial opinion that Diana's body needed to be embalmed
5 was confirmed when he saw the injuries. This was for
6 presentation purposes, for the family and dignitaries
7 who were going to visit and pay their respects. At
8 the hospital, M Monceau met Keith Moss,
9 the Consul General from the British Embassy.
10 I should explain, members of the jury, that
11 the embalming of which we are speaking is not like
12 the kind of embalming associated with the pharaohs in
13 ancient times, which in any event is not permitted under
14 French law. M Monceau will explain that in his
15 experience, which dated back 11 years, there are various
16 levels of embalming and that embalming is primarily
17 concerned with making the body as presentable as
18 possible. M Monceau says that he suggested arterial
19 injections so as to preserve the body from the
20 proliferation of bacteria which cause odour and change
21 of colour.
22 Mr Moss says that he told M Monceau that he thought
23 it was a good idea to proceed in this fashion but that
24 he first must resolve the problems surrounding
25 the authorisation.

11

1 Authority to embalm is required from two sources.
2 First, the Mayor, or, if that cannot be obtained because
3 the town hall is closed, as it obviously was on this
4 occasion, from a representative of the Prefet de Police.
5 Jean Monceau explained the situation to Martine Monteil,
6 a superintendent from the Brigade Criminelle, who
7 assured him that everything would be in order and
8 authorisation given. He took this as the first
9 authority necessary.
10 The second authority is required from the family.
11 You will hear evidence about this authority from several
12 people. Colin Tebbut was an ex-Metropolitan Police
13 Service royalty protection group officer and was
14 employed as a security consultant and driver for Diana
15 in 1997. When the news of her death broke, he was asked
16 by Michael Gibbins, Diana's personal secretary, to go to
17 Paris. He did so along with Paul Burrell, her butler.
18 They went to the hospital.
19 According to Mr Tebbut, the position was becoming
20 critical because of the heat and the deterioration of
21 the body. He phoned Mr Gibbins in London, explaining
22 that Levertons, the undertakers from London, were not
23 expected until about 5 pm, which was the same time as
24 the Prince of Wales was expected, and preparation of the
25 body would take about one and a half hours.

12

1 The evidence of those involved is that a joint
2 decision was made to authorise M Monceau to go ahead
3 with embalming. Mr Gibbins was in London and told
4 Mr Tebbut if he thought M Monceau's company would do
5 a good job and, if Mr Moss agreed, to go ahead. These
6 men may paint a picture of finding themselves
7 unexpectedly in a desperately difficult situation.
8 A decision should have been made by relatives, but who
9 was there to call? To do nothing would have been, in
10 effect, a decision not to embalm.
11 You will have to consider whether, as it is claimed,
12 there was a breach of French law in embalming Diana's
13 body and, if there was, whether this was more than
14 a technical failure to obtain the necessary approval.
15 Mr Al Fayed claims the embalming was carried out on
16 the specific instructions of the British authorities,
17 namely MI6, and that their instruction was conveyed to
18 the French by the British Ambassador in Paris,
19 Sir Michael Jay, and then by him to Madame Coujard,
20 the French prosecutor.
21 Sir Michael denies any involvement in
22 the decision-making process. Madame Coujard likewise
23 says she did not authorise the embalming and played no
24 part in the decision. She maintains that there was no
25 reason for her to have done so. Nevertheless, a story

13

1 appeared in the British press that both were involved.
2 You will hear from Sir Michael and Madame Coujard and
3 from Jean Monceau and others, including Messrs Gibbins,
4 Tebbut and Moss, and you will have to assess what you
5 make of their accounts. In deciding whether
6 the decision to embalm was part of a conspiracy to
7 conceal pregnancy, you will probably wish to ask
8 yourselves how many people must have been party to that
9 decision.
10 The embalming was undertaken by Mr Monceau's company
11 and the physical process was a routine embalming
12 process. Levertons are funeral directors appointed to
13 the Royal Family. They received instructions from
14 Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Mather, who was then
15 assistant controller to the Royal Household.
16 Mr Clive Leverton went to Paris and took two embalmers
17 with him, not because he had been given any specific
18 instructions, but because he needed to have them there
19 in case embalming was necessary.
20 Colonel Mather did not communicate with the French
21 authorities and did not speak to anyone about embalming
22 the body of Diana. He simply appointed Levertons to
23 bring back her body and make preparations for
24 the funeral. It would have been up to them to consider,
25 on arrival in Paris, whether embalming was necessary and

14

1 liaise with the Lord Chamberlain's office for further
2 instructions.
3 According to the undertakers, bodies coming into
4 the United Kingdom are embalmed more often than not.
5 Janusz Knepil is a toxicologist with over 33 years'
6 experience. He tested human urine samples injected with
7 formaldehyde, a substance that would have been in
8 embalming fluid, to assess the effect on pregnancy
9 tests. His conclusion was where embalming has taken
10 place, a negative pregnancy test is likely to be
11 reliable. However, a positive test result has a high
12 prospect of being a false positive due to the influence
13 of the embalming fluid.
14 This part of the conspiracy allegation is based on
15 the premise that any positive pregnancy test could be
16 said to be a false positive due to the presence of
17 embalming fluid. However, no pregnancy test was ever
18 carried out nor is it suggested it was intended one
19 should be carried out. No one who dealt with Diana or
20 her body after the crash saw any reason to do so. You
21 will need to set these factors against the allegation
22 that the authorities had a desire to cover up actual or
23 suspected pregnancy.
24 Let us look for a moment at events in the British
25 Embassy, Paris. The United Kingdom Government has

15

1 maintained from the outset that it was entirely
2 unaware of the presence of Diana in Paris on
3 30th/31st August 1997 and that it had no information
4 with regard to her movements or the circumstances of
5 the crash.
6 It is said by Mr Al Fayed that this is dishonest
7 because they well knew she was in Paris before the crash
8 and that the decision to embalm her body was taken in
9 order to hide the pregnancy. Sir Michael Jay, the
10 British Ambassador in Paris, is said to have been the
11 conduit that conveyed the British instructions to
12 Madame Coujard of the French Public Prosecutor's Office.
13 It is also said that Robert Fellowes, private
14 secretary to the Queen at the time and the husband of
15 Diana's sister, was present in Paris at 11 pm on
16 30th August 1997, one hour after Henri Paul had been
17 briefed by the security services and one and
18 a half hours before he drove the car on its fatal
19 journey. Robert Fellowes, it is said, commandeered
20 the communications centre at the British Embassy and
21 sent messages to GCHQ.
22 You will need to consider whether the Foreign and
23 Commonwealth Office and the British Embassy in Paris had
24 any prior knowledge of the visit and, if they were not
25 in possession of that information directly, whether they

16

1 could have been informed of Diana and Dodi's travel
2 plans by other agencies.
3 Let us first look at the staff at the British
4 Embassy in Paris who had a role in the events after
5 the crash. Sir Michael Jay says he had no knowledge
6 Diana was in Paris that weekend. The British Embassy
7 learned about the crash when the duty security officer
8 was notified in the early hours of the Sunday morning.
9 He informed Keith Shannon, the embassy duty officer, and
10 he in turn phoned Keith Moss, the Consul General, at
11 about 1 am. It was Keith Moss who went to the hospital.
12 Mr Al Fayed regards this evidence as inherently
13 implausible and dishonest.
14 Sir Michael Jay says he was unaware that the body of
15 Diana had been embalmed whilst at the hospital and
16 played no part in the decision-making process about
17 this. To the best of his knowledge, no officers
18 acting for the security services or the
19 Secret Intelligence Service were involved in
20 a conspiracy to cause the death of Diana or Dodi, nor
21 were they involved in any cover-up to mask involvement
22 in their deaths.
23 Whilst it was common practice for many overseas
24 posts to have a number of Secret Intelligence Service
25 officers seconded to them or on attachment and such

17

1 officers were engaged in August 1997 within the embassy
2 in Paris, their role consisted of liaison work with the
3 French authorities in respect of such matters as
4 counter-terrorism and tackling organised or
5 international crime; in other words, it is claimed they
6 had other and bigger fish to fry and were not concerned
7 with the movements of dignitaries.
8 Sir Michael Jay says that he was kept informed by
9 means of regular briefings and reporting about
10 the matters in which these agencies within his embassy
11 were involved. As ambassador, he had overall
12 responsibility for their conduct. He would expect to be
13 informed about any particular operation that was of an
14 unusual or sensitive nature. Mr Al Fayed appears to
15 recognise this because he puts Sir Michael in
16 the forefront of the conspiracy.
17 Sir Michael says no Secret Intelligence Service or
18 security service officers were deployed operationally in
19 Paris over the weekend of 30/31st August 1997, as far as
20 he was aware. Brigadier Ritchie was a military attache
21 at the embassy. Just before midnight on Saturday
22 30th August, he was by chance passing the Ritz with his
23 family when someone in the crowd told him that Diana was
24 inside. Until then, he had no reason to suppose she was
25 in Paris at all. He intended to mention it to

18

1 Sir Michael Jay in the morning.
2 According to the authorities, nobody in the British
3 Embassy in Paris knew Diana was in Paris. She did not
4 have to inform the British Government of her travel
5 arrangements. It was a private visit and she had no
6 personal security.
7 It will be recalled that the first emergency doctor
8 arrived at the scene of the crash at about 12.26 and
9 the first ambulance about 12.40. The police phoned
10 the British Embassy 10 or 20 minutes later.
11 George Younes took the call. Enquiries made of the
12 Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London have not
13 revealed anyone who had prior knowledge of Diana's visit
14 to Paris. You will have to consider whether their
15 response is reliable or unreliable.
16 Neither the French nor immigration control at
17 Le Bourget Airport had any prior knowledge of the visit
18 of Diana, nor did the French Interior Minister. On the
19 other hand, the president of the Ritz, Franz Klein, when
20 on holiday in Antibes, received a phone call from Dodi
21 that he intended to go to Paris at the end of the month.
22 He knew Dodi was with Diana, although Dodi did not
23 mention her by name. He told Claude Roulet, his deputy,
24 of his conversation with Dodi, but did not tell anyone
25 else.

19

1 Paul Burrell says Diana only used to tell the
2 Foreign and Commonwealth Office when she went abroad on
3 official visits. The first he knew of the trip was when
4 Diana told him on Thursday 28th August, 1997.
5 As to the claim that Robert Fellowes was in Paris
6 that night, there is considerable evidence that he was
7 with friends in Brettisham in Norfolk.
8 Burrell: Paul Burrell was appointed Diana's butler
9 in about 1992, having previously spent a number of years
10 serving the Royal Family. He plainly had a close
11 professional relationship with Diana. His role was
12 a broad one and he used to spend a lot of his working
13 day in Kensington Palace in Diana's company. He says he
14 discussed her personal affairs with her, was shown
15 private correspondence and helped to draft replies.
16 His own office was located in the butler's pantry on
17 the ground floor. Diana frequently used to visit it,
18 both when he was there and when he was not there. She
19 used to leave correspondence and notes on the blotter on
20 his desk. I have already told you about the "Burrell
21 note".
22 Burrell has made a number of witness statements. He
23 appears to spend a great deal of his time abroad,
24 principally in the United States of America. I hope
25 that he will come here to give evidence. Burrell, you

20

1 may think, was in an unrivalled position to know about
2 and have insight into various aspects of Diana's life,
3 but I am not going to anticipate what his evidence may
4 be.
5 On learning of Diana's death in the early hours of
6 31st August 1997, Burrell travelled to Paris on
7 a 7.00 am flight with Colin Tebbut, who had been Diana's
8 driver for the previous 18 months. They spent a large
9 part of the day at the hospital. I have already
10 described Tebbut's involvement in the embalming
11 decision. They returned on the Royal Flight with
12 Diana's body in the evening. The flight landed at
13 Northolt and her body was taken to the Hammersmith and
14 Fulham Mortuary. Dodi's body was brought back
15 separately and conveyed to the same mortuary.
16 A word next about Detective Superintendent Rees:
17 Detective Superintendent Rees was the Metropolitan
18 Police officer whose job it was to do whatever was
19 necessary from the police point of view at
20 the post-mortem examinations of Diana and Dodi on their
21 return to the United Kingdom. As such, he was one of
22 those present during the examinations. Thereafter,
23 it was his job to liaise with and assist the French
24 authorities.
25 As it happens, he had in fact been appointed as

21

1 the senior investigating officer in May 1997 into an
2 allegation of theft from a safe deposit box at Harrods.
3 In the circumstances, it might perhaps have been better
4 if another officer had been given this task on
5 31st August and afterwards, but you will want to
6 consider whether there was or was not any significant
7 consequence that arose from this.
8 Henri Paul: Henri Paul was the acting head of
9 security at the Ritz Hotel. It is alleged he worked for
10 the security services in France or the United Kingdom
11 and was instrumental in carrying out the plan, whether
12 inadvertently or otherwise, to have Diana and Dodi
13 murdered in the underpass, a plan which of course
14 resulted in his own death.
15 It is further said that it was publicly and
16 erroneously put about that he was unfit to drive through
17 drink in order to cover up the real cause of the crash.
18 As I have said, Henri Paul's family is represented in
19 these inquests and his representatives are here to
20 safeguard his interests.
21 Henri Paul's role and his actions leading up to
22 the crash in the early hours of Sunday 31st August 1997
23 are critical in assessing the conspiracy to murder
24 allegation.
25 In 1986, Henri Paul joined the Ritz Hotel as

22

1 a security officer. In 1989, he formed a relationship
2 with Laurence Pujol, who was a member of the office
3 staff in the personnel department. The relationship
4 came to an end in 1995. She described him as
5 "an entertaining and fun-loving man with a good sense of
6 humour. He was a careful person who never endangered
7 anyone's life or safety". In 1997, he was 41 years old.
8 His hobby and passion was flying. He was instrument-
9 and night-flight-rated.
10 At the time of his death, Henri Paul had been
11 running the security department for about two months
12 following the resignation of the former head of
13 security. His role was one of controlling security
14 personnel, managing emergencies and dealing with
15 recruitment and management of all security personnel.
16 He was conscientious. Chauffeuring was not part of his
17 duties, although he had been on at least four driving
18 courses in Germany.
19 The former head of security at the Ritz remembers an
20 occasion when Henri Paul was going to drive a guest to
21 the airport who was in danger of missing his plane. He
22 was good-natured and found it difficult to say "no". He
23 was stopped from doing so because there were staff
24 trained and paid to drive.
25 Henri Paul's closest friend, Claud Garrec, says that

23

1 that if Henri Paul had been asked to drive by Dodi, he
2 would not have refused. It would have been a matter of
3 pride. To refuse Dodi would be tantamount to refusing
4 to drive for Mohamed Al Fayed himself. Dodi would not
5 have known Henri Paul had been drinking because he did
6 not display signs of intoxication even when he had
7 consumed more alcohol than usual. Garrec describes him
8 as a convivial man, who would drink on occasions, but he
9 had never seen him drunk. This view was supported by
10 other friends and colleagues.
11 Two searches were made of Henri Paul's home by
12 the French police. The first on September 3rd 1997 and
13 the second six days later. More alcohol was recorded as
14 discovered on the second search than on the first.
15 There is no obvious explanation for this. You must
16 consider whether there are any sinister implications.
17 Alcohol and medication: the topic of alcohol and
18 prescribed drugs taken by Henri Paul raises some
19 difficult issues. There is no doubt that he had taken
20 some alcohol on the evening in question. He ordered two
21 Ricards, that is an aniseed drink of spirit strength, in
22 the Ritz following his return after 10.00 pm. But had
23 he had anything more to drink between 7.00 pm and
24 10.00 pm? In that period, he would perhaps have been
25 entitled to assume that he would not be coming back to

24

1 work that evening.
2 There is, in fact, very little direct evidence as to
3 where he was and what he was doing during that period.
4 There is also no doubt that in the month before his
5 death, he had been prescribed a variety of medications,
6 one of which was Aotal, also known as Acamprosate, which
7 causes a dislike of alcohol. This was because he told
8 his doctor that he was worried about his drinking. He
9 was also prescribed Prozac, the trade name for a drug
10 called "fluoxetine" which is an anti-depressant.
11 Responses to drugs and alcohol are, of course, very
12 personal to the individual. Not everyone will
13 experience or exhibit the same effects. Some people,
14 for example, are soon and obviously affected by a very
15 small amount of alcohol. Others may show no signs.
16 Fluoxetine is a drug which can produce excited
17 behaviour. It does not always do so by any means, but
18 it can do so, and if this is added to the disinhibiting
19 effects of alcohol, the judgment of an individual can be
20 impaired. You will have to consider the evidence about
21 alcohol and drugs and whether individually, or in
22 combination, they played any part in the way
23 the Mercedes was being driven or why the driver lost
24 control.
25 You will hear evidence about the results of

25

1 the tests carried out from samples said to have been
2 taken from Henri Paul's body after his death, which
3 certainly suggested he would have been just over twice
4 the limit for alcohol in the blood that is allowed in
5 this country.
6 A number of tests were carried out on samples of
7 blood, urine, vitreous humour and hair. You will want
8 to consider the results of all of them and decide what
9 weight you can put on any or all of them. You may
10 conclude that there are some unsatisfactory features
11 about the aspects of the sampling and recording
12 procedures and some of the results are puzzling,
13 although the samples of blood and urine showed not only
14 the presence of alcohol, but also of drugs which had
15 been prescribed to Henri Paul by his doctor.
16 Members of the jury, one question you will have to
17 consider is whether the samples analysed had indeed come
18 from Henri Paul or whether they had come from
19 a completely different person. But just as you will
20 wish to look at the totality of the results of the
21 scientific tests, so you will wish to look at all the
22 overall picture so far as this whole topic is concerned.
23 For example, what drugs had Henri Paul been prescribed
24 and why? What medication was he actually taking? What
25 could the effects of taking the medication be,

26

1 particularly if taken with any alcohol? What evidence
2 is there from eye witnesses as to anything he had to
3 drink that evening?
4 How was he behaving inside the hotel? No one inside
5 the hotel seems to have thought he had been drinking,
6 and you may think that if it had been noticeable, no one
7 would have wanted to be driven in the car by him.
8 Furthermore, all his passengers spent some time with him
9 before they set off.
10 You will be able to see the film of him taken on the
11 hotel's CCTV system and you can, for example, see him
12 coming down the stairs, bending down and balancing
13 whilst tying his shoelaces and there is no indication
14 that his movements were affected by alcohol; certainly
15 not that you can see on the CCTV film.
16 On the other hand, the experts who have considered
17 this topic are all agreed that some individuals have
18 such a degree of tolerance to alcohol that they may give
19 the appearance of being sober to a casual observer, even
20 when their blood/alcohol concentration is in excess of
21 twice the legal limit, though, of course, most people
22 would show signs.
23 The experts are also agreed that a person with
24 a blood alcohol concentration at that level would have
25 their ability to control a motor vehicle impaired, but

27

1 that the degree of impairment would depend upon their
2 degree of tolerance to alcohol.
3 I am now going to go on in a few moments to
4 the details of the tests, which is quite a complicated
5 area and I think we will have our first break in
6 the morning now.
7 (10.54 am)
8 (A short break)
9 (11.10 am)
10 (Jury present)
11 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Members of the jury, following
12 the introduction that I gave you before we broke off,
13 it is necessary now to look at some of the details.
14 Dominque Melo is a doctor and was a friend of
15 Henri Paul's. She gives the following account. In
16 about June 1996 he asked her to give him a prescription
17 for Prozac, the anti-depressant, and for Noctamide,
18 which is used to treat insomnia. From time to time he
19 had suffered depressive episodes and this, together with
20 feelings of isolation, had apparently led him on
21 occasions to drink at home outside a social context. He
22 was worried that he was becoming dependent.
23 Dr Melo recommended that he take two other drugs --
24 Aotal, also known as Acamprosate, which causes a dislike
25 of alcohol, and Tiapridal, which acts to prevent someone

28

1 dwelling on things and which she thought would help him
2 to overcome his personal problems. Dr Melo said that
3 sometimes he would not take his medication so that he
4 could drink in reasonable quantities.
5 An empty packet of Aotal tablets was found in
6 the waste basket of Henri Paul's office at
7 the Ritz Hotel. No traces of the drug were found in any
8 of the samples said to have come from Henri Paul after
9 his death. Perhaps that is not surprising. We know
10 that he had two Ricards in the Ritz and it might be
11 rather odd to be taking a drug which causes a dislike of
12 alcohol and then to have an alcoholic drink. If the
13 samples analysed were his, then the absence in them of
14 Aotal means that he could not have taken any for at
15 least a few days or traces of it would have shown up.
16 Two other pieces of information about the state of
17 his health should be borne in mind. First, on
18 28th August 1997, he had a satisfactory medical
19 assessment which he needed to pass to keep his private
20 pilot's licence, although this examination would not
21 necessarily have shown up regular or excessive drinking.
22 Secondly, at his post-mortem examinations, which I am
23 about to turn to, no abnormality was noticed to his
24 liver which might have been caused by habitual excessive
25 drinking.

29

1 There is evidence that two autopsies were carried
2 out on the body of Henri Paul and that samples were
3 taken at each one. According to Professor
4 Dominique Lecomte, she conducted the first examination
5 at about 8.00 am on 31st August 1997. His death was due
6 to multiple injuries and they were typical of the kind
7 sustained in a road traffic accident. His aorta had
8 been severed. The aorta is an artery which leads from
9 the heart.
10 Professor Lecomte says that she took samples,
11 including samples of blood, urine, hair and vitreous
12 humour. The vitreous humour is the gel or fluid which
13 fills the space between the lens and the retina in
14 the eyeball.
15 There are two forms completed in relation to this
16 first examination. One is dated 31st August 1997,
17 the other is dated 1st September 1997. The entries are
18 not always the same in each form and there is no
19 information as to where the blood samples came from.
20 Both forms refer to five samples of blood, however only
21 three samples of blood said to come from this
22 post-mortem examination ever went to toxicologists for
23 analysis. If there were two more samples, there is no
24 saying what happened to them.
25 One blood sample from the first examination went to

30

1 Professor Ricordel, a toxicologist, on 1st September.
2 Two samples went to Dr Pepin, another toxicologist, one
3 on 1st September and the other on 4th September.
4 The sample which went on 4th September was photographed.
5 The printed label includes the words "Sang Cardiaque",
6 "heart blood". In fact, Professor Lecomte said later
7 that the blood had not come from the heart, but from
8 the chest cavity, because there was not enough blood
9 left in the heart to take a sample.
10 On 2nd September, Judge Stephan was appointed as
11 examining magistrate to investigate the causes of the
12 crash. He ordered another pathologist, Dr Campana, to
13 perform a further autopsy on the body and take further
14 samples from Henri Paul, and Dr Pepin was to analyse
15 them. All three men -- Stephan, Campana and Pepin --
16 were present together at the IML when samples were taken
17 from the body of Henri Paul on 4th September. There are
18 photographs of the body which are said to have been
19 taken at the time of this second examination.
20 Dr Campana said that he had taken a blood sample
21 from each of the femoral veins at the top of the thigh.
22 Dr Pepin took one of them back to his laboratory.
23 Again, the printed label on this sample bottle refers to
24 cardiac blood, but there is a handwritten note, "FG",
25 appearing to indicate that in fact the sample was from

31

1 "Femoral Gauche", the left femoral region.
2 I shall now turn to the examination of the samples
3 taken at the two examinations. You do not, members of
4 the jury, need to remember all the details I am giving
5 now as you will hear detailed expert evidence on these
6 matters.
7 On 1st September 1997, Professor Ricordel took
8 possession of one of the blood samples said to have been
9 taken from Henri Paul. at the first examination on
10 31st August. Professor Ricordel reported
11 a blood/alcohol level of 1.87 grammes per litre. In
12 France, the limit for driving is 0.5 grammes per litre.
13 In England, the limit would be 0.8 grammes per litre or,
14 as it is more commonly known, 80 grammes per
15 100 millilitres.
16 On the same day, Dr Pepin tested another of the
17 blood samples said to have come from Henri Paul on
18 31st August. He found a blood/alcohol level of
19 1.74 grammes per litre. On 4th September, Dr Pepin
20 received further samples said to have been taken from
21 Henri Paul at the first examination, a third blood
22 sample and samples of urine and vitreous humour.
23 On 9th September, Dr Pepin provided his complete
24 toxicological report on samples said to have been taken
25 from Henri Paul at the first examination. The results

32

1 were as follows: blood was found to contain alcohol,
2 1.74 grammes per litre; fluoxetine, a constituent of
3 Prozac; norfluoxetine, a breakdown product of
4 fluoxetine; and tiapride; also nicotine and caffeine;
5 and carboxyhaemoglobin, a measure of carbon monoxide in
6 the blood, 20.7 per cent.
7 Stomach contents were found to include alcohol,
8 1.91 grammes per litre, fluoxetine, norfluoxetine and
9 absence of tiapride.
10 Urine was found to contain alcohol, 2.18 grammes
11 per litre, fluoxetine, norfluoxetine and tiapride.
12 Vitreous humour was found to contain alcohol,
13 1.73 grammes per litre.
14 It should be said that a toxicologist may expect to
15 find different levels of alcohol in some different types
16 of sample.
17 Hair, said to have been taken from Henri Paul at
18 the first examination on 31st August, was analysed by
19 Dr Pepin on 5th September. He found fluoxetine,
20 tiapride and something called "albendazole", which is
21 the active ingredient of medication called "Zentel"
22 which is used in the treatment of worms.
23 The sample of blood said to have come from
24 Henri Paul, which Dr Pepin received on 4th September,
25 was found by him to contain alcohol but he did not

33

1 measure the quantity in that sample.
2 As I have already said, Dr Pepin had attended
3 the second examination on 4th September in person and he
4 says that he had taken with him a sample of blood taken
5 from Henri Paul by Dr Campana in Dr Pepin's presence.
6 He analysed it and found alcohol, 1.75 grammes
7 per litre, fluoxetine, norfluoxetine and Tiapride and
8 carboxyhaemoglobin at 12.8 per cent.
9 On 11th September, the examining magistrate asked
10 another doctor to analyse the sample taken on
11 4th September for something called
12 Carbohydrate-Deficient-Transferrin; CDT for short.
13 The level of this can be a measure of alcohol
14 consumption over a period of time. The doctor found CDT
15 at a level which she thought was consistent with
16 moderate chronic alcoholism for at least a week.
17 However, this is only one piece of the jigsaw and cannot
18 be looked at in isolation. It has also to be looked at
19 with caution for a number of reasons, one of which is
20 that there are difficulties with this test when it is
21 used in respect of samples collected from someone after
22 they have died.
23 Another sample of hair was said to have been taken
24 from Henri Paul on 9th September. If an adequate hair
25 sample is taken, it is possible to gain information from

34

1 it about the period of time over which a drug has been
2 taken. The results showed the presence of tiapride and
3 fluoxetine for June, July and August, and additionally,
4 in August, the presence of albendazole, the worm
5 treatment.
6 There were no signs that anyone noticed evidence of
7 worms by the time of the post-mortem examination, and if
8 Henri Paul had taken the drug earlier in August, no one
9 has been identified who might have prescribed it to him
10 or from whom he might have got it.
11 A number of experts have considered a number of
12 issues arising out of these results. One very important
13 issue is the level of carboxyhaemoglobin found in
14 the blood samples. Carboxyhaemoglobin in blood
15 indicates the presence of carbon monoxide. Regular
16 smokers can be expected to have some carbon monoxide in
17 their blood and environmental factors can also account
18 for some.
19 However, the levels found in Henri Paul were high.
20 In particular, the level found in the blood sample said
21 to have been taken from his chest cavity at the first
22 examination was very high. If he had had a level like
23 this when he was alive, it seems that it would have been
24 very noticeable. He would have been obviously unwell.
25 So that can be ruled out. If the sample is from him,

35

1 how did it get to that level?
2 One possibility to consider will be whether or not
3 the sample could have been contaminated in some way.
4 Another possibility to consider is whether the high
5 level means that that particular sample could not have
6 come from Henri Paul. The level of carboxyhaemoglobin
7 was also high in the femoral blood sample, but not as
8 high.
9 An obvious question is why are the levels so
10 different if the samples are from the same person?
11 Another question is what could account for the level in
12 the femoral blood? One possibility to consider is
13 whether the level in this sample could have been
14 accounted for as a by-product of heavy smoking and there
15 will be evidence about this. It will be something for
16 you to consider.
17 Of course, if the high level of carboxyhaemoglobin
18 in one of the chest cavity samples is the result of
19 contamination, the question arises as to how
20 satisfactory or how safe are the other results from that
21 sample. In fact, the alcohol level for a sample from
22 that site on 31st August is 1.74 grammes per litre and
23 for the sample taken on 4th September, from the femoral
24 vein, is 1.75 grammes per litre.
25 However, the similarity between some findings from

36

1 different tests or samples has led some experts to
2 question the reliability of the sampling or testing.
3 Some DNA tests have been carried out with a view to
4 establishing whether or not samples had indeed come from
5 Henri Paul. One sample looked at by French experts was
6 the blood sample examined by Dr Pepin with
7 the carboxyhaemoglobin level of 20.7 per cent. DNA
8 tests appeared to show that this was indeed Henri Paul's
9 blood. You will hear about that work and also about
10 criticisms which have been made of it.
11 Henri Paul's finances: it will also be necessary to
12 consider the state of Henri Paul's finances because it
13 has been suggested that he received payment from
14 the French or British Security Services. At the time of
15 his death, Henri Paul had on his person 12,565 French
16 francs which, at an exchange rate of 10 francs to
17 the pound, was equivalent to £1,256.
18 There is no evidence where the money came from or
19 the purpose for which he had it. His Ritz salary was
20 between 15,000 and 17,000 French francs per month and
21 was paid into his cheque account at the end of each
22 month. There was a bigger amount in November 1996,
23 which is probably accounted for by a Christmas bonus.
24 Henri Paul had numerous bank accounts and, at the
25 time of his death, it is calculated that he had

37

1 something like about £170,000 in sterling terms in cash
2 and shares. He was a single man with no children and
3 had worked for most of his adult life. Bearing in mind
4 the Ritz's clientele, you may think he was well
5 positioned to receive substantial tips. He once told
6 his friend, Claud Garrec, he would receive tips of
7 the equivalent of £100 to £1,000, depending upon
8 the help or services he had organised.
9 VIPs who visited were obsessive about their security
10 and Henri Paul would help. He used to carry large
11 amounts of cash so that he could pay for purchases and
12 services when clients asked for them. Ritz clients
13 often did not carry cash and he would be reimbursed by
14 the Ritz, who would bill the client. He told his mother
15 that on one occasion he was given 5,000 French francs as
16 a tip for buying textiles at a boutique for the wife of
17 a Saudi Arabian Prince, all of which he paid for at the
18 time. He did not declare the tips to the taxman and his
19 mother thought that they were the likely source of the
20 money in his various accounts.
21 Richard Tomlinson, of whom I shall say more later,
22 says it is common for the national security services of
23 a particular country to recruit members of security
24 staff in big hotels in that country as they are very
25 well placed to pick up information. There is no doubt

38

1 that quite large amounts of money were being deposited
2 and withdrawn from Henri Paul's accounts, but the
3 movements of cash were going on long before July 1997.
4 Flying appears to be the one hobby or interest in which
5 Henri Paul invested any significant sums of money.
6 Whether he was paid anything by any intelligence or
7 security services is not something that can be proved or
8 disproved by any direct evidence. You will have to look
9 at the surrounding evidence. Many countries, including
10 France, do not pay sums of any significance to
11 informants and certainly not to informants who are their
12 own nationals. The position is different in the United
13 Kingdom. No links have, however, been established
14 between Henri Paul and the British Secret Intelligence
15 Service. I shall come to the allegation that there were
16 such links as a separate topic later.
17 DST is the abbreviation for La Direction de la
18 Surveillance du Territoire. It deals with espionage,
19 terrorism, the protection of the French economy, serious
20 and organised crime and the fight against
21 the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical
22 weapons.
23 Henri Paul was known to that organisation as head of
24 security at a high-profile Paris hotel. He would be an
25 obvious link to any inquiries in hotel circles. DST

39

1 claims to have no information as to Henri Paul's
2 whereabouts between 7.00 pm and his return to the Ritz
3 soon after 10.00 pm on 30th August 1997.
4 DGSE is the abbreviation for Direction Generale de
5 la Securite. It is, in very general terms, the French
6 equivalent to MI6. They claim to have no knowledge of
7 Henri Paul.
8 Richard Tomlinson, who worked for the
9 Secret Intelligence Service between 1991 and 1995,
10 claims to have seen reference in an MI6 file to
11 a security officer at the Ritz Hotel working as an MI6
12 informant. I shall be saying more about Tomlinson
13 later, but you will have to consider his evidence -- and
14 he has gone back on some of his original assertions --
15 against the background that he was sacked by MI6 in 1995
16 and has served a prison sentence for breaches of the
17 Official Secrets Act.
18 Henri Paul's close friend, Claud Garrec, thinks
19 Henri Paul's link with the security services was no more
20 than as part of his general role with Ritz security.
21 Henri Paul's movements: Henri Paul appears to have
22 made known to other staff on Friday 29th August Dodi and
23 Diana's impending visit the following day and had made
24 arrangements accordingly.
25 On 30th August 1997, Henri Paul was in good spirits,

40

1 having recently passed his medical assessment for
2 flying.
3 I turn next to look at his activities between 7 and
4 10 pm that day. Until about 7 pm, Henri Paul was on
5 duty at the Ritz and closely involved with the
6 arrangements for Dodi and Diana. At about 7.00 pm, he
7 told Francois Tendil he was just finishing work for
8 the day. Dodi and Diana had left the hotel and were not
9 expected back. The evening was expected to be quiet.
10 Nevertheless, Tendil pressed him for instructions in the
11 event of an unexpected change of plan. Henri Paul said
12 that, as usual, he could be reached on his mobile phone.
13 He did not say where he would be.
14 When Dodi and Diana later, unexpectedly, returned,
15 Tendil did call Henri Paul on his mobile and Henri Paul
16 arrived within minutes. Tendil has no idea where he had
17 come from.
18 You will, at an early stage in the proceedings, see
19 some CCTV footage from Ritz Hotel cameras of various
20 movements in and around the hotel over the period from
21 Dodi and Diana's first arrival until their final
22 departure. The CCTV pictures show Henri Paul leaving
23 through the revolving door of the front entrance at one
24 minute past 7 pm, turning left and into
25 the Place Vendome. You may think that he did not, when

41

1 he left, expect to return that night. What was he doing
2 for the next three hours?
3 Claude Roulet talked to Henri Paul outside
4 the Bar de Bourgogne in the Rue des Petits Champs. His
5 evidence will be that he called him out of the bar and
6 they spoke for a few minutes. That bar is close to
7 Henri Paul's home address and only about five to seven
8 minutes away from the Ritz.
9 If you would turn to the plan at page 5
10 [INQ-JB1-0000005] of the bundle, you will see
11 Henri Paul's apartment towards the right of the plan,
12 and you will see the Bar de Bourgogne very close to it,
13 just a little bit to the left along the Rue des
14 Petits Champs, and you will also see another bar, called
15 Le Champmesle, which is just to the right of
16 Henri Paul's apartment, and I shall be referring to that
17 in a moment.
18 CCTV footage shows Roulet leaving the Ritz Hotel at
19 about 20 minutes past eight. Roulet saw Henri Paul as
20 he, Roulet, was walking home. Bernard Lefort, a waiter
21 at the Bar de Bourgogne, when interviewed by the police,
22 had no recollection of seeing Henri Paul in the bar on
23 Saturday the 30th, although he recalled that Henri Paul
24 had been in there the day before. The owner,
25 Myrian Le Maire, says the same and that Henri Paul had

42

1 been a regular visitor over the previous month and
2 a half.
3 Josiane Le Tellier owns the Le Champmesle which is
4 a bar/cafe 50 yards from the Bar de Bourgogne that
5 I have just shown you on the plan and very close to
6 Henri Paul's home. She saw Henri Paul on the Saturday
7 between half past 9 and 10.00 pm, when he picked up his
8 car and drove off. He apparently used to park his car
9 at her cafe. He arrived from the direction of his home
10 and her evidence is consistent with his returning to
11 the Ritz from his home.
12 He went into her cafe for a short period of time but
13 did not have a drink and did not appear drunk. He made
14 an arrangement to meet up with some friends later in
15 the evening, around midnight. This apart, there is no
16 evidence where Henri Paul was between 7 o'clock and
17 10 o'clock that evening.
18 When Diana and Dodi left Dodi's apartment at about
19 9.30 pm, they were intending to dine at the Chez Benoit.
20 Claude Roulet had made the booking for them earlier in
21 the day. The plan was changed because of the attentions
22 of the paparazzi. When the car was in the
23 Rue Saint Honore, the driver, Dourneau, was redirected
24 to the Ritz. This appears to have been Dodi's decision
25 and made about 9.40 pm.

43

1 When the car arrived at the Ritz, about ten minutes
2 later, it was chaos and the paparazzi were very
3 intrusive. It appears to have been at that point that
4 Francois Tendil, the night security officer, phoned
5 Henri Paul. What happened in and around the Ritz Hotel
6 over the next two and a half hours, between 9.50 pm and
7 12.20 am, is of some importance. Fortunately some of
8 the events are covered by CCTV footage which you will
9 see. I shall use the 24-hour clock for timings from
10 the CCTV cameras.
11 At 21.52, Dodi and Diana went directly to
12 the Espadon restaurant in the hotel. Dodi and Diana did
13 not stay in the restaurant, which was full of people.
14 They went to the Imperial Suite on the first floor.
15 The bodyguards accompanied them, but they returned
16 immediately to the bar without being given any
17 indication of subsequent plans.
18 On the CCTV footage, Rees and Wingfield can be seen
19 leaving the hotel and re-entering, walking to the
20 restaurant before returning back along the main corridor
21 and into the Bar Vendome on the ground floor. The time
22 was now 22.04. Three minutes later Henri Paul can be
23 seen on CCTV returning to the hotel. He joined
24 the bodyguards in the Bar Vendome. The evidence of bar
25 bills suggests he ordered a couple of Ricards, although

44

1 the bodyguards do not remember him doing so.
2 At 22.08, Trevor Rees left the Bar Vendome and made
3 a phone call lasting about 15 minutes, possibly to
4 Ben Murrell, a security guard at Villa Windsor.
5 At 22.19, the night duty manager, Thierry Rocher,
6 can be seen talking to Dodi in the foyer outside
7 the Imperial Suite. Rocher's account of this
8 conversation is as follows:
9 "I went upstairs to outside the Imperial Suite where
10 the couple had taken refuge and Dodi came and asked me
11 why there had been a mess on his arrival. At the end of
12 our conversation and after I had informed him of
13 Mr Paul's presence in the hotel, he asked me to let
14 Mr Paul know that a third car would be ready in
15 Rue Cambon and that they would leave via that exit.
16 This information was to remain confidential and only
17 Mr Paul was to be informed."
18 Later he said:
19 "I informed Dodi Al Fayed that Mr Paul had returned
20 to the hotel. Dodi told me I had to inform him that
21 there would be a third car in the Rue Cambon, and that
22 he would leave the hotel that way and that that had to
23 remain confidential. From memory he did not ask me to
24 organise that third car, he simply told me that it would
25 be there and that only Mr Paul was to be informed about

45

1 it. Dodi did not give me the reason for that decision."
2 Later he was again asked about this. He said:
3 "I conveyed to Henri Paul exactly the instructions
4 given to me by Dodi Al Fayed that a third car would
5 leave from the Rue Cambon exit. That information was
6 confidential and only Mr Paul was to be informed. I was
7 not told by Dodi that Henri Paul was to drive that car.
8 When I conveyed this message to Henri Paul, he asked no
9 questions whatsoever and seemed to simply accept
10 the instruction."
11 Members of the jury, this evidence does not tell us
12 what steps were being arranged to get the third car or
13 who was to drive it.
14 At 22.25, Henri Paul can be seen on CCTV leaving
15 the Bar Vendome and walking along the corridor to
16 the Hall Vendome at the front of the hotel, where he
17 meets Rocher and Tendil. A minute later, Henri Paul and
18 Rocher walk along the corridor together. Tendil
19 follows.
20 At 22.27 a conversation takes place near the
21 revolving door between Henri Paul, Rocher, Tendil,
22 Philippe Dourneau and Jean-Francois Musa. Rocher says
23 that, at this stage, he gave Henri Paul Dodi's
24 instructions. Rocher is sure he did not tell Henri Paul
25 that Dodi had said he was to drive the Mercedes.

46

1 If you accept this part of Rocher's evidence -- and
2 it will be for you to make what you will of the CCTV
3 footage -- this was the first time Henri Paul became
4 aware of the plan to use a third car by the rear
5 entrance. It has been suggested that Henri Paul was
6 linked to the security services who were orchestrating
7 a murder. If he was not instrumental in the decision to
8 use the third car from the rear entrance and was acting
9 under instructions from others, then it may be difficult
10 to say that he was involved in any plot.
11 At 22.44, Henri Paul joined the bodyguards in
12 the Bar Vendome. There is evidence that he had said he
13 was going to finish his Ricard with the Englishman. You
14 may ask would he have done that if he knew he was going
15 to drive Dodi and Diana.
16 Thereafter, Henri Paul is described as "popping in
17 and out". When the bodyguards left the Bar Vendome,
18 they went and sat outside the Imperial Suite to await
19 instructions. When they learned of the plan, they were
20 unhappy that Diana and Dodi would have inadequate
21 security but they were told that it was a fait accompli.
22 At 23.10, Henri Paul walked out of the hotel and
23 spoke to Musa, the driver of the Range Rover which was
24 parked at the front of the hotel.
25 Rees says that Henri Paul went into the

47

1 Imperial Suite to see Dodi on a number of occasions and
2 that later Dodi stuck his head out and said he wanted to
3 leave from the back with Henri Paul driving and just him
4 and the Princess in the car. Rees says he strongly
5 advised him to leave from the front, where the usual
6 driver was waiting, but Dodi would not listen. Rees'
7 account of Henri Paul entering the Imperial Suite and
8 Dodi putting his head out is not borne out by the CCTV
9 footage.
10 No two people's recollections of what happened that
11 night and who said what to whom are likely to be
12 identical, especially after this length of time. You
13 may find the CCTV pictures particularly helpful in
14 identifying some kind of framework on which to build
15 the story of what happened.
16 It will be for you to decide who formed the plan to
17 leave from the rear of the hotel in a third car. There
18 is certainly evidence that it came from Dodi. He may
19 have been motivated by a desire to avoid the hordes of
20 paparazzi. As to why Henri Paul was selected as
21 the driver, you may think the idea can only have come
22 from Dodi or from Henri Paul himself. If it was at
23 Henri Paul's suggestion, it is obvious that Dodi must
24 have gone along with it. On any view, the decision
25 appears to have been made at a pretty late stage.

48

1 If Henri Paul was acting under instructions from
2 anybody outside the hotel to persuade Dodi to use him as
3 the driver, there is no obvious means by which they
4 communicated with him from 10.00 pm onwards.
5 The evidence suggests no one had arranged to have
6 a third car available. Accordingly, Musa had to make
7 a search to find a vehicle. The only other available
8 Mercedes had been parked in the underground car park at
9 8.15 by another Etoile Limousine driver, Olivier Lafaye.
10 Shortly before midnight, Frederic Lucard, an
11 assistant doorman, was sent to the car park to that car,
12 to get it and park it discreetly outside the rear
13 entrance to the hotel, and this he did.
14 You will see through CCTV pictures the movements of
15 the various individuals as the couple prepared to leave
16 and eventually did leave from the rear entrance and how
17 the decoy plan was put into operation.
18 Before leaving the subject of Henri Paul, there is
19 one other matter I must mention. You will by now, I am
20 sure, have understood that there is a major issue not
21 only whether or not he was unfit to drive through drink
22 or drugs, but also whether evidence has been fabricated
23 or made up to suggest that he was drunk when, in truth,
24 he was not.
25 There is an issue about an apparent discrepancy

49

1 between what Lord Stevens said to the parents of
2 Henri Paul when he met them in Paris on
3 8th November 2006 and what was said in the
4 Operation Paget report when it was published a few
5 weeks later. On the one hand, Lord Stevens was telling
6 the parents of Henri Paul he was not drunk, whilst on
7 the other, the Paget Report concludes he was unfit to
8 drive through drink.
9 I anticipate Lord Stevens will give evidence that he
10 was trying to reassure the Pauls that their son had not
11 been "as drunk as a pig", as had been alleged in some
12 newspapers. It will, of course, be a matter for you to
13 form your own conclusions about Lord Stevens'
14 explanation when he gives evidence to you.
15 I think we will now break off for our second morning
16 break.
17 (11.59 am)
18 (A short break)
19 (12.12 pm)
20 (Jury present)
21 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I want to turn next to three
22 members of Mohamed Al Fayed's security team:
23 Trevor Rees, Kieran (or Kes) Wingfield and Ben Murrell.
24 Trevor Rees and Kes Wingfield were both on the
25 cruise in the Mediterranean and returned with Dodi and

50

1 Diana to Paris on 30th August. They were involved in
2 crucial events later that evening. Ben Murrell was at
3 Villa Windsor and was less involved.
4 Mohamed Al Fayed claims that these three security
5 officers or bodyguards, although initially supporters of
6 him after the events of 31st August, were subsequently
7 turned against him by the security services.
8 Trevor Rees was the fourth occupant of the Mercedes
9 and is the only survivor of the collision. He was very
10 seriously injured and claims to have minimal memory of
11 events. At first, he could remember nothing after
12 getting into the Mercedes and setting off for Dodi's
13 apartment and being followed by a white three-door
14 hatchback and a motorcycle. Later, he got flashbacks
15 of, one, stopping at traffic lights which he believed to
16 be in the Place de la Concorde, a motorcycle stationary
17 on his right and lots of flashes when they moved off
18 which he took to be from photographers; and two, after
19 the collision, of total confusion and a female voice
20 calling out the name "Dodi".
21 Mohamed Al Fayed contends that Rees did not lose his
22 memory at all but knows exactly what happened between
23 Rue Cambon and the Alma Tunnel, including the details of
24 why Henri Paul took the route via the Alma Tunnel,
25 a motorcycle that supposedly blocked their exit and

51

1 the flashlight which supposedly blinded the driver.
2 Mr Al Fayed maintains that the book Rees wrote,
3 called "The Bodyguard's Story", was a tissue of lies and
4 deceit. He believes that the book was in reality
5 written not by Rees at all, but by the security
6 services. Finally, Mr Al Fayed says that Rees was
7 appointed Head of United Nations Security in East Timor
8 as an inducement to ensure his continued silence. My
9 understanding is that Mr Rees will tell us that he still
10 has no recollection of the accident other than he has
11 already described.
12 Dr Maurice Lipsedge, a psychiatrist, says:
13 "(Trevor Rees) sustained severe head injuries and
14 it is quite common for this to cause major problems with
15 memory. These are of two types: post-traumatic amnesia,
16 which starts from the impact and covers a relatively
17 long period, lasting throughout the period of
18 unconsciousness immediately after the impact plus with
19 several more days or even weeks of amnesia; and
20 retrograde amnesia, which covers the period immediately
21 before the impact. The length of the retrograde amnesia
22 can vary considerably, if the post-traumatic amnesia is
23 very long, there is generally retrograde amnesia for
24 a certain period ... In this case, Trevor Rees Jones
25 remembers getting into the Mercedes in the Rue Cambon

52

1 and the car driving off, he remembers nothing after ...
2 In view of the time that has elapsed, the chances of him
3 recovering his memory are very slight, a few snatches
4 might come back to him but his memories are not at all
5 reliable because even for him, it is impossible to tell
6 if these are genuine memories or reconstructions of
7 events from information he might have had later, dreams
8 or imagination."
9 On his return to the United Kingdom after
10 the accident, Trevor Rees' one aim was to return to work
11 for the Al Fayed family as soon as possible. When he
12 did return to work, he says he found he was treated very
13 differently, no longer staying with other members of the
14 security team but in a residential apartment owned by
15 Mohamed Al Fayed within 60 Park Lane.
16 Rees gives the following account of his relationship
17 with the Al Fayed organisation from this point on. He
18 saw much more of Mohamed Al Fayed than he had ever seen
19 before and there were meetings between just the two of
20 them, something which had never happened before. He
21 felt Mohamed Al Fayed was obsessed with the idea that
22 Diana and Dodi had been murdered and was increasingly
23 trying to pressure him into agreeing with that. He says
24 an interview with the Daily Mirror was sprung on him by
25 the Al Fayed organisation and he decided to leave

53

1 the Al Fayed organisation. Accordingly, he resigned in
2 April 1998.
3 You will have to consider whether Mohamed Al Fayed
4 was indeed putting pressure on him or whether his
5 actions were those of a reasonable employer showing
6 real concern for an employee. Bear in mind that
7 Mohamed Al Fayed had lost a son to whom he was devoted
8 and grief of this kind affects different people in
9 different ways.
10 Mohamed Al Fayed's claim that Rees' book,
11 "The Bodyguard's Story", was written by the security
12 services is denied by Rees. It was, he says, written in
13 collaboration with Moira Johnston and others, including
14 Wingfield, his mother and his stepfather. He read every
15 transcript and it was as accurate as could be. It was
16 not written by the security services.
17 It is suggested that Rees was appointed as Head of
18 Security in East Timor as an inducement to ensure his
19 continued silence about the accident. It is true he
20 worked in East Timor for a year. He applied directly to
21 the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
22 Operations. In 2000, he was given the job of district
23 security officer in the Cova Lima district. He reported
24 directly to the chief security officer. He was never
25 head of United Nations security and never claimed to be.

54

1 The job was a one-year contract and ended in 2001.
2 One of the matters you will need to consider is not
3 only why three bodyguards resigned, but why they did so
4 at broadly the same time. Kes Wingfield resigned in
5 June 1998. He says he did so because of his reluctance
6 to become involved with the media and his refusal to
7 agree with and promote Mohamed Al Fayed's views of
8 events surrounding the collision.
9 Wingfield's version of events is as follows: after
10 the collision, he returned to the United Kingdom. He
11 went on leave to Ireland and was contacted by
12 Paul Handley-Greaves, Mohamed Al Fayed's head of
13 personal security. He was asked to return and appear on
14 television. He did not want to. Handley-Greaves called
15 him again and said Mohamed Al Fayed had asked him to
16 find it in his heart to do so. Wingfield said he was
17 not that hard-hearted to refuse. He felt he might lose
18 his job if he did refuse. He returned to London and was
19 interviewed in the presence of John Macnamara,
20 the director of security at Harrods. After the first
21 interview, he was asked to do another, the management
22 view being that if he had done one, he could do another.
23 In late 1997 or 1998, he was working on
24 Mohamed Al Fayed's estate in Scotland. In the middle of
25 1998, Mr Al Fayed asked him to appear on television but

55

1 he refused. He was asked who he worked for. Wingfield
2 took this as a veiled threat that his job was on the
3 line. He says:
4 "Although he did not directly ask me to go on there
5 and say that they had been murdered, I could tell it was
6 going that way. I refused and he completely lost it --
7 he was swearing at me and I thought, 'Oh no, I have lost
8 the best job in the world up here'. The reason why
9 I felt so strongly about this was because I just did not
10 belief any of the conspiracy theories that were
11 beginning to come out, including the fact that both Dodi
12 and the Princess were murdered and I refused to go on
13 national television and say something I simply did not
14 believe to be true. I have got my self-respect and
15 I thought, 'No, I am not having it'."
16 He asked for time to consider his position, went on
17 leave and then resigned. He brought an action for
18 constructive dismissal and the action was eventually
19 settled without any finding of responsibility.
20 The third individual is Ben Murrell,
21 the security officer at Villa Windsor. He resigned from
22 Mohamed Al Fayed's employment in July or August 1998.
23 After the crash, he was asked to act as a liaison point
24 in Paris for Trevor Rees' family. He felt he was being
25 used as a tool to get information about the family's

56

1 views and movements. He claims that he and Wingfield,
2 who was in London, were told to make sure that
3 Trevor Rees did not say anything until he had been
4 briefed. They had to try and get into the hospital and
5 see Rees before any statements were taken. He did not
6 comply with these instructions.
7 He felt he was being required to act in a way that
8 made him feel uncomfortable. For example, some
9 journalists were coming to visit the Villa Windsor, and
10 he says he was asked to tell them that when Dodi and
11 Diana had visited on 30th August, they were not only
12 discussing suitable decorations for the villa, but also
13 which would be a good room for a new baby. He felt his
14 job was under pressure. He says he felt the writing was
15 on the wall for him and that Rees and Wingfield were on
16 the way out too.
17 Murrell sold his story to The Sun newspaper in
18 the summer of 1998 for £40,000 and was later sued
19 successfully for breach of confidence in selling
20 photographs from the Villa Windsor. You will have to
21 consider particularly carefully the credibility of the
22 evidence he gives against that background and in
23 the light of some contradictory evidence from his
24 ex-wife.
25 There are particular difficulties with his account

57

1 about Henri Paul's condition and behaviour when he saw
2 him at Villa Windsor on 30th August 1997 in the
3 afternoon. Murrell claims that Henri Paul had obviously
4 been drinking, an impression which is contradicted by
5 others. Perhaps of more significance, Rees, Wingfield
6 and Murrell all resigned from Mohamed Al Fayed's
7 employment within a short space of time of each other
8 and the evidence does not show any obvious connection
9 between their resignations, other than dissatisfaction
10 with the way in which they were being treated.
11 Rees, Wingfield and Murrell will, I anticipate, all
12 say they never worked for or had any contact with
13 the security services. No link has been established
14 between the security services and any of these men.
15 Prince Philip letters: there is an issue relating to
16 letters from Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, to Diana.
17 In early 1998, Lady Sarah McCorquodale, Diana's sister,
18 says she opened a chest that had belonged to Diana. She
19 did so in the company of Paul Burrell. Inside was
20 a plastic sleeve containing a large amount of
21 correspondence relating to Diana's divorce. There was
22 also correspondence in Diana's desk in her sitting room
23 at Kensington Palace and this is where Lady Sarah
24 believes Diana kept her personal letters. Lady Sarah
25 says she is certain there were no letters from

58

1 Prince Philip in either the desk or the chest.
2 In the course of an investigation in 2000, which was
3 quite separate from the Paget inquiry (which did not of
4 course begin until 2004) and was concerned with items
5 apparently missing from Diana's estate, Detective
6 Constable Milburn met Lady Sarah. He made notes of
7 their conversation. At this point the chest was empty.
8 DC Milburn made notes of the missing items as he
9 believed they were described to him by Lady Sarah. His
10 notes show one of the items as "Letters, Prince Philip".
11 The contents of the chest have never been found by
12 the police. Lady Sarah believes there never were any
13 letters from Prince Philip in the chest and cannot
14 understand why DC Milburn should have noted that they
15 were missing from the chest.
16 Paul Burrell says Diana received several letters
17 from Prince Philip. Lady Sarah says Diana had
18 a conversation with her about letters from
19 Prince Philip. So it seems probable that such there
20 were such letters, but where they went and whether they
21 still exist remains a mystery. We shall have to see
22 whether the mystery unfolds in the coming weeks and you
23 will have to consider whether and if so what
24 significance is to be attached to the evidence you hear.
25 The white Fiat Uno and Andanson: as I have said,

59

1 the French inquiry established, from debris and from
2 paint samples taken from the Mercedes, that a white
3 Fiat Uno had been in glancing contact with the Mercedes
4 before the crash.
5 The French police never identified the white
6 Fiat Uno or its driver. Mr Al Fayed claims that
7 James Andanson, the photo-journalist that I have
8 mentioned, was in Paris on the evening of Saturday
9 30th August 1997 driving a white Fiat Uno he owned and
10 that he drove that car as part of the orchestrated plan.
11 He claims that Andanson was working for the SIS or some
12 other security service.
13 Andanson was a well-known professional
14 photo-journalist. He lived with his wife and children
15 in Lignieres, about 285 kilometres or 177 miles south of
16 Paris. He died in a fire in his BMW in the South of
17 France on 4th May 2000. The French investigation into
18 his death concluded it was suicide.
19 In common with many photographers and paparazzi,
20 Andanson spent time every summer in the South of France
21 where celebrities were known to go for the season. In
22 the summer of 1997, he took numerous photographs of
23 celebrities. He was part of the group involved in
24 photographing the relationship between Dodi and Diana.
25 He was present in Saint Tropez in July 1997 and while

60

1 they cruised on the Jonikal in August 1997. No evidence
2 has been unearthed to show that he worked for or was
3 connected with any security or intelligence services.
4 Where was Andanson on the night of 30th August 1997?
5 When he was first asked about this in February 1998, he
6 was initially terse with the French police, saying first
7 that he did not have the time to waste and second, he
8 was in Saint Tropez and therefore had nothing to do with
9 the case. The police had contacted him as part of their
10 attempts to contact the owners of white Fiat Unos.
11 What he initially told the police was untrue.
12 However, the following day, he apologised to
13 the policeman, Lieutenant Gigou, and was more
14 forthcoming. He said he was at home with his wife and
15 daughter on the evening of 30th August and gave
16 the following account of his movements:
17 "On Saturday 30th August 1997, I was at Le Manoir in
18 the company of my wife and my daughter Kimberley."
19 "Le Manoir" is the name of his house. Kimberley was
20 nine years old at the time.
21 "Before leaving at 4 o'clock in the morning by car
22 to get to Orly to catch a plain at 7.20 for Corsica
23 (Bonifacio), I went to bed at 10.30 pm. I listened to
24 the news on Europe No 1 as every day. I took my vehicle
25 at about 3.45 am and took the motorway at Bourges, exit

61

1 number 7. There I took my ticket which I paid for at
2 the Survilliers tollgate with my credit card, Mastercard
3 number 5131484817171300, expiring date 06/99. It came
4 to 102 francs. I took my plane to Bonifacio, where
5 I rented a Hertz vehicle to go to the home of
6 Gilbert Becaud with whom I had a work appointment at
7 11 am. I woke him up and told him of the death of
8 Diana. That is my timetable for the days in question."
9 Mrs Andanson corroborates this account. There is
10 documentary evidence to support Mr Andanson's account,
11 including motorway toll tickets and airline tickets,
12 together with the car hire invoice in Corsica showing
13 collection at 9.20 am at Figari Airport. Gilbert
14 Becaud, now deceased, confirmed that Mr Andanson did
15 come to visit him in Corsica that day.
16 You will have to consider the possibility of
17 Andanson having been involved in the collision and yet
18 having flown to Corsica in the early hours of Sunday
19 morning. You may think it would have been theoretically
20 possible, albeit very difficult, for him to have gone
21 home the 177 miles to Le Manoir in the meantime. But if
22 he had nothing to hide, why did he not tell the truth
23 when he was first seen by the police?
24 What evidence is there that he was in Paris on
25 30th August? You will have to consider whether, if he

62

1 had been anywhere near the Ritz or the Alma Tunnel,
2 others would have recognised him. Pierre Suu was
3 a photographer who knew Andanson. He was following
4 Diana and Dodi, but was in the group of paparazzi that
5 followed the other Mercedes driven by Philippe Dourneau
6 from the Ritz to the apartment. Andanson, he says, was
7 not the kind of person to go unnoticed, and if he had
8 been around, he would have seen him.
9 Jacques Morel was in the underpass on the opposite
10 carriageway to the Mercedes on the night of the crash.
11 He is not the same person as Ben Murrell who spells his
12 name differently. He said he thought Andanson was in
13 the car behind him, albeit he had never seen the man in
14 the car before or since and had never met Andanson. If
15 Morel is correct, Andanson was in the wrong carriageway
16 and not in a Fiat Uno.
17 The other evidence comes from Francoise Dard and
18 Josephine Dard, her daughter. They knew James Andanson.
19 Four months after the crash, at Christmas 1997, he
20 visited them at Fribourg and volunteered the information
21 that he had been in Paris from the time Diana and Dodi
22 arrived at the airport. He told the Dards the following
23 account: he had followed the couple on his motorbike to
24 a private address occupied by them and later followed
25 them to the Ritz Hotel. He said he was waiting for

63

1 the convoy to leave the hotel and positioned himself at
2 another location nearby.
3 When he saw the other car leave with Dodi and Diana
4 in it, he followed them on his motorbike, witnessed
5 the crash and took photographs. The Dards never saw
6 the photographs which Andanson said he had taken and
7 neither was entirely convinced that they were being told
8 the truth.
9 There are three points you may wish to bear in mind.
10 First, the Dards' evidence says nothing about a white
11 Fiat Uno. On the account he apparently gave to them, he
12 was on a motorbike. Second, if Andanson had been at
13 the scene and had a secret to cover up and no one else
14 was saying he was at the scene, why would he say he was
15 there? If he had been involved in a murder, surely
16 the last thing he would want to do would be to put
17 himself at the scene of the crime. Thirdly, if Andanson
18 was in Paris and was up to no good, would he have hung
19 around long enough to take pictures of the crash scene
20 and risk being spotted?
21 On the other hand, if he was not in Paris on the
22 night, you would have to ask yourselves why would he lie
23 to the Dards and possibly expose himself to
24 investigation just as other paparazzi had been
25 investigated.

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1 The evidence of the history of Andanson's Fiat Uno
2 appears to be as follows: in March 1988 he bought it for
3 his work and used it for a number of years. Then his
4 mother-in-law used it for a year before returning it to
5 their smallholding, where it was little used and not
6 insured. Its only task was to drive dustbins to the
7 entrance gate from time to time and it did not go on to
8 the public highway. A garage took it in part exchange
9 for another vehicle for the equivalent of about £500 in
10 October 1997.
11 Andanson's Fiat was registered in his local area,
12 which is neither in nor near the 92 or 78 districts
13 (Hautes-de-Seine and Yvelines) that were identified by
14 witnesses as being the two possible registration numbers
15 on the vehicle at the scene.
16 Andanson came to the attention of the French inquiry
17 following anonymous information that he owned a white
18 Fiat Uno. The French authorities carried out forensic
19 tests on paint and bumper samples from Andanson's Fiat
20 and the crashed Mercedes. Although the bumper material
21 was compatible, the retouched paint at the area of
22 probable impact was incompatible.
23 Since the French inquiry, further investigations
24 have been undertaken by LGC forensics. They concluded
25 the physical evidence did not conclusively show whether

65

1 Andanson's Fiat was or was not involved in the
2 collision. They did not entirely go along with the
3 French experts' conclusions that the paint scraping did
4 not match.
5 Andanson's Fiat was originally painted with
6 Bianco 210. This was compatible with the scraping found
7 on the Mercedes. The paint on the rear left wing,
8 the probable point of impact, was not compatible. This
9 meant that the wing had either been replaced or
10 repainted.
11 The French experts had stated that this different
12 paint was applied before 31st August 1997, based upon
13 the wear and condition of the paint. LGC forensics were
14 unable to support this conclusion as it relied on the
15 visual inspection of the French expert.
16 Only one other white Fiat Uno has undergone
17 technical examination. The French experts ruled it out
18 for reasons it may not be necessary to go into. But LGC
19 forensics came to the same conclusion as they did with
20 Andanson's Fiat Uno, namely that on the forensic
21 evidence alone, it could not be ruled in or out as
22 having been involved in the accident. Members of the
23 jury, it is also likely that there are other Fiats
24 which, on examination, would give or would have given
25 evidence which would not conclusively exclude them from

66

1 involvement in the incident.
2 You may like to have in mind the following:
3 the evidence suggests Andanson's Fiat Uno was pretty
4 clapped out in 1997. He ordinarily used a BMW 320D. Is
5 it likely he would take it 177-odd miles to Paris to use
6 as a murder weapon with all the risks of a breakdown
7 that use of a vehicle of that age and condition would
8 entail? Also, two years before, Andanson had been in
9 a TV documentary with the very same Fiat, which can only
10 have made the vehicle more likely to be recognised and
11 identified.
12 As I have mentioned, Andanson committed suicide on
13 4th May 2000. At the end of his death, he was working
14 as an independent photographer in collaboration with
15 the SIPA press agency. He shared an office at their
16 premises in Paris. About six weeks after his death,
17 during the night of 15th/16th June 2000, SIPA's premises
18 were burgled in an armed raid. Mr Al Fayed has claimed
19 that the raid was by the security services and that all
20 Andanson's electronic equipment and photographic images
21 were taken. Enquiries revealed that the only property
22 of Andanson's that was on the premises at the time was
23 some archived photographs and they were not stolen.
24 Three men were arrested in connection with the SIPA
25 burglary and a series of similar offences in Paris.

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1 The Secret Intelligence Service deny having anything to
2 do with the burglary and there is no evidence that any
3 security service was involved.
4 I shall return to Andanson when we come to
5 the Secret Intelligence Service. His involvement is
6 a central plank in the conspiracy to murder theory.
7 The security services: as I have explained,
8 the central allegations supporting the suggestion that
9 Dodi and Diana were murdered is that Prince Philip
10 orchestrated their assassination using serving members
11 of the Secret Intelligence Service, commonly known as
12 MI6, to execute a pre-arranged plan.
13 Henri Paul was, in this theory, a pawn used by MI6
14 to get Diana and Dodi to a spot where the assassination
15 plan could be put into action; namely the Alma Tunnel.
16 It has been suggested that Henri Paul was an MI6 agent.
17 Two mechanisms are proposed to explain how MI6 caused
18 the crash. First it has been suggested that a bright
19 flash was used to blind the driver and cause a loss of
20 control.
21 I have mentioned that there is evidence of a bright
22 flash from a small number of witnesses. You will have
23 to decide whether what they describe was a flash of the
24 sort being suggested in this part of the allegations,
25 and, if it was, why it was not more widely appreciated,

68

1 for example by those closest to the Alma Tunnel. If
2 there was a bright flash, you will want to consider
3 carefully whether it occurred at a time when it could
4 have or did contribute to the loss of control of
5 the Mercedes.
6 Secondly, it is alleged that the white Fiat Uno,
7 perhaps driven by Mr Andanson, was deliberately placed
8 and driven to force the Mercedes to swerve or even used
9 to drive the Mercedes off the road. Much of the
10 evidence used to support the suggestion that MI6 was
11 responsible for the murder of Diana and Dodi stems from
12 allegations made by Richard Tomlinson, who once worked
13 for MI6.
14 Richard Tomlinson was employed by MI6 between 1991
15 and 1995, when he was sacked. That is over two years
16 before the crash. The evidence suggests that relations
17 thereafter between MI6 and Tomlinson were acrimonious.
18 There was litigation resulting from his dismissal. He
19 wrote a book about his time with MI6 which they sought
20 to suppress.
21 In 1997 he was prosecuted for breaches of the
22 Official Secrets Act. He pleaded guilty and received
23 a prison sentence. He was released on 1st May 1998. He
24 eventually published a book in Russia called "I Spy" in
25 2001, in which some of his allegations were repeated.

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1 However, earlier drafts of the book which had been
2 written by Tomlinson before 1998 had been delivered up
3 to MI6 and, in important respects to which I shall
4 return, they were different.
5 Tomlinson has lived abroad since he was released
6 from prison, but I nonetheless anticipate that he will
7 give evidence, either in person or by videolink. He has
8 made a number of statements and been interviewed by
9 Judge Stephan in Paris and by Metropolitan Police
10 officers.
11 It is right to observe that his evidence has varied
12 from time to time. I shall try to highlight its main
13 themes.
14 Some time after the deaths of Dodi and Diana,
15 Tomlinson says he wrote to Mr Al Fayed. That letter
16 appears not to have got through. But at all events, he
17 met Mr Al Fayed in France some time before the end of
18 August 1998. Tomlinson says he was advised by
19 Mr Al Fayed to get in touch with Judge Stephan, which he
20 did, through a French lawyer.
21 Tomlinson was interviewed by Judge Stephan on
22 28th August 1998. The evidence he gave to the judge had
23 three elements. The first of these concerned an
24 assassination plot. He explained that at some time in
25 1992 he saw a document that had contained a plan to

70

1 assassinate President Milosevic of Serbia. The document
2 he described contained a political justification for
3 the assassination and then canvassed a number of
4 different ways it might be done.
5 Scenario one involved using Serbian opponents of the
6 president; scenario two involved using a SAS team.
7 However, it was the third scenario that had led him to
8 think that the plan might be relevant to the deaths of
9 Diana and Dodi. The third scenario he said he had seen
10 involved arranging a car crash in a tunnel in Geneva
11 whilst President Milosevic was there for peace talks.
12 The possibility of using a very bright flash to cause
13 the driver to lose control was mentioned.
14 The second piece of information given by Tomlinson
15 to Judge Stephan concerned high tech weaponry from the
16 former Soviet Union. You may remember that it was only
17 in 1990 that the Soviet Union disintegrated and so
18 the time of which Tomlinson was talking, 1992, had been
19 an unstable time. He said that this operation was
20 conducted in collaboration with a powerful arms dealer
21 who was in frequent contact with Mr Al Fayed. There was
22 an MI6 informant giving this information who was
23 a French man working in the security department at
24 the Ritz in Paris. He speculated that it was
25 Henri Paul. The fact that Henri Paul had unexplained

71

1 money led him to conclude that it was.
2 The third matter raised by Tomlinson which he
3 described as "not as clear cut as the other two" was
4 that there was a member of the paparazzi who followed
5 the Royal Family, including Diana, who was an MI6
6 informant. He was unable to say whether that person was
7 in Paris on the night in question. Tomlinson added that
8 there was something odd about what he believed was
9 the sudden recall of somebody he said was a senior
10 member of MI6 from Paris shortly after the crash.
11 Finally, he confirmed that he had never heard of a plot
12 to kill Diana and that it could not have been done by
13 the service itself. If it was done, it would have been
14 by MI6 members acting independently.
15 In 1999, Tomlinson expanded upon these points in an
16 affidavit when he said that MI6 should have documents to
17 show that there was an informant at the Ritz in Paris
18 and who it was. He also expanded upon the decision of
19 the deployment of people to the Paris embassy,
20 suggesting that in addition to the sudden recall of one,
21 there was significance in the posting of another to
22 the embassy only a month before these events.
23 These matters have been fully investigated on my
24 behalf and you will hear evidence dealing with them
25 towards the end of the inquests. Tomlinson himself has

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1 given further information.
2 On the assassination plot, the author of what
3 Tomlinson was shown has been interviewed, along with
4 others who saw his document. The proposal was one
5 apparently put up for discussion by a relatively junior
6 officer. According to all of those interviewed, it did
7 not concern President Milosevic, but a Serbian extremist
8 leader who the MI6 officer thought might come to power
9 and engage in genocide.
10 He suggested that assassination should be considered
11 if he did come to power. The evidence from MI6 suggests
12 that the proposal was rejected immediately for
13 the reason that MI6 simply does not engage in
14 assassination. Even Tomlinson says it was the only time
15 he had ever seen an assassination proposal.
16 Additionally, the evidence of all of those who saw
17 the proposal in MI6 is that there was no mention in
18 the document of assassination by a car crash or indeed
19 any particular method. Whether that is right or wrong,
20 the drafts of Mr Tomlinson's book, "I Spy", that he
21 delivered up the Treasury Solicitor -- that is the
22 pre-1998 drafts -- contain an account of this whole
23 business. The only method described by Tomlinson in
24 those early drafts was a drive-past ambush made to look
25 like an attack by Bosnians in Switzerland. The flashing

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1 light and SAS versions only appear in the 2001 published
2 version.
3 In his most recent interviews with the Metropolitan
4 Police, Tomlinson, whilst maintaining that the document
5 he saw referred to President Milosevic, accepted that
6 the proposal did not contain anything about flashing
7 lights. It is something he added. We shall have to
8 wait to see what evidence he gives about this.
9 So far as Henri Paul is concerned, I have already
10 dwelt on his circumstances. It would appear that he had
11 some connections with the French security apparatus,
12 although whether this was more than might have been
13 expected of a senior member of the security staff at
14 a hotel whose guests included the very wealthy and well
15 connected is something that you will no doubt consider.
16 Tomlinson does not suggest he can give any direct
17 evidence that Henri Paul sold information to British
18 intelligence. As you would expect, this allegation has
19 been investigated by the Metropolitan Police, who have
20 found nothing to support it. In particular, a search of
21 all relevant files with MI6 reveals no such link.
22 Similarly, nothing has thus far been found to support
23 the suggestion, based, it would appear, on something
24 heard by Tomlinson in his department, that a member of
25 the paparazzi habitually following the Royal Family,

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1 including Diana, was passing information to British
2 intelligence.
3 The question of the appointment and recall of
4 diplomats accredited to the British Embassy in Paris is
5 something that can be and has been checked. Tomlinson
6 named two such people who were accredited,
7 Richard Spearman and Nicholas Langman, as being people
8 whose arrival at or departure from the embassy was
9 suspicious, given the dates involved and Tomlinson's
10 belief that each was an MI6 officer. He suggested that
11 one had been suddenly recalled to London before the end
12 of his term and the other had been deployed only very
13 shortly before the crash.
14 Mr Spearman did indeed arrive in Paris very shortly
15 before the crash, but Tomlinson may have overlooked the
16 fact that diplomatic appointments are usually decided
17 upon many months before they are taken up, and so, it
18 would appear, was the case with Mr Spearman.
19 The evidence suggests that his appointment was made in
20 the autumn in 1996 and from May 1997 he was receiving
21 training, including language training, to prepare for
22 the posting. He arrived on Tuesday 26th August.
23 If the detail of his posting and training is
24 correct, then it is very difficult to see that there is
25 anything in this point at all. Evidence will be called

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1 on the matter. Similarly, the investigation on behalf
2 of the coroner by the Metropolitan Police has shown that
3 Mr Langman did not leave his posting in Paris suddenly,
4 but stayed on until its completion.
5 To be entirely fair to Tomlinson, in recent
6 discussions he has suggested that he did no more than
7 suggest that the movements of these two individuals was
8 "curious". It may be that he now accepts that there is
9 nothing in this point at all, but it will, nevertheless,
10 need to be covered in evidence, if only because it has
11 been represented repeatedly as part of the foundation of
12 the MI6 involvement.
13 The investigation carried out on my behalf has
14 looked more widely at what was known by MI6 about
15 the movements of Diana and Dodi at the end of
16 August 1997. It will not surprise you to know that MI6
17 has staff permanently in Paris. Indeed, it would be
18 surprising if they did not. Yet all the indications at
19 the moment are that they knew nothing of the movements
20 of Diana and Dodi and had no interest in them. I expect
21 to call evidence before you to explore these issues.
22 You will be able to judge for yourselves.
23 Databases and documents have been checked on my
24 behalf. It will perhaps be speculated that all of the
25 searches are flawed because they are circumscribed by

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1 what MI6 itself allows those who delve into its
2 documents to see. But there are ways which continuity
3 in the documentation can be checked. For example,
4 communications between the Paris station of MI6 and its
5 headquarters.
6 It is central to many of the conspiracy theories
7 that have developed over the years since the crash to
8 locate an intelligence interest in Diana and Dodi which
9 was sufficient to justify their murder. We will explore
10 in evidence whether there is any basis for such an
11 interest or justification.
12 The allegations concerning the intelligence
13 community do not stop with MI6. Henri Paul's suggested
14 connection with the French intelligence services has
15 been mentioned, and it is not, at least by them, denied.
16 But it has also been suggested that the Central
17 Intelligence Agency, the CIA, and the National Security
18 Agency, the NSA, were involved in monitoring Diana.
19 The CIA is broadly equivalent to MI6 and the NSA is
20 responsible for interception of communications and
21 the like. This part of the inquiry has its foundation
22 in a request made by Mohamed Al Fayed under the freedom
23 of information legislation in the United States. In
24 answer to that request, the NSA stated that it held
25 39 documents in which there was a reference to

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1 the Princess of Wales. You will need to note that these
2 documents make reference to Diana and are not
3 necessarily about Diana, still less the result of NSA
4 interception directed at her.
5 In answer to a request for information in 2006,
6 the NSA director of policy, Louis Giles, said:
7 "I can categorically confirm that the NSA did not
8 target Princess Diana nor collect any of her
9 communications."
10 The NSA declined to disclose the underlying
11 documents on the grounds that to do so would damage US
12 national security.
13 Burglaries: issues have arisen about burglaries at
14 two properties and whether they were straightforward
15 burglaries or whether they have any sinister
16 implications in connection with the collision.
17 The first concerns the home of Lionel Cherrault. At
18 3.15 am on Monday 1st September 1997, police went to
19 Lionel Cherrault's address in Willesden, North West
20 London, to investigate a burglary. Someone had broken
21 in during the night and taken computer equipment, credit
22 cards, cheque books, £50 in cash and 400 French francs.
23 The burglar or burglars had made off in Mrs Cherrault's
24 Mitsubishi Cruiser.
25 Cherrault was a press photographer specialising in

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1 photographs of the Royal Family, especially Diana.
2 The Mitsubishi Cruiser was found a few miles away on
3 the evening of Tuesday 2nd September. A DNA profile
4 from a cigarette butt recovered from the vehicle matched
5 a known criminal with convictions for burglary who lived
6 400 yards from where the Mitsubishi was found. He had
7 links with the Irish community.
8 One of the cheques stolen in the burglary was
9 presented to the Midland Bank, Stowmarket in Suffolk in
10 December 1997, payable to K Fitzgerald. One of the
11 credit cards was used to make a telephone call to
12 Ireland. There was scaffolding up outside the rear of
13 the house at the time of the burglary and it appears
14 that an au pair, who had left to return to France
15 earlier in the day, had left her window open.
16 On those facts, you may think it had all the
17 hallmarks of ordinary burglary, albeit the suspect was
18 never prosecuted because, when arrested and interviewed,
19 he said he may have been carried in the vehicle,
20 although he had nothing to do with the burglary. The
21 investigating officer appears to have thought it was too
22 much of a coincidence that the burglary occurred so soon
23 after the crash and that the Cherraults were in some way
24 being targeted.
25 Mr Cherrault had been telephoned during the night,

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1 first by the SIPA press agency in Paris with whom he
2 worked closely and second by a friend in Florida who had
3 a contact that was offering copies of pictures of the
4 crash.
5 Mohamed Al Fayed's claim is that this burglary was
6 carried out by the security services, presumably with
7 a view to destroying any evidence Cherrault might have
8 that the collision was other than a pure accident. He
9 makes the same allegation about another accident. This
10 time the premises were those of the Big Pictures
11 Photographic Agency in the Clerkenwell Road, London EC1.
12 The Big Pictures agency received digital photographs
13 showing the scene of the crash immediately after it had
14 occurred and before the announcement of the death of
15 Diana. These photographs were, at that time, worth
16 a great deal of money and there was an agreement for
17 their sale, but it was cancelled as soon as the extent
18 of the tragedy became apparent. Staff at Big Pictures
19 received threatening phone calls after it became public
20 knowledge that pictures of the crash were circulating
21 for sale. The police were called.
22 Big Pictures voluntarily handed over the photographs
23 they had got. Late on the night of 4th September or
24 the early hours of 5th September, staff returning to
25 Big Pictures' premises after a meal at a local

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1 restaurant noticed that their section of the building
2 was in darkness. They heard a ticking noise and then
3 what appeared to be the shadow of a person at the rear
4 of the office. The police were called. Nothing was
5 found and there were no signs of forced entry.
6 The owner, Darren Lyons, cannot explain
7 the occurrence. No evidence has been found that
8 the security services had anything to do with this
9 incident or the Cherrault burglary.
10 A word about French inadequacies: Monhamed Al Fayed
11 claims that the French investigation was inadequate in
12 a number of respects. This can broadly be divided into
13 three aspects: one, poor management of the collision
14 scene; two, refusal to allow an independent autopsy of
15 Henri Paul's body for analysis of forensic samples taken
16 from it; three, failure to secure or take account of
17 relevant evidence from a number of sources during
18 the investigation.
19 You should bear in mind two things: first, things
20 are dealt with in France differently from in this
21 country. That is not to say they are better or worse;
22 they are simply different.
23 Second, you are not inquiring into whether
24 the French investigation got it right or wrong. They
25 are not on trial. They were not looking at allegations

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1 of conspiracy to murder.
2 You will hear evidence at a relatively early stage
3 of these inquests about what happened at the scene of
4 the collision. I have already said something about who
5 arrived at what time and who was in charge. With
6 hindsight, there are always other inquiries that might
7 have been made or things that could have been done
8 differently, but I emphasise that this is not a trial of
9 the French investigation.
10 To the extent that it appeared that the French
11 authorities refused requests made on behalf of
12 Mohamed Al Fayed concerning autopsy and/or forensic
13 samples, the authorities claim their refusals were
14 consistent with standard French procedures and legal
15 restrictions. If there is any issue about the breach of
16 such procedures, that is a matter for the French courts.
17 Over the coming weeks, you will be hearing a great
18 deal of evidence about the issues and events I have
19 described, and as I have mentioned, some issues may fall
20 away and new ones may arise. At the end of it all, you
21 will be faced with the overriding question of whether
22 what happened was anything more than a tragic road
23 accident.
24 As I have already said more than once, what matters
25 is not assertion or speculation, but what is the

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1 evidence. And in testing the evidence, it is very
2 important, as it unfolds, to stand back and look at
3 the whole picture. The evidence will be called, so far
4 as possible, largely in sections or compartments. You
5 may find that in considering the evidence on a topic,
6 you obtain considerable assistance in interpreting
7 the significance of that evidence by looking at
8 the whole picture.
9 You should be alert to preventing any prejudices you
10 may have from influencing your approach to the evidence
11 and your judgment of it. For example, any preconceived
12 views you may have about Diana, the Royal Family or
13 Mr Al Fayed are quite irrelevant, as indeed it is
14 irrelevant whether you have a preference for
15 the monarchy rather than a republic or vice versa. Most
16 importantly of all, you must put aside any preconceived
17 views you may have or have had about the cause of the
18 collision in the Alma Tunnel.
19 You decide the case on the evidence you hear.
20 Nothing else matters, and that includes anyone else's
21 views, including mine. I have endeavoured to outline
22 the main issues with which you will be confronted and
23 explain what some of the evidence is likely to be in
24 order to put those issues in context.
25 If I appear to have expressed a view on any aspect

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1 of the evidence and you disagree with it, disregard it.
2 If the evidence proves to be different from any
3 indications I may have given you in this opening, you
4 must make your decisions based on the evidence you
5 actually hear.
6 To begin with, you will hear some uncontroversial
7 evidence that will help to set the scene and make you
8 familiar with various plans and photographs. Then,
9 after the visit to Paris next week, we shall concentrate
10 on the collision and its immediate aftermath before
11 going on to other topics.
12 Finally, can I say this: arrangements have been made
13 to collect you from your homes in the morning and return
14 you at the end of each day. This is for two purposes.
15 First, in order to make your life a little easier in
16 the course of a long hearing and, second, to try to
17 protect you from any intrusion. Very rarely something
18 may happen, either outside your jury room, for example
19 someone who is not on the jury may apparently try to
20 speak to you about the case, or something may happen in
21 the jury room itself which causes you real concern.
22 If any of you have such a concern, please inform me
23 about it at once, discreetly, in a written note, via
24 the court clerk or one of the ushers. Do not leave it
25 until the inquests are over because it might then be

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1 impossible to put matters right. I am not for a moment
2 suggesting that anything would happen in these
3 proceedings. This is a direction that is given to every
4 jury in every case.
5 Well, I have now completed my opening remarks and we
6 will adjourn until 20 minutes past 2 and then we will
7 begin with some of the evidence.
8 (1.20 pm)
9 (The short adjournment)
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