1 I wanted and we all wanted to do this cooperatively with
2 Dr Kelly, because he would need to stand by whatever was
3 said, this does not mean to say that we simply had to
4 follow as opposed to lead in this respect.
5 Q. There is a difference between following and leading and
6 telling someone else what you are doing?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And whether or not Government had a right, Government
9 was operating at this time on the basis that he was
10 cooperating, was it not?
11 A. Well, he was cooperating throughout.
12 Q. He had no opportunity to cooperate with this final
13 point, did he?
14 A. He had an opportunity to say, if he wished, when the
15 press statement was put to him, and this was very clear:
16 I am very concerned about this statement because it
17 looks to me as if my name will come out. He did not say
18 that and he did not choose to say that. He had the
19 opportunity to do so.
20 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, I do not think I will finish within
21 a short period.
22 LORD HUTTON: Very well. We will rise now and sit at
23 2 o'clock.
24 (1.00 pm)
25 (The short adjournment)
1 (2.00 pm)
2 MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to MoD/1/62, which is page 30?
3 For those without bundles or documents, this is the
4 final draft of the question and answer material, as used
5 by the press office.
6 Can I take you to the fifth entry down:
7 "If the correct name is given, we can confirm it and
8 say he is senior adviser to the Proliferation and Arms
9 Control Secretariat."
10 I think you told my learned friend Mr Gompertz that
11 when you first saw that you thought that was a bit odd
12 or first heard that had been volunteered you thought
13 that was a bit odd, is that right?
14 A. What I think I said is I can understand that it might
15 seem strange that the Director of News would have told
16 any of the journalists that if they put the name to us
17 we would confirm it, as opposed to being held solely
18 within the press office itself for background
19 information to the press officers. I now understand why
20 she did that it way, which was to encourage journalists
21 who seemed determined to try and find the name, I think
22 she mentioned it to two, to actually come forward with
23 the name to her rather than print it, in case it was
24 either the wrong name or we had no control whatsoever of
25 informing Dr Kelly what had happened. That was the
1 point I was making.
2 Q. Did you think it odd when you first heard of that
4 A. When I first heard of it, I assumed that that
5 instruction, if they come forward with the right name
6 you may confirm, I thought that instruction was only to
7 be disseminated within the press office. I had not
8 realised that that itself would be said to journalists.
9 I now realise why it was; and I can understand that it
10 was the right thing. I was simply taking you through
11 the process of a professional Director of News on how
12 they have to operate.
13 Q. So you read this Q and A material, albeit briefly, on
14 the evening of the 8th July; is that right?
15 A. Very briefly, yes.
16 Q. When you first read through it, you had not realised
17 that this was information that was going to be given out
18 to the press, you just understood that this was
19 privately in-house to the Ministry of Defence?
20 A. No, no, I was talking about this particular point.
21 Q. Yes. I am talking about this particular point.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Had you realised that was going to be given out to the
25 A. You mean the point if --
1 Q. The point, "If the correct name is given, we can confirm
2 it"; you did not realise that was going to be shared
3 with the press?
4 A. It did not cross my mind that it would be. It
5 subsequently was explained to me why it was. I realised
6 that was a very proper way of proceeding.
7 Q. Proper or not, let us deal with it. You read the
8 material and did not realise that was the approach that
9 was to be adopted, is that fair?
10 A. On that specific point.
11 Q. On that specific point on that specific evening, is that
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. What chance would Dr Kelly have had of knowing this?
15 A. You mean that Dr Kelly would know if the press came
16 forward with the correct name it would be confirmed?
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. Well, as I explained before, firstly, I think the key
19 point was: did he expect his name to emerge, to come out
20 in the public domain? I think it has been demonstrated
21 that he must have done. There was a full discussion
22 with him about that probability in various scenarios,
23 various circumstances. We know, as a result of that,
24 that he expected it to happen. He told people not just
25 in the Department, he told Bryan Wells, but he also told
1 Olivia Bosch that he expected his name to come out.
2 The question, therefore, is: was it reasonable for
3 the Department to have warned him of this, that we would
4 confirm it if it did? My position, my own view, is that
5 it is difficult to see how he would have assumed we
6 would have behaved differently, of either denying or of
7 not being prepared to confirm, because in that latter
8 situation we would have run the risk of others in the
9 Department being named and would certainly have not been
10 able to control in any way the process of his name
11 emerging; considerations which themselves did not depend
12 entirely on Dr Kelly.
13 Q. Your preference was a statement that named him; that is
14 right, is it not?
15 A. Originally, yes.
16 Q. And you gave, last time, his Lordship two reasons why
17 that had not been possible. One, because you were not
18 sure that he was the source; and the second reason was
19 at the material time he had not been asked.
20 A. Those are both correct.
21 Q. Any other reasons?
22 A. Well, it would also have meant that there would have
23 been less time to warn him of the approaching event,
24 although I, myself, did not attach huge importance --
25 that is the wrong way round, but I did not think at that
1 particular point in that way because that would have
2 assumed there was a deadline, and we did not have
3 a deadline. It was one of those issues that we were
5 But the main reason was that we had sufficient
6 information to justify coming forward with the statement
7 which we needed to make anyway, to avoid the cover-up or
8 putting people in a difficult position before the ISC.
9 It is true that we had not put the point to Dr Kelly.
10 Q. But you had asked Mr Hatfield to put the point to
11 Dr Kelly, had you not?
12 A. Well, I had not asked him specifically. I had said that
13 was where I would, you know, aim to get to if we could.
14 Q. Can I take you to MoD/1/44, page 19? It is a memo from
15 Dominic Wilson but based on what you told him.
16 A. Yes, yes.
17 Q. And apparently it was read to Mr Hatfield before he
18 interviewed --
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. You had said at (b):
21 "Kelly's readiness to be associated with a public
22 statement that names him and carries a clear and
23 sustainable refutation of the core allegation on the
24 '45 minute' intelligence."
1 A. Yes, that is correct. The reason I was quibbling
2 slightly with you is because it said:
3 "The PUS would like to consider in the light of this
4 whether to recommend a public announcement. The key
5 issues will be ..."
6 In other words, he did not have a direct instruction
7 to raise this, it was really letting him know my mind.
8 Q. He did not raise it, we have seen that from the notes.
9 A. He did not raise it because, as I have said earlier
10 today, he still felt there were too many discrepancies
11 between Dr Kelly's account and Gilligan's account to be
12 sufficiently satisfied this was indeed the source.
13 Q. So he did not raise it and give Dr Kelly the chance to
14 be identified in a statement; and yet the Ministry of
15 Defence still perceive there is a need to put out
16 a statement which, as you know and you say Mr Hatfield
17 knows and you say Dr Kelly knows, is going to lead to
18 him being named very shortly anyway.
19 A. The Government I think, rather than the Ministry of
20 Defence, felt the need to put out a statement.
21 Q. So the Ministry of Defence did not feel the need to put
22 out a statement?
23 A. No, I said we associated ourselves with -- I am afraid
24 we are recapping here, and I am a little tired, but do
25 forgive me if I am repeating myself. But the decision
1 to issue a statement, that a statement should be made,
2 was one which was arrived at in No. 10 which, as it
3 happened, the Ministry of Defence was not present at but
4 which had it been it would, I know, at that point, be
5 fully associated with that decision.
6 The timing of the statement was dictated primarily
7 by the concern to get it out before the ISC began taking
8 testimony the following day, although there was concern
9 about the allegations of cover-up the longer it went on
10 after the FAC had reported.
11 Q. You mentioned this morning, and I think you were
12 touching on that when you said you have already given
13 evidence about this, that there was a change in stance
14 after the Prime Minister's meeting, is that right, on
15 8th July? That is what you said this morning.
16 A. I think the words were put to me in that form.
17 Q. Do you adopt them or not?
18 A. I think that there was a continuing process throughout
19 this, as Ministers and officials were judging the
20 situation. It just happened to be that that was the
21 decisive meeting, yes.
22 Q. The decisive meeting?
23 A. I would not say there was a change in stance quite.
24 I would not particularly use those words.
25 Q. What changed as a result of that meeting?
1 A. What changed was a decision to issue a statement.
2 Q. And a decision to issue the Q and A material with it or
3 was that --
4 A. Yes. But as I keep insisting, the Q and A was simply
5 the subordinate material supporting a statement, as it
6 always does when you have a major statement on an issue
7 of policy.
8 Q. You told us today that one of the concerns was the ISC
9 hearings, which were due to start the next day or the
10 day after, Mr Scarlett going to go off to give evidence,
11 the need not to put him in a false position. The ISC
12 hearings are in private or public?
13 A. Private.
14 Q. If Mr Scarlett had said: "By the way, you ought to be
15 aware that someone has come forward, he has been
16 interviewed by the Ministry of Defence. Mr Hatfield
17 does not think that he is the source, but here is all
18 the material on it", how is he in a false position?
19 A. I said there were two reasons for making a statement.
20 That was one of them. The other one was the Government
21 believed --
22 Q. Let us just ignore the other one.
23 A. I do not think we can because the two considerations
24 have to be taken together.
25 Q. All right. But let us just concentrate on this one, the
1 ISC. How did that put Mr Scarlett in a false position?
2 A. Well, I mean, I am tempted to say after so many hours
3 you might ask the Cabinet Office officials who made that
4 judgment. It was not my judgment, but it was their
5 clear feeling and clear sense that that is what their
6 concern was. And that was my understanding of the
7 meetings that took place on the Tuesday in the Cabinet
8 Office and No. 10, which I fully understood and
9 associated myself with.
10 Q. If you have understood and associated yourself with it,
11 perhaps you can help his Lordship with the same point.
12 Why did it put the ISC or Mr Scarlett in a false
13 position if Mr Scarlett --
14 A. Because it was also felt by those officials and
15 Ministers -- and I think this is other people's
16 testimony, so forgive my recollection -- that in doing
17 so it would be insupportable, unjustifiable,
18 indefensible, not to also inform the FAC that this had
19 happened; that it was disrespectful to Parliament --
20 remember, the ISC is a Prime Ministerial committee. It
21 would be disrespectful to Parliament not to also inform
22 the FAC at the same time that that information had come
24 Q. Can I turn to the question of Dr Kelly's understanding
25 of the situation? You had said Mr Hatfield -- tell me
1 if I get this wrong -- had effectively said to you that
2 Dr Kelly was aware that his name was going to come out.
3 A. He was certainly, in very strong terms. I mean, he said
4 that the actual documents here are an understatement of
5 the position and Dr Kelly understood it was inevitable
6 that his name was going to come out.
7 Q. We have seen the documents. We know that on the evening
8 of 8th July Mrs Wilson has a short telephone
9 conversation in which she says she mentioned the
10 question of Dr Kelly having to look for alternative
12 A. Yes. We also know that Mr Hatfield, at the end of his
13 talk with Dr Kelly about the statement, told him to get
14 some advice on press handling, which I regard as being
15 tantamount to saying: this is coming out. Then
16 Mrs Wilson came forward with more detailed advice. The
17 fact that it was a short conversation reflected more,
18 I think, Dr Kelly's wish than Mrs Wilson's, and she
19 would have carried on for as long as it was necessary.
20 Q. We also know on the evening of the Monday, 7th July,
21 Dr Kelly is saying, when Mr Hatfield is putting it to
22 him in very plain terms, according to Mr Hatfield, "Oh
23 well, I suppose my name might come out. One of my
24 friends at RUSI thought my name might come out." He is
25 referring there to "had already made the identification
1 of me" --
2 A. Yes, yes.
3 Q. Can I take you to page 69 of the bundle, which is
4 COM/4/64? This is in fact an e-mail from Olivia Bosch
5 to Dr Kelly saying -- sorry.
6 A. Sorry, I am getting there.
7 Q. Saying:
8 "You might want to read Gilligan's evidence."
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And saying that it has effectively been published on the
11 website and "Wilkie's is up as well".
12 Dr Kelly knew that Olivia Bosch had made a possible
13 connection between Andrew Gilligan's evidence to the FAC
14 and his own views. And when Mr Hatfield says to him:
15 your name may come out, that is Dr Kelly's response:
16 yes, well, you know Olivia Bosch has also made
17 a possible connection.
18 But there seems to be a world of difference, does
19 there not, between that state of mind and knowing that
20 your name is going to be confirmed by your employer
22 A. Well, that was not quite how it was, knowing that your
23 employer is going to confirm your name shortly. But
24 remember, this was Dr Kelly's own letter to us. It was
25 not just an e-mail from Olivia Bosch. His letter said:
1 the reason I have come forward is because a friend of
2 mine -- the whole thing, the reason I come forward with
3 all this information is because a friend of mine told me
4 I might be regarded as the source.
5 Of course, he knew he was partly responsible for the
6 issue anyway because he said: I hope this helps to clear
7 up once more part of the whole dossier story. In other
8 words, he acknowledged from his letter that there was
9 more to it than you are suggesting from this particular
11 The discussions as recorded show at various stages
12 the need possibly to have to defend his position before
13 the Foreign Affairs Committee, which Dr Kelly would have
14 known, having been there, is a committee which takes its
15 evidence in public. So there is plenty of evidence to
16 show he understood that his name -- Mr Hatfield has
17 always talked to me in terms of "inevitable" that his
18 name would come out.
19 Furthermore, the conversations that Mr Hatfield had
20 at the end of his telephone call clearing the statement,
21 and the conversations with Mrs Wilson, would have left
22 Dr Kelly in absolutely no doubt that we expected his
23 name to come out, otherwise he would not need the press
24 handling advice he was getting.
25 The information that we had from that point was that
1 he was relatively calm and content with that situation.
2 Dr Wells said that he felt that, you know, this is going
3 to happen and he did not seem unduly perturbed by it.
4 Other people seem to have regarded him as taking it in
5 a very straight way.
6 Frankly, on the Wednesday, when we did speak to him,
7 the report I had was that he did not seem at all
8 surprised or unsettled. We were all very concerned when
9 we heard from Mrs Kelly that he did feel it was -- he
10 seemed apparently to have felt it was such a damaging
11 blow to him. But nothing else that we were aware of
12 suggested that would be the case.
13 Q. Let us look at COM/1/73. You were on 69. Just the page
14 after. This is Dr Kelly's e-mail in fact arranging to
15 see Dr Scott --
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. -- on 9th July, on the Wednesday. His name is going to
18 be confirmed at about 5.45/6 o'clock. At 3.30 he is
19 e-mailing saying:
20 "I have just checked with London and I am free to
21 see Dr Scott at 9.00 tomorrow (10th July)."
22 It does not look from this e-mail, which is probably
23 the best insight to his mind that we have at 3.30 on
24 9th July, that the penny has dropped, does it?
25 A. It may not be. Firstly, you did say his name was going
1 to be confirmed. Again, with the benefit of hindsight.
2 None of us knew whether his name was going to be put to
3 us. I mean, it could have been that day, it could have
4 been another day. I can only say, you are absolutely
5 right, there is a mismatch between the understanding and
6 the information from Mr Hatfield and from my own staff;
7 and they had absolutely no reason for implying that they
8 had pulled their punches or not been absolutely clear
9 with Dr Kelly. And this -- I mean, I cannot explain why
10 Dr Kelly should have written an e-mail of that kind.
11 But I am quite satisfied that the point that he was
12 likely to have to face press scrutiny had been made to
13 him very clearly the previous day.
14 Q. There is also a mismatch, is there not, between how
15 Mr Hatfield records it in writing and the impression he
16 says he gave to you?
17 A. I would not be as strong as to say a mismatch. He said
18 himself, if anything the way he had recorded it was an
20 Q. Well, it was less emphatic than he said he had given the
21 impression orally.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. So in that sense a slight mismatch.
24 Can I just deal, finally, with the question of
25 support? You have already been taken to CAB/1/106,
1 which is page 56 of the bundle.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. This is a memo of 14th July from Colin Smith to
4 Tim Dowse. What he says is that:
5 "DCDI is to brief David Kelly this afternoon ...
6 will strongly recommend that Kelly is not drawn on his
7 assessment of the dossier ... Kelly is apparently
8 feeling the pressure, and does not appear to be handling
9 it well."
10 Mr Howard did not recollect where that had come
11 from. He did not believe he had made that comment.
12 A. No.
13 Q. I think is a fair summary of his evidence.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Someone within the Government generally, because
16 obviously these two persons are within the Foreign and
17 Commonwealth Office, must have picked that up by
18 14th July; is that fair?
19 A. I, myself, have no way of explaining that. All of the
20 information I had from my staff was that he was handling
21 it well.
22 Q. And this is a rogue reference or ...?
23 A. I cannot explain it. Again, I can only suggest that
24 Colin Smith explains where he got it from, but I cannot
25 enlighten you on that.
1 Q. As far as the hearing is concerned, we also know that
2 Dr Kelly was concerned, we know this from Dr Wells,
3 about the Foreign Affairs Committee hearing because of
4 course it would be in public.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. We also know his original view was he wanted support at
7 the hearing.
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. We also know that a view was taken: well, he was really
10 being asked about matters that he alone could answer.
11 A. Yes, certainly.
12 Q. On the other hand, if we go to the references, the
13 handwritten references from the minutes that were made
14 at the meeting on 14th July, and I will not necessarily
15 take you through them all but I hope this is
16 a reasonable summary, there are some tricky areas that
17 were identified and indeed Mr Howard said he had
18 suggested some possible answers to those tricky areas
19 like "This is a matter for Ministers", in respect of
20 one. "This is a matter for the Ministry of Defence" in
21 respect of another. Now, who is going to answer those
22 points at the Foreign Affairs Committee hearing?
23 A. Well, Dr Kelly would have said: these are a matter for
24 Ministers, these are policy issues on which I am not
25 qualified to give an opinion.
1 Q. And if someone from the Ministry of Defence who had been
2 qualified to give an opinion had been there, they could
3 have answered, could they not?
4 A. They could have answered if they had been there in
5 a policy capacity. But I mean, our purpose in this --
6 by the way -- was not to offer, I repeat, Dr Kelly to
7 the Foreign Affairs Committee. It was their insistence
8 and their request that we were responding to. But we
9 were responding to this in the context of enabling the
10 public record to be clarified by Dr Kelly explaining, in
11 his own words, what he had explained to us about his
12 meeting with Andrew Gilligan, rather than act as an
13 authority on policy, which he was not.
14 I have to say, the critical issue here about whether
15 he should be accompanied or not was Dr Kelly's own
16 decision and satisfaction that he did not need to be
17 accompanied by anybody, because he was given an
18 assurance. And he was given an assurance that he was to
19 use his own words and give his own views about these
20 meetings. If he wished to say he did not believe he was
21 the source, then he had to say it according to his
22 conscience rather than saying: the Ministry think I am
23 so I must say so.
24 Q. No, but there were --
25 A. That is why he said he was content to appear without
1 anybody with him.
2 Q. You have appeared in front of Select Committees, have
3 you not?
4 A. Indeed I have.
5 Q. You know they are not necessarily the nicest experience.
6 A. They can be even worse than this hearing. The Public
7 Accounts Committee can be quite difficult.
8 Q. That is comforting to hear. You also know that it is
9 helpful sometimes to have someone, even at your level,
10 beside you.
11 A. I usually find it better to do it myself.
12 Q. You also know that Dr Kelly wanted, originally, someone
13 beside him?
14 A. Yes. I would not make a comparison with me. Often it
15 is better to do it by oneself because in Dr Kelly's
16 case, you know, you are damned if you do and damned if
17 you do not. If we had somebody sitting there with him,
18 they are likely to say he had a minder with him to make
19 sure he did not say the wrong thing. Whereas being
20 there by himself Dr Kelly was free to explain the
21 context in exactly his own words.
22 Q. But when he did try and say, in relation to press
23 statements, for example, and previous contacts: this was
24 a matter for the Ministry of Defence --
25 A. Yes, yes, it did not exactly stop the questioning. No,
1 well, we could not completely control the questioning.
2 Q. Of course not.
3 A. The critical questioning was in a different area,
5 Q. You could have ensured that someone was there to answer
6 on behalf of the Ministry of Defence.
7 A. I think that the proposition that we should have had
8 somebody there as well is one that can be argued on both
9 sides. My sense -- and I did take an interest in this,
10 a very close interest against the background I would
11 rather it had not have happened at all; my sense was
12 that Dr Kelly felt reassured by the conversation he had
13 had in the preparatory meeting with Mr Howard and felt
14 that it was the best way forward. And it was on that
15 basis that it occurred. As I say, again, if Dr Kelly
16 had said: I still feel it is absolutely essential for me
17 to have somebody there, we would have thought about it
19 Q. Finally, we have heard about some off the record
20 briefings that took place between Whitehall sources and
21 journalists. Mr Blitz has given evidence that shortly
22 after he had spoken to Ms Teare he was then contacted by
23 an unidentified Whitehall source who had given him
24 further information. I would imagine you would
25 deprecate that kind of unofficial contact, would you?
1 A. I have no idea what it was or the basis for that. I
2 cannot help you there at all, I am afraid.
3 Q. Were you aware of any unofficial briefings going on?
4 A. No, I was not.
5 Q. And you would, no doubt, condemn them?
6 A. Yes, I would. I mean, I was completely unaware of --
7 again, the context suggests there must have been some
8 master strategy here. There was no master strategy. We
9 were managing a difficult situation as we went along.
10 Q. Whether master strategy or not, the fact that people are
11 contacting press, briefing off the record and giving
12 further details of a person who was working and being
13 managed by the Ministry of Defence, all I am asking for
14 is your --
15 A. I was entirely unaware of that.
16 Q. And now that you are aware of it, you do not support it?
17 A. No, I did not and would not.
18 MR DINGEMANS: Thank you very much.
19 LORD HUTTON: Mr Lloyd Jones.
20 MR LLOYD JONES: My Lord, I have no re-examination, thank
22 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
23 Sir Kevin, we have heard the evidence about
24 Mr Hatfield's discussion with Dr Kelly when he read the
25 statement to him, and his advice to him that he should
1 contact the press office, and then how Mrs Wilson rang
2 him on the 8th to say he should think of alternative
3 accommodation. But the position was that when
4 Mr Rufford arrived on the evening of the 9th July saying
5 that the press were on their way in droves, Dr Kelly
6 left the house in a great rush, within about 10 minutes.
7 Now, I appreciate one has to guard against
8 hindsight, but looking at the advice that he was given,
9 there was the two conversations with Mr Hatfield and
10 Mrs Wilson, and I appreciate, also, the point that
11 Mrs Wilson made that Dr Kelly did not seem particularly
12 concerned and did not want to have a long discussion,
13 but might it not have been better if someone had gone
14 down to his house to warn him of the real prospect of
15 the press descending on the house?
16 A. Thank you, my Lord, I do take the point; and it is
18 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
19 A. My understanding was that the press office did indeed
20 have somebody standing by to go and help, but did not,
21 as it were, put that to him fully at the time.
22 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
23 A. I am sure that Mrs Wilson acted with absolutely the best
24 and fullest motives. I think she found it quite
25 difficult to make progress with the discussion. I am
1 sure when she says that she advised him about the need
2 to now handle himself carefully in relation to the
3 press, there was going to be a lot of interest, that
4 calls could be put forward to the Ministry of Defence
5 rather than him having to take them himself, that he
6 should think about alternative accommodation. That was
7 a pretty full piece of advice. It may not have taken
8 very long to make it.
9 I think all that was reasonable to have done was
10 done. I mean, we were dealing here with a man who had
11 10 years' experience of dealing with the press himself.
12 He was very experienced in handling press matters. Who
13 was talking to Mr Rufford, you know: this is on the
14 record, this is off the record. This was not somebody
15 naively in the hands of a press machine that he was
16 unaware of or did not have a sophisticated understanding
17 of. Even without knowing what we now know, you know he
18 had a lot of experience in handling the press. He had
19 had a lot of experience in difficult circumstances in
20 Iraq. We had no reason to think he was other than
21 a very experienced and robust individual. So, this is
22 a puzzling aspect. All I can say is I have no doubt
23 that my own staff were doing all they felt they could at
24 the time.
25 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Then there is the evidence that when
1 Dr Kelly's name was confirmed on 9th July at about
2 5.30 pm, it was not until just after 7 pm that Dr Wells
3 was able to get in touch with him to warn him that his
4 name had been confirmed; and this was on a mobile phone
5 on a train when he had a very, very brief opportunity to
6 speak to him and obviously could not speak to him fully.
7 Again, I appreciate one is looking at it with some
8 degree of hindsight, but would it not have been the
9 position that better arrangements ought to have been
10 made to alert Dr Kelly immediately his name was
12 A. My Lord, I think one or two points here. Again, I have
13 puzzled over this. I think firstly, of course, we had
14 no intention of releasing his name or his name having to
15 come out just at the time people were leaving the office
16 to go home.
17 LORD HUTTON: Quite.
18 A. Therefore the line manager would be on a train at the
19 time; that was unpredictable.
20 I think the second consideration is that even when
21 it was clear that journalists had got the name, there
22 was no immediate expectation on the part of the press
23 office -- I mean, I have discussed this with them since,
24 for the same reasons as you are asking me, my Lord.
25 There was no expectation that the press would suddenly
1 descend on his house. Usually it takes quite a lot of
2 time for journalists to first work out the name and then
3 find the address of the individual concerned. They go
4 to electoral registers, you know, it takes quite
5 a while.
6 I do not think the press office were aware of just
7 how close Dr Kelly's relations were to a number of
8 members of the press that he actually saw them at home
9 and therefore they knew where he lived. So to our press
10 office they still thought: there is still plenty of time
11 before Dr Kelly, you know, is inconvenienced at home.
12 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Very well. Thank you very much indeed
13 Sir Kevin. Thank you very much.
14 A. Thank you.
15 LORD HUTTON: I was requested to conduct an investigation
16 into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr Kelly
17 urgently. As I stated when the Inquiry last sat on
18 25th September, I shall deliver my report as quickly as
19 I can but it is not possible to predict how long it will
20 take me to prepare the report and I am not in a position
21 to state the precise date by which it will be delivered.
22 I hope to deliver the report before the end of the year
23 but I have a large amount of oral evidence and a large
24 number of documents to consider; and taking into account
25 the time required for printing, it may be that the
1 report will not be delivered and published before the
2 New Year, but I shall make every effort to deliver it as
3 soon as I can.
4 So we rise now, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you
5 very much for your time.
6 (2.30 pm)
7 (Hearing concluded)
3 SIR KEVIN REGINALD TEBBIT (called) ............... 2
5 Examined by MR LLOYD JONES ................... 2
7 Cross-examined by MR GOMPERTZ ................ 40
9 Cross-examined by MR DINGEMANS ............... 89