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The Hutton Inquiry
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© Crown Copyright 2003

Hearing Transcripts [Please note that at Section 21, line 22 the word "milligram" should read "microgram"]

1 Tuesday, 16th September 2003
2 (10.30 am)
3 LORD HUTTON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
4 Yes, Mr Knox.
5 MR KNOX: My Lord, the next witness is Graham Coe.
6 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Come and take a seat please.
7 DETECTIVE CONSTABLE GRAHAM PETER COE (called)
8 Examined by MR KNOX
9 Q. Mr Coe, could you tell the Inquiry your full name?
10 A. It is Graham Peter Coe.
11 Q. Your occupation?
12 A. I am a police officer.
13 Q. At which station are you stationed?
14 A. I am stationed at Wantage in Thames Valley.
15 Q. On Tuesday 18th July in the early morning were you on
16 duty?
17 A. I was called out at 6 in the morning.
18 Q. Where did you go?
19 A. I went over to Longworth.
20 Q. Longworth police station?
21 A. Abingdon police station. I went out to the Longworth
22 area.
23 Q. When you got to the police station, what were you asked
24 to do?
25 A. Go and make some house to house inquiries in the area

1
1 where Dr Kelly lived.
2 Q. Where did you then go?
3 A. We spoke to a witness who lived more or less opposite,
4 who had seen Dr Kelly on the afternoon, the Thursday
5 afternoon, and myself and a colleague went to the area
6 where she had last seen him and made a sort of search
7 towards the river.
8 Q. And could you be more precise as to where this river is?
9 A. It is the River Thames. We decided -- from what we were
10 told, since the previous afternoon Dr Kelly was missing
11 we decided to try to find the shortest route to the
12 River Thames.
13 LORD HUTTON: Do you remember the name of the person who had
14 seen Dr Kelly?
15 A. Mrs Ruth Absalom, I believe, my Lord.
16 Q. So did you make a search of the River Thames in that
17 area?
18 A. We did not get so far as the river.
19 Q. What happened before you got there?
20 A. On the route to Harrowdown Hill I met the two people
21 from the volunteer search team, a female and Mr Chapman.
22 Q. And what did they say to you?
23 A. Mr Chapman told me that they had found a body in the
24 woods.
25 Q. Who were you with at this time?

2
1 A. Detective Constable Shields.
2 Q. It is just the two of you?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. What did you then do, once you had met Mr Chapman?
5 A. I went with Mr Chapman to Harrowdown Hill to the woods
6 where approximately 75 yards into the set of woods he
7 showed me a body.
8 Q. And how was the body positioned?
9 A. It was laying on its back -- the body was laying on its
10 back by a large tree, the head towards the trunk of the
11 tree.
12 Q. Did you notice anything about the body?
13 A. I did.
14 Q. What did you notice?
15 A. I noticed that there was blood round the left wrist.
16 I saw a knife, like a pruning knife, and a watch.
17 Q. And was the body lying on its front or on its back?
18 A. On its back.
19 Q. Where was the watch?
20 A. If I remember rightly, just on top of the knife.
21 Q. And where was the knife?
22 A. Near to the left wrist, left side of the body.
23 Q. Did you see a bottle?
24 A. I did, a water -- a small water bottle. I think that
25 was the left-hand side of the body as well, towards the

3
1 top left-hand shoulder.
2 Q. Was there any water in the bottle?
3 A. I could not tell you.
4 Q. Did this person have any clothes on?
5 A. He did. He was fully dressed.
6 Q. Could you be more particular as to what the clothes you
7 saw were?
8 A. He was wearing a Barbour jacket. There was a cap,
9 a pair of trousers and think walking boots, but I cannot
10 be certain on that.
11 Q. Was the cap on the head or was the cap apart from the
12 body?
13 A. That I cannot remember -- I have a feeling the cap was
14 off, but I cannot be sure.
15 Q. Did you notice if there were any stains on the clothes?
16 A. I saw blood around the left wrist area.
17 Q. Anywhere else? How close an examination did you
18 yourself make?
19 A. Just standing upright, I did not go over the body.
20 I made a thing -- I observed the scene.
21 Q. How far away from the body did you actually go?
22 A. 7 or 8 feet.
23 Q. How long did you spend at the scene?
24 A. Until other officers came to tape off the area. I would
25 think somewhere in the region of about 25 or 30 minutes.

4
1 Q. Did anyone then arrive after that time?
2 A. Yes, two other police officers arrived, I took them to
3 where the body was laying and then they made a taped off
4 area, what we call a common approach path for everybody
5 to attend along this one path.
6 Q. Did any ambulance people arrive?
7 A. They did, yes.
8 Q. Can you remember what time they arrived?
9 A. I can, if I use my pocket book. Can I?
10 Q. Of course.
11 A. I have 10.07 here.
12 Q. 10.07 being the time at which the ambulance arrived?
13 A. Pronounced death, but they might have arrived just prior
14 to that.
15 Q. It is they who pronounced death; is that right?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. After the ambulance crew arrived, did you do anything on
18 the scene?
19 A. No, I left and left the other officers there, and I left
20 the actual area of the scene.
21 Q. Did you have any further involvement in the search of
22 the scene that day?
23 A. I did not.
24 Q. What about on the following day? We know the following
25 morning there was a search made of Dr Kelly's premises.

5
1 Were you at all involved in that?
2 A. Yes, I was. I went to the premises and at that time
3 I had an attachment with me who acted as an exhibits
4 officer at the house and I oversaw what he did. I made
5 no search whatsoever of the premise.
6 Q. And is there anything else you would like to say about
7 the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr Kelly?
8 A. Nothing whatsoever.
9 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Mr Coe.
10 A. Thank you, my Lord.
11 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
12 MR KNOX: My Lord, the next witness is Dr Hunt.
13 LORD HUTTON: Thank you.
14 MR NICHOLAS HUNT (called)
15 Examined by MR KNOX
16 Q. Dr Hunt, could you tell the Inquiry your full name?
17 A. Certainly. Nicholas Charles Alexander Hunt.
18 Q. Occupation?
19 A. I am a Home Office accredited forensic pathologist.
20 Q. For how long have you been a Home Office accredited
21 forensic pathologist?
22 A. I have been on the Home Office list since 2001. I have
23 been practising full time pathology since 1994.
24 Q. What was your first involvement in the death of
25 Dr Kelly?

6
1 A. I received a telephone call on the morning of the day in
2 question and was asked if I could attend the scene by
3 officers of the Thames Valley Police.
4 Q. What time did you arrive at the scene?
5 A. Approximately midday.
6 Q. Could you describe how the scene was when you arrived?
7 A. Yes. Initially I was taken to the outer cordon at the
8 edge of the copse or the woods where Dr Kelly's body was
9 found. I was then escorted, having seen the scene
10 video, up to the immediate scene where his body was
11 located. He was lying on his back fully clothed with
12 his boots on. His left arm was towards his side and his
13 right arm was over his chest area.
14 Q. You mentioned before entering the scene you were shown a
15 video.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Can you say briefly what that video revealed?
18 A. Yes, it showed the approach path to the body. It showed
19 a deceased man lying on his back, with visible
20 bloodstaining around his left wrist.
21 LORD HUTTON: What time did you arrive, Dr Hunt?
22 A. I arrived and was logged into the outer cordon, my Lord,
23 at 12.00 hours; and then approximately 10 minutes later
24 went up to the body.
25 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.

7
1 MR KNOX: When you went up to the body did you begin to
2 examine it straightaway?
3 A. Yes, from the point of view of looking at the body
4 rather than touching anything at that stage.
5 Q. And were you able to confirm that the body was dead?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Can you recall at what time you did that?
8 A. 12.35 hours is the time I noted as having confirmed the
9 fact of death.
10 Q. And after that, did anything happen at the scene
11 immediately after that?
12 A. Yes, after that there was a fingertip search conducted
13 by police of the common approach path, and the view
14 taken was that we would await the arrival of the
15 scientist, the biologist and his assistant from the
16 laboratory.
17 Q. Did you then carry out a more thorough investigation of
18 the body?
19 A. Yes, I did.
20 Q. At what time did that more thorough investigation begin?
21 A. I was logged back into the scene at about 10 minutes
22 past 2 that afternoon, to begin the definitive scene
23 examination.
24 Q. Was anything over the body by that stage?
25 A. Yes, a scene tent had been erected over the body.

8
1 Although it was in very dense woodland there were
2 obvious concerns to preserve the dignity of the
3 deceased.
4 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, was there a tent erected
5 anywhere else in the vicinity?
6 A. Yes, there was indeed, my Lord.
7 LORD HUTTON: Where was that?
8 A. That was on the edge of the woods and is a tent that has
9 become familiar, I think, through the reporting of the
10 incident. It is the large white tent on the outside of
11 the woods.
12 LORD HUTTON: I appreciate it probably does not fall into
13 your particular sphere, but do you know why that tent
14 was erected on the outside of the copse?
15 A. It was erected really to give us protection from the
16 elements. It was felt that rain may be on its way and
17 we needed somewhere, as the people dealing with the
18 scene, to have a base where we could complete paperwork
19 and the like.
20 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you very much.
21 MR KNOX: Could you describe the position of the body at the
22 scene?
23 A. Yes, certainly. He was laying on his back near a tree.
24 The left arm was extended out from the body slightly,
25 closer to shoulder level, his right arm was laying

9
1 across his chest area and his legs were extended out
2 straight in front of him.
3 Q. I take it from what you just said he was laying on his
4 back?
5 A. He was, yes.
6 Q. Was any part of his body actually touching the tree; can
7 you recall?
8 A. I recall that his head was quite close to branches and
9 so forth, but not actually over the tree.
10 Q. And when you initially looked at the body, did Dr Kelly
11 have his glasses on or had they been taken off?
12 A. No, they were not on his face.
13 Q. What did you notice about the clothing?
14 A. He was wearing a green Barbour type wax jacket and the
15 zip and the buttons at the front had been undone.
16 Within the bellows pocket on the lower part of the
17 jacket there was a mobile telephone and a pair of
18 bi-focal spectacles. There was a key fob and, perhaps
19 more significantly, a total of three blister packs of
20 a drug called Coproxamol. Each of those packs would
21 originally have contained 10 tablets, a total of 30
22 potentially available.
23 Q. And how many tablets were left in those packs?
24 A. There was one left.
25 LORD HUTTON: Did you actually take those blister packs out?

10
1 Did you discover them in the pocket yourself?
2 A. Yes, as part of the search, my Lord.
3 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see.
4 MR KNOX: What about the shirt?
5 A. He was wearing a striped shirt. The upper four buttons
6 of that were undone but there was no sign of them having
7 been ripped apart or damaged in any way.
8 Q. Were there any ECG electric pads on the shirt or body?
9 A. Yes, there was one visible at that stage over the left
10 upper chest area.
11 Q. We have heard about that having been placed on by one of
12 the ambulance crew.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. What about the trousers? What did you notice about
15 them?
16 A. He was wearing a pair of blue denim jeans; they were
17 done up. There was a belt in place in the belt loops
18 and again the buckle was done up.
19 Q. Socks or boots. Did you notice anything about those?
20 A. Yes, a pair of beige socks, and he was wearing a pair of
21 walking boots and the laces had been done up in double
22 bows.
23 Q. Once you looked at the body --
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. -- did you do anything to the body?

11
1 A. Yes. The procedure we adopted was to retrieve as much
2 what I would call trace evidence as possible, potential
3 trace evidence, any -- looking for fibres, looking for
4 DNA contamination by a third party. That sort of
5 evidence was obtained at that stage.
6 Q. Did you undress the body?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. What about the bloodstains on the clothes, did you
9 notice any of them?
10 A. Yes, there were a number of areas of bloodstaining on
11 the clothes, including over the front of the shirt, over
12 the Barbour jacket itself, including in the sleeve of
13 the Barbour jacket on the left.
14 Q. And what about around the trousers or the legs?
15 A. Yes, there was some bloodstaining over the trousers;
16 and, in particular, there was a patch of bloodstaining
17 over the right knee.
18 Q. What about around the arms?
19 A. There was some staining, as I have said, over the left
20 arm. That was the heaviest staining, really, including
21 within the sleeve of the jacket. And there was some
22 bloodstaining over the back of the left elbow.
23 Q. What about bloodstains on the exposed body surfaces;
24 what did you notice about that?
25 A. The most obvious area of bloodstaining was around the

12
1 left wrist, where it was relatively heavy.
2 Q. Did you notice any other bloodstaining around the hands?
3 A. Yes. Over the palm of the right hand and the fingers of
4 the right hand there was further bloodstaining.
5 Q. Did you notice anything about the face?
6 A. His face appeared, firstly, rather pale but there was
7 also what looked like vomit running from the right
8 corner of the mouth and also from the left corner of the
9 mouth and streaking the face.
10 Q. What would that appear to indicate?
11 A. It suggested that he had tried to vomit whilst he was
12 lying on his back and it had trickled down.
13 Q. Was there any vomit found on the scene itself?
14 A. Yes, there was some vomit. There was some vomit
15 staining over the left shoulder of the jacket and also
16 on the ground in the region of his left shoulder.
17 Q. Were any other bloodstains noted on the body?
18 A. There was a small bloodstain over the right side of his
19 neck, which we sampled at the scene. And two further
20 smaller areas of bloodstaining over the right side of
21 his face; again, they were sampled at the scene.
22 Q. Did you investigate the scene next to the body?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And what did that show?
25 A. There was a Barbour flat-type cap with some blood on the

13
1 lining and the peak near his left shoulder and upper
2 arm. In the region of his left hand lying on the grass
3 there was a black resin strapped wristwatch, a digital
4 watch, which was also bloodstained.
5 Q. Was the watch face up or face down?
6 A. It was face down.
7 Q. What about next to the watch?
8 A. Lying next to that was a pruning knife or gardener's
9 knife.
10 Q. Can you describe what type of pruning knife it was?
11 A. The make was a Sandvig knife. It was one with a little
12 hook or lip towards the tip of the blade. It is
13 a fairly standard gardeners' type knife.
14 Q. Were there any bloodstains on that knife?
15 A. Yes, over both the handle and the blade.
16 Q. Was there any blood beneath the knife?
17 A. Yes, there was. There was blood around the area of the
18 knife.
19 Q. How close to the knife was the blood?
20 A. It was around the knife and underneath it.
21 Q. Did you notice a bottle of water?
22 A. Yes, there was a bottle of Evian water, half a litre.
23 Q. Was there any water in that bottle?
24 A. Yes, there was some remaining water. I do not recall
25 what volume exactly.

14
1 Q. Can you remember precisely where the bottle was in
2 relation to the bottle?
3 A. Yes, it was lying propped against some broken branches
4 to the left and about a foot away from his left elbow.
5 Q. And did you notice anything in particular about the
6 bottle?
7 A. Yes, there was some smeared blood over both the bottle
8 itself and the bottle top.
9 Q. Did that indicate anything to you?
10 A. It indicated that he had been bleeding whilst at least
11 placing the bottle in its final position. He may
12 already have been bleeding whilst he was drinking from
13 it, but that is less certain.
14 Q. Was there any other bloodstaining that you noticed in
15 the area?
16 A. There was. There was an area of bloodstaining to his
17 left side running across the undergrowth and the soil,
18 and I estimated it was over an area of 2 to 3 feet in
19 maximum length.
20 Q. Did you carry out any particular tests of the scene?
21 A. Yes. In addition to the trace evidence gathering
22 I also, having completed that, carried out a rectal
23 temperature assessment.
24 Q. What time did you carry that out?
25 A. That reading was made at 19.15 hours or quarter past 7

15
1 in the evening.
2 Q. What was the temperature recorded on that?
3 A. His rectal temperature was 24 degrees Celsius.
4 Q. You yourself presumably had protective clothing on while
5 you did this examination?
6 A. Yes, from the very first moment I entered the scene to
7 the end. The protective clothing is a standard hooded
8 scene suit, protective over-shoes, protective latex
9 gloves and a mask.
10 Q. At what time did your examination conclude?
11 A. I left the scene at about 19.19 hours or nearly
12 20 minutes past 7.
13 Q. Did you notice any signs of visible injury to the body
14 while you were there?
15 A. Yes. At the scene I could see that there were at least
16 five what I would call incised wounds or cuts to his
17 left wrist over the what is anatomically the front of
18 the wrist, but that is the creased area of the wrist.
19 Q. Were there any other visible signs of injury to the
20 body?
21 A. No, there was nothing at the scene.
22 Q. Presumably various exhibits were handed over to the
23 police at the scene?
24 A. Yes, they were.
25 Q. I am not going to ask you to read those out.

16
1 A. Thank you.
2 Q. Did you carry out a post-mortem examination?
3 A. I did, yes.
4 Q. At what time did you begin to do that?
5 A. The examination started at 21.20 hours or 20 minutes
6 past 9 that evening.
7 Q. Where did you carry out that examination?
8 A. That was in the mortuary at the John Radcliffe hospital
9 in Oxford.
10 Q. There were various police officers present at the time?
11 A. There were, yes.
12 Q. Was there anything of significance you found on the
13 outer surface of the body in the course of the
14 post-mortem examination?
15 A. He appeared to be a relatively well-nourished man of
16 average height and weight; and there was nothing to
17 suggest that he was particularly ill from the external
18 examination or anything of that nature.
19 Q. Were there any significant post-mortem changes, that is
20 to say changes which had take place since death?
21 A. Yes, he showed cooling of blood really over the back of
22 the body, that is referred to as hypostasis medically.
23 The significance of that is really that it was
24 consistent with the position that his body was found in,
25 in other words lying on his back.

17
1 Q. On this further examination, did you find any signs of
2 injury to the body that you have not already mentioned?
3 A. I did. I was able to note in detail the injuries over
4 his left wrist in particular.
5 Q. You have made a report, a post-mortem examination
6 report?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Would you just like to read from the significant parts
9 of that in relation to the injuries you found?
10 A. Certainly. There was a series of incised wounds, cuts,
11 of varying depth over the front of the left wrist and
12 they extended in total over about 8 by 5 centimetres on
13 the front of the wrist. The largest of the wounds and
14 the deepest lay towards the top end or the elbow end of
15 that complex of injuries and it showed a series of
16 notches and some crushing of its edges. That wound had
17 actually severed an artery on the little finger aspect
18 of the front of the wrist, called the ulnar artery. The
19 other main artery on the wrist on the thumb aspect was
20 intact.
21 There were a number of other incisions of varying
22 depth and many smaller scratch-like injuries over the
23 wrist. The appearance that they gave was of what are
24 called tentative or hesitation marks, which are commonly
25 seen prior to a deep cut being made into somebody's skin

18
1 if they are making the incision themselves.
2 Q. Did you see any other signs of injury or marks on the
3 body?
4 A. I did. Over the left side of his head there were three
5 minor abrasions or grazes to his scalp, and of course
6 that part of his head was relatively close to
7 undergrowth.
8 In addition to that --
9 LORD HUTTON: Were those abrasions consistent with having
10 been in contact with the undergrowth?
11 A. They were entirely, my Lord; particularly branches,
12 pebbles and the like. There was no bruising deep to
13 those, I should add, at this stage.
14 MR KNOX: Were there any other injuries or bruises?
15 A. Yes. Those were only revealed during the dissection
16 part of the examination. There was a bruise below the
17 left knee. There were two bruises below the right knee
18 over the shin and there were two bruises over the left
19 side of his chest. All of these were small and affected
20 the skin but not the deeper tissues.
21 Q. Would you be able to say how those bruises or injuries
22 could have occurred?
23 A. They would have occurred following a blunt impact
24 against any firm object and it would not have to be
25 a particularly heavy impact. They may be caused -- some

19
1 of them may have been caused as Dr Kelly was stumbling,
2 if you like, at the scene. They may have been caused
3 well before he got to the woods. It is not possible to
4 age them so precisely.
5 Q. Did you see any signs of what are called defensive
6 injuries?
7 A. No, there were no signs of defensive injuries; and by
8 that I mean injuries that occur as a result of somebody
9 trying to parry blows from a weapon or trying to grasp
10 a weapon.
11 Q. What injuries would you normally expect to see of that
12 type?
13 A. If somebody is being attacked with a bladed weapon, like
14 a knife, then cuts on the palm of the hand or over the
15 fingers where they are trying to grasp the knife, or
16 cuts or even stabs on the outer part of the arm as they
17 try to parry a blow.
18 Q. You carried out an internal examination, presumably?
19 A. I did.
20 Q. I am not going to ask you to run through all the various
21 things you examined.
22 A. Yes, thank you.
23 Q. Can you say what significant findings you made on the
24 internal examination?
25 A. Yes, in terms of significant positive findings, there

20
1 was evidence that at the time of his death Dr Kelly had
2 a significant amount of narrowing of the arteries to his
3 heart, his coronary arteries by a process called
4 atherosclerosis or, colloquially, hardening of the
5 arteries.
6 That was the only positive evidence of natural
7 disease, but I could not find evidence that he had had
8 a heart attack as a consequence of that.
9 Q. Did you notice anything about the mouth?
10 A. Yes, in the mouth there was a small abrasion on the
11 lower lip. This was of the order of 0.6 by
12 0.3 centimetres, so very small; and there was no
13 significant reaction to it.
14 Q. How could that abrasion have occurred?
15 A. With the particular appearance and location of this
16 abrasion then it may have been caused by contact with
17 the teeth, in other words biting.
18 Q. What about the stomach contents? Did you notice or not
19 notice anything about them?
20 A. When I examine the stomach contents my examination is
21 relatively cursory compared to the detailed examination
22 that the toxicologist would undertake. But I could see
23 no obvious signs of tablet residue. So in other words,
24 there was not a great volume of tablet material in the
25 stomach.

21
1 Q. At what time did the post-mortem conclude?
2 A. The examination concluded actually at quarter past
3 midnight on the morning of Saturday 19th July.
4 Q. Presumably various exhibits were taken from the
5 examination. They were handed over to
6 Detective Constable Bowsher, I understand?
7 A. They were, yes.
8 Q. Were you handed a toxicology report at any time?
9 A. Yes, I was. It was the report of Dr Alexander Allen.
10 Q. Did you have this report before or after your
11 examination?
12 A. After the examination.
13 Q. In summary what did it show?
14 A. It showed the presence of two compounds in particular.
15 One of them is a drug called dextropropoxyphene. That
16 is an opiate-type drug, it is a mild painkiller, and
17 that was present at a concentration of one microgramme
18 per millilitre in the blood.
19 Q. Did it show anything, this report, in summary?
20 A. Yes, it did. It showed the presence of paracetamol.
21 Q. The concentration of that?
22 A. 97 milligrammes per millilitre.
23 Q. Where was that present in the body?
24 A. It was also present in the stomach contents, as well as
25 the blood.

22
1 Q. Did you carry out an histology?
2 A. Yes, I did. I examined small samples of all the major
3 organs under the microscope.
4 Q. Did that show anything significant?
5 A. No, it did not. It showed minor changes in his lungs
6 and brain, which would be consistent with the way in
7 which he died.
8 Q. Were you able to estimate the time of death?
9 A. Yes, within certain limits, using a particular technique
10 based upon the rectal temperature.
11 Q. What time of death did you estimate as a result of that?
12 A. The estimate is that death is likely to have occurred
13 some 18 to 27 hours prior to taking the rectal
14 temperature, and that that time range was somewhere
15 between quarter past 4 on 17th July and quarter past 1
16 on the morning of the 18th July.
17 Q. You took the rectal temperature at what time?
18 A. That was taken at quarter past 7 in the evening of the
19 18th.
20 Q. Would you just like to summarise what your conclusions
21 were as a result of your examinations?
22 A. Yes, certainly. I found that Dr Kelly was an apparently
23 adequately nourished man in whom there was no evidence
24 of natural disease that could of itself have caused
25 death directly at the macroscopic or naked eye level.

23
1 He had evidence of a significant incised wound to his
2 left wrist, in the depths of which his left ulnar artery
3 had been completely severed. That wound was in the
4 context of multiple incised wounds over the front of his
5 left wrist of varying length and depth.
6 The arterial injury had resulted in the loss of
7 a significant volume of blood, as noted at the scene.
8 The complex of incised wounds over the left wrist is
9 entirely consistent with having been inflicted by
10 a bladed weapon, most likely candidate for which would
11 have been a knife. Furthermore, the knife present at
12 the scene would be a suitable candidate for causing such
13 injuries.
14 The orientation and arrangement of the wounds over
15 the left wrist are typical of self inflicted injury.
16 Also typical of this was the presence of small so-called
17 tentative or hesitation marks. The fact that his watch
18 appeared to have been removed whilst blood was already
19 flowing suggests that it had been removed deliberately
20 in order to facilitate access to the wrist. The removal
21 of the watch in that way and indeed the removal of the
22 spectacles are features pointing towards this being an
23 act of self harm.
24 Other features at the scene which would tend to
25 support this impression include the relatively passive

24
1 distribution of the blood, the neat way in which the
2 water bottle and its top were placed, the lack of
3 obvious signs of trampling of the undergrowth or damage
4 to the clothing. To my mind, the location of the death
5 is also of interest in this respect because it was
6 clearly a very pleasant and relatively private spot of
7 the type that is sometimes chosen by people intent upon
8 self harm.
9 Q. Is that something you have found from your past
10 experience?
11 A. Yes, and knowledge of the literature.
12 Many of the injuries over the left wrist show
13 evidence of a well developed vital reaction which
14 suggests that they had been inflicted over a reasonable
15 period of time, minutes, though, rather than seconds or
16 many hours before death.
17 LORD HUTTON: What do you mean by a "vital reaction"?
18 A. A vital reaction, my Lord, is the body's response to an
19 area of damage. It manifests itself chiefly in the form
20 of reddening and swelling around the area.
21 LORD HUTTON: I interrupted you. You were at 9 and you are
22 coming on to 10, I think.
23 A. Thank you, my Lord. There is a total lack of classical
24 defence wounds against sharp weapon attack. Such wounds
25 are typically seen in the palm aspects of the hands or

25
1 over the outer aspects of the forearms.
2 It was noted that he has a significant degree of
3 coronary artery disease and this may have played some
4 small part in the rapidity of death but not the major
5 part in the cause of death.
6 Given the finding of blister packs of Coproxamol
7 tablets within the coat pocket and the vomitus around
8 the ground, it is an entirely reasonable supposition
9 that he may have consumed a quantity of these tablets
10 either on the way to or at the scene itself.
11 Q. What did the toxicology report suggest?
12 A. That he had consumed a significant quantity of the
13 tablets.
14 Q. I am not going to trouble you with the details of the
15 toxicology report. Was there anything else in addition
16 to the toxicology samples that you noticed?
17 A. (Pause). Really the only other thing in addition to
18 that was the coronary artery disease that could have had
19 a part in the rapidity of death in these circumstances.
20 Q. You have mentioned the minor injury to the inner aspect
21 of the lip.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Moving on from that, you mentioned the abrasions to the
24 head. Would you like to resume your summary at that
25 point?

26
1 A. Yes. The minor injuries or abrasions over the head are
2 entirely consistent with scraping against rough
3 undergrowth such as small twigs, branches and stones
4 which were present at the scene.
5 LORD HUTTON: Did you give any consideration or do anything
6 in relation to the possibility of Dr Kelly having been
7 overpowered by any substance?
8 A. Yes, indeed, my Lord. The substances which one thinks
9 of, as a pathologist, in these terms are volatile
10 chemicals. Perhaps chloroform is a classic example. So
11 in order to investigate that --
12 LORD HUTTON: You need not go into the detail but if you
13 state it in a general way.
14 A. I retained a lung and also blood samples until the
15 toxicology was complete.
16 LORD HUTTON: And the purpose of that toxicology being?
17 A. To examine for any signs of a volatile chemical in the
18 blood or, failing that, in the lungs.
19 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. Thank you.
20 Yes, Mr Knox.
21 MR KNOX: If you move on to conclusion 18.
22 A. Certainly. The minor reddened lesions on the lower
23 limbs are typical of areas of minor hair follicle
24 irritation or skin irritation, so they were not injuries
25 in particular. They were not puncture wounds.

27
1 Q. Conclusion 19?
2 A. I had undertaken subcutaneous dissection of the arms and
3 the legs and there is no positive evidence of
4 restraint-type injury.
5 Q. Conclusion 20?
6 A. There is no positive pathological evidence that this man
7 had been subjected to a sustained violent assault prior
8 to his death.
9 LORD HUTTON: Just going back to your previous observation,
10 a restraint-type injury of someone who has been held by
11 the arms and the legs.
12 A. Yes, my Lord. Yes, particularly around the areas of the
13 ankles and the wrists.
14 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes. Thank you.
15 MR KNOX: Conclusion 21?
16 A. There was no positive pathological evidence to indicate
17 that he has been subjected to compression of the neck,
18 such as by manual strangulation, ligature strangulation
19 or the use of an arm hold.
20 Q. And next?
21 A. There is no evidence from the post-mortem examination or
22 my observations at the scene to indicate that the
23 deceased had been dragged or otherwise transported to
24 the location where his body was found.
25 Q. Did you retain samples for histological examination?

28
1 A. I did, yes.
2 Q. Were there any significant conclusions you drew from
3 that?
4 A. There were no significant findings.
5 Q. And in summary, what is your opinion as to the major
6 factor involved in Dr Kelly's death?
7 A. It is the haemorrhage as a result of the incised wounds
8 to his left wrist.
9 Q. If that had not occurred, would Dr Kelly have died?
10 A. He may not have done at this time, with that level of
11 dextropropoxyphene.
12 Q. What role, if any, did the coronary disease play?
13 A. As with the drug dextropropoxyphene, it would have
14 hastened death rather than caused it, as such.
15 Q. So how would you summarise, in brief, your conclusions
16 as to the cause of death?
17 A. In the formulation, the cause of death is given as 1(a)
18 haemorrhage due to 1(b) incised wounds of the left
19 wrist. Under part 2 of the formulation of the medical
20 cause of death, Coproxamol ingestion and coronary artery
21 atherosclerosis.
22 Q. You have already dealt with this, I think, but could you
23 confirm whether, as far as you could tell on the
24 examination, there was any sign of third party
25 involvement in Dr Kelly's death?

29
1 A. No, there was no pathological evidence to indicate the
2 involvement of a third party in Dr Kelly's death.
3 Rather, the features are quite typical, I would say, of
4 self inflicted injury if one ignores all the other
5 features of the case.
6 Q. Is there anything else you would like to say concerning
7 the circumstances leading to Dr Kelly's death?
8 A. Nothing I could say as a pathologist, no.
9 LORD HUTTON: Thank you for your very clear evidence,
10 Dr Hunt.
11 A. Thank you, my Lord.
12 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, Mr Lloyd-Jones will examine
13 Mr Howard.
14 MR MARTIN LLOYD HOWARD (called)
15 Examined by MR LLOYD-JONES
16 Q. What is your full name, Mr Howard?
17 A. I am Martin Lloyd Howard.
18 Q. Have you previously given evidence to this Inquiry?
19 A. Yes, I have, twice.
20 Q. Are you presently the Deputy Chief of Defence
21 Intelligence?
22 A. I am.
23 Q. Have you formerly held the post of Director General of
24 Corporate Communications at the Ministry of Defence?
25 A. I have.

30
1 Q. And before that were you Director of News at the
2 Ministry of Defence?
3 A. I was, yes.
4 Q. Are you familiar with the way in which Q and A briefing
5 material is normally used in a Government department?
6 A. Yes, I am.
7 Q. Is it unusual for such documentation to be prepared and
8 used?
9 A. No, it is very usual.
10 Q. What is its purpose?
11 A. The purpose of a question and answer brief, or Q and A
12 brief as it is often called, is to anticipate possible
13 questions that journalists or others may put to
14 a department, particularly a press office, and to
15 identify factual and accurate answers which could be
16 given in response to those. It is usually provided to
17 a press office and is particularly useful for those
18 press officers who are perhaps not familiar with the
19 issue that it is related to. It is usually prepared at
20 the same time -- it is always associated with an
21 announcement. One prepares an announcement about
22 a particular issue and one usually prepares a Q and A
23 brief at the same time.
24 The reason why it is important that it is made
25 available to press officers who are perhaps not familiar

31
1 with the issue under question is, for example, in the
2 case of the MoD we operate 24 hours a day and duty press
3 officers come on overnight or at weekends. They use
4 Q and A brief if a journalist were to ring up with
5 a question on that particular topic. That is the main
6 purpose.
7 Q. Is the document actually given to journalists?
8 A. It is not. It is used purely within the press office.
9 Q. Can I turn then to the particular Q and A material with
10 which this Inquiry is concerned. What was your first
11 involvement with that Q and A material?
12 A. As I recall, on the 8th July, which was a Tuesday,
13 I went down to Sir Kevin Tebbit's office in the Ministry
14 of Defence, I think at around about noon, I cannot be
15 entirely sure. The purpose of going down there, I had
16 been asked to attend, was to consider the terms of
17 a public announcement in relation to the fact that an
18 official had had contact with Andrew Gilligan. When
19 I arrived, I stayed in the outer office and had
20 a discussion with Ms Pam Teare, who is Director of News
21 at the Ministry of Defence, about a Q and A brief that
22 she had drafted. I cannot remember precisely but she
23 may have had it either in front of her on the screen or
24 on a piece of paper in front of her.
25 Q. Was there anybody else there at that time?

32
1 A. The private secretary, Dominic Wilson, may have been in
2 the office at the same time but it was essentially
3 between Ms Teare and myself.
4 Q. Was there anything done at that stage in relation to the
5 draft Ms Teare had?
6 A. We talked for about 20 to 30 minutes, as I recall.
7 I offered some factual points for inclusion in the
8 Q and A brief. These would, for example, have related
9 to Dr Kelly's title and would also have filled in
10 information about the sequence of events that took place
11 between Dr Kelly writing to his line manager and the
12 position we were at then.
13 Q. So what was your contribution to the document?
14 A. Well, it was just that, providing the factual
15 information for inclusion.
16 Q. At this stage, was anything in particular said about the
17 approach which was to be adopted if a journalist put
18 Dr Kelly's name to the press office?
19 A. I do not recall that being a significant part of the
20 discussion at the time. My presumption, I have to say,
21 at the time, was that if a journalist had put the
22 correct name to the press office that the press office
23 would confirm it.
24 Q. What was the basis of that understanding?
25 A. Well, I felt that it would be very difficult to do

33
1 otherwise. The purpose of the Q and A brief is to
2 provide truthful and factual answers.
3 Q. How clear is your recollection of the precise sequence
4 of events during the course of that afternoon?
5 A. Well, I have talked about my initial discussion with
6 Pam Teare at around about noon or thereabouts.
7 Subsequently, we moved into Sir Kevin Tebbit's office,
8 I think this would have been about the time that perhaps
9 Sir Kevin Tebbit returned from his visit to Portsmouth
10 and possibly a meeting at No. 10 Downing Street. We
11 then spent most of that afternoon considering the
12 precise terms of a public statement. During that time,
13 I was present, Sir Kevin Tebbit was present, Ms Teare
14 was present. From time to time Peter Watkins, who is
15 principal private secretary to Geoff Hoon, would attend.
16 Q. How long were you there in total?
17 A. I should think something like three or four hours. I
18 cannot be exactly precise about that.
19 Q. When the statement was considered, who else took part in
20 that discussion?
21 A. That was essentially Sir Kevin, Ms Teare, myself;
22 Dominic Wilson was also present as Sir Kevin Tebbit's
23 private secretary. As I mentioned, Peter Watkins from
24 time to time would come into the office.
25 Q. When the text of the statement had been completed, what

34
1 happened then?
2 A. At around about that time we returned to the Q and A
3 brief. I remember Ms Teare showing it to Kevin Tebbit.
4 He read it, and I said I had seen it and I had agreed
5 it.
6 Q. Before we go on to deal with the Q and A brief, did
7 anything else happen in relation to the statement?
8 A. Oh yes. The statement having been completed, it was
9 agreed that Richard Hatfield would put the terms of the
10 statement to Dr Kelly. As I understand, this was done
11 by e-mail, because Richard Hatfield was in a different
12 building from where we were, and I think the statement
13 was sent to him by e-mail. Either in that e-mail or by
14 telephone he was asked to clear the terms of the draft
15 statement as agreed in Sir Kevin Tebbit's office with
16 Dr Kelly.
17 Q. Was anything reported to the group of which you were
18 a member in relation to that?
19 A. Yes, at some time between 4.30 and 5 o'clock, as
20 I recall, Dominic Wilson came back and confirmed that
21 Richard Hatfield had spoken to Dr Kelly and -- by
22 telephone -- had read over the statement to him and
23 reported that Dr Kelly said he was content.
24 Q. At the point at which the text of the statement was
25 complete, what state had the Q and A brief reached?

35
1 A. I think by then it had reached the final form which has
2 been made available to the Inquiry. As I recall, at
3 that time, having dealt with the statement, Pam Teare
4 showed the draft -- well, the Q and A in that form, to
5 Sir Kevin Tebbit. Sir Kevin looked at it pretty quickly
6 and approved it.
7 Q. Was there any discussion at that point about the
8 confirmation of Dr Kelly's name?
9 A. No, there was not.
10 Q. Did you have any further involvement in the Q and A
11 brief?
12 A. No, not that evening; and the following day I travelled
13 to the Middle East.
14 Q. With the benefit of hindsight, have you been able to
15 give any consideration to whether the MoD press office
16 could have taken any other course when asked to confirm
17 that a named person was the person who had come forward?
18 A. Yes, I have. Perhaps I should preface that by saying
19 that I think all of us were surprised that the issue of
20 confirming the name became a point of media criticism
21 and media controversy, but it clearly did. I have
22 therefore thought quite hard about what alternative
23 approaches could have been taken. To my mind there were
24 three.
25 The first would have been to deny that this was

36
1 Dr Kelly. That would, of course, have been a direct lie
2 to the media and I think would have been unacceptable
3 behaviour for a Government department and we would
4 rightly have been heavily criticised for it.
5 The second option would have been to say "no
6 comment" to any name that was provided to the press
7 office. That may well have prevented Dr Kelly's name
8 coming out. I am not sure it would have stopped it
9 completely because it was quite likely that his name
10 would be speculated about. But I felt that in those
11 circumstances unwarranted suspicion would fall on others
12 who might well have been speculated about and that those
13 others might have been subject to unwanted media
14 intrusion.
15 I subsequently discovered, in conversation with
16 Ms Teare, that this was not just a theoretical concern.
17 A particular individual who had not had an unauthorised
18 contact with Mr Gilligan and who was also the subject of
19 a security threat was contacted by a tabloid newspaper
20 on 9th July before Dr Kelly's name was revealed.
21 Indeed, that same tabloid newspaper sent a reporter
22 round to his home.
23 The other point is that in those circumstances
24 I suspect the department would have been criticised for
25 being evasive.

37
1 The final option I considered was that we could have
2 denied other names if other names were put to us and
3 said no, that was not the person, and then offered no
4 comment in the case of Dr Kelly. This seems to me to be
5 intellectually dishonest and evasive and would in any
6 case have led to the identification of Dr Kelly in the
7 same way.
8 Q. Were you aware of the precise instructions that were
9 given to the press office on how the Q and A should be
10 used?
11 A. No, I was not.
12 Q. You were aware, of course, that if a journalist put the
13 correct name to the press office then it would be
14 confirmed?
15 A. Yes, because that was in the Q and A brief, yes.
16 Q. Were you aware that journalists might be told that if
17 the correct name were put forward it would be confirmed?
18 A. No, I was not.
19 Q. With the benefit of hindsight, have you been able to
20 consider whether the press office would have been
21 justified in telling journalists that?
22 A. Well, I have again considered this and again, with
23 hindsight, I feel that the press office or the Director
24 of News would have had again very little option but to
25 confirm that if the correct name were put forward that

38
1 it would be confirmed, simply because that was
2 a decision that had been taken, and I have set out the
3 reasons why that would be. If we had suggested
4 otherwise, I think we would have been accused of being
5 misleading or indeed lying.
6 Q. Mr Howard, was it ever your intention that the Q and A
7 brief should be used as some device for covertly making
8 Dr Kelly's name public?
9 A. Absolutely not.
10 Q. Please could we have on the screen document TVP/3/302.
11 Can you see that, Mr Howard?
12 A. I can, yes.
13 Q. Can you see, towards the foot of the extract that is on
14 the screen at the moment is a sentence in manuscript?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Do you recognise the handwriting?
17 A. Yes, that is my handwriting.
18 Q. In what circumstances did you come to write that?
19 A. This was a draft press release which was prepared in
20 Richard Hatfield's office on 7th July, which was -- and
21 it was prepared before the meeting that Richard Hatfield
22 had with Dr Kelly, at which I was present along with
23 Dr Wells. Richard Hatfield showed this to me in
24 advance, and I inserted that addition as a suggestion
25 that should go into the press release.

39
1 Q. What happened then to that copy of the draft press
2 release?
3 A. As I recall, it was -- a copy was given to Dr Kelly at
4 the end of his interview on 7th July. He looked at it
5 and said that he was content with it. This followed
6 a point made by Richard Hatfield that it was very likely
7 that the Ministry of Defence would have to make some
8 sort of public statement. As I recall, Dr Kelly
9 retained the press statement at the time, this draft at
10 the time.
11 Q. Yes, thank you.
12 May I turn, then, to a different topic? Did you
13 have any personal involvement in the decisions relating
14 to the invitations by the FAC and the ISC to call
15 Dr Kelly as a witness?
16 A. No, I did not.
17 Q. When did you first hear that Dr Kelly wished to have
18 somebody sitting alongside him for the FAC hearing?
19 A. I first heard of this on the afternoon of 14th July.
20 I had been asked to have a meeting with Dr Kelly, by
21 Sir Kevin Tebbit, to help him prepare for his
22 appearances before the Foreign Affairs Committee and the
23 ISC -- the Intelligence and Security Committee, I should
24 say -- and also Sir Kevin had asked me to check he was
25 up to appearing before those Committees.

40
1 Q. How did the issue come up?
2 A. At the beginning of the meeting I recall that Dr Wells
3 said that Dr Kelly had expressed a preference for
4 someone to sit alongside him at the meeting. Dr Kelly,
5 I understand, had consulted the Clerk to the Foreign
6 Affairs Committee and the Clerk to the Foreign Affairs
7 Committee had said that in those circumstances someone
8 sitting beside Dr Kelly would have to be regarded
9 formally as a witness before --
10 LORD HUTTON: Who had consulted the Clerk?
11 A. Dr Wells.
12 LORD HUTTON: Sorry, I interrupted you. Yes.
13 A. That is fine. This was clearly a potential
14 complication, in that there had been discussions between
15 the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Foreign
16 Affairs Committee which set out the areas that it was
17 appropriate to question Dr Kelly on. These were areas
18 that really only he could give answers to and another
19 witness would not be able to deal with it. It also
20 seemed possible that members of the Foreign Affairs
21 Committee might take amiss someone sitting beside him
22 and another witness advising Dr Kelly at the time.
23 MR LLOYD-JONES: So in the meeting on 14th July what action
24 did you decide to take?
25 A. This was raised at the beginning of the meeting. I did

41
1 not reach a decision on that. I said we would return to
2 that at the end of the meeting.
3 At the end of the meeting, having taken Dr Kelly
4 through what was likely to happen and discussed areas of
5 questioning with him, Dr Wells asked him whether he
6 wanted to continue or pursue the idea that someone
7 should sit next to him. Dr Kelly said that he was now
8 content not to pursue that. He recognised and I
9 recognised that he would, of course, be accompanied to
10 the evidence session by Dr Wells, by
11 Wing Commander Clark and by Kate Wilson, the chief press
12 officer, and those individuals sat behind at the time of
13 the evidence session.
14 Q. Turning then to another matter. Do you recall receiving
15 a letter from Dr Jones which was written on 8th July of
16 this year?
17 A. I do, yes.
18 Q. Do you recall when you received it?
19 A. I cannot recall exactly when. It must have been in the
20 week beginning 14th July because I was actually in Qatar
21 and Iraq at the end of the previous week and had only
22 got back that weekend. To the best of my recollection,
23 the first time I saw it -- I am not saying it was not in
24 the office at the time, but the first time I actually
25 laid eyes on it was at a time I was already putting

42
1 together advice for the Secretary of State before his
2 forthcoming appearance.
3 Q. What was the purpose of the advice you were preparing
4 for the Secretary of State?
5 A. The purpose of the advice was to deal with the likely
6 interest of the Intelligence and Security Committee on
7 two issues: firstly, the mechanisms by which members of
8 the Defence Intelligence Staff can express concerns
9 about the misuse of intelligence or indeed anything
10 else; and secondly, they were likely to ask whether
11 those mechanisms had been evoked at the time of
12 the September 24th dossier.
13 Q. The Inquiry has the minute of advice and the appendices.
14 A. That is right.
15 Q. It is a substantial document. Are you able just to
16 summarise briefly the advice which you gave?
17 A. The advice I gave was to set out to the Committee the
18 process by which individuals can express concerns on, as
19 I say, in this particular case, the possible misuse of
20 intelligence. That process is exactly the same for
21 members of the defence staff as it is for anyone else in
22 the Ministry of Defence, which is that concerns should
23 be expressed up to the line management chain.
24 Ultimately that can go to the Permanent Secretary and
25 beyond that to the Cabinet Secretary.

43
1 I said we should say to the Intelligence and
2 Security Committee that at the time of the dossier there
3 had been a very wide variety of views expressed about
4 particular pieces of intelligence -- or the use of
5 particular pieces of intelligence in the dossier, and
6 the detailed drafting of that.
7 I said that in the context -- and that was quite
8 normal, that was what was to be expected, indeed
9 encouraged. I said we should say in the context of that
10 that two individuals had expressed concerns, particular
11 concerns, to their line manager about particular use of
12 language on specific forms of intelligence. I said that
13 the Secretary of State and Sir Joe French, who was
14 formerly the Chief of Defence Intelligence, should raise
15 this if the ISC raised a question of this sort. If they
16 did not, my advice was that the Secretary of State
17 should write to the ISC separately to set that out.
18 Q. That advice was contained in the minute of advice?
19 A. Yes, it was.
20 Q. Were the documents in which Dr Jones and another person
21 had expressed concerns annexed to the minute of advice?
22 A. They were.
23 Q. Before you finalised that advice, was the draft advice
24 circulated for comment?
25 A. Yes, it was.

44
1 Q. To whom?
2 A. I circulated it to David Omand, who is the intelligence
3 coordinator, to John Scarlett, Chairman of the Joint
4 Intelligence Committee, to Sir Joe French, who was going
5 to be attending the evidence session with the Secretary
6 of State, and also to Simon Webb, the MoD Policy
7 Director who would also be attending.
8 Q. Did you have the opportunity to discuss the draft before
9 you finalised it with any of your colleagues?
10 A. Yes. I recall on the late afternoon of I think it must
11 have been 17th -- no, 16th July -- 16th or 17th July, I
12 cannot remember exactly when, I had a meeting with
13 David Omand and John Scarlett. I think Julian Miller
14 was also present, chief of the assessment staff. We
15 discussed the advice. In the light of the points made
16 at that meeting and also written points I had from other
17 people, I submitted the advice on 18th July.
18 Q. Did you disclose to the Inquiry the minute of advice and
19 the annexures?
20 A. In my note I sent to the Inquiry or my solicitor to
21 the Inquiry on 8th August I sent the minute with its
22 annexes. At that stage my solicitor said in the letter
23 that we had not included the attachments at that point,
24 you know, to avoid overburdening the Inquiry with paper,
25 but if the Inquiry would like to have them they would be

45
1 made available. In fact, they have subsequently been
2 made available.
3 Q. Did you reply to Dr Jones?
4 A. I did, yes.
5 Q. What did you tell him?
6 A. I said to Dr Jones I was grateful that he had written to
7 me. I said that I assumed that the document he referred
8 to was the minute which he had actually sent to his line
9 manager, a copy to my predecessor Mr Cragg. I said he
10 had done that quite properly. I said that this issue
11 and his document had been brought to the attention of
12 the Secretary of State and the former Chief of Defence
13 Intelligence in the context of their appearance before
14 the Intelligence and Security Committee, and that in my
15 view, therefore, he had done nothing wrong, he had done
16 nothing culpable, which was the concern he set out in
17 his letter, and that he need take no further action but
18 that if he wanted to discuss it further with me he
19 could.
20 Q. Did you show the letter or your draft reply to anyone
21 within the MoD before you sent the reply?
22 A. Yes, informally I showed it to Sir Kevin Tebbit, along
23 with my draft reply.
24 Q. What was Sir Kevin's reaction?
25 A. He was content for me to write as I proposed.

46
1 Q. Has that correspondence with Dr Jones been disclosed to
2 the Inquiry?
3 A. It has.
4 MR LLOYD-JONES: Thank you, Mr Howard.
5 Cross-examination by MR GOMPERTZ
6 Q. Mr Howard, who made the decision that Dr Kelly should be
7 publicly identified?
8 A. I think it is hard to sort of say that any one person
9 said he should be publicly identified. The fact that
10 his name would be confirmed was set out in the Q and A
11 brief, and that was approved by Sir Kevin Tebbit.
12 Q. So the answer to the question that I ask you is:
13 Sir Kevin Tebbit; is that right?
14 A. He was certainly part of the process of agreeing that we
15 would confirm the name if it were put to us.
16 Q. Was the Secretary of State part of the decision?
17 A. I was not aware, at the time, that the Secretary of
18 State was part of the decision, no.
19 Q. Let us just look and see how it came about. Could you
20 look, please, at MoD/1/67, which is the press statement
21 which was issued.
22 The document commences with the statement that:
23 "An individual working in the MoD has come
24 forward..."
25 Right?

47
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. Then in the third paragraph this information is given:
3 "The individual is an expert on WMD who has advised
4 ministers ... and whose contribution to the dossier
5 of September 2002 was to contribute towards drafts of
6 historical accounts of UN inspections. He is not 'one
7 of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the
8 dossier'. He is not a member of the Intelligence
9 Services or the Defence Intelligence Staff."
10 Right?
11 A. Absolutely.
12 Q. Can you look, please, at the Q and A material, the final
13 version, which is to be found on MoD/1/62? Can I invite
14 you, at this stage, to look, just briefly, at
15 questions 3, 4 and 7 and the answers thereto?
16 A. Hmm, hmm.
17 Q. "How long has he been in the MoD?"
18 Answer:
19 "He has been in his current position for 3 to
20 4 years. Before that he was a member of UNSCOM."
21 Right?
22 A. Hmm, hmm.
23 Q. And number 7:
24 "Is he in Iraq?"
25 Answer:

48
1 "No, though he visited Iraq recently for a week."
2 Right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Can I thirdly ask you to look at a press briefing which
5 was given by the PMOS at 3.45 pm on 9th July? That is
6 to be found at FIN/1/46. It starts at 42, but the
7 passage I would invite your attention to is on page 46.
8 Can we scroll down to the bottom of the page, the
9 last paragraph, the second sentence:
10 "Asked whether he had been suspended from his job,
11 the PMOS declined to get into MoD personnel matters.
12 Put to him that the person did not work for the MoD, the
13 PMOS said that the person was a technical expert who had
14 worked for a variety of Government departments,
15 including the MoD with whom he was currently working.
16 His salary was paid by another department. Asked if it
17 was correct to describe the person as being on
18 secondment to the MoD, the PMOS said that the nature of
19 his work meant that he was more of a consultant than
20 a secondee. Asked why we were so reluctant to say which
21 department paid his salary, the PMOS said that providing
22 this information would make it easier to identify him,
23 given the fact that there were only a few people who
24 were paid a salary by this particular department but who
25 worked for other departments."

49
1 Can I put this suggestion to you: that the
2 combination of the information in the press statement
3 issued at 5.45 pm on 8th July, the final version of the
4 Q and A material, which appears to have come into being
5 on 8th July, and the press briefing at 3.45 pm on
6 9th July, meant that any able journalist, with a little
7 research, would be able to identify Dr Kelly. Do you
8 agree?
9 A. I do not think I agree entirely. I did not -- was not
10 involved in the PMOS briefing, so I have no idea how
11 that came about. I was travelling to the Middle East at
12 the time. The press statement was indeed agreed by
13 Dr Kelly. The Q and A material provided some additional
14 points, but I did not regard them as providing
15 significant additional clues or pointers towards
16 Dr Kelly's identity. I should make this point: that the
17 Q and A brief was not intended to provide such clues.
18 Q. I appreciate that you were not even in the country at
19 the time of the press briefing, but the question I asked
20 you was this: would you agree that the information
21 contained in those three sources would inevitably lead
22 any competent journalist, of whom there are more than
23 a few about, to be able to identify Dr Kelly?
24 A. I think it -- those details, particularly the ones that
25 appeared on 9th July, may well have helped. I am not

50
1 sure they would inevitably have been the only way that
2 they would have identified Dr Kelly.
3 Q. I do not want to go through evidence which has been
4 given but we have heard from several journalists during
5 the course of the Inquiry -- I instance three: Mr Blitz,
6 Mr Baldwin and Mr North -- that with the information
7 which was made available from these three sources, you
8 appreciate I am summarising, with a little bit of work
9 on the Internet and the Civil Service handbook and other
10 sources of that kind they were very quickly able to
11 identify the person concerned. Did you know about that
12 evidence?
13 A. I have read that evidence, yes.
14 Q. Was there a deliberate policy that Dr Kelly should be
15 named by these means rather than a direct naming of him?
16 A. No, there was not.
17 Q. Why was he not named?
18 A. Well, again, I have thought about this, with hindsight.
19 I think that the reason that he was not named in the
20 press statement was that we had told him the previous
21 day that his name would not appear initially. That was
22 the point made by Mr Hatfield when we met on 7th July.
23 Q. You were present, were you not, at that meeting on
24 7th July?
25 A. Yes.

51
1 Q. Could you look, please, and see what was said to
2 Dr Kelly on that occasion? If we could have MoD/1/50,
3 please.
4 If we could go down to paragraph 19, what was said
5 was that:
6 "It was likely that the department would need to
7 make some public statement on Kelly's involvement with
8 Gilligan. [Mr Hatfield] passed Kelly a draft press
9 release and Kelly confirmed that he was content with its
10 terms."
11 Can we just interrupt to look at that press release,
12 which is on the next page, I think. MoD/1/51. Is that
13 it?
14 A. No, that is not it. The press statement that was given
15 to Dr Kelly was the one that was pushed up on the screen
16 by Mr Lloyd-Jones just a few moments ago.
17 Q. Do you mean the one that was finally used or --
18 A. No, I mean the one that had a sentence inserted in my
19 handwriting.
20 Q. I see. Could you look please at MoD/1/56? This does
21 not have your handwriting but I think the sentence that
22 you wrote in your handwriting has been typed in.
23 A. That is right, yes.
24 Q. So it was that one, was it?
25 A. It seems to be, yes.

52
1 Q. All right. Can we go back to MoD/1/50, please?
2 Continuing with paragraph 19:
3 "Hatfield said that although Kelly was not named in
4 the press release his identity may become known in due
5 course. Kelly replied that he acknowledged this: in his
6 letter of 30 June he had said that a friend at RUSI had
7 alerted him to the possibility of his being considered
8 as Gilligan's source."
9 So the way it was left at the end of that meeting,
10 according to this note, was that his identity may become
11 known in due course; right?
12 A. That is the record of the meeting. As I recall, the
13 actual words used by Mr Hatfield were rather stronger
14 than that.
15 Q. Really?
16 A. I think he used the word "likely" rather than just "may"
17 become known.
18 Q. Would you like to look at MoD/1/54, please? This is
19 a letter written by Mr Hatfield --
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. -- the next day, 8th July, to Sir Kevin Tebbit; right?
22 If you go to the third paragraph, in which he details
23 some of what took place in the meeting of the evening
24 before, he said this:
25 "I made it clear to Dr Kelly that, given the FAC

53
1 outcome and particularly the recommendation to try to
2 follow up Gilligan's contacts, it was likely that the
3 MoD would have to reveal that someone had come forward
4 to admit talking to Gilligan. I said that I did not
5 think that it would be necessary to reveal his name or
6 to go into detail beyond indicating that the account
7 given to us did not match Gilligan's PAC account, at
8 least initially. It was, however, quite likely that his
9 name would come out, not least because speculation about
10 the nature of the source [The Times article] might lead
11 in his direction."
12 That is completely different, is it not, to telling
13 him that his name was going to be published in the next
14 day or so by the MoD?
15 A. But the MoD did not publish the name, it responded to
16 a journalist asking if this was the correct name.
17 Q. So you think that the procedure which was adopted, the
18 combination of the press statement, the Q and As and
19 what was said by the PMOS, did not amount to
20 a publication of Dr Kelly's name?
21 A. Well, no, not in that sense.
22 Q. I see. Very well.
23 A. The publication of the name was when the MoD answered
24 the question.
25 Q. Can we look at the three versions of the Q and A

54
1 material, please? The first one, CAB/21/03. This was
2 produced, I believe, by the press officers, Ms Teare and
3 Ms Wilson, on the evening of the 4th July, the Friday;
4 right?
5 A. Possibly. I had not seen this at the time.
6 Q. No, we did not have this document when you gave evidence
7 previously. But could you look at it, please? The
8 first question:
9 "Who is the official?"
10 Answer:
11 "We are not prepared to name the individual
12 involved."
13 Second question:
14 "Why not?
15 "We have released all the relevant details. There
16 is nothing to gain by revealing the name of the
17 individual who has come forward voluntarily."
18 What do you say about that approach?
19 A. Well, that is the approach that was taken. What is not
20 in here is a question which was obviously considered
21 later, is how the department should react if
22 a journalist put the correct name to the department.
23 That was inserted in later versions of the Q and A
24 brief.
25 Q. Right. Well, let us look at the second draft, which is

55
1 on the next page but one. CAB/21/05.
2 We see that endorsed at the top of the page in
3 handwriting by, I anticipate, Ms Teare, was:
4 "Sent to PUS office at 08.07 on Tuesday 8 July.
5 Subject to discussion and approval."
6 A. Hmm, hmm.
7 Q. Did you have any part in the construction of this
8 version?
9 A. No.
10 Q. We see that the first question is now:
11 "Who is the official?
12 "The official works within the MoD."
13 Then the second question:
14 "What is the official's name and what post is
15 currently held?"
16 There is no answer written underneath; right?
17 And thirdly, the question:
18 "Why not?
19 "We have released all the relevant details. There
20 is nothing to gain by revealing the name..."
21 As before; right?
22 A. Hmm, hmm.
23 Q. Then we know, if we go to MoD/1/62, there is
24 a substantial change, is there not? Second question.
25 A. Yes.

56
1 Q. "What is his name and current post?"
2 Answer:
3 "We wouldn't normally volunteer a name.
4 "If the correct name is given, we can confirm it and
5 say that he is senior adviser to the Proliferation and
6 Arms Control Secretariat."
7 A. Hmm, hmm.
8 Q. Who took the decision to insert that answer?
9 A. It is worth saying that the previous version had another
10 formulation for how to deal with what would happen if
11 the correct name was given. I believe it said we would
12 need to consult before confirming it. I think the
13 presumption in the earlier version would be we would
14 confirm the name if the correct name was given.
15 Q. Quite right.
16 A. That appears here as well. This one is, if you like,
17 a development but is consistent with the previous
18 version.
19 Q. I should have taken you to that. Could we go back
20 please to CAB/21/05? I think it is the fifth question
21 down after:
22 "Is it X (i.e. the wrong name)?"
23 Answer:
24 "No."
25 The next question:

57
1 "Is it X (i.e. the correct name)?
2 "If the correct name is put to us from a number of
3 callers, we will need to tell the individual we are
4 going to confirm his name before doing so."
5 Right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. On whose authority was that question and answer
8 inserted?
9 A. Well, I do not know for sure but I imagine that this was
10 a development of the Q and A brief from 4th July where
11 they had inserted additional questions, i.e. these two,
12 what if it is the wrong name, what if it is the right
13 name, and have put in suggested ways in which that could
14 be answered.
15 Q. You cannot help us by that?
16 A. I think that would have been done by Ms Teare and
17 Ms Wilson.
18 Q. You saw this draft, did you?
19 A. I do not recall seeing this particular draft. It could
20 well be this was the one in front of Ms Teare when we
21 discussed it in Sir Kevin Tebbit's outer office on
22 8th July but I do not know that for certain.
23 Q. It is a sea change, is it not, from the attitude being
24 adopted in the first draft?
25 A. I do not regard it as a sea change but it is just that

58
1 people, having seen the first Q and A brief, would have
2 said: how do we respond if they actually put a name to
3 us? That was not dealt with in the first Q and A brief.
4 It is a perfectly reasonable question to expect from
5 journalists. I imagine either over the weekend or on
6 Monday morning Ms Teare and Ms Wilson thought about
7 that: this is an additional question we might have to
8 deal with, and this was a proposal for how we should.
9 Q. So you do not see that it is a sea change at all?
10 A. I see it as an addition of an important additional
11 question that might be put to the department by
12 journalists, yes.
13 Q. Because version 1 would not have identified Dr Kelly at
14 all, would it?
15 A. It did not have any, though -- any provision for how to
16 deal with the question of: is it X? Or is it Y? And
17 that was --
18 Q. Version 1 would not have identified Dr Kelly, would it?
19 A. Version 1 was not intended to identify Dr Kelly, no, it
20 had nothing at all in there about his name.
21 Q. Was version 2 intended to identify him?
22 A. It was not intended to identify him. It was intended to
23 give an answer to a question, "Is it Dr Kelly?" from
24 a journalist.
25 Q. Did anybody think about Dr Kelly's state of mind in

59
1 relation to this change?
2 A. We had interviewed Dr Kelly on 7th July and, as we have
3 already discussed, we made it plain that if we made an
4 announcement it was likely that his name would come out.
5 Q. I have taken you to that material and I am not going to
6 go over it again but I suggest to you that the position
7 as adopted on the 8th with regard to the Q and A
8 material in particular, to a lesser extent the
9 statement, was entirely different to that which had been
10 told to Dr Kelly the evening before; do you agree or
11 not?
12 A. No, I do not accept that. I think that the Q and A
13 brief as finalised on 8th July was entirely consistent
14 with what we had said to Dr Kelly the previous day,
15 which was that it was likely his name would come out
16 once an announcement was made.
17 Q. Why was Dr Kelly's name not simply announced as being
18 the official who was responsible; announced, for
19 example, in the press statement?
20 A. Firstly, because Richard Hatfield, the previous day, had
21 said that we would not need to put his name in the
22 initial announcement. So it would have been contrary to
23 what had been told to Dr Kelly. If we had done so,
24 obviously we would have had to get his agreement to
25 doing so. The net result would have been his name would

60
1 come into the public domain that much earlier. He would
2 have had less time to prepare. It was for that reason
3 that we stuck with what we had agreed with Dr Kelly on
4 7th July.
5 Q. So what you had said to Dr Kelly, what Mr Hatfield had
6 said to him on 7th July was important, was it?
7 A. Yes, I think it was.
8 Q. Yes. Do you not think that the procedure which was
9 adopted on 8th and 9th July was completely different to
10 what he had been told on the 7th?
11 A. I think it was entirely consistent. It was not
12 a procedure for naming Dr Kelly. It was a procedure
13 designed to deal with how we should respond to
14 a journalist who put the correct name to the Ministry of
15 Defence.
16 Q. The procedure adopted, Mr Howard, I suggest, amounted to
17 a parlour game for journalists; would you agree?
18 A. No.
19 Q. A form, perhaps, of 20 questions, though 21 in the case
20 of The Times.
21 A. We are not responsible for how the media put their
22 questions to the press office.
23 Q. Or was it more like a game of Russian roulette?
24 A. No, it was not that either.
25 Q. I suggest to you that the strategy that was adopted with

61
1 regard to disclosing Dr Kelly's identity was both
2 cynical and irresponsible. What do you say?
3 A. I would disagree with that completely.
4 Q. Was Dr Kelly ever asked whether he consented to having
5 his identity revealed?
6 A. He was not consulted over the terms of the Q and A
7 brief, as I understand anyway.
8 Q. Was he ever asked whether he consented to having his
9 identity revealed?
10 A. I do not believe he was asked in those terms, but he was
11 told that it was likely his name would come out.
12 Q. You have just said that he was never consulted about the
13 use of the Q and A material. Can you tell us why not?
14 A. The Q and A material had a number of points in it, but
15 the issue about his being named was consistent with what
16 had been said the previous day. The rest of it was
17 factual information which was either in the statement or
18 which was known to those who were preparing the Q and A
19 brief, and therefore there was no need to consult
20 Dr Kelly over that. If there had been material in the
21 Q and A brief which needed Dr Kelly to provide a factual
22 response to that, he would be consulted.
23 Q. So you consider that the change from what he was told by
24 Mr Hatfield on the 7th to the position which obtained on
25 the 8th and the 9th was something which need not be

62
1 communicated to him at all?
2 A. Well, I do not regard it as a change.
3 Q. Do you not? Do you not agree that Dr Kelly was treated
4 shabbily in relation to this episode?
5 A. No, I do not agree.
6 Q. You have said that one of the reasons why this approach
7 was adopted was because it would be unfair to others who
8 might come under the spotlight if any suspicion fell
9 upon them.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. That was an argument you considered?
12 A. That is an argument I considered subsequently.
13 Q. Ah. Did you consider it at the time?
14 A. Well, as I said earlier, the production of a Q and A
15 brief is actually a relatively routine piece of work in
16 connection with an announcement. We did not spend
17 a huge amount of time on it, as I have already given
18 evidence, on 8th July. As I said, I have considered in
19 retrospect what other approaches we could have made.
20 I have set out my analysis of that.
21 Q. Did you take any account of the pressures which would
22 fall upon Dr Kelly as a result of the publication of his
23 name?
24 A. We recognised that if his name became public, which we
25 regarded as very likely, that he would come under

63
1 pressure. But that point had already been put to him on
2 the previous day.
3 Q. Was any risk assessment conducted?
4 A. I am not quite sure what you mean by "risk assessment".
5 Q. A risk assessment of the dangers to him, as compared
6 with the dangers to others, by suppression of the name?
7 A. We did not carry out a formal assessment in that sense.
8 We considered that if the name came out Dr Kelly would
9 obviously need to be advised on how to deal with it. We
10 did not think that the risks associated with that were
11 any greater, necessarily, than the risks associated with
12 other people being accused unnecessarily.
13 Q. So did you take any account of Dr Kelly's particular
14 personality?
15 A. Well, I personally did not know Dr Kelly very well at
16 all.
17 Q. No, you had only met him on two occasions, is that
18 right?
19 A. Two or possibly three occasions.
20 Q. Were any enquiries made, so far as you know, of the MoD
21 personnel department about Dr Kelly and the possible
22 effects of publication of his name?
23 A. I am not aware of anything beyond what was said to
24 Dr Kelly in his interviews on 4th and 7th July. As
25 I say, I personally was not involved and had no -- had

64
1 little close contact with Dr Kelly.
2 Q. Did the desirability of his appearance before the FAC
3 and, to a lesser extent, the ISC, have any part in your
4 thinking at this time?
5 A. No, I was not involved in decisions on whether or not he
6 should appear before those Committees.
7 Q. No, but as to publication of his name?
8 A. I had no view particularly about whether it was
9 desirable or otherwise. I felt that once we had made an
10 announcement, that it was very probable that his name
11 would come out.
12 Q. Was there any strategy that if Dr Kelly's name came into
13 the public domain and he gave evidence before the FAC
14 that this would serve to discredit Mr Gilligan?
15 A. Not in my case, no.
16 Q. So you cannot help us about that?
17 A. Well, I think that there was an issue about correcting
18 the public record of what had been said about a claim
19 made by the BBC back at the end of May, and that it was
20 possible that the fact that an official had come forward
21 and admitted talking to Mr Gilligan may help in that
22 respect. But not, in any sense, did I feel that the
23 actions that were taken were designed to discredit
24 Mr Gilligan or anyone else.
25 Q. Was part of the object to defeat the suggestion that the

65
1 dossier had been embellished?
2 A. The suggestion had been made. It was factually wrong in
3 terms of the allegations made and reported by the BBC on
4 29th May. The fact that what Dr Kelly said he had said
5 was different from what Mr Gilligan said his single
6 source had said was relevant. In that sense, it would
7 have been important, and I think Sir Kevin Tebbit has
8 testified to this effect, to correct the public record
9 in that respect.
10 Q. So why not produce the earlier drafts of the dossier?
11 A. The earlier drafts of the dossier were, of course,
12 confidential and classified. They were -- that issue
13 was, at that time, before Lord Hutton started his
14 Inquiry, being addressed by the Intelligence and
15 Security Committee, whose inquiry was ongoing at that
16 time, and to a lesser extent by the Foreign Affairs
17 Committee. To my mind it would have been quite improper
18 to reveal earlier drafts of this to the media whilst
19 those inquiries were going on. These are matters really
20 for the Cabinet Office and the Foreign Office rather
21 than me.
22 Q. Very well, if that is the position let me just ask you
23 this question: we have had production of earlier drafts
24 of the dossier in the month of August, by degrees I may
25 say, but what was the difference between production

66
1 in August to production in July?
2 A. Well, I was not party to those decisions, but I believe
3 that the essential difference was the establishment and
4 the conduct of Lord Hutton's Inquiry.
5 Q. Let me ask you about something else. The meeting which
6 was arranged for 24th June.
7 You had first heard about the fact that Dr Kelly had
8 spoken to Mr Gilligan when you met Patrick Lamb on
9 17th June; is that right?
10 A. That is correct, yes.
11 Q. And you reported that matter to Sir Kevin Tebbit on
12 the 18th.
13 A. Yes, I think that is correct.
14 Q. Was it the case that Dr Kelly was out of the country at
15 the time?
16 A. At that time?
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. I do not believe he was, no.
19 Q. I do not put any positive suggestion to you on that.
20 Was it not the case that he was out of the country until
21 21st June?
22 A. Well, it is possible. I knew that he was out of the
23 country on 16th June because I had spoken to him in
24 New York at that time. I was not aware of when he came
25 back. I apologise, he may well have been. That is not

67
1 something I would have known about at the time.
2 Q. What I want to ask you is this: was he told at the
3 meeting of the 24th?
4 A. Yes, I understand he was, yes.
5 Q. By whom?
6 A. By Dr Wells.
7 Q. When Dr Wells gave evidence previously, I think I am
8 right in saying he told us about informing Dr Kelly that
9 the meeting had been cancelled but he did not say
10 anything about telling him of the arrangement for the
11 meeting. But you think it was Dr Wells who did it?
12 A. Yes indeed, because the time was fixed. Dr Wells was
13 going to attend.
14 Q. Was Dr Kelly told why there was to be this meeting?
15 A. I did not tell him directly. I understand from Dr Wells
16 that what he said to Dr Kelly was that it was about his
17 contacts with the media, that he was not more specific
18 than that, but that is what I heard from Dr Wells rather
19 than knowing that directly.
20 Q. When was Dr Kelly excluded from the leak inquiry?
21 A. I do not know precisely when that was. I was not
22 involved in that process. I would imagine it would have
23 been towards the end of June or early July. I am not
24 really very sure exactly when that happened.
25 Q. That topic does not seem to have been mentioned in the

68
1 interviews at 4th July nor at the interview on 7th July.
2 A. I think it is reasonable to presume by the time of the
3 interview on 4th July and certainly by the time of the
4 interview on 7th July that that aspect had been dealt
5 with and he was no longer possibly linked to that leak
6 inquiry.
7 Q. Yes. The meeting which took place on 7th July, the one
8 at which you attended, can I just ask you about that and
9 what happened in relation to both the 4th and the
10 7th July? Mr Gilligan's broadcast was obviously taken
11 very seriously at the highest level, was it not?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And as a result of that, I think there was a letter,
14 MOD/1/17, please.
15 This is a letter written by yourself to heads of
16 departments, is that right?
17 A. That is to my directors in the Defence Intelligence
18 Staff, yes.
19 Q. Thank you. We see the date of that, 5th June.
20 A. Hmm, hmm.
21 Q. It goes over the page -- MoD/1/18, please -- where the
22 last few lines read:
23 "Leaking material to the press is not clever or
24 smart. It is unprofessional, deeply corrosive to trust
25 and morale and is a disciplinary offence. I repeat that

69
1 I have no reason to think that anyone in the DIS is
2 responsible for the leak to Mr Gilligan. But if it
3 turns out that this is the case and the individual is
4 identified, the strongest possible action will be
5 taken."
6 Right? That is what you wrote. When we come to the
7 meeting on 4th July, it may be this is a matter I will
8 have to ask Mr Hatfield about but I ask you first,
9 Dr Kelly gives his explanation, which is immediately
10 accepted by Mr Hatfield. That is fair, is it not?
11 A. His explanation for his meeting or ...?
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. Certainly his account was accepted, yes.
14 Q. Mr Hatfield immediately decided that there was no
15 disciplinary offence.
16 A. I think he decided that it need not go further to a
17 formal disciplinary process.
18 Q. How does that square with what you wrote in your letter?
19 A. Well, I wrote my letter on 4th June before we knew
20 anything about Dr Kelly having spoken to
21 Andrew Gilligan.
22 Q. Certainly.
23 A. The decision taken on 4th July and 7th July was one for
24 Mr Hatfield.
25 Q. Yes. So you have no comment to make about that?

70
1 A. No, not particularly.
2 Q. Because it seems that what had been originally described
3 as a very serious matter was immediately downgraded to
4 a comparatively unimportant one; is that right, or not?
5 A. Well, I certainly would not agree that it was
6 comparatively unimportant. As you say, I think these
7 are questions you really ought to put to Mr Hatfield,
8 but it is worth pointing out that the circumstances in
9 which Dr Kelly's contact with Mr Gilligan was
10 established was because Dr Kelly came forward
11 voluntarily to offer this information. That may have
12 been a factor in Richard's mind when he decided what
13 disciplinary or other action should be taken.
14 LORD HUTTON: Mr Gompertz, are you drawing to an end because
15 we have to give the stenographers a break. I was
16 a little concerned just about the timetable.
17 MR GOMPERTZ: I must apologise. I have overrun somewhat.
18 LORD HUTTON: These are important matters, I quite
19 appreciate that. How long do you think you will be?
20 MR GOMPERTZ: I do have a certain amount more. I would have
21 thought perhaps another half an hour.
22 LORD HUTTON: That is considerably in excess of the time
23 which was agreed.
24 MR GOMPERTZ: Yes. May I say that I did subsequently
25 indicate to Mr Dingemans that I might, with this

71
1 witness, overrun. I hope it will not be a pattern.
2 LORD HUTTON: Very well. I think we will give the
3 stenographers a break now for 5 minutes.
4 (12.12 pm)
5 (Short Break)
6 (12.17 pm)
7 MR GOMPERTZ: My Lord, in fairness to Mr Dingemans I think
8 I should say that it was only this morning that I warned
9 him that I might be longer than the time allocated.
10 LORD HUTTON: I appreciate that. It is difficult to keep to
11 estimated times but I think we all must try to do so.
12 MR GOMPERTZ: Mr Howard, I was asking you about the meeting
13 on 7th July. Could you look, please, in relation to
14 that, at MoD/1/44.
15 This is a letter from Dominic Wilson to Mr Hatfield.
16 You see the date at the top is 8th July. We have
17 established in the Inquiry that in fact it should be the
18 7th. If you go to paragraph 2 that can be readily
19 confirmed, because what he said is:
20 "What is now needed is a more intensive interview
21 with Kelly."
22 Right?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. If you go down to paragraph 4 at the bottom of the page,
25 this is said:

72
1 "The key issues will be ..."
2 Never mind (a), but (b):
3 "Kelly's readiness to be associated with a public
4 statement that names him and carries a clear and
5 sustainable refutation of the core allegation on the
6 '45 minute' intelligence."
7 Was that matter ever discussed in the interview of
8 7th July?
9 A. I should say straightaway I did not see this minute
10 before the meeting which took place on 7th July, the one
11 I attended. So I was not aware of its existence at that
12 point. It did not -- it was not raised in precisely
13 those terms but the question of a public statement was
14 raised with him, as I have already given evidence to
15 that effect.
16 Q. There was no discussion, was there, according to the
17 note that we have of the meeting, of Dr Kelly's
18 readiness to be associated with a public statement
19 naming him, was there?
20 A. We did not discuss with Dr Kelly a public statement
21 which named him. We said we needed to make a public
22 statement and it was likely his name would come out
23 subsequently.
24 Q. Could you explain how it was that this core or key issue
25 was not discussed at all?

73
1 A. As I say, I had not seen this minute before the meeting
2 on 7th July. All I can give you is my recollection of
3 the meeting that took place.
4 Q. You saw Sir Kevin Tebbit after the meeting; I do not
5 mean that evening, but --
6 A. I saw Sir Kevin Tebbit the following day.
7 Q. The next day, 8th July?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Did he ever say to you: what was the upshot of
10 Dr Kelly's readiness to be named in a public statement?
11 A. He never said anything to me in that respect. He may
12 have spoken to Mr Hatfield, I do not know.
13 Q. So the matter was just left, was it?
14 A. The issue of a public statement was dealt with at the
15 meeting, but in the way that I have described.
16 Q. It was not dealt with because there was some discussion
17 of a plea bargain.
18 A. No, there was no discussion of a plea bargain.
19 Q. No?
20 A. No.
21 Q. You see, somehow, appearing in Mr Campbell's diary is an
22 entry relating to a conversation which he had with the
23 Minister, well before this date, of getting "a plea
24 bargain with this guy". Anything like that come to your
25 notice prior to this meeting on the 7th?

74
1 A. Absolutely not.
2 Q. Was there any sort of deal done with Dr Kelly?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Both Mrs Kelly and Mrs Bosch report Dr Kelly as saying
5 that his pension or clearance might be affected in
6 certain circumstances. Can you assist at all as to why
7 it was that he should have made those reports to them?
8 A. I have no idea. Nothing like that was said at the
9 meeting on 7th July which I attended; and there is
10 nothing in the record on the 4th July meeting either.
11 Q. I accept that. Yes. You were then away from 9th to
12 12th July; is that right?
13 A. That is correct, yes.
14 Q. Before you went on the 9th, were you present in your
15 office?
16 A. No, I went straight from home to the airport.
17 Q. So you did not attend the MoD at all on the 9th?
18 A. No.
19 Q. As matters were left at the end of the day on the 8th,
20 the position was, as you understood it, the press
21 statement had been agreed?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And agreed not only by staff at MoD but also by
24 Dr Kelly?
25 A. Yes.

75
1 Q. Yes. And that had been done by Mr Hatfield?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. The Q and A material had reached its final form?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And been approved by Sir Kevin Tebbit?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Was the Minister present at all on the 8th when this
8 material was being produced?
9 A. He was not present at any meetings I was associated
10 with. His private secretary, as I said before, did
11 attend from time to time, and it could be that he was
12 briefing Mr Hoon but I do not know that for certain.
13 Q. The next contact that you have with Dr Kelly was the
14 meeting on 14th July, the briefing meeting.
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. Yes. Before we come to that meeting, can I ask you
17 about CAB/1/106, please? That is a document emanating
18 from Mr Colin Smith of the FCO; is that right?
19 A. That is right.
20 Q. And it refers to "this morning's meeting on Iraq WMD".
21 Were you present at that meeting?
22 A. I was, yes.
23 Q. What is said is this, in (a):
24 "DCDI [that is you] is to brief David Kelly this
25 afternoon for his appearances tomorrow before the FAC

76
1 and ISC, and will strongly recommend that Kelly is not
2 drawn on his assessment of the dossier (but stick to
3 what he told Gilligan)."
4 Just pausing there.
5 A. Hmm, hmm.
6 Q. Would it be fair to interpret that as meaning that you
7 were going to give Dr Kelly a steer on certain matters?
8 A. Certainly not. I should say that I did give evidence at
9 some length on this on my appearance before the Inquiry
10 on 14th August.
11 Q. Yes. I just want to investigate the matter a little
12 further.
13 A. Hmm, hmm.
14 Q. What do you say, then, that that statement means, the
15 strong recommendation?
16 A. Well, I do not recognise I said that at the time. My
17 main recollection of that meeting was my reporting back
18 my visit to Iraq; and this was a record that was
19 produced subsequently by Mr Smith. The first I saw of
20 it was when I appeared before the Inquiry on
21 14th August.
22 Q. Is this the position, then, that Mr Smith has got it
23 wrong? That there was no such strong recommendation?
24 A. Well, I do not recall saying anything like that. It is
25 possible Mr Smith may have misinterpreted what was said.

77
1 I do not have any recollection of exactly what words I
2 used at the time. I know what I intended to do at the
3 meeting of 14th July.
4 Q. You are quite right, you did give evidence about this
5 previously; and I do not want to go over old ground
6 unnecessarily. But you will remember that in I think
7 all the notes that were taken of the meeting of
8 14th July and, indeed, in your notes before the meeting,
9 there is reference to "tricky areas".
10 A. Hmm, hmm.
11 Q. Were you not attempting to assist Dr Kelly in relation
12 to those areas?
13 A. No, I was not -- well, I was aiming to assist him but
14 not to give him -- steer him in any particular
15 direction.
16 Q. No?
17 A. No.
18 Q. So what was the object of assisting him? What were you
19 actually telling him?
20 A. The three areas I described as "tricky", that was
21 a colloquial term for what was a very informal meeting,
22 certainly no sinister intent. There were three areas
23 I thought I wanted to give him advice on how he should
24 respond if the Committee asked him.
25 The first was on whether the Committee should ask

78
1 him about what he, Dr Kelly, thought of the Government's
2 case for war, what he thought -- how he thought the
3 Government had behaved at producing the dossier. I said
4 that to me it seemed to be reasonable that in those
5 circumstances he could say: this is a matter that ought
6 to be addressed to Ministers. It is worth remembering
7 that he was not appearing as a representative of
8 Ministers, which is what usually happens when an
9 official appears before a committee.
10 The second area was that if the Committee were to
11 ask him what is his personal view on Iraq's WMD, I said
12 that strictly speaking that was outside the area of
13 questioning which had been agreed between the
14 Defence Secretary and the Chairman of the Foreign
15 Affairs Committee, but I said: in practice it would be
16 very difficult for you not to respond to that if you
17 wanted to and that you should respond how you wished.
18 The third area was if he was asked: are you
19 Mr Gilligan's source? And I said to him: you could
20 reasonably say this is a matter that is best addressed
21 to the BBC, as they would know, or indeed to
22 Mr Gilligan. He, at that point, said: would it be all
23 right for me to express my own opinion that I was not
24 the source? I said it would, of course, be right if his
25 conscience told him that was the right answer.

79
1 Q. Was Susan Watts a tricky area at all?
2 A. No. I raised that because it was rather tangential to
3 the main point of the meeting. But just before that
4 meeting, or in the previous week, the issue of
5 Susan Watts' article on Newsnight in early June had been
6 cited by the BBC in support of Andrew Gilligan's
7 original report. And I recalled, from the meeting on
8 7th July, that Dr Kelly had said he had spoken to
9 Susan Watts since then. So I simply asked him: you
10 mentioned you spoke to Susan Watts, what did you talk
11 about?
12 Q. Yes, well, I take that aspect of the meeting no further.
13 Others may do so.
14 Can I ask you to go back to the document on the
15 screen, please?
16 A. Hmm, hmm.
17 Q. And to the remaining sentence in (a):
18 "Kelly is apparently feeling the pressure, and does
19 not appear to be handling it well."
20 A. Hmm, hmm.
21 Q. Who reported that at the meeting in the morning?
22 A. Well, this, I think, is attributed to me. I personally
23 do not recall saying it but others have told me that
24 I said something to that effect, so I accept that. If
25 I did say it, it was on the basis of second-hand

80
1 information. It was possible I had spoken to
2 Bryan Wells that morning, but I do not particularly
3 recall. It was not on the basis of any meeting with
4 Dr Kelly. I had not seen Dr Kelly since 7th July.
5 I did not meet him again until the afternoon of the
6 14th.
7 Q. So it was not Mr Smith who produced this information?
8 A. No, I think he was reporting what was said at the
9 meeting.
10 Q. Right. Well, just help us a little bit. You have no
11 recollection at all of where you got this information
12 from?
13 A. Well, no, I am afraid I do not, except I think it is
14 possible that I spoke to Dr Wells that morning and maybe
15 he told me that. But I really cannot recall precisely.
16 Q. Would this be right: that Sir Kevin Tebbit asked you to
17 ensure that Dr Kelly was all right?
18 A. He asked me to see if he was -- to satisfy myself that
19 he was up to appearing before the FAC and the ISC, that
20 is right, yes.
21 Q. So what did you do about that?
22 A. I arranged to see him that afternoon with Dr Wells.
23 Q. Well, that is the briefing meeting.
24 A. That is right.
25 Q. Yes. And what did you do during the course of the

81
1 briefing meeting to ensure that Dr Kelly was all right?
2 A. I felt the main way of establishing that Dr Kelly was
3 all right was first of all to explain how the Committees
4 worked, the differences between them. I also explained
5 the areas of questioning that he may well be subjected
6 to; and I identified those which he should -- where the
7 Committee could legitimately expect proper factual and
8 accurate answers from him. And, as we have already
9 discussed, I mentioned those areas which strictly
10 speaking fell outside the areas which had been agreed
11 between the Defence Secretary and the Chairman of the
12 Foreign Affairs Committee.
13 The purpose was to reassure Dr Kelly before he went
14 to give evidence. At the end of the meeting I felt that
15 he was composed, obviously nervous, which is expected,
16 but I saw no evidence to say that he was not ready for
17 the meeting. And in fact he did thank me for the time
18 I had spent with him that day.
19 Q. So you relied on your own experience, which no doubt is
20 considerable, in making an assessment of how he appeared
21 to you during the course of that briefing meeting?
22 A. Indeed. I mean, I also relied on Dr Wells. Dr Wells at
23 no time suggested that he was not ready -- that Dr Kelly
24 was not ready.
25 Q. Did you refer the matter to Mr Hatfield at all, as

82
1 Director of Personnel?
2 A. No. I did what Sir Kevin Tebbit asked me to do, which
3 was to come back and report to him directly, which is
4 what I did.
5 Q. Were there any steps taken to provide any counselling or
6 assistance or anything of that kind for Dr Kelly?
7 A. Dr Kelly was -- I believe that Dr Wells spent quite
8 a bit of time the previous week and during the 14th and
9 15th in providing support to Dr Kelly. I believe he
10 cancelled his trip to New York specifically to do that,
11 so that he could do that, so that he could support
12 Dr Kelly. He accompanied Dr Kelly both to the Foreign
13 Affairs Committee and to the ISC.
14 MR GOMPERTZ: Yes. Thank you very much.
15 LORD HUTTON: Thank you, Mr Gompertz.
16 Now Mr Caldecott, you have some questions.
17 Cross-examination by MR CALDECOTT
18 MR CALDECOTT: My Lord, I do have a slim hard copy of the
19 documents I am going to refer to, one for your Lordship
20 and one for the witness.
21 LORD HUTTON: Does Mr Dingemans have a copy?
22 MR CALDECOTT: Mr Howard, could we please go straight to the
23 letter from Dr Jones to you of 8th July, please, at
24 MoD/4/11, which you were asked about this morning.
25 A. Yes.

83
1 Q. That is at the front of the bundle.
2 A. Hmm.
3 Q. Can we go through the letter very quickly? Did you know
4 Dr Jones was retired at this stage, first of all?
5 A. Yes, I did.
6 Q. Did you know his position on retirement was branch head
7 of science and a technical director at the DIAS?
8 A. Yes, I did.
9 Q. We see from the opening paragraph that what prompted him
10 to write is his reading of the Foreign Affairs Committee
11 report, which has given him concerns, and essentially he
12 identifies an unease about a potential conflict between
13 his duty to the department and the Government on the one
14 hand, and his responsibilities to Parliament on the
15 other. He goes on in the next paragraph to say that:
16 "Your records will show [then the initials of his
17 post] ..."
18 He describes himself as:
19 "... probably the most senior and experienced
20 intelligence community official working on 'WMD'."
21 Do you accept that description as accurate?
22 A. He was certainly a senior intelligence expert. Whether
23 he was the most senior and experienced, I am not sure.
24 I was not in post at the time that Mr Jones actually
25 occupied the post in the DIS. But he was certainly an

84
1 important individual.
2 Q. He goes on:
3 "I was so concerned about the manner in which
4 intelligence assessments for which I had some
5 responsibility were being presented in the dossier of
6 24th September 2002, that I was moved to write formally
7 to your predecessor, Tony Cragg, recording and
8 explaining my reservations."
9 A. Hmm, hmm.
10 Q. Pausing there, Tony Cragg was your predecessor as DCDI?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. He would not be, would he, Dr Jones' immediate line
13 manager?
14 A. No, he would be one level up from that.
15 Q. In the next paragraph:
16 "The Foreign Affairs Committee appears to consider
17 it important that the Foreign Secretary told them, 'that
18 there had been no formal complaint from members of the
19 security and intelligence services about the content of
20 the [September] dossier'."
21 Then he makes the point that in fact Mr Straw said
22 he probably was not aware of one.
23 A. Hmm, hmm.
24 Q. Then he says:
25 "Nonetheless, it is now a matter of record, and

85
1 I feel very uneasy that my minute could be uncovered at
2 some future date, and that I might be judged culpable
3 for not having drawn attention to it."
4 It is clear from this letter, is it not, that
5 Dr Jones regards his letter to Mr Cragg of at least akin
6 to a formal complaint?
7 A. The first point is he did not write direct to Mr Cragg,
8 he wrote to his line manager and he copied the minute to
9 Mr Cragg.
10 Q. He plainly felt Mr Cragg should see it, did he not?
11 A. Certainly, yes.
12 Q. Can you just answer the question I asked you: it is
13 clear, is it not, that Dr Jones viewed his letter as
14 akin to a formal complaint?
15 A. He wrote formally. He may well have regarded it in that
16 way. But only Dr Jones can answer that clearly as to
17 whether it was a complaint.
18 Q. He would not have been writing to you at all, would he,
19 unless he was concerned that Mr Straw had inadvertently
20 misled the Foreign Affairs Committee?
21 A. That is true.
22 Q. He was concerned obviously that the record should be
23 corrected.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Can we just look at FAC/3/31, just to understand his

86
1 concerns? This is one paragraph from the FAC report,
2 paragraph 86:
3 "We conclude that the claims made in the September
4 dossier were in all probability well founded on the
5 basis of the intelligence then available, although as we
6 have already stated we have concerns about the emphasis
7 given to some of them. We further conclude that, in the
8 absence of reliable evidence that intelligence personnel
9 have either complained about or sought to distance
10 themselves from the content of the dossier, allegations
11 of politically inspired meddling cannot credibly be
12 established."
13 Do you accept that Dr Jones' letter to Mr Cragg was,
14 to some degree, seeking to distance himself from the
15 dossier as published?
16 A. I think to distance himself from certain conclusions.
17 Q. Yes, not the entirety of it by no means but certain
18 conclusions?
19 A. Hmm.
20 Q. And it was also to that degree a complaint?
21 A. I think it is clear he saw it that way.
22 Q. And it was also clear, was it not, that he in fact saw
23 it as a formal complaint?
24 A. He put it in writing, so I imagine he saw it that way,
25 yes.

87
1 Q. Can we next look at your reply, please, which is
2 MoD/4/12, dated 23rd July? Just to state the obvious:
3 this Inquiry had been set up by this stage, had it not?
4 A. Yes, I think it had.
5 Q. And you had been involved in the interview of Dr Kelly
6 on 7th July --
7 A. Hmm, hmm.
8 Q. -- and you therefore had some knowledge of the detail of
9 the Government's dispute with the BBC.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You say:
12 "Thank you for your letter of 8 July (which for some
13 reason did not reach me until the middle of last week)."
14 Pausing there, 23rd July was a Wednesday. I think
15 you said in evidence -- you say here you received the
16 letter about the middle of the previous week, which
17 looks like Wednesday or Thursday, 16th or 17th July.
18 A. That is my recollection, that is when I saw it. It may
19 have been in the office before that.
20 Q. You go on:
21 "I am grateful for you drawing my attention to this.
22 I assume you are referring to the minute you wrote on
23 19th September."
24 That is clearly a correct assumption.
25 A. Hmm, hmm.

88
1 Q. "I was aware of this and regard it as an entirely proper
2 expression of your views at the time. The Defence
3 Secretary and the former CDI have also been briefed on
4 your note as part of the preparations for the evidence
5 they gave this week to the Intelligence and Security
6 Committee. There is, therefore, no question of your
7 being found culpable in any way for what was, as I say,
8 a perfectly legitimate action."
9 I just want you, please, to put yourself in the
10 position of Dr Jones receiving this letter. Do you
11 accept that he would clearly have been under the
12 impression that his concern that his letter had not
13 emerged to correct the record had now been put right
14 because these two very senior gentlemen had been briefed
15 about it, to give evidence to a Parliamentary Committee?
16 A. Yes, I think it is reasonable he would reach that
17 conclusion.
18 Q. Can I just ask you this: you say "no question of your
19 being found culpable for what was, as I say, a perfectly
20 legitimate action". But that was not actually what he
21 was concerned about being culpable about, was it? If
22 you just look back at MoD/4/11, what he was concerned
23 about was being found culpable for not having drawn
24 attention to it, not for having written his letter to
25 Mr Cragg in the first place.

89
1 A. I think that is fair. When I drafted this, I was
2 talking about the perfectly legitimate action was his
3 minute he wrote on 19th September. Certainly implicit
4 in this, and certainly what I thought, was that nor
5 should he regard himself as being culpable for the fact
6 he had not revealed it to a Parliamentary Committee. If
7 that is not clear from this, I apologise for some sloppy
8 drafting.
9 Q. You accept Dr Jones would have been under the impression
10 that these witnesses would have corrected the record in
11 relation to his letter of complaint to Mr Cragg?
12 A. He would certainly have been under the impression they
13 had been briefed on the detail.
14 Q. That is not the question: would Dr Jones have been under
15 the impression that the record had been corrected by
16 revealing to the ISC the existence of his letter of
17 complaint to Tony Cragg?
18 A. He may have done, yes.
19 Q. Do you accept that would be a reasonable and the natural
20 reading of this letter?
21 A. It is certainly a reasonable reading of the letter, yes.
22 Q. Is there another reasonable reading of the letter?
23 A. Not particularly.
24 Q. Can we just look at what in fact the position was as at
25 the time that you wrote this reply to Dr Jones, by

90
1 please going to MoD/4/6? This is dated 18th July 2003.
2 You told us this morning that before this was finalised
3 you had a conversation with Sir David Omand and
4 John Scarlett, and I think Julian Miller may also have
5 been there.
6 A. Hmm, hmm.
7 Q. Can you help me about that? Did you have the letter
8 from Dr Jones with you when you spoke to help on the
9 16th or 17th?
10 A. Almost certainly I did. In fact, I had attached to it
11 the draft which I circulated to them, which was the
12 basis of the discussion -- do you mean the letter from
13 8th July?
14 Q. Yes.
15 A. No, I did not have that with me, no.
16 Q. Did you, at any subsequent point, draw the terms of that
17 letter to the attention of Sir David Omand,
18 John Scarlett or Julian Miller?
19 A. No, I did not.
20 Q. I am not going to go through this in detail, it is
21 a very long document, but you plainly anticipate that
22 questions about the existence of dissent and the routes
23 for dissent are likely to be raised in the ISC.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. If I can just go to two of your recommendations, the

91
1 heading "Recommendation" at MoD/4/6 and then on to the
2 next page, please, 7. I want to draw your attention to
3 letters (d) and (e) at the top of the page:
4 "Agrees that if the ISC raise this (as seems very
5 likely) Secretary of State, or the former CDI, should
6 respond along the lines of the attached speaking note
7 ..."
8 I will come to that in a minute, if I may.
9 "(e) Agrees that we should resist any calls from the
10 ISC to disclose the identities of the individuals
11 concerned, call them as witnesses or have access to
12 their written comments to line management."
13 Why were you so concerned to keep the identity of
14 Dr Jones from the Intelligence and Security Committee?
15 A. My feeling was that this dealt with correspondence,
16 internal correspondence to the DIS which had happened
17 last September, Dr Jones' minute and another minute from
18 another individual who worked with him. I was as clear
19 as I could be, on the basis of the documentation
20 available to me, that those concerns had been properly
21 considered by the Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence
22 and possibly by the Chief of Defence Intelligence and
23 that, therefore, having been dealt with and that the
24 concerns were not pursued further after the publication
25 of the dossier, that in those circumstances it would not

92
1 be appropriate to reveal, as I say, what was internal
2 correspondence to the ISC.
3 Q. Was it not enough that a branch head had written
4 a formal complaint and that the ISC should know about
5 it?
6 A. As I say, it had been dealt with within the line
7 management chain. I saw no reason for the ISC to have
8 the details. It is worth saying that the substance of
9 the points made by Dr Jones in his minute were actually
10 set out in this brief and, indeed, were available to be
11 deployed to the ISC. So, actually having access to the
12 minute would not have aided them in any substantive way.
13 Q. Can we please look at CAB/1/238? This is
14 Prime Minister's Question Time on 4th June, the previous
15 month. I am sorry, it is towards the back of
16 your bundle, Mr Howard, I am sorry. It is just before
17 the transcript at the back.
18 A. 238?
19 Q. Yes. Top of the page, please, four lines in:
20 "Furthermore, the allegation that the 45 minute
21 claim provoked disquiet among the intelligence
22 community, which disagreed with its inclusion in the
23 dossier -- I have discussed it, as I said, with the
24 Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee -- is also
25 completely and totally untrue. Instead of hearing from

93
1 one or many anonymous sources, I suggest that if people
2 have any evidence, they actually produce it."
3 Were you aware that the Prime Minister had said that
4 to the House the previous month?
5 A. No.
6 Q. If you had been aware of it, would it have affected your
7 decision?
8 A. My decision to do what?
9 Q. Not to reveal the identity of Dr Jones, or rather to
10 brief that his identity should not be disclosed to the
11 ISC or his written report revealed to the ISC.
12 A. I do not think it would have made any difference to the
13 briefing I provided to the Defence Secretary, no.
14 Q. Are you sure, Mr Howard, no political considerations or
15 concerns about the fall-out of revealing this document
16 came into play in your decision?
17 A. Certainly not.
18 Q. Were you aware that at least a part of the BBC's
19 broadcast was to the effect that there was disquiet
20 within the Intelligence Services about the 45 minute
21 claim?
22 A. As I recall, that is right, yes, that was.
23 Q. Can we, please, just look at the speaking note at
24 MoD/4/10? Please, Mr Howard, if you think I am being
25 unfairly selective, do say so. One of the advantages of

94
1 a hard copy is it easier to look at the whole document.
2 I want to focus on the fourth of those separate
3 headings. This is what you are briefing the Secretary
4 of State to say to the ISC if he is called:
5 "In the course of that process, but before
6 publication, two DIS staff expressed concern to their
7 immediate line manager about the precise language used
8 in some parts of the dossier. These concerns were not
9 so much about the use of intelligence as about the
10 description to be used (eg, the distinction between
11 intelligence shows, indicates or suggests)."
12 First of all, Dr Jones did not complain only to his
13 immediate line manager, did he?
14 A. Well, he copied it to DCDI.
15 Q. We can turn it up, but he copied it to a number of
16 people; but DCDI is top of the list, is it not?
17 A. That is right, yes.
18 Q. Would it not be right that the ISC should be told it was
19 copied to the DCDI because it goes to the gravity of the
20 complaint as Dr Jones perceives it, does it not?
21 A. We could have told the ISC that. I do not think it
22 added very much to the point. The point was he had made
23 his concerns known to his line manager, which is the
24 appropriate thing to do.
25 Q. There is no reference to it being a formal complaint, is

95
1 there?
2 A. I do not think that word appears in here. It may appear
3 in the brief --
4 Q. It does not appear in the speaking note, I think you
5 will find.
6 A. No, I think the word "formally" does not appear but the
7 actual minutes were attached to the brief.
8 Q. There is no reference to the concerns being expressed in
9 writing, is there?
10 A. No, but the minutes were attached to the brief.
11 Q. I am sorry, but I thought you were recommending that the
12 written documents be withheld from the ISC. You are
13 briefing the Secretary of State to simply say that
14 concern was expressed, but he was not told to say, was
15 he, that the concern had been expressed in writing?
16 A. I believe that is implicit in here; but it does not say
17 that explicitly in here, I agree.
18 Q. Was your objective to reduce the risk of being asked for
19 copies of the documents?
20 A. No. No, not at all.
21 Q. Can I ask you this: do you know whether or not Dr Jones
22 saw the final JIC assessment of 9th September at the
23 time that the dossier was being discussed?
24 A. I do not know. He was on leave at that time, so he may
25 not have done.

96
1 Q. I just want to deal, very briefly, with what in fact
2 happened in the ISC. This is not yet on the net, so
3 I will just read it, if I may. You have it in
4 your bundle, the document immediately behind Question
5 Time. I want to read two paragraphs, if I may. First
6 of all, paragraph 97:
7 "When we spoke to the MoD on 22nd July about whether
8 or not any DIS staff had expressed concerns about the
9 drafting of the dossier, the Defence Secretary told us
10 that there had been a dispute in the context of the
11 45 minutes claim about whether it was better to say that
12 the intelligence was showing or indicating. The
13 Defence Secretary did not tell us that two members of
14 the DIS had written with concerns, nor did his
15 officials, even when pressed on this matter after the
16 Defence Secretary had left."
17 Were you one of those officials who was pressed on
18 the matter after the Defence Secretary had left?
19 A. No, I was not present at that meeting.
20 Q. Then, please, paragraph 100, at the bottom of the page,
21 the same page:
22 "It was not until shortly before his appearance
23 before the Hutton Inquiry that the current DCDI,
24 Martin Howard, informed us that two members of the DIS
25 had written to their line managers on 19th and

97
1 20th September with concerns over the language used in
2 the draft dossier. These letters had been copied to the
3 then DCDI but not to the Defence Secretary or the JIC
4 Chairman."
5 It is fair to say, Mr Howard, copies of their
6 letters were then supplied to the ISC; is that right?
7 A. They were supplied just before we saw them on
8 3rd September, I think, yes.
9 Q. What I want to ask you is this: what had changed to
10 prompt disclosure to the ISC later, when you had been
11 briefing against doing so and that briefing had been
12 followed previously?
13 A. The essential change was the establishment of
14 Lord Hutton's Inquiry. The fact I was called as
15 a witness in particular about what happened at the time
16 of the dossier. My judgment in early August was
17 although the issue seemed to me to be tangential to the
18 main thrust of the Inquiry, it would be proper for his
19 Lordship to be concerned that these concerns were
20 expressed. I therefore provided the brief that I gave
21 to the Secretary of State to him, and as a matter of
22 courtesy I arranged for the Secretary to the ISC to be
23 told of this, because it related to a previous
24 appearance by the Secretary of State before their
25 Committee.

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1 Q. Can you help me with this: was your briefing note at
2 18th July sent before or after Mr Scarlett gave evidence
3 to the ISC?
4 A. I am not sure he gave --
5 Q. I truly do not know the date when Mr Scarlett gave
6 evidence.
7 A. He gave evidence on several occasions to the ISC so
8 I really do not know.
9 LORD HUTTON: May I ask you, Mr Howard, about this
10 paragraph 100, which states that:
11 "Martin Howard informed us that two members of the
12 DIS had written to their line managers on 19th and 20th
13 September."
14 You stated that you informed the Clerk to the ISC
15 orally, did you?
16 A. No, no, in fact I asked a unit in the Ministry of
17 Defence, our tribunals and inquiries unit, to tell the
18 Clerk. I think you wrote to the Clerk. So I did not
19 speak to the Clerk directly.
20 LORD HUTTON: You think there was a letter sent to the
21 Clerk?
22 A. As I understand it, there was. I do not have that
23 available, my Lord.
24 LORD HUTTON: Yes. But were the two minutes of 19th and
25 20th September sent or was it simply information sent

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1 that the two members of the DIS had written?
2 A. It was the latter rather than the former.
3 LORD HUTTON: I see, yes.
4 MR CALDECOTT: I think it may help your Lordship's question
5 if one looks at paragraph 102; it does not appear that
6 the letters were volunteered. What happens was they
7 were asked for and then produced.
8 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see, thank you very much.
9 MR CALDECOTT: Going back, if I may, Mr Howard, to the
10 impression that Dr Jones had from the reply you sent to
11 him on 23rd July at MoD/4/12, do you accept that he was
12 misled as to the record being corrected, when at the
13 same time you were in fact briefing that neither his
14 name nor his letter should be produced to the ISC?
15 A. No, I do not accept that. The point of the brief was to
16 set out the substance of his concerns, which it did.
17 Giving his name and giving the actual minute would not
18 have added to that.
19 Q. I do have to put to you the suggestion that it did not
20 remotely convey the substance of his concerns, which was
21 that he had written a formal letter of complaint to
22 Tony Cragg, CDI and that that should be put to
23 a Parliamentary Committee of some kind to correct the
24 record.
25 A. Well, I disagree with you, sir.

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1 Q. Can I just, lastly, ask you, please, just one short
2 miscellaneous question. It is very short indeed. To
3 help you, right at the back of the bundle there is an
4 extract from your evidence. Just so everybody has the
5 evidence, it is Day 2, page 133. At the top of the
6 page, please. You are there talking about the concerns.
7 At line 3 you say this:
8 "That was fully aired within the DIS and those views
9 were taken into account before the Joint Intelligence
10 Committee finally met to review the final text and
11 approve it."
12 It would be right, would it not, that normally --
13 I appreciate there are urgent circumstances sometimes --
14 there would be a meeting of the Joint Intelligence
15 Committee to finalise an assessment, everybody from the
16 different departments is briefed with the concerns of
17 their respective managers and assistants below and then
18 there is a debate?
19 A. That is right, yes.
20 Q. Now, when was this meeting of the Joint Intelligence
21 Committee at which you say Dr Jones' concerns were, in
22 fact, fully aired and discussed?
23 A. Well, I have looked at this, and of course I was not
24 around at the time, and I made an error in saying that
25 this was before the Joint Intelligence Committee finally

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1 met to review the final text because they had met on
2 18th September. However, the final draft was circulated
3 to members of the Joint Intelligence Committee for --
4 and there was an opportunity to comment on it.
5 I felt, again from the record, not being involved
6 personally at the time, that these concerns had been
7 expressed to DIST, had been copied to DCDI. DCDI is
8 a full member of the Joint Intelligence Committee. It
9 was open to him, there was time to raise those with the
10 Chairman and indeed colleagues on the JIC. He could
11 have called for a meeting. The fact is he chose not to.
12 Q. Can I just for completeness, the complaint from the
13 colleague of Dr Jones which I have not referred to much
14 is at CAB/33/114. This is the other letter. This is in
15 fact sent the following day, 20th September.
16 A. Hmm, hmm.
17 Q. You will notice, again, among those copied at the top of
18 the list is DCDI.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Again, not his immediate line manager.
21 A. No.
22 Q. In fact it is three above him and two above Dr Jones.
23 A. Strictly speaking, that is right, yes.
24 Q. Surely in one sense, insofar as Dr Jones' concern was
25 valid, it would be equally a proper concern that the

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1 Foreign Affairs Committee were unaware of this document?
2 A. They set out very similar concerns to Dr Jones.
3 MR CALDECOTT: Thank you very much, my Lord.
4 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you very much.
5 Just looking at that minute, can you just assist,
6 Mr Howard? It begins "MA/DCDI".
7 A. Yes.
8 LORD HUTTON: "MA" relates to?
9 A. My military assistant. Well, then Tony Cragg's military
10 assistant.
11 LORD HUTTON: The next set of letters?
12 A. The names have changed.
13 LORD HUTTON: Just the position.
14 A. I think that is the position occupied by Dr Jones.
15 LORD HUTTON: Then is there a reference to the director of
16 Dr Jones' section?
17 A. Sorry, my Lord?
18 LORD HUTTON: Is there a reference, then, to the director of
19 the scientific and technical branch?
20 A. That is the main addressee here, DIST.
21 LORD HUTTON: Very well. Thank you very much.
22 I am in your hands, Mr Dingemans. Would you like to
23 begin now?
24 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, I will cut down on my time, but I
25 estimate I will be 10 to 15 minutes, and we have someone

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1 coming in at 2 o'clock.
2 Cross-examination by MR DINGEMANS
3 Q. I do not propose to repeat the cross-examination of my
4 learned friends Mr Gompertz or Mr Caldecott. In the
5 limited time available can I put these points to you: as
6 I understand your evidence the gist is: you had no
7 desire to get Dr Kelly's name out into the open?
8 A. No.
9 Q. And you were not aware that anyone else had that desire?
10 A. Not on its own merits. Not to say: we must get his name
11 out. I think people thought it was inevitable, but not
12 in that sense.
13 Q. Did you think anyone else wanted his name out in the
14 open, from anything that was said to you?
15 A. Nothing that was said to me, no.
16 Q. You provided the press statements that you had made in
17 order to avoid charges of a cover up, is that right?
18 A. The press statements were produced and I was involved in
19 drafting them; and, yes, the idea of a press statement
20 was indeed -- one of the reasons for doing so was to
21 avoid allegations of a cover-up.
22 Q. All of which is fine until you get these facts --
23 LORD HUTTON: Sorry, what were the other reasons?
24 A. The other reason, as I mentioned, my Lord, was the view
25 expressed certainly by Sir Kevin Tebbit, which I shared,

104
1 that there was an opportunity to correct the public
2 record on the allegation that the BBC had reported on
3 29th May.
4 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
5 MR DINGEMANS: All of which is fine, is it not, until you
6 get these facts: that after Dr Kelly's name has been
7 confirmed to journalists, and in the course of writing
8 their articles Mr Blitz tells us he gets a call from
9 someone who he describes as "a Whitehall source" who
10 then gives a further briefing, the general gist of which
11 is to say how little involvement Dr Kelly had in the
12 dossier, et cetera, which rather suggests there was
13 a desire to get Dr Kelly's name out into the open and to
14 say that he had nothing to do with the dossier.
15 A. Hmm.
16 Q. Were you aware that anyone was going to brief
17 journalists?
18 A. Certainly not.
19 Q. So it is all a surprise?
20 A. Well, I mean, I personally deprecate that sort of
21 approach --
22 Q. Does everyone else you know deprecate that approach?
23 A. Most people I deal with yes, but years of experience in
24 dealing with the media suggests that these things
25 happen.

105
1 Q. Is there anyone in your department who you knew would
2 brief journalists?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Because the briefing of the journalists rather suggests
5 there was more of a plan or strategy, does it not?
6 A. It could be interpreted that way, but I knew nothing of
7 that. It certainly was not part of any of my
8 consideration in dealing with the press statement or the
9 Q and A briefing.
10 Q. Not your intention?
11 A. No.
12 Q. There were substantial changes made to the press
13 statement. I am not going to take you through those
14 because my learned friend Mr Gompertz has done that, but
15 the first draft of the press statement shown to Dr Kelly
16 did not give any details at all of the unnamed official
17 who had come forward; is that right?
18 A. It had very few details. I think I added a sentence
19 which suggested what he was not.
20 Q. What he was not?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. But nothing was added to say what he was?
23 A. That is right.
24 Q. That was the press statement shown to Dr Kelly on
25 7th July?

106
1 A. That is correct.
2 Q. We know, from our evidence, that that press statement is
3 redrafted on the evening of 7th July.
4 A. Hmm, hmm.
5 Q. It goes over to Downing Street and is drafted on
6 8th July in the morning, on Mr Godric Smith's computer.
7 In the afternoon you have Mr Powell, Mr Campbell,
8 Sir Kevin Tebbit, Mr Scarlett all in Mr Smith's room
9 drafting this press statement.
10 A. Hmm, hmm.
11 Q. Dr Kelly, wholly unaware of this process. And Dr Kelly
12 is consulted about it, as we understand, while he is
13 driving back from RAF Honnington.
14 A. Hmm, hmm.
15 Q. So all that day and a bit's drafting, and Dr Kelly is
16 asked to consent or not to consent on a telephone call
17 as he is driving back from RAF Honnington. Do you
18 consider that fair?
19 A. Well, I was not party to all those discussions earlier
20 on. The first I saw of a longer press statement was
21 when I arrived at Sir Kevin Tebbit's office. All I know
22 was that once it had been completed -- and it still was
23 not that long, it was less than a page long, two-thirds
24 of a page -- that it was read over completely to
25 Dr Kelly on his way back from RAF Honnington and he

107
1 agreed.
2 Perhaps I could add something here: that we could,
3 of course, have retained Dr Kelly in London to consult
4 him over these things, but we agreed that he should go
5 to RAF Honnington to complete his training because he
6 was very anxious to go to Iraq and he needed to complete
7 this training so he could do so. Mr Hatfield had
8 deliberately made a decision to allow him to carry on
9 with his training so as not to rule out the possibility
10 of his deploying to Iraq, which was what he wished to
11 do.
12 Q. Was it made clear to Dr Kelly on the afternoon of 7th
13 July that he was consenting to this whole process?
14 A. I was not party to the phone call between Mr Hatfield --
15 Q. No, 7th July, when you were at the meeting, the process
16 of issuing the press statement, that he could have said:
17 no, I do not want a press statement issued?
18 A. I think if he had said that we would certainly have had
19 to take that into account, but he did not.
20 Q. The Q and A material went through three drafts, as we
21 can see. The first, no name to be given; the second, no
22 name unless consent; the third, a name is to be given.
23 A. Hmm, hmm.
24 Q. The change from the second to the third draft, from: no
25 name to be given unless consent, to: here is the name if

108
1 you get it right, appears to have been deliberate.
2 No-one could have omitted what was in the second draft.
3 A. I am not sure I agree with your description of the
4 second draft. It did not say: with consent; it says
5 that we would need to tell him that we would have to
6 confirm the name, as I recall. The net result was
7 effectively the same, and I repeat what I said earlier,
8 that we had to decide how our department was going to
9 respond if the correct name were put to it; and the view
10 taken, and I agree with this, is that we should confirm
11 it.
12 Q. So what changed between the second draft, when people
13 are looking at whether or not Dr Kelly ought to be the
14 first to know his name is going out to the press --
15 A. Hmm, hmm.
16 Q. -- and the third draft?
17 A. I cannot comment on how that changed. I did not
18 recognise the second draft as one that I had actually
19 seen.
20 Q. You did not see that?
21 A. Well, it was -- I believe it was either on the screen or
22 in front of Ms Teare when we had our conversation on
23 8th July. I assume it was that version. But I do not
24 actually recall having had it in front of me as a piece
25 of paper.

109
1 Q. So it was not your decision to make that change?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Do you recall any discussion about it?
4 A. I do not recall a discussion about that, no.
5 Q. So I will have to ask Ms Teare about that?
6 A. You can certainly ask Ms Teare, yes.
7 Q. And what about the steer on the first draft which was
8 "middle ranking official" and then the confirmation on
9 the final draft "middle ranking official, not Senior
10 Civil Service"; were you party to that?
11 A. I saw that. I believe I agreed it. I thought it was an
12 accurate description of what I understood Dr Kelly's
13 position to be.
14 Q. Did you at this stage think you ought to find out what
15 his involvement with the dossier had been?
16 A. Dr Kelly had set out his involvement in the dossier in
17 some detail in his letter of 30th June. He said
18 something very similar in his interview with Mr Hatfield
19 on 4th July, and also in his evidence to the Foreign
20 Affairs Committee, and I had no reason to think what he
21 said was wrong.
22 Q. You say you had no foresight that the issuing of the
23 press statement that my learned friend put to you, the
24 Q and A material and indeed the Prime Minister's
25 official spokesman's comments, would have led to

110
1 Dr Kelly being identified. In hindsight, do you think
2 that the Q and A material was inevitably going to have
3 that effect?
4 A. With hindsight, it is possible that some material in the
5 Q and A brief could have helped; but I thought it was
6 inevitable that the name would come out, for all sorts
7 of other reasons. I note that evidence given by
8 Mr Rufford, for example, he said he had concluded or
9 thought it was very likely that Dr Kelly was the source
10 before we issued the press statement even.
11 Q. He did not. His evidence in fact was he went on
12 9th July, having read the press statement.
13 A. Earlier than that he did say in his evidence that he
14 thought it was likely that Dr Kelly was the source of --
15 Q. Then he went to confirm it on 9th July, after the press
16 statement.
17 A. Yes, that is right, but before --
18 Q. Even at that stage he did not know.
19 A. You would have to ask Mr Rufford about that, but his
20 evidence implies that he seemed pretty sure it was.
21 Q. Was not the whole vice of the question and answer
22 material this: that the name could come out at 9 o'clock
23 in the morning, 12 o'clock, or 3 o'clock in the
24 afternoon, and Dr Kelly would have been wholly unaware
25 when he was about to be named?

111
1 A. I do not think that is fair. He had been told that his
2 name was likely to come out. As I understand from
3 evidence given by Mrs Kelly, when he saw the fact that
4 a press statement had been made he thought it was
5 inevitable his name would come out. I agree it would
6 not be possible to confirm -- say to him that it will
7 come out at 3 o'clock or 4 o'clock or 5 o'clock because
8 we were in a position of responding to journalists'
9 enquiries.
10 Q. It would have been perfectly possible to have told him,
11 would it not: if the correct name is being put to us we
12 will confirm it?
13 A. It would have been possible to tell him that, yes.
14 Q. Why was it not done?
15 A. It certainly was not done on 8th July. I believe the
16 judgment at the time was that the fact we were going to
17 confirm the name which, as I said, was telling the truth
18 in response to a query, was consistent with what he had
19 been told the previous day, which was that his name was
20 going to come out, or we thought his name was very
21 likely to come out.
22 Q. It was likely that the name would come out, not that
23 your employer would confirm the name. Why was it not
24 done?
25 A. It was not done. It was not considered at the time.

112
1 Q. Was that a fair way to treat Dr Kelly?
2 A. We did not consider he was being treated unfairly at the
3 time.
4 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, those are my questions.
5 LORD HUTTON: Yes, thank you.
6 Mr Howard, in the meeting with Dr Kelly on 7th July
7 when he was told that a statement would have to be
8 issued and that his name might come out, did he express
9 any view that he would like a little time to alert his
10 family, and that he would prefer that he was unnamed in
11 the statement so he would have a little time before the
12 name did come out?
13 A. No, my Lord, I do not think he said that. What was said
14 was that it probably would not be necessary to put his
15 name in the initial announcement but that it would come
16 out later. He accepted that. I do not recall him
17 saying: I would like time to prepare, or anything like
18 that.
19 LORD HUTTON: Yes. When you say he accepted that, can you
20 elaborate a little on that? Did he simply make no
21 comment on it, did he nod, or was it just implicit in
22 his attitude?
23 A. What he said, my Lord, was that first of all he agreed
24 with the press statement, he was happy with that.
25 Secondly, he accepted his name would come out and what

113
1 he said was that one of the reasons he had written was
2 that a colleague from RUSI had linked words used by
3 Andrew Gilligan in his evidence to the Foreign Affairs
4 Committee on 19th June with things that he, Dr Kelly,
5 may have said in the past. I took that to mean that,
6 you know, people outside MoD were already beginning to
7 think that he was the one. So in a sense he was
8 reinforcing the point that Mr Hatfield said to him.
9 LORD HUTTON: Mr Lloyd-Jones, is there anything you would
10 like to ask by way of re-examination?
11 MR LLOYD-JONES: My Lord, I have no re-examination.
12 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Mr Howard.
13 In that case, ladies and gentlemen, I apologise for
14 the slightly shorter lunch break, but we will sit again
15 at 2 o'clock.
16 (1.15 pm)
17 (The short adjournment)
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