1 Thursday, 4th September 2003
2 (10.30 am)
3 MRS OLIVIA BOSCH (called)
4 Examined by MR KNOX
5 Q. Ms Bosch, could you tell the Inquiry your full name?
6 A. Olivia Marriott Bosch.
7 Q. Your occupation?
8 A. Currently Senior Research Fellow at the Royal Institute
9 of International Affairs, also known as Chatham House.
10 Q. Have you been an UNSCOM inspector?
11 A. In the summer of 1996 I was a UN inspector in Iraq for
12 destruction mission for the biological weapons facility
13 at al-Hakim.
14 Q. When did you first become to know Dr Kelly and what were
15 you doing at the time?
16 A. I began to know David Kelly from the autumn of last year
17 after the Iraqi crisis re-emerged in August. At that
18 time the media were interested to speak with former UN
19 inspectors such as myself. It was during that time that
20 I saw David Kelly at a conference at one of the research
21 institutes in London, that is the International
22 Institute for Strategic Studies where I was working at
23 the time.
24 Q. Did you work with Dr Kelly at all?
25 A. I had never worked with him. He was involved more with
1 the interview and discovery processes regarding Iraqi
2 biological weapons programmes. I was on a destruction
3 mission, which is a different kind of process.
4 Q. Sorry, a different kind of process from the one he was
6 A. Right, yes.
7 Q. Which is?
8 A. He did more interviews of senior Iraqi officials and he
9 did a lot of the discovery process of what the Iraqi WMD
10 programmes were about in the early 1990s throughout to
11 the late 1990s.
12 Q. You were on the destruction side of the programme?
13 A. Right. And I was only there one time in the summer of
14 1996. David Kelly was continuously going out to Iraq
15 from 1991 to 1998 during the UNSCOM period.
16 Q. I think you say you came to know Dr Kelly in the autumn
17 of 2002?
18 A. Right.
19 Q. Where exactly was it that you came to know him?
20 A. There was a conference at the IISS; and I saw him there.
21 I knew of him because of his reputation as an expert on
22 Iraqi programmes. And he had also heard of me. So we
23 had actually heard of each other but never had actually
24 met. And because of the media interest in -- as to what
25 the inspectors were doing, I went up to him and
1 introduced myself and asked if I might be able to
2 telephone him on occasion to seek his technical
3 expertise for background information, if I needed it,
4 for media interviews.
5 Q. He gave you his phone number?
6 A. He had no problem with giving the phone number and we
7 spoke -- began to speak on the telephone from that point
9 Q. Did you meet him as well, in 2002, before we get to
11 A. Yes, there were about three or four meetings; at some of
12 the research institutes they have general meetings and
13 also at his talk at the Foreign Office open day
14 in November, he was giving a talk there and I attended
15 that. He came to Chatham House as well, at a talk I was
16 giving there.
17 Q. What type of things did you speak about?
18 A. We always spoke about Iraq and the programmes of weapons
19 of mass destruction.
20 Q. Did he express any views to you about the weapons of
21 mass destruction programmes in 2002?
22 A. Well, we were trying to examine the programmes, what
23 they were. At that time, he had -- he had mentioned to
24 me once that he had done some historical background
25 preparation for the UK dossier, and in a way both of us
1 agreed that the dossier was a very necessary document
2 because the public and the media and politicians really
3 were not aware of what was going on inside of Iraq. It
4 had been four years since inspectors were there, and the
5 activities that the Iraqis had done during the UNSCOM
6 period, in terms of their deception and concealment
7 plans, were rather below the radar so there was not much
8 press coverage. So in effect, by the time September --
9 the autumn of 2002, it seemed that everyone was learning
10 for the first time what was going on in Iraq.
11 Q. So he felt that was why the September dossier was
13 A. We both did, in that sense. Yes, he would have. It was
14 seen as a document to inform the public. And it would
15 not have been a document similar to that that the IISS
16 had produced, which was very good in facts and figures
17 and analysis and would not have been as reader-friendly
18 as perhaps the UK dossier would have been, because it
19 was much shorter -- something that the public could pick
20 up and read much more easily than the IISS document.
21 Q. Can I take you to the position in 2003? As from the
22 beginning of 2003 you continued to remain in contact
23 with Dr Kelly?
24 A. Yes, because that then began the period -- the
25 inspections had begun in Iraq in November. The Iraqi
1 regime had prepared declaration in December and it was
2 part of the November 1441, which was the UN Security
3 Council resolution, that Hans Blix and his colleague, or
4 counterpart at the IEA were to give regular reports to
5 the UN Security Council to assess the progress that the
6 inspectors were making in Iraq.
7 Q. Did you meet Dr Kelly in England at all in this period,
8 early 2003?
9 A. Yes. I was all this time in the UK. And maybe we met
10 in -- again at some of the -- particularly at
11 Chatham House because at that time, in February 2003,
12 I had moved to Chatham House. We had several general
13 meetings at Chatham House which discussed the
14 preparation to go into war in Iraq and David would come
15 to those. I alerted it to him. In fact, he became
16 a member of Chatham House so he could easily attend
17 these general meetings. There were about three,
18 I think, he came to in the beginning part of the year,
19 prior to May 1st.
20 Q. Did Dr Kelly express any reservations about the
21 proposition that there should be a war in Iraq shortly
22 before it took place?
23 A. I think his views were very well stated in The Observer
24 article that was published this past Sunday. We had
25 very similar views, and that while it was unfortunate
1 that war might have to be done, the use of military
2 force would seem to have been the only way for this
3 particular regime to be able to deal with its
5 The Iraqi regime was not complying to its UN
6 obligations; and while the US and the UK had threatened
7 the use of force throughout the autumn and early 2003,
8 and this threat was very effective and we both thought,
9 and I particularly thought that this was the main reason
10 why the Iraqi regime had brought -- allowed the
11 inspectors to come back. And any kind of perceived
12 concession which the Iraqis were giving -- it was only
13 in process -- was due to the threat of use of military
15 Q. If I can just stop you there for a moment. How often in
16 this period, early 2003, would you speak to Dr Kelly?
17 A. I think you can check on the telephone records, but two
18 or three times a week, possibly more; and we spoke more
19 on the phone, pretty much. That was the type of
20 relationship we had. In terms of e-mails, that would be
21 exchange of information, if there was a press article
22 here or some kind of news item that we thought
23 significant. We had a very interactive rapport and at
24 one time he said he liked talking with me because I had
25 an international security perspective; it was in
1 contrast to but complemented his technical background.
2 Q. What about after the conflict had finished? Did you
3 remain in touch with Dr Kelly?
4 A. During the conflict we spoke actually on a daily basis
5 at that point because we were trying to watch out for
6 the moment or at any time that weapons of mass
7 destruction might be used or found; and so we had -- we
8 would be assessing press coverage. In fact, that is the
9 only thing I had to go on, what was in the press
10 regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq during the
12 So then, after the conflict, well the war was over
13 so we did not quite talk so much. We had established
14 a rapport. We would maybe talk three times a week or
15 so. There were issues of post-conflict reconstruction,
16 the SARS outbreak occurred and because he has
17 a speciality in virology that was something I was
18 interested to seek his views on in terms of the nature
19 of the virus that SARS was.
20 Then around May or so, mid May, the focus went back
21 again to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, because
22 press and politicians were wondering where they were.
23 Q. Did you at all discuss issues relating to the media
24 after May 2003, when the story blew up again?
25 A. Yes, because the media, again, and politicians were
1 wanting to assess where the weapons were; and we were
2 both talking about it and we were always talking about
3 that there was to be an emphasis on the programmes, that
4 the press and everyone was somewhat too focused on the
5 weapon as a smoking gun because that really was not the
6 issue, it was the programmes. Because programmes imply
7 intent to have a capability. And that was quite
8 important and had not really seemed to be brought out in
9 any of the coverage. And it was -- we would talk about
10 what trends the journalists were pursuing and what some
11 of the themes were. And there were, I guess, about
12 three occasions when he was concerned about press
13 reporting of him.
14 Q. That is to say the press reports which seemed to rely on
15 him or named him?
16 A. Well, one in particular that named him. He mentioned
17 that he did speak to journalists -- let me, if I may,
18 look to my notes on something now.
19 Q. Perhaps I can just call up BBC/4/165. You will see an
20 article appearing on the screen in front of you.
21 A. Okay.
22 Q. It is an article in the Sunday Times on 13th April.
23 A. I had not actually seen that article but what he did
24 mention, and it was about that time that David -- he
25 told me he was surprised to find that a journalist he
1 had known quite well had quoted his name in an article.
2 He did not tell me who that journalist was, although
3 I know from the Inquiry who it is.
4 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes. What was the name he mentioned?
5 A. He did not mention -- at that time he did not mention to
6 me the name of the journalist.
7 LORD HUTTON: I see, yes.
8 A. He would be very discreet often in that manner.
9 MR KNOX: It may be this. This is an article written on
10 13th April 2003 by Mr Rufford.
11 A. Right.
12 Q. You will see, in the fourth paragraph down, there is
13 a reference to:
14 "Dr David Kelly, the UN's former chief weapons
15 inspector, said al-Saadi 'knew where all the bodies were
16 buried', adding: 'He advised Saddam on what he could get
17 away with'."
18 Do you think it would have been around this type of
19 time, about April 2003, that he mentioned he was
20 surprised to find his name in an article?
21 A. Yes, because he said it would a rather contentious
22 statement -- that it would be interpreted to be
23 contentious. He remarked to me that his understanding
24 with journalists was he would only give background
25 briefings and that his name was not to be mentioned. He
1 had mentioned to me that he had to reassure his Foreign
2 Office minder about this news reference. He was having
3 to deal with his Foreign Office minder about this.
4 Q. What did Dr Dr Kelly say about his relationship with the
5 press generally?
6 A. He seemed fairly relaxed about it. He seemed to enjoy
7 talking with the press and giving them background
8 information. He knew that they were seeking information
9 to better understand what some of the processes were
10 that were going on in Iraq. And if I refer to my second
11 statement, where I mention that in terms of an approach
12 he said that the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence
13 had different approaches. And I started -- and I kind
14 of led -- I said: do you mean that you do not talk --
15 sorry: with respect to the Ministry of Defence, is it
16 that you do not talk to journalists or the press unless
17 there was a reason to do so, whereas the Foreign Office
18 was more relaxed? And in effect -- and then
19 I started -- that you could speak -- he was saying:
20 unless there was a reason not to. So they had slightly
21 different emphasis in terms of what it was.
22 But, on the whole, I understood that he
23 recognised -- and he said he would need
24 pre-authorisation for that but on occasion, sometimes,
25 he would speak on the telephone for a quick answer or
1 something like that that he might not get that
2 pre-authorised, but the Foreign Office was much more
3 relaxed in his dealings with them.
4 Q. You have mentioned one occasion when Dr Kelly found his
5 name in the press, which he was upset by, which perhaps
6 is the article I took you to. Did Dr Kelly around this
7 time, April or May, around that type of time, did he
8 have any further discussion with you about his contacts
9 with the press?
10 A. Well, he mentioned in his -- I am not sure of the time
11 sequence but if I go through here. It was another time
12 towards mid May he told me he had an unauthorised
13 meeting with Andrew Gilligan, someone he had met
14 a couple of times before but did not know that well.
15 And he said he was -- he was taken aback by the way
16 Andrew Gilligan tried to elicit information from him.
17 I said: yes, but that is what journalists do. He
18 understood that, but he said he had never experienced it
19 in the way that Gilligan had tried to do so, by a name
20 game was the term.
21 Q. Just pause there for a moment. Did he explain what he
22 meant by "name game"?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Well, what did he say?
25 A. Okay, and this was with reference to the September
1 dossier and I do not recall exactly what aspect of it.
2 It was the name game bit was what reminded -- what
3 sticks in my mind. He said that Gilligan wanted to play
4 a name game as to who was responsible for inserting
5 information into the dossier, and that if I understand
6 correctly Gilligan said to him: I will name you some
7 names. Apparently David had said that Gilligan very
8 quickly -- the first name he mentioned very quickly and
9 immediately was Campbell. David told me he could
10 neither confirm nor deny. David said as he was a civil
11 servant he could not provide Government names, least of
12 all to a journalist. We kind of laughed there. Nor
13 could he deny as Gilligan would continue listing names
14 or could continue listing names until the right name
15 came up.
16 Q. Did Dr Kelly then say what he had actually said to
18 A. Yes, then he said what he actually said. Because he
19 could not confirm or deny but he thought he had to give
20 an answer so he said "maybe".
21 Q. So in other words what had happened is Gilligan had come
22 up with the name Campbell and then Dr Kelly had said:
24 A. Right.
25 LORD HUTTON: Did you understand if Mr Gilligan had given
1 more names -- you said he came up almost immediately
2 with that name.
3 A. Right. It is part of this name game that Campbell --
4 sorry, that Gilligan had quickly put up Campbell. It
5 did not give David time really to think about what was
6 going on in that way.
7 LORD HUTTON: Did you understand that was the first name?
8 A. Yes, the very first name.
9 MR KNOX: I just want to get this right: did Dr Kelly say he
10 had given Gilligan this explanation about not being able
11 to name civil servants or did Dr Kelly say: he said
12 Campbell, I said maybe, and the reason I did that is
13 because I am a civil servant.
14 A. I am not clear. He might have said to Gilligan that he
15 cannot give names but I am not clear. I cannot remember
17 Q. You cannot remember precisely what he said he had said
18 to Gilligan?
19 A. Yes, right on that. In terms of this kind of process.
20 LORD HUTTON: Ms Bosch, you said Dr Kelly told you he had an
21 unauthorised meeting with Mr Gilligan.
22 A. Yes.
23 LORD HUTTON: Did he use the word "unauthorised"?
24 A. Yes, he did.
25 LORD HUTTON: How did he come to say that? Did he just say
1 to you: I had an unauthorised meeting with Mr Gilligan?
2 A. Yes, because we would just talk kind of freely about
3 journalists who you would see, whatever, and I believe
4 that he had come back -- I do not know if it was that
5 very night he mentioned it or whatever. But we had --
6 he had, in previous conversations, mentioned authorised
7 and unauthorised.
8 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
9 A. And he had mentioned this was an unauthorised meeting.
10 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
11 A. So confiding, I suppose, in a way.
12 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
13 MR KNOX: Just two things on this conversation. Was this
14 a meeting you had or was this over the telephone?
15 A. This was over the telephone.
16 Q. I know it is difficult to recall dates but could you put
17 an approximate date on this conversation?
18 A. Some time in May. It does not really stick with me
19 because, in a sense, this did not come to mind until
20 after this whole -- until he died.
21 Q. Can I just try to pin it down like this?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. We know there appears to have been a meeting between
24 Dr Kelly and Mr Gilligan on the 22nd May.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. We know also Mr Gilligan made a report on the Today
2 Programme on 29th May.
3 A. Hmm.
4 Q. Did you hear that report on 29th May?
5 A. No, I was abroad at a conference and was not back until
6 after the 31st. I heard the one on 4th June.
7 Q. When you say the one -- that would be a Susan Watts
8 broadcast on 4th June or --
9 A. I understood that Gilligan also had a Today Programme on
10 4th June, right. But I remember Gilligan mentioning
11 something to the effect about -- that there were persons
12 who disagreed with the 45 minutes, that kind of -- the
13 whole issue on that.
14 Q. Just trying to get a date on this again. You said you
15 went away at the end of May?
16 A. Right.
17 Q. When did you go away at the end of May?
18 A. On the 28th.
19 Q. Do you think your conversation with Dr Kelly was while
20 you were still in England?
21 A. Yes, it would have been before that.
22 Q. In all probability it is some time between 22nd and
23 28th May?
24 A. Yes, in terms of that conversation with David, that is
25 quite possible, yes.
1 Q. About Mr Gilligan?
2 A. Yes. And -- yes, go ahead.
3 Q. I think you said a moment ago you did not hear the
4 broadcast of 29th May but you did hear a broadcast by
5 Mr Gilligan on 4th June, is that right?
6 A. I am assuming -- yes, yes.
7 Q. That was on the radio?
8 A. On the radio, I listened to the --
9 Q. When you heard that, did you think that Dr Kelly might
10 be the source of that conversation?
11 A. No, no.
12 Q. Can I ask you this: why was that? After all, he had
13 told you he had only recently spoken to Mr Gilligan and
14 had an unauthorised conversation. Why did you assume he
15 was not the source of the report you heard on 4th June?
16 A. Because the manner of the report was one in which it
17 appeared that there was an attempt to whistle blow or to
18 reflect concerns that were against Government policy and
19 I would never have expected, in all the conversations
20 with David, that that was something he would do. Again,
21 his -- the article in The Observer that was printed last
22 Sunday very much captures the conversation -- the types
23 of perceptions he had and that we talked about.
24 Q. I think you said you were abroad at the time the Today
25 Programme rang. You then came back to England?
1 A. Right.
2 Q. That is presumably where you heard the 4th June
4 A. Right.
5 Q. Did you speak to Dr Kelly after that about this
7 A. No. Let me -- if I might add something to this. On
8 3rd June David had telephoned -- I think he telephoned
9 me, I was at work, and so I would have just come back,
10 not hearing what was going on, on whatever hoo-ha that
11 was going on in the UK. I do not recall that David had
12 mentioned that to me, the 29th May conversation. But
13 what he mentioned to me was that he was concerned that
14 some of the people he was having to deal with in the
15 intelligence community did not seem to appreciate or
16 recognise that intelligence was not an exact science.
17 I had mentioned an article that I had which I could
18 send him to help explain the difference about
19 information used for purposes of evidence, such as what
20 law enforcement would require as opposed to information
21 that might be used and assessed for intelligence
22 purposes. And he said: oh that seemed really good,
23 could you fax it to me? And I said, well, as I was at
24 work, I had it at home so I could post it. He said:
25 well, I am actually travelling tomorrow, which is
1 4th June, and would not actually receive it but go ahead
2 and send it anyway. And I have the title, the name and
3 it would be amongst -- I sent it to him and it should be
4 amongst the documentation that he had, if you are
6 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.
7 A. And it was an article called "Should spies be cops?" by
8 Stewart Baker in the journal Foreign Policy number 97,
9 winter 1994/95.
10 MR KNOX: Just going back to this question of your
11 discussions about Mr Gilligan's broadcasts, did you
12 suggest anything about what everyone was talking about,
13 about rogue elements or anything that?
14 A. Okay. So then he went away on the 4th. That morning of
15 the 4th -- I heard the programme, but he was away. But
16 when he came back he -- I mentioned: oh well, you picked
17 a good time to go away because everyone is looking for
18 rogue elements in the Intelligence Services (kind of
19 jokingly) you were away at the time but everyone in the
20 UK is talking about all this. So he escaped having
21 press attention. But it was not because of Gilligan on
22 that. At that time, I had no -- did not at all think
23 that it was him.
24 Q. When you mentioned rogue elements, what did he say to
1 A. Nothing. He did not make any kind of comment on that.
2 And then I mentioned that they were looking for a person
3 in charge of the dossier and a senior member -- by that
4 time some concern was a senior member of the
5 Intelligence Services; and David said: I am not any of
6 those. Both of us, we did not pay any more attention to
7 the debate because it was a very narrow debate. We
8 thought it was politicisation and internal politics, so
9 we did not really pay any attention to it because we
10 were more interested in what was going on in Iraq.
11 Q. We know there were some Foreign Affairs Committee
12 hearings in June into the war in Iraq.
13 A. Hmm.
14 Q. Did you go to any of those hearings?
15 A. Yes, I went to four of them. I was interested to hear
16 what some of the witnesses would be talking about
17 regarding the programmes in Iraq. I heard Terry Taylor,
18 Professor Inge, al-Marashi and Andrew Wilkie. I thought
19 I would hear what they might have to say.
20 Q. One of the people who gave evidence to the Foreign
21 Affairs Committee was Mr Gilligan. I think he did that
22 on 19th June. Did you go to hear his evidence?
23 A. No, I did not go to any of the politicians -- any of the
24 politicians' evidences because again this -- there was
25 internal politics; I wanted to hear more about what was
1 going on in the Iraq.
2 Q. Or journalists?
3 A. Or journalists, in that sense. It was a politicised
4 debate. There was -- I must say, the four that I heard,
5 three in particular, were very enlightening on what was
6 going on in Iraq and I was quite surprised that there
7 was -- there were very few journalists there, or if they
8 were, in the case of one, that the press had not
9 reported on some interesting information about what was
10 going on in Iraq. The press reporting tended to be on
11 the Gilligan and Campbell debate.
12 Q. After Gilligan had given his evidence, did you find out
13 about the fact he had given evidence?
14 A. Yes, because -- at this time, too, I say that
15 David Kelly was going to the States. The whole week
16 from about 15th to 21st or so David was away during most
17 of the Foreign Affairs Committee and he said: well,
18 Olivia, I can count on you to tell me what happens, when
19 he gets back. So, I mentioned some things when he did
20 get back, but again, during -- in that week after the
21 21st there was even more heated debate about what was
22 going on between Gilligan et cetera and I thought:
23 I better just read to inform myself exactly what it was
24 that he was supposed to have said.
25 Q. Supposed to have said at the Foreign Affairs Committee?
1 A. Yes, that Gilligan had said at the Foreign Affairs
3 Q. So what did you do?
4 A. So I went to the Foreign Affairs Committee website and
5 looked in the oral evidence side and I was reading
6 through it. And then he mentioned a person he had
7 interviewed on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
8 programmes and I thought: oh, this could be David.
9 Q. Why did you think that?
10 A. Because there was a discussion about Campbell and the
11 dossier; and I remember that David had mentioned that
12 Gilligan had tried to talk to him about the dossier and
14 Q. There was that feature. Was there any other feature in
15 Mr Gilligan's evidence which made you think perhaps he
16 is referring to a conversation with Dr Kelly as his
18 A. It was pretty much in the beginning part of the
19 evidence; and I -- that is what I thought of. And
20 I thought, well, David has been away and I did not get
21 the feeling that he was necessarily keeping up with all
22 the press; and so I e-mailed him, I am pretty sure it
23 was the -- I think it was 24th June but the computer
24 forensics will be able to find this for sure.
25 I e-mailed him and said: you might want to look at this.
1 And then that was --
2 Q. Just pause there. What did you actually e-mail him,
3 Mr Gilligan's evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee?
4 A. I e-mailed him the web link to his oral evidence as it
5 was on the Foreign Affairs Committee website.
6 Q. So you e-mailed the web link to him saying: you might
7 want to look at this?
8 A. That is right, a short message on that.
9 Q. If we go to COM/4/64.
10 A. Do I have to push a button here?
11 LORD HUTTON: No, it will come up hopefully.
12 A. Okay.
13 LORD HUTTON: It usually does.
14 A. Oh 25th, okay. Oh, you found it. Yes, that is it.
15 MR KNOX: You have mentioned the reference to Mr Campbell;
16 was there anything else that you mentioned to Dr Kelly
17 in Mr Gilligan's evidence that made you think of him or
18 was it just the reference to Campbell?
19 A. Well, I spoke to David that evening, because I sent the
20 e-mail; and then -- and I said to him -- I said: well --
21 because I was -- I said: David, there might be some
22 turns of phrase that you might have in there; and David
23 mentioned what those might have been. He was saying the
24 reference to the size of the programmes in there. And
25 it was a way just -- you know, I sent him that because
1 if he had any concerns, that it was a way for me to flag
2 up to David that there was this debate and that possibly
3 that might be him, and it was in case David had any
4 concerns about it having been an unauthorised meeting.
5 But I did not really recognise David's phrasing, not
6 really. My -- the main thing was the Campbell
7 discussion he had with Campbell (sic) on that. But in
8 terms of what Gilligan had said, there was not much of
9 David's phrasing that I recognised.
10 Q. Did you speak to Dr Kelly about this subject again?
11 A. Yes; and then it was -- and I am not sure exactly, but
12 maybe a day or two later or so, he mentioned that he was
13 thinking -- I think he said he was going to go to his
14 line manager and mention that he had an unauthorised
15 meeting with Gilligan so that he could clear the matter
16 in his own mind.
17 Q. Now we know he wrote the letter on 30th June and had an
18 interview on 4th July. Do you know if you spoke to him
19 after 30th June, after he had written the letter?
20 A. Well, he had mentioned that he did speak to his line
21 manager. I did not know he had written the letter. In
22 fact, I did not know he had written a letter until after
23 his death and one of the Sunday papers had mentioned
24 that a colleague had made him aware of Gilligan's
25 evidence, this is one of the Sunday papers. And I read
1 that and I thought that might be me.
2 Q. Why did you think that?
3 A. Well, because I did make him aware of Gilligan's
4 evidence; and also he said that a colleague at RUSI --
5 and we often had a joke because somehow he had this
6 thing in his head that I was at RUSI. I thought: oh
7 yes, that is me. It sounds like it was. And I joked
8 about previously, months before, he would mention RUSI,
9 I would say it is Royal Institute of International
10 Affairs, it is RIIA, it is Chatham House and we would be
12 So Sunday newspapers I saw it in there and that
13 Monday, if I just might add, after he died I did go to
14 a colleague of his in the MoD immediately and say:
15 I think that is me. So ...
16 Q. You being the person in RUSI?
17 A. Yes, right. And they asked, you know, was that to
18 deflect the press? I said: no, he just had this thing
19 in his head to call me RUSI, it was a mistake,
20 a misattribution.
21 Q. We know that there were various e-mails -- there was
22 some e-mail contact between yourself and Dr Kelly
23 in July. Can I just ask you, first of all, to go to
24 COM/4/90? This is an e-mail, I think, halfway down the
25 page, from you --
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. -- with an attachment:
3 "Dear David, I have received this request -- foreign
4 which is interesting -- I am not sure I want to be
5 around. Speak with you later."
6 Can you just explain what the background to this
8 A. (Pause). Oh, let me see. Is that 3rd July? I think
9 press were referring to -- I think, if I recall, that
10 the -- you can help me with the press -- the
11 programmes -- I think there was a -- programmes of --
12 weapons of mass destruction programmes might have been
13 what the Government was using and so everyone fed -- let
14 me see -- hold on. Let me see. The request is about
15 a project that we were working on.
16 Q. I think perhaps if we can scroll down the page -- I did
17 not realise it had not scrolled down the page -- there
18 is an attachment from Andrew Foord to yourself. It
19 looks for interviews you have been asked to give. You
20 are discussing the request with Dr Kelly.
21 A. Right, okay, yes. Let me see ... (Pause). Yes, the
22 press would have asked me what my views were about the
23 Foreign Affairs Committee report or when -- or about
24 the -- yes, I did not think -- I do not think I did that
1 Q. Just to pause there for a moment. You were asking
2 Dr Kelly about this. Was there any reason as to why you
3 were asking Dr Kelly about whether or not you should do
4 this interview?
5 A. No, I think I was just letting him know that the press
6 were interested in this topic. I would often say: here
7 is a line of thinking that the press were interested in.
8 LORD HUTTON: It is difficult to make out the date on that
10 A. Is that 3rd July?
11 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you very much. Yes.
12 A. And that is right -- foreign is interesting, that is
13 right, because it was a foreign news -- broadcasting
14 company that was interested in British politics, right.
15 So it seemed that there was politics outside the UK were
16 interested in what the Foreign Affairs Committee was
17 doing. Right.
18 MR KNOX: If we go to COM/4/89.
19 A. Right, yes.
20 Q. You will see he is telling you on 5th July --
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. -- that he is going to be going training on Monday and
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. That was presumably training in order to prepare to go
1 back to Iraq, was it, as far as you are aware?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Then COM/4/88, there are some further e-mails, one from
4 you to Dr Kelly, halfway up the page. And then --
5 A. Oh yes.
6 Q. -- another one at the top of the page.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And it looks, from this, as if you were both in touch
9 with each other and he was not expecting anything
10 unusual at the time.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Coming to this period at 7th or 8th July, did you have
13 any telephone contact with Dr Kelly?
14 A. Yes. He mentioned -- I think when he was training he
15 had to go back -- he had an interruption to go to
16 London, I think on the Monday; and then training -- hold
17 on ... (Pause). So the training would have been on --
18 LORD HUTTON: Monday, 7th July, yes.
19 A. Yes. Right, the 7th and 8th. That is right, the
20 training. He had an interruption, he had to go back to
21 London on the 7th.
22 MR KNOX: I think you have just been looking at your diary,
23 is that right, to check?
24 A. Yes, to recall the day of the week, because the
25 trainings were on a Monday and a Tuesday.
1 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
2 MR KNOX: If we can look up at COM/4/84 you see there is
3 another e-mail on 9th July --
4 A. Hmm, hmm.
5 Q. -- which he is sending you at 2.52 in answer to one that
6 you have written at 5 past 2.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. You will see yours is at the foot of the page saying
9 there is a programme "Weapons inspectors uncovered".
10 You heard Newsnight last night. Then at 2.52 on
11 9th July he writes saying:
12 "Thanks. I gave Newsnight a miss. Call tonight if
13 you can. Best wishes."
14 A. I remember on the 9th, when I sent that e-mail on the
15 9th at 2 o'clock, I sent it and then I had to go to
16 a meeting. I sent it from home. I had a meeting to go
17 to. I did not actually read his e-mail until I returned
18 later that evening.
19 Q. Had you spoken to Dr Kelly at about this time, on the
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. In that case, can you remember when did you did speak to
24 A. I would have spoken on the 7th and the 8th and the 9th.
25 And on the 9th I did as he said, I called him.
1 Q. "Tonight"?
2 A. Yes, I called him on that evening, yes.
3 Q. Can you recall what time you called him, roughly?
4 A. Around 7-ish or so, 7/8 -- 7-ish.
5 Q. What telephone did you call him on, his mobile phone or
6 his home line?
7 A. I probably would have used -- started on -- what did it
8 say -- did it say mobile? I would normally have called,
9 first instance, his land line. There were some problems
10 in the village at some point; I think in one of the
11 earlier e-mails where I said I tried to call him on the
12 Sunday, the village had problems and everyone's phone
13 line was down. So I would have tried anyway his home --
14 sorry, the land line. Then I -- there was no answer
15 machine. Then I tried his mobile and he picked up.
16 Q. And he picked that up?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And how did the conversation go?
19 A. I said: hello, and he said: I have cut and run. I said:
20 what? I was not sure what he said. He said: I have cut
21 and run. It was not a phrase that I expected him to
23 Q. Did he say why he had cut and run?
24 A. Yes, he said that he was advised that he should go
25 because the press were coming to his house and that he
1 would have to be leaving his home.
2 Q. Did he say he was with anyone?
3 A. Yes, he was with his wife. Hmm, hmm.
4 Q. Was it apparent he was in a car or not, or was he
6 A. I am not sure if he was in a car or a train but he was
7 moving, yes. He was on the road or whatever, yes.
8 Q. Did he say anything about being offered somewhere to go
9 or not?
10 A. Yes, he said he had meetings in the MoD about the
11 situation and that, if I recall, he had been given -- he
12 was kind of quiet and he said -- a reprimand and they
13 even -- there was something to the effect about his
14 pension and his clearance might be affected. He had
15 been with his wife. He had been offered like a safe
16 house but he did not want to take that up.
17 Q. Did he say who had offered him a safe house?
18 A. I do not recall, I cannot remember, no.
19 Q. He also said, I think you mentioned something a moment
20 ago about his pension or clearance might be taken away.
21 Did he say he had been told that by the Ministry of
22 Defence or was that him expressing his own fears?
23 A. I thought he said they talked about his pension or
24 clearance might have been taken away; and I did not
25 know, you know, about any of the meetings he had and all
2 LORD HUTTON: He said he had had a meeting in the MoD, was
3 that right?
4 A. Yes, he mentioned that.
5 LORD HUTTON: And did he describe the nature of the meeting?
6 A. No. I assumed it was about the Gilligan -- because the
7 day before he mentioned that he had been pulled over on
8 the side of the road to talk about a press statement
9 that was being drafted, I think it was on the 8th when
10 he was --
11 LORD HUTTON: Pulled over on the side of the road?
12 A. He was driving at some point and someone from the --
13 I think he said MoD, they were drafting -- doing a draft
14 statement and had a correction and wanted his assessment
15 of that; and I thought that -- I think that was on the
16 evening -- the 7th -- I thought that had to do with
17 something in -- when he was with his training, during
18 the time that he was doing his training.
19 LORD HUTTON: Sorry to interrupt you. You said he was
20 pulling over on the side of the road.
21 A. No, no, no. He got a telephone message on his mobile,
22 and to be able to understand it he drove off the road
23 into a place --
24 LORD HUTTON: Yes, a lay by.
25 A. A lay by, so he could listen to what was being read to
2 LORD HUTTON: I see.
3 MR KNOX: This was on the 8th July, this conversation you
5 A. I thought that was something -- I thought maybe it was
6 when he was on -- related to his days of training.
7 LORD HUTTON: I am sorry, could we just go back a little?
8 I may have misheard you. I thought you used some
9 adjective in describing the meeting he said he had had
10 at the MoD. Could you just go back on the screen half
11 a dozen sentences?
12 MR KNOX: Page 30.
13 LORD HUTTON: I see it now, thank you. You said he was kind
14 of quiet.
15 A. Yes, he was speaking --
16 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed.
17 A. He was not expressing any excitement or disgust or
18 anything like that.
19 MR KNOX: You mentioned this meeting or conversation he had
20 with the MoD. Did he say when this meeting had taken
22 A. I do not recall. I do not think so, no.
23 Q. You have this conversation with him on 9th July, on the
24 evening of the 9th July?
25 A. Hmm, hmm.
1 Q. Did you speak to Dr Kelly between 9th July and 15th July
2 when he appeared in front of the Foreign Affairs
4 A. Yes, because at -- during -- at the end of our
5 conversation on 9th July he says: well, keep in touch
6 with me and let me know what happens, vis a vis the
8 Q. So you had a few more telephone conversations?
9 A. Yes, we spoke through the next -- about every day during
10 that time.
11 Q. Did you speak about the Gilligan piece at all or about
12 the Gilligan situation?
13 A. Well, I remember talking to him, I think it was the next
14 day, the BBC had put -- sorry, the MoD had put out
15 a statement and then the BBC had put out
16 a counterstatement, and then -- sorry, I -- there was
17 a BBC counterstatement and another MoD statement; and
18 I was -- I had two of those. One of the MoD statements
19 and the BBC one -- I do not remember but I could go
20 through -- I was reading through to him, and we kind of
21 were trying to make sense, you know, what were they
22 trying to correlate. It seemed a bit confusing or so,
23 but at one point he did say, because I mentioned in the
24 BBC statement that Susan Watts was brought in there, the
25 BBC statement had mentioned Susan Watts --
1 Q. Could you stop there for a moment? Could we go to
2 CAB/1/518. We can perhaps see what the statement is.
3 This is a statement issued by the BBC, I think, on
4 9th -- sorry, 517, I think the statement begins.
5 A. Hmm, oh yes, okay.
6 Q. CAB/1/502.
7 A. We might want to go back to that one, but yes.
8 Q. I think you can see, at the foot of the page, there is
9 a reference to Susan Watts. Do you see this?
10 A. Right, yes.
11 Q. Do you recognise this statement as the BBC statement?
12 A. Yes. That was it, yes. I commented to him that notes
13 were deposited in the BBC legal department and, you
14 know, had he seen those, because I do not know what the
15 nature of correspondence was between whatever. And also
16 I mentioned that -- I read that section out to him, and
17 he was very -- somewhat indignant and said: well, what
18 does she have to do with this?
19 Q. You read that section out?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Can you clarify which particular section you read out to
23 A. "What we do know is that Mr Gilligan's notes and account
24 of what he was told are very similar to the notes of
25 a conversation Susan Watts, science editor of Newsnight,
1 had with her source which led to the Newsnight reports
2 of June 2 and 4."
3 Q. So you read that to him and he is indignant?
4 A. And he says: what does she have to do with this?
5 Q. If I can go back to the reference at 517.
6 A. Hmm.
7 Q. You will see this is a Times article that appeared on
8 10th July.
9 A. Hmm.
10 Q. Did you see this article in The Times, page 517?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Obviously this article names Dr Kelly. Did you talk to
13 Dr Kelly about this article?
14 A. Yes, I did on, I think, two occasions. I am not sure
15 that I mentioned this article at that time. I would
16 have mentioned this article when he knew he was going to
17 appear before the Foreign Affairs Committee, though
18 I might have -- let me see. Hold on. (Pause). Can you
19 please scroll down a little bit on this? (Pause). Yes,
20 I might have -- at some point I mentioned that they said
21 it was a lunchtime meeting, and during the course of the
22 weekend I e-mailed him, because I was not quite sure
23 where he was in the early part of that week anyway --
24 when he was away, weekend. And they were referring
25 to ... (Pause). Yes, this is the line:
1 "Richard Sambrook, Director of News, had been told
2 the name ..."
3 And I read this out to him at some point during this
5 "While the post held by the source is known also to
6 Greg Dyke, the corporation's Director General ..."
7 I read that to him and I said they are said to have
8 been assured by his knowledge, with one executive
9 boasting that disclosure of his identity would transform
10 the debate.
11 And I said to David, I said: well, you do not have
12 a wide public persona, in a sense, so I wondered what it
13 was, because the implication of that statement was that
14 this person was so well known by the public that when
15 that person spoke they would be transforming the debate.
16 But David was not well known to the public in the
17 scientific kind of way. So I thought that indicated
18 that David was not the source.
19 Q. And what did he say to that?
20 A. He did not say anything.
21 Q. Did you speak to Dr Kelly about going to the Foreign
22 Affairs Committee?
23 A. Yes. Let me just, if I might refer to my notes here.
24 Yes, when it became -- when he knew he was going to do
25 that, on several occasions he was concerned about having
1 someone accompany him to the hearing so that that person
2 might be able to deflect questions that he thought might
3 be sensitive or he felt he might have to say no in front
4 of all the cameras. He did not think that would look
5 good in front of all the TV cameras if he had to
6 actually say he could not answer a question.
7 Q. Did you speak to anyone at the Ministry of Defence about
8 this matter?
9 A. On the 14th, the Monday -- David and I spoke on the
10 13th, several other times we spoke. I did mention on
11 the 14th I had occasion to speak with one of his
12 colleagues on a totally separate matter. I very
13 casually mentioned -- because I had not spoken to
14 anybody in the MoD about this, there was not any reason.
15 I just casually mentioned that David had queried about
16 having someone with him, because I did not feel it was
17 my place to talk about this matter with them. I assumed
18 that David was doing whatever necessary preparations
19 were required. And I did not explain why, but the
20 person said -- reassured me that he was going to have
21 company during the Foreign Affairs Committee.
22 Q. Can you remember who it was you spoke to?
23 A. John Clark.
24 LORD HUTTON: When you referred to company, did you indicate
25 what that person accompanying him might do?
1 A. No.
2 LORD HUTTON: I mean, having company might be understood to
3 suggest that somebody would be there, sitting in the
4 room, not necessarily beside him, as opposed to someone
5 sitting beside him to intervene if a question was asked
6 which Dr Kelly did not want to answer.
7 A. Well, the evening before, David and I spoke on the phone
8 and he kind of -- he said he was going to have a meeting
9 on the 14th -- he was going to see the MoD.
10 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
11 A. And so we talked through various points. We might have
12 talked about these various articles.
13 LORD HUTTON: Quite.
14 A. In a way, a kind of a list of homework questions he
15 would have when he went to the MoD for his meeting.
16 I said: ask them. Ask them about what kind of
17 accompaniment you might have to deal with that concern
18 he had. I assumed he would be discussing that with
19 them. On the 14th it so happens I had an occasion to
20 speak with Jonathan Clark about a totally matter.
21 I knew Jonathan Clark was a colleague, that he got on
22 very well, John had gone to Iraq with him, David liked
23 him and I said: John, David just kind of brought up
24 about having company; and I did not want to go into it
25 because I assumed that David would have explained that,
1 but I just wanted to make sure that someone in MoD was
2 aware -- because I did have the sense, during the
3 weekend, I began to have the sense that I was not sure
4 exactly who David was talking to about this, in terms of
5 his own self in all of this.
6 MR KNOX: You were speaking to him over the weekend, that is
7 the weekend of the 12th and 13th, did he seem to be
8 under any pressure at all? How was he behaving?
9 A. There are two types of conversations I recall having.
10 One time is when he called me and this is the third
11 journalistic experience that irritated him. This one
12 was the most. I had never heard David so excited and so
13 frustrated and angry; that he said that the -- he was
14 peeved and excited about the start of a second sentence
15 in an article that Nick Rufford wrote for the Sunday
17 Q. If we pull up CAB/1/526 we can see that article. It is
18 an article on 13th July written by Nicholas Rufford.
19 A. Yes, the only thing that seemed to concern him in the
20 second sentence there:
21 "In his first public comments since the row blew
23 That was what concerned David because --
24 Q. Did he explain why it concerned him?
25 A. Other -- generally -- just briefly that he was not
1 supposed to be talking to the press and this would --
2 this was an indication that it appeared that he was
3 giving an interview to the press when he was not. In
4 fact, he said he had told Nicholas Rufford to go away.
5 Nicholas had appeared on his doorstep and he had asked
6 him to go away.
7 Q. Did Dr Kelly say anything about Mr Rufford, apart from
8 that? Did he say --
9 A. Well, he was really upset; and then he says -- yes, he
10 said: well, how can a journalist write that? I said:
11 well, journalists do that kind of thing. As I had not
12 seen the article I said I would find a copy and see, you
13 know, what words of caveat because journalists would
14 caveat and, you know, massage their statements. David
15 said: well, I am never going to speak to him again.
16 Q. You mentioned that was one type of conversation. Was
17 there any other type of conversation you had over the
19 A. Yes, he rang me up at midday. He was at some gardens,
20 and he mentioned a word which I did not hear correctly
21 but it was the Gardens of Heligan. He said he had
22 a chance to relax and had some time to spend with his
23 wife in that. I had a feeling he at least had a day to
24 kind of get away from the whole thing.
25 Q. Did he seem to be under pressure or upset at this time
1 or seem to be his normal self?
2 A. I would not say normal self, he was aware of what was
3 going on. Depression or anything negative like that did
4 not come across but he was under certain kind of
5 pressure, obviously.
6 Q. Did you speak to Dr Kelly the day before the Foreign
7 Affairs Committee on 14th July?
8 A. Yes. And I think on the 13th as well as the 14th I said
9 well, I would come to his session and give him moral
10 support, be there. And he had mentioned that someone
11 from his office would be attending as well. And he was
12 kind of working up, you know, what he was going to be
13 saying. But he never told me any of what he was going
14 to say. I just kind of assumed that he knew what he
15 would be saying.
16 Q. Did you warn him what to expect from the Foreign Affairs
17 Committee hearing, because you had seen four of them?
18 A. I told him. I reminded him: I went to four of these
19 Foreign Affairs Committee sessions. And I said: the
20 Committee members ask all the pertinent questions but
21 they also do bad cop/good cop; so he could expect all
22 sorts of approaches coming from them.
23 Q. On 15th July he goes to the hearing at the Foreign
24 Affairs Committee. Did you speak to him before that at
1 A. No, but he did leave me two telephone messages on my
2 work answer machine and he -- and it was about the
3 Committee sessions, days and times being changed and
4 being changed back again. I do not recall which message
5 was which and with reference to which Committee. But in
6 any event the second one was -- yes, the Foreign Affairs
7 Committee meeting will be meeting that afternoon. I had
8 plans anyway to go to that.
9 Q. Did you go to the Foreign Affairs Committee?
10 A. Yes, I did. I left a little bit early to go to that and
11 there was a lot of traffic. One of the roads was
12 blocked off. There was some police -- the police had
13 blocked off the road so I had to walk all the way,
14 another way to get there. And --
15 Q. If I just stop you there for a moment. Could we call up
16 FAC/1/66? This is a question from Mr Chidgey --
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. -- when he reads out some notes from Susan Watts'
19 statement. If we could just scroll down the page you
20 will see he finishes by saying:
21 "I understand from Ms Watts that is the record of
22 a meeting that you had with her. Do you still agree
23 with those comments?"
24 Dr Kelly says:
25 "First of all, I do not recognise those comments
1 I have to say."
2 Do you recall this part of the hearing?
3 A. Yes, and I remember them reading that out; and I was
4 reading that and I remembered at some point in the past
5 that David had used a lot of that. I recognised a lot
6 of that, David had mentioned to me. But I do not
7 remember if it was in the context of him having said he
8 had spoken to Susan Watts or any other journalist or
9 just separately.
10 Q. Are you saying, if I can pause there for a moment, what
11 was read out sounded rather like the sort of thing that
12 Dr Kelly might say?
13 A. Yes, I recognised it, yes. And I could not hear all of
14 his answer but I did hear him say:
15 "First of all, I do not recognise those comments."
16 I was sitting in the back of the room and it was
17 difficult to hear what he said, and often I would rely
18 on the Chairman who would say what Dr Kelly had said or
19 the MPs would repeat what he had said. So that was one
20 way I could find out what he had actually said.
21 Q. After the hearing did you talk to Dr Kelly about it?
22 A. Yes, he spoke that evening. Just about the first thing
23 he said was he was thrown by the reference to
24 Susan Watts. He rhetorically asked me: is that the kind
25 of thing I could have said all in one long go?
1 I understood he thought it was a direct quote. I got
2 the feeling that he was having second thoughts about it.
3 Q. When you say he was having second thoughts about it, he
4 was having second thoughts about his answer to the
5 question or what --
6 A. That he had actually said those words. He said "no"
7 during the Committee I understand: no, he did not
8 recollect. My intuition or feeling was that he thought
9 he might actually have said them to Susan Watts.
10 Q. Did you say anything to him?
11 A. I said: well, I do not know. And I was feeling, at this
12 time, a bit confused. I -- because I was not -- I could
13 not understand some of the answers that he was giving in
14 light of what I had known that he had said before.
15 Q. Did he express any views or give any impression as to
16 how he felt he had performed in front of the Foreign
17 Affairs Committee?
18 A. I got the feeling he did not feel he had performed quite
19 well. I mentioned to him I thought that he had replaced
20 the "it is unlikely" or perhaps he should have said
21 "likely" with respect to the 45 minutes. He kind of --
22 kind of like a hmm, you know, I do not know, a somewhat
23 resigned matter. Then I mentioned too that Ben Bradshaw
24 MP had just been on the radio and said that he had
25 thought David Kelly was the source until the BBC said
1 otherwise; and David Kelly asked -- you know: he still
2 said that? You know: he still said that? From that
3 I understood that David must have really believed he was
4 not the source.
5 Q. We know that the next day that Dr Kelly went to the ISC
7 A. Hmm.
8 Q. Did you speak to him on that day?
9 A. Yes. He said that the appearance before the ISC was
10 much more relaxed. He said obviously he could not tell
11 me what they had talked about but it was a much more
12 relaxed occasion.
13 Q. And this was a telephone conversation, was it?
14 A. Yes, this would be telephone conversation.
15 Q. How did he seem to be in that conversation?
16 A. Well, if I recall, that was a -- we had a long telephone
17 conversation. I think he might have said at some point
18 to call him later to -- around 7 or so, the previous
19 time, and I was working in a library, public library.
20 So I called him and I chatted about programmes of
21 weapons of mass destruction and in particular a radio
22 programme that I had been on earlier that day, because
23 I was trying to get him to think about the things he
24 liked, which was about doing inspections in Iraq.
25 Q. And did he seem cheerful enough to do that or not?
1 A. Yes; and in part because I wanted to offer him too an
2 opportunity that if he felt at all frustrated that he
3 could vent out anything. I said: well, this panel
4 programme on weapons of mass destruction that we had,
5 lots of people were all grilling each other. I thought
6 that might elicit from him a sense: oh yes, I know what
7 grilling is about. He did not say that. I mentioned
8 a lot of people on the programme he knew of, et cetera.
9 He said: well, that sounded fun, which was not quite
10 what I had expected because I thought I was giving him
11 an opportunity to, well, express any dissatisfied
12 feelings he might have had at that time.
13 Q. He did not express any?
14 A. He did not. He seemed in a much more regular kind of
15 mood. He seemed okay.
16 Q. On 17th July, Thursday, did you talk to him that day?
17 A. Yes. He telephoned me about mid morning. I think it
18 was around 10.45 or so, but the telephone records may
19 show me perhaps. And he telephoned me because he was
20 preparing a list of journalists, which he had to do for
21 the Foreign Affairs Committee. And he asked me to help
22 him with the name of a journalist that he thought
23 I would know. It was someone he met a long time ago and
24 had moved on. I was able to help him with that name.
25 He was telling me he was preparing a list. He seemed in
1 a quandary because he says: well -- we were talking
2 about this, and he said: well, I think I am just going
3 to mention all of them. It was a tone of voice I never
4 really heard him speak about.
5 Q. What was that tone of voice?
6 A. It was kind of like a spite or revengefulness: I am just
7 going to list them all, kind of thing. I never heard
8 him be like that. Almost immediately he would call back
9 and in a matter of seconds he then came back and he
10 says: but -- then he said: but not all of those would be
11 relevant to the --
12 Q. The question?
13 A. The question that he had to deal with.
14 LORD HUTTON: Sorry, did he telephone you back again or is
15 this the same --
16 A. The same conversation. I am saying in the sentence
17 where he expressed this unusual feeling, in a few
18 seconds he changed -- he seemed to have come away from
19 it. Of course, I am -- that is the -- I felt that at
20 the time, but in light of some of the evidence given by
21 the professor several days ago, this also heightened
22 me -- heightened my attention to it. And he was not
23 sure what to do because not all the journalists that he
24 was listing would necessarily be relevant to the
25 question that he had to answer. And I suggested: well,
1 why do you not just add a sentence at the bottom?
2 MR KNOX: Saying?
3 A. Saying something to the effect that if any -- so that he
4 could say to journalists: if they saw the list, saw
5 their name on it and were concerned why their name was
6 on there, then I said: you could always say you had
7 written a sentence qualifying their names, you know,
8 that not -- which he could say: well, not all of the
9 above journalists were relevant to this question or
10 something to that effect.
11 Q. Did you have any further conversations with Dr Kelly?
12 A. Yes. Again, I thought -- I wanted to get him to talk
13 about Iraq -- no, sorry, he mentioned that the MoD had
14 asked him to go out to Iraq the next day, he was ready
15 to go out but he thought that -- he said he was not
16 going to because he needed time to clear his head and
17 then, as he would be going for a fairly long time, he
18 just needed time to prepare. And I thought this seemed
19 very reasonable. He was matter of fact about it, it
20 made sense; and from my perspective it was as if the
21 worst had passed and he was trying to move on to the
22 next phase.
23 Then also I tried to get him to talk about
24 inspections and I was -- I said to him I had e-mailed
25 him an article about some Iraqi officials who had
1 recently been interviewed and there was an article on
2 that. I said: you know, have you -- if he had seen
3 that. He said: no, I have not seen that. And you know,
4 we talked about what might be going on in Iraq and
5 inspections. I was trying to get him on a topic that he
6 liked. And then I asked him again about the 10th July.
7 Q. You went back to the 10th July article in The Times?
8 A. Right, yes.
9 Q. How did that part of the conversation go?
10 A. Then -- because if I might just backtrack for one
11 second. When I had spoken to him once about this
12 10th July article before he appeared at the Foreign
13 Affairs Committee, so it would have been the weekend
14 when he was away, and I asked him, I said: when you give
15 your evidence, will you be saying when you met with him?
16 And he thought that the Foreign Affairs Committee would
17 not go into that kind of detail. And I did not probe,
18 but I thought that was strange for someone who might
19 just want to clear up what had happened. So therefore
20 I came back to him on this day and I said: you know that
21 10th July article, it says you did not meet over lunch.
22 Q. I think it said: you did meet over lunch?
23 A. I said: the article said that you met over lunch. He
24 said: no, we did not meet over lunch, it was much later,
25 over an orange juice. I said the article referred to
1 Gilligan having a Palm Pilot. I said: did he have
2 a Palm Pilot? He said: no. I said: was he writing
3 notes? He said: yes, he was writing notes. Because in
4 my mind it was still unclear about when these meetings
5 were, et cetera. Then I realised we were on the phone
6 a long -- not a long time but it appeared to be getting
7 on because he had still to do his list for the Foreign
8 Affairs Committee and he had to submit by noon. So we
9 ended that conversation.
10 Q. Did you have any other conversation with him?
11 A. No. That evening I tried to call him because I had
12 called him -- we called -- we spoke with each other
13 every day and after the Channel 4 News I tried to
14 telephone him. His land line did not have the answer
15 machine on so I thought maybe there was a problem in the
16 village as before. I tried his mobile phone and some
17 message came up to the effect that the line was not
18 working or you could not get through, or something to
19 that effect.
20 Q. Just pausing there for a moment. This may be
21 significant. You are sure that the phone just did not
22 keep ringing but there was actually a message that came
23 up on the mobile phone?
24 A. Yes, yes.
25 Q. Can you recall roughly what time it would have been that
1 you tried to call him on his mobile phone?
2 A. It was after the Channel 4 News, so about 7.45 or so
3 that night. So I would have talked about the news
4 coverage of the day with respect to what was going on.
5 Q. Did you try again later that evening or just that one
7 A. I just tried that one time. I assumed from our
8 conversation that morning he was finding time to
10 Q. We know the following morning Dr Kelly had disappeared,
11 it seems he may have taken his own life. Did you have
12 any contact with anyone in the news about this?
13 A. I had a television news editor who phoned me, he woke
14 me. We had a joke about that. He asked me for a
15 comment on the disappearance of David Kelly. I was
16 somewhat surprised. I said I did not know anything
17 about it. And we were kind of talking it through to
18 assess what kind of comment, if any, might be necessary.
19 And I said: I think it is perhaps too early to speculate
20 because he had mentioned that -- because I said:
21 perhaps -- I did not say David had told me, but I said:
22 perhaps David Kelly needed time away and so maybe he is
23 taking some time off.
24 Q. Can you recall what time this took place?
25 A. Around 8 o'clock in the morning, about that time.
1 Q. So you have this conversation at 8 o'clock in the
2 morning. Later, of course, the full story comes out.
3 Can I ask you this: you had obviously had
4 considerable contact with Dr Kelly in the last month or
5 so. I understand from one of your previous answers you
6 were speaking on a daily basis?
7 A. Hmm.
8 Q. Was there anything in the conversations you had had with
9 him which would have given any indication that he might
10 have wanted to take his own life?
11 A. No, not at all.
12 Q. And did you get the impression after the 10th July,
13 which was when his name was out in the press, did you
14 get any impression that there was a radical change in
15 his behaviour or the way he spoke to you?
16 A. No. At some point, I think before his name actually
17 came out, he mentioned that he had, in his meeting with
18 the MoD, that they had told him that his name might come
19 out. And that evening when I spoke to him he says:
20 well, you know -- he was somewhat resigned to the fact
21 that his name would be coming out, at that time, yes.
22 LORD HUTTON: What date would it have been that you had this
23 conversation that it seemed his mind was resigned to his
24 name coming out?
25 A. Well, he seemed -- accepted -- this would have been
1 around 9th -- the meeting he -- it was a meeting he had
2 at the MoD where it was discussed.
3 LORD HUTTON: I see, yes.
4 A. This is backtracking now.
5 LORD HUTTON: I appreciate that, yes.
6 A. He understood that his name was likely to come out.
7 MR KNOX: You understood that from conversations you had
8 with him on about 7th July or was that something --
9 A. Whenever it was the day that he had the meeting where
10 I think in the previous testimony we heard discussions
11 where he was at the MoD and there was --
12 LORD HUTTON: Yes, he had two meetings with the MoD.
13 A. Hmm.
14 LORD HUTTON: One was on --
15 A. The training course day?
16 LORD HUTTON: Yes, that was the second meeting. He came
17 back for that second meeting. Do you think it was
18 the --
19 A. The second one, I think.
20 LORD HUTTON: This was the second meeting, was it?
21 A. Yes. The first one I surmised that something was up,
22 but he did not tell me anything about it. He did not
23 mention anything, no.
24 MR KNOX: Finally, Ms Bosch is there anything else you would
25 like to say to this Inquiry about the circumstances
1 leading to the death of Dr Kelly?
2 A. No. I find it all very sad and it was all very
3 unexpected and I was unaware of some of the other issues
4 that have come out in terms of his concern about pay.
5 He never raised that kind of aspect with me. I did not
6 know about the statement in the reprimand letter about
7 not speaking to any more press. Again, that has come
8 out since the evidence. So through the course of
9 the Inquiry I see there are other facets that he would
10 not have discussed with me, but putting out -- I think
11 Professor Hawton had mentioned about the e-mails coming
12 to him on the 9th on the morning, about more
13 Parliamentary Questions about disciplinary proceedings;
14 and it may be I would have thought that that might have
15 affected him.
16 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
17 MR KNOX: You say you spoke to Dr Kelly on the 17th. He did
18 not mention those two e-mails that talked about
19 disciplinary proceedings?
20 A. No, he did not mention those, no. I do not know when he
21 would have read it or whatever.
22 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed, Ms Bosch.
23 A. Thank you.
24 LORD HUTTON: I think this would be a convenient time for
25 a short break.
1 (11.50 am)
2 (Short Break)
3 (11.55 am)
4 MR DINGEMANS: Miss Potter, please, my Lord.
5 MS LEIGH MARY POTTER (called)
6 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
7 MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name?
8 A. It is Leigh Mary Potter.
9 Q. What is your occupation?
10 A. I am a student.
11 Q. Do you do any part time work as a student?
12 A. Yes, I work at the Wagon and Horses in Southmoor.
13 Q. Where is that in relation to the Kelly's house?
14 A. Directly opposite.
15 Q. Did you know the Kelly family?
16 A. Only as people who live in the village, only by sight.
17 Q. So you would have recognised Dr Kelly?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Did Dr Kelly come into the Wagon and Horses?
20 A. Not to my knowledge. I had never seen him in there.
21 Q. Did he come in at any time in July?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. On one occasion. I will come back to the date and time
24 if I may.
25 A. Okay.
1 Q. Did he come and order a drink?
2 A. No, he came in the front entrance, which is directly
3 opposite his house, and approached the bar and asked me
4 whether Graham and Lindsay, the landlord and landlady,
5 were in.
6 Q. And how did he seem?
7 A. Quite normal.
8 Q. And were Graham and Lindsay in?
9 A. No, it was actually their evening off. He asked me --
10 he was quite -- he asked me to leave -- if he could
11 leave a message that he will be going away for a few
12 days and the press were going to pounce.
13 Q. Going away for a few days because the press were going
14 to pounce?
15 A. Yes, to the best -- that is the wording I can remember.
16 Q. The gist of what you recall.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Was anyone else there at the time?
19 A. There was a chap at the bar, he was not a regular, who
20 made a facial expression towards me as I was bemused at
21 quite an odd statement.
22 Q. Unusual comment to make?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Did you have any further conversation with Dr Kelly?
25 A. I said that I would pass the message on that he was
1 going away and he thanked me with -- he made a nod or
2 some sort of gesture, and left the pub through the front
3 entrance again.
4 Q. How long was he in the pub for?
5 A. Well, I actually -- I saw him walk in, so we made eye
6 contact straightaway, so probably about 30 seconds.
7 Q. 30 seconds. Do you know what date this was?
8 A. To the best of my knowledge it was Wednesday 9th July.
9 Q. Wednesday 9th July. Do you know what time it was?
10 A. I am assuming it is between 8 and 9 o'clock.
11 Q. How do you time it?
12 A. Well, when the police came round and we were clarifying
13 dates and times, it worked out the chap who was at the
14 bar was an away Aunt Sally player.
15 Q. An away?
16 A. An Aunt Sally -- it is an Oxfordshire game.
17 Q. A pub game?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. He was playing against your pub?
20 A. He was in the away team. They do not generally arrive
21 until at least 8 o'clock in the evening.
22 Q. That is how you time the conversation?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Your first statement to the police, and in fact the
25 reason you were called, you had given the date of
1 5th July.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Which would have been an unusual date.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And in evidence you have just mentioned 9th July.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Are you now sure about 9th July? How have you worked it
9 A. The reason I thought it was the Saturday was because
10 I could not recall having anyone working with me at the
11 time, and on Saturday afternoons I work on my own. As
12 it happens, on the Wednesday Graham and Lindsay had the
13 day off and the managers were about but they were not
14 actually present at the time Dr Kelly came in. It was
15 basically through talking to the police and them
16 commenting on how they -- that they had spoken to this
17 player -- this Aunt Sally player who was actually at the
18 bar at the time. As I had seen him and --
19 Q. Recalled him?
20 A. -- recalled him and the description matched the person
21 I had seen, so that is how we came to it.
22 Q. That is how you worked out the date of 9th July?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Did you see Dr Kelly at any time after this?
25 A. No, not to my knowledge, no.
1 Q. Did any members of the press arrive and come to the
2 Wagon and Horses?
3 A. I recalled the press arriving -- one member of the press
4 arriving on the Thursday evening.
5 Q. Does that also help you to date your conversation with
6 Dr Kelly? Was it shortly after your conversation with
7 Dr Kelly?
8 A. Yes. Yes, because I had a friend coming to stay and she
9 noted on the press being outside the pub.
10 Q. How many members of the press were outside the pub?
11 A. By the Thursday evening there were possibly three or
13 Q. Waiting to see if Dr Kelly was at his house?
14 A. Yes. I remember we were almost joking at the fact that
15 he was not there as he had informed us he was going
17 Q. And is there anything else relating to the circumstances
18 of Dr Kelly's death that you can help his Lordship with?
19 A. Not that I know of.
20 MR DINGEMANS: Thank you very much.
21 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.
22 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Mangold, please.
23 MR THOMAS CORNELIUS MANGOLD (called)
24 Examined by MR KNOX
25 Q. Mr Mangold, could you tell the Inquiry your full name?
1 A. Thomas Cornelius Mangold.
2 Q. Your occupation?
3 A. Journalist and author.
4 Q. I gather you used to work for the BBC?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Until quite recently?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Were there any subjects which you particularly
9 specialised, either as an author or while you worked at
10 the BBC?
11 A. Usually defence and intelligence.
12 Q. It is clear from articles you have written since
13 Dr Kelly's death in various newspapers that you knew
14 him. When and how did you first come across him?
15 A. I think the first time we met was in Manhattan, when
16 I was researching a book on biological warfare; and
17 I met him at the United Nations at the UNSCOM rooms.
18 I think that was the first time.
19 Q. And roughly what date would that have been?
20 A. I think we are looking about 1998.
21 Q. You wrote a book called Plague Wars. Did Dr Kelly play
22 any part in that?
23 A. Yes, he played a significant part in that and was really
24 one of my principal interviewees.
25 Q. In general terms, what was the information he provided
1 you with?
2 A. He really painted a full background of the UNSCOM
3 inspectors' work in the Soviet Union, as it then was,
4 and in Iraq; and he really told me anything I have ever
5 learned about biological warfare.
6 Q. As far as you were concerned, what was his reputation
7 within that field?
8 A. Extremely high. He was always known to me, and they
9 spoke about him in Manhattan, as the inspectors'
11 Q. How frequently would you speak to him over the years?
12 A. It was not that frequent. I spoke to him whenever I had
13 a query about biological warfare or occasionally
14 chemical warfare subjects. But it was not a frequent
16 Q. Would these be unattributable briefings?
17 A. Sometimes they were; but the major interview for the
18 book he came to my home and I spoke to him for about
19 eight hours in one day and that was on the record, that
20 was attributable.
21 Q. And his name is mentioned in the book.
22 A. Yes, yes.
23 Q. You would meet him sometimes. Would you be able to say
24 roughly how often you would meet him?
25 A. I would say, on balance, maybe twice a year.
1 Q. And when you spoke to each other, it was generally just
2 on professional matters --
3 A. Always.
4 Q. -- or other matters as well?
5 A. But I spoke to him on the phone much more than I met
7 Q. In those telephone conversations, what did you talk
9 A. Biological warfare.
10 Q. You were in e-mail contact with Dr Kelly as well?
11 A. Yes, yes.
12 Q. In the course of your meetings with him, did he ever
13 give away what seemed to be secrets or secret
15 A. No, not at all.
16 Q. Were there times when you asked him questions to which
17 he said: well, I cannot discuss that?
18 A. No.
19 Q. And before the war -- this is the second war in Iraq --
20 did he ever discuss the threat from Iraq before the
21 recent conflict?
22 A. I do not recall a conversation of that kind. There may
23 have been one, but I do not recall it.
24 Q. Obviously in the five or so years you have had some
25 contact with him. Would you be able to say what type of
1 man Dr Kelly was?
2 A. Decent and honourable, and well informed.
3 Q. Moving on to the September dossier, did you ever discuss
4 the September dossier with Dr Kelly before the Iraq War?
5 A. No.
6 Q. And did he ever say anything about the 45 minutes claim
7 to you before the Iraq War?
8 A. Not before, no.
9 Q. Did anyone else in the Intelligence Services ever say
10 anything to you about the September dossier before the
12 A. No.
13 Q. We know that on 29th May Andrew Gilligan reported on the
14 Today Programme various things about the September
15 dossier. Did you hear that broadcast at the time?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Did you come to find out about that broadcast in the
18 course of 29th May?
19 A. Yes, yes.
20 Q. We have heard from Gavin Hewitt that on the same day,
21 29th May, he did a piece on News at 10 about the dossier
22 after speaking to Dr Kelly. Did you have anything to do
23 with putting Mr Hewitt in touch with Dr Kelly?
24 A. Yes. Gavin called me and asked me if I knew anybody who
25 could address the subject of the earlier Today Programme
1 and I recommended David immediately. David was always
2 accessible to journalists, he gave them time, and
3 I said: call him wherever he is and if he can talk to
4 you, he will.
5 Q. We know on Newsnight on 2nd and 4th July Susan Watts did
6 two more pieces that touched on the dossier; did you
7 hear those?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Did you hear about them at all?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Did it occur to you that Dr Kelly might be the source
12 for Susan Watts' story?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Did you ever speak to Dr Kelly about the Today
15 Programme, that is the Gilligan report on the Today
16 Programme, after the Today Programme had taken place?
17 A. Yes, we had a brief conversation about it; and I was not
18 on assignment so I had no particular interest in the
19 matter. We often -- not often, occasionally we just
20 gossiped on the phone and on this occasion we gossiped
21 about the 45 minutes claim because I thought it sounded
22 risible to me, and I wondered what David felt about it.
23 Q. What did he say about it?
24 A. He thought it was risible too.
25 Q. Did he explain why?
1 A. Well, we just discussed -- I mean, it was a question of
2 which verb was supposed to be used; and he did not feel
3 that the weapons could be deployed or activated within
4 45 minutes and we spoke about the length of time it
5 might take just to fill a munition. That alone would
6 take 30 to 45 minutes. If you have the bacteria here
7 and the warhead there, it still takes all that amount of
8 time, and we spoke about the temperatures at which these
9 things have to be kept. He just laughed about the
10 45 minutes claim.
11 Q. Did he express any view as to what he thought it might
12 refer to?
13 A. No, because it is an answer that no-one can give. It
14 depends entirely where the stuff is. I mean if the
15 warheads are in one place and the bacteria in another
16 place and explosives in the third location, and it
17 depends again on keeping the material at the right
18 temperature, it is almost impossible to make an
19 assessment. My understanding of the 45 minutes claim
20 was that it did not really concern deployment, but that
21 it was a communications matter.
22 Q. If I can just get you to confirm what you said a moment
23 ago, he said it was risible. I think it has come out in
24 the draft transcript as "reasonable". "Risible" is the
25 word, is it?
1 A. Risible.
2 Q. Is there any other aspect of the September dossier you
3 spoke to him about?
4 A. No, not really.
5 Q. Did you speak to Dr Kelly about Gavin Hewitt's report at
6 all in these conversations?
7 A. No.
8 Q. You did not ask him if Mr Hewitt had spoken to him?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Was there any other aspect of the dossier that you ever
11 spoke to Dr Kelly about after this conversation you have
13 A. I submitted an article that I wrote on spec for
14 The Times. I asked him to check it.
15 Q. I think we can call up TMG/1/4, which is an e-mail you
16 sent on 30th June. You should see something appearing
17 in front of you in a moment. At the foot of the page is
18 your e-mail of 30th June:
20 "I have no commission for this yet. It may not be
21 strong enough as it stands. Could I ask you to check
22 bits relevant to you and possibly to add information
23 that logically belongs to the thread of the argument."
24 A. That is the one.
25 Q. The article I think is at TMG/1/1.
1 Does this look right?
2 A. That is the one, yes.
3 Q. Just dropping down to the penultimate paragraph on the
4 page, after the question:
5 "What is the probable truth?
6 "I understand that British intelligence have
7 consistently warned not that Saddam could launch or
8 deploy WMD at 45 minutes notice (that is risible to
9 anyone who knows how the weaponry works) but, more
10 accurately, that Saddam's demand and control
11 communications systems (C3) had been sufficiently
12 refined to allow him to authorise the use of WMD to his
13 regional and often far flung outposts."
14 Pausing there for a moment, is that something you
15 had gathered from Dr Kelly or from other sources?
16 A. No, that came from other sources.
17 Q. Over a few pages at TMG/1/3, you will see your
18 conclusion which is succinctly put:
19 "The irony is it [presumably that is the case] never
20 needed 'sexing up'."
21 You were putting this to Dr Kelly for his input?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Did you understand this to be more or less his view of
24 the matter?
25 A. I did not know until he sent an e-mail back saying:
1 looks good to me. Then he referred me to the Rolf Ekeus
2 piece in the Washington Post.
3 Q. I think one can go back to 1/4 for the reply, at the top
4 of the page:
5 "Looks good to me. Did you see Ekeus's piece..."
6 What was the significance of the Ekeus piece?
7 A. Well, the significance is quite considerable, because
8 the Ekeus piece argued why weapons of mass destruction
9 might never be found, and why the idea that, sort of in
10 inverted commas, smoking guns would be discovered was
11 not on. And my understanding is that David was always
12 an Ekeus man in that sense, and that he believed there
13 was a far more complicated weapons programme, with the
14 accent on the programme, going on in Iraq than people
15 generally believed. So whereas my piece was sort of
16 halfway in that direction; and I was grateful that he
17 had cleared it. I did then go on to read the Ekeus
18 piece and I made a lot of phone calls after that, and
19 began to establish that there were really sort of two
20 camps; there was the September dossier camp and then
21 there was the Rolf Ekeus camp.
22 Q. Did you form an impression as to what camp Dr Kelly fell
24 A. Well, obviously Ekeus because he would never refer me to
25 the piece if he did not approve of it.
1 Q. After this e-mail did you speak to Dr Kelly again?
2 I know there is another e-mail we will come to. Did you
3 speak to Dr Kelly again?
4 A. I think I may have done, but if I did, I did not make
5 a record of it.
6 Q. You cannot recall what it was that was said in that
8 A. No.
9 Q. Could I ask you, please, to go to TMG/1/6. You will see
10 an e-mail from you, I think at the foot of the page,
11 dated 9th July 2003:
12 "The Times today quotes Hoon as identifying
13 Gilligan's source in such a way that I feel it is
14 someone I know and admire.
15 "Could we have a chat about this. I am available
16 for help, consultation, a drink, a dry shoulder or
19 "Tom Mangold."
20 The Times article did not name Dr Kelly as such.
21 Can you recall what it was in The Times article that you
22 made you think it was Dr Kelly?
23 A. I cannot. I did not keep a copy of The Times article,
24 but you did not have to be Plato to work out that it
25 would be David Kelly. It is quite a small word, the
1 biological warfare world, and there are not many UK
2 inspectors who are that closely identified with it.
3 I only know of another four or five; and of those, only
4 David Kelly spoke to the press. The others spoke to me
5 privately but nobody spoke as much as David did.
6 Q. Can I just put this to you: on 9th July there is the
7 headline in The Times:
8 "MoD man admits I spoke to the BBC."
9 This included some information which was not in the
10 MoD statement, including the following, I am now quoting
11 what is in The Times article:
12 "The adviser is understood to work for the
13 Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat."
14 Did you know that is where Dr Kelly worked?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And: "The Times understands that the adviser has known
17 Mr Gilligan for some time. He is said to have
18 previously worked as a UN weapons inspector."
19 Again, you knew that?
20 A. Absolutely.
21 Q. So it was pretty straightforward stuff?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Could I ask you this: would it have occurred to you to
24 disclose the name of Dr Kelly yourself to the public as
25 the source, having received this information from
1 The Times?
2 A. No. Why would I want to do that?
3 Q. I am not saying you would, and obviously one of the
4 things that has been said by the Government was that
5 Dr Kelly's name was bound to come out anyway. Obviously
6 you are a journalist who recognised who it but you did
7 not name him, and it seems Mr Rufford recognised his
8 name but did not name him. Likewise Mr Beaumont
9 recognised who it was but he did not name him.
10 I wondered if there is a pattern, namely that if the
11 journalist recognises the source, albeit unnamed, he is
12 not likely to reveal that person himself?
13 A. I think that is an unlikely theory. There were a number
14 of journalists who I would have thought would have
15 recognised that the source was David Kelly and would
16 immediately have gone after him. That is the nature of
17 the trade.
18 Q. What if you have had personal contact with him over the
20 A. Say again?
21 Q. If you had had personal contact with him over the years
22 would that make any different?
23 A. You did not need to have personal contact, there was
24 enough information in that Times piece, now that you
25 have refreshed my memory, for anybody who has been
1 involved in this particular discipline, which is a small
2 one, really, biological and chemical warfare and WMD in
3 Iraq; there are not many people who do it. Most of the
4 people involved in that would have understood almost
5 immediately it was David Kelly. I am sure that one of
6 them or several of them would have gone chasing after
7 the story. It had by then become a major matter.
8 LORD HUTTON: Would that have involved naming him? I mean,
9 when you say go after him and chasing after the story,
10 would that have involved his name coming out?
11 A. Yes, my Lord, yes.
12 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
13 MR KNOX: Just going back to TMG/1/6, we will see Dr Kelly's
14 reply to you:
16 Thanks. Not a good time to be in communication."
17 I take it there was no further communication between
18 the two of you after this time, after 9th July?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Can I ask you to go to COM/4/31.
21 This seems to be an e-mail I think from you to
22 Dr Kelly on 10th July. This is an e-mail found on
23 Dr Kelly's computer where you are asking if perhaps he
24 can give you a little bit of assistance. Do you
25 recollect this?
1 A. Yes, I do. Yes.
2 Q. But I do not think, certainly not according to what we
3 have been able to find, there was any reply to this. Do
4 you recall if there was any reply to this from Dr Kelly?
5 A. No, I do not think there was.
6 Q. You did not chase him for any further information?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Did you speak to Mrs Kelly on 17th or 18th July?
9 A. Yes, I did, yes. I received a phone call on that day,
10 somewhere around 9 to 9.15, telling me that David Kelly
11 was missing.
12 Q. And you then spoke to Mrs Kelly?
13 A. Yes. I sat down and thought about that quite carefully;
14 and then I spoke to Jan, yes.
15 Q. And what did she tell you?
16 A. Well, I had very mixed emotions on that day. I knew the
17 moment I got the phone call at 9 o'clock in the morning,
18 I knew that he had to be dead because David Kelly did
19 not go missing. If he was missing, he was dead. So
20 I had a slightly difficult phone call with Janice. She
21 was still fairly upbeat and felt that he must have had
22 a heart attack or a stroke and was -- she felt he was
23 lying in a field, you know, waiting to be found.
24 Q. Did she say anything about how he had appeared over the
25 last few days?
1 A. Yes, she said he had been very unhappy. As I recall it,
2 I did not make a note of the conversation, I was a bit
3 emotional myself at the time, but she said something to
4 the effect that the FAC hearing had not been the
5 catharsis he had hoped it would be, I think that is what
6 she said, and that he had been unhappy and depressed.
7 Q. Did she say anything about him being angry?
8 A. I think she may have done, yes.
9 Q. We know you wrote about this in one of the pieces in the
10 Evening Standard, that is how I asked you the question.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Just one other question I want to ask you about, it is
13 this: did you talk to Mr Gilligan about his story
14 shortly after Dr Kelly's death?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Can you recall what that conversation was?
17 A. Well, I have to tell you that I had two or three
18 conversations with Andrew; and to the best of my
19 knowledge they were all confidential calls. They were
20 non-attributable. That was the assurance I gave him, so
21 that unless he clears me to talk about them, it would be
22 indiscreet of me to talk about them now.
23 Q. Is there anything else you would like to say about the
24 circumstances leading to Dr Kelly's death?
25 A. No.
1 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Mangold.
2 A. Thank you.
3 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Taylor, please.
4 MR RICHARD CHARLES HYDE TAYLOR (called)
5 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
6 LORD HUTTON: Just sit down Mr Taylor, please.
7 MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name.
8 A. Yes, good afternoon my name is Richard Charles
9 Hyde Taylor.
10 Q. What is your occupation?
11 A. I am special adviser to the Secretary of State for
13 Q. That is Mr Hoon?
14 A. That is Mr Hoon, that is correct.
15 Q. How long have you been his special adviser?
16 A. Since January 2001.
17 Q. Did you have any involvement at all in relation to the
18 dossier as a matter of history?
19 A. No, I am a consumer of intelligence information to
20 advise my role in defence policy. I am not a producer
21 or a drafter of intelligence information.
22 Q. You know it is published on 24th September. When was
23 the first time you had heard of Dr Kelly's name?
24 A. The first time I was aware that an official had come
25 forward, having had contact with Mr Gilligan, was on the
1 early evening of Tuesday 8th July.
2 Q. We have heard, in fact, that Dr Kelly had written
3 a letter of 30th June to Dr Wells, his line manager. He
4 is interviewed on 4th July; and Mr Hoon is told, in
5 fact, that an individual has come forward on the evening
6 of 3rd July. He reports that to Mr Powell. Were you
7 aware of that at all?
8 A. No, I was not.
9 Q. And there are various discussions over the weekend in
10 which Mr Hoon was involved. Were you aware of those
12 A. Again, I was not.
13 Q. On 7th July we have heard that Dr Kelly is called back
14 from RAF Honnington and interviewed again in the
15 afternoon of 7th July. Was you aware of that?
16 A. I was not aware of those discussions. Perhaps I can
17 qualify it, in that in the first instance this matter
18 was a personnel issue in the department. I would not
19 expect to be consulted on it.
20 Q. How do you become aware that someone has come forward?
21 A. From the Ministry of Defence putting out the press
22 statement. I was not in the office at the time, but
23 I heard it on the news.
24 Q. You heard it on the news?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. You had not seen the press statement in draft form?
2 A. I had not been shown the -- a draft of a statement, no.
3 Q. And had you seen any draft Q and A material?
4 A. No, I did not see any draft Q and A material.
5 Q. Where were you when you heard this news?
6 A. I was at home, on my way to a private function.
7 Q. Do you recall what time of the day it was?
8 A. It would have been early evening, 7.30/8 o'clock.
9 Q. Having heard the news, do you call Mr Hoon or anything
10 like that?
11 A. I did not. I was on my way to a private function.
12 Q. Right. What is said on the morning of the 9th July?
13 You come into work that day ...
14 A. Yes. On the morning of Wednesday 9th July I attended
15 the routine meeting in the Secretary of State's office
16 to discuss media issues of the day.
17 Q. Is that a morning meeting every day?
18 A. Yes, it happens most days. It starts each morning with
19 looking through press cuttings for the day and
20 considering whether there is any follow up which may be
21 required by the Ministry of Defence.
22 Q. Had there had been a similar meeting on the 8th July?
23 A. To the best of my recollection, yes.
24 Q. But, at that, nothing had been said about the draft
25 press statement?
1 A. No.
2 Q. And on 9th July, what is said at that meeting?
3 LORD HUTTON: Could I just ask you: who was at that meeting,
4 Mr Taylor?
5 A. On that day, Wednesday 9th July, the routine press
6 meeting was attended by the Secretary of State, by his
7 principal private secretary, Mr Peter Watkins, by the
8 Director of News, Pamela Teare, and me.
9 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
10 MR DINGEMANS: What was said?
11 A. The meeting started, as always, with looking at the
12 press cuttings, and the key issue that morning in the
13 broadcast media as well, was the MoD statement of the
14 previous evening and the BBC's reply, both to the press
15 statement and in a separate parallel process Mr Davies'
16 reply to Mr Hoon's letter of 8th July.
17 Q. We know Mr Hoon had written a letter on 8th July just
18 before the press announcement saying: Dear Gavyn, here
19 is a copy of the press announcement.
20 Did you know that Mr Hoon was going to write that
22 A. On 8th July?
23 Q. Yes.
24 A. I did not, no.
25 Q. That was the principal discussion you had on 9th July.
1 Was anything concluded?
2 A. The discussion focused primarily on how to respond to
3 Mr Davies' letter, given the substance of his reply that
4 he would not agree to the offer to confirm or deny the
5 source, in his view on the basis of source protection.
6 And also given the tone. It was clear that he was not
7 wishing to try and reconcile any differences the BBC may
8 have with the Government through this letter.
9 Q. And what advice did you give?
10 A. My advice, together with that of the Director of News,
11 was that we should write again to Mr Davies, in private,
12 and to include the name in that letter.
13 Q. We have seen a draft of a letter that was sent over from
14 the Garden Rooms at the House of Commons, part of which
15 seems to have formed or been adopted in Mr Hoon's
16 letter. Were you aware that was being faxed over or
17 e-mailed over?
18 A. I was part of a discussion in the media meeting about
19 whether or not to include the name in that second letter
20 and I recommended that it should be. I did not draft
21 the letter. I did speak with the principal private
22 secretary later that morning to check the draft and
23 advise that the contents should be very short. I did
24 not see that proposed draft that you are referring to
25 from the Garden Rooms.
1 Q. Which I think Mr Campbell said he had assisted in
2 drafting. Did you speak with Mr Campbell or Mr Powell
3 about this?
4 A. Not on that day, no.
5 LORD HUTTON: What was the purpose of giving the name to
6 Mr Davies?
7 A. I offered my advice on the basis of wishing to move the
8 argument forward with the BBC. There was an alternative
9 view proposed at that meeting, my Lord, which suggested
10 that maybe we should repeat the previous day's offer to
11 the BBC that we would give them the name in return for
12 them confirming or denying it. I did not believe that
13 that was tenable for the next 24 hour period and that to
14 move forward we should disclose the name in private in
15 the letter.
16 LORD HUTTON: But move forward in what way? I mean, what
17 was the underlying purpose of giving the name to
18 Mr Davies?
19 A. In terms of trying to reconcile the differences with the
20 BBC and to see if there was a way in which it could be
21 resolved, whether this official who had come forward was
22 indeed the source to Mr Gilligan's story. And indeed,
23 whether the BBC were confident in reliability of their
24 reporting of that source.
25 LORD HUTTON: If the BBC had confirmed that Dr Kelly was the
1 source, what was then the intention on the part of the
2 MoD, as far as you knew?
3 A. As far as I knew at the time, and it is inevitably
4 speculation too because those events did not happen, but
5 the hope was that if Mr Davies accepted the offer then
6 there would be an opportunity to explore further the
7 nature of the contact which Dr Kelly had had with
8 Mr Gilligan and whether, indeed, he was the primary
9 source and therefore whether the disputed report of
10 29th May could be clarified for the public record.
11 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
12 MR DINGEMANS: We know that Mr Hoon writes the letter; and
13 he offers the name to Mr Davies in confidence. Do you
14 know why he decided not to publicise the name at that
16 A. Our hope had been, in the first letter on 8th July, and
17 it was discussed again that morning on 9th July, that
18 this would provide an opportunity for agreement between
19 the BBC and the Government as to who the source was. As
20 I said, my advice was that I did not think it would be
21 tenable for another 24 hours to repeat the offer or,
22 given the tone of Mr Davies' reply and the BBC
23 statements, that they would change their mind and agree
24 to the offer. So it was put in private and I understand
25 measures were taken to ensure that it was sent privately
1 to Mr Davies.
2 Q. Although you have not been party to any of the
3 discussions which led to the press statement being
4 issued, or indeed the Q and A material, was anything
5 mentioned about the press statement at that morning
7 A. Not specifically about the press statement.
8 Q. Was anything mentioned about the Q and A material?
9 A. At the end of a discussion on how to follow up the
10 letter to Mr Davies there was a brief discussion on what
11 we should do if journalists were to ring and put the
12 name directly to the Department of who the official was.
13 I would not call it a discussion of the Q and A
14 material. There was a discussion of one of the
15 questions, which I have since learnt was in the Q and A
17 Q. Was there any discussion about the other questions in
18 the Q and A material?
19 A. No, not --
20 Q. Was he a member of UNSCOM et cetera?
21 A. No, to the best of my recollection we only discussed the
22 rationale for what to do if the name was put directly to
23 the department.
24 Q. What was the debate or was there a debate or you were
25 all of one view?
1 A. The Director of News outlined the approach which had
2 been agreed the previous evening for use by the press
3 office as the statement was published.
4 Q. Who did she say had agreed that?
5 A. She did not at the time say who had agreed it. She was
6 outlining material which she, as Director of News, and
7 her press office were using. I, at the time, would have
8 assumed it was written by her. I would not have
9 questioned its approval.
10 Q. Can I just take you to one passage in the Q and A
11 material, which begins at CAB/1/66? This is part way
12 through the Q and A material. If I can go back to
13 CAB/1/65 we can see the second question:
14 "It is unprecedented for a Government Department to
15 make a statement of this sort. Why have you done it?"
16 Then the explanation is given:
17 "There is no comparable situation ...
18 "We have set out the facts as they have been put to
19 us, on an issue of considerable public concern. The
20 official involved volunteered ..."
21 Do you know from the discussions that took place on
22 9th July whether Ms Teare had discussed this Q and A
23 material with anyone else?
24 A. Not in that discussion. It was a brief discussion about
25 the rationale for the approach of what to do if
1 a journalist rang directly with Dr Kelly's name.
2 Q. Have you found out since whether or not Ms Teare
3 discussed this Q and A material with anyone?
4 A. I have only learnt through the course of the Inquiry
5 that she discussed it with the Permanent Secretary's
6 office, but not at the time.
7 Q. Not from what the Inquiry has heard, from your own
8 research at the Ministry of Defence. No-one has told
9 you, as it were?
10 A. I did not see the question and answer brief until after
11 Dr Kelly had died; and I did not therefore ask any
12 questions about it in this timeframe.
13 Q. You say "to move the discussion with the BBC forward".
14 What was the need to move the discussion forward? Why
15 was there a need to move the discussion with the BBC
16 forward, as you perceived it?
17 A. In my perception, having heard the Ministry of Defence
18 statement and the BBC's response the previous evening
19 and then seen the reply from Mr Davies, and in the
20 course of that discussion that morning, and I had --
21 I had not -- I was aware that Mr Hoon had been to see
22 Mr Sambrook as well on the previous day, we were trying
23 to find a way in which the differences between the
24 Government, including the Ministry of Defence, could be
25 resolved with the BBC. And as I said previously, in my
1 answer, that I did not see any merit in repeating the
2 offer. And in order to try to perhaps present the offer
3 in a different way, we would reveal the name in private
4 to Mr Davies so that he could make his own inquiries
5 within the BBC; and that in itself may have elicited the
6 response which I have just speculated about, in terms of
7 trying to resolve the differences.
8 Q. Why was it decided to confirm the name if the correct
9 name had been put forward?
10 A. There was a discussion that morning about that approach;
11 and we explicitly talked through if a direct name was
12 put then it was agreed that it would be not tenable to
13 say "no" because that would be to lie.
14 Q. Who was at --
15 A. This is the meeting on the morning of 9th July, with
16 Secretary of State, Pam Teare and the principal private
17 secretary --
18 Q. Mr Watkins?
19 A. -- and me.
20 Q. And Mr Hoon?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. It was decided that it would be a lie to say --
23 A. As I said earlier, Pam Teare outlined the approach which
24 the press office were using since the issuing of the
25 statement the previous evening. She said that if
1 journalists rang and put the name directly to the
2 Department then, yes, they would confirm it. The
3 discussion explored the rationale for that; and if
4 people had said "no" in answer to the name
5 "Dr David Kelly" that would be a lie, and that would be
6 unacceptable for the Department to respond in that way.
7 Q. If I was a journalist and I had rung you up and said: is
8 X (giving a name) the leading Government nuclear
9 scientist working in MI6; would you confirm the name to
11 A. I would not, in the hypothetical question that you are
12 posing --
13 Q. What would the reply be, hypothetically?
14 A. To that hypothetical question I would ask for
15 circumstances in which I would need to confirm that.
16 I think it is fair to say that on Wednesday 9th July,
17 given the MoD statement and the tone of the BBC's
18 response, that the -- who the unnamed official was was
19 going to be of increasing media interest; and there was
20 a concern expressed that morning, which is why we were
21 considering, again [as I said earlier] the rationale for
22 what to do if someone came forward with the name. That
23 that was a question likely to be asked by journalists
24 and given, for example, the article in The Times on the
25 previous Saturday it was becoming increasingly likely
1 that the name would be put.
2 Q. Was any part of the discussion centering on: it is not
3 our practice to confirm names of civil servants?
4 A. It did not. The other option which we considered was
5 whether it was tenable to offer a: no comment.
6 Q. Was it tenable?
7 A. No. Perhaps I can speak from my experience of talking
8 to journalists.
9 Q. Yes, of course.
10 A. If I offer a "no comment", usually in my experience the
11 immediate follow up question is: does that mean you know
12 and you are not telling me or you do not know? And if
13 it is the former, that you know and you are not telling
14 them, then they would take that as a tacit "yes". So to
15 offer a "no comment" as discussed at that meeting would
16 appear to be a tacit confirmation of a name.
17 LORD HUTTON: Is that say if a list of name is given?
18 Suppose a reporter rings up and says: is it A, is it B
19 or is it C? If you say "no comment" that is not giving
20 tacit confirmation.
21 A. Yes. If you were given a list of three contacts then,
22 yes, I think it is fair to speculate you could perhaps
23 attempt, first of all, to offer: no comment. When we
24 were talking about a circumstance in which a journalist
25 rings up and asks you just one name as a direct question
1 of fact, in those circumstances and in my experience on
2 other issues on single direct questions of fact it is
3 very difficult to say: no comment.
4 LORD HUTTON: But we have heard that journalists were
5 ringing up giving a number of names before they arrived
6 at Dr Kelly's name.
7 A. I was not aware of that in terms of the press office
8 calls. I am sure we will come on to the journalist who
9 I spoke to.
10 LORD HUTTON: Was there any discussion of the name just
11 being issued in a statement on that morning? I mean, if
12 you thought the name was going to be a matter of great
13 interest and you were going to confirm the name if it
14 was put correctly, was any thought given to simply
15 a statement being issued?
16 A. To my recollection there would only have been brief
17 discussion on that because the first topic of the
18 conversation was how to reply to Mr Davies. Having
19 agreed to include the name in a private letter to him,
20 the aim there was we hoped that they would come back to
21 us and that the name would remain confidential and not
22 immediately enter the public domain. This discussion
23 was only to clarify that question of journalists putting
24 the name directly.
25 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
1 MR DINGEMANS: Was there any discussion about: well, we are
2 in this situation, we have to give the name if it is put
3 to us, let us tell Dr Kelly that is going to be done?
4 Did anyone mention that?
5 A. It was a very brief discussion. There was another
6 meeting following straight after. It is a routine media
7 meeting. The bulk of the conversation was on the letter
8 to Mr Davies. Very briefly, at the end, we discussed
9 this rationale of confirming the name if it was put
10 directly to us. We did not go into greater detail at
11 that time.
12 Q. So I infer the answer is: no.
13 A. It is a simple "no" to that question, but I am only
14 trying to give you -- this was not a meeting why -- this
15 was not a meeting specifically about the BBC or
16 specifically about Dr Kelly. This was a routine meeting
17 which the Secretary of State has to go through media
19 Q. We have seen in the earlier draft Q and A material, and
20 I will not take you back through it, I know you are
21 aware of it, where the original response was going to
22 be: we cannot yet give you the name, we need to go back
23 and talk to the individual. But as far as you are
24 aware, you were not party to any of the discussions in
25 which that Q and A material was changed or any
1 discussions about whether or not Dr Kelly should be
3 A. No, I did not see that Q and A until after he died.
4 Q. After that meeting I think you have told us what
5 happened at the meeting. Did you have any other
6 dealings with the circumstances in which Dr Kelly's name
7 came out?
8 A. I was contacted that evening by a journalist asking me
9 the name.
10 Q. What time was that?
11 A. It was at about 10 to 6 that evening. I recall the time
12 well because the 9th July is my wedding anniversary and
13 I met my wife at a quarter to 6 outside Charing Cross
14 station and took the call a few minutes later while
15 I was walking along The Strand.
16 Q. Who was the journalist?
17 A. The journalist was Chris Adams of the Financial Times.
18 Q. What did he ask you?
19 A. He put the name to me directly. I said: yes; confirming
20 it consistent with the approach of the press office.
21 Q. We know why you did that, because of the meeting in the
22 morning. Can I just ask you this: have you ever
23 confirmed any other civil servant's name to a member of
24 the press?
25 A. No, because there has not been a similar circumstance
1 like that in the time in which I have been special
2 adviser to the Secretary of State.
3 Q. Can I simply, as you are, as it were, the last witness,
4 use you to put in a document? I think you have just
5 been warned about this. It is not a document that you
6 were party to but it comes to us from the Government.
7 It is CAB/27/2. This appears to be a memo which is
8 dated -- I will show you where we get the date from --
9 18th September 2002. It is a record of a meeting. It
11 "Iraq dossier: Public Handling and Briefing.
12 "Ownership of the dossier.
13 Ownership lay with No. 10."
14 If we go to 27/2 and 27/3 -- there is quite a lot
15 redacted. 27/4 we see the bottom of the page. Then
16 a further minute, which is CAB/27/5. I am sorry,
17 Mr Taylor, to use you to take you through documents:
18 "Iraq dossier: Public Handling and Briefing."
19 This is a document dated 22nd September 2002. It
20 deals with the printing of the dossier. It continues at
21 27/6 and 27/7.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. It was sent to us under a covering letter and it has now
24 been scanned in. It is CAB/27/1. It says that these
25 are redacted versions of minutes of meetings held in the
1 Cabinet Office in September 2002, chaired by
2 John Scarlett, concerned with the mechanics of
3 publication of the dossier.
4 In the second paragraph it says:
5 "I have spoken to John Scarlett about the reference
6 to ownership of the Dossier. He has confirmed that he
7 had ownership ... until the approved text was handed
8 [over] on 20th September."
9 Then a request that this letter be published, as it
10 were, with the documents.
11 Sorry to use you for those purposes.
12 Subject to that, is there anything else you know of
13 surrounding the circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that
14 you can assist his Lordship with?
15 A. No, I do not think there is.
16 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Mr Taylor.
17 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, that is the last witness.
18 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you very much. You may leave.
19 Thank you very much.
20 Well, I propose to make a brief statement but the
21 television camera is going to be set up so, ladies and
22 gentlemen, I will adjourn for just a few minutes while
23 that is done.
24 (12.45 pm)
25 (Short Break)
1 (12.50 pm)
2 STATEMENT by LORD HUTTON
3 LORD HUTTON: The evidence which has been heard this morning
4 concludes the first stage of the Inquiry, which was
5 designed to obtain a full and detailed account of the
6 relevant facts affecting Dr Kelly prior to and leading
7 up to his death and the actions which were taken to
8 investigate his death after his body was discovered.
9 As I said in my opening statement on 1st August,
10 I now propose to adjourn the sittings of the Inquiry to
11 enable me to consider what parts of the evidence already
12 given and what issues arising from that evidence should
13 be made subject to more detailed and rigorous scrutiny.
14 I will also give consideration to what witnesses
15 I should recall to assist me in the second stage of
16 the Inquiry and I will consider whether there are any
17 additional witnesses whose evidence I have not yet heard
18 whom I should call.
19 I propose that the second stage of the Inquiry will
20 begin on Monday 15th September. In the course of the
21 next week Mr Martin Smith, the solicitor to the Inquiry,
22 will notify the witnesses whom I wish to recall and any
23 persons whom I wish to call as witnesses who have not
24 previously given evidence.
25 There are three points which I wish to make clear
1 and to emphasise.
2 The first is that the fact that I recall a witness
3 to give further evidence in the second stage of
4 the Inquiry does not necessarily mean that I regard that
5 person as a possible object of criticism. I may recall
6 a witness simply to clarify some matters and not because
7 I think that he or she may be liable to criticism in my
9 The second point is that the fact that I do not
10 recall a witness does not necessarily mean that he or
11 she may not be subject to criticism in my report. It is
12 possible that the reason why a witness is not recalled
13 is because I have notified that person privately in
14 writing that I may criticise him or her in my report in
15 a particular way and that person has informed me that he
16 or she does not wish to dispute that criticism and have
17 the opportunity to give further evidence in the second
19 The third point is that if a witness is privately
20 notified by me that he or she may be subject to
21 criticism in my report, this will be a provisional view
22 which I may alter or revise in the light of further
23 evidence and/or on further consideration.
24 Therefore, when it becomes known whom I intend to
25 call in the second stage of the Inquiry, speculation as
1 to whether certain persons may or may not be subject to
2 criticism may well be ill-founded.
3 Before the second stage begins, a list of the
4 persons who will give evidence in it will be made public
5 and at the commencement of the second stage
6 Mr Dingemans, the Senior Counsel to the Inquiry, will
7 outline the course that that stage will follow. I will
8 now adjourn until 10.30 on Monday 15th September.
9 (1.00 pm)
10 (Hearing adjourned until 10.30 am on
11 Monday 15th September 2003)
3 MRS OLIVIA BOSCH (called) ........................ 1
5 Examined by MR KNOX .......................... 1
7 MS LEIGH MARY POTTER (called) .................... 55
9 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 55
11 MR THOMAS CORNELIUS MANGOLD (called) ............. 59
13 Examined by MR KNOX .......................... 59
15 MR RICHARD CHARLES HYDE TAYLOR ................... 75
18 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 75
20 STATEMENT by LORD HUTTON ..................... 93