Hearing Transcripts

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1 doubt.
2 Q. And there is a difference, I take it, from your answer
3 between "indicates" and "shows"?
4 A. Yes.
5 LORD HUTTON: This might be a convenient time to rise.
6 MR DINGEMANS: In fact Dr Jones will not be the next witness
7 at 2 o'clock because we have the video link. I am
8 sorry, you will have to wait to finish off your evidence
9 after lunch.
10 (1.05 pm)
11 (The short adjournment)
12 (2.00 pm)
13 LORD HUTTON: We are having Mr A now, are we?
14 MR DINGEMANS: It is someone called Mr A. We are not going
15 to see his face.
16 MR A (called)
17 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
18 Q. Mr A we cannot see you. Can you see us?
19 A. Yes, I can see you.
20 Q. Can you tell us what your current occupation is?
21 A. Currently I am a casually employed civil servant with
22 the Counter Proliferation Arms Control Department.
23 Q. Have you ever made Dr Kelly?
24 A. I have met him on many occasions since I first met him
25 in 1992.

95
1 Q. Where did you meet him in 1992?
2 A. I would have met him out in Bahrain as we helped the
3 missions for UNSCOM, the United Nations Special
4 Commission, prepare their missions into Iraq.
5 Q. Did you get on well with him?
6 A. Very well, initially as professionals working in the
7 same field, and later on socially.
8 Q. What were you doing from 1999 onwards?
9 A. From 1999 onwards, along with Dr Kelly, we worked on
10 a number of issues for the Foreign Office and the
11 Ministry of Defence relating to the situation in Iraq.
12 Q. Did you have anything to do with the drafting of
13 the September dossier?
14 A. I was invited to a meeting at the Ministry of Defence on
15 19th September.
16 Q. Who invited you to that meeting?
17 A. Dr Kelly invited me and suggested I had some valuable
18 contributions to make to the process of that meeting.
19 Q. And where was the meeting held?
20 A. It was held in the Old War Office.
21 Q. And who else was present at the meeting? I do not need
22 names but were they Foreign and Commonwealth Office
23 personnel?
24 A. They were Ministry of Defence personnel.
25 Q. And what part of the Ministry of Defence?

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1 A. The Defence Intelligence Service.
2 Q. What was discussed at this meeting?
3 A. A draft of the dossier had been produced and the purpose
4 of the meeting was to check it, once again, for errors
5 of fact, errors of language and the totality of the
6 document as a whole.
7 LORD HUTTON: Mr A, we have heard evidence from
8 Dr Brian Jones this morning. Was he at the meeting?
9 A. He was.
10 LORD HUTTON: Did he chair the meeting?
11 A. He did chair the meeting.
12 LORD HUTTON: Thank you. Yes.
13 MR DINGEMANS: How many other people, apart from you,
14 Dr Kelly and Dr Jones, were at the meeting?
15 A. Another 7 or 8 apart from myself, Dr Kelly and Dr Jones.
16 Q. Had you seen any earlier drafts of the dossier?
17 A. I had not.
18 Q. Do you recall the nature of the discussions?
19 A. It was a page by page fact checking exercise. We were
20 going through it fairly swiftly in order to catch any
21 last minute items that had been incorrectly stated or
22 needed amplification.
23 Q. Did you make any particular comments on the dossier?
24 A. Yes, I did. There were errors of detail and there were
25 errors of emphasis, in my view.

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1 Q. Can you help us what areas you thought there were errors
2 of detail on?
3 A. The detail appears to be covered in one of the documents
4 already submitted to you. And that is, I believe,
5 CAB/3/79.
6 Q. Right. Can we look at CAB/3/79? This is a letter dated
7 19th September from the DIS to the JIO assessment staff.
8 If we scroll down the page. Can you see that now
9 yourself?
10 A. I have a copy myself in front of me.
11 Q. We are looking now, and it begins:
12 "Page 4, paragraph 5, 4th bullet;
13 "Suggest change ..."
14 And the rationale is language. Is that what you are
15 talking about in terms of detail?
16 A. Yes, I have been through the document, myself, in the
17 past couple of days. I have not seen the document
18 before, but I can see, within that document, perhaps 12
19 changes which I believe were suggested by Dr Kelly and
20 about four changes I believe were suggested by myself.
21 These, of course, represent changes which were accepted
22 and forwarded to the assessment staff for change or
23 inclusion.
24 Q. Right. Changes that were accepted in the discussion
25 group that you were having?

98
1 A. That is correct.
2 Q. And can you help us with the changes that Dr Kelly
3 suggested?
4 A. I would say pretty much the majority -- I can go through
5 them point by point but I have possibly 12 to 14 points
6 which I believe come from Dr Kelly.
7 Q. Can you very quickly take us through those?
8 A. Certainly. At the bottom of the first page:
9 "Amend to: '... with her team at al-Muthanna...'"
10 The next four points completely, down to "aflatoxin.
11 "4.6 tons of growth media". Moving down the page, the
12 "al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Vaccine Institute". The
13 "facility ... used to store biological agent". The
14 point beneath that dealing with UNSCOM establishing that
15 in 1987.
16 Q. That is at the bottom of the second page, is it?
17 A. That is at the bottom of the second page.
18 Q. Going to the third page now.
19 A. The first point:
20 "... is known to have tested."
21 About halfway down the page "add additional sentence
22 ... 'specified timeframe'", and the next two points
23 beneath that.
24 Q. They were all Dr Kelly's suggestions, were they?
25 A. Looking back at my recollection of the meeting,

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1 I believe those were all suggested by him.
2 Q. And there was a letter being drafted or these points
3 were being noted and then put into the letter; is that
4 right?
5 A. I believe so. As I say, I have not seen this document
6 before three days ago. Therefore it looks like the
7 formal response from the DIS to the assessment staff.
8 Q. And you said that there were points on detail that you
9 commented on. Were there any points on emphasis?
10 A. Indeed, I made a comment on the al-Qa'qa' phosgene plant
11 and the tone adopted in relation to that.
12 Q. Can I just pull up another document for us back here
13 because we do not have anything to look at, at the
14 moment. It is DOS/1/75 at paragraph 10.
15 A. I do not have a copy of that in front of me.
16 Q. Well, this is the dossier itself, as published, and we
17 can see if we scroll down to paragraph 10 -- can I help
18 you by reading out what it says:
19 "Parts of the al-Qa'qa' chemical complex damaged in
20 the Gulf War have also been repaired and are
21 operational. Of particular concern are elements of the
22 phosgene production plant at al-Qa'qa'. These were
23 severely damaged during the Gulf War, and dismantled
24 under UNSCOM supervision, but have since been rebuilt.
25 While phosgene does have industrial uses it can also be

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1 used by itself as a chemical agent or as a precursor for
2 nerve agent."
3 Is that the passage you are referring to?
4 A. That is indeed. I have a copy of that in CAB/3/43 also
5 paragraph 10, word for word identical.
6 Q. What were your concerns about that?
7 A. My concerns were that it really was a non-issue, and it
8 was wrong for the Government to make such a fuss about
9 the phosgene production plant at al-Qa'qa'. I had
10 visited there as part of a UN inspection team and many
11 other inspection teams had visited the plant. It is
12 true that phosgene was used as a toxication during the
13 First World War, but some 6 million tons or so,
14 I believe, are manufactured worldwide every year, and
15 this was a small expensive way of producing phosgene
16 dedicated to a particular process, a legitimate process
17 within the al-Qa'qa' plant. Therefore to state it was
18 of particular concern against a background in which the
19 Iraqi armed forces had never weaponised phosgene nor
20 shown any intention of doing so was, for me, the wrong
21 emphasis. My quarrel was with the phrase "of particular
22 concern".
23 Q. What we are looking at at DOS/1/75 is the final version.
24 That rather suggests that your concerns were not
25 accepted.

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1 A. That is correct.
2 Q. What was Dr Kelly's attitude to the dossier, apart from
3 those specific comments that you have already
4 identified?
5 A. Both of us believed that if you took the dossier as
6 a whole it was a reasonable and accurate reflection of
7 the intelligence that we had available to us at that
8 time.
9 Q. And after the meeting, did you have any further
10 involvement in the drafting of the dossier?
11 A. I did not.
12 Q. Did you have any other communications with Dr Kelly
13 about the dossier?
14 A. I did. I e-mailed him about --
15 LORD HUTTON: Just before we move there, Mr A, did Dr Kelly,
16 at that meeting, make any reference to the statement in
17 the dossier that chemical and biological weapons could
18 be ready for use within 45 minutes?
19 A. I think all of us touched on the subject in one way or
20 another. It was a statement which seemed to rather beg
21 more questions than it answered; and for those of us
22 without access to the source intelligence, it really
23 made us ask further questions. Since we did not have
24 access to that intelligence, no assurances about its
25 origins or its implications could be given.

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1 LORD HUTTON: Was Dr Kelly critical of that statement or did
2 he raise questions about it? Can you be a little more
3 specific on that point?
4 A. Certainly. I think all those of us without access to
5 that intelligence immediately asked the question: well,
6 what does the 45 minutes refer to? Are you referring to
7 a technical process? Are you referring to a commander
8 control process? And if your assessment causes you to
9 immediately ask questions, then we felt that it was not
10 perhaps a statement that ought to be included. But the
11 discussion about it was general, and did not relate to
12 Dr Kelly or any other person at the meeting feeling
13 particularly that it should not have been included.
14 LORD HUTTON: Thank you.
15 MR DINGEMANS: You were about to tell us of the further
16 contact you had had with Dr Kelly about the dossier.
17 A. Indeed. About six days later, on the 25th, I e-mailed
18 him. He had asked for a little bit of background on the
19 phosgene plant and I had dug some old stuff out of my
20 files.
21 Q. Did that follow a newspaper report?
22 A. It did. As I sadly predicted, the Iraqis had
23 immediately invited journalists to go to the al-Qa'qa'
24 plant and see for themselves no proscribed activities
25 were taking place.

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1 Q. Can I just interrupt you and ask for MED/5/1 to 2? We
2 are going to look at The Guardian, page 2 for 25th
3 September 2002. Is that the newspaper report that you
4 are going to refer to?
5 A. It is indeed.
6 Q. What this says in paragraph 2 is:
7 "Mr Said, director general of the al-Qa'qa' military
8 industrial complex, near Baghdad, said that at least one
9 of the chemical warfare allegations in relation to his
10 plant was easily refutable: 'it is a pretty stupid
11 mistake for the British to make.'
12 "He expected to be bombed anyway..."
13 Then he went on to talk on about various other
14 matters and make specific comments on it. Is that the
15 article you were referring to?
16 A. It is indeed. I wrote to David on that day that I was
17 with the manager of al-Qa'qa', that it was a pretty
18 stupid mistake for the British to make.
19 Q. Can I pull up CAB/29/15? Can you see what we are
20 looking at or not?
21 A. CAB/29/15. I do not believe I can.
22 Q. Right. This is an e-mail from someone who is blanked
23 out to David Kelly and it is dated 25th September 2002
24 timed at 14:58:10 "research department of ..."
25 Is that the e-mail you sent to Dr Kelly?

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1 A. That is the e-mail I sent to Dr Kelly.
2 Q. Why did you send him this e-mail?
3 A. As I say, he had asked me for a little bit of background
4 material on al-Qa'qa'. I was able to dig it out and in
5 passing I made the comment that The Guardian newspaper
6 interview of the manager of al-Qa'qa' had resulted in
7 what I had suggested would happen at the meeting of
8 19th September.
9 Q. Well, you say in the second paragraph:
10 "Casting your mind back to Thursday's rushed little
11 meeting..."
12 Is that the meeting that you are telling us about at
13 the moment?
14 A. It is, indeed.
15 Q. "... you will recall me pointing out that the phosgene
16 [plant] was too small to be interesting, and regarded by
17 UNSCOM as legit dual use. I was assured that rebuilding
18 had gone on.
19 "I also pointed out that the bulk world usage of
20 phosgene, and the small size of the unit. You will
21 recall [blank] admitted they were grasping at straws."
22 I do not know need to know who "blank" was. Was
23 blank at the meeting?
24 A. Blank was at the meeting. It was a conversation I had
25 with blank after the meeting where I expressed my view

105
1 that to include it in the document really was not going
2 to serve any useful purpose.
3 Q. Why did this person say they were grasping at straws?
4 A. I cannot remember if he used those exact words. I may
5 have paraphrased, in my e-mail to David, exactly what
6 blank felt about it, but it was a conversational aside
7 at the end of the meeting, that I was simply making the
8 point that not taking my advice was not a good idea.
9 Q. You then say:
10 "My annotations are on [blank] draft -- you'll
11 remember [blank] was keen to relieve me of possession of
12 the dossier at the end of the meeting!"
13 You have put exclamation marks. Was there any
14 significance behind that?
15 A. Not at all. I was shown a copy of the draft 20 or
16 30 minutes before the meeting. I read the relevant
17 parts very quickly, made some notes on it and then
18 handed the draft back.
19 Q. You say in the penultimate paragraph:
20 "So all in all -- having read page 2 of
21 The Guardian -- I'm with the manager of al-Qa'qa: 'it is
22 a pretty stupid mistake for the British to make'."
23 A. Indeed, that was my opinion then and it remains my
24 opinion.
25 Q. Then you go on, last paragraph:

106
1 "Another example supporting our view that you and
2 I should have been more involved in this than the spin
3 merchants of this administration. No doubt you will
4 have to more to tell me as a result of your antics
5 today. Let's hope it turns into tomorrow's chip
6 wrappers ..."
7 Had you and Dr Kelly discussed whether or not you
8 felt you should have been more involved with drafting
9 the dossier?
10 A. We had. We, ourselves, had not been directly involved
11 before; but as a result of the work that summer, where
12 both of us had been involved in drafting the
13 International Institute of Strategic Studies report on
14 Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, we felt that the UK
15 Government was missing a trick by not including us in
16 the loop in the preparation of Her Majesty's
17 Government's dossier.
18 Q. You make the comment about the involvement of the spin
19 merchants of this administration. Who were you
20 referring to?
21 A. Well, it is really a general comment from the working
22 level within the DIS about perceived interference and
23 really that --
24 Q. Sorry to interrupt. What was the perception?
25 A. The perception was that the dossier had been round the

107
1 houses several times in order to try to find a form of
2 words which would strengthen certain political
3 objectives.
4 Q. And was that a view widely shared within the DIS?
5 A. I am not able to comment on that since I was not working
6 at the DIS at the time.
7 Q. You refer to his "antics today". What was that?
8 A. I believe he was attending another meeting, but I cannot
9 recall exactly which meeting he was attending.
10 Q. And you express the hope that it turns into tomorrow's
11 chip wrappers. Can you just explain formally what you
12 mean by that?
13 A. Well, news is often unimportant two or three days after
14 it has been published and that was the sentiment I was
15 seeking to express, that really we could move past this
16 little difficulty of a dossier which had one or two
17 errors in it. You must remember our view that the
18 dossier as a whole was quite a decent dossier and
19 represented a reasonable summation. It is just that it
20 included some points which could have been left out.
21 Q. After publication of the dossier, were you ever
22 contacted by anyone in relation to the dossier?
23 A. Some journalists had approached my home telephone number
24 seeking for informed comments but I was unable to help
25 them since I had not been involved in the production of

108
1 the dossier apart from that particular meeting.
2 Q. Were you authorised to speak to journalists?
3 A. I was not authorised to speak to journalists and said
4 very little other than: thank you very much and no
5 I have nothing to say, before putting the phone down.
6 Q. When did you last visit Dr Kelly?
7 A. I last visited his home -- it would have been about
8 a week before the 2nd July. He last visited my home on
9 10th July.
10 Q. When you visited his home, if it is the week before, it
11 is about 26th June, is that about right?
12 A. It is about then, yes.
13 Q. Did he speak to you about any letters he was going to
14 write to the Ministry of Defence about press contacts?
15 A. He did not.
16 Q. Did he speak to you about whether or not he had spoken
17 to Mr Gilligan?
18 A. He never mentioned Mr Gilligan at all.
19 Q. Either on 26th or on 10th July?
20 A. On neither occasion did he mention Mr Gilligan.
21 Q. Did you see Dr Kelly after 26th June?
22 A. Yes, I did. We underwent some training together at
23 RAF Uxbridge and RAF Honnington in preparation for our
24 imminent deployment to Iraq. And shortly after that
25 training he visited my house on the 10th to drop off

109
1 some malaria medication.
2 Q. When you saw him at RAF Uxbridge and RAF Honnington, how
3 did he seem?
4 A. He seemed his normal self, chatty, friendly, gregarious
5 and it was only when he was called away on the Monday we
6 were at Honnington, which I believe is the 7th --
7 Q. 7th July?
8 A. 7th July, that he -- we began to think that perhaps
9 there were other matters afoot which would involve him.
10 Q. Who is "we"?
11 A. Those people being trained to deploy to Iraq.
12 Q. How did Dr Kelly seem when he was called away?
13 A. He simply turned his phone off and turned -- rather
14 ended the call and said: I have to go to London
15 immediately; and made preparations to leave the
16 training.
17 Q. Did you overhear the conversation?
18 A. No, I did not.
19 Q. When you saw him on 10th July, where were you?
20 A. I was at home, preparing to fly the next day.
21 Q. We do not want to know exactly where your home is. Can
22 you give us a general description of the area, perhaps
23 by county?
24 A. Certainly, Wiltshire.
25 Q. And you saw him on 10th July?

110
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. We have heard that he spent the night of the 9th July at
3 a hotel in Weston-Super-Mare then, I think, travelled
4 down on 10th July to Cornwall. Did he tell you that he
5 was travelling anywhere?
6 A. It was slightly odd. He rang me on the morning of the
7 10th to tell me he had the medication for me.
8 Q. What medication was this?
9 A. It was paladin, it is an anti-malarial medication.
10 Q. Who had given him that?
11 A. The doctor at RAF Honnington had given him the
12 medication for the three of us who were about to deploy
13 to Iraq on Friday. She had made a slight error in the
14 prescription and was giving us some more.
15 Q. Right. And he rang you to say that he had the
16 medication -- sorry, I interrupted.
17 A. Yes. He rang to say he had the medication and was quite
18 happy to drop it off. This was quite odd. I was quite
19 happy to travel the short distance to his home to pick
20 it up. But he almost insisted he dropped it off.
21 Within about half an hour to an hour he arrived at my
22 house.
23 Q. Sorry to press you, whereabouts in Wiltshire? Can you
24 give a town that you are near?
25 A. I am near Swindon.

111
1 LORD HUTTON: Was Mrs Kelly with Dr Kelly at this time,
2 Mr A?
3 A. It is possible that she could have been in the car. I
4 myself did not understand how the whole
5 Weston-Super-Mare/Cornwall trip works in the chronology.
6 David had parked some distance from my house and walked
7 100 yards up the road to my house.
8 Q. Do you have a drive?
9 A. I am afraid not.
10 Q. Was 100 yards the closest he could park?
11 A. Yes, that is the problem.
12 Q. And how did he seem to you when you saw him on
13 10th July?
14 A. He was distracted. Our conversation would normally
15 include a significant part relating to work, but he
16 seemed to want nothing more than to have a cup of coffee
17 and walk through my garden talking about the garden, so
18 that is what we did.
19 Q. Was that usual behaviour for him?
20 A. It was not. I would characterise his behaviour as being
21 somewhat distracted at this point; and he clearly did
22 not want to talk much about work.
23 Q. Was that usual?
24 A. It was not. Our friendship was based partly on work
25 but -- mostly on work, and really a large part of our

112
1 meetings would consist of talking of matters of
2 professional mutual concern.
3 Q. Had you by this stage become aware of the Ministry of
4 Defence press release on the evening of 8th July which
5 referred to an unnamed official coming forward?
6 A. I had not. I picked up the paper shortly after he left
7 and he was named in that paper; but at that point I did
8 not know he had been named.
9 Q. And he did not volunteer anything about that to you?
10 A. He did not. I mentioned briefly whoever the mole was
11 probably had some explaining to do. It never crossed my
12 mind for a moment that they possibly could be referring
13 to David. The reason for that is I knew he had been
14 charged with the responsibility of giving background
15 briefings by both the FCO and MoD for many years and
16 I believe that his authorisation covered all his media
17 contacts.
18 Q. Had you ever discussed retirement plans or Dr Kelly's
19 retirement plans?
20 A. We often did. He was approaching the end of a long and
21 meritorious career and he still had, he believed, a lot
22 to offer. It was unclear to him exactly how he would
23 deal with his retirement. But a significant change did
24 occur over the period of the winter 2002 to the spring
25 of 2003.

113
1 Q. What was that change?
2 A. I would say that before the autumn of 2002 he had every
3 intention of working in an official/semi-official or
4 academic capacity in the field which he had made his own
5 for the past 30 years. But when we discussed the
6 subject in May or June of 2003 he did say to me that the
7 events of the winter and the spring had made him think
8 very seriously as to whether his previous ideas of
9 continuing on were realistic and maybe he ought to just
10 draw a line under the whole experience when it was over.
11 Q. Did he tell you what events he was referring to?
12 A. David had been in great demand throughout the winter and
13 the spring, by various people, and had done a lot of
14 work and a lot of travelling; and I do not think
15 necessarily that he had the support that he thought was
16 necessary. I say in that that he found it really quite
17 frustrating at times dealing with people who were not
18 fully aware of the issues.
19 Q. "Dealing with people", what sort of people?
20 A. He was never indiscrete enough to mention which
21 departments or individuals he was having difficulty
22 with; but of course Government -- this is a consensual
23 process and you can have opinions and people cannot take
24 your advice. If people do not take your advice, this
25 can be seen to be quite difficult.

114
1 Q. Did he refer, in this context, to the dossier at all?
2 A. He did not. That more or less did turn into yesterday's
3 chip wrappers for a period over the winter, and it was
4 subsumed by the February dossier to some extent which
5 had its own particular problems.
6 Q. Is there anything else surrounding the circumstances of
7 Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?
8 A. Not at all, but I can tell you about a meeting held in
9 Baghdad some 8 days after David's death. Some 30 former
10 colleagues of David actually gathered, which in a sense
11 was fairly impressive, to remember the man and his
12 achievements. And we felt that his loss is actually
13 a sorry loss for the Iraq Survey Group and we miss his
14 expertise and his friendship greatly.
15 Q. Is there anything else you would like to say?
16 A. Not at all.
17 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed, Mr A.
18 A. Thank you.
19 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, I am afraid we will need a couple of
20 minutes to disconnect.
21 LORD HUTTON: I will rise.
22 (2.28 pm)
23 (Short Break)
24 (2.30 pm)
25

115
1 DR BRIAN FRANCIS GILL JONES (continued)
2 Examined by MR DINGEMANS (continued)
3 LORD HUTTON: Sit down again, please, Dr Jones.
4 MR DINGEMANS: Dr Jones, I am sorry to have interrupted your
5 evidence.
6 You have told us about the three categories of
7 concern you had in relation to the 45 minutes comment.
8 You had also dealt with the other matter highlighted on
9 that.
10 When you were having your meeting on 19th September
11 in DIS, was the person who we have heard of as Mr A
12 present?
13 A. I believe so, yes.
14 Q. I do not know whether the voice was distorted or whether
15 you might have been able to recognise him?
16 A. That was the only -- I think the only occasion I ever
17 met Mr A; and so I am not familiar -- you know, I am not
18 familiar with his voice. I am virtually certain it was.
19 Q. He sounded fairly forceful about certain matters. Was
20 that a fair impression?
21 A. (Pause). My recollection of the meeting does not
22 coincide exactly with what you have just heard. In the
23 main parts I think it does. The reason for the meeting,
24 from my perspective -- well, the meeting was not held
25 for the reason that Mr A thinks it was, and it did not

116
1 gather the information for the particular document you
2 showed.
3 Q. Right.
4 A. Some of it may have come from that meeting, but that was
5 not the purpose of the meeting. The purpose of the
6 meeting, and I think the description of it of "rushed"
7 and "little" were probably correct. It was a rushed
8 little meeting; but I actually called it at the
9 suggestion of one of my staff, who was aware of the
10 problem in my mind over the fact that Dr Kelly -- and
11 that David had told me that he thought the dossier was
12 good, on the one hand, and my staff and indeed my
13 impressions of it were that it was not completely good.
14 Q. So it was to iron out those differences of perception?
15 A. It was to iron out those differences. As far as the
16 presence of Mr A, you know that was an additional bonus,
17 if you like, that he had come in and he was the CW
18 expert in --
19 LORD HUTTON: He was the what expert, sorry?
20 A. The CW, sorry, the chemical warfare expert. David being
21 the biological warfare expert. We could just sit down
22 and briefly chew over the things really in order to try
23 to, you know, settle this problem I had in my mind.
24 I have a great deal of respect for David Kelly's input
25 to this, and I was really worried about there being some

117
1 contradiction.
2 MR DINGEMANS: Right. It seems from what Mr A had said that
3 the invitation was extended by Dr Kelly. Did you invite
4 Mr A or did Dr Kelly?
5 A. I did not. The way in which it happened was that on
6 that morning a member of my staff, knowing that I had
7 these worries, said to me that David was coming in and
8 Mr A was coming in with him, would I like a small get
9 together just to try to resolve some of the issues that
10 existed? I said: that is a very good idea. And we had
11 a meeting, I think in the late morning; and we did have
12 a round table discussion of aspects of the dossier. But
13 I do not think it was a very long meeting and it
14 certainly did not itemise matters that I was going to
15 put or a member of my staff was going to put in
16 a response to the assessment staff.
17 Q. Mr A referred to the letter at CAB/3/79. He identified
18 a number of comments that Dr Kelly had made and he
19 identified Dr Kelly as being the source of those
20 comments. Did that accord with your recollection?
21 A. That could well have been the case, but you will recall
22 that Dr Kelly was looking at the dossier the day
23 before --
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. -- and he will have been passing comments, I imagine, to

118
1 members of my staff who would then have incorporated
2 them in the comments they would send on. So it does not
3 surprise me that these additional comments, where my
4 staff thought that they contributed to the process,
5 would have been taken and used in that way. Indeed, it
6 is why they -- you know, why they were welcomed in to
7 help in this exercise.
8 Q. The letter of 19th September we can see on the screen,
9 was that sent after your meeting with Dr Kelly and Mr A
10 and your other assessment staff?
11 A. I do not know. I mean, that did not originate in my
12 branch. It almost certainly includes comments that my
13 branch will have fed to this --
14 Q. Person coordinating?
15 A. Coordinating this.
16 Q. So this is the letter from your branch, reported up
17 comments?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And the coordinator, having heard all the comments from
20 DIS, then put this letter together?
21 A. I think that is what it represents, yes.
22 Q. Do you remember what dossier you were looking at on
23 19th September? We have one at CAB/3/22 which, in the
24 top right-hand corner, has some handwriting,
25 19th September on it.

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1 A. My recollection is that David was coming in to look at
2 the latest version of the dossier.
3 Q. That day?
4 A. So, I would -- my best guess would be that it was that
5 version.
6 Q. We are told that the 19th September 2002 has been
7 written on after the event to help us try to follow the
8 progress of the dossier but is taken, as it were, from
9 computer records. So you think it was a dossier that
10 you got in that day?
11 A. I believe so. There was one, as I think I mentioned
12 earlier, that they had been working on the day before;
13 and as far as I can remember, and I cannot be absolutely
14 certain about this, I believe that at that stage my CW
15 expert said, when the new dossier arrived: they still
16 have not taken these comments that I am rather bothered
17 about. So I do not think the two versions, as far as we
18 were concerned -- those pieces of the dossier that were
19 primarily of interest to us, I do not think they had
20 changed greatly between the two.
21 LORD HUTTON: Do you remember, Dr Jones, the draft of the
22 dossier that you looked at of 19th September, was it in
23 the same form as the dossier that was finally published
24 on 24th September? Do you remember that?
25 A. (Pause). I think it was -- I think it was close to

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1 that, to the final version.
2 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Might it have been exactly the same
3 or -- I appreciate it is very difficult to remember
4 precisely.
5 A. Yes, yes.
6 LORD HUTTON: -- is it the position it might have been the
7 identical document or it was certainly close to it?
8 A. I believed, I think, at the time that this was the
9 version as it would appear and that the only comments
10 that were required on it were very minimal and there
11 were going to be no further major changes.
12 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
13 A. I was surprised when I refreshed my memory last week at
14 the Ministry of Defence to see that there had been, in
15 fact, another version on the 20th. I cannot recall that
16 that was the case, but that is what the record showed
17 and I can believe that.
18 MR DINGEMANS: Right. You saw another version, handwriting
19 in the top right-hand corner with the 20th on it?
20 A. No, I do not think I saw that.
21 Q. No, no, not at the time, but last week?
22 A. No, I saw reference to it in a chronological list of --
23 Q. Of dossiers?
24 A. Of dossiers, yes.
25 Q. Do you remember -- it is slightly unfair -- how many

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1 dossiers there were listed there?
2 A. No.
3 Q. What was the latest dossier that you recall there?
4 A. Well, I believe it was the one on the 20th was the last
5 draft. But I cannot be certain about that.
6 Q. After the meeting on 19th September, your CW expert, and
7 I imagine that is a different --
8 LORD HUTTON: Sorry, may I just ask: you said that the
9 purpose of that meeting was to really resolve an issue
10 which was that some members of your staff had
11 reservations about the dossier, whereas Dr Kelly had
12 told you that he thought it was a good dossier. That
13 was the purpose of the meeting, as I understand it.
14 A. Yes.
15 LORD HUTTON: How was that matter resolved at that meeting
16 or was it resolved?
17 A. Well, it was resolved to my satisfaction and to the
18 extent that David made it clear that his comments on the
19 dossier did not relate to the latest intelligence, which
20 he had not seen; that it was mainly about those parts of
21 the dossier dealing with the historical aspects and the
22 information he had acquired in his duties as an
23 inspector. Those were the parts that he was focusing
24 on.
25 LORD HUTTON: Yes.

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1 A. And his position was that they were very sound and the
2 general thrust of the document he found -- he thought
3 was good.
4 LORD HUTTON: Please correct me if I am in any way wrong in
5 my understanding. Was it the position that Dr Kelly
6 then did not express a view about the 45 minute claim,
7 in that it was based on recent intelligence which he had
8 not seen?
9 A. I cannot recall that he expressed a view on it.
10 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
11 A. It may well be that, as you heard from the last witness,
12 there may have been some general discussion about it.
13 In fact, I think that was probably likely. But -- and
14 I think probably the context of the meeting was that my
15 staff expressed reservations about it, but since he will
16 not have seen it, I do not think there could have been
17 a detailed discussion of it because it would not have
18 been appropriate at that time.
19 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.
20 MR DINGEMANS: After the meeting, a letter is written, we
21 have seen that letter, which incorporates various
22 comments and --
23 A. Sorry, which --
24 Q. We have seen the letter, 19th September letter.
25 A. The one that was --

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1 Q. Yes. Do you want to see it again?
2 A. I do not think so. I mean, you should be clear that
3 that letter or that minute was not as a result of the
4 meeting.
5 Q. No, sorry. Well, comments are passed up to the
6 coordinator, who then writes the letter.
7 A. Yes, as far as I am aware. It might have been done
8 before we had the meeting, I do not know.
9 Q. Were any comments passed up, as a result of the meeting,
10 to the coordinator by your group?
11 A. Not as a -- no. No, they were not.
12 Q. Right. But by then, comments had been passed up by your
13 CW expert that had not been accepted in the subsequent
14 drafts?
15 A. They had been passed up several times during the course
16 of the preparation of the dossier.
17 Q. Was your CW expert happy or unhappy about this?
18 A. He remained unhappy that significant -- that comments he
19 had made that he felt were significant had not been
20 incorporated.
21 Q. So what do you do in those circumstances?
22 A. Well, these circumstances are quite unusual.
23 Q. Can you tell us why?
24 A. Well, I mean the whole dossier was unusual. It was not
25 something we did. If I think about that in the same

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1 context as the normal product of the assessment process
2 and the JIC assessment process, it would, in fact, be
3 very unusual to arrive at a point where a paper was
4 about to be published, not in the wider sense but
5 published as a secure paper --
6 Q. The JIC assessment finalised?
7 A. Yes, where significant differences remain. Part of that
8 process in the normal production of a JIC assessment
9 would involve a meeting within the DIS of analysts with
10 our two representatives on the Joint Intelligence
11 Committee, at which arguments would be put to them, if
12 there were outstanding issues, for them to take into the
13 full Committee to discuss. And that happened fairly
14 often, that there would be one or two things and the
15 Chief of Defence Intelligence and his deputy would look
16 at those and decide whether they would represent them or
17 otherwise.
18 Q. At the Joint Intelligence Committee meeting?
19 A. Yes, yes. And usually issues were either resolved
20 before that or resolved as part of that process.
21 Q. Because the Chief of Defence Intelligence would say,
22 "Look, you are being silly about this; for reasons A, B,
23 C I am not going to represent this argument in the Joint
24 Intelligence Committee" or "You have persuaded me,
25 I will see what I can do".

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1 A. That is exactly it.
2 Q. Did that happen in this case?
3 A. No. There was, I believe, a slight difference in
4 process here, in that these latest dossiers were -- the
5 latest drafts of the dossier, I think, were being
6 modified between major JIC meetings, as I understand.
7 Q. Right.
8 A. So -- sorry.
9 LORD HUTTON: Carry on please, Dr Jones.
10 A. So I think some of these issues were -- probably must
11 have been, as far as I can see, dealt with out of
12 committee, as it were, by members of the JIC.
13 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Scarlett told us that he set up a drafting
14 committee, sub-committee, I hope I represent it fairly,
15 from the Joint Intelligence Committee and his joint
16 intelligence assessment staff which was responsible for
17 drafting the dossier.
18 A. That is right, yes.
19 Q. And that is what you refer to as being a slightly
20 unusual process, is it?
21 A. No, no. The involvement of the assessment staff in the
22 drafting of the papers was normal process.
23 Q. What was abnormal?
24 A. (Pause). I am -- I think "abnormal" is the wrong word.
25 What was unusual or what did not follow the normal

126
1 practice was that this was not a paper that was going
2 through the process by which it was examined and argued
3 over at a full meeting of the Joint Intelligence
4 Committee at the stage that we are talking about.
5 Q. Right.
6 A. Unless there was an extraordinary one, of which I am
7 totally unaware, I would think that the last meeting
8 before publication, which was a Tuesday, would have been
9 the previous Wednesday.
10 Q. Right.
11 A. And here we are into the Thursday and the Friday of that
12 cycle.
13 Q. So the -- and I think Mr Scarlett has already told us
14 this -- Joint Intelligence Committee committee meetings
15 are the Wednesday. If you work back on the dossier: the
16 dossier is published on 24th September; we know there
17 are some versions, 20th you refer to or late on the
18 19th, maybe the same one, which are produced after the
19 Joint Intelligence Committee had met.
20 A. Yes, I think that just working backwards there would
21 have been a meeting on the 18th, I believe.
22 Q. Right. Do you understand there to have been a full
23 meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee which
24 considered the final draft of the dossier?
25 A. I am not aware that there was one, but I am not sure

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1 that there was not one.
2 Q. Right. Would you normally know of meetings of the Joint
3 Intelligence Committee?
4 A. I think I would have known if there was one on this
5 matter, but again I cannot be absolutely sure.
6 Q. Their usual meetings are the Wednesday. You would have
7 known there was an extraordinary, in the sense of not
8 the usual time, meeting?
9 A. I would be surprised if I did not know. But, I mean,
10 one cannot be absolutely certain. There was a lot going
11 on. But I am not aware that there was; but if someone
12 told me that there was one, I would not argue with it.
13 Q. Is that why you considered the process -- I used the
14 word "abnormal", you did not like that, you said
15 "unusual". Is that why you considered there was an
16 unusual process?
17 A. Well, yes, in the sense that the task that was being
18 undertaken was different from the normal process.
19 I mean, we had maybe produced one paper that was a bit
20 like the dossier before, and this was really, you know,
21 unusual in its -- the whole thing was a little unusual.
22 So it was not necessarily surprising that it did not
23 follow exactly the same process. It was not surprising
24 to me then.
25 Q. Was the perception, right or wrong, that the Joint

128
1 Intelligence Committee had not considered in committee
2 the final draft before it was published something that
3 was commented on by others?
4 A. No, I think it has only sort of dawned on me that was
5 the case retrospectively. I mean, I do not remember
6 thinking that -- I do not remember thinking that, at the
7 time. The impression I had was that on about
8 19th September, as it may have been the 20th September,
9 as it were, the shutters were coming down on this
10 particular paper, that the discussion and the argument
11 had been concluded. And it was the impression that
12 I had, at that time, that our reservations about the
13 dossier were not going to be reflected in the final
14 version.
15 Q. As a result of this, did you take any action?
16 A. Yes, I wrote a minute to my director making it clear
17 that there were problems with this, and I copied that
18 to --
19 Q. Can I call up a minute and you can tell me if it is the
20 right one?
21 A. -- my deputy director.
22 Q. It is MoD/22/1. If we scroll down.
23 A. Yes, that is the one.
24 Q. You send it to various people; and it said:
25 "... has been involved in the generation of the Iraq

129
1 dossier which, in the last two weeks has involved
2 a number of iterations which have incorporated new
3 intelligence. It is my understanding that some of the
4 intelligence has not been made available to my branch.
5 Because of this they have had to express their
6 reservations on several aspects of the dossier. Most of
7 these have been resolved. However, a number remain in
8 the document at reference and it is important that
9 I note for you at this stage the remaining areas where
10 we are unable to confirm the statements made on the
11 basis of the information available to my branch."
12 Was that the background against which you wrote the
13 note?
14 A. That was, yes.
15 Q. Then you make a number of points:
16 "Although we have no problem with a judgment based
17 on intelligence that Saddam attaches great importance to
18 possessing WMD we have not seen the intelligence that
19 'shows' this to be the case. Nor have we seen
20 intelligence that 'shows' he does not regard them only
21 as a weapon of last resort, although our judgment is
22 that it would be sensible to assume he might use them in
23 a number of other scenarios. The intelligence we have
24 seen indicates rather than 'shows'..."
25 That I think picks up a point you were making

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1 shortly before lunch, is that right?
2 A. Yes, that is right.
3 Q. At 3:
4 "We have a number of questions in our minds relating
5 to the intelligence on the military plans for the use of
6 chemical and biological weapons, particularly about the
7 times mentioned and the failure to differentiate between
8 the two types of weapon."
9 Is that a reference to the 45 minutes point?
10 A. It is, yes.
11 Q. "4. We have not seen intelligence which we believe
12 'shows' that Iraq has continued to produce CW agent in
13 1998-2002, although our judgment is that it has probably
14 done so. Whilst we are even more convinced that Iraq
15 has continued to produce biological weapons agent (on
16 the basis of mobile production intelligence) we would
17 not go so far as to say we 'know' this to be the case."
18 That is on BW, is that?
19 A. Yes, that is right.
20 Q. That is a thing that Dr Kelly would have known about; is
21 that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Over the page:
24 "Finally, I note we are pleased that the claim that
25 Iraq used aflatoxin against the Shi'a uprising in 1991

131
1 has been excluded from the dossier but we are concerned
2 that the claim in relation to mustard remains as we
3 consider the evidence to be weak."
4 To a lawyer who reads people moaning about words all
5 the time, it might seem that this is a usual sort of
6 minute to write. Would that be a fair impression?
7 A. No, if we revert to our comparison with the normal JIC
8 product, I think I had only had cause to express this
9 sort of reservation after the shutters had come down, if
10 you like, on one occasion, maybe two. I can remember --
11 I can clearly remember one, but there may have been
12 another. But, you know, in 15 years of dealing with
13 this process it was very unusual to have to do that.
14 Q. Did you get a response?
15 A. My director -- who I should explain was only recently in
16 post, he had only been in post a few weeks, had come
17 from outside the intelligence area -- was, you know,
18 having a difficult time then, shall we say, coming to
19 terms with all this. And he did write me a note saying:
20 thank you for your minute; and I think that was the only
21 response I had.
22 Q. You got the impression he did not really mean it when he
23 said "thank you".
24 A. He may well not have meant it, but I do not know -- no,
25 I cannot really comment on that. I mean, we had had

132
1 a discussion about it, and he was aware of my
2 reservations, you know, 24 hours earlier.
3 Q. At MoD/4/11 we can see a letter that is dated
4 8th July 2003, which refers to the fact that, halfway
5 down:
6 "Your records will show that as [then there is
7 a title] and probably the most senior and experienced
8 intelligence community official working on 'WMD', I was
9 so concerned about the manner in which intelligence
10 assessments for which I had some responsibility were
11 being presented in the dossier of 24 September 2002,
12 that I was moved to write formally to your predecessor,
13 Tony Cragg, recording and explaining my reservations."
14 Do you know anything about this letter?
15 A. Yes, I wrote it.
16 Q. That is from you, is it?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And I think we have seen the terms of that letter.
19 LORD HUTTON: Now, was Mr Tony Cragg someone separate and
20 distinct from your director or is he the same?
21 A. Yes, he is my -- he was my director's boss.
22 LORD HUTTON: I see.
23 A. So he is --
24 LORD HUTTON: He was the Deputy Chief of Defence
25 Intelligence.

133
1 A. Yes, that is right.
2 LORD HUTTON: He was your director's boss?
3 A. Yes, that is right.
4 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. Thank you.
5 MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to a document? It is SJW/1/59
6 and take you to the bottom of that. Taking it down the
7 page, if that is all right, this is said to be a tape
8 recording of Dr Kelly in conversation with Ms Watts.
9 And if I pick it up just before the bottom of the page
10 you can see:
11 "DK: I wouldn't go as strongly as to say that
12 particular bit, because I was not involved in the
13 assessment of it, no. [He is talking about the
14 45 minutes] I can't say that it was against MY advice.
15 I was uneasy with it. I mean my problem was I could
16 give other explanations, which I've indicated to you,
17 that it was the time to erect something like a scud
18 missile or it was the time to fill a 40 barrel multi
19 barrel rocket launcher.
20 "45 minutes might well be important and I mean
21 I have no idea who de-briefed this guy, quite often it's
22 someone who has no idea of the topic and the information
23 comes through and people then use it as they see fit."
24 Do you recall Dr Kelly expressing those sort of
25 comments?

134
1 A. No, I cannot recall that he did that.
2 Q. But you recall there was some discussion about the
3 45 minutes around the table?
4 A. I think there almost certainly was.
5 Q. It is just you --
6 A. And there may have been some general comments raised, as
7 indeed the last witness mentioned, about an issue like
8 that. I mean, they would obviously, with their
9 background and experience, try to fit something into
10 that, having read it in the draft dossier. I mean, they
11 did parallel concerns that we were trying to deal with.
12 Q. Ms Watts says:
13 "So it wasn't as if there were lots of people saying
14 don't put it in don't put it in, it's just it was in
15 there and was seized upon, rather than No. 10
16 specifically going against."
17 Dr Kelly is reported as saying this:
18 "There were lots of people saying that -- I mean it
19 was an interesting week before the dossier was put out
20 because there were so many things in there that people
21 were saying well we're not so sure about that, or in
22 fact they were happy with it being in but not expressed
23 the way that it was, because the wordsmithing is
24 actually quite important and the intelligence community
25 are a pretty cautious lot on the whole but once you get

135
1 people putting it/presenting it for public consumption
2 of course they use different words. I don't think
3 they're being wilfully dishonest I think they just think
4 that that's the way the public will appreciate it best.
5 I'm sure you have the same problem as a journalist don't
6 you? Sometimes you've got to put things into words that
7 the public will understand."
8 Is that a fair reflection of what was going on in
9 the week before the dossier was published?
10 A. (Pause). Not completely. I think it depends on what
11 one's perception of "lots of people" were. I mean
12 people around -- a few people around me were; and
13 letting me know about it.
14 Q. And a few people obviously then around Dr Kelly, because
15 he was around the same sort of people.
16 A. He, I think, would have been aware to some extent of
17 that. I do not think -- as I think I mentioned earlier,
18 I do not think it was a matter of if we are still on the
19 45 minutes, I think we are --
20 Q. Well, generally.
21 A. It was a matter of saying, you know: do not put that
22 in -- it was the way it was qualified which was the
23 issue, I believe.
24 Q. Over the page, at the top of page 60:
25 "In your heart of hearts [this is Dr Kelly still]

136
1 you must realise sometimes that's not actually the right
2 thing to say but it's the only way you can put it over
3 if you've got to get it over in two minutes or
4 three minutes.
5 Ms Watts: Did you actually write that section which
6 refers to the 45 minutes or was it somebody else?
7 "Dr Kelly: I didn't write THAT section, no. I mean
8 I reviewed the whole thing. I was involved with the
9 whole process. In the end it was just a flurry of
10 activity and it was very difficult to get comments in
11 because people at the top of the ladder didn't want to
12 hear some of the things."
13 Was that a fair comment?
14 A. (Pause). I mean, I think David was involved in the
15 whole process to the extent that he had visibility of
16 the whole -- the complete drafts of the dossiers or at
17 least by the time I returned from leave on the 18th
18 I think he was seeing them. His -- I mean, he did not
19 contribute to the process of the analysis of the latest
20 intelligence, so he was not involved to that extent.
21 Q. Now if --
22 A. His description of the flurry of activity was certainly
23 right and I think I have explained that. I mean,
24 I think -- I think the end of that, "Because people at
25 the top didn't want to hear some of the things".

137
1 I mean, whether that was the case or not, I do not know.
2 It was certainly difficult to get the things done and it
3 was more difficult than usual, and we were disappointed
4 when we did not succeed. But the exact cause of that
5 one can only guess at. One cannot -- I was not in
6 a position to know, and I do not know whether he knew
7 any more than I did.
8 Q. If members of your staff had given this sort of
9 information to journalists about the discussions that
10 had taken place in your branch relating to concerns
11 about the dossier, what would your reaction have been to
12 that?
13 A. (Pause). I would have thought that they were acting
14 well beyond the bounds of what they should have been
15 doing. I would have been very disappointed and very
16 annoyed.
17 Q. Can I take you to one final reference, CAB/29/15? This
18 is the e-mail -- I think you were in while Mr A was on
19 the screen. This was Mr A's e-mail. Just at the bottom
20 of CAB/29/15 Mr A makes the comment:
21 "Another example supporting our view that you and
22 I should have been more involved in this than the spin
23 merchants of this administration."
24 Mr A has explained what he meant by that. Was there
25 a perception, right or wrong, amongst DIS personnel that

138
1 spin merchants were involved with the dossier?
2 A. Well, "spin merchants" is rather emotive. I think there
3 was an impression, right or wrong, and I do not know,
4 I did not allow that to concern me as this process --
5 I think there was an impression that there was an
6 influence from outside the intelligence community.
7 Q. And were people in the intelligence community happy with
8 that?
9 A. No, I do not think -- well, I cannot comment on the
10 broader intelligence community. I think the people who
11 had been involved on my staff and possibly others --
12 I mean, one cannot make a general statement about this.
13 But certainly those people that were working directly
14 with me were concerned and unhappy; in the way I think
15 I described earlier in my evidence, in the way that
16 people can be unhappy. But I think there was
17 a realisation that this was a different process; and
18 I think, at the end of the day, what they were very keen
19 to do is have any assessment reflect as accurately as
20 possible the product of their work.
21 Q. Is there anything else surrounding the circumstances of
22 Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?
23 A. I do not think so, no.
24 Q. Is there anything else you would like to say?
25 A. No. No.

139
1 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed Dr Jones.
2 A. Thank you.
3 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Green, please.
4 MR ROY JAMES GREEN (called)
5 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
6 LORD HUTTON: Just sit down, please, Mr Green.
7 A. Thank you, my Lord.
8 MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name?
9 A. Yes, Roy James Green.
10 Q. What is your occupation?
11 A. I am a forensic biologist.
12 Q. Who do you work for?
13 A. I work for Forensic Alliance Limited.
14 Q. And is that a private company or a publicly owned
15 company?
16 A. Forensic Alliance is a private forensic company,
17 probably the largest independent supplier of forensic
18 science in this country.
19 Q. What does being a forensic biologist mean that you do?
20 A. It is basically looking at evidence from crimes,
21 interpreting the evidence that you find and giving an
22 opinion on what you feel that evidence means.
23 Q. Were you involved in the investigation into Dr Kelly's
24 death?
25 A. Yes, I was and I still am.

140
1 Q. And when was your first involvement?
2 A. May I refer to my notes, if that is all right?
3 Q. Yes, of course.
4 A. I received a phone call on 18th July.
5 Q. At what time, morning, evening?
6 A. It was around about dinner time.
7 Q. Around about?
8 A. Dinner time.
9 Q. What did you do as a result of that?
10 A. I attended Harrowdown Hill accompanied by one of my
11 colleagues.
12 Q. What was the name of your colleague?
13 A. Dr Eileen Hickey.
14 Q. What time did you get to Harrowdown Hill?
15 A. We arrived at the scene at just gone 2 o'clock.
16 Q. 2 o'clock in the afternoon?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Who was there?
19 A. There were lots of people there, but specifically there
20 was Senior SOCO John Sharpley, Principal SOCO
21 Mark Scholar.
22 Q. What did you see when you arrived?
23 A. Sorry, there were some other people. DCI Alan Young;
24 the pathologist, Dr Hunt; a photographer Mr McGee(?);
25 and another senior SOCO, Katie Langford(?).

141
1 Q. What did you see when you arrive?
2 A. Well, immediately we went to a tent to put on protective
3 clothing and so forth.
4 Q. Right.
5 A. And I was then shown through a taped common access path.
6 Q. Yes. Leading up to?
7 A. Leading up into the wood; and there was a blue tent
8 there, which contained the body of Dr Kelly.
9 Q. When you arrived at the body, what did you do?
10 A. Well, basically the start of it is just to have a look
11 and see -- just to take it all in and make notes and
12 measurements and try to get some sense of what could
13 have happened.
14 Q. How long were you doing that for?
15 A. It was sort of a gradual process. As I say, I arrived
16 at just gone 2 and left at about 7, so it was quite
17 a while. But during that time I will have gone back to
18 the original tent, the changing tent, to report what
19 I was seeing to DCI Young.
20 Q. Yes.
21 A. And to make arrangements for toxicology work that needed
22 to be done.
23 Q. How long were you on the scene for that day?
24 A. In total, from just gone 2 until 7, so just short of
25 five hours.

142
1 Q. Did you spend your whole time looking at the body and
2 then coming back and making reports?
3 A. I also examined a gate further down the path.
4 Q. Right. What did you do that for?
5 A. I was told that there was a gate there and in case there
6 might have been any blood staining on there; it was just
7 a precaution really.
8 Q. Did you find anything on the gate?
9 A. No, nothing.
10 Q. Did you find anything around the body area of interest?
11 A. Yes. There was blood distribution.
12 Q. Where had the blood come from?
13 A. It appeared that the blood had originated from
14 Dr Kelly's injured left wrist.
15 Q. Right. I think we have heard from an extract that
16 Mr Page has read out to us that the ulnar artery was
17 severed. Did you understand that to be the case at the
18 time?
19 A. Obviously injuries are a pathologist's domain. However,
20 the blood distribution was what I would expect to see if
21 an artery had been severed. There was bloodstaining
22 typical of that sort of injury.
23 Q. What do you expect to see in such circumstances?
24 A. Well, when veins are severed the blood comes out under a
25 low pressure, but when arteries are severed it comes out

143
1 on a much higher pressure and you get spurting of blood,
2 you get a phenomenon known as arterial rain, where you
3 have a great deal of smallish stains all of about the
4 same size over the area.
5 Q. Did you find that arterial rain?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. On what?
8 A. On the nettles -- there were nettles alongside the body
9 of Dr Kelly.
10 Q. And did you look for the distribution of blood?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. We have heard from some ambulance personnel, and they
13 said they were not specifically looking, for obvious
14 reasons, at the distribution of blood but they noted,
15 just on their brief glance, not very much blood. What
16 were your detailed findings?
17 A. Well, there was a fair bit of blood.
18 LORD HUTTON: There was -- I beg your pardon?
19 A. A fair bit of blood, my Lord. The body was on leaf
20 litter, the sort of detritus you might find on the floor
21 of a wood, which is -- and that is very absorbent, so
22 although it may not have appeared to them there was that
23 much blood, it would obviously soak in.
24 MR DINGEMANS: A bit like blotting paper in some respects?
25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. What else did you see around the body?
2 A. There was a bloodstained watch and a knife to --
3 Q. Was the knife bloodstained?
4 A. Yes, it was, yes. There was a Barbour hat/cap near
5 Dr Kelly's left shoulder and then out from that there
6 was an Evian water bottle, the cap of which was just
7 a bit further along. These were -- the bottle was about
8 25 centimetres from the shoulder.
9 Q. Did you examine the vegetation around the body?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Did you form any conclusions from that examination?
12 A. Well, the blood staining that was highest from the
13 ground was approximately 50 centimetres above the
14 ground. This was above the position where Dr Kelly's
15 left wrist was, but most of the stainings were
16 33 centimetres, which is approximately a foot above the
17 ground. It was all fairly low level stuff.
18 Q. What does that mean?
19 A. It meant that because the injury -- most of the injuries
20 would have taken place while Dr Kelly was sitting down
21 or lying down.
22 Q. Right. When you first saw the body, what position was
23 it in?
24 A. He was on his back with the left wrist curled back in
25 this sort of manner (Indicates).

145
1 Q. Did you make any other relevant discoveries while you
2 were looking around the area?
3 A. There was an obvious large contact bloodstain on the
4 knee of the jeans.
5 Q. What do you mean by a "contact bloodstain"?
6 A. A contact stain is what you will observe if an item has
7 come into contact with a bloodstained surface, as
8 opposed to blood spots and splashes when blood splashes
9 on to an item.
10 Q. Which means at some stage his left wrist must have been
11 in contact with his trousers?
12 A. No, what I am saying, at some stage he has knelt --
13 I believe he has knelt in a pool of blood at some stage
14 and this obviously is after he has been injured.
15 Q. Any other findings?
16 A. There were smears of blood on the Evian bottle and on
17 the cap.
18 Q. And what did that indicate to you?
19 A. Well, that would indicate to me that Dr Kelly was
20 already injured when he used the Evian bottle. As an
21 explanation, my Lord --
22 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
23 A. -- when people are injured and losing blood they will
24 become thirsty.
25 MR DINGEMANS: They become?

146
1 A. Thirsty, as they are losing all that fluid.
2 Q. You thought he is likely to have had a drink then?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. What else did you find?
5 A. There was a bloodstain on the right sleeve of the
6 Barbour jacket. At the time that was a bit -- slightly
7 unusual, in that if someone is cutting their wrist you
8 wonder how, if you are moving across like this, how you
9 get blood sort of here (Indicates). But if the knife
10 was held and it went like that, with the injury passing
11 across the sleeve, that is a possible explanation.
12 Another possible explanation is in leaning across to get
13 the Evian bottle that the two areas may have crossed.
14 Q. Had crossed?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. We know, in fact, the wrist which was cut was the left
17 wrist, is that right?
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. And we know that Dr Kelly was right handed.
20 A. I was not aware of that, but yes.
21 Q. Were those all your relevant findings?
22 A. The jeans, as I have talked about, with this large
23 contact stain, did not appear to have any larger
24 downward drops on them. There were a few stains and so
25 forth but it did not have any staining that would

147
1 suggest to me that his injuries, or his major injuries
2 if you like, were caused while he was standing up, and
3 there was not any -- there did not appear to be any
4 blood underneath where he was found, and the body was
5 later moved which all suggested those injuries were
6 caused while he was sat or lying down.
7 Q. And was that the extent of your investigations that day?
8 A. Not entirely. I assisted in some of the removal of the
9 clothing and the photography of the clothing, just
10 providing a steadying hand for some items. I was
11 present when the tablet packets were found and the
12 mobile phone in his pocket.
13 Q. You mentioned the tablet packets; those were the
14 Coproxamol tablets?
15 A. That is correct, yes.
16 Q. How many packets were there?
17 A. There were three blister packs.
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. It was noted at the time that one tablet remained in it,
20 so there were 29 missing, because each one had the
21 capacity for 10 tablets.
22 Q. They were packets of 10 each, were they?
23 A. Yes.
24 LORD HUTTON: Were the packets actually found -- in what
25 part of the clothing?

148
1 A. They were in Dr Kelly's Barbour jacket, my Lord. I have
2 a photograph --
3 LORD HUTTON: I think it suffices to have your evidence,
4 thank you. And it was the pathologist who found them,
5 was it? He took them out, did he; Dr Hunt?
6 A. It was -- Dr Hunt was present, yes.
7 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.
8 MR DINGEMANS: Were you present while any other relevant
9 discoveries were made?
10 A. I do not believe so. I was there from the time that
11 Dr Kelly was in the blue tent till the time just before
12 the body was about to be removed. As I left, the hearse
13 was approaching. So it was my understanding that the
14 body was then going to be taken for the post-mortem.
15 Q. That concluded your investigations on the day, did it?
16 A. On that day, yes.
17 Q. And what further investigations did you make?
18 A. Well, since then I have had upwards of -- I could count
19 them but at a guess 50 items sent to the laboratory.
20 Q. To analyse?
21 A. To analyse, to carry out DNA profiling, to look at some
22 of the staining in a little more detail.
23 Q. Right. And you have carried all that out and reported
24 back to Assistant Chief Constable Page or through his
25 senior investigating officer?

149
1 A. Well, my examinations are still ongoing.
2 Q. Right.
3 A. I have provided a spreadsheet with a kind of --
4 a snapshot of where we are today about what items have
5 been examined, what has been found on them, which items
6 were profiled, the results of those profile tests,
7 although I have not put my evidence down in a statement
8 form as yet.
9 Q. Because you are just finishing off the testing of that
10 material?
11 A. Exactly.
12 Q. I think when all that is concluded Assistant Chief
13 Constable Page is going to come back and tell us the
14 results.
15 Subject to that, is there anything else that you
16 know of relating to the circumstances of Dr Kelly's
17 death that you can assist his Lordship with?
18 A. I do not think so, my Lord.
19 LORD HUTTON: Very well. Thank you very much indeed,
20 Mr Green.
21 MR DINGEMANS: Thank you for coming at short notice.
22 A. You are welcome.
23 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Is that a conclusion of the evidence for
24 today?
25 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, no. Mr Lamb is coming, just to be

150
1 signed off formally.
2 LORD HUTTON: I see. Yes.
3 MR PATRICK LAMB (continued)
4 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
5 Q. I am sorry to have brought you back. When you gave your
6 evidence in two parts earlier on I did not ask you, as
7 I had asked everyone else, was there anything else you
8 knew, and at that time that was because you had just
9 reported the contact that David Broucher had made with
10 you; is that right?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. And in fact in the interim we have heard from
13 David Broucher and he has given his evidence.
14 A. Certainly.
15 Q. And I think you have had a holiday?
16 A. Absolutely, yes indeed, or part of a holiday.
17 Q. Can I just ask you two quick questions in fact, now that
18 I have got you back?
19 First of all, on 5th June I think we had heard from
20 the Foreign Affairs Committee that there was a meeting
21 between the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Foreign
22 and Commonwealth Office. Do you recall that?
23 A. Sorry, you heard on 5th June?
24 Q. Yes, 5th June, which is shortly after Mr Gilligan's
25 broadcast, and the Foreign Affairs Committee I think

151
1 probably announced either that day or the day before
2 they were going to set up an investigation. Do you
3 recall visiting them on some --
4 A. Excuse me, yes. There was a -- I think it was the
5 correct date. I think it was the Wednesday morning, if
6 the 5th June was a Wednesday.
7 Q. I have not looked, sorry.
8 A. Again, if I am correct, there was a half day course and
9 a meeting which took place and an opportunity for
10 Whitehall civil servants to acquaint themselves with
11 Committees, and in particular the Foreign Affairs
12 Committee, and I was one of the people quite by chance
13 on that course on that very morning.
14 Q. Right.
15 LORD HUTTON: I think the 5th June was a Thursday actually.
16 A. I am very sorry.
17 MR DINGEMANS: We have also heard from you last time on
18 17th June you met Mr Howard at a reception and had
19 mentioned the contact Dr Kelly had reported to you that
20 he had had with Mr Gilligan.
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. And Mr Howard had then reported to Mr Tebbit and there
23 was an interview going to be arranged for Dr Kelly to be
24 seen on 24th June. Mr Howard told us that it was you
25 that was to notify Dr Kelly of that interview. Do you

152
1 recall that?
2 A. No. I think that is incorrect because I, as I said,
3 mentioned to Mr Howard on 17th June that Dr Kelly had
4 told me in passing that he had spoken to both
5 Mr Gilligan and Ms Watts. I reported that on that
6 occasion in the context of a wider conversation
7 concerning a separate and other issue, which was the
8 press reporting concerning a British expert who was
9 commenting on whether or not trailers which had recently
10 been discovered in Iraq were either for the production
11 of hydrogen, as was claimed, or whether they were for
12 the production of biological weapons.
13 There had been an article, I believe in
14 The Observer, in which an unnamed, as at that point, BW
15 expert had claimed they were not for the production of
16 biological weapons. So there was concern as to who the
17 source of that particular story was.
18 There was a degree of suspicion that it was
19 Dr Kelly, as the source of that particular story. That
20 has, in fact, now or subsequently been confirmed by
21 The Observer newspaper itself.
22 It was in the context of that wider conversation
23 that I mentioned to Mr Howard that I knew, from
24 a conversation with Dr Kelly, that he had spoken to
25 Mr Gilligan and Ms Watts. But after that I had no

153
1 further involvement whatsoever and I certainly was not
2 requested to contact Dr Kelly to inform him.
3 Q. Right. Did you in fact tell Dr Kelly of your
4 conversation with Mr Howard?
5 A. I did not, no.
6 Q. I am sorry to have brought you back to answer this final
7 question: is there anything else that you know then of
8 the circumstances surrounding Dr Kelly's death that you
9 can assist his Lordship with?
10 MR DINGEMANS:
11 A. No, sir.
12 MR DINGEMANS: Thank you very much.
13 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much. Mr Lamb, I think it was
14 entirely proper of you to bring to the attention of
15 the Inquiry Mr Broucher's recollection.
16 A. Thank you.
17 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, that is the end of the evidence for
18 today.
19 LORD HUTTON: I will sit again at 10.30 tomorrow morning.
20 (3.30 pm)
21 (Hearing adjourned until 10.30 am the following day)
22
23
24
25

154
1 INDEX
2 PAGE
3 MR ALEXANDER RICHARD ALLAN (called) .............. 2
4
5 Examined by MR KNOX ......................... 2
6
7 ASSISTANT CHIEF CONSTABLE MICHAEL ................ 19
8 PAGE (called)
9
10 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 19
11
12 MR STEPHEN JOHN MACDONALD (called) ............... 49
13
14 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 49
15
16 DR BRIAN FRANCIS GILL JONES (called) ............. 58
17
18 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 58
19
20 MR A (called) .................................... 96
21
22 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 96
23
24 DR BRIAN FRANCIS GILL JONES ...................... 117
25 (continued)

155
1
2 Examined by MR DINGEMANS (continued) ......... 117
3
4 MR ROY JAMES GREEN (called) ...................... 141
5
6 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 141
7
8 MR PATRICK LAMB (continued) ...................... 152
9
10 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 152
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

156

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