1 Wednesday, 3rd September 2003
2 (10.30 am)
3 MR ALEXANDER RICHARD ALLAN (called)
4 Examined by MR KNOX
5 LORD HUTTON: Good morning. Yes Mr Knox.
6 MR KNOX: My Lord, the next witness is Mr Allan.
7 LORD HUTTON: Thank you. Sit down please Mr Allan.
8 A. Thank you.
9 MR KNOX: Mr Allan, could you tell the Inquiry your full
11 A. Alexander Richard Allan.
12 Q. What are your qualifications?
13 A. I am a Bachelor of Science, I am a Doctor of Philosophy,
14 a Fellow of the Royal Society of Chemistry and
15 a Chartered Chemist.
16 Q. What particular experience do you have?
17 A. I am a forensic scientist, more specifically I am
18 a forensic toxicologist specialising in the analysis of
19 drugs and poisons in body fluids. I have been
20 a forensic scientist for over 25 years.
21 Q. In that period were you employed by the Home Office
22 Forensic Science Service?
23 A. I was, yes, for 20 years.
24 Q. Who are you employed by?
25 A. I am employed by Forensic Alliance, a company in
2 Q. That is a private company?
3 A. It is a private company that works for the police,
4 prosecution and defence and so on.
5 Q. Do you have any current designation or award?
6 A. I am designated the merit scientist in the toxicology
7 and drugs department at Forensic Alliance.
8 Q. On 19th July this year were you handed any items by the
9 Thames Valley Police?
10 A. I was. My Lord, may I refer to my notes?
11 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
12 MR KNOX: If you could just tell us what the items were and
13 from whom they were taken.
14 A. I received several items. I can list them if you wish.
15 Q. Yes, if you would.
16 A. Yes. They were attributed to the body of
17 Dr David Kelly. At that time I do not think the
18 identity was absolutely certain but they were
19 attributed, I believe, to Dr Kelly at a later time. But
20 I received several items. The following: NCH39.
21 Q. What was that?
22 A. That was preserved urine.
23 Q. When you say preserved urine, what does the word
24 preserved indicate?
25 A. That is urine with some preservative in it to try to
1 retard any decomposition of the urine. So if you wish
2 to do any analysis for alcohol, for example, then any
3 microbiological action will not happen and the urine
4 will last in a good condition for longer than if it were
6 Q. It was you who put the preservative in?
7 A. The preservative-contained bottles come as part of the
8 pathologist kits.
9 Q. What is the next item?
10 A. NCH40 plain urine. NCH41 bile. NCH42 preserved bile.
11 Q. That is the same meaning?
12 A. It is the same preservative, to retard decomposition of
13 the fluid. NCH43 hard blood. NCH44 preserved blood.
14 I have blood fluoride oxidate which is, again, preserved
15 blood. NCH46 blood EDTA.
16 Q. What does EDTA signify?
17 A. That is an anticoagulant in the blood to stop it
19 Q. Is that something that is added to the blood?
20 A. That is something that is added to the blood.
21 Q. After the event?
22 A. Yes, it is in a preservative containing -- it is in
23 a little phial containing EDTA and the blood is added to
24 that at the post-mortem.
25 Q. What next?
1 A. Some more plain blood NCH47. NCH48 left lung.
2 Q. What exactly was left lung?
3 A. It is the lung that has been removed from the body, the
4 entire lung.
5 Q. The entire lung, is it?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Next?
8 A. NCH49 contents of stomach.
9 Q. Is that the whole of the contents of the stomach?
10 A. Yes, it is.
11 Q. Then next?
12 A. NCH50 liver sample.
13 Q. Then?
14 A. NCH52 vitreous humor which was preserved, that is the
15 fluid inside the eye. NCH53 vitreous humor plain.
16 Q. Before you carried out your examination, what had you
17 been told about the circumstances in which Dr Kelly's
18 body had been found?
19 A. Well, very briefly, I had been told that there was
20 a body found in some woodland near -- I cannot remember
21 the name of the village, Southmoor or something,
22 Littlemoor. My colleagues were at the scene. There
23 was, I believe, evidence of damage to Dr Kelly's wrist.
24 There was evidence of some tablets present, some
25 Coproxamol tablets were found in his pockets. There
1 were, I believe, 30 tablets of which one remained. And
2 I was also informed that a bottle of water was found
3 nearby and some vomit was also present near the body.
4 Q. Were you told at the time the time at which he had been
6 A. I do not believe I was told at that time, no.
7 Q. But I think subsequently you were told that it was --
8 that is before the examination were you told what time
9 the body had been found?
10 A. I do not believe so, no.
11 Q. When did you carry out your examination?
12 A. I carried out my examination on the Saturday morning
13 when I received the items, which was the 19th,
14 I believe.
15 Q. 19th July?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And what was the purpose of your examination?
18 A. To analyse the body fluids for the presence of any
19 substance that might have been ingested by Dr Kelly.
20 Q. Such as alcohol, drugs?
21 A. Such as alcohol, drugs of abuse, the components of these
22 Coproxamol tablets, the components are paracetamol and
23 a substance called dextropropoxyphene, and investigate
24 the body contents for those substances.
25 Q. If I could ask you first of all about the blood and
1 urine samples. What were they specifically analysed
3 A. The blood and urine samples were analysed for the
4 presence of alcohol and a wide range of commonly
5 available drugs that includes amphetamines,
6 barbiturates, benzodiazepine drugs, that is the group
7 that includes diazepam and temazepam, benzoylecgonine
8 which is the metabolite or breakdown product of cocaine;
9 cannabinoids, that is the constituents of cannabis;
10 chemically basic drugs such as anti-depressants, and
11 that includes things like dextropropoxythene and
12 antihistamines as well, amongst a wide range of other
13 substances, methadone, methyl amphetamine,
14 3,4-methylenedioxymethylamphetamine which is known by
15 its initials MDMA and also known as ecstasy and related
16 compounds. Opiate drugs such as morphine and heroin,
17 and this is the standard sort of analysis that we do in
18 all suspicious deaths in criminal cases.
19 Q. That is specifically what you looked for in the blood
20 and urine samples?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. What about the stomach contents?
23 A. I examined it for the presence of paracetamols as well
24 as measuring the contents and visually inspecting the
1 Q. Was there anything that the blood was specifically
2 analysed for?
3 A. Yes. I also analysed the blood for the presence of
4 paracetamol and volatile substances such as organic
6 Q. In carrying out your examination did you have any
7 assistance from others?
8 A. I did, yes. On this initial stage I had two assistants.
9 Q. Two other scientists, is that right, at the Forensic
11 A. That is right, yes.
12 Q. I want to ask you about the results, first of all the
13 results of the blood item which you have called NCH47
14 which I think is the plain blood. Could you tell us
15 what you found there, in NCH47, the blood sample?
16 A. Yes, I found paracetamol at a concentration of
17 97 microgrammes per millilitre of blood; and
18 dextropropoxyphene at a concentration of 1.0
19 microgrammes per millilitre of blood.
20 Q. Did you find anything else in the blood sample?
21 A. Yes, I did. I also found some substances related to
22 dextropropoxyphene, breakdown products, metabolites, and
23 so on, and some caffeine.
24 Q. What about the blood item, 44 and the urine item, 39?
25 A. I analysed the blood item, 44, for alcohol and I found
1 no alcohol in that. And I found no alcohol in the urine
2 item NCH39.
3 Q. Did you find anything at all in the blood item 44?
4 A. I found traces of acetone in the blood and also possibly
5 in the urine and none of the other volatile substances
6 were detected.
7 Q. There was also another urine item which was NCH40.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. What did you find in that?
10 A. I found caffeine in that, significant amounts of
11 dextropropoxyphene again and its breakdown products, the
12 metabolites and so on. I did not specifically analyse
13 that for paracetamol but doubtless there was some in
15 Q. What about the stomach contents, NCH49?
16 A. Yes, the stomach contents consisted of a brown watery
17 slurry containing approximately 67 milligrammes of
18 paracetamol. I noticed when I was examining it that
19 there was no unusual smell and there was no obvious
20 tablet or food material. I did however notice two
21 pieces of what I believe could have been tablet film
22 coating, the protective plastic coating, yes. That is
23 all I did at that stage, yes.
24 Q. I would just like you to comment, first of all, on the
25 paracetamol and dextropropoxyphene that you found. What
1 did that indicate?
2 A. Well, the two components, paracetamol and
3 dextropropoxyphene, are the active components of
4 a substance called Coproxamol which is a prescription
5 only medicine containing 325 milligrammes of paracetamol
6 and 32.5 milligrammes of dextropropoxyphene.
7 Q. What sort of ailments would that be prescribed for?
8 A. Mild to moderate pain, typically a bad back or period
9 pain, something like that. And the concentrations of
10 both drugs represent quite a large overdose of
12 Q. What does the dextropropoxyphene cause if it is taken in
14 A. Dextropropoxyphene is an opioid analgesic drug which
15 causes effects typical of opiate drugs in overdose,
16 effects such as drowsiness, sedation and ultimately
17 coma, respiratory depression and heart failure and
18 dextropropoxyphene is known particularly in certain
19 circumstances to cause disruption of the rhythm of the
20 heart and it can cause death by that process in some
21 cases of overdose.
22 Q. And what about paracetamol, what does that do?
23 A. Paracetamol does not cause drowsiness or sedation in
24 overdose, but if enough is taken it can cause damage to
25 the liver.
1 Q. If enough? I think you mean if too much is taken.
2 A. If too much is taken. I beg your pardon.
3 Q. What about the concentrations you have mentioned that
4 you found in the blood? What did that indicate?
5 A. They are much higher than therapeutic use. Typically
6 therapeutic use would represent one tenth of these
7 concentrations. They clearly represent an overdose.
8 But they are somewhat lower than what I would normally
9 expect to encounter in cases of death due to an overdose
10 of Coproxamol.
11 Q. What would you expect to see in the usual case where
12 dextropropoxyphene has resulted in death? What types of
13 proportions or concentrations would you normally expect
14 to see?
15 A. There are two surveys reported I am aware of. One
16 reports a concentration of 2.8 microgrammes per
17 millilitre of blood of dextropropoxyphene in a series of
18 fatal overdose cases. Another one reports an average
19 concentration of 4.7 microgrammes per millilitre of
20 blood. You can say that they are several fold larger
21 than the level I found of 1.
22 Q. What about the paracetamol concentration you found?
23 A. Again, it is higher than would be expected for
24 therapeutic use, approximately 5 or 10 times higher.
25 But it is much lower or lower than would be expected for
1 paracetamol fatalities normally unless there was other
2 factors of drugs involved.
3 Q. What sort of level would you normal expect for
4 paracetamol fatalities?
5 A. I think if you can get the blood reasonably shortly
6 after the incident and the person does not die slowly in
7 hospital due to liver failure, perhaps typically 3 to
8 400 microgrammes per millilitre of blood.
9 Q. About four times as much in other words?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Putting it in short terms, you would expect there to be
12 about four times as much paracetamol and two and a half
13 to four times as much dextropropoxyphene?
14 A. Two, three, four times as much paracetamol and two,
15 three, four times as much dextropropoxyphene in the
16 average overdose case, which results in fatalities.
17 Q. You have mentioned that it seemed that a number of
18 Coproxamol drugs were taken. Was it possible, from your
19 examination, to estimate how many tablets must have been
21 A. It is not possible to do that, because of the complex
22 nature of the behaviour of the drugs in the body.
23 I understand that Dr Kelly may have vomited so he would
24 have lost some stomach contents then. There was still
25 some left in the stomach and presumably still some left
1 in the gastrointestinal tracts. What I can say is that
2 it is consistent with say 29/30 tablets but it could be
3 consistent with other scenarios as well.
4 Q. Do you know what warnings Coproxamol tablets come with
5 when they are prescribed?
6 A. I do, yes. They have the following warnings: it may
7 cause drowsiness. If affected do not drive or operate
8 machinery. Avoid alcoholic drink and do not take more
9 than two at any one time. Do not take more than eight
10 in 24 hours and do not take with any other paracetamol
12 Those last two warnings are because of the danger of
13 paracetamol overdose causing liver damage.
14 Q. Can I ask you about the stomach contents? How much
15 paracetamol was there found in the stomach contents?
16 A. I found in the stomach contents 67 milligrammes of
18 Q. I think you have mentioned that you have been told there
19 had been some vomiting?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. As a consequence of that, is it possible that some
22 paracetamol and indeed dextropropoxyphene had been lost?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. What could you infer about the concentration of
25 paracetamol that remained in the stomach contents?
1 A. Well clearly that is much less than the equivalent of
2 one tablet which contains 325 milligrammes of
3 paracetamol. So it is approximately equivalent to
4 a fifth.
5 Q. What would have happened to the tablets? If they are
6 not in the stomach, where would they have gone?
7 A. They would have been absorbed into the body, and some
8 ejected into the vomit.
9 Q. And could you work out from your examination how long
10 before death the tablets had been ingested?
11 A. Again, it is difficult to say, but what I would say is
12 that I believe it is probably -- it is likely that they
13 may have been ingested about an hour or so or longer
14 before death, because of the lack of residue in the
15 stomach, notwithstanding the ejection of some by vomit.
16 But the lack of residue in the stomach indicates
17 probably about an hour or so before he died that they
18 were ingested.
19 Q. So there is the lack of residue in the stomach. Could
20 you tell anything from the amount that was found in the
21 urine sample as well?
22 A. The fact that there was a reasonable amount present in
23 the urine obviously meant that his body was functioning
24 for some time before he died and that allowed time for
25 the paracetamol to pass -- for the dextropropoxyphene
1 and the paracetamol to pass into the urine.
2 Q. As a conclusion would Dr Kelly have died before all the
3 paracetamol had been absorbed?
4 A. That seems to be what the findings of the stomach
5 contents are telling me, yes.
6 Q. Would higher levels have been produced if death had not
8 A. That is very likely. If he had not ejected some of the
9 vomit and the residue in the stomach had been absorbed
10 into the bloodstream, then he could had achieved higher
11 levels of paracetamol and dextropropoxyphene, yes.
12 Q. I think you mentioned caffeine had been found?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Did you see any significance in that?
15 A. No, typically you would find caffeine in most people.
16 It is due to the consumption of tea, coffee or soft
18 Q. I think you mentioned acetone had been found in one of
19 the blood samples?
20 A. Yes, I found a trace of acetone in the blood sample.
21 Again, it is produced naturally in the body in small
22 quantities if you have not eaten for some time and it is
23 of no significance.
24 Q. In what period of time?
25 A. No, it is difficult to say. When your body runs out of
1 glycogen, which is the energy source, the main energy
2 source which produces glucose, and there are limits to
3 the supplies in the liver, your body switches to
4 a different mechanism for production of energy which is
5 the burning of fats and the burning of fats produces
6 traces of acetone in the body and these traces of
7 acetone can last for some considerable time. It just
8 may mean he skipped a meal or has not had a full meal.
9 Q. So it does not indicate anything of significance?
10 A. Not that level, no, it is just a tiny trace.
11 Q. Can I ask you what your conclusions are from the samples
12 we have so far discussed? What, first of all, do the
13 blood paracetamol and blood dextropropoxyphene levels
15 A. They indicate that Dr Kelly had taken a considerable
16 Coproxamol overdose.
17 Q. And what about the time at which death took place?
18 A. Death appeared to have intervened before all the
19 paracetamol had been absorbed from the stomach.
20 Q. And what about the levels at which paracetamol and
21 dextropropoxyphene have been found? What does that
23 A. There is a possibility that they could be fatal or
24 potentially fatal, but it is more likely in the absence
25 of other substances which combine with the actions of
1 dextropropoxyphene, such as alcohol, that the levels may
2 not have produced fatal respiratory depression, although
3 I cannot rule out the possibility of adverse cardiac
4 effects from the dextropropoxyphene overdose.
5 Q. We have so far discussed the urine, the blood and the
6 stomach. There were of course other samples you
7 mentioned. Were they analysed?
8 A. They were at a later date. Some of those samples were
9 analysed, yes.
10 Q. You say at a later date. Can you say when?
11 A. I can, yes. (Pause). There were various dates. I can
12 refer -- go through my notes.
13 Q. If you just give us the span of the dates?
14 A. In the period up to the end of July there were
15 additional analyses carried out.
16 Q. Was there anything significant you found in those
18 A. Those analyses confirmed my original findings, the
19 Coproxamol overdose, and they entirely support my
20 original conclusions.
21 Q. Was there anything which shed further light on your
22 conclusions or was it simply confirmatory?
23 A. It was confirmatory. What I also did was I looked at
24 the water which was found at the scene, or the contents
25 of the water bottle that was found at the scene.
1 Q. What did you find in that?
2 A. I found traces of dextropropoxyphene in that.
3 Presumably that would come from someone contacting the
4 bottle with saliva in the bottle. We did not find
5 anything else of note in there. It may be that
6 paracetamol was in there as well but the tests are not
7 sensitive enough to detect the traces of paracetamol
8 that may have been present.
9 Q. Was there anything else you examined apart from the
10 water bottle and the items you have so far mentioned?
11 A. I did not, as far as I am aware. I am just checking.
12 I did not analyse any other exhibits, no.
13 Q. Mr Allan, is there anything else which you know of which
14 might have contributed to the circumstances of
15 Dr Kelly's death?
16 A. From the toxicological point of view, no.
17 LORD HUTTON: Mr Allan, if a third party had wanted
18 paracetamol and dextropropoxyphene to be found in
19 Dr Kelly's blood is there any way that the third party
20 could have brought that about by either persuading or
21 forcing Dr Kelly to take tablets containing those two
23 A. It is possible, but I think it would be --
24 LORD HUTTON: That is the only way that those substances
25 could be found in the blood, by taking tablets
1 containing them?
2 A. Yes, he has to ingest those tablets.
3 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you very much indeed.
4 MR DINGEMANS: Assistant Chief Constable Page, please.
5 ASSISTANT CHIEF CONSTABLE MICHAEL PAGE (called)
6 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
7 Q. Can you tell his Lordship your full name?
8 A. Michael Page.
9 Q. And what is your occupation?
10 A. I am Assistant Chief Constable, Community Services,
11 Thames Valley Police.
12 Q. We have heard there was a report to the police at 11.40
13 on 17th July in the evening.
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. When did you become aware of that report?
16 A. I received a telephone call at 3.09 am on Friday
18 Q. So some four hours later?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Is it normal for a missing person report to get up to
21 Assistant Chief Constable level as quickly as that?
22 A. Only where there are vulnerable or exacerbating factors
23 to the missing person.
24 Q. What were those vulnerable or exacerbating
1 A. Well, all missing persons are subject to an assessment
2 and the officers at the scene carried out an assessment.
3 Q. Do you know who the officer at the scene was?
4 A. Sergeant Morris.
5 Q. We have heard he was from Abingdon police station, is
6 that correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. He carried out an assessment?
9 A. That is right, which rated Dr Kelly as a medium risk
10 missing person.
11 Q. What does that mean, is that a good or bad thing?
12 A. Neither good nor bad in many respects. But it raises
13 our awareness of issues around that person and prompts
14 us to take certain actions.
15 Q. What are those actions?
16 A. Normally the notification of the senior officer so that
17 any specialist resources that are required can be
18 obtained. In this particular case, that assessment was
19 arrived at which prompted a call to the officer's area
20 commander, as it would do.
21 Q. The area commander is what rank?
22 A. Chief Superintendent. She, on receipt of the
23 information, coupled with her knowledge of Dr Kelly and
24 the circumstances that surrounded him --
25 Q. She had watched the news?
1 A. She had watched the news and because he was a resident
2 in her area, she was perhaps a little more aware of what
3 was going on, and she decided that adding those
4 circumstances to the standard assessment --
5 Q. The medium risk?
6 A. The medium risk raised it somewhat higher and she rang
7 me almost immediately.
8 Q. That is why you get the call in the morning?
9 A. Absolutely.
10 Q. What did you do?
11 A. I listened very carefully to what had happened thus far
12 and made my own assessment of the actions that had been
14 Q. What had been done so far?
15 A. There had been a reasonably thorough search of
16 Dr Kelly's house and the surrounding grounds.
17 Q. Who had done that?
18 A. That had been carried out by Sergeant Morris and
19 officers from the night shift at Abingdon. They were
20 later supplemented by a police dog which had been used
21 to assist in the search. I do apologise for my voice.
22 So that search had been conducted at the scene. The
23 police helicopter had also been called out and had been
24 making intermittent searches around the area of the
25 house using heat seeking equipment.
1 Q. So who had been responsible for calling out the police
3 A. Sergeant Morris.
4 Q. Where is that helicopter based? We have heard it came
5 from RAF Benson, is that right?
6 A. That is correct, that is where it is based.
7 Q. How many police officers were involved in the search?
8 A. At that particular time half a dozen.
9 LORD HUTTON: Just so that it is clear, I think what you
10 said, Mr Page, this was a police helicopter?
11 A. It was a police helicopter, my Lord, yes.
12 MR DINGEMANS: Does it have anything that assists in finding
14 A. A number of items but the principal one in use on the
15 night was heat seeking equipment.
16 Q. You get told of all this activity?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And what was the outcome of your review?
19 A. I asked for a further, more thorough search of the house
20 and the outbuildings and the surrounding grounds to be
22 Q. We have heard from Mrs Kelly in fact I think she said
23 4.30, it may have been 5.30 in the morning she has to go
24 out of the house while a police dog goes through. That
25 is as a result of your initiative, is it?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And that further search carried out, did you ask for
3 anything else?
4 A. Yes, I did. I asked for a number of key individuals to
5 meet me at Abingdon police station at 5 am.
6 Q. Who were those key individuals?
7 A. Those key individuals were a superintendent to arrange
8 resourcing for what I anticipated would be more
9 widespread searching. The head of Special Branch of my
11 Q. Why did you ask for Special Branch to be involved?
12 A. Again because of -- having read the papers I was aware
13 of the circumstances surrounding Dr Kelly.
14 Q. That he was a scientist employed by the Government?
15 A. Absolutely; and I was aware that I may have to access
16 Government departments and the easiest way for me to do
17 that is through my own Special Branch.
18 Q. Who else was there at the meeting?
19 A. I called out Detective Inspector Smith, who was the area
20 detective inspector, to begin inquiries for me. And
21 myself and the area commander -- I beg your pardon,
22 I also asked for a qualified police search adviser,
23 Sergeant Paul Wood.
24 Q. Sorry, I lost that, a qualified police?
25 A. Police search adviser.
1 Q. Yes.
2 A. And I asked for a sergeant from Milton Keynes who had
3 undertaken a lot of work nationally in respect of the
4 assessment of missing persons and I asked them all to
5 meet me at Abingdon police station at 5 am.
6 Q. Did they all get there at 5 am?
7 A. I think we started the meeting about 5.15 am.
8 Q. What did you discuss at the meeting?
9 A. I was obviously briefed on the information that had been
10 obtained from Dr Kelly's family.
11 Q. What information had been obtained?
12 A. In terms of when he had left the house, his demeanour,
13 what he had been wearing when he had left, details of
14 any conversations that had taken place, their feelings
15 about his mood at the time of leaving, general
16 background information as to what had happened over the
17 last few weeks and what impact that may have had on him.
18 Q. And your receipt of that information -- and we have
19 heard from the family ourselves now -- what effect did
20 that have on your approach to the investigation?
21 A. Well, at that stage it was a missing person
22 investigation. My concerns were that Dr Kelly had gone
23 out for a walk, perhaps become ill, perhaps had an
24 accident befall him, possibly had been abducted against
25 his will, possibly was being detained. There were
1 a whole range of options that I was trying to consider.
2 Q. What was the result of your meeting at 5.15?
3 A. Well the result of my meeting was that we began to
4 establish a search pattern. As a holding measure,
5 I asked for officers who were reinforcement officers who
6 were arriving about this stage -- we had between 30 and
7 40 officers available to us, and I asked them to start
8 searching outward from Dr Kelly's house. I asked for
9 the helicopter to be brought into play again.
10 Q. Right.
11 A. But I also asked the police search adviser and the
12 sergeant from Milton Keynes with the specialist
13 knowledge of missing persons to make an assessment for
14 me of where we should begin looking for Dr Kelly; and
15 the way they do that is to gain as much information as
16 they can about the person who is missing, favourite
17 haunts, favourite walks, that type of thing and they
18 produced a list of probably half a dozen places that we
19 should begin to look. So by about 7 o'clock I was
20 beginning to get some sort of form to the search we were
22 Q. And while they were forming that assessment how many men
23 did you have on the ground searching outwards?
24 A. Ultimately by about 7.30 I had 30 police officers drawn
25 in from other police areas. I had the resources on duty
1 within that police area, which would have been another
3 Q. Yes.
4 A. I had the mounted branch on the way from Milton Keynes
5 but they had not yet arrived.
6 Q. You had?
7 A. The mounted branch. Because they obviously give you the
8 ability to cover ground very quickly. And I had asked
9 for resources from the underwater search unit because of
10 the proximity of the River Thames to the location.
11 Q. By 7 o'clock you had got the assessment back from those
12 two specialists in missing persons?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And did they identify Harrowdown Hill as a site of
15 interest for you?
16 A. Yes, Harrowdown Hill to the best of my recollection was
17 number 2 on their list.
18 Q. Did you send a search team to Harrowdown Hill?
19 A. Yes, I asked the police search adviser to arrange for
20 the area to be searched, and members of the South East
21 Berks Emergency Volunteers and the Lowlands Search Dogs
22 Association, who by this time had also joined us, were
23 deployed to Harrowdown Hill.
24 Q. We heard from those yesterday. Do you often use the
25 volunteers to assist in searches?
1 A. Yes, indeed, particularly where we call out the services
2 of a police search adviser, because they work with the
3 volunteer organisations quite regularly and they are
4 extremely useful to us.
5 Q. We have also heard from them, Ms Holmes and Mr Chapman,
6 how they came across the body. When did you hear about
8 A. I think within seconds of the information coming in to
9 us but the time I have is that it was 9.20.
10 Q. Where were you at the time?
11 A. I was in the briefing room at Abingdon police station.
12 Q. What, sending out other search teams?
13 A. Yes, generally coordinating the effort. I perhaps ought
14 to add that in the background we had established where
15 Dr Kelly's offices were and I had asked for officers
16 from the Metropolitan Police Special Branch to go to
17 those offices (a) just to make sure he was not at work
18 as it were and (b) to check the offices to see if there
19 was any indication as to what may have happened to him.
20 Q. And did you get a report from them at any time during
21 the day?
22 A. Yes, I did. I think there were three offices in various
23 locations in London that were visited. Once we realised
24 that Dr Kelly's body had been found, I then asked for
25 items in those offices to be seized, any items relevant,
1 which the officers did.
2 Q. So Special Branch from the Metropolitan area seized
3 items from Dr Kelly's offices?
4 A. They did.
5 Q. Having received the information about Dr Kelly's body
6 being found, did you go to the scene?
7 A. No, I did not.
8 Q. What happened after that information had come to your
10 A. Well, from my perspective I appointed a senior
11 investigating officer, a man who would, if you like,
12 carry out the technical issues around the investigation.
13 I met fairly quickly with my Chief Constable and we
14 decided what levels of resourcing and what levels of
15 investigation we should apply to these circumstances.
16 Q. The fact that a body had been discovered, what sort of
17 inquiry did you launch at the start?
18 A. We determined from the outset because of the attendant
19 circumstances that we would apply the highest standards
20 of investigation to this particular set of circumstances
21 as was possible. I would not say I launched a murder
22 investigation but the investigation was of that
24 Q. We have heard how a common access path was established
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And the fingertip searching was carried out. Did
3 forensic pathologists become involved?
4 A. Yes. We were very anxious, from the outset, to ensure
5 the most thorough possible examination of the scene.
6 I spoke to the Oxfordshire coroner, Mr Gardiner, and we
7 agreed between us that we would use a Home Office
8 pathologist, which is a very highly trained pathologist.
9 It was also agreed with the senior investigating
10 officer that we would use forensic biologists who are
11 able to look at the scene and, in particular, blood
12 splashes and make certain determinations from those in
13 relation to what may have happened.
14 As you say, a common approach path had been
15 established; and it was determined that for that common
16 approach path and for a distance of 10 metres either
17 side and for a radius of 10 metres around Dr Kelly's
18 body that we would carry out a fingertip search. It was
19 also agreed that Dr Kelly's body would be left in situ
20 so that the pathologist and the biologists could visit
21 the scene with the body in situ to make their own
22 assessment of the scene, which is not always the case
23 but in this case we decided it would be wise to do so.
24 Q. Why was that, just to ensure --
25 A. Just to ensure that they could look at the environment
1 and the surroundings and take in the full picture.
2 Q. What was the name of the pathologist who --
3 A. The pathologist was Mr Nicholas Hunt.
4 Q. We were hoping to call Mr Hunt to give evidence this
5 morning, but he is on holiday and he is coming in
6 stage 2. Just so that we can keep the evidence
7 chronological, perhaps you can assist me in identifying
8 some of the material parts of his findings.
9 A. Yes, my Lord.
10 Q. Do you know what time he arrived at the scene?
11 A. I do not have the exact time, but I believe it was
12 around midday.
13 Q. Do you have a copy of his report?
14 A. I have not with me.
15 Q. Do you know if he examined the scene?
16 A. He did.
17 Q. And do you know what he found at the scene?
18 A. Well, he describes finding Dr Kelly's body.
19 Q. Right.
20 A. And he describes the position of Dr Kelly's body; and
21 initially he found a bottle of Evian water, partially
22 filled. He found an open knife.
23 Q. An open knife, yes.
24 A. Yes. And a wristwatch. Subsequently when the body was
25 moved he found three blister packs.
1 Q. Three blister packs?
2 A. Of tablet packs.
3 Q. Of what type of tablet?
4 A. Coproxamol.
5 Q. How many tablets were left in the blister packs?
6 A. One.
7 Q. And how many tablets did each blister pack take?
8 A. 10.
9 Q. So it could have been up to 30 in the blister packs that
10 were taken?
11 A. That is correct, my Lord.
12 Q. Leaving one in the blister pack. Anything else?
13 A. Again when the body had been moved he found Dr Kelly's
14 mobile phone.
15 Q. Do you know whether that was on or not?
16 A. My recollection is that when found it was off.
17 Q. Anything else that was found?
18 A. There was a Barbour hat a short distance from Dr Kelly's
20 Q. And what tests were taken at the scene? Any swabs
22 A. Yes, there was a very thorough swabbing of the body at
23 the scene. Samples of all blood splattering were taken.
24 Q. Right.
25 A. Samples of every pool of blood were taken. Samples of
1 every stain of blood on Dr Kelly's clothing were taken.
2 The items that I have mentioned, the knife, the Evian
3 bottle, the watch, the hat, were all swabbed. The Evian
4 bottle, the mobile phone, the watch were swabbed to
5 establish whether there was any DNA present other than
6 Dr Kelly's.
7 Q. And did Dr Hunt carry out a post-mortem?
8 A. He did indeed.
9 Q. When did he carry that out?
10 A. The body was removed from the scene again from the best
11 of my recollection at between 6.30 and 7 o'clock in the
12 evening and the post-mortem started at 9 o'clock in the
14 Q. Did Dr Hunt find any defensive marks or signs of
15 a struggle on Dr Kelly's body?
16 A. He found some marks which he said were not defensive
17 marks and were nothing other than he would expect to
18 find in a normally exposed body as it were -- sorry --
19 in a normally active person.
20 LORD HUTTON: Defensive marks are?
21 A. Defensive marks my Lord are marks where an individual
22 may have defended themselves, so they may consist of --
23 if, for example, an individual is being attacked by
24 a knife one might expect to find knife marks here where
25 an individual has tried to defend himself.
1 MR DINGEMANS: Or scratching or gauging?
2 A. Or scratching or whatever.
3 Q. Did he find any wounds to the body?
4 A. Yes, he found a number of incisions to Dr Kelly's wrist.
5 Q. Right. And did he form any conclusion about cause of
7 A. His conclusion around cause of death was that it was due
8 to blood loss from incisions made to Dr Kelly's wrist.
9 Q. And we will hear from him but unhappily not today.
10 What other searches were carried out at the scene?
11 You have mentioned a forensic biologist. What do they
13 A. A forensic biologist, I believe you will be hearing from
14 one later --
15 Q. Who was the forensic biologist?
16 A. A Mr Green I think. Yes, Mr Rory Green.
17 Q. I think you have very kindly arranged for him to come
18 along later today?
19 A. That is correct, my Lord.
20 Q. What was he doing? We will hear in detail from him.
21 A. Essentially he was looking at the undergrowth around
22 Dr Kelly's body.
23 Q. For what?
24 A. For blood splashing. Perhaps it is best to allow him to
25 explain it himself but essentially he would be able to
1 give a judgment as to what occurred at the scene from
2 the pattern made by the blood splashes.
3 Q. That is the scene. We have also heard about Dr Kelly's
4 offices. What searches were carried out at the house?
5 A. The house was subject to a full search by search trained
6 officers and by members of Thames Valley Special Branch.
7 Their presence I felt necessary again because of
8 Dr Kelly's background. Should we come across any
9 documents of a secret nature, those officers are cleared
10 to handle those documents. That is why they were there.
11 Q. You are not cleared to handle those sort of documents?
12 A. Not at present, I have been in the past.
13 Q. I think we heard yesterday a photograph had been
14 recovered from the scene. Do you have a copy of that
16 A. I do indeed.
17 Q. Can we go to TVP/12/1? Can we see at the bottom
18 right-hand corner a date on the photograph?
19 A. 11th August 1993.
20 Q. Do you know why this was seized?
21 A. The officer who came across it felt that the individual
22 accompanying Dr Kelly in the photograph bore
23 a resemblance to Andrew Gilligan.
24 Q. Have you now had the photograph checked and assessed?
25 A. The photograph was checked by the Inquiry team who
1 discounted it being Dr Gilligan.
2 Q. We now have it on screen. We can see that the man
3 standing next to Dr Kelly has receding hair and wears
4 glasses. I have to be careful about these things
5 myself! Was there anything else that caused you to
6 think it might be Mr Gilligan?
7 A. No. I mean, I have to say the officer acted with the
8 best of intention. He saw it, he felt that it resembled
9 Mr Gilligan and he seized it.
10 Q. Right. And that line of inquiry has now been excluded?
11 A. Absolutely.
12 Q. That can go off the screen. What other material was
13 recovered from his house, just in general terms?
14 A. A range of documents, but principally computer equipment
15 and associated hardware, CDs, that type of thing.
16 Q. What have you done to analyse the computer equipment?
17 A. Well, there is a vast amount of equipment.
18 Q. Can you tell us what equipment there was?
19 A. I can, my Lord. If I can -- I will very quickly go
20 through the technical details. We seized one NJN tower
21 PC with a 6 gigabyte disk, 3.4 gigabytes of which had
22 been used.
23 Q. So he used over half the capacity of the machine?
24 A. On that particular machine, yes.
25 Q. If I decided to print out the whole of those contents
1 that he used, what sort of mound of paper would I end up
3 A. I am advised by our computer technical people that of
4 all the memory that we have seized from Dr Kelly's
5 various computers --
6 Q. So from all the computers together?
7 A. From all the computers, if we were to print it out it
8 would produce a pile of paper twice as high as Big Ben.
9 Q. You have obviously not printed out or have you printed
10 out that amount of paper?
11 A. No, my Lord, we have not. What we have done is every
12 disk in our possession we have interrogated using
13 a number of key words which we felt would highlight any
14 data that would be of interest to police inquiries.
15 Q. What is an example of a key word?
16 A. "Suicide", "despair".
17 Q. Have you put in, for example, "Iraq"?
18 A. Yes, we have put in "Iraq".
19 Q. Right. And other key words of that nature?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And have you extracted anything as a result of those key
22 word searches?
23 A. We have extracted a number of documents, e-mails and so
25 Q. And where was this process carried out?
1 A. It was carried out on premises in Thames Valley, our
2 technical premises which I will not disclose the
3 location of, if you do not mind.
4 Q. Who did the work?
5 A. A technical computer technician employed by Thames
6 Valley Police as a forensic computer specialist.
7 Q. You recovered quite a lot of material from that and you
8 have shared relevant material with the Inquiry, is that
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. You were telling us what computers you have recovered
12 from the scene. We had got to the stack, I think.
13 A. In addition to the NJN tower PC, we seized a Palm M505
15 Q. What is that?
16 A. Personal Digital Assistant, one of the small hand-held
17 computers, 12 megabyte disk, and everything had been
18 used on that. We seized a Dell tower PC with a disk
19 size of 55.9 gigabytes, 16.7 gigabytes of which had been
20 used. We seized a Toshiba laptop with a disk size of
21 3.8 gigabytes, 1.6 gigabytes of which had been used. We
22 seized a Dell laptop with a disk size of 9.3 gigabytes,
23 7.9 gigabytes of which had been used, and we seized
24 a further Dell laptop with a disk size of 55.9
25 gigabytes, 6.1 gigabytes of which had been used. We
1 seized one card-style laptop which was faulty and
2 therefore we have been unable to access. We retrieved
3 one hard-drive of 406 megabytes which has not been used,
4 and we also, from the Ministry of Defence, seized
5 a tower PC with a disk size of 3 gigabytes, 2.4
6 gigabytes of which had been used.
7 Q. And you have identified the computer searches. If
8 I may, I will come back to the computers and ask you to
9 look at some documents from that. What other inquiries
10 have you pursued, again in general terms? Have you
11 taken statements from people?
12 A. We have taken statements from a range of people. The
13 terms of our inquiry were to look back from the date of
14 Dr Kelly's death and look particularly for contacts,
15 correspondence, that may have had an impact on how and
16 why he met his death.
17 Q. Have you looked at his telephone records?
18 A. We have, in some detail.
19 Q. And is that just mobile telephones or home telephones
20 or --
21 A. We looked at all telephones, all home telephones and his
22 mobile telephone.
23 Q. And have you come to any conclusions about whether or
24 not there is evidence suggesting third parties were
25 involved in Dr Kelly's death?
1 A. I have to say that, going back to what I said earlier
2 about being determined to be as careful as we could in
3 terms of examination of the scene, and basing my
4 response on that examination of the scene, I am as
5 confident as I can be that there was no third party
6 involvement at the scene of Dr Kelly's death.
7 Q. Why do you say that?
8 A. Because I cannot conceive of a way in which a third
9 party could have been involved at that location in that
10 environment without at least leaving some trace of their
11 presence; and I have been unable to find any trace of
12 any presence whatsoever.
13 Q. From that have you inferred that Dr Kelly met his death
14 at his own hands?
15 A. I can find no evidence of the involvement of a third
17 Q. And are there any features of the evidence -- we heard
18 from Professor Hawton yesterday about what assisted him
19 to conclude that there were no third parties involved.
20 Can you help us with your thought processes on that
22 A. I mean, again, in terms of the scene of Dr Kelly's death
23 and the complete absence of anything that would suggest
24 the involvement of a third party, I remain confident
25 that he met his death at his own hand.
1 Q. I said I would come back to the computers and I will if
2 I may. Can I just take you to some e-mails that have
3 been recovered from his computer? At COM/1/10, we can
4 see an e-mail we briefly saw yesterday dated 17th July,
5 timed 11.18. It is Dr Kelly replying to Ron Manley, who
6 had wished him well.
7 Can I take you to COM/1/11? This is one from
8 Geeta Kingdon of the Department of Economics:
9 "Roger and I saw with concern newspaper reports of
10 your being the BBC informant. Whatever comes of it in
11 the end, we hope the tussle between the BBC and the govt
12 will not tarnish your impeccable reputation for
13 integrity. We thought it must have been quite difficult
14 for you in the past few weeks and you were very much in
15 our minds and prayers.
16 "With best wishes ..."
17 Q. What is his reply, can you help me with that?
18 A. "Many thanks for your thoughts and prayers. It has been
19 a remarkably tough time. Should all blow over by early
20 next week then I will travel to Baghdad a week Friday.
21 I have had to keep a low profile which meant leaving
22 home for a week. Back now. With best wishes and thanks
23 for your support. David."
24 Q. I think it is probably a little unfair to ask you to
25 read the e-mails. Can I take you to COM/1/12? This is
1 from someone called Debbie:
2 "Hi David, I am in town (London area) staying
3 with ... My original plan was to visit with his
4 family ...
5 "I may try to call you before I depart just to say
6 hi and make sure you are doing okay with your
7 'notoriety'. Just what everyone needs ... you have got
8 lots of friends."
9 The reply:
10 "Many thanks for the email. GKW let me know that
11 you had been trying to contact me but I have been
12 keeping low on MoD advice. If all blows over by the
13 beginning of next week I will get back to Baghdad soon."
14 Can I take you to COM/1/13? This is from
15 Professor Hay:
16 "Dear David, having tried to reach you by phone, but
17 unsuccessfully because the MoD will not enable it, I am
18 using the only e-mail address I have.
19 "... I hope that you are not having too hard a time
20 of it. The pressure you are under must be immense and
21 I trust that you are able to find ways to get a break to
22 help you stay above it all."
23 "Dear Alastair, many thanks for your support.
24 Hopefully it will soon pass and I can get to Baghdad and
25 get on with the real job."
1 And at COM/1/14 from someone called Philippe:
2 "Dear David, I watch you today on BBC, I have not
3 specific comment on all these issues, but you can be
4 sure that all your colleagues, bio experts or not are
5 supporting you. We are confident where is the truth and
6 this one must be revealed rapidly and avoid you to be
7 longer interviewed as the 'famous guy who'."
8 "Philippe, many thanks for your email. I know that
9 I have a lot of good friends who are providing support
10 at a difficult time."
11 COM/1/15 from Judith Miller:
12 "David, I heard from another member of your fan club
13 that things went well for you today. Hope it's true."
14 That is 16th July. That is the day he was
15 interviewed by the ISC, is that right?
16 A. That is correct.
17 Q. And the reply:
18 "Judy, I will wait until the end of the week before
19 judging -- many dark actors playing games. Thanks for
20 your support. I appreciate your friendship at this
22 Did you make investigations as a result of the
23 suggestion that there were "many dark actors playing
25 A. Yes. I think it would be fair to say that a number of
1 our inquiries have been framed around that suggestion
2 and maybe other interpretations that could be put on
3 Dr Kelly's words and Dr Kelly's position and we have
4 made extensive inquiries around all those e-mails.
5 Q. Can I finish off those e-mails on 17th July? COM/1/16.
6 This is from someone called Malfrid:
7 "Hello, I just wanted to send a little email to say
8 that I hope you manage to keep energy for your important
9 work, undoubtedly recent events must have been
10 straining. Seems to be an occupational hazard
11 associated with UNSCOM work..." and it goes on to
12 discuss Cairo.
13 "Malfrid, thanks. It has been difficult. I hope to
14 get to Baghdad soon to really work. I will then
15 probably be out of email contact but send me whatever
16 you wish and I will respond as soon as I can."
17 Then COM/1/17, from someone called Dick:
18 "In the words of my teenagers 'wicked' or 'phat' --
19 do you have a clue as to the meaning of such words?
20 "Hope to see you abroad in a few weeks time."
21 "Quite a week. If all blows over I will be in
22 Baghdad next Friday. Hope to see you shortly after
23 that. All the best, David."
24 Were those the e-mails that you had extracted that
25 were sent at 11.18?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Can I also take you to some further material that was
3 taken off the computer at COM/4/83. This is just to
4 illustrate what Dr Kelly thought was going on, on
5 9th July. This is 9th July. It appears to have been
6 sent at 15.37, so just mid afternoon. Marie:
7 "I have just checked with London and I am free to
8 see Dr Scott at 0900 tomorrow (10th July)."
9 Who is Dr Scott? You have taken a witness statement
10 from him; is that right?
11 A. I have not personally.
12 Q. Not you personally, sorry. Is he -- sorry, I will help.
13 Is he his manager at DSTL?
14 A. Yes, I beg your pardon.
15 Q. This e-mail on 9th July -- we know he is seen by
16 Mr Rufford after his supper in the garden, and we also
17 know that he gets a phone call shortly after Mr Rufford
18 has arrived, from the Ministry of Defence, saying his
19 name is out in the press. On 9th July at 3.30 it
20 appears from this to suggest he was thinking he would be
21 able to travel to London on 10th July.
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. Did he in fact get to London on 10th July, as far as you
25 A. Not as far as I am aware.
1 Q. I think we have heard from his wife where he ended up.
2 Can I just take you to some other -- I am sorry to
3 use you, as it were, to put in the material -- material
4 that has been extracted from his computer.
5 COM/4/101, he sent on 7th June 2003 a document from
6 Jacqueline Shire:
7 "Doubtless you will have seen this, but in case not,
8 I will paste below.
9 "I would be grateful for any additional insights..."
10 It appears to be a report about the mobile trailers
11 that had been found in Iraq and comments on that.
12 At the top of the page Dr Kelly replies:
13 "Jacqui, just back from a trip abroad. The article
14 fits in with my thoughts."
15 COM/4/105 is an e-mail picking up correspondence
16 that starts at COM/4/106. If we go to COM/4/106 we can
18 "Gary, enjoyed your interview on Channel Four news
19 last night."
20 This is Gary Samore, do you know who he is?
21 A. I do not I am afraid.
22 Q. I think he is with the IISS, International Institute of
23 Strategic Studies.
24 "Agreed with all you said except that I was a little
25 surprised that you almost dismissed CW completely. Time
1 will tell what the CW programme was in 2003. It is
2 likely to be small but not insignificant. The search
3 has yet to truly start and once Dayton gets a grip which
4 he surely will then discoveries will be made. The IISS
5 overall CW assessment that Iraq possesses a few hundred
6 tonnes of agent and a few thousand munitions remains
7 a distinct possibility. Iraq had a policy of fill to
8 use and I wonder how many unfilled CW munitions have
9 already been missed by the 75th.
10 "I would love to catch up with you but I am
11 travelling a lot over the next few weeks..."
12 That was his response, COM/4/105, it was in response
13 to Gary Samore's suggestion:
14 "Well, maybe I'm being premature, but I figure that
15 we should have stumbled over a few hundred tons of agent
16 and thousands of empty munitions by now..."
17 Other e-mails. At COM/2/2, we can see a draft
18 letter to Richard Scott. I helped you a bit with who
19 Richard Scott was. Here we can see he is the Director
20 of DSTL Chemical and Biological Sciences Porton Down.
21 It is obviously a draft letter:
22 "Thank you for completing my annual report which
23 I return duly signed. I note that the salary estimate
24 is not compiled and I assume that is because the
25 promotion element has not yet been calculated --
1 certainly I have not seen an increase in pay recently."
2 That is as recently as 2nd June 2003.
3 A. Hmm, hmm.
4 Q. A final few documents, if I may, that have been found on
5 his computer, relating to the dossier. Can I take you
6 to COM/4/166. I will wait, if I may, until it comes on
7 screen, if it comes on screen. Ah, well that is
8 particularly unhelpful because what has been redacted is
9 the wrong bits. Can I read out from mine which is
10 unredacted. At COM/4/68 it is from someone who is
11 nameless to the CBW Discussion Forum. This was located
12 on Dr Kelly's computer:
13 "Hi, the following author names are embedded in the
14 Word document version of the Downing Street dossier on
16 We can see the date of this document is
17 6th February 2003. What should have been redacted is,
18 quite right, the top. What should not have been
19 redacted are the names I am going to read out: P Hamill,
20 J Pratt, A Blackshaw and M Khan.
21 "Does anyone know who these folks are?"
22 Can I take you on to the next page? You can see the
23 date of this one is 4th February 2003, so two days
24 before the other e-mail. It is to various people.
25 Again, the CBW Discussion Forum. The subject:
1 "Iraq -- its infrastructure of concealment,
2 deception and intimidation:
3 "BTW. Here are the folks who worked on the UK
4 document according to the revision log in the Microsoft
5 Word doc that was released (anyone know who these folks
7 You can see somebody appears to have accessed a Word
8 document which they say was the UK dossier. You can
9 see, as you go down:
10 "Revision 4 J Pratt, J Pratt, A Blackshaw,
11 A Blackshaw, A Blackshaw, M Khan and M Khan."
12 It follows on from an e-mail on 3rd February. We
13 have heard some evidence about who A Blackshaw was.
14 I am sorry to use you to introduce those computers
15 but they were effectively examined, as I understand it,
16 by your personnel?
17 A. They were indeed.
18 Q. We have heard that, unhappily, the forensic pathologist
19 is on holiday and will come obviously back later.
20 I understand you will be coming back to conclude your
21 evidence on a formal basis also in the second stage of
22 your Inquiry?
23 A. I will indeed, my Lord.
24 Q. Subject to that caveat, is there anything else you would
25 like to say at this stage?
1 A. Not at present, my Lord.
2 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much. This will be
3 a convenient time to have a short break.
4 (11.40 am)
5 (Short Break)
6 (11.45 am)
7 MR STEPHEN JOHN MACDONALD (called)
8 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
9 MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name.
10 A. I am Stephen John MacDonald.
11 Q. What is your occupation?
12 A. I am Assistant Director on the central budget, security
13 and safety for the Ministry of Defence.
14 Q. What does that mean you do?
15 A. I provide security advice working to the director on the
16 implementation of security policy. I am responsible for
17 the day-to-day security of all staff in the MoD
18 buildings in London.
19 Q. Is that security as in a physical sense or for inquiries
20 into leaks et cetera?
21 A. I am also with a small team of security officers that
22 carry out internal investigations into lapses and
23 breaches of security.
24 Q. And how long have you been in that position?
25 A. I have been in my current appointment since
1 November 2002. Prior to that I was the senior security
2 adviser at the main headquarters in Abbey Wood, Bristol.
3 Q. We have heard that Dr Kelly's body was found on Friday
4 18th July. Did you get any telephone calls on Sunday
5 20th July?
6 A. I received a telephone call from the director --
7 Q. The director of?
8 A. The director of security and safety.
9 Q. Right.
10 A. Informing me that a burn bag had been found in the
11 Metropole Building with contents --
12 Q. Can I interrupt you? First of all what is the Metropole
14 A. The Metropole Building is a building of the Ministry of
15 Defence on Northumberland Avenue.
16 Q. What is a burn bag?
17 A. A burn bag is a paper sack into which either
18 confidential or protectfully marked -- that is documents
19 that have a security classification for disposal, that
20 are placed prior to safe disposal.
21 Q. I interrupted you. You were telling me what was the
22 content of your phone call.
23 A. The director had informed me that a bag had been found
24 in a third floor office in the Metropole Building that
25 had been unsecured and unlocked and the contents of the
1 bag included a document relating to David Kelly.
2 Q. Right. Should it have been there?
3 A. No. Burn bags are not normally left out in offices. If
4 there is any information inside them they should be
5 locked away. Clearly security procedures had been not
6 followed in this case.
7 Q. What do you do as a result of that?
8 A. As a result of that particular activity, the Ministry of
9 Defence Police had been called. They had actually taken
10 the bag, the contents and the document into safe custody
11 and they had sealed the room. That was not a normal
12 procedure for a security lapse of that kind.
13 Q. What, leaving a burn bag, you would not normally get
14 a room sealed?
15 A. No, it is a minor security occurrence.
16 Q. Why had this additional action been taken?
17 A. The security guard who found the bag and its contents,
18 noting that David Kelly was mentioned in the bag and
19 given the recent press profile and the activity that we
20 had seen, that we had actually sealed the room with the
21 Metropolitan Police, decided that merited the attendance
22 of the MDP.
23 Q. The information in the burn bag that related to
24 Dr Kelly, can I take you to a document which is
25 MoD/23/10? We have only got obviously the photocopy
1 scanned in. It rather looks as if it has been crumpled
2 in the middle of the page; is that right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Is that because it had been torn apart?
5 A. It is normal for secret documents to be ripped before
6 putting into such bags.
7 Q. Right. If we scroll down a bit more, we can see someone
8 has written in -- even a little further -- we can see
9 someone has written in handwriting the name
10 "David Kelly". Is that what the security guard had
12 A. This is what the security guard had seen.
13 Q. He called in the MDP, that is the Ministry of Defence
14 Police; is that right?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. They had sealed the room. What did they do with the
17 burn bag?
18 A. They took the burn bag into safe custody and the next
19 morning they handed it, I am told, to the Metropolitan
20 Police Special Branch for the Metropolitan Police
21 Special Branch to conduct an investigation.
22 Q. Did they carry out an investigation?
23 A. Later that day I was advised by a member of my staff
24 that the Metropolitan Police had examined the contents
25 of the bag and they had assessed that there was nothing
1 likely to be significant for the Hutton Inquiry.
2 Q. Right. And what further actions were taken?
3 A. At this stage my staff took no further action because
4 given that the Metropolitan Police and the MDP were
6 Q. And did you receive any record of this in relation to --
7 any report or any formal report?
8 A. I called for statements from the supervisor on duty on
9 the 20th; and we did actually -- I did receive a copy of
10 a security infringement report which is a short formal
12 Q. Can I take you to a document, MoD/23/9. Is this what
13 you received?
14 A. That is the security infringement report that
15 I received.
16 Q. And it tells us the details of the infringement:
17 a classified burning bag found on the floor adjacent to
18 the window. It was protectively marked, it tells us how
19 it was protectively marked. And signatures and entries
20 have been redacted. That is what you received. When
21 did you get that document?
22 A. I received that on 22nd July.
23 Q. Did you carry out any further action as a result of
25 A. A member of my staff would have asked the branch
1 security officer for that part of the building to
2 conduct his or her own inquiries into that type of
3 security lapse.
4 Q. And what were the result of those inquiries?
5 A. I understand that the branch security officer spoke to
6 members in the area by 23rd July and that it had been
7 ascertained who had actually left out the bag.
8 Q. Right. I do not think we need to go into who had left
9 it out. Was there any media coverage which related to
11 A. Well, the security investigation was still under way
12 when, on 1st August, an article appeared in the
13 Daily Telegraph alleging that a senior official had been
14 caught hastily shredding documents, and a further
15 article appeared on 3rd August in the Mail on Sunday
16 alleging that a mysterious blonde had been found inside
17 the MoD and had been removing documents.
18 Q. I think you were asked by the Inquiry or the
19 Cabinet Office was asked by the Inquiry to provide
20 information in relation to that. Did you produce any
21 notes as a result of these reports?
22 A. Yes, on 1st August I drafted a note to the joint chiefs
23 of staff outlining what really happened in relation to
24 the security lapse and the position of the internal
25 inquiry. And given the press activity, I spoke with the
1 press office and we deemed it necessary and appropriate
2 to ask the Metropolitan Police for a copy back of the
4 Q. And that is the document that we have seen, with
5 "David Kelly" written on it?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And did you carry out any further investigations once
8 you had received that bag?
9 A. On receipt of the document, I actually spoke to a member
10 of staff who had said that they had actually been
11 responsible for the confusion that had been caused and
12 who had left the bag out.
13 Q. Right. Do you know how Dr Kelly's name had come to be
14 written on the document? If we go back and look at it
15 again, if we may, at MoD/23/10.
16 A. The member of staff informed me that he was new to the
17 department in which he worked, which was in fact the
18 Iraq Secretariat.
19 Q. Right.
20 A. He had been assisting a colleague in the preparation of
21 minutes. These in actual fact were an annex to the
22 minutes of the Information, Campaign and Coordination
24 Q. If we scroll to the top of the page, we can see
25 "Information Campaign week ahead". That is coordinating
1 as it were press responses; is that right?
2 A. It is a paper that really sets out military and
3 political issue developments in Iraq to be considered by
4 the ICCG, both positive and negative.
5 Q. By way of example, you can see positive: some broadening
6 the coalition, CN deployments et cetera. Negative, you
7 can see US/UK differences. We see someone has written
8 in "David Kelly"; do you know who had done that?
9 A. Yes, the member of staff explained to me that during
10 a discussion on the role of the ICCG, that is the
11 Information, Campaign and Coordination Group, he
12 suggested to his colleague that David Kelly might be an
13 issue to discuss, given the negative impact of his
14 recent death upon the MoD; and at the same time jotted
15 down the name on the annex to the minutes that the
16 secretary had actually printed off for him. The
17 conversation moved on in due course; but before it did
18 his colleague pointed out to him that David Kelly's
19 death was a domestic matter and not for consideration by
20 the ICCG.
21 Q. Did you produce any further report as a result of those
22 inquiries you carried out?
23 A. Yes. After interviewing the individual, and I received
24 reports from the secretary and the member of staff
25 concerned, I produced a note for file and also sent
1 a note to the tribunals inquiry not including the
2 officers' names.
3 Q. Can I take you to the note I think you sent on
4 6th August which is MoD/23/11. That, I think, sets out
5 that you requested a summary of events concerning the
6 discovery of the unsecured -- if we scroll down the page
7 you can see the steps you had taken, which I think you
8 related, and over the page it continues and finishes off
9 at MoD/23/12, and you say this:
10 "Written statements have been received from the
11 staff concerned covering the security brief and their
12 involvement. This time I am not intending to take any
13 further action and details can be held on file."
14 Is that what you have done?
15 A. That is what I have done.
16 Q. So far as you are aware, was that the source of the
17 shredding allegations?
18 A. Yes. I can confirm that there was never any suggestion
19 of any official, senior or otherwise, shredding
20 documents which were relevant to the Inquiry, nor any
21 unauthorised access to MoD property, and I have received
22 no other reports of any documents relating to
23 David Kelly being destroyed.
24 Q. Nor mystery blondes?
25 A. No mystery blondes unfortunately.
1 Q. Is there anything else that you know of relating to the
2 circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that you can assist
3 his Lordship with?
4 A. No.
5 LORD HUTTON: Very well. Thank you very much Mr Macdonald.
6 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Jones, please.
7 MR BRIAN FRANCIS GILL JONES (called)
8 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
9 LORD HUTTON: Sit down please.
10 MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name.
11 A. It is Brian Francis Gill Jones.
12 Q. What is your occupation?
13 A. I am a retired civil servant.
14 Q. Before you retired?
15 A. Before I retired I was a scientist, I am still
16 a scientist, worked in the MoD since 1973. From about
17 1987 until I retired I was a branch head in the
18 Scientific and Technical Directorate of the Defence
19 Intelligence Analysis Staff, which is in turn part of
20 the Defence Intelligence Staff, the DIS.
21 Q. That was from 1987?
22 A. From 1987, yes.
23 Q. What, in general terms, did that involve?
24 A. I was responsible for all aspects of the management of
25 the branch of scientists and engineers whose
1 responsibility it was to analyse intelligence from all
2 sources on various matters of interest to the Ministry
3 of Defence.
4 Q. What was your particular area that you were looking at?
5 A. Well, the branch I managed initially was one which
6 covered a wide range of scientific and technical
7 matters. Originally I am a material scientist by
9 Q. What does that mean to a lay person like me?
10 A. Well, I qualified as a metallurgist with a Bachelor of
11 Science degree and PhD. I then did research in material
12 science for several years.
13 Q. Was that before or after you became a civil servant?
14 A. Both before and after I became a civil servant. When
15 I moved into the DIS there was a small element of my
16 branch, at that time, which covered chemical and
17 biological warfare.
18 Q. Did you meet Dr Kelly at all?
19 A. I did. I first met David Kelly at a management training
20 course in about 1986, I think not long after he actually
21 joined the MoD.
22 Q. That was before you had been appointed to the DIAS?
23 A. That is right.
24 Q. Did you have any professional contact with him at that
25 stage, in 1986?
1 A. None at all. Our first meeting was at that course,
2 I think we were at one stage in the same syndicate group
3 on that course. So I did chat to him at that time.
4 Q. After you had been appointed in 1987 to the DIAS, did
5 you have any contact with Dr Kelly?
6 A. On taking up those particular duties I came into some
7 contact with David Kelly who was then working at
8 Porton Down.
9 Q. What was the nature of that contact?
10 A. At first it was fairly slight, but as interest developed
11 into areas where he was an expert, it increased and so
12 we then, from the late 1980s, for a while worked quite
13 closely together, or at least David worked very closely
14 with some of my staff and as a consequence I got to know
15 him a good deal better.
16 Q. What was the area in which he was an expert?
17 A. He was at that stage primarily, as far as we were
18 concerned, an expert in microbiology whose expertise we
19 needed to use from time to time.
20 Q. Did his area of expertise enlarge or change?
21 A. From some point I think in about 1989, maybe slightly
22 earlier, various projects arose in which we increasingly
23 needed expertise of the sort that David had. And as is
24 fairly typical -- I mean there is nothing at all unusual
25 in this -- arrangements were made for him to be cleared
1 to see certain information that came to us and to study
2 it when we thought that it was appropriate that he did
4 Q. We have, in fact, seen his clearance which was to the
5 highest level, but Mr Hatfield said that that was on
6 a "need to know" basis. Can you help me with what "need
7 to know" means?
8 A. Yes. That description applies really to all highly
9 classified material. Only those people who need to know
10 certain things will see that information. I mean, it is
11 a sensible security device and, for example, even those
12 of us who worked within intelligence would only see
13 intelligence as it related to our particular areas of
15 Q. So later on when he becomes a chemical and biological
16 warfare specialist, he would need to know intelligence
17 in relation to that but not other aspects. Is that
18 a fair analysis?
19 A. Yes, maybe I should just clarify. His job at
20 Porton Down was to do with biological defence. He had
21 a background -- he was a microbiologist, that was his
22 area of expertise. But he did have a background in
23 biological defence in particular. Sorry, I have
24 forgotten the detail of your question.
25 Q. No, that is enough on the "need to know".
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. In about 1989, when there was an increasing need for
3 Dr Kelly's area of expertise, we have also heard at some
4 stage he became involved in inspections in the
5 Soviet Union, is that right?
6 A. That is right.
7 Q. And that was the area in which his expertise was needed?
8 A. Very much. Yes, it was, yes.
9 Q. We have also heard that he went, after the first
10 Gulf War, out to Iraq to carry out inspections in
11 relation to chemical and biological warfare. Was his
12 expertise needed in that respect as well?
13 A. It was; and I think one followed from the other, in
14 a sense, that he had been involved in the Russian work
15 and then very similar work was required in Iraq; and
16 David was a very natural selection to do that work.
17 Q. And what was the nature of your contact with Dr Kelly
18 during these years?
19 A. Professionally I got to know him quite well. We saw one
20 another quite often. I would describe our relationship
21 as a friendly relationship although I would not describe
22 us as friends. We had little or no social contact
23 outside of the work environment and not relating to
25 Q. We have heard that Dr Kelly had three offices in London,
1 one at the Metropole Building, one with the Foreign and
2 Commonwealth Office and one in the DIS building. Were
3 you in the DIS building?
4 A. I was.
5 Q. Did Dr Kelly have an office there?
6 A. Not to my knowledge.
7 Q. Did he come there reasonably regularly?
8 A. Yes. At some early stage we arranged that David could
9 come regularly into the secure area which the DIS
10 occupies, and I encouraged him to do so, and he had
11 a pass that meant he did not have to be accompanied when
12 he came in, so he could walk in, and I encouraged him to
13 do that, to talk to my staff and talk to me.
14 Q. What was the purpose of encouraging him to do that?
15 A. Primarily it would be -- I mean, this sort of approach
16 we used because the staff within the intelligence
17 community is obviously very limited, we cannot know all
18 that we need to know, so we need professional advisers
19 from outside. So that sort of relationship was
20 encouraged. We would consult with him. He would come
21 in and chat to us about things he had spotted. It was
22 the normal exchange, when those sort of relationships
23 are developed.
24 Q. What was he consulted on? What areas was he consulted
1 A. Well, obviously Iraq was a -- was something -- we were
2 always interested to hear what David said about Iraq.
3 He was a considerable expert on Iraq, from his visits
4 there. We also needed his advice, from time to time, on
5 detailed microbiological matters, technical --
6 scientific, technical matters that came up in
7 information we were looking at when perhaps we could not
8 understand it fully and we needed to ask him, you know,
9 if he could interpret, if he could tell us what he
10 thought was going on.
11 Q. Were you involved in the production of the dossiers at
13 A. I had some superficial sort of distant supervisory
14 involvement. There were various papers being prepared
15 through the summer of 2002, or the early part of 2002.
16 Things then became rather quiet on that issue, and I can
17 remember wondering, from time to time what had happened
18 to the dossier. But --
19 Q. Can I take you to a document that we have now seen,
20 which is at CAB/23/59? If you look in the top left-hand
22 "One document version 20 June 2002.
23 "British Government briefing papers on Iraq."
24 If we go to the next page you can see:
25 "Executive Summary, Iraqi Weapons of Mass
1 Destruction, History of UN Weapons Inspections and Iraqi
3 That is getting closer to the document actually
4 published on 24th September. Is that a document you
5 will have seen at the time?
6 A. It may have crossed my desk; but I did not focus on any
7 detail in that document at that time.
8 Q. You have told us you started in 1987 at the DIAS?
9 A. Hmm, hmm.
10 Q. Were there any reorganisations, at any time, in your
12 A. Yes, there were. In about 1996 there was a fairly major
13 reorganisation; and that involved drawing together the
14 analysis, activities on chemical warfare, on biological
15 warfare and on nuclear aspects into one branch.
16 Q. Who was heading that branch?
17 A. I took charge of that branch when it was formed.
18 Q. If you have chemical, biological and nuclear, are those
19 the weapons of mass destruction?
20 A. That is a term that is often applied to them, yes.
21 I have some problems with the term myself.
22 Q. I am sorry, I was going to ask you what the term
23 actually meant, what you understood the term meant.
24 A. "Weapons of mass destruction"?
25 Q. Yes.
1 A. Well, it is used to -- if it is used too loosely it is
2 used to represent all nuclear, chemical and biological
4 Q. You say "used too loosely", which rather suggests you
5 think it ought to be used in a more restrictive way?
6 A. That is a personal opinion, yes.
7 Q. What is your personal opinion about weapons of mass
9 A. My personal opinion is that almost all -- almost all --
10 nuclear weapons truly fit this concept of being a weapon
11 of mass destruction, that some biological weapons are
12 perhaps reasonably described in that way because they
13 could be used to produce very large numbers of
14 casualties on the same sort of scale perhaps even as
15 nuclear weapons, but there are many biological weapons
16 that struggle to fit into that. Some are incapacitants
17 for example rather than lethal.
18 Q. What is an incapacitant?
19 A. An incapacitant is something in a weapon sense designed
20 to make someone unable to conduct their duties rather
21 than to actually kill them.
22 Q. Making them sick or giving them diarrhoea et cetera?
23 A. Exactly so.
24 Q. Those are biological weapons you think do not fit into
25 that character. What about the chemical weapons?
1 A. I think chemical weapons almost struggle to fit into
2 that category. There are certain agents and certain
3 scenarios where I would think that chemical weapons
4 truly are describable as weapons of mass destruction.
5 Sorry, could I take a sip of water?
6 Q. Yes of course.
7 A. We are getting into considerable detail here. I think
8 the sort of scenarios where I think that chemical
9 weapons might be described as a weapon of mass
10 destruction are where they might be used in enclosed
11 spaces. An example might be the somewhat unsuccessful
12 attempt to use them in that way by Aum Shinri-kyo on the
13 Tokyo underground in the mid 1990s, where if large
14 amounts of the nerve agent they tried to use had entered
15 the atmosphere then many more people would have died.
16 But it is rather more difficult to think of them in
17 those terms really on the battlefield perhaps where to
18 produce large numbers of casualties you need very large
19 amounts of material.
20 Q. Obviously if you are an infantry soldier in the front
21 line and subject to a nerve agent artillery attack you
22 have to put on your gas mask, if you get it on in time.
23 Is that sort of artillery shell delivery of chemical
24 weapons something you would term a weapon of mass
1 A. No, I think personally I would struggle to make that
2 particular scenario really fit into an equivalence of
3 them facing a nuclear blast.
4 LORD HUTTON: Do I gather, Dr Jones, that there is perhaps
5 some debate in intelligence circles then about the
6 precise meaning of "weapons of mass destruction"? You
7 are expressing your own view. Do I take it that there
8 are others that might take a different view?
9 A. There may be. I mean, I think "weapons of mass
10 destruction" has become a convenient catch-all which, in
11 my opinion, can at times confuse discussion of the
13 LORD HUTTON: Yes I see. Thank you, yes.
14 MR DINGEMANS: You say there may be. Are you aware of
15 anyone who does have a different view?
16 A. That is difficult. I do not think I was ever in
17 a situation where it was discussed in quite those terms.
18 I think it was quite a frequent comment from myself and
19 my staff about particular issues, that it is perhaps not
20 right to use that general term to describe something
21 that is more specific.
22 Q. Mr Scarlett, I think, told us that Dr Kelly may have
23 been confused about the difference between missile
24 delivery of chemical weapons and artillery delivery. Do
25 you think there is a difference between the two, in
1 terms of weapons of mass destruction?
2 A. Yes. I think I would struggle to describe either as
3 a true weapon of mass destruction.
4 Q. Sorry, you were telling us about the reorganisation of
5 your branch in 1996, I think.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. You became head of the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
9 A. Still within the Scientific and Technical Directorate.
10 There were other groups within the DIAS that had
11 responsibilities in the same subject areas.
12 Q. Were there any other reorganisations before the dossier
13 came to be produced?
14 A. Not before the dossier was produced, no.
15 Q. Was there one afterwards?
16 A. There was one shortly afterwards. It came into effect
17 in October, I seem to recollect; and at that time I was
18 asked temporarily to take charge of a reorganised branch
19 that was somewhat expanded, included other subjects of
20 study as well.
21 Q. We have got on to in 2002, and before your October
22 reorganisation, the dossier. You may have seen the
23 dossier I showed you, 25th June. You said things went
24 quiet on the dossier front, is that right?
25 A. That is right, yes.
1 Q. Do you know why that was?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Did you ask?
4 A. No. It was one of those things that you were -- you
5 stayed curiously interested in whilst you busily get on
6 with other things in your workload.
7 Q. You say that slightly cryptically. Why is that? Was it
8 best not to ask?
9 A. No, not really. If it was a job that came to the fore
10 then we would deal with it. But we did have a lot of
11 work on, as most people do.
12 Q. So you were not looking for work?
13 A. Indeed.
14 Q. Did you go on holiday that year?
15 A. I did. I went on holiday on 30th August.
16 Q. And when did you get back?
17 A. And I returned to work on 18th September.
18 Q. Before you went on holiday, was the dossier on your
20 A. Not on mine personally; and I was not aware that anyone
21 in the branch was working hard on it.
22 Q. When you came back, was it still the same situation?
23 A. No, the situation had changed a great deal and on my
24 return to work one of the first things that my staff
25 told me was that the dossier had suddenly become very
1 active and that they had been very busy working on the
2 dossier, looking at several drafts and responding to
3 drafts in very, very short timescales and it really had
4 dominated their workload while I had been away.
5 Q. Was anything expressed about this increase in the
6 profile of the dossier?
7 A. In what terms?
8 Q. I mean, if suddenly you get a lot of work to do some
9 people may say: it is a bit unfortunate, I have all this
10 work to do.
11 A. Well, that was the mood certainly.
12 Q. Right. Was anything said in relation to any pressures
13 about the dossier?
14 A. They were certainly higher pressures than would normally
15 apply to any particular single piece of work, yes. It
16 was exceptional in that regard.
17 Q. We have seen a document at CAB/23/15 which is dated
18 11th September. I appreciate you are on holiday at the
19 time. Going down the page, this appears to have been
20 sent round from the Joint Intelligence Committee
21 assessment personnel:
22 "Dear all,
23 "We have now received comments back from No. 10 on
24 the first draft of the dossier. Unsurprisingly they
25 have further questions and areas they would like
2 Paragraph 1 relates to chemical weapons and
3 biological weapons and nuclear. That was your area; is
4 that right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Did you see this memo at all?
7 A. No, I did not. As you say, I was on leave and that is
8 something that would have sort of been lost in the work
9 that was going on while I was away that I never had time
10 to return to and look at.
11 LORD HUTTON: Mr Dingemans, can you give me the reference
13 MR DINGEMANS: CAB/23/15, my Lord.
14 If we go down to 4:
15 "Can we say how many chemical and biological weapons
16 Iraq currently has by type? If we can't give weapons
17 numbers can we give any idea on the quantity of agent
19 "I appreciate everyone, us included, has been around
20 at least some of these buoys before, particularly
21 item 4. But No. 10 through the Chairman want the
22 document to be as strong as possible within the bounds
23 of available intelligence. This is therefore a last
24 call(!) for any items of intelligence that agencies
25 think can and should be included."
1 Was that the sort of pressure that you were
2 referring to?
3 A. No, no. They were quite normal and natural questions
4 that would arise in the preparation of any particular
5 paper. The pressure I was referring to, I think, was
6 the frequency of drafts that were coming on, and the
7 fact that my staff were being pressed to get their
8 comments back to the assessment staff or, you know, to
9 the interface with the assessment staff very quickly
11 Q. You returned on 18th September. Did you speak to
12 Dr Kelly on your return?
13 A. I did. On the day of my return, David was, as he
14 often -- you know "often" is not the right word, but it
15 was not unusual for me to encounter him in the office of
16 one of my staff, sitting at a desk and either talking to
17 them or looking at a paper or --
18 Q. How many times a week would he be in your section?
19 A. It may go for many weeks without him being in the
20 branch. If there was a matter of particular mutual
21 interest, if he had a question or a series of issues to
22 discuss or we did with him, he could be there, you know,
23 several times in a week.
24 Q. Right. Were there any other branches within the DIS
25 that he assisted?
1 A. There were, yes. There was another branch that dealt
2 specifically with Iraq issues in relation to the sort of
3 work that David did. It was a branch that focused on
4 inspections in Iraq and that sort of thing; and he had
5 a separate relationship with them.
6 Q. Right. Do you know whether Dr Kelly had seen the
7 earlier drafts of the dossier? You go on holiday on
8 30th August, nothing mentioned about the dossier. We
9 have then seen various drafts starting with
10 4th September and running through. Do you know whether
11 he had seen all those drafts?
12 A. I cannot say whether he had seen all of them. The
13 impression I gained on my return, although such was the
14 nature of the relationship it was not something I felt
15 I had to ask about, was that he had looked at other
16 drafts than the one -- I mean he was actually --
17 I discovered on 18th September, when I met him then,
18 that he was actually looking at the latest draft at that
20 Q. He was looking at the latest draft, what, sitting in
21 someone's office and looking at the latest draft?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. I think you told us he had been asked because of his
24 chemical and biological warfare expertise. Was he
25 looking at those aspects of it?
1 A. I think he had a general interest. He had,
2 I understand, provided information. I mean, he had
3 a particular expertise about one section of that dossier
4 and had made a contribution to it; and that really
5 related to the work he had done from the early 1990s up
6 to 1998 when the UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq.
7 Q. Did you discuss with Dr Kelly his view of the dossier as
8 so far drafted?
9 A. At that point, I did. I asked him what he thought: what
10 do you think of the dossier, David? You know.
11 Q. And what did he say?
12 A. He said he thought it was good.
13 Q. And were there others in your group who had differing
15 A. There were, yes.
16 Q. And what did you do, having heard of these different
17 expressions of support for the dossier?
18 A. Well, maybe I can just explain that some of my staff had
19 said that they were unhappy with all the detail that was
20 in the dossier. My expert analyst on CW expressed
21 particular concern. I had, I think, at the time I spoke
22 to David, begun to look at his problems, to look at the
23 bits of the dossier that he had problems with.
24 Q. And what was your CW expert's particular concern?
25 A. Well, at its simplest he was concerned that some of the
1 statements that were in the dossier did not accurately
2 represent his assessment of the intelligence available
3 to him.
4 Q. What had he done in your absence as a result of that?
5 A. There was a process going on. I mean the preparation of
6 the dossier was a process in which drafts were produced
7 from our visibility by the assessment staff. They were
8 circulated, given -- on a fairly narrow circulation
9 I seem to recall, but to the experts for them to
10 comment. There were several groups of experts in the
11 Defence Intelligence Assessment Staff so there was
12 a point of coordination that was not my branch.
13 Q. And was that the Joint Intelligence Committee
15 A. No. No, it was an individual -- it was really an
16 individual, but he belonged to a section in another
17 directorate that dealt with proliferation issues.
18 Q. Right.
19 A. I do not know the reason why he was asked to do it, but
20 it was appropriate. Probably, at that time of the year,
21 he was available to do it.
22 LORD HUTTON: Was he someone from the assessment staff? We
23 have heard about the assessment staff.
24 A. He belonged to the Defence Intelligence Staff and it was
25 his job to coordinate the views of the various groups
1 within the DIS and it was at that point there was the
2 interface with the assessment staff.
3 LORD HUTTON: And he would pass on those views to the
4 assessment staff?
5 A. Yes. And to return to the rather long answer, I am
6 sorry, to your question, but this process involved those
7 comments being sent back through this coordinating
8 person to the assessment staff. That had been going on
9 over several drafts. And the particular changes that
10 were asked for had not been taken up.
11 LORD HUTTON: May I just pursue: changes had been suggested.
12 Is it your understanding they were passed on to the
13 assessment staff but they were not adopted?
14 A. That is correct.
15 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
16 MR DINGEMANS: In terms of structure, you have your nuclear,
17 biological and chemical cell, you have another Iraq
18 inspection cell, et cetera. You are all making comments
19 on the dossier. They go up to this person within the
20 DIS who is coordinating responses and he passed on the
21 concerns which had been expressed to him by your CW
22 expert to the JIC intelligence assessment group.
23 A. That is right.
24 Q. And those concerns had not been accepted?
25 A. Some had, but there were significant ones that had not
1 been accepted.
2 Q. And how did your CW expert feel about that?
3 A. He was very concerned.
4 LORD HUTTON: Could you just elaborate a little on his
5 concern? Can you give us examples of the nature of his
6 representations not being accepted? Were they matters
7 of language? Were they matters of assessing how serious
8 a particular matter was? Were they on the basis that he
9 simply thought some statements were wrong, in the sense
10 that the information simply did not exist?
11 A. My Lord, they --
12 LORD HUTTON: I do not want you to go into security matters.
13 A. My Lord, they were about language but language is the
14 means by which we communicate an assessment so they were
15 also about the assessment, yes.
16 LORD HUTTON: Quite. Yes.
17 A. I mean, if I can just refer to a note I have here,
18 because I wanted to be sure I was clear on this, so ...
19 they were really about a tendency in certain areas, from
20 his point of view, to shall we say over-egg certain
21 assessments in relation particularly to the production
22 of CW agents and weapons since 1998. Indeed, I mean,
23 I guess that goes all the way back to the end of the
24 Gulf conflict. And he was concerned that he could not
25 point to any solid evidence of such production. He did
1 not dismiss that it may have happened, and there was
2 certain evidence that suggested that it could have
3 happened, but he did not have good evidence that it had
5 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Could you just perhaps, and please say
6 if you are not able to do this, but when you say that he
7 was concerned about language and he was concerned that
8 certain assessments were over-egged, can you give
9 examples of that as regards the use of language? If you
10 cannot, please do not speculate. I do not want you in
11 any way just to speculate.
12 A. I think -- I think it is the difference between saying,
13 for example -- making a judgment that the production of
14 CW agent had taken place as opposed to that judgment
15 being that it had probably taken place or even possibly
16 taken place.
17 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
18 A. It was that degree of certainty in the judgments that
19 were being made. I hope that helps.
20 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you very much.
21 MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to a document, which is
22 CAB/11/66. Just so that you know what it is, it is
23 a memorandum from Alastair Campbell to John Scarlett
24 dated 17th September, looking at the draft he was
25 looking at. He says:
1 "Please find below a number of drafting points. As
2 I was writing this, the Prime Minister had a read of the
3 draft you gave me this morning, and he too made a number
4 of points."
5 There is talk about chapter 3 being re-ordered;
6 worried about the way that the nuclear issue had been
7 expressed. And the detailed comments, if we go down to
8 the bottom of the page:
9 "My detailed comments on the draft, which is much
11 Then he sets them out at the next page. If you look
12 at 1:
13 "In light of the last 24 hours, I think we should
14 make more of the point about current concealment plans.
15 Also in the executive summary, it would be stronger if
16 we said that despite sanctions and the policy of
17 containment, he has made real progress, even if this
18 echoes the Prime Minister."
19 If we go down to 6:
20 "'Vivid and horrifying', re human rights, doesn't
21 fit with the dry text around it."
22 If I could take you to 9, he says "'might' reads
23 very weakly"; and 10, "'may' is weaker than in the
25 Those are obviously points on language. You have
1 made the point to his Lordship that intelligence
2 personnel communicate by language. Is this the sort of
3 comment that intelligence personnel might be passing to
4 and from each other?
5 A. Yes. Those are the things which we spend hours
6 debating. They are very important in this business --
7 I mean, it depends on context and I cannot tell from
8 what you have showed me there the context of those
9 particular statements, so I could not comment on that.
10 But the use of, you know, a "might" or a "may" does
11 convey some uncertainty in the information you are
12 trying to provide.
13 Q. Can I take you then to CAB/11/70 which is the reply.
14 This is from Mr Scarlett to Mr Campbell. It is dated
15 18th September. I will not take you to the date because
16 that is right at the bottom of the page, if that is all
17 right. He says:
18 "Thank you for your minute..."
19 He talks about reordering and other aspects. Then
20 if we go down the page at paragraph 6:
21 "Turning to your details points, we have ..."
22 strengthened language on current concerns and plans.
23 If I can go over to page 71, he talks about "vivid
24 and horrifying" being dropped which obviously reduces
25 some of the impact. If you look at 9, he says:
1 "We cannot improve on the use of 'might' ..." but at
3 "The language you queried [which was 'may'] has been
5 Is that the sort of response you would expect, as it
6 were, between intelligence personnel discussing this
7 type of issue, looking at the intelligence, and deciding
8 what the language will bear?
9 A. (Pause). Yes.
10 Q. Mr Campbell told us of a distinction between
11 presentation and intelligence. How do you present your
12 intelligence to others? How do you communicate it?
13 A. I mean, we write reports, we give presentations.
14 I mean, I am sorry I am having difficulty with the
16 Q. Sorry, perhaps it was not as clear as it ought to be.
17 Did any of the personnel who were working under you know
18 that people within the communications side of No. 10 had
19 been making suggestions on the dossier?
20 A. I think there was an impression that they were involved
21 in some way.
22 Q. Were people happy or unhappy about this?
23 A. (Pause). I think -- I mean, it is very, very difficult
24 to interpret the views of people who feel they are under
25 pressure and being pressed and worked very hard.
1 Q. Inevitably people will moan about hard work?
2 A. That is right. They will occasionally say: well, this
3 is because of this reason and this is because of that
4 reason and is that not a nuisance, to put it politely.
5 I do not know what the foundation was, and I did not
6 try to find out, for the belief of this other
7 involvement. I mean it was one of those things. From
8 my perspective this was a job that had to be done. As
9 far as I was concerned, the important thing was that the
10 intelligence or our intelligence assessments should be
11 correctly represented in the process. And I really --
12 you know, the other things, as far as I am concerned,
13 were a little -- were not much more than gossip, perhaps
14 about that sort of thing. There was a task there. The
15 task was being done in what appeared to me to be an
16 entirely reasonable way at that stage.
17 Q. Can I take you to a document MoD/4/9? This is produced
18 after the event. It is annexed to a briefing paper, so
19 that you know, dated 18th July 2003 and it is in
20 relation to the Intelligence and Security Committee.
21 But it talks about concerns expressed by DIS staff in
22 relation to the September dossier. It says:
23 "The concerns fall into 3 main groups.
24 "Recent Production of CBW Agent.
25 "The DIS personnel concerned suggested that language
1 in the dossier was too strong on the continued
2 production of chemical and biological agents. These
3 concerns related..."
4 LORD HUTTON: I am not sure we have the right place on the
6 MR DINGEMANS: Sorry, my Lord, that is paragraph 1.
7 LORD HUTTON: I see, yes, fine.
8 MR DINGEMANS: "... related to the foreword, executive
9 summary and main text.
10 "The language in the dossier was stronger on this
11 issue than it had been in the 9 September JIC
12 assessment. This reflected the arrival of further,
13 corroborative intelligence on 11 (and 23) September.
14 Because of its sensitivity, this had not been seen by
15 the personnel concerned (as they acknowledged)."
16 Were you aware of that particular concern?
17 A. Yes, I was. Yes.
18 Q. And were you aware that further intelligence had been
19 received that had not been seen?
20 A. We are really talking now about the very end of the
21 production, the dossier production process, for most of
22 which I was away.
23 Q. Yes.
24 A. But when I came back I looked at the information and had
25 these concerns and, indeed, there was a suggestion, and
1 I cannot remember how it came to be there, perhaps one
2 of my staff mentioned it, that there was said to be
3 additional intelligence that actually had it been
4 available to us would have removed those concerns that
5 we had.
6 Q. So you were aware that there was further intelligence?
7 A. I was.
8 Q. Did you make any efforts yourself to find out whether
9 there was this further intelligence, to see it for
11 A. I discussed the matter with my boss, my director.
12 Q. Right.
13 A. Partly because it was suggested to me, I think, that he
14 had seen it, he had seen that intelligence.
15 Q. And had he seen it?
16 A. No, he had not. He told me that he had not seen the
17 intelligence although he was also aware of its existence
18 and had been contacted by a senior official from one of
19 the other agencies and it had been suggested to him that
20 the intelligence judgments that were being made in the
21 dossier were in fact okay because of -- and they were
22 supported by this additional intelligence.
23 Q. And did that satisfy you?
24 A. No, it did not. I mean, it would not anyway. I mean,
25 I would always have to put a caveat on a conclusion
1 which was based on something I had not seen. I mean,
2 that is --
3 Q. Inevitable.
4 A. So I told him that was the case and that really we, you
5 know, would have to express a reservation on the
6 particular language in the dossier because of that.
7 Q. Because you had not seen the intelligence?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Did you ever see the intelligence?
10 A. No.
11 Q. And do you now know whether or not it supported the
12 stronger language?
13 A. No, I do not.
14 Q. The 45 minutes is the next area.
15 "Concerns related to the level of certainty
16 expressed in the foreword and executive summary. By
17 this stage in the drafting process, following
18 consultation with the DIS, the main text said
19 'intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able
20 to deploy ...' This reflected the language in the
21 9 September JIC paper. The executive summary expressed
22 the point differently, as a judgment. The personnel
23 concerned did not share this judgment. But it was
24 agreed by the JIC."
25 Were you aware of any concerns about the 45 minutes?
1 A. Yes, I had some concerns about the 45 minute point
2 myself; yes.
3 Q. What were your concerns?
4 A. My concerns -- I will refer to some notes I have, again,
5 if I may.
6 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
7 A. My concerns were that Iraq's chemical weapons and
8 biological weapons capabilities were not being
9 accurately represented in all regards in relation to the
10 available evidence. In particular, I had seen -- on the
11 advice of my staff, I was told that there was no
12 evidence that significant production had taken place
13 either of chemical warfare agent or chemical weapons.
14 We also had reservations -- I mean, this all relates
15 to the 45 minutes and some of the detail on the
16 45 minutes that we had seen were causing us problems.
17 Do you want me to ...?
18 MR DINGEMANS: Yes, of course.
19 A. I think there were -- the problems we had fell into
20 three categories. I mean, firstly we had problems about
21 the source. Indeed, as you have heard, the primary
22 source was described as reliable and -- who had reported
23 regularly in the past, I think.
24 Q. So why did you have any concerns?
25 A. Well, our concern was that what we were hearing was
1 second-hand information.
2 Q. Right.
3 A. He was not the originator of the information we heard;
4 and I cannot recall knowing then as much as I know now
5 about that secondary source. I mean, maybe we did.
6 Q. Was Dr Kelly aware of these concerns at the time?
7 A. He was certainly aware at that time or shortly
8 afterwards that there were concerns over the 45 minute
10 Q. Shared by persons such as yourself?
11 A. Yes, I mean -- yes, I think from contact with myself and
12 people in my branch. I do not think that at that stage
13 he would have seen the original reporting.
14 Q. Right.
15 A. My recollection is that it was something that we could
16 not automatically show to him; and I cannot recall that
17 permission was asked for that material to be shown to
18 him. So he did not -- he was not aware, I think, from
19 reading the material. But he would have been aware
20 of -- at some stage, whether before or after the
21 dossier, that there was a problem with the sourcing,
22 I think, just from chatting to us.
23 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Dr Jones, the Inquiry has been shown
24 this intelligence report that a person in Iraq had been
25 told by another person in Iraq that these weapons could
1 be deployed within 45 minutes. Had you, at any time
2 prior to 24th September, actually seen that report, seen
3 its wording or seen a summary of it?
4 A. Yes, I had seen that report.
5 LORD HUTTON: You had seen that report. And also presumably
6 other members of your staff had seen that report?
7 A. Yes. In fact they drew it to my attention on my return,
8 as part of their briefing me on the problems they were
9 having with the dossier, with the drafts of the dossier.
10 I think it had actually arrived whilst I was on leave,
11 you know.
12 LORD HUTTON: I think we were told it is about 30th August,
13 I think.
14 MR DINGEMANS: You left for holiday on 30th August.
15 A. Yes.
16 LORD HUTTON: Just on that, Dr Jones, you say that you and
17 your staff were concerned by the fact that it was
18 a second-hand source, that it was passed on by someone
19 who had heard it from someone else. You mentioned that
20 as being one of your concerns.
21 A. One of our concerns, yes.
22 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Now, was it the position that -- as
23 I understand it, you and your staff were technical
24 experts, you were concerned with the scientific aspect
25 and the technical aspect of chemical weapons and
1 biological weapons. Could the view be taken that as
2 regards the assessment of the reliability of information
3 from a second-hand source, that that was a matter that
4 fell more within the area of intelligence officers
5 concerned to assess reliability of sources than experts
6 on technical matters?
7 A. (Pause). Yes. I mean, I think primarily one -- I mean,
8 the starting position, then, would be the information
9 provided by the agency that acquired the intelligence.
10 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
11 A. And the guidance that they provided.
12 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
13 A. And, as I recall, there was no mistake in that guidance
14 that it was from a regular and reliable source,
15 reporting information that he had been given --
16 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
17 A. -- by someone who was in a position to know such things.
18 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes. Thank you. That was just one
19 aspect of the problem. I think you were going on to
20 mention other --
21 MR DINGEMANS: You said you had three categories.
22 A. Yes. I mean, I will leave the source now. There is
23 more detail about our reasoning there.
24 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
25 A. But our second concern was then --
1 LORD HUTTON: Do not hesitate. If there are other matters
2 that are relevant, please raise them.
3 A. They go really I think into the detail of why we had
5 MR DINGEMANS: What were those?
6 A. One of them was the way in which the information was
7 reported did not give us any real feel that the --
8 certainly -- and I think there was some acknowledgement
9 of this in the reporting, that the primary source, the
10 source -- the well known source knew very much about the
11 subject he was reporting on and so we were left
12 wondering: well, did the secondary source know these
13 sort of things? That was a little element of doubt in
14 our minds then when we were doing the analysis.
15 Then, of course, you know one has the whole series
16 of questions about motivations and we even wondered, in
17 discussing the issue, whether he might even have been
18 trying to influence rather than inform. I mean, this is
19 something that happens from time to time. And certainly
20 I must say that when the collectors have suspicions
21 about that, they do usually refer to their suspicions
22 and they did not refer to them in this case. But these
23 were all elements of doubt, in our mind.
24 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
25 MR DINGEMANS: The second category.
1 A. The second category was the content of the information.
2 I have already touched on that slightly but maybe I can
3 expand a little. And this was that the information did
4 not differentiate between whether these were chemical
5 weapons or whether they were biological weapons; and
6 that is an important matter.
7 Q. Why is that?
8 A. Really because if one is thinking in terms of biological
9 warfare agents that fall into this category of being
10 reasonably described as weapons of mass destruction,
11 then they would have to be live biological warfare
13 Q. Is it easy to keep biological --
14 A. The important point is that from the time of delivery to
15 the time that they have an effect there is an
16 appreciable delay. So the circumstances in which
17 45 minutes to deliver them would be fairly special
18 circumstances where that 45 minutes mattered. So that
19 was an issue, an issue that concerned us. And there was
20 also -- that sort of pushed us to thinking perhaps we
21 were talking about chemical weapons here. It is easy to
22 put them together in a collective term, chemical and
23 biological weapons is something that rolls off the
24 tongue. But there was an element of doubt coming into
25 our analysis on that.
1 We would have looked, normally, for further
2 definitions to feel really comfortable with a report of
3 this sort as to which particular agents were involved,
4 because as I have said, different agents behave in
5 different ways. And the way in which they behave will
6 relate to whether it is important that you can launch
7 these things within 45 minutes.
8 LORD HUTTON: So is the point there that if you have
9 a biological weapon that may take days or weeks to have
10 an effect on its victims, the fact that it can be fired
11 off within 45 minutes of a decision to do so rather
12 loses its significance? Is that --
13 A. Can I just correct my Lord? It is probably many hours
14 to days rather than many weeks.
15 LORD HUTTON: I see. Many hours. Very well. Yes.
16 A. I think it could matter in circumstances where there was
17 a concern on the part of the user that if he did not get
18 these things off within 45 minutes they might be
19 destroyed. But then we are into bigger areas there.
20 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see.
21 A. But these are things that cast doubt in our mind. That
22 is what I am trying to explain, rather than ...
23 MR DINGEMANS: That was the second category. Was there
24 anything else in relation to the second category of
1 A. Well, there was a lack of detail on whether the agents,
2 the weapons, what scenarios were being discussed. It
3 was a fairly nebulous general statement that concerned
4 us. But I mean at times one has to work with that sort
5 of information in intelligence.
6 Q. And the third area?
7 A. The third area was we felt that we did in fact lack the
8 collateral intelligence that allowed us to add
9 confidence, if you like, to this single source. I mean,
10 that is part of the analysis process. One casts around
11 to see whether information from other sources or of
12 other types actually fits that information; and there
13 were some reports on plans and logistics and you could
14 say that the military experience might be there that
15 matched such capabilities. But the sort of thing we
16 would normally look for is -- I have mentioned before --
17 these things come together. The evidence of agent
18 production and the absence of CW agent production was --
19 evidence of that worried us. We had not seen the
20 weapons being produced. We had no evidence of any
21 recent testing or field trials and things like that. So
22 that all cast some doubts in our mind on that particular
23 piece of intelligence.
24 There is an important point to make, I think --
25 I mean it might be your next question.
1 Q. Well, you tell me.
2 A. The important point is that we at no stage argued that
3 this intelligence should not be included in the dossier.
4 Q. Right.
5 A. We thought it was important intelligence. I personally
6 thought that the word used in the main body of the text,
7 that the intelligence indicated this was a little bit
8 strong but I felt I could live with that, but I thought
9 that the other references to this intelligence in the
10 dossier --
11 Q. Which were?
12 A. They were references, I think, in a conclusion in the
13 executive summary.
14 Q. In the executive summary -- there was no conclusion.
15 There was at one stage, but ...
16 A. And indeed in the foreword. I thought they were too
18 Q. If one looks on the page, there is Saddam and the
19 importance of CBW. Was there anything that you knew of
20 concerning that matter?
21 A. Yes, I think we felt that it was reasonable to say that
22 the intelligence indicated that this was the case; and
23 I think I felt it was a reasonable conclusion to draw;
24 but we did not think -- we did not think the
25 intelligence showed it absolutely beyond any shadow of
2 Q. And there is a difference, I take it, from your answer
3 between "indicates" and "shows"?
4 A. Yes.
5 LORD HUTTON: This might be a convenient time to rise.
6 MR DINGEMANS: In fact Dr Jones will not be the next witness
7 at 2 o'clock because we have the video link. I am
8 sorry, you will have to wait to finish off your evidence
9 after lunch.
10 (1.05 pm)
11 (The short adjournment)