1 Wednesday, 13th August 2003
2 (10.30 am)
3 LORD HUTTON: Good morning, Mr Dingemans. You are going to
4 continue with Ms Watts.
5 MS SUSAN JANET WATTS (continued)
6 Examined by MR DINGEMANS (continued)
7 MR DINGEMANS: Ms Watts, we had been speaking, yesterday,
8 about your dealings with Dr Kelly; and we had spoken
9 about your interview with him or discussions with him on
10 7th May.
11 A. Hmm, hmm.
12 Q. Can I take you to SJW/1/27? Perhaps you can tell us
13 what this document is. (Pause). Are these notes that
14 you made on 7th May?
15 A. Yes. Notebook 45, yes, that is right.
16 Q. I think you have transcribed them at SJW/5/18. I cannot
17 read shorthand.
18 A. No. Yes, they are transcribed, that is right.
19 Q. At the top of the page you tell us this:
20 "Shorthand notes transcribed exactly, that is not
21 for sense, by symbol by symbol. For sense please see my
22 witness statement."
23 We are not having witness statements, you are
24 telling us what your evidence is.
25 A. Hmm, hmm.
1 Q. So what do you mean by "for sense please see witness
2 statement"? That is just to describe the nature of the
3 conversation, what we were talking about at the time.
4 These were my notes to myself, an aide memoire, if you
5 like, of the key points. It was my common practice in
6 conversations with Dr Kelly, as I have said that these
7 were for background. If there were points of interest
8 that I felt to be newsworthy, I would return to those
9 points with him and discuss those in more detail.
10 Q. Is there anything else in relation to your discussion on
11 7th May that you wanted to say that arises from these
13 A. Yes. Well, yesterday I did feel I was racing ahead
14 rather; and I just wanted to say several things that
15 I thought may have been lost yesterday in the brief half
16 an hour we had towards the end of the day.
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. Just to summarise, then, over the course of the two
19 years up to this conversation I had built -- I was
20 covering WMD issues, building on a number of research
21 materials, beyond conversations with Dr Kelly, of
22 course, so drawing on various publications, Government
23 documents, UNSCOM documents, scientific papers,
24 discussions with other former inspectors,
25 nonproliferation experts and scientists. During that
1 two years my relationship with Dr Kelly also changed.
2 So we moved from fairly technical conversations to,
3 as I think I again mentioned yesterday, some more
4 gossipy content in those conversations. By that time
5 I was very, very much able to discern the difference
6 between what I would characterise as his gossipy remarks
7 and his remarks that were based on his expert opinion or
8 his considered opinion.
9 For example, in that 7th May conversation we were
10 talking about speculation in the American papers about
11 Judith Miller, who is a New York Times journalist, and
12 her unusual access to the American teams that were
13 searching for WMD. And he said, Dr Kelly said: Miller
14 has Chalabi link. There he is referring to --
15 Q. I will just pull that up. SJW/5/19. This is the second
16 page of your transcribed notes, is it?
17 A. Yes, that is right.
18 Q. If we look three lines up from the bottom -- sorry
19 I interrupted you.
20 A. Yes:
21 "Miller has Chalabi link."
22 He is referring there to Chalabi, the leader of the
23 Iraqi national congress, which I would characterise as a
24 very gossipy remark and I would certainly not rush to
25 air with that. Certainly not without considerable
1 further research.
2 Q. At the top of that page, how would you have
3 characterised the top lines?
4 A. In the same way, gossipy, off the cuff, almost
5 gratuitous remark.
6 Q. Right.
7 A. Which is my point --
8 Q. Sorry, and the second line?
9 LORD HUTTON: So you were just referring to the line:
10 "... mistake to put in ... A Campbell seeing
11 something in there ..."
12 A. Exactly. The second line, which you draw attention to,
13 I have actually noted to myself as being of interest and
14 exactly the type of point I would go back to him and
15 check in more detail if I were ever to use that in a
16 report on Newsnight. As I think I alluded to yesterday
17 but probably did not talk about in detail, was that this
18 was a very busy news day, a fast-moving news day on
19 which the Pentagon confirmed for the first time
20 speculation, again in the New York Times, that the
21 so-called mobile laboratories for biological weapons
22 production had been found, and gave lots of details of
23 those. They only did that at 7 o'clock in the evening
24 time, UK time, so we were rushing to get things on air.
25 It was also the day of the Robin Cook interview. It was
1 important to bundle that all together and I noted to
2 come back to that point.
3 Can I also say that conversation on 7th May should
4 not be seen in isolation. It is very important it is
5 seen in the context of the two further conversations on
6 12th and 30th May, which I know we will come to.
7 Q. Can I take you to 12th May?
8 A. I have a few more things I would like to say on the 7th.
9 Q. Well, you tell us.
10 A. I just want to say also it was not clear at that time
11 whether he was talking -- whether his view, that
12 gratuitous remark on the 45 minute claim, was his view
13 at that time on the 7th or his view at the time of
14 publication in September.
15 Q. Right.
16 A. It had no timeframe for me.
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. And, as I would say, an off the cuff remark, whereas the
19 single source allegation was very much worth following
21 I would also like to say I have made a point of not
22 familiarising myself with what Andrew Gilligan has given
23 in his evidence so that I can remain independent in
24 mind, but I am of course familiar with his broad
25 reporting both on the Today Programme and in The Mail on
1 Sunday and the remarks he made in those reports.
2 I wanted to say, contrary to some of the
3 interpretations that were put on my evidence of
4 yesterday in today's newspapers, I feel that there were
5 significant differences between what Dr Kelly said to me
6 and what Andrew Gilligan has reported that Dr Kelly said
7 to him.
8 Q. What were those differences?
9 A. Well, he did not say to me that the dossier was
10 transformed in the last week. He certainly did not say
11 the 45 minutes claim was inserted either by
12 Alastair Campbell or by anyone else in Government. In
13 fact, he denied that specifically that Alastair Campbell
14 was involved, in the conversation on 30th May, which we
15 will come to, which will become clearer. He was very
16 clear to me that the claim was in the original
17 intelligence material.
18 Q. That was your understanding?
19 A. Seized upon --
20 Q. That was your understanding when you spoke to him?
21 A. Absolutely.
22 Q. Can I turn now to 12th May?
23 A. Yes. Only one more sentence, which was that those
24 conversations meant that the reports themselves were
25 very different in significant ways. And just to be
1 clear on this, in my reports I did not mention
2 Alastair Campbell, for reasons which I think will become
3 clear. I did not say that he or any member of the
4 Government had inserted the claim and I did not say that
5 my source was a member of the Intelligence Services.
6 Q. Those were your reports on Newsnight?
7 A. Absolutely.
8 Q. We will come to those in sequence.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. 12th May you have another conversation with Dr Kelly.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Who initiates this conversation?
13 A. I did.
14 Q. You telephoned him. Where were you at the time?
15 A. Can I just find this? (Pause). Now, I think I was at
16 work on this occasion.
17 Q. Right. And do you know where he was? Do you remember
18 where he was? It does not matter if you cannot.
19 A. No. No.
20 Q. Can I take you to SJW/1/32; and is this an extract from
21 your --
22 A. It is.
23 Q. -- notebook?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Happily these have been transcribed by you. That is at
1 SJW/1/520. Is that the transcribed note --
2 A. It is.
3 Q. -- for 12th May?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And what was the gist of your discussion on that day?
6 A. So, on that day we were talking again about the mobile
7 laboratories and we started by talking about his
8 confidence that they were as the Americans had described
9 them; they were weapons production facilities or not.
10 He said, I thought very interestingly, that on the day
11 the Pentagon had made their announcement, 7th May, he
12 was 90 per cent confident that they were as the
13 Americans were describing them, but by the 12th his
14 confidence level had fallen to around 40 to 50 per cent.
15 We discussed why that was and he also made clear he did
16 not have the full set of information he would need, the
17 full process diagrams, how they fitted together.
18 I noted that as again something I would return to in
19 more detail if I were to use it on Newsnight.
20 We also talked about how in his experience in Iraq
21 previously he had come across some of the pesticide
22 manufacturing which the Iraqis were alluding to as
23 a possible explanation for these mobile laboratories.
24 He suggested the Americans might be confusing that
25 pesticide manufacture with biological weapons
1 production. Again, that he needed more information to
2 be certain.
3 He talked about his understanding and continued
4 understanding that Iraq's policy was fill to use, i.e.
5 you would not necessarily find weapons with filled
6 warheads, that they would be filled when they were
8 And he also for the first time talked about straight
9 on to some more political matters and talked, for
10 example -- I quote him in my notes saying:
11 "Did not think the British had a definitive position
12 on Iraq's exact capabilities and when Bush/Straw said
13 they had such and such, that was spin."
14 He was talking about the -- and he went on to say
15 the reality was that they had programmes, not a view
16 that wanted to be heard.
17 Here he was talking about -- there had been a lot of
18 comment about whether the correct use of language in
19 regard to the unaccounted for quantities of VX and other
20 materials, anthrax, and whether that could correctly be
21 interpreted as missing or rather an unaccounted for.
22 Q. He drew a distinction between the two?
23 A. Yes. I mean, he thought that the fact that they were
24 unaccounted for or missing did not necessarily mean that
25 they existed.
1 Q. Was there anything else from that conversation that you
2 wanted to highlight?
3 A. (Pause). Well, again, I feel he was more relaxed, more
4 gossipy, more chatty, talking again for example about
5 the anthrax, a person of interest. They had found
6 a plastic glove box in a lake outside Washington. There
7 had been speculation this was used to fill the
8 envelopes. We were chatting generally about that.
9 Q. On that day you had e-mail communications with him. Can
10 we look at SJW/5/5? Was this before or after your
11 telephone conversation? This is an e-mail from
12 David Kelly to Susan Watts dated 12th May 2003. Perhaps
13 you can just read out what he says.
14 A. Yes. We are talking about -- we had had previous
15 conversations about Dr Germ; she was one of the key and
16 most well-known figures that people were anticipating
17 being captured or coming forward. We talked about what
18 she might reveal. On that day she had -- either on that
19 day or the previous day she had given herself up. He is
20 e-mailing me here a wire copy, AP copy on her capture.
21 I think I had e-mailed him before this to say: did you
22 see she had been captured? What do you make of it? He
23 replied saying:
24 "Susan, interesting - I wonder what she will reveal.
25 I suspect not a lot since she fronted the deception and
1 was probably not involved after 1991.
2 "Best wishes, David."
3 Q. Right, and you cannot recall whether that preceded or
4 succeeded your telephone conversation?
5 A. Well, it is timed quarter to 8 in the evening. I had
6 a number of e-mail exchanges with him. Generally those
7 would be in the evening, after he had returned from
8 work. He would pick up my message at whatever time it
9 was sent in the day and then reply to that in the
10 evening, I assume from home.
11 Q. Did you then have any further dealings with Dr Kelly
12 before the broadcast made by Andrew Gilligan on
13 29th May?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Did you hear the Today Programme broadcast on Radio 4 on
16 29th May?
17 A. I had the radio on, as I do, that morning but I was
18 actually at home in a very -- I have three young
19 children and it was on, I was aware of it and I picked
20 up the gist, but I cannot say I heard every word.
21 Q. Did that prompt you to do anything?
22 A. I heard it and I recognised some of the content, that is
23 I recognised the general gist of it, that there was
24 unease with use of some of the intelligence. I was --
25 my ears pricked up. I did not recognise any imputation
1 that any -- of the idea of sexing up, that there had
2 been any pressure on the Intelligence Services to that
3 regard either.
4 Q. Right. What did you do as a result of that pricking up
5 of your ears?
6 A. So that was the Thursday. On the Friday -- the Thursday
7 I was actually off, taking time off because I had just
8 produced a lengthy film on GM crops. Thursday I was not
9 working. Friday I was working at home. I emailed
10 Dr Kelly to ask if we could talk about the issues
12 Q. Can I take you to that e-mail? SJW/1/36. Can you tell
13 us all what this is? Who is this e-mail from and to?
14 A. This is an e-mail from me to Dr Kelly. Here I am asking
15 him if we could have a chat about these stories. The
16 Today Programme report had prompted me to remember the
17 7th May conversation.
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. I did not actually look back at my notes then because
20 I think that notebook was at work, but I thought: hang
21 on, I recognise some of this, could this be the same --
22 along the same lines, what exactly -- I better go back
23 and check exactly what was said because it is not my
24 specific memory that these specific allegations made in
25 that report best reflected my conversation with him on
1 7th May. Here I am saying:
2 "... wondered if we could have a chat about the
3 stories [that are] WMD-wise around yesterday and today.
4 Did I miss a trick?
6 Q. Did you in fact make contact with Dr Kelly after that?
7 A. Yes, I rang him on his home number; and I think I got
8 his answer machine. But he then rang me back on my
9 mobile at home and I went up to my study -- I have all
10 the facilities to work at home which I have at work --
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. -- and rang him back, and then we had our long
13 conversation of the 30th.
14 Q. Did you make notes of that conversation on the
15 30th of May?
16 A. I started to make notes in the same way as I usually
17 would i.e. the shorthand aide memoire which I would note
18 to myself the key parts and come back if I felt I wanted
19 to. Because I was taping that conversation, I stopped
20 after a few moments because I felt I could rely on the
22 Q. With what type of machine were you taping the
24 A. This was a hand-held dictaphone, quite an old hand-held
1 Q. Were you holding it to the receiver or did you have him
2 on speakerphone?
3 A. No, I had, again, quite an antiquated set-up, I suppose.
4 It was one of these stick on microphones attached to
5 the receiver. Again, it was as an aide memoire to
6 a private conversation for me to -- an equivalent of
7 notes, I suppose.
8 Q. And did you tell Dr Kelly that you were taping the
10 A. No, I did not tell him.
11 Q. Can I take you to SJW/2/3? This is a letter from you to
12 Mr Lawrence of the BBC litigation department when you
13 send a copy of your tape to the BBC. We will come to
14 the circumstances in which you sent the tape later on,
15 if I may.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. You make a number of points about the tape.
18 A. Hmm.
19 Q. You produced one tape from the machine?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. That is right, and you sent it into the BBC?
22 A. Eventually, yes, a long time later.
23 Q. We will come to the circumstances in which there was
24 a delay later.
25 A. Hmm, hmm.
1 Q. That was then sent on to Lord Hutton's Inquiry?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Now, you produced your own note of that tape recording.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And I think you tell us you produced that note on about
6 14th July, your first note.
7 A. The very first note was on the morning of the first
8 broadcast on Newsnight, 2nd June. That was me sitting
9 at my desk at work at Newsnight listening to it and
10 transcribing. As coincidental with the editorial
11 process of deciding what I should do on that night's
12 programme with regard to these WMD issues. That is the
13 very first manifestation and there are a number after
15 Q. Then you produced a better version?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. You know that the Inquiry have been able to enhance the
18 tape so that it can be played; and --
19 A. Well, on this Friday that has just passed I had a letter
20 from the Inquiry indicating that a so-called enhanced
21 version had been produced and I was provided with
22 a transcript of that enhanced version. But I have some
23 serious concerns about that because there are key words
24 and key sentences and indeed whole chunks, two of which
25 are very significant, not used in my broadcast but which
1 are now important in my evidence, which whoever was
2 doing the transcribing did not seem to be able to hear.
3 I do not know whether -- this tape, remember, it was
4 in a fragile -- it was an old tape to begin with,
5 recorded on a fragile machine. I played it back on that
6 first day over and over and over again to get the right
7 words, you know, to actually -- I know the tone of the
8 conversation, I have known the person for two years,
9 I know the subject matter, so I feel best placed to get
10 the full version of that.
11 LORD HUTTON: You think if there is some word that is
12 indistinct that someone who obviously did not take part
13 in the conversation could not quite make out, you,
14 because you took part in a conversation, feel able to
15 say what the word was?
16 A. I feel, absolutely, that I am best placed to judge.
17 Much of the subject matter of the tape, for example,
18 reference to UNSCOM documents and VX material, may not
19 be familiar to the transcriber but I have also to say
20 that the tape went to the BBC. I do not know whether
21 they played it many times also. I have concern that the
22 physical quality of the tape may have deteriorated over
23 time also.
24 MR DINGEMANS: Over the passage of time.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. I am going to ask you about the transcript that
2 the Inquiry has managed to produce from the tape, no
3 matter how deteriorated, in a short while. But we are
4 going to hear, now, just from the person who enhanced
5 the tape, the person who created the transcript from
6 that enhanced tape. Then, if I may, I will ask you
7 further questions about any discrepancies that you have
8 been able to identify with your original tape.
9 So, Ms Watts, if it is all right with you what
10 I propose to do is just call two short witnesses to deal
11 with the process of transcribing and enhancing the tape.
12 Then we will hear the tape. Then, if it is all right,
13 I will ask you some further questions later.
14 A. I should also say that I have a copy of that tape which
15 has not been through the process of being listened to
16 lots of time either by myself or the BBC, and I have
17 checked and the words and phrases which are inaudible to
18 the transcriber are audible to me on that.
19 MR DINGEMANS: You will be able to tell me all those things
20 in a short while. Thank you very much.
21 My Lord, may we have Chris Mills?
22 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
23 MR CHRISTOPHER MILLS (called)
24 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
25 Q. Can you tell his Lordship your full name?
1 A. Christopher Martin Mills.
2 Q. What is your occupation?
3 A. I am the director and senior audio consultant of the
4 forensic science division of the control risk group in
6 Q. What does that mean you do?
7 A. I specialise in the enhancement, authentication and
8 transcription of audio material.
9 Q. Did you receive a tape from the Inquiry offices through
10 Smith Bernal?
11 A. Yes, I did.
12 Q. Have you been able to produce a version of that that we
13 can now play?
14 A. Yes, I have produced an enhanced version on to compact
15 disk and cassette tape.
16 Q. Did you take any part in the transcription of that?
17 A. No, I did not.
18 Q. That went back to Smith Bernal?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Is there anything further that you can tell us about the
21 enhancement process?
22 A. Only that the micro cassette tape that was produced was
23 fairly poor quality, in terms of its audibility, and we
24 worked quite hard to get that enhancement on to the CD.
25 Q. Right.
1 A. In my view it is quite audible.
2 Q. As good as we are going to get to play in a courtroom?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you very much.
5 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Mr Mills.
6 MR DINGEMANS: Ms Reema Corney.
7 LORD HUTTON: Just sit down please.
8 MS REEMA CORNEY (called)
9 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
10 Q. Can you give the court your full name?
11 A. Reema Corney.
12 Q. And what is your occupation?
13 A. Business development manager at Smith Bernal Wordwave.
14 Q. And what does Smith Bernal do?
15 A. We provide court reporting services, transcription
17 Q. Did you receive the tape that we have heard mention of
18 this morning from the Hutton Inquiry?
19 A. Yes, on Tuesday 5th.
20 Q. What did you do with that?
21 A. We assessed the quality of the audio first, deemed it of
22 such a poor quality that we could not actually start
23 transcription and contacted Network Forensics.
24 Q. That was how Mr Mills was brought in. After he had
25 enhanced it, what happened to the enhanced tape?
1 A. We then gave it to the in-house transcriber to
2 transcribe for us.
3 Q. Then you produced a transcription?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Is there anything else you can assist with in relation
6 to receipt of the tape?
7 A. No.
8 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed.
9 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, now may be a convenient moment to
10 play the tape.
11 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
12 (Tape played)
13 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord --
14 LORD HUTTON: The intention was to give that typed
15 transcript prepared by Smith Bernal to the press; it
16 would be available for them now.
17 MR DINGEMANS: Two transcripts, my Lord, both the Smith
18 Bernal one. We have all been able to hear the quality,
19 even enhanced, of the tape and the earlier transcript
20 produced by Ms Watts at a time when it seems the quality
21 of the tape may have been better. Both of those will be
22 distributed to members of the press to ensure so far as
23 possible accurate reporting. I will then be going
24 through, with Ms Watts, the differences between the
25 transcript after they have been distributed. My Lord,
1 to enable the distribution to take place and indeed to
2 give a short break to the stenographers --
3 LORD HUTTON: I think that is a good idea.
4 (11.15 am)
5 (Short Break)
6 (11.20 am)
7 MS SUSAN WATTS (continued)
8 Examined by MR DINGEMANS (continued)
9 MR DINGEMANS: Ms Watts, what I propose to do now is compare
10 your original transcript which was made at a time, when
11 obviously the quality of the tape was better, with the
12 enhanced version of the deteriorated quality and try to
13 identify any differences and have what you think is the
14 right answer on transcription, if that is all right.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Can I have two documents on the screen, which is SJW/3/1
17 and SJW/1/38. 3/1 is the Smith Bernal transcript and
18 1/38 is your original transcript. I understand that is
19 as good as it is going to get on the screen.
20 LORD HUTTON: Ms Watts do you have the two copies?
21 A. I have, yes.
22 MR DINGEMANS: If we are going to go through, as it were,
23 the two transcripts, the introduction, there may be
24 minor differences but there is nothing really relevant
25 to his Lordship's Inquiry until we get to about halfway
1 down page 38, when you say:
2 "OK, um, while I'm sure since you've been in New
3 York I don't know whether you've been following the kind
4 of the rumpus that's erupted over here ..."
5 Have you found that passage halfway down page 38 on
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Because the transcripts do not follow exactly on the
9 same pages, it is on SJW/3/2 to compare with SJW/1/38.
10 There does not seem to be much of a difference
11 between those two aspects; is that right, Ms Watts?
12 A. No, I mean odd words like "happening with Bates" is
13 "happening in the States" and very minor things, yes.
14 Q. Nothing that is likely to impact on his Lordship's
15 evaluation at the end of it?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Then continuing with yours, he said:
18 "I guessed something was up -- I read The Times this
19 am and I could see there was something there and I think
20 this follows on from what was happening in the States
21 with Rumsfeld's comments."
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You answer:
24 "Yes ..."
25 And go back to him:
1 "But what intrigued me and which made, prompted me
2 to ring you, (huh) was the quotes yesterday on the Today
3 programme about the 45 minutes part of the dossier."
4 That was something that is on your transcript but
5 not on the Smith Bernal; is that right?
6 A. Well, it is on there, but it is slightly different. It
8 "What intrigued me, and which -- "
9 Mine is fuller:
10 "-- prompted me to ring you, was the quotes
11 yesterday on the Today Programme about the 45 minutes
12 minutes ... part of the dossier."
13 No, I mean that is largely faithful.
14 Q. Then Dr Kelly says this:
15 "We spoke about this before ..."
16 You say:
17 "We have."
18 He says this:
19 "I think you know my views on that."
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. What did you understand that to be a reference to?
22 A. That reference, I understood him -- by that I understood
23 him to mean that he felt there were a variety of
24 interpretations over the 45 minutes claim and what it
25 might mean, and this whole fill to use business which he
1 had referred to in earlier conversations.
2 Q. Can I take you to SJW/5/18, which is your transcribed
3 note of the telephone conversation on 7th May 2003. It
4 is the only reference I have been able to find where he
5 has talked to you about the 45 minutes clearly; and at
6 the bottom of the page we can see "45 minutes". This is
7 obviously your note of the telephone conversation. So
8 you turn to "45 minutes".
9 We then go to SJW/5/19, that short passage which
10 I think you explained to us earlier on this morning, at
11 the top:
12 "... mistake to put in ... A Campbell seeing
13 something in there ...
14 "NB single source ... but not corroborated
15 ...sounded good."
16 I think you said this morning the top bit was
17 gossipy and the bottom bit you highlighted as something
18 to go back to him if you wanted to use it.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Was that your understanding about his reference to his
21 views on the 45 minutes?
22 A. Well, it is rather the following sentence about making
23 it clear he is guessing, but that in 1991 the Iraqis
24 were "playing around with multi-barrelled launchers" and
25 "these take 45 minutes to fill". Attempting to give
1 some explanation as to the meaning of that 45 minute
3 Q. How it might have been 45 minutes to launch?
4 A. Hmm, hmm.
5 LORD HUTTON: Did you understand the reference to the
6 multibarrel launchers to be launchers that could launch
7 WMD or more normal types of shells, munitions.
8 A. I cannot claim to be familiar with the detail of the
9 launches, it is not an area I am particularly expert in.
10 MR DINGEMANS: Going back to SJW/1/38 you say that:
11 "Yes, I've looked back at my notes and you were
12 actually quite specific at that time -- I may have
13 missed a trick on that one ..."
14 Continuing over the page to 39:
15 "You were more specific than the source on the Today
16 Programme -- not that that necessarily means that it's
17 not one and the same person ... but, um in fact you
18 actually referred to Alastair Campbell in that
19 conversation ..."
20 And that is a reference to your note --
21 A. Hmm, hmm.
22 Q. -- compared to the report that Andrew Gilligan had put
24 A. Yes, because this was the 30th. I had not heard the
25 name "Alastair Campbell" on the Today Programme reports.
1 Q. Right. And there is again not much material difference
2 between the two. There are some "ers" and "ums" that
3 are not transcribed, but ...
4 A. Hmm, hmm.
5 Q. Then he goes on to say this -- on your note it says:
6 "I mean I did talk to Gavin Hewitt yesterday -- he
7 phoned me in New York, so he may have picked up on what
8 I said ... because I would have said exactly the same as
9 I said to you ..."
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. If we look at SJW/3 by way of comparison, we have again
12 almost identically the same material parts?
13 A. Yes, like he says he was over in New York. My
14 recollection, and having listened to the tape and the
15 copy, what I hear is he says, "He phoned me in
16 New York"; presumably that could be clarified with
17 Gavin Hewitt.
18 Q. Yes, where Dr Kelly was when he spoke to him.
19 A. Hmm, hmm.
20 Q. And then returning, if we may, to SJW/1/39. I am not
21 going to do the split screen because it is completely
22 invisible, if that is all right.
23 A. Hmm, hmm.
24 Q. You said:
25 "Yes, so he presumably decided not to name
1 Alastair Campbell himself but just to label this as
2 No. 10."
3 What was that a reference to, Gavin Hewitt's report
4 or Mr Gilligan's?
5 A. No, I did not hear Gavin Hewitt's report. So there I am
6 saying to him: if you are telling me that you said the
7 same thing to him as you said to me, then presumably he,
8 like me, took the decision not to name Alastair Campbell
9 himself but that he was referring more generically to
10 the No. 10 press office machine.
11 Q. Or he may have decided, for the reasons you have
12 decided, that it was gossipy or whatever.
13 A. Off the cuff.
14 Q. Then you ask:
15 "Are you getting much flak over that?
16 "Dr Kelly: Not yet anyway; I was in New York.
17 "Ms Watts: That's good timing.
18 "Dr Kelly: Erm, but I mean they wouldn't pick(?) on
19 me, I don't think."
20 A. That is a material difference between what is on the
22 Q. Perhaps you can explain the difference here.
23 A. What I hear him to say, and what I heard him to say and
24 recollect him as having said is:
25 "I mean they wouldn't think it was me, I don't
1 think. Maybe they would, maybe they wouldn't. I don't
3 Q. Indeed, we can see on the Smith Bernal transcript there
4 is a question mark after "pick" which suggests they were
5 not confident on that part of the transcription.
6 A. Hmm, hmm.
7 Q. So he was saying at that stage, "They would not think it
8 was me", he did not think?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And then, continuing on, you ask:
11 "... is that the only item in the report that you
12 had concerns over being single sourced rather than
13 double sourced?"
14 A. Hmm, hmm.
15 Q. And Dr Kelly replied:
16 "You have to remember I'm not part of the
17 intelligence community -- I'm a user of intelligence ...
18 of course I'm very familiar with a lot of it, that's why
19 I'm asked to comment on it ... but I'm not deeply
20 embedded into that ..."
21 If one is looking then at the Smith Bernal
22 transcript, he says:
23 "... I'm a user of intelligence of course; I'm very
24 familiar with a lot of it ..."
25 Then he says:
1 "... can't comment on it. But I'm not particularly
2 buried(?) in (inaudible)."
3 You seem to have lost also a wee bit of the
4 transcript with your triple crosses.
5 A. Yes, I could not hear that.
6 Q. "So some of it I really can't comment on, cos I don't
7 know on whether it's single sourced or not."
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Then you asked him:
10 "But on the 45 minutes.
11 "Mr Kelly: Oh that I knew because I knew the
12 concern about the statement ... it was a statement that
13 was made and it just got out of all proportion ... you
14 know someone ... They were desperate for information ...
15 they were pushing hard for information which could be
16 released ... that was one that popped up and it was
17 seized on ... and it was unfortunate that it was ...
18 which is why there is the argument between the
19 Intelligence Services and Cabinet Office/No. 10, because
20 things were picked up, and once they have picked up on
21 it you can't put it back, that's the problem."
22 If we look at the Smith Bernal transcript there is
23 quite a lot that is said to be inaudible but nothing
24 that is, as it were, inconsistent with your transcript.
25 A. Not inconsistent, no.
1 Q. It is just that yours is fuller.
2 A. Yes, much fuller. If you look at the very first
3 manifestation of my having listened to the tape on
4 2nd June, where I typed only the key chunks I intended
5 to use on that night's broadcast, that is there in its
7 Q. Fantastic. Then you say this:
8 "But it was against your advice that they should
9 publish it."
10 Dr Kelly says this:
11 "I wouldn't go as strongly as to say ... that
12 particular bit, because I was not involved in the
13 assessment of it ... no ... I can't say that it was
14 against MY advice ... I was uneasy with it ... I mean my
15 problem I could give other explanations ... which I've
16 indicated to you ... that it was the time to erect
17 something like a scud missile or it was the time to fill
18 a 40 barrel, multibarrel rocket launcher."
19 Again, there is a much fuller part of the transcript
20 in your document.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And Smith Bernal have many missing words, as it were.
23 A. Hmm, hmm.
24 Q. You think the explanation is the tape has just
25 deteriorated in the interim?
1 A. Yes, I guess so. I mean, I do not know. The gentlemen
2 who gave evidence indicated to me -- in my letter I make
3 clear that the tape played best on the machine on which
4 it was recorded, which is perfectly logical, the heads
5 would line up in the same position. He never received
6 that dictaphone, I do not know why, which was delivered
7 to the BBC. So in order to make his first copy from
8 which he produced an enhanced version it would have been
9 better if he had had the machine on which to play the
10 original tape.
11 Q. Then you say this:
12 "... (Next five words physically removed from tape
13 ... not present on Monday 14/7/03 ... assume due to
14 rubbing as tape constantly rewound."
15 We will come to the Newsnight broadcast where you
16 might be able to fill that in:
17 "... ('All sorts of reasons why')"
18 You put that in brackets. That is from your
19 recollection, was it?
20 A. That is the missing five words. They are on the
21 original transcript, again, made of the chunks on the
23 Q. So your original transcript that you made for the
24 broadcast on 2nd June had "all sorts of reasons why"?
25 A. Hmm, hmm.
1 Q. "45 minutes might well be important and ... I mean I
2 have no idea who debrief this guy, quite often it's
3 someone who has no idea of the topic and the information
4 comes through and then people use it as they see fit..."
5 Then continuing on to page 40:
6 "So it wasn't as if there were lots of people
7 saying, "Do not put it in, do not put it in"; it was
8 just it was in there and was seized upon rather than
9 No. 10 specifically going against.
10 A. Hmm, hmm.
11 Q. And Dr Kelly replies:
12 "... there were lots of people saying that -- I mean
13 it was an interesting week before the dossier was put
14 out because there were so many things in there that
15 people were saying well ... we're not so sure about
16 that, or in fact they were happy with it being in but
17 not expressed the way that it was, because you know the
18 word-smithing is actually quite important and the
19 intelligence community are a pretty cautious lot on the
20 whole but once you get people putting it/presenting it
21 for public consumption then of course they use different
22 words. I don't think they're being wilfully dishonest
23 I think they just think that that's the way the public
24 will appreciate it best. I'm sure you have the same
25 problem as a journalist, don't you, sometimes you've got
1 to put things into words that the public will
3 We can see from the Smith Bernal transcript, which
4 is on page 5 of that, that that is in fact
5 a substantially fuller rendition than you will get out
6 of the tape.
7 A. Hmm, hmm.
8 Q. Then you say "Simple", which Smith Bernal have not been
9 able to transcribe. I am not sure much is going to turn
10 on that. Dr Kelly says this:
11 "In your heart of hearts you must realise sometimes
12 that's not actually the right thing to say ... but it's
13 the only way you can put it over if you've got to get it
14 over in two minutes or three minutes."
15 A. Hmm, hmm.
16 Q. And you would, no doubt, say that that is much better
17 than the Smith Bernal transcription which we can see on
18 page 5?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Which says "over to hundreds of people" but with
21 a question mark, making it plain they are not entirely
22 confident that is accurately transcribed.
23 A. Hmm.
24 Q. Then you ask this:
25 "Did you actually write that section which refers to
1 the 45 minutes or was it somebody else?"
2 And he replied:
3 "I didn't write THAT section, no. I mean I reviewed
4 the whole thing, I was involved with the whole process
5 ... In the end it was just a flurry of activity and it
6 was very difficult to get comments in because people at
7 the top of the ladder didn't want to hear some of the
9 Again, if one looks at the Smith Bernal transcript
10 there is a lot that is said to have been inaudible and
11 with question marks.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. When you produced your transcript you were able to hear
14 his words sufficiently clearly to type them out?
15 A. Absolutely. That is a key section. Because it is that
16 section where he says:
17 "I didn't write THAT section, no. I mean I reviewed
18 the whole thing, I was involved with the whole
20 It was those words which informed my attribution to
21 him of his role in the dossier.
22 Q. Which we will come on to with the 2nd June broadcast.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. "So you expressed your unease about it? Put it that
1 "Dr Kelly: Er, well ... yes yep yes.
2 "Ms Watts: So how do you feel now No.10 is
3 furiously denying it and Alastair Campbell specifically
4 saying it's all nonsense, it was all in the intelligence
6 There is not much material difference.
7 You have recorded Dr Kelly as saying this:
8 "Well, I think it's a matter of perception isn't it.
9 I think people will perceive things and they'll be, how
10 shall I put it, they'll see it from their own standpoint
11 and they may not even appreciate quite what they were
13 And you asked:
14 "Do you think there ought to be a security and
15 intelligence committee inquiry?"
16 Dr Kelly's view:
17 "Yes, but not now."
18 Here there are quite significant bits missing from
19 the Smith Bernal transcript.
20 A. Hmm.
21 Q. Perhaps you can read his answer.
22 A. I can do, although I have to say that this is of
23 interest but I did not -- it is of interest generally
24 but I did not use any of this material in the Newsnight
25 broadcast. I did not consider it -- it was interesting
1 in the general context of the conversation but --
2 Q. And it is not anything that is likely to impact on
3 Lord Hutton's Inquiry?
4 A. Only the very final section.
5 Q. Perhaps you could read us that.
6 A. He is talking about his personal view of the value of
7 the inspection process per se. He talks about his
8 perception that they have weapons but actually not --
9 I could not hear the next bit myself other than to say
10 "at this point in time". He then goes on to elaborate
11 by saying:
12 "The PROBLEM was that one could anticipate that
13 without any form of inspection, and that forms a real
14 deterrence, other than the sanctions side of things,
15 then that that would develop."
16 He is talking there about the weapons programmes
18 "I think that was the real concern that everyone
19 had, it was not so much what they have now but what they
20 would have in the future. But that unfortunately wasn't
21 expressed strongly in the dossier because that takes
22 away the case for... to a certain extent."
23 That very last bit is faithfully transcribed.
24 Q. You can see where that tracks the Smith Bernal
25 transcript. They have you inserting a "yeah"; I do not
1 anyone is going to argue about that.
2 A. Hmm.
3 Q. Then:
4 "Ms Watts: A clear and present, imminent threat?
5 "Dr Kelly: Yes.
6 "Ms Watts: Yes ... so did you pick up anything in
7 New York last week as to whether you'll be going back in
8 or the chances of UNMOVIC going back in?
9 "Dr Kelly: Yes ... remember I don't wear a blue hat
10 any more ... I mean I go out to advise them, but I don't
11 wear a blue hat."
12 You ask him:
13 "You were hoping you might get involved in some of
14 the interviewing process."
15 That is interviewing of detainees, is that right?
16 A. Of the Iraqi scientists who had either come forward or
17 were captured.
18 Q. Who had by then been detained.
19 A. Some of them, yes.
20 Q. "Yes hopeful but it hasn't happened yet ... and the
21 reason for that is of course these guys aren't talking
22 and there's actually not a lot of point in me discussing
23 things if they are actually saying no. Once they start
24 opening up, that's the time."
25 Then you have "to go back" in brackets. Why is
1 that? Is that from recollection rather than from tape
2 or just to explain it?
3 A. I do not recall. I would have to listen to it again.
4 Q. Smith Bernal have that as inaudible on the tape. They
5 managed --
6 A. I think I may have put that in brackets because like
7 them I could not hear it and I was explaining to myself.
8 But I really cannot remember.
9 Q. "What's likely to make them start opening up though --
10 do we need to get to the stage of talking about war
11 trials? Or is that only going to make things worse."
12 Then he talks about a selection of all sorts of
13 tools; and I am not sure that although there are
14 substantial differences between what you have managed to
15 transcribe and Smith Bernal have recorded as inaudible,
16 there is nothing that really impacts on it --
17 A. No.
18 Q. -- until we go back to the 45 minutes. You introduce
19 that by saying:
20 "Okay, just back momentarily on the 45 minute issue
21 ... I'm feeling like I ought to just explore that
22 a little bit more with you ... the um ... er. So would
23 it be accurate then, as you did in that earlier
24 conversation, to say that it was Alastair Campbell
25 himself who ...?"
1 You can see where Smith Bernal have managed to
2 transcribe some of that but with parts recorded as
3 inaudible or question marks. And you are confident
4 about your transcription on that?
5 A. Absolutely.
6 Q. And Dr Kelly says:
7 "No, I can't. All I can say is the No. 10 press
8 office. I've never met Alastair Campbell so I can't."
9 You interrupt:
10 "They seized on that?"
11 And who were you referring to when you said "They
12 seized on that"?
13 A. The No. 10 press office.
14 Q. And he replied:
15 "But I think Alastair Campbell is synonymous with
16 that press office because he's responsible for it."
17 A. Hmm, hmm.
18 Q. And how did you assess his answer in that respect, as
19 a reliable answer or a chatty answer?
20 A. Well, I think he was clarifying, as I had hoped he would
21 by going back to him, what he was saying in the earlier
22 conversation on 7th May. He was talking to my mind
23 about the No. 10 press office generically, almost as
24 a tribe, rather than Alastair Campbell himself as an
25 individual. And, in fact, to my mind he specifically
1 denies that Alastair Campbell was involved personally by
2 saying "No, I cannot."
3 LORD HUTTON: But when you asked, "They seized on that", and
4 by "they" you mean the No. 10 press office, what was the
5 implication of that question? What did you mean by
7 A. Because he had talked about seizing on it earlier on.
8 LORD HUTTON: And you say, "They seized on it"?
9 A. They, the No. 10 press office.
10 LORD HUTTON: But what was it they seized on?
11 A. The 45 minute claim.
12 LORD HUTTON: And seized on it in what way?
13 A. Well, saw it, pulled it out, highlighted it.
14 LORD HUTTON: What for? For what purpose?
15 A. Well, it was in the context of his having talked about
16 presenting material in a way that the public would
17 appreciate. You will recall he talked about not
18 believing this was done in any wilfully dishonest way
19 but in a way that the No. 10 press office might feel it
20 best appreciated by the public.
21 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Very well.
22 MR DINGEMANS: Then if I could skip the bit about the IEA
23 inspectors and pick it up towards the bottom of the
25 "Right, so you don't feel optimistic then?
1 "Dr Kelly: Well, I think that eventually the UN is
2 going to have a role to play in this, but I think the
3 difficulty is how does the UN engage with the coalition
4 forces -- there has to be a process -- they can't both
5 do the same job. I think it's going to be very
6 difficult for them to work in harmony together, because
7 of the animosity between the UN and the US, both as
8 institutions, and between people who are involved.
9 There's tremendous ... UNSCOM possibly UNMOVIC --
10 there's tremendous anti-US feeling. That they were
11 pulled out and they were doing their job and that if
12 they had continued to do their job they would have
13 solved the problem. That may not be the case but they
14 actually think that. And so they are very resentful of
15 the US ..."
16 Then there is a bit that you did not manage to pick
18 "... I think you know."
19 Over the page at 42, page 5 of your transcript:
20 "We've seen on the mobile labs the POLITICS of that
21 is so STRONG that it deflects all practical
23 Why do "politics" and "strong" go into capital
25 A. That is my emphasis.
1 Q. He emphasised that?
2 A. Yes, he said the politics of that were so strong.
3 Q. We can see there are substantial chunks missing from the
4 Smith Bernal transcript and have been rightly identified
5 as several inaudible words, several inaudible words.
6 A. Hmm, hmm.
7 Q. Then you talk about the laboratories and:
8 "Has your assessment of whether that, of how
9 important that is changed -- I think was 90 and went
10 down to 45 per cent?"
11 Is that right?
12 A. Yes, and I was surprised it was still that low.
13 Q. And you talk in those terms.
14 A. Hmm, hmm.
15 Q. And you also talk in terms continuing through the
16 transcript about why weapons of mass destruction have
17 not been found and talk about Saddam being a fairly
18 strategic thinker, halfway down the page.
19 A. Hmm, hmm.
20 Q. Dr Kelly:
21 "I think a lot is going to come out. It's one thing
22 to be talking about hardware -- which is what people are
23 concerned about. But I think it's actually going to
24 either come out of individuals, if they choose to talk,
25 or it will come out of documentation ... might lead to
1 incriminating evidence -- there will be something
2 somewhere in Saddam's documents that indicate..."
3 You have got "interrupt" there.
4 A. I think that is me interrupting him by doing something.
5 Q. "... destroyed."
6 A. Hmm, hmm.
7 Q. I do not think we get very much more from the Smith
8 Bernal tape on that.
9 A. Hmm.
10 Q. Then you go to his plans, when he is going to return.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And on the final page, page 6 of your transcript of it:
13 "OK, I'll pester you if I need to but I'll avoid
14 doing that if I do not."
15 That is line 3:
16 "Dr Kelly: Call me in the evenings that's no
17 problem ...
18 "Ms Watts: ... ok well many thanks again and I'll
19 talk to you soon."
20 You say this:
21 "Are you doing anything for NN?"
22 A. No, that is Dr Kelly. He says:
23 "Are you doing anything for Newsnight?"
24 Q. So that is just your shorthand for Newsnight?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. You say what you have been concentrating on and:
2 "... Newsnight has been doing pieces that last two
3 or three nights on the Rumsfeld situation and I've been
4 feeding things in or pointing people in ... the CIA
5 report on the mobile labs."
6 And he comments on that, but not in any way that is
7 likely to impact on this Inquiry.
8 A. No.
9 Q. Subject to those improvements to the Smith Bernal tape,
10 you are then happy with your transcript?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. You then prepared your own broadcast for 2nd June 2003,
13 for Newsnight.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And you transcribed sections that you considered to be
16 newsworthy from that tape?
17 A. Hmm, hmm. Yes.
18 Q. So that was the first transcription you had made?
19 A. That is right.
20 Q. Obviously when you prepared your transcript we have just
21 looked at you had the benefit of that earlier
23 A. Hmm, hmm.
24 Q. And you discussed with the editor of Newsnight who your
25 source was, is that right?
1 A. I did, yes.
2 Q. So that he would be happy that you could use him?
3 A. Confident that we should run the piece, yes.
4 Q. And did you, at that time, have any suspicions about
5 whether or not Dr Kelly had been the source for the
6 story on the Today Programme?
7 A. I did suspect that he had been a source for the Today
8 Programme item and I said as much to the editor of
9 Newsnight, George Entwhistle, although I pointed out
10 I did not know of course who Andrew Gilligan's source or
11 sources were, so I could not be certain of that.
12 Q. You made a decision to broadcast, is that right, but
13 making it clear that --
14 A. Well, George and I discussed whether we should make
15 clear my suspicion that this could possibly be the same
16 source or one of the -- there was an overlap with one of
17 the sources and we had -- because there had been some
18 internal debate within the BBC about the use of single
19 sources following the Andrew Gilligan reports, George
20 referred that up to Mark Damazer and the message came
21 back that it would be okay for us to do this report on
22 a single source so long as we were confident in the
23 credibility of that source. We also discussed whether I
24 should make clear in my report my suspicions and we
25 decided there was no need to do that as long as I did
1 not give the impression that we felt there were two
2 separate sources out there.
3 Q. Can I then turn to the Newsnight transcript, SJW/1/50?
4 This was a transcript which I think was made by the BBC;
5 is that right?
6 A. Yes, there are two transcripts here. Well, the --
7 Q. You have your original transcript?
8 A. I have my original. It is my normal practice when I am
9 producing items for Newsnight to be quite meticulous in
10 producing a script for my own records, but not
11 meticulous to the point where every word in the what we
12 call "sync", which is the quotes, that appear on screen
13 from people is necessarily verbatim; but my track and in
14 this instance the quotes from Dr Kelly are word for
16 Q. Right.
17 A. The other transcript which you have here (Indicates) was
18 actually provided to my solicitor by the BBC when we
19 requested a transcript. They are not ordinarily
20 produced by the BBC in my understanding; they were
21 produced for this purpose. And there are a lot of
22 differences between their version and my version but --
23 Q. Are any of the differences material?
24 A. They are not material but they are different, and
25 I think that --
1 Q. You tell me which one you would rather look at and we
2 will go with your choice.
3 A. Let us look at mine.
4 Q. Can we turn to SJW/1/53? Is this the beginning of that?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And this is a summary of what you are going to say to
7 the camera and indeed did say?
8 A. Yes. So, for example, the beginning of the item, you
9 hear Clare Short, a short burst of Clare Short talking
10 and then a short burst of Robin Cook talking.
11 Q. It is really on page 54, if we can go to that, that we
12 get any report of your conversation with Dr Kelly. It
13 is about halfway down. And you introduce your anonymous
14 source, making it clear that you cannot name him. Then
15 you say:
16 "Our source said ..."
17 Perhaps you can read that out?
18 A. Yes. The direct quote from Dr Kelly is:
19 "That was the real concern -- not so much what they
20 had now, but what they would have in the future. But
21 that unfortunately was not expressed strongly in the
22 dossier, because that takes away the case for war -- to
23 a certain extent."
24 Then there is another quote from him:
25 "But in the end it was just a flurry of activity and
1 was very difficult to get comments in because people at
2 the top of the ladder didn't want to hear some of the
4 Q. Then I think at the top of page 55 to Newsnight, on
5 2nd June, other statements were made, reported from
6 that. Can you read those?
7 A. From the same conversation.
8 Q. Can you read those?
9 A. "It was a statement that was made and it just got out of
10 all proportion. They were desperate for information,
11 they were pushing hard for information which could be
12 released. That was one that popped up and it was seized
13 on, and it's unfortunate that it was. That's why there
14 is the argument between the Intelligence Services and
15 Cabinet Office/No. 10 -- because they picked up on it
16 and once they've picked up on it you can't pull it back
17 from them."
18 Q. Any other comments from him?
19 A. "It was an interesting week before the dossier was put
20 out because there were so many people saying, 'Well, I'm
21 not so sure about that', or in fact that they were happy
22 with it being in, but not expressed the way that it
23 was -- because the word-smithing is actually quite
24 important. The intelligence community are a pretty
25 cautious lot on the whole -- but once you get people
1 presenting it for public consumption then of course they
2 use different words."
3 Q. And that was the material that you had obtained from
4 your telephone conversation with Dr Kelly that you used
5 on 2nd June?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. You made a further broadcast on 4th June.
8 A. That is right.
9 Q. We have the BBC transcript and your own notes.
10 I suppose you would rather like me to take you to your
12 A. Yes, please.
13 Q. SJW/1/74. Are these your notes for the 4th June
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And where do we start with Dr Kelly's quotes, is it
17 towards the bottom of the page?
18 A. Towards the bottom of the page where we are talking
19 about -- I introduce him again and talk about the fact
20 that he and others felt considerable discomfort with the
21 45 minute claim, and then I quote him.
22 Q. Right. Perhaps you could just read his quotes.
23 A. So he says:
24 "I was uneasy with it -- my problem was I could give
25 other explanations, which I've indicated to you -- that
1 it was the time to erect something like a scud missile
2 or it's the time to fill a multibarrel rocket launcher
3 ... All sorts of reasons why 45 minutes might well be
5 Q. And then the next one, was that from him?
6 A. No, that is me. Where it says "WT" that is wild track,
7 that is me talking.
8 Q. That is you talking. Then over the page, at 75, is
9 there --
10 A. No, that is a quote of Tony Blair's foreword from the
11 weapons dossier.
12 Q. No other extracts from your source on the 4th?
13 A. No, that is the only one.
14 Q. After you had spoken with Dr Kelly on 30th May and
15 before his death, did you have any other contact with
17 A. Yes. On one occasion.
18 Q. Can I take you to SJW/1/78? What do we have here?
19 A. That is an e-mail from me on the day of 25th June, which
20 is the day that Alastair Campbell gave evidence to the
21 Foreign Affairs Committee.
22 Q. Perhaps you can just read it out.
23 A. "Would it be possible to talk today before 3 pm? If
24 that's not possible, can we speak this evening post the
25 3 pm interview process taking place in the House today?
1 Obviously I and the programme are very keen to hear your
2 reaction to that interviewing process and how the
3 responses tally with your recollection of events
4 surrounding the September 24th publication."
5 Q. Did you in fact make contact with Dr Kelly?
6 A. I did.
7 Q. How did you make that contact?
8 A. So he did not reply to that e-mail, which is written in
9 fairly cryptic language because I was concerned not to
10 identify him to anyone who might be reading his e-mails.
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. I rang Dr Kelly on his mobile because I had been asked
13 by the editor of Newsnight, George Entwhistle, via the
14 editor of that day's programme, if I could make contact
15 with him again and see what his reaction was to
16 Alastair Campbell's evidence. I had been reluctant to
17 contact him again because I felt if I had contacted him
18 and he was being observed in some way by MoD or Foreign
19 Office that might be an uncomfortable situation for him.
20 Q. Right.
21 A. I did not take any notes of this conversation, which was
22 very brief, but I have a very clear memory of it and
23 I --
24 Q. Can you tell us what was said?
25 A. I essentially repeated, but in less cryptic terms, what
1 was in the e-mail. I asked him if he would be watching
2 the interviewing process taking place in the House of
3 Commons. He seemed to be unaware of it. I then said
4 Alastair Campbell was giving evidence. He did not seem
5 to know what I was referring to. He said he was too
6 busy at work. I assumed from this he was probably at
7 work, either not able or disinclined to get to
8 a television. I asked him if I could ask him to watch,
9 explained that Newsnight would be interested in what he
10 would have to say about it. He was non-committal.
11 I said words to the effect "Because of your involvement"
12 or "Would you rather have no further involvement", and
13 he said "I am not involved".
14 Q. He said?
15 A. "I am not involved".
16 Q. What did you understand him to mean by that?
17 A. I was slightly puzzled but I interpreted it to mean that
18 he felt that either colleagues were listening, either
19 directly in the room or by some other means, and he was
20 trying to distance --
21 Q. Do you know where he was when he received the mobile
22 telephone call?
23 A. No, but it was during the day so my guess would be that
24 he would be at work, probably at the MoD, but I do not
1 Q. Right. He just said, "I am not involved." Did you have
2 any further conversation?
3 A. I then continued by saying could I ring him once the
4 evidence was complete. He said, "You can ring me any
5 time, Susan".
6 Q. And that was your last conversation with him?
7 A. Yes. It was the last conversation. I did actually ring
8 him after the evidence was finished. I did not get
9 through to him. I left a message on his answer machine
10 saying to "ring me if you feel able to" and he did not,
11 and I did not pursue it any further.
12 Q. Did you make contact with him after you had seen him
13 give evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee?
14 A. No.
15 Q. That is on 25th June. Did there come a time when anyone
16 wanted to know who the source for your story on
17 Newsnight was?
18 A. Yes, there did.
19 Q. And who was that?
20 A. Well, this was part of a lengthy process which began
21 on -- began in its entirety on the Monday, the
22 30th June.
23 Q. Right.
24 A. Would you like me to talk you through that?
25 Q. Yes, tell us what happened.
1 A. Well, on that day -- I had personally been puzzling over
2 the weekend as to why -- as to the possible explanations
3 as to why Andrew Gilligan's reports had received so much
4 attention from the Government and yet mine had not, and
5 I had a number of theories as to why that might be.
6 Q. What --
7 A. I had resolved to myself to talk to George about it, in
8 the way that one would with the editor of a programme.
9 Q. Were any of your theories based on things that you knew
10 or just speculation?
11 A. Some of them were based on things that I knew, which was
12 that my reports differed significantly in some of the
13 detail, and that might be a reason. But I had other
14 speculative explanations.
15 Q. If it does not embarrass you, could you summarise
16 shortly what those were?
17 A. I mean, for example, I -- so, as I said, I decided that
18 the best possible explanation was that there were
19 significant differences.
20 Q. Right.
21 A. Other explanations, for example, might be that the
22 Government simply had not noticed my reports, which
23 means that fewer people maybe listen to the Newsnight
24 programme. But I decided that was unlikely since
25 directly after the Monday report Baroness Amos had been
1 on the programme to address some of the issues directly.
2 Then on the Wednesday, Ben Bradshaw had been on the
3 programme addressing some of the issues directly, so
4 I discounted that one.
5 I then thought that possibly an explanation was that
6 the Government wanted to maintain, for some reason,
7 Newsnight as a channel for its views and had decided not
8 to enter into a row with Newsnight and to focus its
9 attention on the Today Programme. But I again
10 discounted that because Newsnight has produced a number
11 of items which are uncomfortable for the Government and
12 it did not seem to make a lot of sense unless there was
13 some other background which I did not know. I resolved
14 to myself that I would talk to George about it
15 because --
16 Q. Can I just summarise your three reasons, speculative or
17 not. First of all, the difference in wording that you
18 perceived there to be between your report and
19 Mr Gilligan's. The second is that the Government may
20 have missed your report. And the third is that the
21 Government effectively wanted to keep Newsnight sweet.
22 A. Yes. If I look back -- I made extensive notes during
23 this time and if I look back at those notes there were
24 a couple of others that they had no quibble with my
25 stories, obviously that made sense.
1 Q. Right.
2 A. And also that they were saving me for later.
3 Q. Can we go to 30th June then?
4 A. So I resolved I should talk to George about this issue.
5 Coincidentally, he rang me to let me know that
6 Richard Sambrook wanted to talk to me about Newsnight's
7 two broadcasts.
8 Q. Mr Gilligan I think explained briefly yesterday; who is
9 Mr Sambrook?
10 A. He is deputy news director. No, he is news director.
11 Q. Director of news?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Right. He wanted -- sorry, you were telling us?
14 A. He wanted to talk to me about my two Newsnight
16 Q. Did you talk to him?
17 A. So that was the Monday, I was told by George that
18 Richard wanted to talk to me.
19 Q. George?
20 A. Entwhistle, editor of Newsnight. That was fine. In
21 fact, an appointment was made for us to talk on the
22 Thursday, 3rd July.
23 Q. Yes.
24 A. Where Richard Sambrook did ask me to tell him the name
25 of my source.
1 Q. Did you tell him the name of your source?
2 A. No, I did not.
3 Q. Why was that?
4 A. Because I considered it would not have been the right
5 thing for me to do. This person had spoken to me on the
6 very strict understanding that his identity not be
8 Q. Even internally?
9 A. Well, I had spoken to the editor of Newsnight,
10 George Entwhistle, and detailed to him the reasons why
11 I felt Dr Kelly to be a credible source; for example,
12 I described his five hats, that he was an adviser to the
13 MoD, a key adviser to the Foreign Office, he was
14 a former weapons inspector of some high regard, he was
15 a right-hand man to Britain's commissioner at UNMOVIC
16 and had been a source of material I had used on a number
17 of occasions over the previous two years. I also named
18 him to George, although I believe he did not really take
19 that name in.
20 But I did not feel it would have been appropriate
21 for me to reveal that identity to anybody beyond my
22 editor. The only reason I revealed it to my editor was
23 to give him confidence in running the story. But on the
24 strict understanding that conversation was privileged
25 and confidential and should go no further, any of the
1 content of that conversation should go no further.
2 Q. And was that accepted by --
3 A. By George?
4 Q. By Mr Sambrook?
5 A. Oh, by Richard ... so he asked me if I would reveal the
6 identity and I said no. He asked me then if he were to
7 give me a name would I be prepared to confirm or deny it
8 and I said no, I would not be prepared to do that.
9 Q. And was that the end of the matter?
10 A. Well, he asked me if I would be able to give him any
11 helpful information that I felt I could about my
12 relationship with my source, for example how long I had
13 known him and in what context; and I did give some
14 snippets of information but I was very wary because in
15 fact it had been indicated to me that there might be
16 a process of triangulation.
17 Q. What does that mean to people who have no idea of these
19 A. I think it is an orienteering term but it is attempting
20 to work out by putting together pieces of information
21 whether my source was the same as the source on the
22 Today Programme.
23 Q. You say "indicated to me"; that is a slightly cryptic
24 way of putting it. Who had told you that?
25 A. As I say, there were a number of conversations between
1 myself and various members of the BBC internally; and
2 those conversations were intended to be confidential.
3 As I have also said, I have a very good memory and full
4 notes --
5 Q. Right.
6 A. -- over a two week period of all of those conversations.
7 But I really would like some guidance from the Inquiry
8 as to whether you feel -- I did not feel that detail was
9 relevant at this point.
10 LORD HUTTON: I do not think we need go into those details.
11 MR DINGEMANS: In any event, there came a situation where
12 you decided not to reveal to the BBC management your
13 source beyond that disclosure that you had already made
14 to Mr Entwhistle.
15 A. Yes. I did say I had known him for a couple of years,
16 but I was very careful to avoid either identifying him
17 or giving any information that might facilitate him
18 being identified.
19 Q. There came a time when the BBC paid for you to take
20 independent legal advice through a firm of solicitors;
21 is that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And they wrote a letter to the BBC on your behalf.
24 A. They did.
25 Q. The BBC responded. Can I take you very quickly through
1 those, which is SJW/1/81. This is a letter dated
2 11th July 2003 from Finers Stephens Innocent to the BBC
3 litigation department, effectively saying that you were
4 happy to cooperate but did not want to give details of
5 your source.
6 A. That is right.
7 Q. I hope that is a fair summary, and that continues on to
8 page 82.
9 Then there is correspondence from the BBC to you;
10 and that letter is Mr Sambrook's letter, SJW/1/84,
11 22nd July 2003, which is after Dr Kelly's death.
12 To continue the correspondence chain, there is
13 a letter of 22nd July 2003 from your solicitors back to
14 the BBC legal department, at SJW/1/87, dealing with the
15 circumstances in which you were prepared to cooperate
16 with the BBC and the Inquiry.
17 Is that I hope a fair summary?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Just so that the BBC's response is there,
20 23rd July 2003, the BBC's litigation response, SJW/1/92.
21 There was a bit more correspondence. Is there
22 anything in the further correspondence you want to draw
23 attention to or --
24 A. No, I do not think so.
25 Q. And so when was the first occasion on which you
1 confirmed Dr Kelly's name to the BBC management other
2 than Mr Entwhistle?
3 A. On the Friday 18th July.
4 Q. Right.
5 A. After myself and my solicitor were called into the BBC
6 having heard that Dr Kelly had gone missing and that
7 a body had been found, presumed to be his.
8 Q. And were you party to the circumstances in which the BBC
9 produced the statement that was made on 20th July 2003?
10 A. Well, for the whole of that day, which was the Friday,
11 I was in the news suite where that process was taking
12 place. I sat separately from the other people involved,
13 with my solicitor in a separate room. I made various
14 representations to Mark Damazer, that statement, which
15 had several iterations.
16 Q. Several?
17 A. Iterations of that statement. I have some of those but
18 I think Mark Damazer is probably better able to provide
19 a complete set.
20 Q. With earlier drafts of the statement?
21 A. There were a number of concerns being taken into
22 account, the sensitivities --
23 Q. The draft we have, which I think is the published draft,
24 went through a number of different variations?
25 A. Hmm, hmm.
1 Q. If you were asked by the Inquiry, no doubt you would be
2 able to supply the drafts you have?
3 A. The ones that I have, but I think a fuller set could
4 come from Mark Damazer.
5 Q. No doubt we can ask in relation to that. Could I just
6 ask you this: if one looks at CAB/1/19, here is a piece
7 written by Tom Baldwin in The Times on 5th July 2003.
8 It says:
9 "The source for bitterly contested allegations that
10 Downing Street 'sexed up' its dossier on Saddam
11 Hussein's weapons of mass destruction is a military
12 expert who is now based in Iraq, BBC insiders are
14 Did you or anyone you know have anything to do with
15 the circumstances of this report?
16 A. No.
17 Q. You do not know how that came --
18 A. No. No, this is talking about the source of the claim,
19 45 minute claim.
20 Q. Yes?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And the BBC insiders at the end of line 3, you were not
23 one of those insiders?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Can I take you to a further document, TVP/3/134?
1 This is a document that was recovered by Thames
2 Valley Police. You can see Monday 10th March at
3 1400 hours, you have SW, 1400 hours. Now it is not
4 a date that I think you have given us as a contact that
5 you had with Dr Kelly. Is that a reference to you or
6 are you aware of that reference?
7 A. It does not immediately ring any bells with me but
8 I have, for the purposes of the Inquiry, gone through
9 every single notebook over two years and noted every
10 single mention of his name. So I would be happy to
11 check if there is anything on March 10th. Is that this
12 year? Yes. I would be happy to check that.
13 Q. Is there anything else that you know about the
14 circumstances surrounding the death of Dr Kelly that you
15 can help his Lordship with?
16 A. No. I mean, we have not covered some of the aspects of
17 the pressure that I felt under internally but if --
18 Q. If there is anything you want to say, you say it. You
19 tell us about the circumstances.
20 A. So, we talked about the Monday 30th conversation that
21 I had with George Entwhistle and the Thursday
22 conversation I had with Richard Sambrook. And we have
23 mentioned the involvement of independent legal advice.
24 I should just clarify I think why that happened.
25 Q. Right.
1 A. And it was for two reasons, two important reasons.
2 Firstly, that I felt under some considerable pressure to
3 reveal the identity of my source.
4 Q. Pressure from?
5 A. The BBC.
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. And I also felt that the purpose of that was to help
8 corroborate the Andrew Gilligan allegations and not for
9 any proper news purpose. I continually stressed through
10 all of this that I felt that my two broadcasts on
11 Newsnight stood and spoke for themselves.
12 Q. Did you consider that they corroborated
13 Andrew Gilligan's story?
14 A. No, I did not.
15 Q. Why not?
16 A. Because there were very significant differences between
17 his report and my report, and I have listed those;
18 namely, that I did not include the name of
19 Alastair Campbell. Importantly, I did not state that
20 the 45 claim was inserted --
21 Q. His broadcast on 29th May did not list
22 Alastair Campbell.
23 A. But his reporting in general, including The Mail on
24 Sunday, makes that allegation.
25 Q. That is on 1st June?
1 A. That is right.
2 Q. Sorry, I interrupted.
3 A. And I did not refer to my source as being a member of
4 the Intelligence Services and that the claim was not
5 inserted by either Alastair Campbell himself or any
6 member of the Government. I considered those to be
7 significant differences which I felt the BBC to be at
8 some stages to be ignoring, in that there was an attempt
9 to mould my stories into almost the stage where they
10 were said to be: I am reaching the same conclusions or
11 matching, making the same points. And I was unhappy
12 about that.
13 It was for those two reasons, the pressure to
14 identify my source and what I felt to be a misguided
15 strategy in the use of those Newsnight reports, on which
16 I sought independent legal advice.
17 Q. Right. Well, in fact, the only other aspect of that
18 I ought to ask you to comment on is Andrew Gilligan's
19 original pieces, as we saw and heard yesterday, did not
20 describe Dr Kelly as in senior intelligence service,
21 that was a description that was applied later on and we
22 will deal with that later.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. But that did not affect your view about whether or not
25 your stories supported or corroborated Andrew Gilligan's
2 A. No, I felt -- I am most concerned about the fact that
3 there was an attempt to mould them so that they were
4 corroborative, which I felt was misguided and false.
5 Q. Is there anything else in addition to those comments
6 that you would like to say to his Lordship?
7 A. Only one thing, which is that during the process in the
8 news suite on the Friday we have alluded to and the
9 iterations of various statements, I was very --
10 Q. To put it in context, this is Friday, 18th July?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. The day on which Dr Kelly's body has been found?
13 A. That is right. I do not demur from -- that process
14 I thought was entirely -- I would not complain about
15 that process. Everybody was very upset. There were
16 many different concerns being juggled, sensitivities to
17 the family, the needs of straightforward objective news
18 reporting by the BBC. But I was concerned that it not
19 be apparent that it was Dr Kelly's death that had
20 prompted me to feel able to reveal his identity. It was
21 not his death. For me, and I feel this may be have been
22 different from other parts of the BBC, when he gave
23 evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, I formed
24 a view on listening to that evidence that if I had been
25 called to the Foreign Affairs Committee which was
1 a possibility, I felt, at some point, I would have felt
2 that he had relieved me of my obligation of confidence
3 to him and I would then have felt able to reveal him as
4 the source of my stories. And the reason for that is
5 because under questioning from Mr Ottaway MP he was
6 given some -- loosely quoted the quotes from him in my
7 reports. Although it was hard to discern on first
8 watching, I was viewing a web cast of that evidence, it
9 was hard to discern his response immediately but when
10 I saw the transcript the following day, which is in fact
11 the morning of the 18th, my solicitor showed me that
12 transcript, he appears to deny that those are his
14 I felt that together with his having acknowledged
15 having spoken to me, although I think he was less than
16 frank in describing the full nature of our relationship
17 and conversations, that those factors together relieved
18 me of my obligation to protect his identity as
19 a confidentiality source.
20 I wanted, somehow, to have that expressed in the
21 statement that BBC put out; that I did not want it to
22 appear that it was his death alone which had relieved me
23 of that obligation. But that did not happen, and in the
24 end I did not feel too disgruntled with that.
25 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
1 MR DINGEMANS: Perhaps I ought just to give you the
2 opportunity to comment on his evidence to the Foreign
3 Affairs Committee. This will be very short. The
4 questioning that you would like to refer to is
5 Mr Ottaway's questioning, is it?
6 A. That is right.
7 Q. Can we have FAC/1/86, please.
8 We can see, I hope, at the top of this question 131:
9 "In response to my colleague, David Chidgey, he gave
10 you a quote which appeared on Newsnight in a programme
11 introduced by Susan Watts. You have confirmed that you
12 have spoken to Susan Watts. Can I just take you through
13 the quote again that was read out. You said you did not
14 recognise it. Could you concentrate on it. It is
15 talking about the 45 minute point. It said: 'The
16 45 minute point was a statement made and it got out of
17 all proportion. They were desperate for information.
18 They were pushing hard for information that could be
19 released. That was the one that popped up and it was
20 seized on and it is unfortunate that it was. That is
21 why there is the argument between the intelligence
22 services and Number 10, because they picked up on it and
23 once they had picked up on it you cannot pull back from
24 it, so many people will say 'Well, we are not sure about
25 that' because the word smithing is actually quite
1 important." There are many people who think that you
2 were the source of that quote. What is your reaction to
3 that suggestion?
4 "Dr Kelly: I find it very difficult. It does not
5 sound like my expression of words. It does not sound
6 like a quote from me.
7 "Q132 Richard Ottaway: You deny that those are your
9 "Dr Kelly: Yes."
10 What do you say about Dr Kelly's evidence in that
12 A. I think in his first response he is being careful not to
13 answer the question directly.
14 Q. Right.
15 A. But then when he is pinned down -- I think this is
16 actually a rare example of Dr Kelly being pinned down by
17 the Foreign Affairs Committee questioning process, which
18 I felt to be very inaccurate and imprecise. But on this
19 occasion he is asked:
20 "You deny those are your words?"
21 Although I could not discern it from the web cast,
22 he does appear from the transcript to be saying yes, he
23 is denying those are his words. In that case, I would
24 have felt it my role to say, "No, actually those were
25 his words", if I had been called but I was not.
1 Q. You stand by your transcript of the tape?
2 A. Absolutely, yes.
3 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed.
4 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, Mr Knox is going to deal with
5 Mr Hewitt.
6 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
7 MR GAVIN JAMES HEWITT (called)
8 Examined by MR KNOX
9 MR KNOX: My Lord, the next witness will be Mr Hewitt.
10 LORD HUTTON: Mr Hewitt, yes, thank you very much.
11 MR KNOX: Mr Hewitt, could you tell the Inquiry your full
13 A. It is Gavin James Hewitt.
14 Q. Your occupation?
15 A. I am a special correspondent for the BBC's 10 o'clock
17 Q. How long have you worked for the BBC?
18 A. I have had two phases but in the more recent phase,
19 17 years.
20 Q. Which programme do you work for now?
21 A. For the 10 o'clock News.
22 Q. Before then for which programme did you work?
23 A. Panorama.
24 Q. How long have you worked for the 10 o'clock News?
25 A. For about three and a half years.
1 Q. Before 11th September 2001 had you reported on issues
2 relating to Iraq?
3 A. Yes, I had. I had visited that country and I had
4 reported on it, yes.
5 Q. Did you report on the Gulf War in the early 1990s?
6 A. I do not think I was there -- no, I certainly was not
7 there and I do not think I reported on that, no.
8 Q. And what involvement did you have in reporting on Iraq
9 issues between 11th September 2001 and the start of the
10 recent Iraq war?
11 A. Well, I covered quite a lot of the debates at the
12 United Nations involving Hans Blix, the attempt to get
13 a second resolution. I was also there when George Bush
14 made his pitch in order to get the United Nations to act
15 on Iraq.
16 Q. After that, what involvement did you have in reporting
17 on the war itself in Iraq?
18 A. Well, during the war I was with the American
19 3rd Infantry Division and covered the war as it
20 unfolded, going all the way from Kuwait until the
21 American 3rd Infantry Division got to Baghdad itself.
22 Q. On 29th May this year were you in England?
23 A. Yes, I was.
24 Q. We know on that day there were three broadcasts by
25 Mr Gilligan on the radio, two on the Today Programme and
1 then one on Radio 5 Live in the morning. Did you hear
2 any of those broadcasts as they were being put out?
3 A. I heard one of them on the Today Programme, not the
4 5 Live one. And I did not necessarily hear it all. And
5 I suspect I heard it around 8 o'clock in the morning.
6 Q. So that is probably the second one?
7 A. Probably not the first one, which I think happened prior
8 to 7 o'clock.
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. Okay.
11 Q. We know you yourself did a report on News at 10 that
12 night. How did the idea come about that you yourself
13 should make a report on the issues which Mr Gilligan had
14 touched on that morning?
15 A. During the day there were discussions as to whether we
16 could take the story further forward. I spoke to the
17 editor of the 10 o'clock news, Mark Popescu, and we
18 agreed if we could take it further forward we should.
19 But I had insisted that I would need to have
20 conversations myself, conversations with people who had
21 authority to comment on this. What I did not want to do
22 was just to report what had happened that morning;
23 I felt I needed to take the story further forward.
24 Q. Did you speak to anyone about this apart from
25 Mr Popescu?
1 A. I think I might have had conversations within the
2 10 o'clock News team and whoever was editing that
3 particular day, but essentially these were conversations
4 with Mark Popescu.
5 Q. How was it that you decided eventually to speak to
6 Dr Kelly, as we know you did?
7 A. In fact, initially I was looking more at developing an
8 American angle and I noticed that I was thinking of
9 talking to people like Jim Woolsey, the former head of
10 the CIA, and seeing if I could look at how the Pentagon
11 and their intelligence unit was functioning. I did not
12 make very much progress on that.
13 And then I remembered, both from conversations I had
14 had in the States when I had been covering UNSCOM
15 matters with people like Richard Butler, that there was
16 this person, this British person who was senior,
17 respected, and I then thought actually I should try to
18 talk to Dr Kelly.
19 Q. And so what steps did you take to bring that about?
20 A. Well, I did not have Dr Kelly's number myself and so
21 I phoned a former colleague who I knew from what he had
22 written in the past that he would have the number.
23 Q. And who was that former colleague?
24 A. That was Tom Mangold, who was a former colleague of mine
25 on Panorama.
1 Q. What did you say to him and what did he say to you?
2 A. I said to him did he have Dr Kelly's number. He
3 mentioned that he certainly did. He was close to
4 Dr Kelly. Dr Kelly had been a source for his book on
5 chemical and biological weapons "Plague Wars" and he
6 gave me the number. I think he said, as far as I can
7 recollect, that he regarded Dr Kelly as something of
8 a gold standard of a source.
9 Q. Gold standard of source on what issues?
10 A. On the whole area of Iraq and chemical and biological
12 Q. Can I just check this: did you know Dr Kelly's name
13 before you spoke to Tom Mangold?
14 A. Yes, I did. I was familiar with it.
15 Q. And what was his reputation, as far as you were aware,
16 before you spoke to Mr Mangold?
17 A. That he was one of a number of former UNSCOM officials
18 who I knew. And as far as I can recall, I had never
19 spoken to him myself. I cannot be absolutely certain on
20 that. I had not spoken to him before but there were
21 several UNSCOM officials whom I knew of or I had met.
22 Some I had met directly, some of them I just knew of,
23 and he was in the latter category.
24 Q. At what time of the day did you then contact him?
25 A. I think it was about between 2 and 3 in the afternoon.
1 Q. Where were you and where was he?
2 A. I was in an office or in fact an office off my office at
3 Television Centre. When I got hold of him he was in
4 New York.
5 Q. You got hold of him on his mobile phone?
6 A. I cannot recall which of the numbers I -- I know there
7 were two numbers for him and I am afraid I do not know
8 which one I phoned.
9 Q. When you got through to him, what did you say you were
10 calling him about?
11 A. I said to him I was calling him about the controversy
12 around the September dossier.
13 Q. You presumably introduced yourself by name?
14 A. Yes. I said: I am Gavin Hewitt, I am a correspondent
15 for the 10 o'clock News. He seemed to know either who
16 I was or certainly know what the programme was.
17 Q. Did you explain at the beginning of the conversation the
18 basis on which you were asking him to talk to you?
19 A. Yes, I did. I said it was an off the record
20 conversation; I was going to talk on a confidential
21 basis to him.
22 Q. Can I ask you to clarify what is exactly meant by an
23 "off the record" conversation? What are the practical
24 consequences of that?
25 A. What I meant by that, and he did not question this, was
1 that I would be able to quote what he said but I would
2 not be able to name him, so that his name would not be
3 brought in in any subsequent report I did.
4 Q. And what did Dr Kelly say when you called him? For
5 instance, did he seem surprised to be receiving a call
6 from a BBC correspondent?
7 A. No, not at all. He seemed to be very familiar with the
8 subject and almost immediately went into it. There was
9 no: this is not something I do not particularly want to
10 talk about. It seemed once I established the basis on
11 which we were going to have the conversation, we went
12 into it immediately.
13 Q. Did you have a notebook with you when you picked up the
14 telephone and started talking?
15 A. Yes, I did, yes.
16 Q. Did you take notes of the conversation as it went along?
17 A. Yes, I took notes of that part of the conversation which
18 I felt would be useful for me if I was going to do
19 a report for the 10 o'clock News that night.
20 Q. You have very kindly provided to the Inquiry the
21 handwritten notes that you took at the time; and can
22 I ask you to take a look at or perhaps can I ask for
23 BBC/7/107 to be brought up on the screen? These are
24 your handwritten notes, as I understand it, of the
25 conversation that you had with Dr Kelly.
1 Try 108.
2 Now Mr Hewitt, if you just look behind you, maybe in
3 front of you, you will be able to see a copy of the
5 A. Right. I can see them here as well. (Indicates).
6 Q. These are the notes, as I understand it, that you took?
7 A. That is right.
8 Q. Can I just ask you, first of all, to identify which part
9 of these notes were notes of what Dr Kelly said and
10 which parts were nothing to do with the conversation
11 with Dr Kelly at all? As I understand it, you can see
12 down the right-hand side of the page a marking that
13 looks something like "Unit Pentagon".
14 A. Yes. On this particular page the only part that does
15 not relate to what Dr Kelly told me were the words "Unit
16 at Pentagon". That was a note from something else. And
17 on the bottom left-hand corner there is some reference
18 down here (Indicates) which says something about
19 "station" which I do not think came from my conversation
20 with Dr Kelly. The rest of it did.
21 Q. And then moving on to the next page, at 109.
22 A. Right.
23 Q. Again, which part of the notes relate to your
24 conversation with Dr Kelly and which do not?
25 A. At the top of the page there are two phone numbers which
1 clearly were Dr Kelly's phone number. The phrase here
2 "unease of some substance", that was a direct quote from
3 Dr Kelly.
4 The notes on the right-hand side did not relate in
5 any way to the conversation with Dr Kelly. And the
6 rather poor diagram in the middle was we were trying to
7 work out where we might do a piece to camera. Therefore
8 that did not relate to the conversation with Dr Kelly.
9 Q. Everything else on this page does?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. At the top of this, page 109, there seems to be
12 a rectangle; does that indicate you had blanked out
14 A. Yes, there was a redaction there of a phone number.
15 Q. That has nothing to do with this?
16 A. And has nothing to do with this, no.
17 Q. Can I ask you, first of all, simply to read out the very
18 words themselves which you see on page 108, first of
19 all, ignoring for present purposes those entries which
20 have nothing to do with your conversation with Dr Kelly
21 on that day. Right at the top is "Dossier"; would you
22 like to carry on?
23 A. That is right:
24 "Dossier No. 10 spin came into play."
25 Underneath that is:
1 "Quality of intelligence. Fundamental information
2 reasonable. Very black and white way. Don't constitute
3 major threat. Not massive arsenal. 225 biological
4 weapons. Loaded up system. 122 millimetre rockets.
5 45 minutes. 6 months."
6 This you will not be able to read but I can:
7 "Material that was put in during the final week."
8 And on the top right-hand side:
9 "UK dossier provided by UK sources."
10 Q. Then moving over to the next page, 109.
11 A. Moving across to the next page, apart from the telephone
13 Q. Yes.
14 A. It is the phrase which was the very final phrase used in
15 the conversation with Dr Kelly:
16 "Unease of some substance."
17 Q. The reference on the right-hand of the page to "TM" in
18 brackets, that is presumably a reference to Tom Mangold?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. And the two telephone numbers, one looks like a mobile
21 number, 08702, that is presumably the number you got
22 Kelly on because the other number looks like an Oxford
24 A. That is probably correct because I would have got him on
25 the mobile number.
1 Q. If I could ask you to go back to page 108 --
2 A. Right.
3 Q. -- and, as it were, just elaborate on what these notes
4 actually mean.
5 A. Sure.
6 Q. In other words, try to reconstruct as far as you can
7 what it was Dr Kelly was telling you as reflected by
8 these notes.
9 A. Well, we got straight on to the question of his kind of
10 overall view of the dossier and very early on in the
11 conversation -- and these are his precise words. He
13 "No. 10 spin came into play."
14 I asked him what he meant by this and he elaborated
15 and he said he felt the essential quality of the
16 intelligence provided by the Intelligence Services was
17 fundamentally reasonable. That is the phrase,
18 "fundamental information reasonable"; but -- and this is
19 where his reservation came in -- he felt that the
20 dossier had been presented in a very black and white
21 way. He expressed some caution about that. I think he
22 would have liked more caveats. I think he would have
23 been comfortable, from what he said, that it would have
24 been more measured, in his view.
25 He then went on to give me his views about weapons
1 of mass destruction and he was clear, throughout this
2 fairly brief conversation, he believed that weapons of
3 mass destruction did exist in Iraq, but he did not feel
4 that they constituted a major threat and he felt that
5 even if they were found they would not be found as
6 a massive arsenal.
7 Q. Obviously those latter comments are reflected in your
8 notes. To what extent were you asking him questions as
9 opposed to him just telling you, as it were, what it was
10 he wanted to say?
11 A. I think it was kind of a mixture of both, really. I was
12 out to -- because I was, in a sense, fresh to this story
13 as of that day, I think I was out initially to get
14 a sense from a man who I knew -- and I should point out
15 one thing. Right at the very beginning, before he said
16 "Dossier No. 10 spin came into play", I did of course
17 ask him what his involvement was with the dossier and he
18 said: I was consulted on the dossier and was in
19 a position to know about the process of putting it
20 together. So, prior to these comments, I had
21 established, as far as I was concerned, here was a man
22 who was in a position to know. His whole language was
23 very credible. He did not seem to have an axe to grind
24 and I immediately warmed to him on the phone as a man
25 who looked to me to be a credible source.
1 Q. Did he seem to be quite chatty or gossipy?
2 A. I would not say "gossipy". I found him rather precise,
3 quite exact. I felt during the conversation that I was
4 not going to have too much time with him. I got the
5 sense he was on the move in New York. Whether he was or
6 not, I do not know. It was as if: you ask me the
7 questions and I will give you answers. He did not
8 elaborate too much. So it was, I think, probably best
9 to characterise the conversation like that.
10 Q. To continue dropping down the note on page 108. I think
11 you have got to "Not massive arsenal" and then that is
12 followed by "225", is it, "biological" --
13 A. Biological weapons.
14 Q. Can you remember what he said about that? He then moves
15 on to "loaded up" and so forth.
16 A. We moved on, having established, if you like, his
17 overview about the dossier. When he said it was "not
18 a massive arsenal", he talked about -- I think it was
19 225 biological weapons. At the time I understood that
20 to be his assessment, I think going back to the early
21 1990s, of the amount of biological weapons that the
22 Iraqis had, and he clearly felt that they had
23 significantly less than that now.
24 Then he did talk about the 45 minute claim and he
25 was sceptical about it.
1 Q. If I can just stop you there. You say he was sceptical
2 about it. What did he actually say about it?
3 A. I cannot recall the precise words but he clearly had
4 some doubts about it. Looking back at my notes, when he
5 was talking about the 122-millimetre system and loading
6 it up, it was not done in a definite way like: look,
7 this is completely impossible. It was much more: look,
8 I have my doubts as to whether you really could load
9 this up in time. He did not dismiss it but he clearly
10 had some doubts about it.
11 Q. Pausing there for a moment, are you saying he referred
12 to 45 minutes in the context of "122m system rockets" or
13 rocket system?
14 A. Yes, he did. Yes.
15 Q. Just to clarify, as far as you can recall, what did he
16 say about 45 minutes in relation to those rockets?
17 A. Well, in relation to those rockets -- I mean, rather as
18 I have said, that he -- we got on to the 45 minute
19 question. As I say, he talked about 122-millimetre
20 rockets. He said: for instance, I am doubtful whether
21 we can -- whether they can be loaded up in that time.
22 He did not dismiss it altogether but he clearly had
23 a reservation. And I know what I then went on to ask
24 him -- and perhaps I am jumping ahead of you -- was: do
25 you think that the 45 minute claim was inserted into the
1 dossier against the advice of the Intelligence Services?
2 At that point he said: well, I could not really entirely
3 go along with that or I am not sure I would go that far.
4 It was at that point certainly that I felt we were
5 running out of time with the conversation, but I also
6 felt that I was not going to be able to substantiate
7 that enough in the time that we had for that evening's
8 news. So what I did, at that point, was to go back to
9 the broader question to try and establish whether this
10 man who was in a position to know had some unease, some
11 doubts about the way, or about the language of the
13 Q. That is to say the language generally as opposed to the
14 45-minute point?
15 A. About the language generally, yes.
16 Q. I imagine, if one goes over the page for that --
17 LORD HUTTON: Before you do that may I ask you: do you know
18 what the range of a 122-millimetre rocket would be,
19 approximately speaking? You may not.
20 A. I am afraid I do not.
21 LORD HUTTON: No.
22 A. I have never been very good on weaponry. I know certain
23 things can be loaded onto shells, but I do not know the
24 range of it, no.
25 LORD HUTTON: This discussion was on the basis that these
1 rockets would be loaded with either chemical or
2 biological weapons. That was your understanding of the
4 A. That is right, yes.
5 LORD HUTTON: Thank you.
6 MR KNOX: Did Dr Kelly suggest the 45-minute claim might
7 relate to something other than rockets, or these
9 A. Not that I can recall, no.
10 Q. You did not suggest to him that it might do?
11 A. No. I mean, I do not have any recollection of that, no.
12 I mean, I think this was an example he used but I did
13 not get the impression this was the only piece of
14 weaponry that might be involved. I think he was using
15 that in the sense of: look, for instance, if you were
16 going to load one of these shells which might contain
17 chemical and biological weapons, I have my doubts as to
18 whether that can be done.
19 I do not think for a moment he was suggesting that
20 was the only piece of weaponry that the Iraqis might
22 Q. For the moment, staying on page 108. You will see
23 45 minutes, then six months. Is that a reference to the
24 time the dossier took to compile?
25 A. That is right. He said the dossier had been put
1 together over a six month period. I remembered this
2 very carefully because I used it that evening. He said:
3 in the final week before it was published material was
4 coming in and material was being taken out.
5 Q. Looking at your note at the foot of page 108. I think
6 you have already interpreted, but I wondered whether
7 what you suggested was correct. I think you said what
8 looks like "lot P" in fact is material. Is that right?
9 A. I do not think it is, actually, no. I know the final
10 word is "week".
11 Q. "Last week", possibly?
12 A. It might be "last week". I am afraid I cannot even read
13 my own writing for the bit under "6 months". I know
14 that was a reference to, in the last week material was
15 taken out and material was put in.
16 Q. It has occurred to me, could it be "lot" that you see
17 there before "P"?
18 A. It could be. I would allow for that.
19 Q. The reason I say that is this: we know that according to
20 your notes -- sorry, your report that night, you say: in
21 the final week before publication some material was
22 taken out and some put in. I will come to that moment.
23 Then you wrote an e-mail on 27th June 2003, which
24 I will take you to later. You say in that e-mail:
25 "In the final week it had become frenetic with
1 material being taken out and material being added in."
2 I just wondered whether "lot P" might be "lot
3 pressure last week" or something like? Or "lot put in
4 last week", perhaps?
5 A. It could have been but I cannot be certain of it.
6 Q. Turning over the page, to page 109. There is the
7 reference to "unease of some substance". Would you like
8 to remind the Tribunal exactly how that comment came to
9 be made?
10 A. Well, right before the -- the very closing comments of
11 this conversation with Dr Kelly, I knew that I was not
12 going to be able to make real progress and get to the
13 bottom of this issue as to whether the 45-minute claim
14 had been inserted and to what his precise views were so
15 I broadened it back to the question where I felt I had
16 made progress on and I knew I would be able to report
17 that night. So I actually then said to him: "Look, can
18 I just clarify one thing? When you talk about there are
19 some reservations about the language in this dossier,
20 are you talking about amongst intelligence people? Is
21 it a lot of unease? Is it an average amount of unease?
22 Is it a small amount of unease?" I just wanted to get
23 certainty from him. He came up with the words, "unease
24 of some substance".
25 Q. Did you ask Dr Kelly to comment on any of the specific
1 allegations that had been made that morning by
2 Mr Gilligan in his broadcasts? Can I just put to you
3 the first of the three of them.
4 LORD HUTTON: Mr Knox, it is 1 o'clock. I think this might
5 be a convenient time to rise to have our break.
6 (1.00 pm)
7 (The short adjournment)