1 Monday, 11th August 2003
2 (10.30 am)
3 LORD HUTTON: Morning, ladies and gentlemen. I hope the air
4 conditioning is going to work rather more effectively.
5 If anyone would like to take off a jacket, please feel
6 free to do so.
7 Before we hear the evidence this morning, there are
8 some matters I would like to refer to briefly.
9 First, in my opening statement on 1st August
10 I said that the post-mortem report stated that
11 four electrocardiogram electrode pads were found on
12 Dr Kelly's chest and I proposed to call medical evidence
13 to explain this. However, it appears to be clear from
14 statements which I have read that the pads were placed
15 on Dr Kelly's body by the ambulance team who arrived at
16 the scene and who placed the pads on his chest to see if
17 they could find any heart activity, but there was none.
18 Secondly, my terms of reference required me to
19 conduct the Inquiry urgently and I therefore decided
20 that I should sit to hear evidence during August.
21 I realise, of course, that many people arrange to take
22 their holidays in August and that sitting in August will
23 cause considerable inconvenience for some witnesses and
24 the disruption of their holidays. I much regret this
25 and I greatly appreciate that so many witnesses are
1 making themselves available during this month.
2 Then, to try to convenience witnesses and to avoid
3 them having to wait unnecessarily, Mr Dingemans has
4 prepared a provisional timetable which he has given to
5 counsel and solicitors. But it is always difficult to
6 estimate how long a witness will take to give his or her
7 evidence and therefore, as I am sure you will
8 appreciate, we may not always be able to keep to the
9 timetable precisely; there may be some days when we may
10 overrun and have to bring a witness back or we may rise
11 earlier than 4.15 pm.
12 In the course of the sittings, during each morning
13 and afternoon I intend to adjourn just for a very brief
14 period of 5 minutes to give the stenographers a break,
15 which I am sure they will need in these very warm
17 Finally, it is very apparent from the volume of
18 statements and other documents which I have been
19 receiving that a large number of officials, both in the
20 Government and in the BBC, and also police officers and
21 administrative staff in the Thames Valley Police and
22 also solicitors and counsel, have been working very hard
23 and I am most grateful for all that they have been
25 Mr Dingemans, you propose to call Mr Terence Taylor
1 to give evidence on a video link from Australia.
2 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, yes. Before I do that, may I make
3 it clear that I and my junior Peter Knox intend that the
4 questioning of all the witnesses will be courteous, fair
5 and designed to elicit the truth. My Lord, I hope
6 consistently with your opening statement, it is intended
7 the evidence will be chronological and some witnesses
8 therefore will not be asked about later evidence where
9 documents or other witnesses cover the evidence
11 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
12 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, may we have the video link?
13 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
14 MR TERENCE THOMAS TAYLOR (called)
15 LORD HUTTON: I understand it is evening in Australia so
16 I wish you good evening, Mr Taylor. Can you hear me?
17 A. I can hear you but not distinctly.
18 LORD HUTTON: Very well. We will try to make that clearer
19 for you. Please say if you have any problem at all in
20 hearing, Mr Taylor.
21 Mr Taylor, my name is Brian Hutton. I have been
22 asked by the Secretary of State for Constitutional
23 Affairs to conduct an Inquiry into the circumstances
24 surrounding the sad death of Dr Kelly. I understand you
25 have been good enough to agree to give evidence about
1 your knowledge of his work. So I now ask Mr Dingemans,
2 the Senior Counsel to the Inquiry, to take you through
3 your evidence.
4 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
5 Q. Mr Taylor, could you give the Tribunal your full name
7 A. Mr Terence Thomas Taylor.
8 Q. Thank you. What is your current occupation?
9 A. At present I am the president and executive director for
10 the International Institute of Strategic Studies US,
11 which is based in Washington DC.
12 Q. I understand you wrote an obituary relating to Dr Kelly
13 which was published in The Independent on
14 31st July 2003; is that right?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. How long did you know Dr Kelly?
17 A. I knew Dr Kelly from around 1985, when he first came to
18 work at the chemical and biological defence
19 establishment at Porton Down in Wiltshire.
20 Q. Can you tell us a bit about his background?
21 A. Well, before -- he came to Porton Down or came to the
22 defence field when he was about 40 years old. He is
23 a biologist by training. He has a number of degrees
24 from several universities, including a D Phil from
25 Oxford University. He was a specialist in the field of
1 biology. From his research and so on, a very high
2 quality one. He came to work at Porton Down in order to
3 head microbiology division at Porton Down. I think he
4 assumed that appointment, I think, in 1984.
5 Q. Did he carry out any work involving decontamination
6 while at Porton Down?
7 A. One of the things that his part of Porton Down oversaw
8 was the decontamination of Gruinard Island off Westeroth
9 in Scotland where, during the Second World War, the
10 British Government had carried out trials with anthrax
11 there as a biological warfare agent. Of course the
12 United Kingdom gave up its biological warfare
13 capabilities soon after the Second World war, but the
14 island was contaminated in trials I think conducted in
15 1944. In the 1980s a programme was put in hand to
16 decontaminate the island and Dr Kelly's department
17 played a major role in overseeing that decontamination.
18 Q. Did he carry out any work in the Soviet Union?
19 A. Later in about 1989 a defector came from the then
20 Soviet Union giving information about the biological
21 warfare programme of the Soviet Union. I was then
22 myself working for the Ministry of Defence as a military
23 officer and Dr Kelly and I, by 1991 and 1992, became
24 involved in the analysis of the information and together
25 we went to what by then was Russia to carry out
1 inspections as members of an Anglo American team
2 visiting Russian biotechnology facilities in different
3 parts of Russia, and Dr Kelly played a leading role in
4 that effort.
5 Q. Was his work in the Soviet Union successful?
6 A. His work in Russia was remarkably successful. He was
7 very meticulous in his work. He did an enormous amount
8 of research. He absorbed very large amounts of
9 information, process it and analyse it in a way that was
10 most impressive. I myself was involved in more of the
11 policy side of these issues in relation to the
12 biological and toxin weapons convention and I very much
13 welcomed his scientific and technological expertise, as
14 indeed did others, not just other members of the British
15 component but also he was highly respected by the
16 United States contingent as well.
17 Q. When did he come to work in Iraq?
18 A. Well, he almost concurrently with the work we had to do
19 in Russia of course in 1991 as a result of the ceasefire
20 resolution, the UN Security Council resolution number
21 687, which put in hand the inspection process for the UN
22 Special Commission, and Dr Kelly was, early on, deeply
23 involved in that process from 1991 onwards, which
24 involved him going to Iraq and carrying out inspections
25 as one of the chief inspectors in the field and of
1 course also assisting the British Government in
2 analysing the situation and giving advice on policy and
3 so on. So he became very, very much involved in I think
4 more or less full time.
5 I came to that issue in 1993 as one of the
6 commissioners of the Special Commission and also an
7 inspector in the field myself. So I was able to see
8 Dr Kelly's work first hand. And in effect he became my
9 scientific and technological mentor during that period
10 of time.
11 Q. Was his work in Iraq successful?
12 A. His work in Iraq was remarkably successful. He carried
13 the inspection system through during a very difficult
14 time when the Iraqis denied having a biological warfare
15 programme from 1991 onwards. There were times when
16 colleagues were saying: well, perhaps they do not have
17 a programme, perhaps it is a very small research
18 programme, maybe it is not so important. He was very
19 determined and resolute in carrying through the
20 inspections and supported us all sharing his insights
21 and so forth in a very effective way.
22 This resulted, of course, in 1995 in the UN Special
23 Commission making a breakthrough and forcing the Iraqi
24 side to admit they did indeed have a biological warfare
25 programme, a very extensive one as it turned out.
1 A large amount of this was due to Dr Kelly's superb
2 work. This was recognised by the British Government and
3 in 1996 he was awarded a Cross of St Michael and
4 St George in recognition of his very significant work.
5 Q. I have the citation for his award here and it says this:
6 "... he devised the scientific basis for the
7 enhanced biological warfare defence programme and led
8 strong research groups in many key areas. Following the
9 Gulf War he led the first biological warfare inspection
10 in Iraq and has spent most of his time since either in
11 Iraq or at various sites in the former Soviet Union
12 helping to shed light on past biological warfare related
13 activities and assisting the UK/US RUS trilateral
14 confidence building process. He has pursued this work
15 tirelessly and with good humour despite the significant
16 hardship, hostility and personal risk encountered during
17 extended periods of service in both countries. In 1991
18 he was appointed adviser to the UN Special Commission
19 (UNSCOM). His efforts in his specialist field have had
20 consequences of international significance."
21 Would you agree with that analysis?
22 A. I would agree with that analysis 100 per cent. It is
23 important to also note, I think as was mentioned towards
24 the end of the remarks you read, he was recognised
25 internationally. He had very high standing, not only in
1 the United Kingdom but also in the United States and
2 other countries around the world, and rightly so because
3 his work was really quite remarkable and he was very
4 steadfast in very difficult and very testing conditions
5 in Iraq.
6 Q. Do you know what he did after he returned from Iraq?
7 A. He was involved in Iraq up until 1998. So he was coming
8 and going on many inspections, I think he did more than
9 35 inspections during that period. But of course, in
10 1999 the UN withdrew the inspectors from Iraq as there
11 was no progress being made, through lack of cooperation
12 from the Iraqi side. So the inspection process came to
13 an end. But by then Dr Kelly was the senior adviser in
14 the Ministry of Defence, in what I think was then called
15 the Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, advising
16 on biological warfare defence matters. He continued, of
17 course, to give advice on Iraq issues but also other
18 biological defence issues.
19 I was at more of a distance. By this time I was not
20 with the Government, I was with the International
21 Institute for Strategic Studies, but we kept in very
22 regular touch during all these periods and regularly
23 consulted on issues associated with Iraq and with the
24 former Soviet weapons programme and other weapons
25 programmes around the world. So we were in regular
1 touch in our professional work.
2 Q. Did he help with the new team which went to Iraq
3 in November 2002 in any way?
4 A. He participated in the -- I know from my conversations
5 with him, he participated in the training sessions, so
6 he did give support and advice to the UNMOVIC, as it was
7 called, the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection
8 Commission. He was of course advising the British
9 Government at this stage. But I think the formal
10 details that, I think, probably would be best sought
11 from the officials in the Ministry of Defence.
12 Q. The International Institute of Strategic Studies
13 published its own dossier on Iraqi weapons of mass
14 destruction on 9th September 2002. Were you involved in
15 that publication?
16 A. I was involved as one of the contributors. It was very
17 much a team effort. So I did have a role but I was then
18 in Washington DC at the US office of the Institute. But
19 I was not responsible for the editing, overall editing
20 of it and its eventual distribution and so on. But
21 I was involved with it, yes.
22 Q. Do you know whether Dr Kelly was involved in the writing
23 of the International Institute's dossier?
24 A. The dossier was written by members of the Institute, so
25 whether he was involved or not in the actual -- I am
1 sure his advice was sought, as many people's advice was
2 sought in a number of different countries, not just the
3 United Kingdom and the United States, a number of other
4 countries as well. So the Institute as a team did
5 consult with knowledgeable people and I am sure Dr Kelly
6 was one of them.
7 Q. When was your last dealing with Dr Kelly, your last
8 contact with Dr Kelly?
9 A. My last contact was -- I think it was about four days
10 before his death, and I spoke to him by telephone and
11 from the United States because I was coming to the
12 United Kingdom and I was discussing plans in order to
13 meet him after -- at the weekend, the following weekend,
14 which would have been -- I am searching my memory --
15 would have been the weekend of 20th July. We were
16 planning to meet, as I was passing nearby his house on
17 my way to visit my younger daughter.
18 Q. And did you have any discussions with him about the
19 situation that he was in?
20 A. Not in detail. Most of our conversation was about the
21 Iraq Survey Group, that is the Group that is now in Iraq
22 being run by the coalition forces in Iraq. He was
23 clearly thinking about that, thinking about going to
24 Iraq. We discussed that not in great detail, but in
25 general. He said that he was probably going to be going
1 out maybe in a little more than a week's time, but,
2 nevertheless, we could probably meet, he would not have
3 gone by the time I come to the United Kingdom. So he
4 was clearly thinking, was focused on this, at least he
5 was during this particular conversation. The only
6 previous contact, I actually stayed with him at his
7 house which was about three to four weeks before this
8 particular time.
9 Q. When you stayed with him, how was he then?
10 A. He seemed to me to be in what I would describe as
11 a normal state of mind as someone I had known for
12 16 years and I did not detect any discernible
13 difference. We spoke about the Iraq issues in very
14 general terms. He was speaking about his daughter's
15 forthcoming wedding in October. I have daughters too,
16 so we exchanged as friends on these kind of issues. He
17 seemed to be in a very normal state of mind, bearing in
18 mind this was about a month before this particular awful
20 Q. As far as you knew, was he looking forward to going back
21 to Iraq or was he not looking forward to that?
22 A. He was looking forward to the challenge of going to
23 Iraq. He -- the only point that I would say where he
24 was -- had expressed some negative thought, if I could
25 put it that way, was that he was worried about --
1 concerned about his colleagues. He knew there had been
2 discussions about their consulting arrangements and so
3 on. Somehow that irritated him a little bit. And he
4 seemed to be concerned about his relationship with them
5 once he got to Iraq. He said -- I think his words were
6 to the effect that: my relationships with them would not
7 be quite the same again as they were in the past. These
8 were colleagues with whom he had done many inspections
9 in Iraq. But at the time that did not seem to me to be
10 particularly remarkable. It was not said in a very
11 strong form, but that was the only point that perhaps
12 was a little negative.
13 Q. Which colleagues were those? Those were the
14 United Nations colleagues or Ministry of Defence
16 A. No, these were members of the coalition -- what is now
17 called the Iraq Survey Group.
18 Q. Did he indicate why his relations might not be the same?
19 A. I think Dr Kelly had a very purposeful sense of mission,
20 very sort of dedicated approach to it. And I think
21 people going as consultants, I think it mildly irritated
22 him is probably the best way I could put it, and so he
23 felt that a difference in terms of dedication to the
24 mission, if I might put it that way. I think I would be
25 speculating if I went further than that.
1 Q. Is there anything else which you knew of the
2 circumstances surrounding the death of Dr Kelly which
3 you can help Lord Hutton with?
4 A. I cannot think of anything else that we covered in the
5 questions, but if I do I will certainly let you know in
7 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord.
8 LORD HUTTON: Mr Taylor, thank you very much indeed for your
9 very fair and helpful evidence. I am most grateful to
10 you for giving it to the Inquiry today. Thank you very
11 much indeed.
12 A. Thank you.
13 LORD HUTTON: Well now, ladies and gentlemen, I am proposing
14 to rise just for a few minutes to enable the video link
15 to be disconnected.
16 (10.52 am)
17 (Short Break)
18 LORD HUTTON: Yes, Mr Dingemans.
19 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Hatfield please.
20 MR RICHARD PAUL HATFIELD (called)
21 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
22 Q. Can you tell Lord Hutton your full name?
23 A. Richard Paul Hatfield.
24 Q. What is your current occupation?
25 A. I am a civil servant in the Ministry of Defence.
1 Q. What is your title at the moment?
2 A. I am the Personnel Director.
3 Q. For the?
4 A. For the Ministry of Defence as a whole.
5 Q. Can you look a document numbered MoD 29, which I hope
6 has just come on to your screen?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. This is a document which I understand it you assisted in
9 preparing; is that right?
10 A. It was prepared under my instructions.
11 Q. In paragraph 1 you identify the beginnings of Dr Kelly's
12 career in the public sector, with the National
13 Environmental Research Establishment; is that right?
14 A. That is what it says, yes.
15 Q. And then he joins the Ministry of Defence in 1984.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. In paragraph 2. And he is promoted under an individual
18 merit promotion to grade 5.
19 A. Yes, although I should explain his career is taking
20 place in what has been in various stages an agency
21 Ministry of Defence and at this stage he is in I think
22 the chemical and biological defence establishment at
23 Porton Down.
24 Q. So that he was not employed by the Ministry of Defence?
25 A. It is an agency of the Ministry of Defence.
1 Q. Then he is, at the end of paragraph 2, awarded promotion
2 in July 1992 and appointed senior adviser in biological
3 defence at Porton Down?
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. From 1992 to 1996, he spent a good deal of time, we have
6 just heard from Mr Taylor about this, working as a
7 United Nations Special Commissioner inspector and he was
8 appointed senior adviser to Unscom, as it is called, in
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. And his home base continued to be Porton Down, is that
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. In April 1995 a new agency was established. What was
15 the name of the new agency?
16 A. Well, Porton Down was absorbed into the Defence
17 Evaluation and Research Agency.
18 Q. Did this include Dr Kelly's work?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Then, from April 1996 he was appointed on secondment to
21 something called PACS. What is PACS?
22 A. PACS was the Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat
23 in the main part of the Ministry of Defence. So he was
24 seconded from his agency to the main head office of the
25 Ministry of Defence.
1 Q. His employer was still the agency or the Ministry of
3 A. Both. His direct employment was through the agency,
4 which was an agency of the Ministry of Defence.
5 Q. And did he continue working with PACS until his death?
6 A. Yes. Although the division was renamed shortly before
7 his death, it is essentially the same job.
8 Q. What was it renamed?
9 A. The Directorate of Counter Proliferation and Arms
11 Q. Department. CPAD, is that right?
12 A. No, the D is at the beginning, Directorate, I believe,
13 but you can ask Dr Brian Wells the exact title.
14 Q. Who was his employer at that time, the Ministry of
16 A. He is still employed by the agency, or rather the
17 Defence Evaluation and Research Agency was split into
18 two in 2001. Part of it was privatised, that is kinetic
19 and part of it, which Dr Kelly worked in, stayed inside
20 the Ministry of Defence as a new agency called the
21 Defence Scientific and Technical Laboratories, usually
22 known as DSTL, but he was directly employed by that
23 agency as seconded to head office of the Ministry of
25 Q. Can we turn to MoD/1/43? If we go down to the second
1 paragraph, this is a later letter; but there is a letter
2 here about his employment status. It was suggested that
3 he was "an FCO official, seconded to the Ministry of
4 Defence's Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat":
5 "In fact, the individual in question is not and
6 never has been an FCO official."
7 Is that right, he was never an FCO official?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. It says there he was an employee of DSTL Porton Down,
10 seconded to the Ministry of Defence, is that right?
11 A. That is roughly right. Porton Down is not actually a
12 separate agency, but he is an employee of DSTL seconded
13 to the Ministry of Defence.
14 Q. So it is right to the extent that he was an employee of
15 DSTL but not right he was DSTL Porton Down?
16 A. We do not make that distinction.
17 Q. Then it says this:
18 "After an arrangement dating back to 1996, the FCO
19 reimburses the Ministry of Defence for his staff cost
21 Why was that?
22 A. The particular post was, I understand, funded as part of
23 the conflict prevention budget which is funded across
24 government, but, again, I think the correct witness to
25 ask about that would be Dr Wells, probably, as his line
2 Q. So you cannot really take us very much further on that?
3 A. Not in detail.
4 Q. Can we look at MoD/3/6? I hope this will give us a bit
5 more about his career. Here you can see from the text
6 that he is listing -- this is for the purposes of an
7 internal staff appraisal -- his achievements
8 from April 1996 to March 2000. He talks about, in
9 paragraph 1, his involvement with Unscom and his leading
10 of inspections in August 1991 and subsequently
11 undertaking 37 inspections. Do you know any of the
12 details in this or --
13 A. No, I do not. As you say, I think it is from a staff
14 report, looking at it. And I would not have seen his
15 staff reports because his personal management was
16 handled by the agency from which he was seconded.
17 Q. Right. Can I ask you to look at the top of page 7,
18 MoD/3/7? And the second paragraph, he says this:
19 "Throughout this period I worked with ..."
20 Then he gives a number of agencies.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Are you able to assist us with what these agencies are?
23 A. I know the first three. I do not know the last two.
24 Q. Right. "DIS" is that defence?
25 A. Defence intelligence staff. Box 850 is a synonym
1 sometimes used for the Secret Intelligence Service. CIA
2 is the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States,
3 I presume.
4 Q. Then AFMIC and ACDA, I cannot find those on any of the
5 documents I have seen.
6 A. I am unaware of what they are either.
7 Q. Then he says he provided advice on BWC protocol
8 biological --
9 A. Weapons convention, I think in shorthand.
10 Q. Russian BW?
11 A. Biological weapons.
12 Q. To NPD?
13 A. I am not sure if that is the current title, but it was
14 the Non Proliferation Department in the Foreign and
15 Commonwealth Office.
16 Q. And Foreign and Commonwealth Office as necessary. Thank
18 It is said, in one document, and that is CAB/1/117,
19 that his expenses were being paid as part of something
20 called "Operation TELEC", you can see that at the top
21 lines: "Authorised and paid for by the FCO", which I
22 have asked you about, but were instead funded as part of
23 Operation TELEC.
24 Can you assist Lord Hutton with what that is?
25 A. I think I can do so, though the particular document is
1 not familiar to me. I imagine what it is saying is that
2 during a particular period, and maybe the document tells
3 you, he was being funded because his activities were in
4 support of the Ministry of Defence operations which
5 ultimately culminated in the invasion of Iraq. Even in
6 the planning and preparation stage, where there was no
7 necessary operation, it was known as Operation TELEC by
8 the British Ministry of Defence.
9 Q. So that related to planning for the subsequent
11 A. I do not know precisely what Dr Kelly was doing in
12 support of Operation TELEC but it was the umbrella name
13 for the entire work that the British Ministry of Defence
14 was doing in support of what ultimately became the
15 invasion of Iraq.
16 Q. If you do not know, would Dr Wells know?
17 A. I would expect so.
18 Q. Right. Did he, at this time, have any United Nations
19 responsibilities as far as the British Government were
21 A. I am unaware of any, but again Dr Wells would be the
22 person to give you chapter and verse on that.
23 Q. His staff appraisals refer to him being the United
24 Kingdom expert on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
25 Perhaps we can look at MoD 3/26. If you look at the
1 first two lines:
2 "David Kelly is the UK expert on all aspects of
3 Middle Eastern CB proliferation."
4 That is one comment. If we look at MoD/3/11:
5 "David Kelly continues to be the expert on Iraqi
7 I imagine WMD is weapons of mass destruction, is
8 that right?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Do you know from your own experience within the Ministry
11 of Defence whether those are accurate appraisals?
12 A. Well, I think the first one is generally assumed to be
13 accurate because it describes his particular area of
14 specialism. This particular one seems to be rather
15 wider, covering all of Iraqi WMD, which I think would
16 not be true because there are aspects of it which are
17 not his specialism. Both those forms, however, are
18 actually -- I have never seen them before. One of them
19 was a DSTL form, and the other is a DERA dorm so they
20 are actually scientific establishment assessments and
21 not --
22 Q. Not the Ministry of Defence?
23 A. Not necessarily the Ministry, depending on who actually
24 wrote the manuscript comments on the screen.
25 Q. I think we had established DERA and DSTL were at least
1 agencies to the Ministry of Defence?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. It is clear he did some work for the Foreign and
4 Commonwealth Office. For example, he is recorded as
5 appearing alongside the Foreign Secretary on
6 25th September 2002. Do you know what work he did do
7 for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office?
8 A. Not in detail, but because I have been in a similar
9 position myself I think probably when he appeared
10 alongside the Foreign Secretary he was appearing because
11 he was providing expert advice on something that the
12 Foreign Secretary is giving evidence. I have certainly
13 been to a Parliamentary Committee where the Foreign
14 Office had been in the lead and I had been a member of
15 the team providing Ministry of Defence support.
16 I imagine that is what he was doing in this particular
18 Q. You have no further details about that particular
20 A. No, I have not.
21 Q. It also appears that the Foreign and Commonwealth
22 Office -- and this is MoD 143 -- asked him to write part
23 of the September dossier. Did you know about his
24 involvement or cross posting for those purposes?
25 A. The only thing I knew about that -- I knew nothing
1 before the events that we are considering today. The
2 first I knew of his involvement of this was from
3 Dr Kelly's own letter to Dr Brian Wells and from my
4 subsequent discussions with Dr Kelly in the Ministry of
5 Defence. But prior to that, I had no knowledge
6 whatsoever of Dr Kelly's involvement or otherwise in
7 the September dossier.
8 Q. Is it quite usual for members of one department like the
9 Ministry of Defence, albeit through an agency, to work
10 and support other departments like the Foreign and
11 Commonwealth Office?
12 A. Yes, although my understanding is the dossier was being
13 drawn up on an inter-cross Government basis, so it was
14 even more usual.
15 Q. His final staff document relating to his posting
16 appeared to be MoD/3/25 which suggested that he was
17 going to remain with PACS until retirement. If you look
18 at "Future career aspirations":
19 "Recently FCO have agreed to continue my secondment
20 to PACS to support UK policy-making with regard to Iraq
21 until my retirement in May 2004, and I am content with
22 this arrangement."
23 Was that your understanding of his status at the
24 time of his death?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. You have referred to some documents. Perhaps we can
2 look at MoD/2/16. I hope what you see here are DSTL
3 procedures for conduct. Can you remind everyone what
4 DSTL stands for?
5 A. Defence Service and Technological Laboratories.
6 Q. Does this document have anything specific to press
8 A. I cannot actually see very much of it on my screen, but
9 having previously looked at it the answer is yes.
10 Q. Right. Can we turn to MoD/2/25? I think to avoid going
11 back perhaps I can read from the bottom of page 24:
12 "Extra curricular activities.
13 "If an employee wishes to carry out any of the
14 following types of activities (or similar activities),
15 he/she must seek prior written consent from his/her line
17 Then at the bottom of 24 there is:
18 "Political activities."
19 Then we can see from the first bullet point there
21 "Business or academic activities."
22 Then thirdly:
23 "Media activities."
24 Is that the part that you are referring to?
25 A. Yes, indeed.
1 Q. Would this document have been given to Dr Kelly?
2 A. I do not know whether he physically had a copy. As you
3 can see from the copy on the screen, it was printed off
4 the DSTL intranet, so it would have been readily
5 available for him at DSTL, although in the MoD it might
6 have been more appropriate to look at the very similar
7 MoD document, which I think you have also had provided.
8 Q. Can I take you first of all to MoD/2/29, which is still
9 from the DSTL document at paragraph 8.4:
10 "Media activities."
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Perhaps you can just read for us the first paragraph.
13 A. I was afraid you were going to ask me that because I
14 cannot quite understand it, to be honest.
15 Q. I will read it:
16 "It is important to dispel any impression, however
17 unfounded, that there is a conflict of interest between
18 a particular activity and the responsibilities of an
19 employee. There is no exhaustive list of activities
20 that fall into this category, but it is in everyone's
21 interest for individuals to seek approval before
22 indulging in any such activity and to ensure that
23 records are kept."
24 A. Indeed.
25 Q. You said that you did not quite understand it.
1 A. I did not quite understand the very first sentence,
2 which appears to be taken out of context. I cannot
3 understand what this business about dispelling
4 impressions is about. But the substance of the
5 paragraph I entirely understand.
6 Q. Yes. Then at 8.4.2 it talks about activities that might
7 conflict; press announcements, the first bullet point.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Broadcasts and media interviews and public speaking.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You have also referred to the Civil Service code, in
12 particular paragraphs 9 and 10. Can I take you to
13 MoD/2/38? If we can scroll down to paragraphs 9 and 10.
14 Are those the paragraphs that you wanted to refer to in
15 this context?
16 A. They are the most obvious paragraphs in the Civil
17 Service code, yes.
18 Q. Would Dr Kelly have been provided with the Civil Service
20 A. Yes, he would. It was an annex to both the DSTL code
21 which you showed, the MoD code, and I think every member
22 of the Civil Service has been issued with one of those
23 which I am holding up at the moment, which is the Civil
24 Service code.
25 Q. Right. Paragraph 9 is a general paragraph, dealing with
1 civil servants' conduct to retain the confidence of
2 Ministers or assembly secretaries.
3 A. Indeed, but it is particularly pertinent if you turn to
4 the MoD -- I mean MoD discipline code rather than
5 DSTL -- it makes quite clear that our guidance on
6 contact with media and, indeed, other forms of public
7 speaking or commenting on information is linked to the
8 need to preserve that degree of trust with Ministers of
9 whatever administration who are in power.
10 Q. To complete therefore the picture, can we turn to
11 MoD/2/12? Is this the document to which you were
13 A. That is right.
14 Q. Can you tell us what this is?
15 A. This is the relevant section from the MoD personnel
16 manual, which is also readily available on our intranet
17 and is publicly available too; and most civil servants
18 would be aware of it, and many, I would expect most of
19 those who have reason to deal with the media will have
20 seen it, probably had rather more detailed advice, but
21 this is the basis of the entire position inside the MoD.
22 And the DSTL document should have been and indeed
23 I think was derived from this overarching document.
24 Q. Right. Is there any specific paragraph in this document
25 that you wanted to refer to? I think you have referred
1 in the past to section 6.
2 A. I provided the document because the Inquiry asked for
3 it. These are the most relevant sections of the
4 document. The scroll has come to the point I think:
5 "You must not make comment on or disclosure of
6 classified or 'in confidence' information; relations
7 between civil servants and Ministers, and advice give to
8 Ministers; politically controversial issues ..."
9 Further on in the same chapter there is detailed
10 comment about procedures and about what we should and
11 should not say at public seminars, even where you have
12 authority to attend and speak. It is all related to
13 those three basic bullet points.
14 Q. Can we look at MoD/1/24? If we turn to the bottom of
15 that, there is a passage here which deals with contact
16 with FCO press office guidelines. Are these the
17 guidelines that we have now looked at, the Ministry of
18 Defence guidelines, the DSTL guidelines and the Civil
19 Service guidelines?
20 A. This is in the record of my first discussion with
21 Dr Kelly. When I started that line of questioning I was
22 assuming, though he said he had not read them, that he
23 would also have seen some more detailed instructions
24 which are issued from time to time or made available
25 from time to time from those who are in the habit of
1 dealing with the press or are in the habit of being
2 contacted by the press. However, having said that, the
3 instructions, the ones to which I have referred or you
4 have referred to in the other documents, are in
5 themselves a quite sufficient basis for dealing with the
7 Q. Because what Dr Kelly said there is:
8 "[You said] I asked who had given him authority to
9 exercise his own judgment about contacts with
10 journalists on defence related business, since this was
11 contrary to standing departmental instructions.
12 Dr Kelly said that he had never read those instructions,
13 nor sought to discover what guidance existed ..."
14 A. I found that, as my comments further on the record make
15 clear, somewhat surprising for someone who had been
16 dealing with the media on his own account for some
17 period. As he also makes clear in his original letter
18 and in this conversation, he actually did know the
19 proper procedures because although there was some doubt
20 about which press office he should have been consulting
21 in relation to what, when he routinely had contact with
22 the press there is no doubt that he knew who was
23 supposed to contact. He makes that clear both in his
24 original letter and in this interview.
25 Q. Can I ask you this: you referred to some more detailed
1 guidance. I have taken you to the DSTL document.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. I have taken you to the Civil Service code and I have
4 taken you to the Ministry of Defence personnel manual.
5 What more detailed guidance would have been available to
7 A. Well, it depends to whom they are and how much they seek
8 out. But there are -- periodically guidance is provided
9 to individuals who deal with the media. From time to
10 time reminders are put out to parts of the department
11 who may find themselves caught up with the media, for
12 example following periodic leak inquiries and things
13 like that. It would not have surprised me if Dr Kelly
14 had seen any of that, although from his own account he
15 had not. He did not need to see that to know the rules
16 because the basic rules are clear from the extracts you
17 have seen. It is also clear from other Government
18 departments, including the Foreign Office, with whom he
19 had habitually dealt for many of his contacts, had very
20 similar rules and principles of which he should have
21 been and I believe was aware.
22 Q. Would it be possible to make available to the Inquiry
23 some of those documents to which you have referred,
24 namely the latest and more specific?
25 A. I think you would need to ask other parts of the MoD to
1 provide whatever the latest information was. This is
2 more likely to be local management information put out,
3 for example, by the director general of corporate
4 communications or indeed by local management to
5 reinforce the basic standing instructions. There is no
6 doubt that the instructions that Dr Kelly should have
7 seen, and I believe they are even annexed to his
8 contract, provide sufficient basic guidance for dealing
9 with the press unless you feel that you have a problem
10 which is not covered by that, in which case you can seek
11 advice and should seek advice.
12 Q. We will come back to dealings with the media later, if
13 I may. Can I just turn on to one topic which I have not
14 seen in any Civil Service codes, but on the other hand
15 I am not a director of personnel. That is to do with
16 naming of civil servants. Are there any codes which
17 deal with the circumstances in which a civil servant's
18 name is made public?
19 A. The reason you have not seen it is because there is no
20 such reference. Indeed, our standing instructions would
21 normally suggest that where there is a matter of public
22 interest we would disclose as much information as
23 possible, with of course obvious exceptions. We
24 normally try to protect the identity, for example, of
25 people working in the special forces and there may be
1 other circumstances in which we would try to protect
2 somebody's identity. Equally, we do not gratuitously
3 disclose names of individual officials to the media, for
4 the very obvious reason that we try to spare some of the
5 consequences of media speculation or comment on the
7 Q. Can I take you to some defensive question and answer
8 material, as it was entitled, dated 8th July, which is
10 A. I have it, yes.
11 Q. You can see there, at paragraph 2, and we will come back
12 to this material later on, but just on personnel issues
13 this was prepared to assist with media enquiries on the
14 evening on 8th July, it looks like. I think it sets an
15 expected format for press questions:
16 "Who is the official?
17 "The official works in MoD.
18 "What is his name and current post?
19 "We would not normally volunteer a name."
20 That was just a general understanding, was it, that
21 names would not be volunteered?
22 A. We do not normally volunteer a name about something
23 which has just been put into the media in the context of
24 this sort of event. However, as it goes on to say, we
25 expect very often the media to try to speculate about
1 the name and we have to consider that sort of line.
2 Q. Right.
3 A. It is also important to recall that if this is the
4 document from the evening on which the MoD made its
5 press release, that this was intended to be the line for
6 that evening, if you like. We were anticipating that
7 this name would be appearing before at least one
8 Parliamentary Committee in the near future, when quite
9 clearly we would expect his name, as any other official
10 who appears in front of a Committee, to appear so in
12 Q. So this was, as it were, a holding line until he went to
13 give public evidence?
14 A. It was a holding line for as long as it held.
15 Q. Right. I will deal with that with other witnesses, if
16 I may.
17 Can I then turn to the question of his security
18 clearance and turn to document MoD/4/4 at paragraph 6?
19 It says this, talking about his contacts in the first
20 sentence. Second sentence:
21 "Some of those [contacts] may have related to the
22 dossier. He was an acknowledged leading expert in his
23 field and in particular on the history of the UN
24 inspection process up until 1998. It would have been
25 quite natural and proper for DIS [that is Defence
1 Intelligence Service] staff to consult him on matters of
2 detail relating to his expertise. He was fully cleared
3 and had access to DIS Headquarters in the Old War Office
4 Building and knew many of the individuals in the DIS
6 What does "fully cleared" mean?
7 A. It certainly means he had a high classification
8 developed vetting clearance. It may or may not have
9 meant he had special access within the DIS headquarters,
10 but you would have to ask the author of this document
11 whether they anything more than developed vetting, what
12 used to be known as positive vetting.
13 Q. Can I take you to a document from his personnel file,
14 MoD/3/61? Does this help at all?
15 A. That is what I was referring to. I do not know whether
16 anything else was being referred to in that letter.
17 Q. This would mean he would have had had access to all
18 levels of information?
19 A. On the basis of need to know; and even with this
20 clearance you do not get to see things that you do not
21 have a need to know.
22 Q. Right.
23 A. As it says.
24 Q. Do you know whether he had been served with any notice
25 pursuant to the provisions of the Official Secrets Act
2 A. I am unaware of that and I would be astonished if he had
3 been served with any such notice.
4 Q. So there is a higher level of clearance than this
5 document, is that right, and you say that is accessed to
6 the DIS building?
7 A. No, it is not higher level. This is the highest level.
8 Q. Right.
9 A. But consistent with the need to know principle, there
10 are what is known in the trade as "compartments" which
11 mean people are given access to particular lines of
12 information because they need to know that and they are
13 not given access to other lines of information.
14 Q. Right.
15 A. But it is all based on the same vetting clearance.
16 Q. I understand that. Would it be fair to infer that he
17 would have been given access to all Iraqi weapons of
18 mass destruction material which impacted on chemical and
19 biological warfare?
20 A. I am not sure about that. You would need to ask his
21 line managers that.
22 Q. His line manager is the one?
23 A. I do not think it is necessarily true that he would have
24 seen all intelligence on that.
25 Q. And his line manager is Dr Wells?
1 A. Is Dr Wells.
2 Q. Thank you. Can I ask you this: was he a member of the
3 Senior Civil Service?
4 A. No, he was not.
5 Q. His citation for his CMG records his grade job title as
6 "individual merit grade 5".
7 A. That was true in about 1993, I am trying to remember the
8 exact date.
9 Q. I think it was 1996 when he was awarded that, yes?
10 A. But as you point out, it was an individual merit
11 promotion to grade 5 which has subsequently, in general,
12 become inside the Senior Civil Service. However,
13 because he was employed in an agency which subsequently
14 decided to do its own grading system, he was regraded
15 throughout that -- as was everybody else in that -- on
16 a different system and it is not formally part of the
17 Senior Civil Service. At his death he was a DSTL
18 level 9, which does not have a direct equivalent inside
19 the Ministry of Defence but is fractionally below the
20 formal Senior Civil Service.
21 LORD HUTTON: As regards posts, where does the senior grade
22 begin, Mr Hatfield? There may be a whole range but in
23 what --
24 A. It is what used to be called grade 5, now in the
25 Ministry of Defence a director. So Dr Wells, for
1 example, is a director, is a member of the Senior Civil
2 Service. Part of the point about Dr Kelly's original
3 promotion, it was an individual merit promotion in his
4 agency reflecting, if you like, his distinguished
5 scientific background and so on. But very specifically
6 it was not reflecting the normal management
7 responsibilities that go with the Senior Civil Service.
8 So Brian Wells, who was managing him in the Ministry of
9 Defence, is the first level of the modern Senior Civil
11 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.
12 MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to a document, MoD/3/150.
13 This is a letter dated 16th July 1999 from Dr Andrew
14 Shuttleworth, technical manager threat reduction, to
15 Heather Skelton. She appears to be a personnel manager
16 at DERA then, is that right? Do you know Miss Skelton?
17 A. I do not know.
18 Q. What he asks about is this he says:
19 "I have been engaged in a long running series of
20 discussions with Ted Payne and latterly with Ted
21 Hadrill, trying to resolve pay issues relating to
22 Dr David Kelly. These discussions have been complicated
23 by the fact that David is rarely in the country due to
24 the nature of his work and therefore information is
25 rarely available at short notice.
1 "The situation seems to be as follows. David Kelly
2 was originally employed at DERA at Porton Down and then
3 seconded to PACS in April 1997; largely as a financial
4 'fix'. He received a grade integration pay correction
5 in January 1997 ..."
7 "I passed an ARA and APA ..."
8 Can you help us with that?
9 A. No, I cannot. This is an internal DERA or DSTL
10 document, depending on its date, and it is all about
11 their personnel management inside the agency. I am
12 afraid those initials do not mean anything to me at all.
13 Q. Turning to paragraph 3:
14 "In April-May of this year, there was some
15 discussion as to whether Dr Kelly's status may have
16 caused his pay awards to fall into a black hole -- was
17 he substantive grade 5, or not? Ted Payne and
18 Ted Hadrill assured me that, despite a letter given to
19 Dr Kelly in 1996 that seems to say he is a substantive
20 grade 5 and thus a member of the Senior Civil Service,
21 he is not."
22 Is the proper analysis this then: that he was
23 a substantive grade 5 but he was not a member of the
24 Senior Civil Service?
25 A. I think to get detailed advice on what this minute is
1 saying you would have to ask DSTL. But my
2 interpretation is he was indeed a substantive grade 5,
3 subject to that being what they confirm.
4 Q. Yes.
5 A. When he was appointed to a grade 5, I am not even sure
6 that was included in the Senior Civil Service because it
7 used to start one level up from that. But subsequently
8 his agency got rid of those Civil Service gradings
9 altogether. So it became a technicality for that agency
10 how they were going to fit him into their new pay
11 structure. I think that is what all this is about. He
12 was certainly at the time of his death not a member of
13 the Senior Civil Service as it is defined across
15 Q. In the sense that he had no management responsibilities
16 but he got to a level that otherwise would have
17 qualified, or is that wrong?
18 A. I am afraid there are time shifts here. I think when he
19 became grade 5 in the early 1990s that was not part of
20 what was then the predecessor of the Senior Civil
21 Service. It used to start at the grade 3 level. I am
22 afraid this is all very esoteric stuff. He is not,
23 I think, recorded by the Cabinet Office as being
24 a member of the Senior Civil Service as such. That is
25 certainly not how I recorded him in the central data of
1 the Ministry of Defence.
2 Q. The only reason I ask these questions is if we look at
3 MoD/3/4 it seems from the documents I was very kindly
4 given over the weekend that he had at least some
5 unhappiness about the level he had got to. He talks
6 about enclosing his annual review form in the first
7 paragraph. Then he says this:
8 "My secondment to PACS was arranged hastily in 1996
9 with Mr Paul Hatt, then deputy director of PACS and this
10 seems to be the reason for my 'invisibility' since I do
11 not actually work for PACS. It is essentially an
12 accommodation address to enable the FCO to fully use me
13 in support of the United Nations. Fortunately, and
14 coincidentally, D/PACS has been the UK Commissioner for
15 UNSCOM/UNMOVIC and he has a good appreciation of my
17 First of all, is that, as far as you have been able
18 to ascertain, an accurate analysis of why he ended up
19 with PACS?
20 A. I am not sure whether it is completely accurate.
21 Q. Do you know of anything to suggest it is inaccurate?
22 A. No, but I do not know his personnel career in sufficient
23 detail to comment.
24 Q. Then he talks about:
25 "Three years away from retirement I have chosen not
1 to complete page 2."
2 He is talking about his track record, et cetera.
3 Then he says this:
4 "Career level is my contentious issue. I believe
5 that I have worked at a level higher than DCSO ..."
6 Can you help me with what that means?
7 A. I think that is maybe even a defunct grade, something
8 like Deputy Chief Scientific Officer, but I am not sure
9 of that.
10 Q. "Grade 5 for the past year and I have accepted
11 considerable and, to an extent, unique responsibilities
12 working for UNSCOM.
13 "I am sure that these issues can be resolved and it
14 is important that they are, since it affects such things
15 as pensions!"
16 Just one further letter that impacts on that, and it
17 is MoD/3/95. This appears to be a sort of draft
18 proforma letter. You may be able to help with that. It
19 is talking about a current programme to create a new
20 Senior Civil Service. So, I mean, when did that take
21 place? From what you say, that seems to be 1996/1997.
22 A. I cannot remember the exact date.
23 Q. But about that?
24 A. Perhaps you could date it from the document which I have
25 not previously seen. It is a DERA document again.
1 Q. I am afraid I only got it on Saturday and it does not
2 have any other date on it, it is just an annexure.
3 A. Well, it is clearly, since it refers to DERA employees,
4 it must be at least two or three years old. It is also
5 I think fairly clearly an internal document from that
7 Q. Right. But effectively I should ask someone who deals
8 with DERA, or now DSTL for that matter?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And to the extent that he was unhappy also with his
11 current grading, would that be a Ministry of Defence
12 matter or a DSTL matter?
13 A. I think it would be a DSTL matter, but I would observe
14 on the basis of the extract you have just shown me,
15 despite the fact he claimed he was working above grade 5
16 level, he was actually working below grade 5 level, he
17 was working for a grade 5, i.e. Dr Wells. His promotion
18 back in the early 1990s to grade 5 was on the basis of
19 individual merit, not on the basis of his
20 responsibilities. So at that level his note does not
21 actually seem to square with what I know to be the case.
22 Q. Just so that you can see what he would have said on
23 those issues, can I take you to MoD/3/48, which is his
24 letter of 14th September 2001. This is a letter to
25 Hilary Brown who is the manager of interchange. What is
2 A. I imagine that is a title given inside DSTL for somebody
3 who is managing secondments out of DSTL, whether to the
4 Ministry of Defence or, indeed, possibly to the private
5 sector or other Government departments. Interchange is
6 often used as a synonym for secondments in both
8 Q. I hope I can take you through the letter shortly but
9 reasonably fairly:
10 "I write to express concern about my current
11 position and personal management within DSTL, and
12 previously the failure of the Defence Evaluation
13 Research Agency (DERA) to properly and actively monitor
14 my career and achievements since 1st April 1995 ...
15 I have worked full time in support of the United Nations
16 under the patronage of the Foreign and Commonwealth
17 Office since 1994."
18 Pausing there, he may have done but he was always
19 part of DERA or DSTL, is that right?
20 A. Yes, very much so.
21 Q. That may at least explain some of his confusion:
22 "As you will be aware, I was recruited by MoD in
23 1984 ..."
24 Then he talks about his career. If I can skip that
25 and then turn to page 49. He talks, at the first
1 paragraph, about his promotion to DCSO. Then he talks
2 about the work he has done in the Soviet inspections.
3 Then in paragraph 3 he talks about the work he has done
4 in the Iraqi inspections and UNSCOM.
5 He says this at the bottom of the penultimate
6 paragraph, final sentence:
7 "In 1996 the exceptional nature of my work was
8 honoured by the award of CMG, it is an honour given in
9 recognition of important confidential services to
10 foreign affairs at a senior level."
11 Can you just help me with this: is this right,
12 because there is a ranking with Orders and all the rest
13 of it, is it right that a CMG is awarded to people who
14 are at the level of Senior Civil Service for Foreign
16 A. I think you had better ask the Foreign Office in
17 relation to CMG, but that is usually a rough rule of
18 thumb on the home Civil Service equivalent. It is not
19 I think an absolute rule. I think they have been
20 awarded to people below that level.
21 Q. His complaint appears to be at the bottom of page 49:
22 "All of this appears to have passed by without the
23 recognition of DERA management and human resources. In
24 1999 I discussed the issue of my grading with
25 Paul Taylor, director chemical and biological defence,
1 Porton Down, seeking consideration of promotion from
2 grade 5 to grade 4. Despite a sympathetic reception, no
3 action followed."
4 Then if we can turn to page 50 --
5 A. Can I interrupt at this point? I am rather puzzled
6 because grade 4 had disappeared by that stage,
7 disappeared in the MoD and the entire grading system
8 inside his agency, DSTL, or possibly DERA, depending on
9 exactly what stage this was, had a completely different
11 Q. But if someone had gone to Iraq and spent a lot of time
12 in Iraq, they might not necessarily be up with these
14 A. I think they would have noticed that their entire pay
15 system had changed inside their agency.
16 Q. Or should have noticed?
17 A. They certainly should have done. It would be on their
18 pay statement every month.
19 Q. He says a bit about that. Turning the page:
20 "The issue was twice raised again with Paul Taylor
21 in the course of opportunity meetings to discuss Iraq
22 and although I finally wrote to him formally on
23 17th April 2000 I received no subsequent acknowledgment
24 of receipt or action. Richard Scott succeeded
25 Paul Taylor and I raised the issue with him in a meeting
1 of opportunity on 7th September 2000 and later on 25th
2 September 2000 specifically at Porton Down.
3 "Still no action was forthcoming and so I again
4 raised the topic of my status in a letter to Richard
5 Scott covering submission of the annual review proforma
6 provided by Avril Pimlett. After the failure of my
7 letter of April 2001 to elicit a response, I made
8 enquiries of Richard Scott ..."
9 He talks about others. He was informed:
10 "... there were no personnel records for me on file
11 and apparently none had existed. Richard Scott believed
12 that I was 'level 8' and suggested that I should be
13 nominated for consideration for a level 9 promotion in
15 These were the new levels introduced by DSTL, is
16 that right?
17 A. I think you will have to, if you wish to pursue this
18 line of questioning, get a DSTL witness. This document
19 is new to me, I have some vague understanding of it, but
20 it is all about DSTL internal process. None of this has
21 been raised with the MoD, nor would I expect it to be,
22 with the MoD central personnel section. It is within
23 their delegated powers, all of this.
24 Q. Do not worry. That is very helpful. It is just these
25 documents came to us on Saturday, in fact, from the MoD
1 side. I assumed you might be able to deal with them.
2 A. You have reached the limit of my knowledge on this.
3 Q. I must say I had great fun trying to work out what the
4 grades were myself.
5 Can you help me with his pay? I think you have told
6 us that his salary was at a certain level, level 9, or
7 we are told that in other documents.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. At the time of his death.
10 A. Indeed.
11 Q. And it is said that some investigations were being made
12 to find out whether any other sums were owing, is that
14 A. That is right. Because of the timing of Dr Kelly's
15 death, and the MoD and indeed DSTL sort of pay awards,
16 almost everybody in the MoD, almost wherever they are
17 will be just having or just had a pay rise based on what
18 happened last year. My understanding that Dr Kelly's
19 salary before his pay rise due this year was £61,038.
20 He had a 4.027 per cent pay raise, which was another
21 2,458, bringing his total salary up to £63,496. In
22 addition, I am advised under the DSTL system of bonuses
23 he was also entitled to "non-consolidated lump sum
24 bonus" for last year of £620. That would be paid over
25 the course of the year by DSTL. We are establishing how
1 much of that had actually been paid before his death and
2 the MoD will of course pay any balance that is
3 outstanding, and if there are any other allowances or
4 anything else which turns out be to be outstanding that
5 will also be paid.
6 Q. Was he due any bonuses?
7 A. That is the only bonus I am aware of, which is a DSTL
8 bonus which is calculated for all their employees
9 according to -- they have a scoring system which takes
10 all sorts of things into account. Why he qualified for
11 that sum, I am afraid I do not know.
12 Q. There have been some suggestions, and perhaps you are
13 probably the best person to ask about this, that those
14 involved in the writing of the dossier were due to be
15 paid bonuses; that is right, is it not?
16 A. I have no knowledge of this. I would not expect it to
17 be the case. If somebody was being paid for
18 a particular project like the dossier, I would expect it
19 to be under a totally different bonus scheme,
20 a so-called special bonus scheme for a particular
21 project. I have no reason to suppose that any such
22 bonus was due to Dr Kelly or being paid to him. The
23 bonus I have just referred to, very explicitly, would
24 not be due to that or any other specific thing.
25 Q. The one you have referred to, I think to make it clear,
1 as my understanding is right, is to pay and general
2 inflationary increases, et cetera?
3 A. The 4.027 per cent was, but the bonus, £620 bonus, was
4 calculated by DSTL according to -- they have a system of
5 merit for everybody in their department. I think it is
6 partly linked to things like their scientific standing,
7 and so on. That was where his bonus was coming from.
8 DSTL could explain to you precisely why he was being
9 offered it and how it was calculated, but I cannot. It
10 is not part of the main MoD bonus scheme and it is
11 certainly not, as far as I am aware, anything to do
12 specifically with the dossier.
13 Q. Can I just ask you a bit about holiday entitlement? We
14 may hear evidence that he had not taken many holidays
15 over the previous three years. Do you know whether
16 anyone monitored his holiday entitlement?
17 A. I think the note that we provided for you explains his
18 holiday record over the last few years. How much
19 monitoring has gone on of his holidays in the new leave
20 year, which I think probably even for DSTL starts around
21 the beginning of April, I do not know. But I would
22 expect that the few months that have been covered to be
23 something that his line manager Brian Wells could
24 answer. But we have provided you, I think, with his
25 holiday record over the last few years, as requested.
1 Q. In relation to that, it was said that he was on leave
2 from 10th August to 4th September -- sorry, if you want
3 to --
4 A. It would be helpful.
5 Q. That is MoD/2/10. It is at the bottom.
6 A. That is my information.
7 Q. So you talk about 1999, 2000 to 2001. Then 2002 to
8 2003, this is four lines up from the bottom:
9 "... he booked leave from 10th August to
10 4th September (though he would have been in New York on
11 UNMOVIC commissioners business for part of that
13 A. Hmm, hmm.
14 Q. Indeed, although I need not take you to it, at
15 question 21 that was his answer to the Foreign Affairs
16 Committee, that he was either on leave or working abroad
17 in August and early September.
18 A. Hmm, hmm.
19 Q. How much time from 10th August to 4th September was
20 actually booked as holiday, all of it?
21 A. I have no idea.
22 Q. No idea. Who might be about to help me with that?
23 A. Dr Wells might be able to help you with that, although
24 it would be quite common -- I am afraid I do it myself
25 -- not to keep a hugely accurate day-by-day account of
1 how much leave has been taken, otherwise the Ministry of
2 Defence would probably be giving me lots of extra leave.
3 Q. If it was all booked to leave but he had actually done
4 some work for UNMOVIC at that time, one would not
5 necessarily have been surprised?
6 A. Not at all.
7 Q. His work with UNMOVIC would be part of his duties with
8 the Ministry of Defence for these purposes, is that
10 A. At this time it would be a very minor part because it
11 must have been related to essentially past history and
12 possibly preparing for a possible return to Iraq. I do
13 not think it was a major part of his duties but
14 a perfectly reasonable part of his duties at this
16 Q. Right. One other matter that has occurred from
17 documents that we have now seen over the weekend is that
18 we understood he flew to Kuwait on 19th May 2003 but the
19 visa was incorrect and he was refused entry, searched
20 and then deported. Do you know anything about that or
21 would that be Dr Wells?
22 A. That is the first I have heard of that.
23 Q. I will deal with that with Dr Wells.
24 Can I return then to the question of press contact
25 and whether press contact was authorised or
1 unauthorised, and take you to the document that we have
2 just been looking at, the later part of it, MoD/2/9. At
3 paragraph 4. Talking about his history, in April 1995
4 DERA was established. This agency embraced Porton Down
5 and Dr Kelly's personnel management and employment
6 formally passed from the MoD to DERA. The following
7 year Dr Kelly was appointed on secondment.
8 Then, talking about his UNMOVIC duties, which is
9 United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection
10 Commission. he contributed to UNMOVIC activities and
11 says where. He was also responsible for providing
12 advice to the Defence Intelligence Staff and the Secret
13 Intelligence Service on Iraq. Then this:
14 "Finally, he had responsibilities in relation to
15 communicating Iraq WMD issues externally by providing
16 informed contributions to international institutions,
17 the media and the press."
18 A. Correct.
19 Q. None of the written terms and conditions that you very
20 kindly provided to us deals with that.
21 A. Sorry, in what sense?
22 Q. In the sense of: it is a part of your job to have
23 communications with the media. So would this all have
24 been oral?
25 A. No, no. I think you will find if you looked at his
1 annual staff reports for the period concerned, you will
2 probably find on the front page a list of his duties, or
3 something equivalent to that, and I would expect this to
4 appear there if it was a significant part of it;
5 although it might be all oral, I would expect it to be
6 on the front page of his report.
7 Q. Right.
8 A. Not least because I would expect there to be some
9 assessment in the report about how well he had carried
10 out those duties.
11 Q. Can we look at an example of that, just to help you?
12 MoD/3/8. This appears to be his DERA annual review
13 from April 1999 to March 2000. You can see Dr Kelly has
14 been seconded, it is reported, by the FCO, that he has
15 given expert advice in support of development and
16 implementation on UK policy on Iraqi WMD:
17 "In addition, Dr Kelly has provided support to a
18 range of Government departments. He has also provided
19 press and TV interview. Dr Kelly is stated to be the
20 'expert of choice'."
21 I have read that, I hope fairly, as meaning by the
22 media, as it were, their expert of choice; is that
24 A. I am not sure. I do not know if it is by them or by
25 DERA; nonetheless, it is obviously a compliment.
1 Q. For the media. Is this as much as you will get in terms
2 of what his responsibilities and duties were?
3 A. That particular form, very interestingly, is not
4 a Senior Civil Service form, for example. I would have
5 thought that slightly more recent forms might have a --
6 and maybe it appears before part A, but a more detailed
7 description of duties. Certainly in the main part of
8 the Ministry of Defence, currently both below and in the
9 Senior Civil Service, we would expect a clearer
10 statement of the main duties of the post as part of the
12 Q. Right. Can I just take you through that form then, for
13 you to show me if there is anything missing that I have
14 missed on it.
15 Page 9, track record and deployability, development,
16 career level, future career aspirations. There does not
17 appear to be anything on it.
18 Page 10, manager's comments. It talks about
19 Dr A Wedge and Mr J Tutnot, who were people who were
20 consulted. They appear to be Foreign and Commonwealth
21 Office rather than any Ministry of Defence.
22 A. I am not quite sure which year you are talking about
23 here but I presume, because in that year they had more
24 sight of what he was doing, especially in relation to
25 UNMOVIC than the MoD.
1 Q. This was from March 1999 to April 2000?
2 A. It rather looks to me, since, as you point out, both
3 those officials are in the FCO, that the FCO was
4 providing the assessment that year, presumably because
5 they had seen more of what he was actually doing. This
6 may also explain the rather generalised comments in the
7 box on the first page, whereas I would expect an MoD
8 reporting officer to have been a little bit more
9 systematic about the type of comments. It is
10 a difference in ministerial style, I think, departmental
12 Q. Perfectly understandably. That may suggest that if he
13 was really working for the FCO, but he was getting his
14 job description, you can see his complaint: "Look,
15 I have fallen into a black hole, DERA are not assessing
17 A. That was not true, I do not think.
18 Q. That was his complaint, I am not saying it is right.
19 A. He has not fallen into a black hole because the people
20 who are assessing his performance on a day-to-day basis
21 are those who are observing him. The form is a DERA
22 form, or a DSTL form. depending on which year we are
23 talking about, and it goes back to DSTL and, in the
24 light of the comments they received from the people who
25 have actually been employing him, they make their
1 judgments. So I do not think that suggests he has
2 fallen into a black hole at all.
3 Q. When we go to the next year or the latest year, as it
4 were, which is MoD 3/14, you are right the form does
5 change and this becomes DSTL. If you look at what is
6 the second main box, statement of role and
7 responsibilities, if we can just skip 1 and 2 and look
8 at 3. It says this:
9 "Communicating Iraq issues to the media and
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Now, that is about as good as I have been able to find
13 in writing about his duties in relation to communication
14 with the media; and I have to say, as I say, I only got
15 this material over the weekend. Is that what you would
16 expect to see?
17 A. Yes. As you will see, that box is much more like
18 a standard MoD box. It says:
19 "Statement of your roles and responsibilities."
20 The first two bullets are pretty substantial tasks
21 and the third bullet, which is there because it is not
22 a usual thing, is a thing that happens in the course of
23 that which, yes, he is expected to communicate Iraq
24 issues to the media and institutions. There may be
25 further in the report, I do not know, more detail of
1 what he does in relation to that. But the line manager
2 who appears at the bottom, Dr Brian Wells, and indeed
3 Mr Patrick Lamb from the FCO, could no doubt provide
4 oral illumination.
5 Q. If we turn to page 16 you can see "Objectives", a whole
6 series of objectives set out.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. "Support to UNMOVIC."
9 If I may, I will skip that:
10 "Support to the Non Proliferation department/Middle
11 East Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
12 "Support to Bryan Hatt ...
13 "Support to SIS FCO and DIS MoD."
14 Those are the Intelligence Services, effectively,
15 are they not?
16 A. To avoid confusion, I had better point out there is a
17 mistake on that page. There is no such person as Bryan
18 Hatt. Brian Wells is his current boss. He previously
19 worked at an earlier stage for Paul Hatt, doing the same
20 job, and he must have conflated the two names.
21 Q. But it was one or the other?
22 A. At this period it should have been Brian Wells.
23 Q. And then:
24 "Support to the UK commission to the
25 United Nations."
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. So that would have been part of his role. Then over the
3 page at page 17, box 6, this is the only detail we
4 appear to get on media. This appears to pick up the
5 media part of his role:
6 "To continue making contributions to the
7 deliberations of international institutions and
8 providing informed contributions to the international
9 media and press."
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And the managers' comments:
12 "David has lectured widely on Iraqi WMD issues, is
13 much sought for attendance at international conferences
14 and as appropriate has provided media briefings."
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. So it appears to have been at least, although not part
17 of the formal written job description, picked up in the
18 annual review that part of his duties were to deal as
19 the media?
20 A. I take that as being effectively part of his job
21 description. I have no problem with that at all.
22 Q. Right. And we can see that he had, as he put it,
23 reasonably extensive media interaction. If we look at
24 MoD/3/19, if this assists you, this appears to be an
25 annexure to his March 2003 assessment. I mean, without
1 having seen the original document, I assume it is
2 clipped on?
3 A. I imagine so.
4 Q. He is talking here about on 11th and 12th November 2002
5 there is the Organisation for the Prohibition of
6 Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands,
7 "Protection Network". He deals with that from 18th to
8 20th November. Then he deals with the International
9 Institute for Strategic Studies, London, a conference,
10 talking about invasion or inspections, that is January
11 and February 2003. That is shortly before the war.
13 "Attributable and unattributable briefings plus
14 interviews on Iraq, Russia, weapons, anthrax and
16 "Television and radio: Channel 4, Australian
17 Broadcasting Company, Canadian Broadcasting Company,
18 Tokyo Broadcasting Systems, CNN, CBS, ABC, Radio
19 Netherlands, BBC 4, BBC 24 hours/World Service, BBC
20 local radio (London, Wales)."
21 Then the news media, he seems to go through the
22 whole of Fleet Street: Guardian, Daily Telegraph, The
23 Times, New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles
24 Times, Newsweek, Herald Tribune and Wall Street Journal.
25 So he was having extensive contact with them.
1 A. He had an extensive number of contacts with them, yes.
2 Q. Yes.
3 A. But it does not also make clear over what period, but
5 Q. It also appears to make clear that some of the contact
6 was on an unattributable basis.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Is that something that is authorised, as it were, by the
9 Ministry of Defence?
10 A. Yes, it should be.
11 Q. Right.
12 A. Indeed, his own letter, which started the events as far
13 as I was concerned, makes it clear that they normally
14 were cleared. In fact, slightly unusually but
15 nonetheless cleared through the FCO press office usually
16 rather than the MoD press office. That clearly reflects
17 a lot of it is briefing in relation to his role in
18 support of what he did in relation to UNMOVIC, where the
19 Foreign Office were in the lead. I would assume every
20 one of those listed on there had been cleared either on
21 an individual basis or if you like especially in
22 relation to the appearances at conferences on a block
23 basis that: this is the sort of conference you do and
24 you know the rules.
25 Indeed, the general rules we started with make it
1 quite clear that, for example, contact with IISS does
2 not have to be cleared on an individual basis because it
3 is an established institution with which MoD deals. But
4 there are rules about how you behave at such conferences
5 where you are speaking.
6 LORD HUTTON: May I ask you: suppose Dr Kelly had been
7 authorised to speak to a reporter about a particular
8 subject, let us say a particular type of chemical
9 weapon, and he had made his report to that person and
10 then subsequently that reporter rang him up -- and it
11 seems some reporters knew his mobile number or home
12 number. Suppose that reporter rang him up to ask him
13 for some further detail about the conversation, would he
14 have been required to seek authorisation to speak to
16 A. No, I do not think he would, my Lord, but you would
17 exercise your own judgment about the nature of what you
18 had both originally said to the journalist and the
20 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
21 A. If it was merely a technical issue following up
22 a previous conversation about background, he might have
23 well have answered it on the spot, although especially
24 if there was any sensitivity about the subject matter
25 I would certainly have expected it to be subsequently
1 declared. It would, however, be a different matter if
2 you had been, whether unattributably or attributably,
3 taking part in a discussion about policy rather than
4 just providing factual information.
5 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
6 A. I have been in precisely the situation described myself
7 in previous jobs.
8 LORD HUTTON: So when the reporter rang a second time to ask
9 for clarification of some particular point and then
10 tried to draw the conversation and to move on to other
11 topics ...
12 A. The wise answer would be to decline to continue the
13 conversation at that point or arrange a formal briefing
14 under the usual rules, as it were.
15 LORD HUTTON: I see. Yes. Thank you.
16 Mr Dingemans, I want to give the stenographers just
17 a little break. I think this is now going to be
18 a convenient time. Again, I think just for
19 five minutes.
20 (12.05 pm)
21 (Short Break)
22 (12.10 pm)
23 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Hatfield, we were discussing questions of
24 Dr Kelly's contacts with the press; and there is going
25 to be evidence suggesting that Susan Watts, a Newsnight
1 presenter, had been given Dr Kelly's number by the
2 Foreign and Commonwealth Office in May 2001. That sort
3 of contact would not have surprised you?
4 A. Well, Dr Kelly himself said to me he did occasionally
5 talk to Susan Watts. Again, I think he refers to it in
6 his original letter of 30th June.
7 Q. Right. Can I take you to a document, CAB/1/115, which
8 is a document produced by Mr Lamb, talking about
9 customary practice; and paragraph 1, I think, deals with
10 the manner in which press and media contacts within the
11 FCO were handled, consistent with what you were saying
12 earlier on this morning.
13 Paragraph 2:
14 "There were obviously also instances where he was
15 contacted first by the journalist or researcher but he
16 was, as far as I was aware, scrupulous about informing
17 FCO in order to seek prior agreement and discuss areas
18 on which he should not be drawn. This situation applied
19 over a number of years. I took on the responsibility of
20 being most often the initial CPD point of contact on
21 becoming deputy head of department in September 2000.
22 Other colleagues ... may have handled requests ...
23 "3. He was much in demand and an obvious press
24 target because of his technical expertise and experience
25 as an UNSCOM inspector. His frequent visits to New York
1 gave him an international profile. I, in turn, had
2 confidence in him as he had become an accomplished media
3 performer. On what was always a difficult and complex
4 issue he expressed himself clearly and put across HMG's
5 line with authority.
6 4. This system, which ultimately relied on self
7 discipline and judgement on all sides, worked well and
8 provided the media with expert background briefly and
9 led to no embarrassments for HMG over the period 2000 to
11 This is Mr Lamb talking about self discipline and
12 judgment. I can ask Mr Lamb about this, so if you
13 cannot answer just tell me. Is that referring to what
14 you said in answer to his Lordship about judgment, about
15 whether you can deal with a follow up interview or
16 follow up discussion or not?
17 A. I would take it to be referring to that, and indeed back
18 to paragraph 2 here, which explains how though sometimes
19 contacted first he was usually scrupulous about
20 informing the FCO to seek prior agreement to discuss
21 areas on which he should not be drawn. All of that is
22 entirely within the rules and exactly what I would
24 Q. Within the understanding, because we have looked at the
25 written rules and the written rules just say "go and
1 contact" as it were, when your job description extends
2 to dealing with the media there is nothing more
4 A. The written rules we have referred to, there are further
5 written rules that explain what you can and cannot
6 comment on in the same passage, I mean over the page and
7 so on. That I find entirely consistent with normal
8 Government practice in every Government department.
9 Q. Dr Kelly was in the process of listing his media
10 contacts on 17th July. Can we look at TVP/2/12 to 14?
11 We see here a draft letter from Dr Wells to PS/PUS,
12 Personnel Director. The Personnel Director is you, is
13 it not?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. "I attach a reply to the [Foreign Affairs Committee]
16 Clerk's letter of 16th July asking for details of
17 Dr Kelly's contacts with journalists."
18 It then says:
19 "Its terms are consistent with the draft Answers ...
20 "We have given as comprehensive an answer as
21 possible. Dr Kelly will have met journalists at
22 seminars, Chatham House events, and similar occasions.
23 He is often contacted at home (not least on technical
24 issues). In many cases he has not kept a record of the
1 Pausing there, not keeping a record of the details
2 would not concern you as long as he was --
3 A. As long as he was merely making a brief reply of the
4 type that my Lord suggested, no, it would not. But if
5 he was having a substantial conversation with
6 a journalist, I would expect, in his own interest, to
7 keep some record of the details.
8 Q. "We have therefore listed those meetings specifically
9 set up by a journalist with Dr Kelly, and where Dr Kelly
10 has logged the meeting in his diary, and listed all
11 those journalists whose business cards (or other contact
12 details) Dr Kelly has in his possession, which indicates
13 that he has met them in some context, even if it was in
14 the margins of another event, and possibly many years
16 Then if we can turn to page 13, the top three
17 paragraphs are really introducing the letter to the
18 Clerk to the Foreign Affairs Committee. Then there are
19 names -- a discussion on 14th March 2002 Nick Rufford;
20 Alex Nicoll of the Financial Times, Phillip Sen of The
21 Engineer, Andrew Gilligan of the BBC in February
22 and May 2003.
23 Then over the page, to page 14:
24 "Dr Kelly has also had such meetings during the
25 period with Jane Corbin on general UN inspections and
1 Tom Mangold on UNSCOM inspections, but has no record of
2 the dates.
3 "In addition, Dr Kelly has spoken with journalists
4 about Iraq at a range of seminars and similar events,
5 and on the telephone. He has also discussed non-Iraq
6 weapons of mass destruction matters, on which he is an
7 acknowledged expert. For example, he had a conversation
8 about Iraq WMD with Andrew Gilligan at the IISS seminar
9 12-14 September 2002 and, as mentioned, at the Foreign
10 Affairs Select Committee hearing, he met with
11 Susan Watts on 5th November 2002. Other than those
12 noted above, Dr Kelly does not have records of contacts
13 with journalists. However, those journalists whose
14 business cards (or other contact details) Dr Kelly has
15 in his possession are listed below: he believes that he
16 has either met them, either one-to-one or in the margins
17 of seminars..."
18 Then those are listed on page 14.
19 Is that consistent with what you might expect in
20 terms of his interaction with the media?
21 A. Very much so, and consistent with what he told me
23 Q. Yes. Can I then turn to what appears to have been
24 Dr Kelly's understanding of what he was entitled to do,
25 and first of all take you to MoD/1/21 for what he was
1 doing, as it were. This is an extract from his letter
2 of 30th June, which I think you have referred to.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. It is the fourth paragraph down:
5 "I should explain my unusual interaction with the
7 You have seen this letter before, have you not?
8 A. Yes, indeed.
9 Q. You can see the gist of this letter is he conducted
10 a number of major press conferences which were
11 internationally covered outside UN headquarters in
12 New York and then:
13 "Over the next 10 years [he] undertook at the
14 request of MoD, FCO, CBD Porton Down, and especially the
15 UN press office and UNSCOM/UNMOVIC press officer both
16 attributable interviews and occasionally unattributable
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. To the extent that Dr Kelly was ever asked by the
20 UN press office to provide briefings, what would have
21 been the procedure he ought to have gone through so far
22 as you were concerned?
23 A. If he was literally providing a briefing on behalf of
24 the UN, I would expect those procedures to be whatever
25 the UN required of somebody speaking in their name.
1 Q. Right, so it would not have --
2 A. Assuming he was speaking on UN matters, that would not
3 be a matter for the Ministry of Defence or the Foreign
4 and Commonwealth Office as long as he stuck to his
5 brief, which I would have expected him to have done.
6 Q. He says after that:
7 "All such interactions were cleared by the
8 appropriate authority. As my contact details became
9 known it became inevitable that direct approaches were
10 made and I used my discretion as [to] whether I provided
12 As I understand what you are saying, you did not
13 mind him using his discretion as long as it was just
14 providing a technical bit further, is that right?
15 A. As long as he stayed within the rules and the
16 understanding with his managers of how he was to
18 Can I just draw your attention to something at the
19 beginning of that paragraph which is quite significant,
20 although I had not picked it up before. He attended, at
21 his request, the MoD senior officers TV course at Wilton
22 Park "which served to make me aware of some of the
23 pitfalls of journalism".
24 That means he was indeed exposed maybe some years
25 ago to quite a lot of detailed briefing as to how you
1 handled and do not handle journalists in the Ministry of
2 Defence, quite apart from the basic details that are
3 laid down for everyone to see.
4 Q. Right. So for that course there would be sort of
5 joining instructions, with a bit of pre-course reading
6 about contacts with media, would there?
7 A. I would expect so, though the content of the course
8 itself is quite specific about how to handle
9 journalists. That is exactly what it is there for.
10 Q. And when to stop talking and when to talk?
11 A. Amongst other things, yes.
12 Q. Then he talks, towards the end of the paragraph, about
13 his interaction with the media on four issues: Iraq,
14 Soviet/Russian biological warfare, smallpox and anthrax.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. he says this:
17 "If it was technical information available from open
18 sources (and nearly all requests were such) then
19 I provided details or more realistically a clarification
20 and explanation of that information (I tend to be a
21 human archive on Iraq's chemical and biological
22 programmes). If it was about individuals (Iraqi or UN)
23 I would comment only on their role and not their
25 A. Indeed. I was going to say, his next sentence which
1 completes that is absolutely fine and that is exactly
2 what I take him to mean when he says he is acting on his
3 own discretion. If he was acting as he has described
4 there, there is absolutely no difficulty about it at
5 all. That would be, for somebody in his position,
6 within the grounds of his discretion, and he has
7 described it very accurately.
8 Q. Right. So:
9 "Comment on other matters were declined although in
10 the case of Iraq it is impossible to draw a clear
11 distinction between the truly technical and Iraq's
12 political concealment."
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. To the extent that he is commenting, as a human archive,
15 on Iraq's chemical and biological programmes you would
16 not expect him to comment on his belief about whether or
17 not the contents of the dossier were accurate or not?
18 A. I would expect him not to.
19 Q. Perhaps you can just make it clear on what basis he
20 would not be making that comment?
21 A. On two bases. One it would not be consistent with what
22 he has written in this document. Secondly, and more
23 importantly, it is fundamentally that to comment on
24 matters of Government policy for or against, as it were,
25 as a private individual or as a member of the Civil
1 Service, unless you are doing so on behalf of the
2 Government, is quite contrary to what civil servants
3 should be doing and is made quite clear in all the
4 discipline codes you have referred to. That is for
5 Ministers to do or people who have been authorised to do
6 so by Ministers.
7 Q. Right. Can I take you to some other evidence he has
8 given about his contacts with journalists? The first
9 document is ISC/1/33 at the penultimate paragraph. Just
10 so that everyone can be made aware, this is an extract
11 of Dr Kelly's evidence to the Intelligence and Service
12 Committee. This evidence will not be published until it
13 has been published first to Parliament, but we have been
14 given permission to ask questions on it. And Dr Kelly
15 refers there to a lot of press and television companies
16 having his telephone number, so he will get cold calls:
17 "... I will get called to comment on something or to
18 explain something, most of the calls that I have tend to
19 be rather technically boring, they come from journalists
20 who do not know what a formentor is or do not know the
21 difference between a virus and a bacterium. They come
22 from enquiries about Iraq and some of the principal
23 facilities that were associated with them so they can
24 understand them, some of the personalities associated
25 with the programme, and I will comment on their role,
1 but not their personality as such. But I also of
2 course, most of my work is at the behest primarily of
3 the Foreign Office, occasionally the MoD, but also the
4 United Nations, and for example when the anthrax
5 envelopes incidents occurred shortly after
6 September 11th then the UN used me quite a lot because
7 there was considered to be a connection with Iraq, which
8 I do not believe to be the case but that was certainly
9 part of the speculation, so the UN press office asked me
10 to brief on their behalf."
11 None of that, I imagine, would have caused you any
13 A. It would not have caused me any concern, but I must say
14 I am slightly surprised that the UN appears to have been
15 using him as a spokesmen at that period; but what he
16 said does not cause me any concern at all.
17 Q. Why were you surprised that the UN would be --
18 A. Because he had returned to the MoD and was working in
19 the MoD. It just seems slightly unusual; but the
20 substance of what he did was completely within the
22 Q. Yes. Well, no doubt there are good reasons for that.
23 Then perhaps at FAC4/16 at question 112, we are picking
24 it up at question 112, he was asked, this is his
25 evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee -- well
1 perhaps we ought to go up to question 110:
2 "Question: What are the ground rules for talking to
3 the press amongst you and your peers?
4 "Answer: Normally you have to have authorisation or
5 a request by the Ministry to interact in such a way.
6 "Mr Mackinlay: But you did not on this
8 "Answer: I did not.
9 "Question: Why not?
10 "Answer: I think you have to look back at my
11 history. I have been involved with the press for 10 to
12 12 years, primarily as an UNSCOM inspector, and when
13 I was a chief inspector I had responsibility for dealing
14 with the press. Since then I have been asked on many
15 occasions by both the United Nations and the Foreign
16 Office and the Ministry of Defence to provide interviews
17 both to British and to international press. As
18 a consequence of that, it is quite often follow ups on
19 clarification of issues with contact numbers and so one
20 responds to that."
21 That, I imagine, would not have caused you any
23 A. That depends what is the "this occasion" being referred
24 to by Mr Mackinlay.
25 Q. I think he is talking in fact about the contact with
1 Mr Gilligan.
2 A. In that case it would indeed concern me because it does
3 not fit, I am afraid, with what he has been doing for
4 the UN. It is a completely different type of meeting.
5 Q. And the distinction is Dr Kelly effectively was entitled
6 to follow up but only on technical matters, and when you
7 are going off on to a new issue --
8 A. It is not as simple as that. He appears to have had, on
9 his own account, two meetings with Andrew Gilligan which
10 took place off MoD premises, with nobody having any
11 knowledge about them. Even on Dr Kelly's account of
12 what took place at that interview, he clearly had
13 strayed beyond providing technical information of the
14 type being described there.
15 My interpretation, I am afraid, thinking back over
16 his history, is he could not have done that without
17 realising he had gone outside the scope of his
19 Q. Picking up one further answer he gave to the Foreign
20 Affairs Committee at FAC/4/26, question 176 --
21 A. Can I just elaborate on that, just to be clear? If it
22 is referring to the Gilligan interviews, neither of them
23 were cold calling. They were interviews pre-arranged,
24 which again is very different from the stuff that you
25 had been previously showing me.
1 Q. If it was the cold calling, then your previous answers
2 hold good. To the extent it is a pre-arranged meeting,
3 it is a different matter?
4 A. Very much so.
5 Q. It was not the context of Gilligan's meeting I was
6 asking you.
7 A. That is the context of that question that was asked by
8 Mr Mackinlay, which is why I asked you which occasion it
9 was referring to.
10 Q. At question 176 he was asked by Mr Pope, and this
11 specifically was Mr Gilligan:
12 "Question: When you met Mr Gilligan on 27 May did
13 you feel at the time that you were doing anything
14 untoward, that you were breaching the confidence that
15 was expected of you within your job?
16 "Answer: No, I think it has been agreed by the
17 Ministry of Defence there was no security breach
18 involved in the interactions I had."
19 That is still the position, no security breach?
20 A. There was no security breach.
21 Q. But your concern relates to?
22 A. My concern relates to the basic breach of confidence as
23 to how he is supposed to behave towards his employer and
24 the Government, since he works for the Government. But
25 there was never any suggestion of a security breach on
1 any of the information provided by Dr Kelly or indeed,
2 as far as I can see, on Andrew Gilligan's account of the
4 LORD HUTTON: I think that question and answer may have to
5 be read in the context that I think Dr Kelly said at one
6 stage that he had met Mr Gilligan so he could obtain
7 information from Mr Gilligan about conditions in Iraq.
8 I think that was part of the context in which that
9 question and answer took place.
11 MR DINGEMANS: Can I then deal with one specific question
12 relating to the naming of Dr Kelly? You had said that
13 there were no procedures in relation to someone in his
14 situation, as it were; is that right?
15 A. I am not quite sure how you would characterise his
16 "situation", but there is no rule about naming or not
17 naming individuals in general.
18 Q. Right.
19 A. Obviously you make your decision when you are making
20 a press statement or responding to the press in the
21 light of the circumstances. But we would normally
22 expect to provide whatever information is necessary to
23 make our statement credible and indeed, in the era of
24 freedom of information, to supply all information we
25 could do. In some circumstances there would be specific
1 reasons for not naming a person, either short-term or if
2 we could for hiding their identity for a longer period.
3 I gave you one example of that.
4 Q. Yes. Can I just take you to CAB/1/235? Just so that
5 you know, this is an extract from a press briefing given
6 by the Prime Minister's official spokesman. It is
7 towards the bottom of the page. This was given on
8 21st July 2003. If I can pick it up, it is about
9 ten lines up from the bottom or 15 lines up from the
11 "Put to him that the MoD's apparent readiness to
12 confirm Dr Kelly's name was problematic, the PMOS said
13 that this was an issue that Lord Hutton would no doubt
14 want to consider. That said [and this is the PMOS
15 continuing] the key point in all this was the fact that
16 relatively few people worked in Dr Kelly's area. There
17 had therefore been a strong likelihood that suspicion
18 would fall unfairly on to others. Asked who had made
19 the decision to confirm Dr Kelly's name, the PMOS said
20 the matter had been handled in accordance with MoD
21 procedures and had been overseen by those at the top of
22 the MoD in view of the fact that it had been the lead
24 Just to confirm with you, I mean the MoD procedures
25 related no doubt to interviewing him, to making --
1 A. Since it is the PMOS, I think you better ask the PMOS
2 what he meant. But I take it to refer to the general
3 procedures adopted by the MoD, whether it is in relation
4 to discipline or it might be in relation to media
5 handling. But there is no specific procedure about
6 naming individuals, quite the contrary.
7 Q. Thank you. After Dr Kelly's name became available to
8 you, you participated in the interview with Dr Kelly and
9 you wrote him a letter afterwards?
10 A. I did.
11 Q. Is this right: that the documents, note of the interview
12 and your letter, accurately reflect your involvement
13 with that?
14 A. With that particular interview, yes, of course.
15 Q. And then your letter?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. You do not appear to have had anything else directly to
18 do with Dr Kelly after that period of time.
19 A. Perhaps I should just sketch out a little bit more. My
20 involvement started on the evening of Thursday July 3.
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. I interviewed Dr Kelly on July 4th with Dr Brian Wells.
23 Q. Yes.
24 A. And I interviewed him again on Monday July 7th; and
25 I spoke to him on the telephone two or three times after
1 that. The last time, from memory, must have been on the
2 evening of the 8th, which is when the statement was
3 issued, just before the statement was issued. That was
4 my last significant involvement although -- and the last
5 time I spoke to Dr Kelly -- I provided one or two pieces
6 of information and advice to support appearances before
7 the Foreign Affairs Committee and the ISC later in the
8 week. Subsequent to his tragic death I have been
9 involved, in my responsibilities for the MoD welfare
10 organisation, in supervising support to his family.
11 Q. If I may, simply to try to keep the chronology of the
12 evidence, I will deal with others in relation to the
13 interviews on the 4th and 7th July because those are
14 well documented, and your letters. I do not appear to
15 have any notes of your telephone conversations with him,
16 so perhaps you could just briefly help his Lordship with
17 the gist of those conversations were. I think you said
18 your last telephone conversation was the evening of
19 8th July.
20 A. I have provided a statement to the Inquiry which
21 summarises this. Without reading it through, my main
22 conversations to him on the telephone were, I think, on
23 the morning of the 8th July, after I had interviewed him
24 for the second time. He had returned to RAF Honington
25 where he was conducting some training. At the end of
1 the second interview the day before we had agreed that
2 he could return and complete his training but I said to
3 him that it was quite likely that events would overtake
4 us, we might have to recall him and therefore, before he
5 began his training that morning, we would have
6 a telephone conversation to confirm that was not
7 required or otherwise. So I spoke to him at 8.30
8 roughly that morning to say, "Carry on with your
9 training and complete it". I then spoke to him --
10 Q. Sorry to interrupt you. That training was relating to
11 his ...
12 A. To his intended deployment to Iraq later in the month
13 of July, as part of the Iraqi survey group. This was
14 predeployment training for everybody who goes on that
16 Q. Thank you. Sorry to interrupt you.
17 A. Then I had a conversation with him in the afternoon at
18 around -- well, between 4.15 and 4.45. I cannot be
19 precise about it but I think it finished about 4.30 when
20 I was clearing with him over the telephone the statement
21 that was subsequently issued. And that was my last
22 conversation with him.
23 Q. Right. And there will be others who one can question
24 more directly about their conversations with him
25 relating to the support offered before his appearances
1 before the Committee?
2 A. Oh correct, yes.
3 Q. Subject to those aspects, is there anything else which
4 you know of the circumstances surrounding the death of
5 Dr Kelly which you can help Lord Hutton with?
6 A. In my witness statement, for example, I put an analysis
7 which I conducted after the first interview, which is
8 quite important, the development of how the Ministry of
9 Defence handled this, of whether or not it was likely
10 that Dr Kelly, on the evidence of his interview with me
11 and Dr Wells and comparison with the foreign affairs
12 hearing with Mr Gilligan, of whether or not Dr Kelly was
13 likely to be the "single source" described by
14 Mr Gilligan.
15 Q. That document you have provided?
16 A. I have.
17 Q. And we will produce the chronological sequence. But the
18 document speaks for itself, does it not?
19 A. I believe so, yes.
20 Q. Subject to that, is there anything else?
21 A. Perhaps I could help you with one of your earlier
22 enquiries. I was reflecting in the break about the
23 arcane grading systems and so on. Perhaps since you
24 were particularly interested in his pay, I think you
25 will find the pay he had as a DSTL level 9, whether or
1 not that counts as being within the Senior Civil
2 Service, the band is well within the band of pay that
3 would be available for a senior civil servant. So for
4 pay purposes he was indeed being paid at that sort of
5 level. It is just that he is not managed as a member of
6 the Senior Civil Service, he is not part of its
7 corporate programme, et cetera, et cetera.
8 Q. The distinction appears to have been, from what you were
9 saying before, tell me if I get this wrong, that
10 scientifically he was obviously at that level, it is
11 just that managerially, because scientists perhaps like
12 lawyers do not make the best managers, he was not at
13 that level.
14 A. He certainly had not had any management experience at
15 that level, that is true. I do not know about his
16 actually qualities as a manager.
17 MR CALDECOTT: Thank you very much.
18 LORD HUTTON: Mr Hatfield, may I ask you: you have said that
19 there is no specific procedure about naming the names of
20 civil servants, but would you say that there is
21 a general understanding that the names of civil servants
22 are not given to the media?
23 A. No, I would not say that. I would wish that there was
24 perhaps, but there is not. If a civil servant does
25 something that is of media interest, I would normally
1 expect to disclose the name, especially if I, as
2 I indicated in this case, think it is quite likely the
3 civil servant is likely to appear before a parliamentary
4 committee. There are many occasions where we would want
5 to keep the name back for as long as possible, and there
6 might also be occasions where if you hope that it is not
7 going to turn out to be a major media event or subject
8 to major media interest that by not disclosing a name
9 initially you will not need to later on. There is
10 certainly no presumption we do not name the people who
11 are involved in important events.
12 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
13 A. The only qualification I would give on that is we do
14 not, of course, normally publicise the outcome of
15 internal disciplinary matters. But this was not in
16 relation to an internal disciplinary matter primarily
17 that we made the statement.
18 LORD HUTTON: Yes. If I may just take a case to illustrate
19 a point in my mind. Suppose there was a debate in the
20 Ministry of Transport about road congestion and one
21 policy that was advocated was that you seek to put more
22 money into the railways to encourage people to travel on
23 railways. The other point of view was that you widen
24 the motorways to improve the flow of traffic. Suppose
25 there was a leak to the press, in general terms, that
1 there were two senior civil servants each of whom were
2 advocating their different policy and putting it to the
3 Minister and there was a conflict on this point in the
4 Ministry, and suppose the media came to the press
5 officer for that Ministry or that department and asked
6 for the names of the two civil servants. Now, in that
7 sort of case, would the names normally be given?
8 A. We would not normally disclose the names of civil
9 servants who advocated particular policies internally,
10 but that is not because it is their name we are
11 protecting, we are protecting the convention that we do
12 not give details of internal positions and advice to
13 Ministers. If one of those officials in your story had
14 been, as it were, caught, if I can put it that way,
15 leaking to the media and it had been established we felt
16 that individual was the source of the leak, we might
17 well have, in your story, confirmed this was the name of
18 the individual we had been talking to or whatever, you
19 know, the enquiry had got to.
20 LORD HUTTON: And that would be done on what basis? What
21 would be the thinking behind the decision to disclose
22 that name?
23 A. I think it would depend why we were making the statement
24 in the first place. It is not that we are making
25 a statement to name an individual. We are making
1 a statement about roads, or stories that had been run
2 about roads in your story. If it is necessary, either
3 for the purposes of the immediate statement or in the
4 light of what will happen the next day, as it were, to
5 identify the individual then we would identify it. If
6 it is not, we would not gratuitously identify an
8 LORD HUTTON: And if it were appreciated that putting the
9 name into the public domain would attract perhaps
10 considerable criticism of that civil servant, is that
11 a consideration that would come into the decision?
12 A. It certainly is, but so would be the reverse, that in
13 certain circumstances, which I think certainly applied
14 in this particular case, we would be just as likely to
15 be criticised if we suppressed the name. Indeed, I am
16 afraid I cannot resist making this comment: I find some
17 difficulty in squaring the press' desire to know the
18 name of Dr Kelly with the press' criticism of us for
19 providing it to them.
20 LORD HUTTON: Yes. You said that the civil servant who had
21 appeared to be the source of the information might be
22 a witness before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee or
23 the House of Commons. At the time the decision was
24 taken to issue the Ministry of Defence statement, the
25 Committee had not been informed at that time, had they,
1 of --
2 A. I am not sure about that. You would have to ask one of
3 the other witnesses at what point the Committee was
5 LORD HUTTON: But part of the thinking in the Ministry, as
6 you have explained, was that this civil servant might
7 well be called to give evidence before that Committee?
8 A. It was my personal thinking from the moment that I first
9 saw the papers on Friday 4th July, since Dr Kelly's
10 contact with Andrew Gilligan clearly could be seen as
11 being related to the evidence Mr Gilligan had given to
12 the Foreign Affairs Committee, regardless of whether
13 they actually turned out to be the same person, it
14 seemed to me highly likely he would be called, from the
15 moment I saw the letter alongside the evidence given by
16 Mr Gilligan, because it was covering the very similar
17 territory, even leaving the omissions or at least the
18 bits that do not overlap in the two stories.
19 LORD HUTTON: I think you have indicated, correct me if this
20 is incorrect, that perhaps part of the thinking in the
21 Ministry was that the press would narrow down
22 Mr Gilligan's source to perhaps three or four persons in
23 the Government service and that if the name of the
24 particular civil servant were not given, that would
25 perhaps subject a number of people to criticism or make
1 them the focus of media attention?
2 A. That is quite correct; and they were doing that or
3 getting quite close to that even before -- well, even on
4 the Saturday.
5 LORD HUTTON: Yes. I see.
6 You refer to Dr Kelly going to this course on
7 I think 2nd July in preparation for deployment to Iraq.
8 Were you concerned, as director of personnel, with that
9 appointment and with that posting?
10 A. In what respect, my Lord?
11 LORD HUTTON: Would you have been asked about it? Would you
12 have given your approval?
13 A. I was only asked in the sense of because of the events
14 in which Dr Kelly had found himself caught up at that
15 point, I was asked at the end particularly of the second
16 interview on the Monday whether it was sensible to
17 proceed with that. Indeed, we had a preliminary
18 discussion on the Friday about whether he was likely to
19 go to Iraq. In the normal circumstances I would have
20 had no direct involvement. But the issue was
21 essentially, because of what he was now caught up with,
22 was he likely to go. The answer was: yes, subject to
24 LORD HUTTON: I see. I think you have stated already that
25 view was conveyed to Dr Kelly?
1 A. It certainly was conveyed to Dr Kelly by myself, and
2 subsequently I think arrangements were made indeed to
3 the extent of getting his plane tickets.
4 LORD HUTTON: Yes. So up until his sad death it would be
5 your opinion that Dr Kelly thought that he would be
6 deployed again to Iraq?
7 A. Yes, within days.
8 LORD HUTTON: I see. And when you spoke to him about the
9 issuing of the Ministry of Defence statement, which
10 referred to an unnamed civil servant, what was his
11 attitude about that, when you spoke on the telephone?
12 A. I think that both he and I conducted that conversation
13 on the basis that his name would inevitably come out
14 really quite quickly. As you see, the statement does
15 not name him but it provides quite a lot of information
16 about him, which he knew was going to be in there; and
17 we had conducted all our interviews since I first met
18 him on the Friday on the basis that in some form or
19 other, and that partly depended on whether we could
20 establish he was not the source for Andrew Gilligan's
21 report, this is going to become public.
22 Quite simply, I mean we had already done something
23 unusual in the Ministry of Defence. We had summonsed
24 him to a meeting in my office. We called him back from
25 RAF Honington for the second interview. It would not
1 have taken much investigative journalism to have found
2 out that Dr Kelly was attracting some unusual attention
3 inside the Ministry of Defence.
4 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much. I am most grateful for
5 the help you have given me.
6 Now, Mr Dingemans, would you like to rise now?
7 MR DINGEMANS: I am in your hands. We have Mr Lamb, who is
8 available to start giving evidence on the dossier. He
9 will be coming back later in the week to give other
10 evidence but he is available and has been since
11 12 o'clock.
12 LORD HUTTON: I think as we have had a number of short
13 adjournments we should proceed.
14 MR DINGEMANS: Yes. Mr Lamb please.
15 While we are waiting, we might as well get DOS/1/55.
16 MR PATRICK LAMB (called)
17 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
18 Q. Mr Lamb, could you tell his Lordship your full name?
19 A. My full name is Patrick Lamb.
20 Q. And what is your current occupation?
21 A. I am presently the deputy head of the Counter
22 Proliferation Department in the Foreign and Commonwealth
24 Q. In that capacity did you work at all with Dr Kelly?
25 A. I worked very closely with David Kelly, in particular
1 since 2000 when I was appointed to the post of deputy
2 head of the department, because at that time
3 responsibility came to me in addition to overall
4 responsibility for arms control issues related to
5 chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, matters
6 relating to the UNMOVIC section within our department.
7 Q. You are going to be asked later on in the week about
8 your other dealings with Dr Kelly. Can I just deal now
9 with the dossier?
10 A. Certainly.
11 Q. Were you involved yourself in the production of the
12 Government's 24th September 2002 dossier?
13 A. I was involved at an early stage in the course of 2002
14 with preparation of the historical elements, the
15 historical briefing paper that formed part of that
16 eventual dossier that related to the history of the
17 UNSCOM inspections in Iraq in the course of the 1990s.
18 Q. Can we turn to page 56, which has the contents
19 summarised? A document should be coming up just in
20 front of you which will give you the contents. The
21 foreword by the Prime Minister you obviously were not
22 involved with.
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. Nor the executive summary. Can you tell us in part 1
25 what, if anything, you had to do with?
1 A. In part 1 at an earlier stage in the year I reviewed the
2 situation with respect to the current position of the
3 Iraq's WMD programmes.
4 Q. So that is pages 17 to 33 or 17 to 32, as it were?
5 A. Excuse me. I would say, yes, 17 to 32.
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. But the direct involvement was with pages 33 to, I think
8 in effect, 41; and that was the history of the weapons
10 Q. Right. And did you have anything to do with the
11 historic Iraqi programmes between 1971 to 1998, what is
12 chapter 2 if you look at the dossier?
13 A. No. The focus of my work and my direct involvement
14 really was on that briefing paper that was going to be
15 focused on the UNSCOM inspections and, as I say, the
16 history of those inspections.
17 Q. So that is really pages 33 on?
18 A. Correct.
19 Q. Just to give you the title of that, if we turn to
20 DOS/1/88, here we see page 33 of the dossier "History of
21 UN Weapons Inspections".
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. This is the beginning of your contribution?
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. When did you produce your contribution?
1 A. The contribution was taken forward in the following way:
2 the then head of the UNMOVIC section was asked by the
3 Cabinet Office to produce a briefing paper on the
4 history of the UNSCOM inspections, which he did
5 in April 2002.
6 Q. Who was that who was asked?
7 A. The official in question was Mr Peter Spoor.
8 Q. He then delegated the actual writing of it to you, is
9 that right?
10 A. No, Mr Spoor produced the initial text on the history of
11 the UNSCOM inspections. He showed the text to Dr Kelly
12 and to me. At that point a decision was made that it
13 would be helpful if we perhaps included a specific case
14 study on the history of the Iraqi biological weapons
15 programme, which was, of course, David Kelly's very
16 specific area of competence and expertise.
17 The paper, therefore, went forward in that form
18 initially into the Cabinet Office and the meetings which
19 then took place in the Cabinet Office on the basis of
20 that text. Mr Spoor left at the end of April 2002; and
21 in the absence of an immediate successor, I therefore
22 took over the drafting role in the event that any
23 further material was required. And following meetings
24 in the Cabinet Office it was felt that we could
25 supplement it with further information that would, as
1 I recall, focus on the extent of Iraqi deception and
2 concealment; that would focus on the presidential
4 Q. Right.
5 A. And also that would bring in a further historical
6 element, namely the Desert Fox operation in 1998.
7 Q. When were those later additions made?
8 A. They were made in the course of May 2002.
9 Q. Right. Now I think you have disclosed that Dr Kelly was
10 involved in April 2002 in the first draft.
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. Was he involved in the May additions?
13 A. Yes, he was. The primary responsibility, as I said,
14 with drafting actually fell both to Mr Spoor and then
15 subsequently to me. But at all times we would show the
16 text to David and we would very much rely on his
17 expertise and knowledge, as the source and person who
18 could verify the accuracy of what we were producing.
19 Q. That was because of his involvement in the UNSCOM
21 A. Very much so. He obviously had direct involvement.
22 Often, I can recall, if I had to make a choice between
23 a textural choice and Dr Kelly, I would often back
24 Dr Kelly ahead of the textural source. That is to say,
25 one would normally go to an UNSCOM document and use that
1 as the basis for one's information, but I do recall on
2 certain instances, even though I had textural
3 information and textural support, I still asked David to
4 confirm, such was his expertise and such was our
5 confidence in him.
6 Q. And as far as your own writing was concerned, he then
7 looked at every word you drafted, and reviewed it with
9 A. The additions -- yes, I would say that is probably
10 accurate. Often much of this was uncontentious. As
11 I say, it is largely historical and therefore not
12 subject to any controversy, insofar as it is now part of
13 the historical record. But occasionally, and inevitably
14 when one is producing something that is a summary -- it
15 is important obviously to accurately reflect the whole.
16 And I would often put past him, sometimes on the
17 telephone if need be, a particular sentence or
18 a particular phrase, especially if following the
19 Cabinet Office meetings there was some discussion of
20 a particular point.
21 Q. Those Cabinet Office meetings that you have referred to
22 were in, I think, May 2002; you told us about that.
23 A. Correct, yes.
24 Q. Were there any subsequent Cabinet Office meetings that
25 you were aware of?
1 A. There were subsequent meetings in May, and obviously
2 in June, because as far as I can recall, my work and the
3 work of my department ended, directly at least, with the
4 historical element of the dossier around about 20th June
5 when a version of the briefing papers was produced.
6 Q. Right.
7 A. I am aware obviously, excuse me, that there were later
8 Cabinet Office meetings obviously on the dossier.
9 Q. Yes. But you were not involved?
10 A. I was not involved with those later Cabinet Office
11 meetings, no.
12 Q. But it appears that David Kelly had further involvement,
13 but that was not through you; is that right?
14 A. He had further involvement through me in one respect,
15 which is that after the decision by the Prime Minister
16 on 3rd September that there would be a public dossier,
17 there was obviously a revision of all of the constituent
18 parts that we had variously put together in the Foreign
19 Office and elsewhere. And my colleague in the Counter
20 Proliferation Department, who by then had been appointed
21 to be head of the UNMOVIC section, received a draft of
22 the historical element on 9th September which he showed
23 and shared with Dr Kelly. So Dr Kelly saw that element,
24 I believe, on 9th September. But it was the only
25 element of the dossier that he saw in the Foreign Office
1 that I am aware of.
2 Q. Through the Foreign Office?
3 A. Through the Foreign Office.
4 Q. And the Defence Intelligence Service you had nothing to
5 do with?
6 A. Clearly we worked very closely our colleagues in the
7 Defence Intelligence Services, but I was unaware of any
8 meetings that took place with the defence intelligence
9 staff involving Dr Kelly.
10 Q. And whether or not he had any involvement through the
11 Defence Intelligence Service?
12 A. I was aware that Dr Kelly spoke to and liaised with
13 colleagues in the defence intelligence staff, obviously,
14 but I was unaware at the time that he had any contacts
15 relating to the dossier through the defence intelligence
17 Q. I am not going to ask you to name the persons in the
18 Defence Intelligence Service but you have mentioned
19 someone in the Foreign Office who liaised with him --
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. -- with the September draft. Are you in a position to
22 give me his name?
23 A. Certainly, yes. That individual, that person is
24 Mr Mark Peters.
25 Q. Right. He was working for you?
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. In tidying up the drafts.
3 A. It came through, as I recall, very quickly and had to be
4 turned round very quickly. Mark saw it, I saw it, but
5 it was a very rapid revision/review of the work that we
6 had, in effect, completed a month and a half earlier,
7 around about 20th June.
8 Q. Perhaps after lunch I can come back to what you drafted
9 and what Dr Kelly drafted in May and June, and then the
10 detail of what you had in September.
11 A. Certainly.
12 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.
13 (1.00 pm)
14 (The short adjournment)
15 (2.00 pm)
16 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Lamb, I was asking you some questions
17 about the dossier. Can you look at CAB/3/82 which is
18 going to come up on your screen. This is the earliest
19 version of the dossier we have been given. It is dated
20 20th June 2002. If you look at the top, it says:
21 "1 document version, 20th June 2002."
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. That talks about the history of UN weapons inspections
24 in Iraq. Is that the document to which you referred
25 earlier this morning?