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The Hutton Inquiry
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© Parliamentary Copyright 2004

CHAPTER 7

Issues relating to Dr Kelly's meeting with Mr Gilligan in the Charing Cross Hotel on 22 May 2003

  229.  These issues are the following:

(a) What did Dr Kelly say to Mr Gilligan in the course of the meeting?

(b) At the time of his meeting with Mr Gilligan and discussing the dossier with him was Dr Kelly having a meeting which was unauthorised and in breach of the Civil Service rules of procedure which applied to him?

(c) At the time of the meeting or subsequently to it did Dr Kelly realise that the meeting was unauthorised and in breach of the Civil Service rules of procedure which applied to him?

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(a) What did Dr Kelly say to Mr Gilligan in the course of the meeting?

  230.  In his evidence to the Inquiry Mr Gilligan said that in the course of his meeting with Dr Kelly on 22 May in the Charing Cross hotel he made notes on his personal organiser (an electronic notebook). The version of his notes which Mr Gilligan first referred to in his evidence was as follows (Exhibit JP/15):

20030522 kelly 22.5.03 transformed wk befo € re pub to make it sexier

the classic was the 45 mins. mst thn €gs inndossier wre dbl sc but that was single-source one source €e said it took 4 minutes to set up a missile assembly, that wa - €s misinterpreted

most people in intel werent happy with it, € beause it didnt refect the considere view they were putting f€orward

campbell

real info but unr, incl agaisnt ur wishes

no €t in orig draft - dull, he asked ifanything else cd go in

u f €rom africa - not nuke xpert but was v suspect, documents certa €inly forges,

10-15 yrs go there was a lot of info, with the c €oncelment anddeception op there was far less infomration

it w €as small because you dnt conceal a lg prog, and because it was € actually quite hard toimport things. the sanctions were effect €tive, they did limit programme

no usable wpns

in one of the ja €n - chemical reactors not destroyed by unscom, gla lined chamb €er to promote chme rections - were being used again by the ira €qis, recovered, taken

at al muthanna, not properly destoyed b €y un, recovred y iraqis, taken to fallujah, and used for no-ba €nned purposes.

the 18 chem missiles wre reportedby blix, but €downplayed blix thought they wre leftovers

i thin it 30pc €likely that iraq had active cw prog in the 6 m to a year like €lier that ther was bw

not much coming out of detainees, desp €ite financal inventives … they are in qt gd conds in me

there €has been prolif - not in terms of people walking across the i€raqi border with 20 shells, but supply chain knowedge, -plans

€isg headed by a major general, below him 2 one starts, british €an australian

we dont have a gt deal of knowldege than we ha €d before

1500 - 100 brits, 10-20 aussies - not all experts, ab €out 20 of the brits are

it is a big handicap not to be able t €o draw on the eertise of russian and german et exprts

isq baY

kelly cont real debate as to w €hether the mobile labs are what they appear to be - i is an od €d pieceof kit, feeling is it cdbe made into a fermenter, but i €s it a fermenter

enormosu qual of documents to be explouted- €

saadi and taha were taken out of the problm … because they €interfaced with the un

weve got 10-20 in custody..

why didnt € they use them? in the early stges, you just have to look at t €he weather conds, by the end the c2 was in total disarray.

hi €s prog was small - he couldnt have killed very many people, ev €en if everything had gone right for him - not really md in tru €e meaning of ord

british 1-star is john deverell, kelly will Y be senior brit inspector Y%

  231.  This was an abbreviated note. In order to assist the Inquiry Mr Gilligan expanded this note in order to give a fuller version of abbreviated words and to correct obvious typographical errors. This expanded version was as follows:

transformed week before publication to make it sexier

the classic was the 45 mins most things inn dossier were double source but that was single-source. one source said it took 45 minutes to set up a missile assembly, that was misinterpreted..

most people in intelligence weren't happy with it, because it didn't reflect the considered view they were putting forward

campbell

real info but unreliable, included against our wishes

not in original draft - dull, he asked if anything else could go in

uranium from Africa - not nuke expert but was very suspect, documents certainly forgeries,

10-15 years ago there was a lot of information, with the concealment and deception operation there was far less information

it was small because you don't conceal a large programme, and because it was actually quite hard to import things. the sanctions were effective, they did limit programme

no usable weapons

in one of the january - chemical reactors not destroyed by unscom, glass lined chamber to promote chemical reactions - were being used again by the Iraqis, recovered, taken

at al mutahanna, not properly destroyed by un, recovered by Iraqis, taken to fallujah, and used for no-banned purposes

the 18 chemical missiles were reported by blix, but downplayed..blix thought they were leftovers

I think it 30percent likely that iraq had active chemical weapons programme in the

6 months to a year

likelier that there was biological weapons

not much coming out of detainees, despite financial incentives.. they are

in quite good conditions

in middle east

there has been proliferation - not in terms of people walking across the Iraqi border with 20 shells, but supply chain knowledge, - plans

iraq survey group headed by a major general, below him 2 one starts, british and australian

we don't have a great deal of knowledge than we had before

1500 - 100 brits, 10-20 aussies - not all experts, about 20 of the brits are

it is a big handicap not to be able to draw on the expertise of russian and german et experts

isq ba

real debate as to whether the mobile labs are what they appear to be - it is an odd piece of kit, feeling is it could be made into a fermenter, but is it a fermenter

enormous qual of documents to be explouted

saadi and taha were taken out of the problem..because they interfaced with the un

we've got 10-20 in custody

why didn't they use them? in the early stages, you just have to look at the weather conditions, by the end the c2 was in total disarray.

his programme was small - he couldn't have killed very many people, even if everything had gone right for him - not really mass destruction in true meaning of word

british 1-star is john deverell, kelly will be senior brit inspector

  232.  In his evidence Mr Gilligan said that on the next day, 23 May, he made a manuscript note of his conversation with Dr Kelly:

[12 August, page 29, line 20]

A. The first thing I did was I sat down and did a sort of manuscript note of my full recollection of the conversation, because the trouble with making notes on one of these little keyboards is, as you see, they are abbreviated, so while it was still in fresh in my mind I actually sat down and did a full manuscript note of what I remembered my questions had been and what his answers had been; and the answers, the sentences are slightly fleshed out a little. Some of the sentences in the notes were abbreviated and these sentences fleshed them out. So that was the first thing I did.

  233.  However Mr Gilligan said in evidence that he could not now find that note and that he thought he had mislaid it. Mr Gilligan said that he had offered the Today programme the story about Dr Kelly and that the programme wanted a summary of Dr Kelly's main quotes and he then sent to a producer of the Today programme a note of Dr Kelly's main quotes on 28 May which was as follows:

WHAT MY MAN SAID

Q. What about the Blair dossier {Sept 2002}? When we last met {in spring 2002} you said the dossier wouldn't tell us anything we didn't already know.

A. Until the week before it was just the same as I told you. It was transformed in the week before it was published, to make it sexier.

Q. What do you mean?

A. The classic was the statement that WMD were ready for use within 45 minutes. Most things in the dossier were double-source but that was single source. And we believed that the source was wrong. He said it took 45 minutes to construct a missile assembly and that was misinterpreted {in the dossier} to mean that WMD could be deployed in 45 minutes. What we thought it actually meant was that they could launch a conventional missile in 45 minutes. There was no evidence that they had loaded missiles with WMD, or could do so anything like that quickly.

Q. So how did this transformation happen?

A. Campbell.

Q. What do you mean? They made it up?

A. No, it was real information. But it was included in the dossier against our wishes because it wasn't reliable. It was a single source and it was not reliable.

He said Downing Street had asked if there was anything else on seeing the dull original dossier and had been told about this and other things.

Other examples - he mentioned the African uranium, although said he had no personal knowledge of that because he doesn't do nuclear.

Other quotes: "What you have to understand is that 10-15 years ago there was a lot of information. With the concealment and deception operation {by the Iraqis} there was far less material."

"I believe it is 30 per cent likely there was a CW programme in the six months before the war, and more likely that there was a BW programme, but it was small because you couldn't conceal a larger programme. The sanctions were actually quite effective. They did limit the programme."

"Most people in intelligence weren't happy with it {the dossier}, because it didn't reflect the considered view they were putting forward."

On the aftermath: "We don't have a great deal more information yet than we had before. We have not get (sic) very much out of the detainees yet."

  234.  After Mr Gilligan had first given evidence to the Inquiry on 12 August it emerged from an inspection of his personal organiser carried out by two computer experts, Professor Anthony Sammes instructed by the Inquiry and Mr Edward Wilding instructed by Mr Gilligan who gave evidence on 18 September, that there were two versions of his notes of his conversation with Dr Kelly. It appeared that the note on his personal organiser to which Mr Gilligan had referred when he had first given evidence and which is set out in paragraph 230 above was not the first note which he had made but that there was an earlier note which was as follows (Exhibit JP/11):

20030521 kelly 22.5.03 in one of the jan - €chemical reactors not destroyed by unscom, gla lined chamber €to promote chme rections - were being used again by the iraqis €, recovered, taken at al muthanna, not properly destoyed by u €n, recovred y iraqis, taken to fallujah, and used for no-banne €d purposes.

the 18 chem missles wre reportedby blix, but do €wnplayed …blix thought they wre leftovers

i thin it 30pc lik €ely that iraq had active cw prog in the 6 m to a year likely €that ther was

not much coming out of detainees, despite finan €cal inventives …they are

the dossier was transformed in the € wek before it was published, to make it sexier

the classic w €as the 45 mins …one source said it to took 4 minutes to set up a € rocket launcher … and that was misinterpreted

i alwsy said t €he programme was small

most people in intel werent happy with € it, beause it didnt refect the considere view they were putti €ng forward

45 min was single-source

10-15 yrs go there was a €lot of info, with the concelment anddeception op there was far € less infomration

iraq survey group- 1500 - six months to 2 y €ears

war was a tragic failure of diplomacy, no direct ffort t €o engg iraq

it was a football for everyone

it was small becau €se you dnt conceal a lg prog, and because it was actually quit €e hard toimport things

the sanctions were effective, they di €d limit programme

saddam

there has been proliferation - not € in terms of people walking across the iraqi border with 20 sh€ells, but supply chain knowedge,-plans

isg headed by a major €general, below him 2 one starts, british an australian

we don €t have a gt deal of knowldege than we had before

1500 - 100 b €rits, 10-20 aussies- not all experts, about 20 of the brits ar €e

it is a big handicap not to be able to draw on the eertise €of russian and german et exprts

real debate as to whether th €e mobile labs are what they appear to be - i is an odd pieceof € kit, feeling is it cdbe made into a fermenter, but is it a feY rmenter

isq ba Y

kelly cont enormosu qual of do €cuments to be explouted

saadi and taha were taken out of the € problem …because they interfaced with the un

weve got 10-20 €in custody

why didnt they use them? in the early stges, you j €ust have to look at the weather conds, by the end the c2 was i €n total disarray.

his arsenal was small - he couldnt have kil €led very many people, even if everything had gone right for hi €m

british 1-star is john deverall, kelly will be senior brit Y inspector Y4

  235.  There are two significant differences between these two versions of the note. The earlier version is dated in the top left hand corner 20030521 indicating that it was made on 21 May 2003, and it does not contain the name "Campbell", whereas the later version to which Mr Gilligan referred when he first gave evidence is dated in the top left hand corner 2003 05 22 and contains the name "Campbell".

  236.  When he was recalled on 18 September to give evidence to explain these two versions of the notes Mr Gilligan's evidence was as follows:

[18 September, page 192, line 14]

Q. Can you tell us when JP15 was created, first of all?

A. Yes. JP15 was created at the meeting with David Kelly. There were two saves of this file in the organiser. The one on the left that you see which has the date of the 21st on it, and the one on the right which has the date of the 22nd, indicating that the organiser's clock crossed midnight during the meeting. The one on the right, the 22nd, is the final saved version of the notes taken at that meeting.

Q. When did you create that document?

A. At the end of the meeting with David Kelly, when I was agreeing the quotes I would use with him. It was the result of the checks I did with Dr Kelly at the end of the meeting. It overwrote the version of 21st May.

..........

[18 September, page 197, line 1]

MS ROGERS: Can I just ask you this: as you are taking notes during the conversation, are you getting down every word verbatim?

A. No.

Q. So on the text on the right-hand page we see the words "[most things in] dossier were [double source] but that was single-source", and on the left-hand side of the page in the paragraph marked 1 those words are not there but there are three dots.

A. That is right.

Q. Can you explain the change?

A. Yes. Essentially this is me going over the quotes I wanted to use with David Kelly. I read them to him and he expanded on them for me in a couple of points. For instance, in that section about the 45 minutes, you will see that the original text says "the classic was the 45 [minutes] … one source said it took 4" should be 45 minutes "to set up a rocket launcher … and that was misinterpreted".

When I read back that quote he said "the classic was the 45 minutes" was fine; and then he said: Yes, most things in the dossier were double source but that was single source, and he asked me to change "rocket launcher" to "missile assembly", so - which I did. And the rest of the quote is as he originally gave it.

Q. Looking at the second paragraph on the right-hand page, can you look over to the left-hand side and about a third of the way down you see the words "most people in [intelligence] weren't happy". So will you put a 2 beside that? We know that there are no changes there. Paragraphs 3 and 4 and 5 do not appear on the left-hand page. Can you explain why it is that they do not appear on the left but they do appear on the right?

A. Yes. This is the passage about Campbell, among other things. I cannot remember how far into the conversation that Campbell came up. This suggests it came up near the end, in the quote checking process, but I cannot be absolutely sure about that. What I do know is that when we were going over the checks then the words that appear there were spoken by David Kelly. We expanded on this section. He said - this is when he made the point about it being real information but unreliable and "included against our wishes".

LORD HUTTON: I am sorry, does that mean that the name "Campbell", whether it was first uttered by you or by Dr Kelly, only arose when you were going through, at the end, with Dr Kelly, what he had already told you?

A. I cannot remember why I did not note it in the first version. It may be that he was going too fast, I did not get it down the first time. But what happened at the end was that the - that when we were going over the quotes I was asking him whether there were - whether I could use the Campbell quote, as I mentioned in my earlier evidence, and he said the words that appear in those notes.

LORD HUTTON: May it have been that the word "Campbell" was not uttered by you or by Dr Kelly until you were going over what he had previously told you at the end of your discussion?

A. That may be the case; but again, at this distance of four months I cannot remember. I was going on the JP15 note, which is the only sort of extant version in the organiser.

LORD HUTTON: But why does "Campbell" then appear towards the start of that note?

A. This is - the notes are - the notes are in the order of - in which I discussed them with Dr Kelly, the quotes. Clearly the key quote of the exchange from my point of view was "transformed the week before it was published to make it sexier" and the second most important quote was "the classic was the 45 minutes". Those were the first two quotes I sought to check with David Kelly. So there the second, the JP15 version, shows the order in which I discussed them with Dr Kelly when I was checking them.

  237.  After the two computer experts and Mr Gilligan (for the second time) had given evidence on 18 September the computer experts at the request of the Inquiry made efforts by a specially devised computer software programme to access Mr Gilligan's personal organiser in order to show the sequence in which the files were generated regardless of their position in the memory as their recorded date. However it has not been possible for them to arrive at any positive conclusion on this matter.

  238.  Mr Gilligan said in his evidence on 12 August that it was he who introduced the term "sexier" into the conversation:

[12 August, page 25, line 16]

A. We started by talking about other things and then we got on to the dossier; and I said: What happened to it? When we last met you were saying it was not very exciting. He said: Yes, that is right, until the last week it was just as I told you. It was transformed in the week before publication. I said: To make it sexier? And he said: Yes, to make it sexier. Then I said: What do you mean? Can you give me some examples? And he said the classic - he did not use the word example, he said the classic was the 45 minutes, the statement that WMD could be ready in 45 minutes, and most things in the dossier were single source.

But Mr Gilligan was definite in his evidence that it was Dr Kelly and not he who introduced the name "Campbell" into the discussion:

[12 August, page 26, line 24]

Q. Then there is the entry which is just a single word, "Campbell". Was there any question that gave rise to that entry?

A. Yes, it was something like: how did this transformation happen?

Q. Right.

A. And then the answer was that, one word.

Q. He said just "Campbell"?

A. Yes.

Q. And what question led to the next entry?

A. Well I was surprised and I said: What, you know, Campbell made it up? They made it up? And he said: No, it was real information but it was unreliable and it was in the dossier against our wishes.

LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Mr Gilligan, looking at the first paragraph, you put the question: Was it to make it sexier? And Dr Kelly replied: Yes, to make it sexier?

A. Yes, to make it sexier, yes, so he adopted my words.

LORD HUTTON: Now are you clear in your recollection that you asked how was it transformed, and that the name Campbell was first spoken by Dr Kelly?

A. Yes, absolutely.

LORD HUTTON: It was not a question by you: was Campbell involved in this?

A. No, it was him. He raised the subject of the 45 minutes and he raised the subject of Campbell.

  239.  In his letter to his line manager, Dr Wells, dated 30 June 2003 Dr Kelly wrote:

The issue of 45 minutes arose in terms of the threat (aerial versus land launch) and I stated that I did not know what it refers to (which I do not). He asked why it should be in the dossier and I replied probably for impact. He raised the issue of Alastair Campbell and since I was not involved in the process (not stated by me) I was unable to comment. This issue was not discussed at any length and was essentially an aside.

  240.  Ms Olivia Bosch, who had been a UN Inspector in Iraq in 1996, was a trusted friend and colleague of Dr Kelly and she frequently spoke to him on the telephone. In her evidence she told the Inquiry what Dr Kelly had said to her about his meeting with Mr Gilligan:

[4 September, page 10, line 11]

It was another time towards mid May he told me he had an unauthorised meeting with Andrew Gilligan, someone he had met a couple of times before but did not know that well. And he said he was - he was taken aback by the way Andrew Gilligan tried to elicit information from him. I said: yes, but that is what journalists do. He understood that, but he said he had never experienced it in the way that Gilligan had tried to do so, by a name game was the term.

Q. Just pause there for a moment. Did he explain what he meant by "name game"?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, what did he say?

A. Okay, and this was with reference to the September dossier and I do not recall exactly what aspect of it. It was the name game bit was what reminded - what sticks in my mind. He said that Gilligan wanted to play a name game as to who was responsible for inserting information into the dossier, and that if I understand correctly Gilligan said to him: I will name you some names. Apparently David had said that Gilligan very quickly - the first name he mentioned very quickly and immediately was Campbell. David told me he could neither confirm nor deny. David said as he was a civil servant he could not provide Government names, least of all to a journalist. We kind of laughed there. Nor could he deny as Gilligan would continue listing names or could continue listing names until the right name came up.

Q. Did Dr Kelly then say what he had actually said to Gilligan?

A. Yes, then he said what he actually said. Because he could not confirm or deny but he thought he had to give an answer so he said "maybe".

Q. So in other words what had happened is Gilligan had come up with the name Campbell and then Dr Kelly had said: maybe?

A. Right.

LORD HUTTON: Did you understand if Mr Gilligan had given more names - you said he came up almost immediately with that name.

A. Right. It is part of this name game that Campbell - sorry, that Gilligan had quickly put up Campbell. It did not give David time really to think about what was going on in that way.

LORD HUTTON: Did you understand that was the first name?

A. Yes, the very first name.

MR KNOX: I just want to get this right: did Dr Kelly say he had given Gilligan this explanation about not being able to name civil servants or did Dr Kelly say: he said Campbell, I said maybe, and the reason I did that is because I am a civil servant.

A. I am not clear. He might have said to Gilligan that he cannot give names but I am not clear. I cannot remember exactly.

Q. You cannot remember precisely what he said he had said to Gilligan?

A. Yes, right on that. In terms of this kind of process.

  241.  Having heard and considered Mr Gilligan's evidence about how there came to be two versions of his discussion with Dr Kelly on his personal organiser, and how he lost his manuscript note which he made the next day, and how his memory of his discussion with Dr Kelly is not now entirely clear, I have considerable doubt as to how reliable Mr Gilligan's evidence is as regards what Dr Kelly said to him and, in the state of the evidence, including the absence of any conclusive evidence from the two computer experts, I am unable to come to a definite conclusion as to whether or not Mr Gilligan's account of how he made the two versions of the notes of his discussion with Dr Kelly is correct. It may be that his account of how he came to make the two versions of his discussion on his personal organiser in the course of his meeting with Dr Kelly is basically correct. It may be that the fact that the first version is dated 21 May and the second version is dated 22 May is due to the clock on the personal organiser being slow and that the clock changed from 21 May to 22 May in the course of the meeting.

  242.  On the question whether in their discussion Mr Gilligan first suggested the name "Campbell" to Dr Kelly or whether it was Dr Kelly who first spoke the name "Campbell" to Mr Gilligan, it may be that it was Dr Kelly who first spoke the name "Campbell", having regard to the evidence of Ms Susan Watts, whom I regard as an accurate and reliable witness. In a telephone conversation which she had with Dr Kelly on 7 May 2003 she made a shorthand note that Dr Kelly said to her regarding the 45 minutes claim " …mistake to put in … A Campbell seeing something in there … NB single source … but not corroborated … sounded good." I think it is also reasonably clear from the transcript of Ms Watts telephone conversation with Dr Kelly on 30 May that he accepted in that conversation that he had mentioned the name of Alastair Campbell to her in relation to the 45 minutes claim in their earlier telephone conversation on 7 May. The relevant parts of the transcript are:

SW: But what intrigued me and which made, prompted me to ring you, (huh) was the quotes yesterday on the Today programme about the 45 minutes part of the dossier

DK: yep. We spoke about this before of course …

SW: We have

DK: I think you know my views on that.

SW: Yes, I've looked back at my notes and you were actually quite specific at that time - I may have missed a trick on that one, but err

(both laugh)

SW: you were more specific than the source on the Today programme - not that that necessarily means that it's not one and the same person …but, um in fact you actually referred to Alastair Campbell in that conversation …

DK: err yep yep … with you?...

SW: yes

DK: I mean I did talk to Gavin Hewitt yesterday - he phoned me in New York, so he may have picked up on what I said … because I would have said exactly the same as I said to you …

SW: Yes, so he presumably decided not to name Alastair Campbell himself but just to label this as Number 10 …

DK: yep yep

..........

SW: ok … just back momentarily on the 45 minute issue …I'm feeling like I ought to just explore that a little bit more with you …the um … err. So would it be accurate then, as you did in that earlier conversation, to say that it was Alastair Campbell himself who …?

DK: No I can't. All I can say is the Number Ten press office. I've never met Alastair Campbell so I cant …. (SW interrupts: they seized on that ?) But … I think Alastair Campbell is synonymous with that press office because he's responsible for it.

Therefore the fact that Dr Kelly had mentioned the name of Alastair Campbell to Ms Watts in relation to the 45 minutes claim in their telephone conversation on 7 May tends to suggest that it might have been Dr Kelly who introduced the name "Campbell" into his discussion with Mr Gilligan.

  243.  In his evidence Mr Gavin Hewitt, whom I also regard as an accurate and reliable witness, said that he spoke on the telephone to Dr Kelly on the afternoon of 29 May about the dossier and that Dr Kelly said to him "No. 10 spin came into play". As Dr Kelly made this comment to Mr Hewitt on 29 May it may be that when Mr Gilligan suggested to him that the dossier had been transformed to make it "sexier", he replied "yes, to make it sexier".

  244.  However two of the most serious allegations reported in Mr Gilligan's broadcasts on the 29 May were the claim that "actually the Government probably knew that that the forty five minute figure was wrong, even before it decided to put it in" and the claim that "the reason it [the 45 minute figure] hadn't been in the original draft was that … it only came from one source and most of the other claims were from two, and the intelligence agencies say they don't really believe it was necessarily true because they thought the person making the claim had actually made a mistake, it got, had got mixed up". Mr Gilligan's notes of his discussion with Dr Kelly contained no entries which suggest that Dr Kelly made either of these allegations to Mr Gilligan. In relation to the allegation that the 45 minutes claim had not been inserted in the original draft of the dossier because it only came from one source, Mr Gilligan accepted in answer to his own counsel that the allegation was wrong:

[17 September, page 7, line 21]

Q. In terms, also, of the reason for the non-inclusion of the 45 minutes, you say in this part of the broadcast, it is at the top of BBC/4/223, which I think is up, that the reason for the non-inclusion was that it had only come from one source.

A. Yes. As I have said in my witness statement, that was wrong, although I do not attribute that particular view to David Kelly in fact. But that is clearly incorrect. The reason it came in late, which is now accepted, was that it simply was a matter of the timing when it arrived.

Q. It arrived late, but it was single sourced?

A. Yes.

  245.  In relation to the allegation that the Government probably knew that the 45 minutes claim was wrong even before it decided to put it in the dossier, Mr Gilligan also accepted in cross examination by Mr Sumption QC for the Government that his words were imperfect and he should not have said them:

[17 September, page 14, line 20]

Q. Mr Gilligan, I would like to ask you first about your 6.07 broadcast, where you said that the Government probably knew that the 45 minutes figure was wrong even before they put it in. You made a point a few minutes ago about the difference between dishonesty and spin. If a Government puts into a dossier which it lays before Parliament a statement which it probably knows to be wrong, is that an allegation that they are dishonest, in your book?

A. I think the allegation here that I was trying to convey was that the claim in the form in which it was made was considered to be wrong, considered to be unreliable and considered to be misinterpreted by many in the intelligence community; and that form being that Saddam's military planning allows some WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them.

Q. But when you said that the Government probably knew that it was wrong, you were actually saying, whether you intended to or not, that they were dishonest, were you not?

A. The allegation I intended to make was of spin, but as I say, I do regard those words as imperfect and I should not have said them.

Q. And the reason why you should not have said them is that they did, in fact, accuse the Government of dishonesty, whether or not that was your intention.

A. I think that is probably right, yes. But I really did try and repeatedly make it clear on subsequent occasions that I was not accusing the Government of lying or fabrication. I said that the intelligence was real. I said at 7.32 - I said on subsequent broadcasts on 31st May that I was not accusing the Government of lying or fabrication or of making this up. I said it also repeatedly to the Foreign Affairs Committee, to the Spectator and in The Mail on Sunday.

Q. I think you accepted on the last occasion that you gave evidence here, and more or less accepted this morning, that that particular allegation, that the Government probably knew that the 45 minutes figure was wrong, was something that you could not support?

A. It was not sufficiently supported. It did not have no support. David Kelly did not say it in terms but he did say that the statement that WMD were ready for use in 45 minutes was unreliable. He said it was wrong. He said it was included "against our wishes". And the conclusion I drew from that was that the wishes had been expressed and the wishes had been made known, which is something we do now know to be the case.

Q. You accept, I think, that it was expressed by you as something that your source had said, whereas in fact it was an inference of your own?

A. Yes, that is right, that was my mistake.

Q. The same is true, is it not, of the word "ordered"; that was not something that Dr Kelly had said, it was Gilligan speaking not Kelly, was it not?

A. Yes. It was my interpretation of what he had said.

  246.  When questioned by Mr Dingemans QC, counsel to the Inquiry, Mr Gilligan said:

[17 September, page 77, line 12]

Q. I will not repeat my earlier questioning nor indeed the earlier cross-examination. Can I just take you to some passages of the 29th May broadcast at the start and ask whether you contend these were accurate representations of what Dr Kelly had told you? BBC/1/4, if I may. The first part I want to draw your attention to is in the first paragraph: " … what we've been told by one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up that dossier was that, actually the Government probably erm knew that that 45 minutes figure was wrong, even before it decided to put it in." Do you now accept that was not based on what Dr Kelly had told you?

A. I accept that it was not the - I accept that it was not the right form of words to use because it gave listeners the impression that he had said that in terms. He did not say it in terms.

Q. And he did not suggest that to you?

A.Well, he said that the statement that WMD were ready for use in 45 minutes was unreliable, it was wrong, it was misinterpreted and he said that it had been included "against our wishes". I concluded from that that the wishes had been made known, but it was wrong to ascribe that statement that they had been made known to Dr Kelly.

Q. The bottom of the page: " … and the reason it hadn't been in the original draft was that it was, it was only erm, it came from one source and most of the other claims were from two, and the intelligence agencies say they don't really believe it was necessarily true …" That was not the reason it had not been in the original draft, do you now accept that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. And Dr Kelly gave you nothing to suggest that was the reason.

A. That is correct, and I did not ascribe it in fact to him either.

Q. The next page. Just before "End of first recording": "Clearly, you know, if erm, if it, if it was, if it was wrong, things do, things are, got wrong in good faith but if they knew it was wrong before they actually made the claim, that's perhaps a bit more serious." Suggesting that Dr Kelly had suggested to you that the claim was false.

A. I think the operative word here is "if". This does suggest that I am not suggesting it is true. But, you know, as I have said to you before, the statement that - the statement "probably knew it was wrong" was - was not something that Dr Kelly had said in terms.

Q. If you knew that this was not right you would have said so. It was not your suggestion that they knew that it was wrong, was it?

A. No, my error in this was in ascribing that - you know, expressing my understanding as something which Dr Kelly had actually said in terms, which he had not.

Q. And neither had he suggested it?

A. Well, he said things which had led me to conclude it, but he had not suggested it directly, no.

Q. Scrolling down the page, Mr Humphrys picking up on what you are saying, fourth line down: "Now our defence correspondent, Andrew Gilligan, has found evidence that the Government's dossier on Iraq that was produced last September, was cobbled together at the last minute with some unconfirmed material that had not been approved by the Security Services." Dr Kelly did not say that to you, did he?

A. No. These were not my words, these were John Humphrys' words. I would not have said those words and did not write them for him.

Q. That was Mr Humphrys' understanding of your earlier broadcast no doubt.

A. I do not believe it was -

Q. He is hardly likely to have made it up.

A. The cues - the things that the presenter says, the cues are actually written by the presenters before the programme even starts, so he would not have heard the earlier broadcast at the time that he devised this particular cue.

Q. BBC/1/6 towards the bottom of the paragraph: "Now that claim has come back to haunt Mr Blair because if the weapons had been that readily to hand, they probably would have been found by now but you know, it could have been an honest mistake, but what I have been told is that the Government knew that claim was questionable, even before the war, even before they wrote it in their dossier." Dr Kelly never told you that, did he?

A. No. Again, my error there was expressing that understanding, and I defend the use of "knew it was questionable" but expressing it as something which Dr Kelly had told me in terms, which he had not - but it was not the main thrust. It was not the main import of the broadcast. The broadcast was summarised probably most - in its essentials by the news bulletin piece which I wrote, and that did not mention any "Government knew" type things.

..........

[17 September, page 83, line 22]

MR DINGEMANS: So there are those errors you accept in your transmission on 29th May?

A. Yes, I do. Yes.

Q. In fact, on 29th May there was an allegation made against the Government of conscious wrongdoing; do you accept that?

A. My feeling on this was that it was an allegation less serious than that; that it was part of a political debate. As I say, I mean, the Ministry of Defence press log is - has got - I have just got a - I mean, the stories in the newspapers in the morning of 29th May, that was before a word had been spoken by me, included the Independent splash "Labour rebels threaten to report Tony Blair for misleading Parliament"; the Mirror "War of Lies"; the Guardian "Tony Blair faces growing crisis over failure to uncover WMD"; The Times "Inquiry into arms dossier claim". So this was seen -

Q. So you thought you would join in?

A. This was seen as part of -

Q. Is that right, Mr Gilligan?

A. This was seen as part of a continuing debate. It was not something we created. It was not something we started.

Q. I did not say you created it, Mr Gilligan. I am asking you about 29th May. Did you think you would join in with that morning's headlines?

A. No, that was not the intention. The intention was to report what Dr Kelly had told me; and I regret that on those two occasions I did not report entirely carefully and accurately what he had said. My error was to ascribe that statement to him when it was actually a conclusion of mine.

  247.  Therefore it is clear that Dr Kelly did not tell Mr Gilligan that 10 Downing Street probably knew that the 45 minutes claim was wrong before it decided to put it in the dossier. The true position was that the 45 minutes claim was inserted in an assessment by the assessment staff of the JIC based on intelligence received by the SIS and the 45 minutes claim was then inserted in the dossier with the full approval of the JIC, and at the time of the publication of the dossier the JIC, the assessment staff and the SIS believed that the intelligence relating to the 45 minutes claim was reliable.

  248.  It is also clear that the reason why the 45 minutes claim was not in the original draft of the dossier was not that it only came from one source. The reason why the 45 minutes claim was not included in the original draft was because the relevant intelligence was not received until 29 August 2002.

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Issues (b) and (c)

(b) In meeting Mr Gilligan and discussing the dossier with him was Dr Kelly having a meeting which was unauthorised and in breach of the Civil Service rules of procedure which applied to him?

(c) At the time of the meeting or subsequent to it did Dr Kelly realise that the meeting was unauthorised and in breach of the Civil Service rules which applied to him?

  249.  Referring to the list of Dr Kelly's contacts with the press for the year April 2002 to March 2003 (see paragraph 26) counsel to the Inquiry put the following questions to Mr Hatfield:

[11 August, page 59, line 4]

Q. He is talking here about on 11th and 12th November 2002 there is the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands, "Protection Network". He deals with that from 18th to 20th November. Then he deals with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, a conference, talking about invasion or inspections, that is January and February 2003. That is shortly before the war. "Media. "Attributable and unattributable briefings plus interviews on Iraq, Russia, weapons, anthrax and smallpox. "Television and radio: Channel 4, Australian Broadcasting Company, Canadian Broadcasting Company, Tokyo Broadcasting Systems, CNN, CBS, ABC, Radio Netherlands, BBC 4, BBC 24 hours/World Service, BBC local radio (London, Wales)." Then the news media, he seems to go through the whole of Fleet Street: Guardian, Daily Telegraph, The Times, New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Newsweek, Herald Tribune and Wall Street Journal. So he was having extensive contact with them.

A. He had an extensive number of contacts with them, yes.

Q. Yes.

A. But it does not also make clear over what period, but nevertheless.

Q. It also appears to make clear that some of the contact was on an unattributable basis.

A. Yes.

Q. Is that something that is authorised, as it were, by the Ministry of Defence?

A. Yes, it should be.

Q. Right.

A. Indeed, his own letter, which started the events as far as I was concerned, makes it clear that they normally were cleared. In fact, slightly unusually but nonetheless cleared through the FCO press office usually rather than the MoD press office. That clearly reflects a lot of it is briefing in relation to his role in support of what he did in relation to UNMOVIC, where the Foreign Office were in the lead. I would assume every one of those listed on there had been cleared either on an individual basis or if you like especially in relation to the appearances at conferences on a block basis that: this is the sort of conference you do and you know the rules.

Indeed, the general rules we started with make it quite clear that, for example, contact with IISS does not have to be cleared on an individual basis because it is an established institution with which MoD deals. But there are rules about how you behave at such conferences where you are speaking.

  250.  Sections of the Civil Service rules of procedure relating to civil servants speaking to journalists are set out in paragraphs 23, 24 and 25. Mr Patrick Lamb, the deputy head of the Counter Proliferation Department in the FCO, gave evidence as to how the system of authorising Dr Kelly to speak to the press operated. In cross-examination by Mr Gompertz for Dr Kelly's family he stated:

[24 September, page 79, line 19]

Q. Can I invite you to recollect your evidence on a previous occasion? You said, in answer to Lord Hutton, that in theory and properly he, Dr Kelly, should have approached the press office about each and every request. I am looking at page 102 if you have it in front of you. I am sorry, I do not have a copy to show you. In practice, you then said, as I think we all know: ' … once a journalist has a number they will tend to pursue that person or ring that person without - off the cuff. Dr Kelly worked from home, to a very large extent; and so that meant that often, I presume, he would receive calls at home having exchanged a card with a journalist. And certainly there were instances where, for reasons I perfectly understand, he had no opportunity to seek prior authorisation or clearance. But in my experience he was also very scrupulous about informing us after the event. That in itself was helpful, very helpful in the event that something arose following that particular interview' - Is that a fair summary?

A. I think that is an accurate reading of what I said on that occasion.

Q. Thank you. Is it a fair summary of what happened?

A. It is a summary of what happened. Let me explain. The point is that I recognise perfectly that Dr Kelly was attending seminars, he was attending receptions, as I do, and there were occasions when journalists will meet with him and those are not occasions when this procedure can be followed, self-evidently. There are also instances where Dr Kelly would have exchanged a card or a telephone number with a journalist, a meeting with that journalist may have been approved by the Foreign Office, and that journalist rings Dr Kelly to clarify a particular point or pursue some other item. I would not expect Dr Kelly to put down the phone and say: sorry, I cannot speak about this issue until I have spoken to the Foreign Office. There is an element whereby - as I said, I believe, elsewhere in my evidence, there is an element of self-discipline and judgment involved in all of these matters, and that self-discipline is imposed on all of us involved, including Dr Kelly. I believe that if he were contacted by a journalist say two or three months after an initial contact, he should at that point have referred that to the Foreign Office, because the whole point of getting policy and press office agreement is to take account of events as they are today and not events as they were two or three months ago.

Dr Kelly, I think, understood very clearly that he should not become involved on commenting on current UK Government policy.

Q. The words you use there, "self-discipline" and "judgment", are an echo from a document I think you prepared, CAB/1/115. If we can scroll down to paragraph 4 - having described the system, I am not going to go through it because we have looked at this document before, but you say this: "This system, which ultimately relied on self-discipline and judgment on all sides, worked well and provided the media with expert background briefing and led to no embarrassments for HMG over the period 2000-2002." That is fair, is it?

A. It is fair, yes. It is an accurate reading of what I said.

  251.  Mr Lamb also stated that sometime in late May 2003 Dr Kelly briefly mentioned to him that he had spoken to Mr Gilligan and Ms Watts:

[24 September, page 64, line 14]

Q. Can I move on to the second topic I wish to cover. When did you first become aware that Dr Kelly had spoken to Mr Gilligan and Ms Watts?

A. I believe that this took place or rather I believe he spoke to me some time in late May. I say this for two reasons. I believe it had to be subsequent to his conversations with Ms Watts, which I now know took place on 7th and 12th May. I believe it had to be subsequent to his conversation with Mr Gilligan which took place on 22nd May, because Dr Kelly referred, very fleetingly and very briefly, to the fact that he had spoken to both those journalists in a conversation that took place in my office. He did not elaborate. He made no further comment or explanation or exposition as to what had taken place, if anything. And I noted, very specifically, those two names and that I remember specifically - the only element of the conversation I now retain is the fact, and retained even at the time, that he had spoken to two named journalists and that I was unaware that he had sought authorisation.

Q. Why did you not follow it up at the time that Dr Kelly made those comments?

A. I did not follow it up at the time because he did not specifically say to me that he wished to raise a matter with me. He did not specifically say: I would like to discuss with you what took place, or give me any run through as to what had happened, as he had done previously in the case of the German TV radio interview where he had gone through it in detail. Dr Kelly, I should add, on that occasion, and because I was extremely busy with covering two posts within the Proliferation and Arms Control Department at that time and was dealing with another meeting which I cannot refer to here but was a bilateral meeting with another country, an issue that country had raised already at Prime Minister level, I was the lead FCO official dealing with that meeting, which took place eventually on 28th May, and running with all the arrangements for it and preparations for it. That is why I was extremely busy, as I now recall. It was that particular issue that was dominating my attention. Dr Kelly, I think, could and should have spoken to either of my three colleagues, possibly four colleagues, to whom he could have drawn this - he could have drawn this to their attention and any one of them would have realised what needed to be done. He could and should primarily have spoken, in my judgment, to the press office as well. He did not.

This was a fleeting reference and comment made to me at a time when he knew and saw that I was busy. Dr Kelly and I normally sat down at the table in my office when he came to call. On this occasion my distinct recollection is of being behind my desk, totally preoccupied with the work I was doing, and of him standing in the doorway. It was most unusual for us to have such an exchange. It was a very fleeting and brief exchange.

  252.  In her evidence, in describing a conversation which she had had on the telephone with Dr Kelly, his friend and colleague Ms Olivia Bosch said:

[4 September, page 9, line 4]

Q. What did Dr Kelly say about his relationship with the press generally?

A. He seemed fairly relaxed about it. He seemed to enjoy talking with the press and giving them background information. He knew that they were seeking information to better understand what some of the processes were that were going on in Iraq. And if I refer to my second statement, where I mention that in terms of an approach he said that the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence had different approaches. And I started - and I kind of led - I said: do you mean that you do not talk - sorry: with respect to the Ministry of Defence, is it that you do not talk to journalists or the press unless there was a reason to do so, whereas the Foreign Office was more relaxed? And in effect - and then I started - that you could speak - he was saying: unless there was a reason not to. So they had slightly different emphasis in terms of what it was. But, on the whole, I understood that he recognised - and he said he would need pre-authorisation for that but on occasion, sometimes, he would speak on the telephone for a quick answer or something like that that he might not get that pre-authorised, but the Foreign Office was much more relaxed in his dealings with them.

  253.  Mr Gompertz submitted that as Dr Kelly was employed by DSTL and sometimes worked for the FCO and for the MoD it was difficult for him to know from whom he should seek authorisation to speak to the press. Dr Kelly's precise employment situation in May 2003 was somewhat complex, and there could be debate as to which of the sets of rules forbidding speaking to journalists set out in paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 applied to him. But it is clear that one of those sets of rules applied to him and that in making the comments which he probably did to Mr Gilligan about the 45 minutes claim being single sourced and that there was unhappiness in the intelligence community about the phraseology employed in the dossier in relation to that claim, Dr Kelly was in breach of one or other of those sets of rules.

  254.  Dr Kelly must have learned of some of the matters on which he commented to Mr Gilligan when he had discussions with Dr Jones and other DIS officials in the DIS offices on 18 and 19 September 2002. In respect of the propriety of discussing such matters with a journalist Sir Richard Dearlove stated in his evidence in relation to Dr Kelly's conversation with Ms Watts on 30 May:

[15 September, page 106, line 22]

A. Can I also say in respect of this recorded conversation here?

Q. Yes.

A. As chief of the service, I am shocked to see someone discussing one of our CX reports, which is what he is discussing, with a journalist without authorisation.

Q. I appreciate he was not within your specific area, which is why I have not asked you about it, but what would your reaction have been to finding out about these discussions?

A. That it is a serious breach of discipline.

Dr Brian Jones stated:

[3 September, page 137, line 8]

Q. If members of your staff had given this sort of information to journalists about the discussions that had taken place in your branch relating to concerns about the dossier, what would your reaction have been to that?

A. (Pause). I would have thought that they were acting well beyond the bounds of what they should have been doing. I would have been very disappointed and very annoyed.

  255.  Under Parts IV A and V of the Employment Rights Act 1996 an employee is protected from being subjected to any detriment by his employer if he makes a "protected disclosure" of information as defined in that Act. I consider that the information which Dr Kelly disclosed to Ms Susan Watts on 7 and 30 May and to Mr Gavin Hewitt on 29 May and whatever information he disclosed to Mr Gilligan on 22 May was not "protected disclosure" of information within the meaning of the 1996 Act. In his evidence to the ISC Dr Kelly said:

ALAN HOWARTH: When you went to meet Andrew Gilligan, at the Charing Cross Hotel, did you enter the discussion with an agenda of your own, you've mentioned that you were anxious to learn what you could from him, but did you also go to meet him with a view to conveying any particular points to him.

DR KELLY: No, it was very much with the intention of being in receive mode - to understand his experience he had in Iraq.

I am further of the opinion that in relation to such information there was no provision of the 1996 Act which operated to relieve Dr Kelly from the duty imposed on him in relation to the non-disclosure of information by the Civil Service rules of procedure set out in paragraphs 23, 24 and 25. It is also clear that after his meeting with Mr Gilligan on 22 May 2003 Dr Kelly never sought to suggest that he had been entitled to discuss intelligence matters with Mr Gilligan.

  256.  It may be that in his meeting with Mr Gilligan Dr Kelly said more to him than he intended to say. As Ms Watts said in her evidence, Dr Kelly could be gossipy and chatty with a journalist. It may be that at the time of the meeting Dr Kelly did not realise the gravity of the situation which he was helping to create by discussing intelligence matters with Mr Gilligan. His discussion with Ms Watts on 30 May suggests that he treated an unauthorised discussion with a reporter about intelligence matters in a somewhat lighthearted way:

DK: I mean I did talk to Gavin Hewitt yesterday - he phoned me in New York, so he may have picked up on what I said … because I would have said exactly the same as I said to you …

SW: Yes, so he presumably decided not to name Alastair Campbell himself but just to label this as Number 10 …

DK: yep yep

SW: are you getting much flak over that?

DK: me? No, not yet anyway I was in New York … (laughs)

SW: yes good timing I suppose

DK: I mean they wouldn't think it was me, I don't think. Maybe they would, maybe they wouldn't. I don't know.

  257.  But whatever Dr Kelly thought at the time of his meeting with Mr Gilligan it is clear that after Mr Gilligan's broadcasts on 29 May Dr Kelly must have come to realise the gravity of the situation for which he was partly responsible by commenting on intelligence matters to him. In his letter to Dr Wells dated 30 June he wrote: "With hindsight I of course deeply regret talking to Andrew Gilligan even though I am convinced that I am not his primary source of information.", and I have no doubt that this regret weighed on his mind during June and July.

  258.  It is also clear that Dr Kelly himself recognised that his meeting with Mr Gilligan was unauthorised. In her evidence Ms Bosch said:

[4 September, page 10, line 4]

Q. You have mentioned one occasion when Dr Kelly found his name in the press, which he was upset by, which perhaps is the article I took you to. Did Dr Kelly around this time, April or May, around that type of time, did he have any further discussion with you about his contacts with the press?

A. Well, he mentioned in his - I am not sure of the time sequence but if I go through here. It was another time towards mid May he told me he had an unauthorised meeting with Andrew Gilligan, someone he had met a couple of times before but did not know that well. And he said he was - he was taken aback by the way Andrew Gilligan tried to elicit information from him. I said: yes, but that is what journalists do. He understood that, but he said he had never experienced it in the way that Gilligan had tried to do so, by a name game was the term.

..........

[4 September, page 12, line 20]

LORD HUTTON: Ms Bosch, you said Dr Kelly told you he had an unauthorised meeting with Mr Gilligan.

A. Yes.

LORD HUTTON: Did he use the word "unauthorised"?

A. Yes, he did.

LORD HUTTON: How did he come to say that? Did he just say to you: I had an unauthorised meeting with Mr Gilligan?

A. Yes, because we would just talk kind of freely about journalists who you would see, whatever, and I believe that he had come back - I do not know if it was that very night he mentioned it or whatever. But we had - he had, in previous conversations, mentioned authorised and unauthorised.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. And he had mentioned this was an unauthorised meeting.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. So confiding, I suppose, in a way.

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Summary of conclusions on the issues relating to Dr Kelly's meeting with Mr Gilligan in the Charing Cross Hotel on 22 May 2003

  259.  The conclusions which I have come to on these issues are the following:

(1) In the light of the uncertainties arising from Mr Gilligan's evidence and the existence of two versions of his notes made on his personal organiser of his discussion with Dr Kelly on 22 May it is not possible to reach a definite conclusion as to what Dr Kelly said to Mr Gilligan. It may be that Dr Kelly said to Mr Gilligan that Mr Campbell was responsible for transforming the dossier, and it may be that when Mr Gilligan suggested to Dr Kelly that the dossier was transformed to make it "sexier", Dr Kelly agreed with this suggestion. However I am satisfied that Dr Kelly did not say to Mr Gilligan that the Government probably knew or suspected that the 45 minutes claim was wrong before that claim was inserted in the dossier. I am further satisfied that Dr Kelly did not say to Mr Gilligan that the reason why the 45 minutes claim was not included in the original draft of the dossier was because it only came from one source and the intelligence agencies did not really believe it was necessarily true. In the course of his evidence which I have set out in paragraphs 244, 245 and 246, Mr Gilligan accepted that he had made errors in his broadcasts in the Today programme on 29 May 2003. The reality was that the 45 minutes claim was based on an intelligence report which the Secret Intelligence Service believed to be reliable and the 45 minutes claim was inserted in the dossier with the approval of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the most senior body in the United Kingdom responsible for the assessment of intelligence. In addition the reason why the 45 minutes claim was not inserted in the first draft of the dossier was because the intelligence on which it was based was not received by the SIS in London until 29 August 2002. Therefore the allegations reported by Mr Gilligan that the Government probably knew that the 45 minutes claim was wrong or questionable and that it was not inserted in the first draft of the dossier because it only came from one source and the intelligence agencies did not really believe it was necessarily true, were unfounded.

(2) Dr Kelly's meeting with Mr Gilligan was unauthorised and in meeting Mr Gilligan and discussing intelligence matters with him, Dr Kelly was acting in breach of the Civil Service code of procedure which applied to him.

(3) It may be that when he met Mr Gilligan, Dr Kelly said more to him than he had intended to say and that at the time of the meeting he did not realise the gravity of the situation which he was helping to create by discussing intelligence matters with Mr Gilligan. But whatever Dr Kelly thought at the time of his meeting with Mr Gilligan, it is clear that after Mr Gilligan's broadcasts on 29 May Dr Kelly must have come to realise the gravity of the situation for which he was partly responsible by commenting on intelligence matters to him and he accepted that the meeting was unauthorised, as he acknowledged in a telephone conversation with his friend and colleague Ms Olivia Bosch after his meeting with Mr Gilligan.

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