

# FRENCH LESSONS?

A CROSS-CHANNEL LOOK AT REGENERATION,  
COHESION AND INTEGRATION



# FRENCH LESSONS?

A CROSS-CHANNEL LOOK AT REGENERATION,  
COHESION AND INTEGRATION

Dr. Gareth Potts, Director of Research and Policy  
British Urban Regeneration Association (BURA)

June 2007

This piece of work was commissioned by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, a fixed-term advisory body set up by the Communities Secretary in September 2006. It is being published alongside the Commission's final report as a piece of independent thinking. The findings and recommendations are those of the authors, and do not represent the views of Ministers, or of officials within the Department of Communities and Local Government.

© Queen's Printer and Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2007

*Copyright in the typographical arrangement rests with the Crown.*

If you require this publication in an alternative format please email [alternativeformats@communities.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:alternativeformats@communities.gsi.gov.uk)

Communities and Local Government Publications  
PO Box 236  
Wetherby  
West Yorkshire  
LS23 7NB  
Tel: 08701 226 236  
Fax: 08701 226 237  
Textphone: 08701 207 405  
Email: [communities@twoten.com](mailto:communities@twoten.com)  
or online via the Communities website: [www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)

June 2007

Product Code: 07ELMAT04656(j)

# Contents

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| <b>INTRODUCTION</b>  | <b>7</b>  |
| <b>EARLY REGENERATION CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES</b>               | <b>9</b>  |
| The Grands Ensembles   | 9         |
| The Habitat et Vie Sociale                                       | 10        |
| Developpement Social des Quartiers (DSQ)                         | 10        |
| Regies de Quartiers (RdQs)                                       | 11        |
| Physical Regeneration  | 11        |
| Labour Market and Welfare Policy                                 | 12        |
| Zones d'Education Prioritaire                                    | 13        |
| <b>URBAN AND REGENERATION POLICY IN THE 1990S</b>                | <b>14</b> |
| Contrats de Ville (Town Action Plans)                            | 14        |
| Pacte de Relance pour la Ville (and the Zones Franches Urbaines) | 16        |
| <b>REGENERATION POLICY FOR THE NEW MILLENIUM</b>                 | <b>19</b> |
| The Scale of the Problem   | 19        |
| The New Contrats de Ville  | 22        |
| The Renewed Assault on Regeneration and Cohesion                 | 25        |
| <b>COHESION</b>  | <b>27</b> |
| Order and Security   | 27        |
| Alternative Measures for Cohesion                                | 30        |
| <b>INTEGRATION</b>   | <b>34</b> |
| Immigration  | 34        |
| Race   | 36        |
| Political Participation by Minority Groups                       | 28        |
| Integrating Islam  | 40        |
| Sport and Culture as Agents of Integration                       | 43        |
| <b>CONCLUSIONS</b>   | <b>46</b> |
| Regeneration   | 46        |
| Cohesion   | 48        |
| Integration  | 49        |
| <b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>  | <b>51</b> |

# About BURA

BURA, founded in 1990 and based in central London, is the trade association for the regeneration sector. BURA aims to represent the public, private and voluntary sectors and to cover issues ranging from economic development, physical regeneration, and community capacity-building.

The activities include, principally: events, training, awards and research. The organisation aims to foster the transfer of regeneration knowledge (notably around best practice) within the sector and also to represent the sector to policymakers, mainly at the national level. BURA is also keen to facilitate entry into the regeneration profession – through its Regenerator programme. The focus has been largely domestic thus far although the first major international conference was held last year in Barcelona and BURA has this year hosted foreign regeneration practitioners on visits within the UK. More such international work is planned. BURA relies for its income on a variety of means: membership fees; the Steering and Development Forum membership fee; events, training and research.

BURA has some 500 members from the private, public and not-for-profit sectors – this includes senior figures from: national organisations, over 50 local authorities, all nine RDAs and a number of New Deal for Communities bodies and Urban Regeneration Companies. There are also strong links with Communities Scotland, the Scottish Centre for Regeneration and the Regeneration Team at the Welsh Assembly. BURA's Board and Steering and Development Forum both mirror this cross-sector diversity. Its President is Sir Jeremy Beecham (Vice-Chair of the Local Government Association and Chair of Labour's National Executive Committee).

In mid-2006 the organisation took the decision to build up BURA's Research and Policy section and, already, commissions have been secured from the London Assembly (two projects), the Commission for Racial Equality (as sub-contractor to Ipsos-MORI) and the HEFCE-funded 'Urban Buzz: Building Sustainable Communities' Programme.

# BURA Project Team

## **PROJECT DIRECTOR/REPORT AUTHOR**

The report was written, drawing on the literature reviews of the Research Team and on his own background reading, by BURA'S Director of Research and Policy, Gareth Potts. Gareth joined BURA from the Young Foundation in July 2006. At the Young Foundation his work included: a major review of historical and contemporary developments in the East End and Thames Gateway for the Director, Dr. Geoff Mulgan CBE (former Head of the No. 10 Policy Unit); a project on the value of good urban design for the Commission on Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE) and UK work on the European Commission-funded Polycentric Mega-City Region project run by Professor Sir Peter Hall. Prior to this he worked on the ESRC London Study (published as *Working Capital* in 2002) with Mark Kleinman (now Director of Urban, Regional and Economic Policy at Communities and Local Government), Peter Hall and others. He has a first degree in Social Policy and Administration, a Masters degree in Urban Design and a PhD in Economic Geography. He has also worked at the Marsh Farm Community Development Trust, Luton and as Research Advisor on the New Economics Foundation's Inner City 100 project. He serves on the Editorial Board of the *Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal* and sat on the Steering Committee for the recent THINK 07 event. His current research work includes involvement in several aspects of the CRE's Formal Investigation into the Race Impacts of Physical Regeneration.

## **RESEARCH TEAM**

The project consisted of large amounts of background reading – looking almost entirely at the work produced in English. The work was divided between the Project Director and a large and very able team of researchers (see Table 1) – all of whom have postgraduate experience. The Think-piece (Executive Summary) section is the author's own work. Neither these thoughts, nor the overall report, necessarily, represent the views or interpretations of the Research Team or the BURA Board.

| <b>Table 1: The BURA Research Team</b> |  |
|--|--|
| <i>Name</i>                            | <i>Brief Biography</i>   |
| Alisdair Jones                         | Alistair is currently an ESRC-funded PhD student (social value of urban space) on the LSE Cities Programme. He recently completed an internship at the Greater London Authority and has been a researcher for various London consultancies. He has a Masters degree (with distinction) in Modern Society and Global Transformations and a double first in Geography (with distinction) – both from Cambridge University.   |
| Andrew Harris                          | Andrew is a part-time researcher with University College London. He has a PhD from University College London and degree from Cambridge University (both in Geography). His PhD looked at arts districts in London. He has undertaken consultancy for Camden Council on local enterprise and has taught at UCL.   |
| Carol-Corinne McNaughton               | Carol is currently a part-time researcher at University College London and was recently awarded her PhD from Glasgow University's Centre for Urban Studies (where she also gained a first class degree in sociology and a Masters (with distinction) in social research methods).  |
| Dekonti Mends-Cole                     | Dekonti is a student on the LSE Masters degree in Housing and Regeneration (she is holder of a Beveridge Award Graduate Merit Scholarship). She is a qualified US attorney and Member of the American Bar Association's Affordable Housing and Community Development Forum. Her past work includes a research internship for New York University's School of Law.  |
| Elena Besussi                          | Elena is a PhD student and Teaching Fellow at the Bartlett School of Planning, University College London. She also works as a part-time Planning Advisor (supporting community groups on planning issues) at the Willowbrook Centre, Southwark.  |
| Julia Markovich                        | Julia is currently a PhD candidate at Oxford University's School of Geography (looking at gender aspects of urban design). She has a degree in urban geography from the University of Toronto, and a master's in town planning from Queen's University Canada. She worked for a planning consultancy for five years and as an academic research assistant.   |
| Katrina Gaus                           | Katrina is a student on the LSE's Housing and Regeneration Masters degree. She is also the part-time Research Assistant and Administrator for LSE London and a member of the Kings Cross Railway Lands Group. In addition to overseeing major survey work for the University of Connecticut she also spent two years working with juvenile offenders in inner-city Baltimore.  |
| Moustafa Traore                        | Moustafa is a French citizen and is currently a supply-teacher in Coventry whilst preparing for his PhD viva at the Sorbonne University, Paris. His PhD looks at the integration of Muslims in Britain over the last decade. He holds several degrees from the Sorbonne – including a Masters degree where his dissertation looked at the Brixton riots. He is a published poet <a href="http://www.trafford.com/06-1908">http://www.trafford.com/06-1908</a> , former radio presenter and member of UNADE (the French diversity and equality umbrella group). |
| Paul Goodwin                           | Paul is an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Urban and Community Research, Goldsmith's College. In 2006 he co-organised (with Bonnie Greer) a seminar on the challenges of diversity in Britain and France for the Franco-British Council. He is also a PhD candidate at Oxford University's School of Geography (looking at African Immigration and the Politics of Urbanism in Paris).   |
| Silvia Gullino                         | Silvia is a Visiting Scholar at Kings College London's Department of Geography and will shortly take up a lectureship in spatial planning at Kingston University. She has a degree in Architecture, Master in Environmental Engineering and PhD in Planning (all from the Politecnico of Milan where she was, until recently, lecturer in Urban Regeneration). She was also recently an International Senior Fellow in Urban Studies at John Hopkins University, Baltimore.  |

# Introduction

Since the turn of the Millennium, Britain has witnessed substantial urban disorder in three of its Northern Towns (2001), a major terrorist attack (2005), the arrest of several dozen home-grown terrorists who call themselves Muslim and the rise (at least until the 2007 local elections) of the Far Right British National Party. Alongside this have been ongoing discussions about British identity, multiculturalism, the compatibility of Islam with the British way of life, debates about the definitions and desirability of segregation and about immigration from within and without the European Union.

France too has been wrestling with all of these issues with the exception of not having faced a major terrorist incident. The nation has seen major riots in the suburbs of many of its cities and towns – areas that are physically and economically run-down and whose population is largely made of those who have arrived since the Second World War and whose skin colours and cultures differ to the French norm. The Muslim population is absolutely and relatively Europe's largest and in 2002 the Far Right candidate, Jean-Marie Le Pen, reached the second round of the Presidential elections with 20% of the votes cast.

The proximity and *prima facie* similarity of the French experience make it important and realistic for those concerned with integration and cohesion to familiarise themselves with developments across the channel. This involves understanding issues, policies, people, and projects. It involves looking at what has worked, what hasn't worked, to reflect on what might have been tried and, crucially, what might be transferable between the two countries (recognising, all the while, the difficulties of taking approaches out of their national context and transplanting them elsewhere).

The report looks specifically at the inter-linked aspects of regeneration and community cohesion. Cohesion is here taken to include order and security (which can come through policing and surveillance) and the understanding, tolerance and, conceivably, celebration of diverse races and cultures (that are the result of integration and, in some cases, assimilation). Regeneration is interpreted as economic, physical and social – which can mean, respectively, growth in jobs and businesses, improvements to the built environment and to community capacity (skills, networks and confidence).

BURA's aims with this report are to look at what lessons may be drawn now but, more importantly, to lay the groundwork for an ongoing community of interest that sees politicians, civil servants, academics, community groups and regeneration professionals feel increasingly willing and able to meet and communicate with their counterparts in France<sup>1</sup>. The use of French project names is done to assist French-speakers to learn more.

Above all else the report was produced with the aim of distilling a short think-piece for the Commission on Integration and Cohesion. There are reflections and analysis throughout the report but it is the ***conclusions that constitute the think-piece proper.***

<sup>1</sup> There are already elements of international exchange between the two countries – for example, seminars by the Franco-British Council, work by the French and British Planning Study Group, work on the riots in Britain and France by Sheffield Hallam University's David Waddington and ongoing more piecemeal collaborations between British and French academics. However, this report hopefully lays the groundwork for something more substantial – something BURA hopes to play an active part in as its remit extends to research and international work.

# Early regeneration challenges and responses

## THE GRANDS ENSEMBLES

### Origins

In the 1950s the French government sponsored the construction of Housing at Moderate Rents (*Habitation a Loyer Modéré* – HLMs) – essentially tower blocks for white working class families. This is provided by public, private and semi-public agencies<sup>2,3</sup>. The housing in these big suburban projects (*cites/grands ensembles*) was seen as an intermediate step in these groups social mobility towards the purchase of single-family houses.

At this same time ‘shantytowns’ sprouted in the outskirts of large cities such as Paris, Lyon, Grenoble and Marseille as urban housing infrastructures were unable to provide enough decent housing for the immigrants. These mostly came from Algeria which had become a French department in 1946 and so didn’t even require visas (Simon 1998).

Many of the HLMs’ initial inhabitants left in the 1970s to move into individual houses (Cesari 2005) and were often replaced by immigrant families from North Africa, Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa. These new groups did not however enjoy the same employment guarantees as a result of the crisis which followed the various oil shocks and the consequent mass unemployment (Green et al. 2000, Blanc 1998).

Since the 1970s such accommodation has become increasingly the preserve of poor<sup>4</sup>, usually non-white<sup>5</sup>, groups that are generally excluded from all but the most menial of employment (where they make up most of the workforce) due to often poor skills but also because of prejudice, stigma and ‘xenophobia’ (Murray 2006).

That developments were intended as an ‘in between’, a ‘step up’ for low paid workers before they moved on to buying their own homes meant that the design of many of the suburbs, without community amenities, storage space etc, reflects their purpose – housing for people who would spend much of their time in their work place (Blanc 1998).

<sup>2</sup> The Union Sociale pour l’Habitat is the umbrella organisation for housing associations.

<sup>3</sup> Sociétés D’économie Mixte a Activité Immobilière.

<sup>4</sup> France does also have some ‘ethnic neighbourhoods’ that people have consciously moved to as opposed to the enforced nature of the ‘ghettos’ (Simon 1998).

<sup>5</sup> Rhein (1998) convincingly illustrates in her study that, statistically, class and not race remains the real indicator of who will or who will not be living in social housing in France.

## THE HABITAT ET VIE SOCIALE

The grands ensembles were well-meaning efforts to deal with appalling post-war housing crises but poor design, poor building standards and poor management saw many falling into decay. The authorities were forced to react. Between 1975 and 1990 the proportion of households living in precarious housing fell from 10 to 4% – due to upward residential mobility and demolition of the shanty towns and from 1977, the *Habitat Vie et Sociale* – the rehabilitation of those *grands ensembles* in the worst conditions<sup>6</sup>. These operations, organised in a highly centralised manner and essentially devoted to refurbishing building façades, quickly revealed their limitations (Storper 2007).

## DEVELOPPEMENT SOCIAL DES QUARTIERS (DSQ)

The 1981 riots in the Lyon suburbs<sup>7</sup> were part of the reason behind the setting up, in the same year, of the National Commission of Neighbourhood Social Development (*Commission Nationale de Développement Social des Quartiers* – DSQ) to promote innovative regeneration schemes, specifically in the grands ensembles. The DSQ programme that emerged was an attempt to combine local and national efforts toward regeneration. The policy, under the Mayor, combined physical regeneration of building stock and their surrounding areas along with a more humanistic approach of social, educational and cultural programmes (Green et al. 2001). With the decentralisation laws of 1982 giving more town planning power to mayors (see ahead), DSQ was to expand considerably between 1984 and 1988 to take in 148 sites. In 1988, DSQ was rebadged as *Développement Social Urbain* (DSU) and aimed to reintegrate deprived areas into mainstream society through a formal contract uniting national and local authorities and with a predominantly economic focus (Godayer 2003).

Green et al. (2001) claim that the DSQ initiatives had rather mixed results: while achieving minor successes on a relatively small scale, the programme appeared to further isolate already stigmatized communities as the neighbourhoods falling under the focus of DSQ received increased negative stigmatization through their designation as 'needy communities'. The lesson perhaps is to use language that inspires confidence (within and without the target areas) that the fortunes of the places and those who live there are about to change. Green et al. also add that the focus remained so specific that many of the identifiable problems within targeted communities actually fell outside of the scope of the programme, thus eliminating the possibility of their remedy from the outset.

<sup>6</sup> This was not the first spatial policy in France. Before it turned its attention to cities and poor neighbourhoods France was concerned with developing a planning system around the objective of balanced regional development. With this in mind the *Délégation À L'aménagement Du Territoire Et À L'action Régionale* (DATAR – the Town and Country Planning and Regional Development Agency) was established in 1963 and it has remained in place since. Its main role has been to rebalance regional disparities and the primacy of Paris.

<sup>7</sup> Until the late 70s Lyon, France's Second City, had shanty towns housing immigrants mainly from North Africa. The *cité* of Les Minguettes saw the first big suburban riot – followed in 1984 by the neighbouring suburb of Venissieux.

## REGIES DE QUARTIERS (RDQS)

These first developed in the 1970s but were very much cemented during the 1980s. RdQs are not-for profit organisations involving local residents in the management of their neighbourhood. Through partnerships between a wide range of agencies, institutions and community groups, they work on the principle of employing local residents, particularly the most marginalised members of the community, to deliver local services. In so doing, these residents are helped to develop skills and to make links which will enable them to access employment in the longer term. Importantly, residents are expected to be fully involved in the management structure of their *Régies* – and so are offered empowerment and control of their own neighbourhood. Basically RdQs are social enterprises designed to develop the social capital and political resources of a neighbourhood in decline. The RdQs are invariably the product of a ‘bottom-up’ initiative emanating from the locality (either from the local authority or from local associations or residents) rather than a ‘manufactured’ response to a centrally funded government initiative (Clark and Southern 2006). They continue to be dependent on state and municipal funding (Loughlin et al. 2004) although they also appear to be delivering valuable social outcomes and, as such, do not represent a poor investment.

Clark and Southern (2006) looked at Régie Bocca Services which covers an area of 10,000 people living in marginalised estates on the western outskirts of the Riviera town of Cannes. They found that the approach was about more than jobs – residents are helped to resolve personal issues affecting their lives – either through direct support or through referrals to appropriate agencies. This helps integrate residents into the local economy. For example, in response to calls for more focused activity to be provided for young people, a group of older teenagers were employed through the *Régie* to run a youth centre. It is suggested that being run by people from the community helped make this youth centre well attended and respected by local youngsters. The initiative also has a strong collective/community element – for example, small street-scale groupings of residents were created, each with its own representative who feed views to the management board and general forum (and back to residents). This example of French urban policy sees people being empowered to ‘lead’ statutory agencies to ‘bend’ mainstream service delivery rather than get swamped in decision-making fora by public service professionals working to a ‘managerialist’ and centrally-driven agenda of local partnership-working.

## PHYSICAL REGENERATION

### Banlieue 89

After seeing the Parisian suburb of La Courneuve, the then Socialist President, Francois Mitterrand, instituted a series of housing projects, named “Banlieue ‘89”, in an attempt to make the seemingly defunct suburban spaces more aesthetically pleasing, like those of the metropolitan Paris. It was thought that these projects would, by dint of appearance, centralize local communities and local governments that would eventually lead to a polycentric Paris. The project was led by architect,

Roland Castro who was interested in creating cultural ambience through the manipulation of space –for example, his plan included central courtyards featuring football pitches and basketball courts, as well as indoor gyms with boxing rings (Rudosky 2005; Silverstein 2000)<sup>8</sup>.

Most of the expenditure was directed to altering the image of the neighbourhoods, while only 30% was used to address economic issues such as employee training programmes. It is therefore understandable to see why after only a few years, money and time ran out, and the social and political struggles within the area did not change, and were instead exacerbated by public and governmental scrutiny (Rudosky 2005). The approach was however successful in restoring suburbs with minimal social problems, such as La Defense, Marne-la Valle, or St. Quentin en Yvelines and transforming newly created satellite cities into high tech middle class hubs or expanding existing suburbs (Storper 2002).

### **The Grand Projet Urbain**

In October 1990, particularly serious urban riots led the authorities to restore priority to neighbourhoods. A new procedure was introduced, the Major Urban Project (GPU), aimed at a thorough restructuring, including demolitions, of 13 especially difficult neighbourhoods. Like the HVS and Banlieue 89 this was a physical project and had physical successes but little more (EUKN nda).

### **LABOUR MARKET AND WELFARE POLICY**

France saw a decided shift in the 1980s away from the previous post-war welfare model of 'passive receipt of assistance', towards a new model in which individuals were required to actively participate in their own 'insertion' (inclusion). To address the rising unemployment rates assistance programs were tied to the obligation of economic activity. This included:

- Le Revenu Minimum d'Insertion (RMI – minimum income) established in 1988. Recipients were required to sign a contract pledging to pursue some kind of insertion activity.
- Economic incentives for employers to hire disadvantaged individuals, through such measures as relaxing employment regulations, and offering tax exemptions to private firms.
- Increasing hiring opportunities for disadvantaged groups by consolidating policies into:
  1. the *Contrat Employ-Solidarité* (CES), a contract of 20 hours per month for 3 to 36 months of minimum wage employment within a locality, public enterprise or association

<sup>8</sup> Silverstein (2000) notes how the spatial remodelling of areas to include sports facilities and centres has been a central feature of urban regeneration policy.

2. the Actions d'insertion et de Formation (AIF), a form of personalized training received within the public employment service
3. the *Contrat de Retour a L'emploi* (CRE), a more direct form of access to jobs in private firms generating between 24 and 39 hours per week.

Silver and Wilkinson (1995) conclude that the small scale of these efforts rendered them insufficient to address the sheer vastness of unemployment issues exhibited. The RMI survives to this day and, as will be seen, several of these initiatives have modern day equivalents.

## **ZONES D'EDUCATION PRIORITAIRE**

### **Nature**

Originally introduced in 1982, the Zones Education Prioritaire (ZEPs) are determined by such factors as: local unemployment rate, parents' qualifications and type of work, numbers on income support and the proportion of immigrant families. The Zones receive an additional 10% state funding which is used to reduce class sizes, finance more teachers and fund a payment bonus to teachers. Measures to promote achievement include home visits by health workers, parental education and liaison workers for parents for whom French is an additional language. A major objective is to increase the number of two-year-olds in nursery education. More recent policy developments also relate to children as members of the local society in their own right, who should be able to access community resources. There is also an emphasis on children's physical and psychological needs, and how these should be recognised and accommodated by the school. Initiatives over the last decade have sought to extend the role of the school by incorporating childcare and recreation within the school-day. Schools may also offer additional childcare facilities before and after the formal school day (Moss et al. 1999).

### **Impact**

The scheme's flexibility and holistic nature makes it surprising that the major UK evaluation of it paints a somewhat negative picture. The system reveals some tension between centralism and the movement towards decentralisation (see ahead), including the promotion of decision-making about the school-day at local level. There is also evidence that different Central Government Departments (Ministries) involved in policy development towards children find collaboration difficult. Other difficulties are that schools do not collaborate easily with other agencies and are not sufficiently open to parental participation (all from Moss and Petrie 1999). The other work that mentioned the scheme cited a French survey suggesting that parents often try to avoid these schools (EUMC 2006)<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> In 2002, some 1.8m students (around 15% of primary age children and 18 per cent of secondary students) were taught in 7,700 ZEP schools (IRCAF undated).

# Urban and Regeneration Policy in the 1990s

## **CONTRATS DE VILLE (TOWN ACTION PLANS)**

### **The Contrats**

These ran from its earliest stages in 1989 through 1998, with a strong influence on the period between 1994 and 1998. The Contrats served primarily to extend the DSQ policies into neighbouring communities thereby recognising that an effective approach to regenerating spatially designated areas of deprivation would rely on the realization of community interdependence. These contrats had to find out the urban, social and economic weaknesses and strengths of a town and to then promote activities to rectify this (from anti-crime measures to job creation and support to find employment). By 1995 215 Contrats had been drawn up and agreed between main agencies and providers in urban areas (Green et al. 2001). The Contrats need to be set within the context of the emerging *Politique de la Ville* – in particular the devolution of French governmental authority in the early 1980s.

### **Decentralisation**

The decentralisation law of 2 March 1982 marked the Paris government's desire to alter the balance of power between the state and local authorities. The three main tiers of local administration are: the Commune (these are mostly neighbourhood size but can also include towns and cities), the Department and the Region.

The commune has a decision-making body (the Municipal Council) that elects an executive (the Mayor). This manages municipal assets, notably primary school buildings and equipment. It also issues building permits and ensures public health and the conservation of the commune's natural environment and built heritage. Communes' economic and social brief, long limited to granting aid for job creation and helping needy families, has been broadened to enable it to play an important role in combating unemployment and social exclusion and engage actively in economic restructuring and development of new activities.

The 96 Departments<sup>10</sup> represent the administrative presence of the Central State in the provinces. The Department essentially has competence in health and social services, rural capital works, departmental roads, and the capital expenditure and running costs of colleges. In the housing field central government has retained control over the housing finance system but operates a policy of partnership with local authorities and defines technical standards. A Law of March 1982 modified the powers of the Departmental Heads (*Prefets*) by conferring executive authority for the

<sup>10</sup> And the 4 overseas Departments – Reunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guyana.

department on the chairman of the general council. The General Council is the department's decision-making organ. It is made up of councillors elected for a six-year term.

26 Regions were created in 1982. Their main spheres of competence are planning, regional town and country planning, economic development, vocational training, and the building, equipment and running costs of schools (lycées). Regional Council makes the decisions assisted by an economic and social committee, which is a consultative assembly made up of representatives of businesses, the professions, trade unions and other employees' organisations, regional voluntary organisations, etc.

### **Inter-Communal Co-operation**

Lyon has helped blaze the trail, subsequently followed by other cities, of 'bottom-up' inter-municipal co-operation and has taken the process of 'up-scaling' further than any other French city. It took advantage of enabling legislation, first passed in 1966, to create a '*Communauté Urbaine*' for the urbanised area that has the city of Lyon at its core in 1967. These communautés could be formed voluntarily by communes covering a population of 50,000 or more and were seen primarily as a response to the extreme fragmentation of local administration in France. Such arrangements, it was felt, could enhance local capacity and build critical mass in order to improve service delivery in areas such as planning, public works, transport, traffic regulation, water, waste and fire services. The subsequent successes of all the cities that were amongst its 'early movers' suggests that the communauté urbaine initiative delivered upon its original goal of raising the quality of public services and in so doing enabled key French cities to modernise themselves effectively (Marvin et al. 2006).

The 'Loi Chevènement' of 1999 is generally seen as representing a turning point for inter-municipal co-operation. This introduced stronger financial incentives for the creation of Communautés de Communes and the wider-scale Communautés d'Agglomérations and Communautés Urbaines. These incentives consisted of both support from central government departments and the provision of an independent, local (business) tax base for the new structures. The result has been many new co-operative arrangements – in some cases this has meant little more than the 'creation' of new units of indirectly elected government of around the same size as UK local authorities (Marvin et al. 2006).

### **Politique de la Ville and the New Institutions**

From this new situation a policy of national and local cooperation has emerged for the operation of the Contrats. National responsibility (via the Department) includes management and development of the policy, major decisions, coordination of involved parties, and supervising the implementation of policy. Local responsibility includes project execution, monitoring, and program management. Godayer (2003) notes that Politique de la Ville involves five principles.

- spatial targeting of deprived areas, determined by predetermined criteria

- bottom-up approach which requires close proximity of designated project areas
- multi-partner approach to policy and projects
- (non-hierarchical) partnerships and contracts between involved parties
- creating a holistic approach to regeneration efforts is an important goal of the policy

The 1990s also saw a new apparatus emerging to address the new urban policy concerns. This consisted of a Minister for the City (created after the 1991 riots), the *Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville* (Interministerial Committee for Cities, chaired by the Prime Minister and gathering together all ministers concerned with urban policy) which decides on the action to be taken and, lastly, the *Conseil National des Villes* (National Council for Cities, a proposal body composed of local authorities and experts created in 1988). Locally, the position of *Sous-Préfet Ville* was also created – this is the representative of the state at the departmental level for urban policy problems, a privileged interlocutor for other partners (especially local authorities).

There has also been key legislation in the housing field. The 1990 Housing Act recognised, for the first time, citizens' legal right to decent housing. At a local level cities and suburbs must implement a joint housing plan to meet the need for housing in their area (a *Programme Local de L'habitat*). Local authorities were also encouraged by the state to have partnership agreements with local social housing organisations on the allocation of housing (Blanc 1998). City contracts generally include a significant housing element and central government is, consequently, looked to for help locally with the financing of studies and major projects to restructure the built environment.

### **PACTE DE RELANCE POUR LA VILLE (AND THE ZONES FRANCHES URBAINES)**

1996 saw the implementation of the *Pacte de Relance pour la Ville*. With roots in the 1991 Loi d'Orientation pour la Ville (LOV) which involved the first geographic targeting of periphery housing estates<sup>11</sup>, ZFU supplemented existing categorization of needy neighborhoods, essentially creating a 'Russian doll model' of increasing levels of assistance. Areas targeted would have high unemployment rates, a higher proportion of people on social assistance and living in social housing, greater numbers of people under 25 years of age, more unqualified youth and higher social housing vacancy rates (Lévy-Vroelant 2006). The policy put the emphasis on economic development at the centre of urban policy. The new zones came under the names of:

- Zones Franches Urbaines (Fragile Urban Zones)
- Zones de Redynamisation Urbaine (Zones of a New Urban Dynamic)<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The aim of the 1991 Law for the City was to promote diversity in cities in terms of housing and population. The vision was a city inhabited by mix of social groups living together. The relocation system behind the diversity aim tended to dismantle social networks based on social or ethnic homogeneity (Simon 1998).

<sup>12</sup> The team found almost no mention of these – they appear to have been curtailed.

- Zones Urbaines Sensibles (Critical Urban Areas)

These aim to encourage business and employment development in deprived areas. These became tax free zones for businesses with less than fifty employees.

Exemptions included:

- Payroll tax
- 5-years from company tax for business with a turnover of less than 400,000 francs
- 5-years from land tax
- 5-years from employer contributions (social security, work-place accidents etc.)

An important contingency of these tax alleviations comes in the form of hiring mandates: at least 20% of any employment created must be taken by local residents (Green et al. 2001 – the EUKN claims it is at least one third). The aim was to encourage industry to relocate in neighborhoods with histories of driving out business through acts of violence and vandalism.

The Zones Franches Urbaines (ZFU) have received by far the most attention in the English literature. Green et al. (2001) concluded that the PRV (by which they really mean the ZFUs):

- appears to have had only limited success in creating jobs
- little evidence as to the nature or the permanency of the jobs that have been created
- expensive – conservatively estimated cost of each new job approximately \$27000
- evidence of businesses already in existence moving short distances to gain from tax breaks
- many residents of ZFU areas lack necessary training and experience for jobs
- programme lacks any monitoring to ensure firms are recruiting locally
- focuses exclusively on recruiting new industry (not longevity for existing businesses)
- lacks regard for displacement effects on existing firms
- lack of information regarding whether or not employment gained was due to the policy
- political rather than technical criteria influenced part of the area selection process

Green et al (2001) do however use the example of the *Zone Franche* in the Lille suburb of Roubaix to illustrate some of the more positive effects that this policy may actually have had, but also qualify this by noting this was not a typical zone. In particular the Mayor campaigned to have the town centre included in the Zone (the only one of the 44 Zones that did). This meant that the policy was implemented in an

area of the town that already had a developed business and transport infrastructure. New business creation went up significantly and opportunities were created for all the residents of the area, including those who had been most excluded, which may help to promote the policies and the sustainability of their outcomes. It is also important to note that a number of urban regeneration policies were launched in Roubaix at the same time, and therefore their Zone was part of a wider regeneration package<sup>13</sup>.

Green et al. (ibid) contend that ultimately the greatest benefit of the ZFU is the unintended consequence of an increased network and collaboration among pre-existing organizations within the communities. Government provision offices and local employment centres have developed long-term relationships with participating businesses, and further development of programme includes involvement of 140 chambers of commerce initially recruited to contribute to the original initiative. This might lead to increased funneling of local residents into employment due to personal relationships and personal investment in the neighbourhood. Zones have been persisted with – from the initial 44 there were a further 41 established in 2003 and another 15 in 2006. Although the literature has nothing to say on the record of the other two types of Zone, the ZUSs are certainly still in existence – there are 750 at present covering 4.7m residents (Lévy-Vroelant 2006:16).

<sup>13</sup> Lille is not a completely regenerated town by a long way. Despite being European Capital of Culture in 2004 and the arrival of Eurostar, the worst-hit area in southern Lille has a jobless rate above 30% (Christafis 2007). A detailed outline of developments in Roubaix can be found in a 2006 study by URBED 'Learning from Lille and Roubaix' (2006).

# Regeneration Policy for the new Millennium

## THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM

### Overview

Following the 2002 general elections, the Government took the view that there had not been a narrowing of the development gap and other inequalities between the poorest neighbourhoods (quartiers difficiles) and the rest of the country. The decision was taken to focus state urban policy action on a limited number of issues appearing as the most urgent priorities for deprived areas, mainly: urban renovation, unemployment and educational failure (EUKN nda).

### The Economic Situation

France's unemployment problem consistently topped voter concern lists in the 2007 Presidential contest. It was widely reported that those with the right connections have well-protected jobs for life, while vast numbers of others face precarious short-term contracts or long-term unemployment. Even the government's latest overall unemployment figure of 8.4% is suspected of having been massaged down some way (Chrisafis 2007). Between 1988 and 2000 the numbers of RMI (minimum income) collectors doubled from half a million to a million (Nadeau and Barlow 2004).

Particularly hard hit have been France's youth. There have been support measures for young job-seekers, principally:

- *Mission Locales* (youth support services that provide advice and help on housing and health as well as advice on career guidance, training and job seeking for young people aged 16 – 25).
- TRACE programme (more intensive support and advice to the most excluded young people through the Mission Locales).
- *Emplois Jeunes* (service jobs for the young paid at the minimum wage or above with the state making substantial contributions to the employer) (Wilson 2000).

But the measures either haven't been achieving their desired outcomes for whatever reason. Whereas in 1982 10% of the young failed to get a steady job in three years of leaving school the corresponding figure for 2004 was more than a quarter (Niel 2007). Black, Arab and Asian youth are much more likely to be unemployed than their white counterparts with the same level of education and social background, according to *L'Observatoire des Inegalites*, an independent body set up by researchers to monitor discrimination in France (Guilyardi 2005). Youth unemployment is among the worst in Western Europe, at around 20% (double this on some housing estates)

(Chrisafis 2007). Intergenerational unemployment is high (Storper 2002). Silver and Tetrault (2005) suggest the escalation has been from 30% to as high as 85% in some places. As Table 2 reveals, recent years, particularly the Presidential election hustings, have thrown up various suggestions of how to tackle the unemployment problem.

| <b>Table 2: Recent Ideas for Tackling Unemployment</b> |   |  |
|--|---|--|
| <i>Issue</i>   | <i>Policy Idea</i>  | <i>Progress</i>  |
| Youth Unemployment                                     | Plans by the government for a temporary, flexible contract aimed at tackling youth unemployment ( <i>contrat première embauche</i> ) It allows them to fire workers under 26 after 2 years and without giving a reason. | Had to be shelved after massive nationwide protests by students and sixth-formers that disliked the principle. |
|  | Royal (Socialist) "First Chance Contract", a plan to encourage small firms to hire school leavers.  | Uncertain as she was not elected President!  |
|  | Sarkozy (UMP) – "Marshall plan" to train school dropouts in troubled areas.   | Sarkozy's election means it has a chance of being introduced.  |
| Employment   | Sarkozy – freeing two jobs in every small business from social charges.   | Basically the same policy – Sarkozy's election means it has a chance of being introduced.                      |
|  | Bayrou (UDF) – Small Business Act to allow small firms to hire 2 new staff without paying hefty State social charges for a fixed period.  |  |

The small business measures seem good ideas although the ideas for tackling youth unemployment seem very similar to what has gone before. There is also still the question of the *Taxe Delalande* – a crippling levy on any company that sacks anybody over the age of 45 which, because it makes getting rid of staff harder, makes job offer to younger workers less likely. But getting rid of staff is a zero-sum game – it doesn't create more jobs overall. Similarly, the move towards the 35-hour week (RTT – Réduction du Temps de Travail) started in 1997 has been done with the aim of cutting unemployment but preferably operating within a growth context so that there are more hours to be shared around. Growth requires supply-side measures – as the President of the French employers' organisation MEDEF noted during the election there needed to be more discussion in the election of stimulating investment and research (Streeter 2007).

### **Housing Need**

Problems persist in the housing sphere too. Figures show that between 1990–2001 the void rates for HLM housing rose significantly from 1.8–2.7% of stock, a trend particularly apparent in traditionally manufacturing and rural areas (Hall and Hickman 2005). There is also a housing shortage as, since 1989, 300,000 units have been phased out – often leading to immigrant squats that, in several cases, have proven to be fire hazards.

That said, there has been much activity since the 1990s to help realise the right to housing. Financial Housing Solidarity Funds (FSL – *Fonds de Solidarité Logement*) consist of matched funding from central government and the Departments and are

used to provide social assistance for families in, or seeking, social housing but who have various financial difficulties. Since they were set up in 1990, they have helped 1.5m households in difficulty. Tenants on low incomes may also receive a special allowance – in 1999 almost 6.3m households were receiving this. The state has recently begun encouraging private-sector landlords to provide property (both old and new) to people whose income is above the upper income limit for obtaining an HLM, but not high enough for the traditional private sector (AmbraFrance c. 2000).

There have also been numerous efforts to improve the physical housing stock. Housing Improvement Programmes (OPAH – *Opérations Programmées d'amélioration de L'Habitat*), involve a joint contract between a local authority, the National Home Improvement Agency (ANAH) and the state. These enable the renovation work on a group of housing units to be coordinated so as to revitalize an urban area and encourage a greater social mix. Similarly, Conservation Plans help finance the renovation of dilapidated housing in co-ownership. Social housing has enjoyed a reduced VAT rate of 5.5% for some years on both new buildings and renovations and, alongside such carrots, there is also the stick of a tax, levied since 1999, on the owners of empty buildings (the proceeds of which go to ANAH) (AmbraFrance c. 2000).

## **Transport**

Social housing areas remain characterized by poor transport links. According to the 1990 National Institute for Statistics and Economic Research, nearly 60% of suburban municipalities do not have a train station – a position largely unchanged today (Silverstein and Tetreault 2005). The provision of good transport links is clearly important if those on suburban estates are going to have a chance of finding work elsewhere in the urban labour market.

## **The Solidarity and Urban Renewal Law (2000)**

A 1991 (Town Planning Outline) Act made the provision of a minimum specific quota of social housing mandatory for communes in conurbations of a certain size which had deficits of this type of housing. In some cases this did not occur however. The 2000 Act now strengthens the obligations on locally elected representatives – communes (with more than 50000 people) without a minimum quota of social housing (20%) will now be obliged to provide this by 2020 or face penalties (Stevens and Monaghan c. 2006). Dikec (2006) argues however that the definition of what constitutes social housing could be narrowed in order to increase the chances of mix between rich and poor. The reforms of 2000 also had greater transparency in the allocation procedures for HLM housing as a core objective. Following the reform, a single departmental registration system ensures that all housing applications are assessed and dealt with in a reasonable period of time and that local communes hold joint conferences on housing (CIL – *Conférences Intercommunales du Logement*).

The Mayor of Paris Bertrand Delanoë intends to apply this policy to all 20 Paris districts. His aim is to reduce the 93000 applications for HLMs by providing new homes mainly in the city's 8th and 13th district. At his election, he pledged to buy

luxury properties mainly in the up-market areas of Paris and make them available at lower rents to poor tenants. The result of this political commitment has been hundreds of apartments accessible as moderate rent dwellings in the west and centre of the city (Stevens and Monaghan c. 2006).

The key question is what type of mix is involved. Talk of social mix in France tends to imply racial mix too yet there is conflicting evidence, from Marseilles, as to whether there are processes in play which work against racial mix. Fuller (2005) claims that Marseille emerged relatively unscathed from the 2005 riots with an urban regeneration plan that actively pursued the physical and social integration of ethnic groups and which did not geographically place its immigrant population in marginal housing projects on the edge of the city. Against this, Sala Pala (2003) claims, albeit without much evidence, that housing policies have been left in the hands of local partnerships with a strategic role but little or no power in the direct allocation of housing. She asserts that data on ethnic origins, whose collection is restricted by law, are recorded by social landlords, who claim to use them in order to meet the requirement of social mixing and improve their capacity to allocate housing (but actually often use them to keep areas homogenous).

## **THE NEW CONTRATS DE VILLE**

### **Overview**

The Contrat de Ville has evolved from a multilevel contract for urban regeneration to an arena for modernising public services and enhancing democratic participation and accountability. The aim was to ensure urban policy was more linked to other national policies such as social inclusion, reform of inter-communal cooperation, sustainable development and housing. The focus is still neighbourhood renewal and public housing estates. The remit has been extended to incorporate other contractual agreements designed to provide services in the fields of safety, health<sup>14</sup> and education and they have a wider territorial coverage and more money backing them. To ensure a more equitable distribution of resources across the country, criteria such as average personal income or level of public sector housing in relation to the total population are used to inform funding allocations<sup>15</sup> (DIV 2000).

The first aspect of the new Contrats was to produce strategic plans that identify structural aims such as housing, health, and transport needs. A second line of action works at the neighbourhood level with the *Grand Project de Ville* (GPV) and *Opération de Renouvellement Urbain* (ORU), two instruments which are nested within the strategic plans set by the CDV. The GPVs aim to increase the economic and social

<sup>14</sup> In the field of health, urban contracts have contributed towards the structuring of health approaches at a territorial level. They have particularly favoured the inclusion of a public health policy in governmental thinking. *The Ateliers Santé-Ville* ("Health and the city" workshops) are an extension and territorial expression of this policy (EUKN nda).

<sup>15</sup> Financing comes from various partners, including the State, local authorities, and the EU, and totalled 35bn francs (5.4 bn euros) in 2000. State funding, which comprised 65% of this, was derived from the Ministry of Urban Affairs and other sectoral policies (e.g. transport, housing and education).

vitality of certain targeted districts. The ORUs focus almost entirely on physical regeneration – mainly demolition and rebuilding rather than refurbishment (that has failed in the past to revert the decline in popularity and to attract a more mixed community). Fifty French cities<sup>16</sup> are targeted under the six year plan – also aligned to the European Commission’s Structural Funds programme running from 2000 to 2006<sup>17</sup> (Hall and Hickman 2002, Godayer 2003).

In 2000 the DIV (the Inter-Ministry Urban Affairs Department) outlined principles of the contrats approach – some of which are particularly interesting as they appear to be new. Most significant of all is the explicit mention of ethnicity.

- Institutional Partnerships – extending beyond monetary contributions to include technical and professional training, social assistance and housing provision;
- Public Participation – active involvement of local residents in the development of contrats de ville is critical to ensure maximum impact and improve local capacity building<sup>18</sup>.
- Involvement of Ethnic Minorities – recognising that priority areas are disproportionately comprised of immigrant families, projects should include these communities and tackle racial discrimination;
- Skills development – for professionals and local actors involved in the development and implementation of these projects.

### **Best Practice in the Contrats**

In the new generation of contrats, emphasis is placed on four main priorities: employment, education (see box ahead), crime prevention and urban regeneration. The example below is interesting in terms of how the school appears to be embedding itself with wider local institutions that can help it to deliver its mission. It is also interesting for the importance that the voluntary sector has played – something addressed in more depth in the next sub-section.

<sup>16</sup> DIV notes that a total of 247 contrats were in operation between 2000 and 2006. There may then have been more than one contrat in a city.

<sup>17</sup> EU has attempted to prioritise urban issues in its 2000-06 round of structural funding (especially through the Urban II initiative).

<sup>18</sup> There is some evidence that consultation doesn’t always live up to such ideals. Hall and Hickman (2005) find evidence from Lyon that community involvement in the planning of regeneration has actually been superficial, with few examples of residents actually having real involvement in strategic decision making.

### **A Contractual Approach to Education**

Education is linked to the *contrats de ville* through a local education contract, or *Contrat Éducatif Local* (CEL). Cultural activities have an important role in the Nantes CEL (Brittany), and have helped establish linkages between the school and other educational institutions. For example, music and dance workshops are delivered in neighbourhoods, sculpture courses are developed in co-operation with museums, reading and writing activities are linked to the local city library, and heritage and history initiatives are linked to the city archives.

The voluntary sector has also had an important role in implementation of the CEL, by offering activities between and after classes, publishing a newsletter for parents, liaising with other social centres, and establishing linkages with sports clubs and libraries. The grassroots approach of the CEL (drawing on local resources and involving members of the public as active partners in educational initiatives) is also viewed as contributing to its success (DIV 2000).

### **Linking in with the Voluntary and Community Sector**

In the area of regeneration and social welfare, associationism refers to the belief that stronger partnerships with associations in the voluntary sector enhances the capacity of the state to provide better services to socially excluded groups, strengthens the voluntary sector while also democratising state bureaucracies. Nicholls' (2006) central argument is that the form of 'associationism from above' embodied in France's *politique de la ville* failed to produce the desired outcomes. Instead, according to Nicholls, there was a new layer of state bureaucratic infrastructure that stifled associations rather than empowered them. Clientelism and party competition emerged as neighbourhood associations competed for political favour and influence.

Basing his case on in-depth research on Toulouse, the fifth largest city in France, Nicholls concluded that because of the low level of trust between public partners, the *politique de la ville* in Toulouse consisted largely of micro-scale projects carried out by neighbourhood associations with limited effects in terms of the overall goal of regenerating run-down areas of the city. In fact, he concludes forcefully that in more than 20 years of existence in Toulouse the *politique de la ville* "has yet to 'redevelop' or 'reintegrate' a single neighbourhood under its jurisdiction" (p.1794). This constitutes a lost opportunity to articulate the interests of local residents to the state and risks encouraging less democratic avenues of expression (i.e. rioting)<sup>19</sup>. Associationism is clearly an important issue here and needs to be looked at more closely by those in France and the UK that are eager to see welfare reform without wholesale privatisation.

<sup>19</sup> Bull et al. (2004) note how, in Lille, grass-roots activism involvement in regeneration has been dominated, and to some extent co-opted, by party networks.

There is also increased concern for public participation in the management of local services and programmes, notably in the 2002 Law on Local Democracy (*Loi de la Démocratie de Proximité*). The majority of local authorities have actively pursued this approach using various mechanisms, such as the Neighbourhood Council (*Conseil De Quartier*). These Councils were usually funded by the municipality but hired locals to run and staff them and operated in conjunction with the Departments (Loughlin et al. 2004). Such councils had existed before – the Law simply made them mandatory for all cities with more than 80,000 people. An example of a Council, from the south Paris suburb of Issy, is included below.

### **Issy-les-Molineaux Neighbourhood Council, Paris**

Each Council is elected every three years and comprises: 6 elected members (including two deputy mayors) the Mayor (ex-officio), 8 residents (4 elected by local internet voting, and others elected to represent the young, the elderly and the local socio-economic council), 3 “economic actors” (nominated by a body similar to our Chamber of Commerce) and 1 “group of associations” member (similar to our voluntary and community sector). The city council consults the Neighbourhood Councils extensively and stages regular consultation through information booths at the daily markets. Neighbourhood councils can decide to finance investment projects up to 152,500 euros and other projects up to 15,250 euros per year and recently, Participatory Budgeting techniques have been used to consult on them, prior to the council taking the final decision. For the residents’ elections in 2005, the local council set up a website, giving all the candidates space for a web blog (and free training to run it), with an animated cartoon character to explain to users in simple terms everything about the elections. The site was also used for secure internet voting (Governance International 2006).

## **THE RENEWED ASSAULT ON REGENERATION AND COHESION**

### **Law for the City and Urban Renovation (2003)**

The Law for the City and Urban Renovation of August 1st 2003 is taking up the challenge of reducing the gap between disadvantaged areas and the rest of the country through a five-year programme of urban renovation aimed at ‘destroying urban ghettos’. The objective is to restructure these neighbourhoods by reorganising public spaces and services and overall through major work on housing: the demolition and reconstruction of 200,000 dwellings and the rehabilitation of another 200,000. More than 150 neighbourhoods are currently involved. To help achieve this, the Agence Nationale de Rénovation Urbaine (ANRU) has been created. This receives all the national funding for the National Programme of Urban Rehabilitation and allocates funds to projects proposed by regional and local governments (including projects proposed by the Contrats to be known, from January 2007, as the Urban

Contract for Social Cohesion (CUCS). For the latest (post-2006) Contrats all Ministers were mobilised around the urban question and asked to single out some fifty measures, collectively, from within their respective spheres (EUKN undated).

### **The National Observatory**

An Observatoire National des ZUS (National observatory on critical urban areas) was created in 2003. This is responsible for measuring the evolution of social inequalities and differences in relation to other cities or neighbourhoods in the fields of employment and territorial development, and improvements to housing and the urban environment, health, improvements in school results and the mobilisation of public services. From 2004 the government must present an annual report to parliament on the evolution of problem neighbourhoods and ZFU – to be followed, each year, by a policy debate.

### **The Law for Social Cohesion (2005)**

The Law, which appeared in the Spring, planned several measures in the field of employment, integration and new social housing construction, which are not specifically dedicated to deprived urban areas. But two important actions are focused on these neighbourhoods:

- the reform of the *Dotation de Solidarité Urbaine* (urban solidarity grant) which increases the financial resources allocated by the state to the general budget of the poorest cities.
- the creation of *Equipes de Réussite Educative* (educational success teams) which aims to mobilise and coordinate all the field players within educational policies (teachers, social workers, psychologists, physicians, sports and culture players) to deal with the problems of children identified as having been exposed to educational failure.

# Cohesion

## **ORDER AND SECURITY**

### **The 2005 Riots**

Resentment does not only take the form of rioting – other forms of destruction such as routine vehicle burning, damage to public buildings and tagging are common (Lévy-Vroelant 2006). But it was the riots of Autumn 2005 that saw the eyes of the World turning to France. The suburban riots occurred across 40 towns and cities and it was two weeks before they were all over. The initial riots in a poor Paris suburb, Clichy-sous-Bois, were precipitated by the deaths of two teenagers who were electrocuted after running from police (with whom relations have long been poor there) and hiding in an electrical substation. France had seen such disorder before but never before had the events spread so widely and so quickly.

This activity primarily concerns first- and second-generation immigrants from the former colonies of the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). Debates continue (Kaya 2005, Murray 2006, and Cesari 2005) as to whether the rioting was conducted along lines of race, religion, class and poverty. Dikec (2006) rightly cautions that “when the youth in banlieues revolt, they are always portrayed as revolting as blacks, as Arabs, as the children of immigrants, as Muslims etc” (p. 163). The challenge, he claims, is to listen to what they say rather than prejudge their demands according to the group(s) they belong too. What perhaps gets less attention is that amongst those arrested were also children of French parents and grandparents and the offspring of sub-Saharan immigrants. What they all have in common is their alienation from mainstream society (Cesari 2005).

### **The Evolution of Policing and Crime Prevention in Recent Decades**

In 1976 the Peyrefitte Report referred to a social malaise which they dubbed *le mal Français*. The authors feared this was in danger of escalating into urban disorder which was made more likely by repressive policing. As a result of the Peyrefitte Report, task groups were formed to look at crime and delinquency in a wider context – specifically: the psychological aspects of violence; the impact of town planning, housing and cultural change on human behaviour; linkages between economy and violence; problems of criminality. In May 1981 there was a change of government which brought the Socialists into power. They had spent their years in opposition denouncing the approach to crime based only on repressive policies, and what they regarded as the political exploitation of fear of crime. Urban disorder and delinquency in the summer of 1981 in some of the suburbs around Paris and Lyon left the incoming government with the task of having to generate a new approach (and preferably one that wasn't unduly costly). Solutions from 'on high' seemed unlikely to work.

One key result of this situation was the setting up, from 1983 onwards, of the local (communal) councils for security and crime prevention, (*Conseils Locaux de Securite et de Prevention de la Delinquance* – CLSPD), coordination and steering bodies for local crime prevention contracts<sup>20</sup>. Throughout the 1980s cities developed ‘contracts for preventative action’ in their areas, promoting the accessibility of housing, shelters, literacy programmes, community service schemes, social, cultural and sporting facilities to prisoners, drug addiction programmes, etc. An example can be seen in the next box.

### **A Contractual Approach to Crime prevention in Vaulx-en-Velin, Lyon**

Initiatives go beyond focusing exclusively on criminal activity and consider issues of citizenship and the role of community action. The Lycée Professionel les Canuts has, since 1994, been transformed from a school suffering from high rates of absenteeism and violent attacks on people and property, to one in which crime rates and staff turnover have been reduced and student success is improving. This process of transformation involved extensive consultation with pupils and teachers to restate the importance of the profession, and the provision of full training for pupils, in which issues associated with work, citizenship and personal matters were also addressed. External partnerships were also developed with those in the cultural sector, police, and members of the business and school communities. Other strategies employed included the re-formulation of school regulations, twinning with an engineering college, and the development of partnerships with institutions providing work placements (DIV 2000).

A multi-authored account produced for International Learning & Information Network for Crime Prevention & Community Safety claims, appearing to cite evidence from the 1980s, that “in the majority of communities where real progress was made, the local partners report that they were very satisfied with development”. They add that despite political change there was continued investment in such measures throughout the 1990s (ILINPCPS).

The authors seem to suggest however that the police had been bypassed by the new measures partly because of their traditionally militaristic approach and partly because the preventative approach made sense. They did note however that there was, in various areas at the turn of the millennium, a burgeoning interest in community policing methods.

<sup>20</sup> In 1982 a cross-Party commission of Mayors set up by the then Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy to look at prevention of crime and the fear of crime, reported that flexible, local responses should be adopted, in a working partnership of the police, public health, education, culture, housing departments, etc. These recommendations led to the setting up of the National Council for the Prevention of Crime (*Conseil National de la Prevention de la Delinquance*) and the Departmental and Communal Councils.

More recent accounts point to the police retaining a fairly hard-line law and order approach. In response to fears about crime and social marginality that are prevalent in the *quartiers difficiles*, a series of policing and legal reforms have been adopted. These measures include:

- preventative identity checks in sensitive areas
- stronger sentences for first time offenders
- reform of juvenile law so that 13-16 year olds could be detained pre-trial for misdemeanours
- lowering the age of penal responsibility from 13 to 10 years
- jail sentences for public order violations (begging, prostitution, loitering in public housing)

In 2001, Chirac argued that France had a zero tolerance policy for delinquents, especially youth, and there was increased pressure for “local pacification missions within the projects”, which typically involved more police (Ossmann and Terrio 2006). Policing was at its most stringent during the riots of 2005 when the Government imposed a curfew based upon emergency legislation from 1955. The then interior minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, ordered the deportation of all foreign nationals found guilty of participating in the riots, including those with residence permits (Henley and Harding 2005)<sup>21</sup>.

Police cannot be blamed for enforcing laws but they can be blamed for the manner in which they go about their work. Riots in the banlieue are almost always sparked by the deaths of young black men at the hands of the police, and then inflamed by a contemptuous government response. At the time of the March 2007 riots in Paris’ Gare du Nord station<sup>22</sup>, the (then) Interior Minister Sarkozy was accused by his Presidential Election opponents of presiding over a “worrying breakdown of trust between the security services and our citizens” (Royal) and of turning the police into a “mere force of repression” (Bayrou). In April 2005 an Amnesty International report criticised the excessive force “generalised impunity” used by French police in conducting ID checks on young men from African backgrounds (in Bouteldja 2005). Ossman and Terrio relate normative assumptions about immigrants within government and the judicial system (seen as pathological immigrant culture or a clash of civilisations between Islam and Western norms) to the suburban unrest of 2005: as they put it “consensus on the immigrant delinquent as a candidate for control and containment rather than prevention and reinsertion set the stage” (Ossman and Terrio, 2006:13).

<sup>21</sup> Segolene Royal’s interesting suggestion for a form of military service for unruly teenagers/young offenders on riot-torn estates proved unpopular with many in her Party and wasn’t a subject she embraced during the ‘campaign proper’.

<sup>22</sup> A (Congolese) fare-dodger’s arrest, with (allegedly with excessive force) sparked nine hours of clashes between youths and riot police.

## Security

In addition to the order threat was a security (terror) threat. The end of the 1980s and early 1990s saw a number of violent 'terrorist' incidents involving young French born Muslim youth (in North Africa and Paris) (Silverstein 2000). Several writers claim that religion and ethnicity offer attractive 'solutions' for people beset with intertwined problems (see Kaya 2005, Cesari 2005 and Kastoriyano 2006). This is fine until it helps underpin extremism.

A police report of 2004 claimed that 32 imams in the Paris region could now be considered radical (Henley 2004). Antoine Sfeir, an expert on Islam in France, claims that radical foreign-born imams often find a willing audience in France's rundown immigrant suburb<sup>23</sup> (Henley 2004). Similar views have been expressed by Stephane Berthomet, a former anti-terrorist investigator and Oliver Roy, author of *Globalised Islam* (in Astier 2005). Roy observes that, for some alienated youth, extremism serves as both a voice and identity. The "Militants do not draw their force from Islam itself" (*ibid.*). This raises not just an actual security threat that might, at worst, affect thousands but also leads to a much more pervasive fear of terror/violence that affects millions – Silverstein (2000) claims that, in the 1990s, the banlieues came increasingly to be seen in the French public mind as a threatening space of growing Islamic radicalisation. The events of 9/11 saw the State quick to act – the Law of Everyday Security, passed in late 2001 (just after 9/11), substantially expanded police powers to allow for the stop and search of vehicles and premises and more widespread monitoring of electronic transactions.

## ALTERNATIVE MEASURES FOR COHESION

### National and Local Intermediaries

Religious and community figures appear to be important in calming and mediating the often tense environments of the suburbs. In Marseilles, relatively untroubled by riots, the local clerics committee (Marseilles Hope) was important in addressing issues as they arose (Ali and Geissendorfer 2006). In the suburbs of Clichy, Khalid El-Quandili, a former world kick-boxing champion, was an important mediator in the days immediately following the riots. At this same time, the country's biggest Muslim fundamentalist organisation, the Union for Islamic Organisations of France, issued a fatwa forbidding those Muslims from taking part in any action that damages private or public property or others. It is important for the police and communities alike that they are plugged into such people.

<sup>23</sup> Despite some young Muslims who have fully integrated becoming professionals unemployment among young Muslim youths has been estimated at approximately 30% (Gerges 2004). Muslims are twice as likely as non-Muslim immigrants to be unemployed – 56% having less than an upper secondary school diploma. Access to adequate housing is also an issue – many Muslim immigrants concentrated in the outer suburban housing estates of France's larger cities (Euro-Islam 2007: 1-2).

## Police Tactics

The language employed by police in the banlieue could be more thoughtful. Even the police authorities are now acknowledging that the not uncommon police practice of addressing non-white youths with the condescending 'tu' rather than the more respectful 'vous' undermines police-community relations (Murray 2006). Other measures mentioned are the pro-active approach that the police force adopted in fighting hate crimes in Marseilles (Ali and Geissendorfer 2006) and the National Police practice, from 1998 onwards, of systematically hiring citizens of foreign origin as police auxiliaries – unfortunately there appear to have been no statistics kept (for reasons discussed in the race section ahead) so evaluation is difficult (Nadeau and Barlow 2004). As was touched upon earlier, there has also been some interest in low profile community policing – along the lines of US-style campus police. An example of this is outlined in the next box.

### Community Policing in Meaux, Paris

Meaux is one of Paris' troubled banlieues. The young Mayor Jean-Francois Cope wanted an alternative to what he felt was the reactive and heavy-handed activity of the Police Nationale in his area. However, he also wanted a visible force – to address petty crime and anti-social behaviour (because such acts were intrinsically annoying and because they can be the thin end of the wedge in regard to wider crimes). However, in France only towns with less than 10,000 residents can have their own police (Mieux has just fewer than 50,000). Using his good personal connections the Mayor nonetheless managed to persuade the local Prefet to allow the commune to have and house 88 officers stationed at several bases across the area. These achieved notable successes against local drug dealers and thugs (Nadeau and Barlow 2004)

## Sport and Cohesion

The crime prevention potential of sport was explicit in the *Droit de Cité* programme established in 1992 to offer meaningful activities to disadvantaged young people who were not being reached by traditional youth services. The programme continues to operate throughout France and has involved hundreds of thousands of youngsters in cultural and sporting activities. Through these activities it aims to develop co-operation and leadership among young people so that they are "not a problem, but part of the solution". The programme is basically youth work by young people for young people. Through its "grass roots" origins and operation, *Droit de Cité* has had particular success with integrating young people from ethnic minorities who were becoming marginalised in many neighbourhoods (ILINCPCS undated).

Silverstone (2000) believes (see box below) that lots of sport-based regeneration has an ulterior social control motive – regeneration as some combination of state attempts to re-impose governmental authority and corporate marketing (rather than regeneration as fun). However, he concludes that neither state nor sports brands have

succeeded in controlling seemingly unruly immigrant neighbourhoods. Often, young Muslim youth have instead simply re-appropriated banlieue public spaces for their own forms of improvised “ghetto sports”.

### **Youth and Sports Programme**

In the aftermath of the 1990 youth riots in Vaulx-en-Velin (Lyon) and Mantes-la-Jolie (West Paris), sports initiatives featured heavily in the measures proposed by the government of Michel Rocard. In September 1992, millionaire owner of Marseilles football club, Bernard Tapie, working with the (then) Ministry of Urban Affairs, launched a 40m francs programme of investment over several years in the construction of hundreds of sports installations and over a 100 sports fields in 120 different municipalities around the country.

The physical regeneration aspect of much of this ‘Youth and Sports’ Programme was complimented by ‘moral regeneration’ efforts. The Summer Prevention operation<sup>24</sup>, in 1992 sponsored over 1,500 banlieue youth (mainly of immigrant parents) to attend weekend excursions and summer camps. These camps were ostensibly aimed at ‘preventing’ violence, delinquency and drug abuse in poor neighbourhoods. They also served a re-education function and were meant, Silverstein argues, to “defuse the ‘communitarianism’ supposedly created in the parallel summer camps organised by Muslim associations” (p.34)<sup>25</sup>.

### **Representing the Riots**

Numerous criticisms have been made of the ways in which the media described and presented individuals involved in the 2005 riots as ‘guerrillas’ engaged in acts of ‘rebellion’ and ‘violence’. Ossman and Terrio (2006) suggest that the media presented the public with a specific category of person: the ‘immigrant delinquent’. Growing fears about crime and violence were increasingly linked to the ‘immigrant projects’, and soon the image of delinquent immigrant youths came to signify the violence, danger and disorder of the suburbs. Muslim women were also targeted by the media for supporting their fellow neighbours who committed those ‘crimes’ (Lévy-Vroelant 2006).

It is not just (biased) images that can do damage. Sarkozy’s words were often slightly ill-chosen and then, to make matter worse, taken out of context. When he spoke of hosing away the louts in an estate it was less widely reported that the previous day an 11-year-old had been killed there by a stray bullet in a fight apparently between two rival drug gangs. On another estate he was met with jeers and diverse projectiles

<sup>24</sup> Garbaya (2005) also refers to organisation of holidays for youths from housing projects to avoid summertime agitation in the 1980s – known as Operations Anti Hot Summers.

<sup>25</sup> Also useful is the website of SportUrban, a European Commission-funded inter-regional exchange between partners in 12 EU countries of methods and approaches by which sport facilities can have a leverage effect on urban renewal, economic development and social cohesion. French-based Association SportUrban is the Lead Partner (of 24 – another 7 of whom are also French). The website is starting to be populated with case studies from France and elsewhere.

and promptly promised to rid France's estates of their "rabble" by which he again was referring to those who had offended him. He did however make other comments – that the riots appeared coordinated (without evidence for this) and telling police that "your jobs are not to play soccer with these kids; your job is to arrest them" (Ireland 2006). That said, the words may have been calculated – he did, after all, win the Presidential election.

# Integration

## IMMIGRATION

### France's Immigrant History

Immigration and integration in France are statistical black holes. Children of immigrants become citizens at 18 as long as they grew up on French territory. Thereafter they vanish from statistics. The evidence there suggests that in 2000 there were 3.5m immigrants of whom 20% were unemployed and that another 1.7m had left immigrant status to become citizens. More importantly little is known about whether immigrants integrate or what factors determine whether they do. This opens up the potential for racists and xenophobes to fabricate and perpetuate myths about the behaviour of certain nationalities and about these groups' access to state welfare, jobs etc. (Nadeau and Barlow 2004).

Nonetheless, France has a long history of immigration. Between a quarter and a third (figures vary) of French citizens have at least one grandparent of foreign origin (Nadeau and Barlow 2004; Jack 2001). This mix is continuing – in 1990 half of marriages involving an immigrant also involved a French-born person (Jack 2001). A major factor behind immigration used to be the economy. In the post World War II era, due to a labour shortage, the French government recruited immigrant workers from its former colonies to fill industrial jobs (Ireland 2006).

Today, the nature of migration has changed, with very few immigrants (less than 5%) arriving for work purposes (Pedder 2003). This fact, allied to high unemployment in some areas, creates the potential for racism/xenophobia and/or fears that immigrants, not just first generation ones, will take jobs, welfare and, conceivably, sexual partners. Such fears will be particularly intense in areas with high levels of disadvantage. A 1997 survey by the French Human Rights Commission found 38% of French saying they are racist – far higher than the figures in Germany, Britain, Italy and Spain (in Jack 2001). Black umbrella group Le Cran recently published the first opinion poll in France asking people about race. In all, 56% of black people said they suffered racial discrimination in their everyday lives, and 37% said this had worsened in the past year (Chrisafis 2007b).

Immigration also has implications for educational performance. In the 2000 PISA study, native pupils with at least one of the parents born in the country achieved better results in the combined reading, mathematical, and scientific literacy scales than pupils who were born in the country with two foreign born parents. Exposure to other pupils who speak French might help but this may not be easy – a 2005 survey highlighted that 40% of pupils of migrant descent concentrate in 10% of middle schools (both in EUMC 2006).

France's colonial history has not been a smooth one – notably the Algerian War – and this still has some reverberations today as some vigorously sought to retain (and now lament the loss of) France's colonial presence. Others, from Algeria, were often vigorously in favour of independence. Both sides used torture in the war. Perhaps hardest hit were the Harkis – Muslim auxiliary troops in the French army. About 100,000 of these settled in France to avoid persecution after Algerian independence in 1962. Unfortunately, nothing had been planned for them and the Government even refused to formally recognize their right to stay in France for some years. They were initially kept out of sight in temporary camps. As recently as the mid-1990s, Harki groups were protesting, sometimes even through hunger strikes, their continued treatment as second-class citizens (Charbit 2006).

### **Immigration Policy**

The *Front National* of Jean-Marie Le Pen has been the only political party to speak about immigration and race so openly, for so long and in such radical terms (for example, offering voluntary repatriation). Le Pen nudged out the Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin in the first round of the 2002 Presidential elections. Although his first round win was also partly due to voter apathy and a split French Left, he nonetheless won 18% of the French vote in the second round. The Party has no National Assembly seats at present (in the mid-80s they had 35) but does have local strongholds – notably in the South and Alsace – where the votes for Le Pen in 2002 were as high as 40%. Whilst this might not lead to political victory it can make life very uncomfortable for non-white groups living in such areas.

Le Pen is thought to have influenced tougher immigration laws in the 80s and 90s – specifically, the removal of the right to automatic citizenship at birth for the children of immigrants and forcing foreign spouses to wait longer for citizenship (Murray 2006). He still keeps immigration and race issues in the media and forces other politicians to address some of the issues where he is deemed to have touched a public nerve. Sarkozy has certainly sought to occupy some of this ground and has recently talked, albeit in little detail, of plans to found a Ministry for Immigration and National Identity – something the majority of French voters supported. In mid 2006 he drafted a Bill making it more difficult for unskilled migrants to settle in the country, and illegal immigrants will no longer have the right to remain after 10 years. Other new rules include the requirement for immigrants from outside the EU to sign a contract agreeing to learn French and respect the principles of the French Republic. In general, it will also be more difficult for immigrants to bring their families over, as they will have to wait longer for residence cards. The Bill reflects Sarkozy's assertions that the country must assume greater control over immigration, and that the suburban riots of 2005 were evidence of the failings of the current system (BBC News 2006).

Good immigration policy is not about just about barriers and conditions of stay. It could, for example, offer some form of voice for non-citizens (who cannot vote in elections) – for example, in 2002 Paris created its first Council of Immigrant Representation. Pedder (2003), in a report on immigration and integration in Britain and France, rightly notes that good immigration policy can also entail:

- tackling abuse and fraud in asylum and visa-seeking processes (including bogus marriages)
- working with the home countries of refugees to address socio-economic problems
- opening up legal and economic routes to migration
- uniformly strong border controls so that no country gets taken advantage of

### **Policy for Residents from Former Colonies (and their Descendants)**

French government has enacted various measures to help the Harki community (notably the 1994 Romani law and the 2005 Mekachera law), however, as the Harki community claims, measures are often too little, too late. There are hundreds of active Harki associations in France working to obtain further recognition for their welfare needs. Recently, the Chirac administration has acknowledged these former allies and public ceremonies have been held to commemorate their sacrifices, such as the September 25, 2001 Day of National Recognition for the Harkis.

In 2005, an ill-advised law was passed demanding that lycée teachers instruct students in the “benefits of colonialisation”. Teachers were to “acknowledge and recognise in particular the positive role of the French presence abroad, especially in North Africa”. To their credit, many French people saw this as a denial of their country’s racist crimes and Chirac engineered the law’s repeal.

## **RACE**

### **The Statistical Hole and the Republican Model of Integration**

Classifying people by their ethnicity is illegal in France – the nation of “liberty, equality, fraternity” considers all people should be equally French with no differentiation. A landlord in Lille tried to require racial data on prospective tenants in 1999 and caused a minor national outcry. No direct census questions can be asked that would determine the exact ethnic, racial or religious makeup of society. French statistics refer to individuals in terms of nationality or place of birth, without mentioning their origin.

Frenchness is socially constructed – that is there is nothing intrinsically French. Instead it had to be built by, amongst other things, the abolition of regional languages and the centralisation of power. The notions of liberty, equality and fraternity, that have been the keystone of the Republican *Modele d’Integration*, mean that no-one gets preferential treatment – France is committed to a concept of citizenship that,

domestically, ignores other cultures and races and keeps religion out of state affairs. It is even illegal to even keep records on race or religion – a reaction by De Gaulle to the Vichy Government’s appalling treatment of French Jews (a historical mistake that Chirac gave the first official apology for recently). This Republican model is the anti-thesis of multi-culturalism and is implicitly assimilationist.

Le Cran recently repeated demands that France begin collecting statistics – a move that Sarkozy was reported to support. Not all were in agreement. Segolene Royal opposed the move as she feared information could be used to keep records on individuals. At the same time, 40 academics and campaigners publish a petition in the *Libération* newspaper – warning that “ethnic statistics” could lead to confrontation between groups. Some argue instead that racism and discrimination are being swept under the carpet. Certainly, there is a danger of race statistics leading to race groups adopting identities around their skin colour (e.g. a sense of ‘not being good enough’ or ‘only good at certain things’ perhaps) and for others to falsely link high incidences of certain social phenomena (e.g. unemployment) in a particular group to racial characteristics. But such statistics can also prevent racist (or faith-based, or nationality-based) abuses taking place – for example, in terms of racist recruitment practice or examination marking.

### **Race Equality and Diversity**

A couple of other measures that were mentioned in the 2004 Social Cohesion Plan also came into play shortly afterwards – i.e. without being in the 2005 Law for Social Cohesion. France’s version of the UK’s Commission for Racial Equality HALDE (*Haute Autorité de Lutte Contre les Discriminations Et L’égalité*) was established<sup>26</sup>. HALDE is established with the aim of fighting discrimination and promoting equality. It is Chaired by Renault chairman Louis Schweitzer. In true French fashion there is no reference to the word race in the title and it is not entirely clear from the literature available in English what major measures it will undertake.

The involvement of the Renault chairman is hopefully an indicator that business sees the importance of diversity practices and that others also see this on their behalf. He is not alone in his efforts. Axa chairman Claude Bebear has authored a government-backed report titled “Business reflecting the colours of France’ and the Montaigne Institute (the employers’ think-tank that he Chairs) has also drawn up a voluntary “Charter for Diversity” for business to sign up to. It is not just big corporate France either. The CJD union, a union for employees of small and medium-sized businesses, is seeking to build further support for the campaign, starting later this year with a series of awareness meetings in 300 companies. The Government has sought to move this process forward by moving to ban the requirement for a photo on CV applications – thereby introducing the principle of ‘anonymous CVs’ (ideally there would also be mechanisms to ensure that names were not given either) (Guilyardi 2005).

<sup>26</sup> Also established was l’ANAEM (Agence Nationale de l’accueil des étrangers et des migrations) – the National Agency for the Reception of Foreigners and Migration. This was less radical as it was a merger of the old Office of International Migration and the Social service assistance for emigrants.

## The Law on Equal Opportunity (2006)

This Law was introduced by Azouz Begg (Minister for Equal Opportunities) and Jean-Louis Borloo, (Minister for Employment, Social Cohesion and Housing<sup>27</sup>). The key measures fall into three main categories (see Table 3) – ironically only one of which is overtly about equal opportunities. Although not part of this Law, the departments most concerned by urban violence, saw the appointment, in late 2005, of six *Préfets Délégués À L'égalité Des Chances* (Equal Opportunity Heads). These senior officials are to coordinate and oversee, together with elected local officials, resource networks for integration and community life, as well as State provisions regarding employment, educational support, housing, urban renewal, transport and even prevention of violence. Like HALDE, the purpose of the National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity is not really clear from the literature but, as with HALDE, the existence of a body with this title is, of itself, cause for hope.

| <i>Area</i>   | <i>Key Aspects</i>   |
|---|--|
| Education, Employment and Economic Development            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• institution of junior apprenticeships from the age of 14</li> <li>• internships of over 3 months' duration must be remunerated</li> <li>• creation of 15 new ZFUs in poor areas of over 8,500 inhabitants</li> </ul>  |
| Equal Opportunity and The Struggle Against Discrimination | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity<sup>28</sup> (focusing on troubled neighbourhoods)</li> <li>• extended mandate for the new HALDE agency</li> <li>• initiatives to combat discrimination in radio and tv (through the CSA – the Audio-Visual Council)</li> </ul> |
| Parental Responsibility and The Fight Against Incivility  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• parental responsibility contract to combat absenteeism at school</li> <li>• 6-12 month voluntary civil service programme for 16-25 year olds</li> </ul>   |

## POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY MINORITY GROUPS

### Mainstream Politics

Getting an exact position on the ethnic make-up of the French National Assembly (Parliament) has been difficult for the project team. According to a 2006 article, 11 of the French National Assembly's 577 members are minorities (Ward 2006). Azouz Begg, the Equal Opportunities Minister is certainly of Algerian parentage. Several other accounts mention that there are none – aside from those representing its overseas territories. What seems clear is that the figures are low.

Bird (2005) suggests that one contributory factor is that Parties determine a ranking of candidates with voters determining only the number of seats. Influenced by a growth in popularity for Le Pen's *Front National*, other mainstream parties have been reluctant to take on any minority candidates themselves, and no party has found a

<sup>27</sup> The Ministry for Urban Affairs was subsumed into this new entity in 2003.

<sup>28</sup> Like ANRU, this will be based under the aegis of DIV in the Ministry of Employment, Social Cohesion and Housing).

reason to recognize, cater to, or utilize minority groups during campaign mobilization. Garbaye (2002) claims that ethnic minorities hailing from North Africa are leaving governments that “are hardly democratic and have long sought to control the politics of their communities” – influences that affect current political drive and participation. Also, comprehension of the new system will be limited or even non-existent for some time.

At a local level, the possibility for minorities to make their mark as candidates or voters should be greater. However, the scale may still need to be very local. Garbaye (2002) notes how the ruling party in Lille, the Socialist party, considers local support strong enough to render the North African vote unnecessary and so does little to gain favour with the North African community. Those who win favour from the “machine” are groups focused on “innocuous cultural and leisure activities,” those external are generally impoverished youth who vocalise their discontent at local unemployment and racism through non-political channels.

Garbaye (2005) observes that there have been successes at local elections by first or second generation North African candidates but laments that the Beur (North African immigrant) protest movement in the 1980s, which originally created a powerful dynamic of support among liberal public opinion<sup>29</sup>, was dropped and marginalized by a short-sighted Socialist Party (swayed by the rise of the Far Right and the Republican tradition of not talking about ethnicity).

### **Grassroots Activity**

Several networks (see Table 4) have sprouted up in the wake of the suburban tensions of 2005. These are building on the efforts of older but now more formal bodies like SOS Racisme (closely linked to the Socialist Party), UNADE (diversity and equality umbrella group) and Droit de Cite (an urbanist think and do tank). Falconer (2006) claims that only a few groups, such as Communists and intellectuals involved with the *Monde Diplomatique* newspaper, have made practical efforts to collaborate and engage in dialogue with Muslim or black activists. These groups’ energy and first-hand experience must be tapped into and harnessed.

<sup>29</sup> In 1983, one hundred thousand participants staged a peaceful demonstration march from Lyon to Paris in the Mache des Beurs demanding for the complete integration of French-Arabs.

| <b>Table 4: New Grassroots Initiatives</b> |   |
|--|---|
| <i>Group</i>                               | <i>Key Aspects</i>  |
| AC Le Feu                                  | Pronounced Assez le feu (no more burning) its work has included an extensive public consultation exercise culminating in a report documenting issues such as unemployment, discrimination and exclusion, justice, the behaviour of police officers, education, and lack of political representation and efforts to persuade the banlieue to vote. Certainly, registration has risen 10% in the areas that erupted in the 2005 riots.  |
| Le CRAN                                    | <i>Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires</i> (Representative Council of Black Associations). This brand new organisation puts together more than sixty Black associations to make an assessment of discrimination and find solutions. The members underline the gap they often notice between the reality of the street from which millions of blacks come from and what happens in the leading institutions. Most members of this organisation also belong to a political party. |
| Véto                                       | This was created in December 2004 by youngsters living in the suburbs of Paris Garges-lès-Gonesse. It works like a think tank and a tool aimed at encouraging cultural and political activities in the city. The members of Veto have meetings on a regular basis. They have also developed a monthly newspaper called SASSUFI (that's enough). They also denounce the veiled racism in France as well as what they call the colonial administration of the French suburbs.               |
| Les Indigene de la Republique              | Created in June 2005 these are one of the most radical associations fighting against racism. It is an association very much turned to the past which according to its members explain the institutional racism and discrimination in France. The main idea of this association is that the Republique is racist.  |

French rap music, the growth of which benefited from cultural laws demanding a set proportion of French language material, has played an important role in the recent Presidential elections. Their<sup>30</sup> key message (delivered on tracks, at concerts and through the media) is to get people voting. They don't necessarily all advocate who to vote for – some even back Sarkozy, a figure badly-liked in the suburbs from where many rappers originate. Many are motivated by a desire to avoid a repeat of the 2002 election where apathy was an important factor in the Le Pen's strong showing. Certainly, there has been a dramatically increased voter registration in areas hit by the riots and/or where there are big immigrant populations (Burke 2007).

## **INTEGRATING ISLAM**

### **Integrating Islam**

France is home to a significant Muslim community of over four million people. Most – half to three-fifths of whom are believed to be French citizens – have adopted French cultural norms; they enthusiastically endorse republican values, including *laïcité* (the French state's strong official secularism). They tend to vote somewhat less often and somewhat more to the left than most of the French population, but socio-economic variables, not religion, account for the differences (Giry 2006). Despite media images that might suggest otherwise (see ahead), millions of Muslims embrace their identities as Europeans, French people and democrats (Lagrange 2005).

<sup>30</sup> Notable examples are Xiao-Venom Blackara, Diams, Doc Gyneco and Akhenaton Ditto Feniski of Saipan Supa Crew.

That said, there have been cultural conflicts. Notable here has been the banning of the hijab (headscarf) in schools has led to increasing pressures, from those who object, to the establishment of state-approved Islamic schools. Indeed, one such institution has recently been established in Lille (Euro-Islam 2007). This is a surprising development in a nation that has a highly secularised education system – the Strasbourg school district has expelled a high number of Muslim schoolgirls for wearing the hijab (albeit often overturned in the French High Court). Other examples of some Muslims wanting to be apart from the mainstream, in addition to their need for separate places of worship, include the allocation of sites for Islamic burial rites, and the provision of venues for halal slaughter of animals (Euro-Islam 2007). Publication (by the paper Charlie-Hebdo) of cartoons of the prophet Mohammed also drew legal action by the Muslim World League, the Grand Mosque of Paris, the Union of Islamic Organisations of France and drew criticism from the French Council of the Muslim Faith, an umbrella organization of Muslim groups. This was despite all key political parties showing support for the right to publish and stressing that, in any case, Islam was not being offended.

### **Imams**

According to the Interior Ministry, France's Muslim community, Europe's largest, is ministered to by between 1,000 and 1,500 imams. Government figures show 27 Muslim prayer leaders were deported on public order or human rights grounds between 2001 and Spring 2004 – more than half of these since July 2003. Only 10% of them are believed to be citizens, less than half speak French and "probably a majority" are illegal immigrants. The majority of imams preaching in France are self-taught or have had no formal religious education.

The main issue with Imams is not about stopping the tiny minority that preach Jihad or stoning women but is instead about ensuring they can communicate with local people, particularly youth. To do this they need to speak good French and understand life in (and preferably beyond) the banlieue. The French government is working to develop guidelines and additional programmes at universities to help train imams (Euro-Islam 2007). This will include training Muslim clerics in a moderate Islam that respects human rights and the republican code. A training scheme to be run by France's moderate National Muslim Council is also in preparation. State aid for such work may however be difficult given France's strict laws on secularisation (Henley 2004).

### **Community Groups**

Silverstein explains that Muslim associations in France (particularly cultural and religious based ones) had been growing rapidly and filling the institutional vacuum left by the failure and political co-option of the secular, multicultural Beur Movement of the early 1980s. In the early 1990s, many of these associations became the main focus for local organisation and grassroots development. Young people afflicted by rapidly rising rates of unemployment were offered jobs working in mosques and positions as traders selling goods in local markets. Youth summer camps were also

organised. Silverstein (2000) argues that such movements can appear to be “a viable alternative to drugs, delinquency and prison for these ‘excluded’ (male) youth” (p.29). Such an alternative is clearly preferable although it might also be seen as suggesting that the State or mainstream communities/groups can’t hope to intervene.

### **(Politically) Representing Islam**

France is highly secularised – to have any dealings with the State a religious group must have a national federation. Catholics, Protestants and the Jewish community have all had this – Muslims have not. In 1992 a Council to represent all Muslim associations was created but split in 1995. In early 2000 the then Minister of the Interior Jean-Pierre Chevènement convinced France’s five main Muslim federations to sign a 6-page text outlining how the administration and the Muslim faith in France should relate. The signatories affirmed their adhesion to the principles of the Republic, in particular the separation of state and religion. In return they agreed that mosques should be used for religious purposes and to support community life only and that foreign activism and foreign policy matters are strictly forbidden. The federations recognised that only national and local construction standards would apply for the building of mosques and the Government agreed that building permits would only be refused for failure to comply with these standards (Nadeau and Benoit 2004 : 231-2). More recently, 2003, the French Council of the Muslim Faith was created to help bring a more public face to Islamic practices (Euro-Islam 2007).

### **Representing Islam in the Media**

News sources have sensationalized Muslims symbols as a resistance to integration and assimilation. Headlines from the L’Express print racy titles such as “zealous pupils know that their hijab is covered with blood” (in Rigoni 2005 : 565). Falconer notes that representations usually depict a withdrawal into ‘communitarism’ and religious conservatism, or a growth in extremism – “suburbs with a large immigrant/Muslim population have in this view become extraterritorial zones outside the Republic.” Silverstein (2000) convincingly argues that one of the central images in these alarmist accounts has been the portrayal of Islam as a “masculine mass movement ..... whereby the individual believer loses his identity, if not control of his body, to the group” (p.30). Images circulated constantly in the media of the massed ranks of men in prayer or at the mosque gathering for Friday prayers focus on the uniform and public character of Islam rather than on its internal diversity or on private acts of piety and charity. The threat of a mass explosion or riot was assumed to be ever present – a fear that is reinforced through the appearance in certain of these pictures of French riot police (see also Euro-Islam 2007).

The Muslim media serves a very different audience and encourages emerging dialogues by providing alternative views to the mainstream. In addition Muslim magazines, such as La Medina and internet sites such as oumma.com provide a new venue for young Muslims to make their voices heard. Allowing a departure from the older generation in regards to post colonial ideologies and women’s participation,

youth media sources are fundamental for creating a first generation identity (Rigoni 2005). The question then is how to encourage more journalists (and talented amateur writers) to move between such media and the mainstream.

## **SPORT AND CULTURE AS AGENTS OF INTEGRATION**

### **Sport**

Le Pen has been critical of the French football team for having few white players yet, particularly during their success in the 1998 World Cup, the team's players, many of whom grew up in the country's immigrant ghettos, were widely celebrated by politicians and the public for their achievements as French citizens. It seemed an arena where ethnic minorities had arrived as leading figures – Zinedine Zidane is more famous but Lilian Thuram (see next box) has been willing and highly able to speak on the plight of those living in the banlieu where he grew up. Ali and Geissendorfer (2006) also note how Marseilles multi-ethnic and successful team was an element in that city's relative cohesiveness at the time of the 2005 riots. However, Bremner (2006) is amongst those cautioning that the composition of the national football team should be a reminder to 'white France' that it has not embraced its minorities outside the world of sport and music. Certainly, outside sport and entertainment there are few French men and women of Arab or African origins in high-profile positions. French television news anchors are almost exclusively white, as is much of the police force.

#### **Role Model : Lilian Thuram**

Professional footballer / World Cup 1998 winner / France's most capped player

Born in an overseas Department / raised in the Parisian suburbs

Appointed as an adviser to the *Haut Conseil d'Integration* (race think tank)

Member of the Legion d'Honneur – the highest civilian honour

Helped secure reform on the laws on les sans-papiers

### **Cultural Integration of Les Beurs**

Paris-based Algerian-born singer Rachid Taha, a musician who blends Western and north African styles, claims that "an Algerian in France still frightens the French – they think he's still a terrorist who'll cut your throat for nothing" (in Hussey 2007). There is evidence to suggest he is mistaken – people of North African birth or parentage are starting to enter mainstream French life. In recent years Beur names like Djamel Deboze (comedian and actor), Sami Bouajila (film) and, most famous of all, Zinedine Zidane (football) have become mainstream names. Algerian Rai music is popular – one of France's biggest international pop stars is the rai singer Cheb Mami

who has worked with Sting. Corner stores are often referred to as the arabes and rap stars are mostly Beurs. One of the most popular French comedies of the last decade, *Taxi*, was about a Beur cabbie from Marseilles.

### **Film and Literature**

Film and literature have been important media for keeping issues in the banlieue in the minds of the French public and indeed the wider World. For example, Mathieu Kassovitz's critically acclaimed 1995 film, *La Haine* (Hate), detailed the aftermath of a riot on an impoverished Paris housing project. For decades the photographer Denis Darzacq has lived and worked in some of Paris's roughest neighbourhoods – taking portraits of people he meets there. Novelists have also got in on the act – for example, various works by Rachid Djaidani, 'Banlieue Noire' by Thomte Ryam and the acclaimed 'Just Like Tomorrow' by teenager Faiza Guene. The key in all these works is that they have the potential to demystify 'the other' – to show people with real lives and concerns and who have strengths and weaknesses.

The other issue that is receiving a lot of attention recently are films about France's colonial past – a useful reminder when the Mahgrebi population of the banlieue are being demonised. A good example here is Rachid Bouchareb's excellent film last year about north Africans fighting the Nazis in the second world war for De Gaulle's Free French ('Les Indigenes'/'Days of Glory'). At the start of the 1960s, the French government had decided to freeze their Pensions at their 1959 levels – the film catalysed President Chirac to change the law to bring the surviving foreign combatant pensions into line with what French veterans are paid. Other films appearing about Algeria include: *Mon Colonel*, by Costa-Gavras which deals with the torture by French soldiers of presumed supporters of the Algerian National Liberation Front; *La Trahison* (The Betrayal), about the tensions in a mixed unit of Algerian Arab and French soldiers in 1960. Bouchareb's next film is about the Sétif massacre in Algeria in 1945 – another dark episode in French history. Ideally, such works will be balanced up with projects that offer positive (and realistic) scenarios for the present day – a film about a community group who transform the fortunes of their banlieue perhaps?

### **Integration and Regeneration through Arts and Culture – Case Study of La Friche in Marseilles**

La Friche Belle de Mai, a cultural and arts centre established in 1990 in Marseilles, illustrates how the cultural sector can play a significant role in the regeneration of urban areas. La Friche is located in a former industrial building in the north-east centre of the city. Drawing on Marseille's diverse cultural scene, La Friche provides the physical and social infrastructure necessary to support music, theatre and the arts. Its inventory includes workshop and studio space, and it is home to a local radio station and newspaper. As such, it serves as a communal learning, working and exhibition space for the district of Belle de Mai and the City of Marseilles.

Music is one activity in particular that has had a significant role to play in the regeneration of Marseilles, and through its support of local musical talent, La Friche continues to be helpful in this regard. For example, the centre trains artists on how to move through the production cycle, offering courses on song writing, recording and concert organisation. This helps young artists have a more comprehensive understanding of the music industry, and provides the support needed to assist new talent in deprived areas. In addition, La Friche has also played an important role in supporting music festivals organised by the city, which were developed to help celebrate Marseille's history and cultural diversity. Music festivals are viewed as important mechanisms for regeneration because they provide forums for artists and young people to perform, stimulate the local economy, and help project a positive image of the city in which diversity is celebrated.

There are a number of reasons why La Friche is viewed as a successful urban regeneration model. One of the more notable is its ability to establish linkages between the public and private sectors, particularly within the music industry. The culture of creativity and the businesses that support it are well integrated in La Friche's workshops, training courses and productions. Equally important, the centre has made a significant contribution to the local economy, by creating employment opportunities in the arts and education sectors, and by supporting productions that re-invest in other local projects. Thirdly, the Centre is particularly attractive to young people in the city, and serves as a place where youth can learn new skills, develop their talents and become more involved in the community. In so doing, it provides support to a segment of the population that is especially vulnerable to unemployment and exclusion. Lastly, the centre's activities are linked to the city's broader social inclusion agenda. For example, trainees are given full support by La Friche after they have completed their courses, and start-up funds are available for new projects and enterprises. The fact that the centre now receives a substantial portion of its funding from the public sector, including the City Council, the Ministry of Culture and various state sources, is a strong indication of how valued this approach to regeneration is within the French government (all the above from URBACT 2006).

# Conclusions

The look across the channel has not thrown up any simple solutions for domestic policy-makers but the account's wide scope in terms of the issues covered and the long time-span looked at helps to throw the current British perspective into greater focus. The report is, ultimately, written with a view to feeding into a short punchy Think-piece. With that in mind the conclusions are not a reflection upon everything covered but an attempt to draw back from all the detail and think of some new perspectives – and ones that are relevant for the UK as well, hopefully, as France. The conclusions are broken down into three main sections – regeneration, cohesion (in the sense of order) and integration (as a process of achieving cohesion).

## **REGENERATION**

On the economic front numerous efforts to stimulate entry into work have been seen or are now being planned – notably the *Zones Franches Urbaines*. Whilst the evidence base is not exhaustive, there is a sense that these have either not delivered or been too small-scale to make many inroads into the scale of the problem. It is not so much that the initiatives are wrong but that the macro-economic climate and regional policy framework (see footnote vi) isn't really there to really deliver full employment in all locations. Moreover there is the sense that the politicians need to understand what it might take to deliver this and to communicate this, in lay terms, to the populations most in need. It is about coming clean with people – not promising utopias but helping to manage expectations.

## **Recommendations – Economic**

- Need for short 'what works' local economic policy guide for disadvantaged areas
- Politicians to address the macro-economic climate to deliver jobs
- Politicians to address regional policy to deliver jobs more evenly across the UK
- Politicians to communicate this in lay terms to communities in need of answers and hope

Rioters, whilst they may live in very harsh socio-economic conditions, somehow seem to have an amnesty status from many because of this. It might be helpful if some language could be found to label them as 'youth moaners', the 'ready to give up' or the 'expecting to be helped by others'. These are all suggested tongue-in-cheek but the point about needing to rethink the view of these people as passive recipients (which may well be self-fulfilling) is a serious one. Many rioters are young but they are often nearing adulthood and there are also older (non-rioters) in these areas that are unemployed. Individually, they may be unable to help themselves but collectively, and with help, they might be able to set up social enterprises that deliver publicly-funded services (and perhaps private ones too) to meet their communities' needs –

for example, various environmental type works that don't require enormous amounts of training. There are ways of doing this that need not mean redundancy for those currently providing such services as part of the local council staff. Efforts have been made here in some French areas – notably the *Regies de Quartier* projects. The need then is to get youths to look at these models and to start getting communities to try and find their way out of their economic plight collectively. This collective action might also assist in stimulating active citizens and fostering understanding between different racial and religious groups. It needn't necessarily involve setting up enterprises either – mutual aid and neighbourliness might also be pursued.

### **Recommendations – Community**

- Encourage the unemployed to seek solutions rather than simply visit a job centre
- Making older school pupils in sensitive areas aware of some of these possibilities
- Encouraging community groups to visit areas (including French ones) where self-help works
- Encouraging mutual aid/neighbourliness in poor communities as part of collective self-help

Going back to the *Habitat et Vie Sociale* projects of the mid-1970s, France has seen various efforts to physically regenerate its big suburban housing estates. This was important and often successful although it raises deeper questions about the nature of these estates. Demolition has been common but it is unclear whether the concept of such places has been abandoned. Britain lacks, thankfully, any uniformly stigmatised areas – there is no term like the French *banlieue* or the US projects. But Britain does have estates with reputations for crime, delinquency and decay. These reputations see residents stigmatised and discriminated against (notably by employers) elsewhere in their cities. Britain also has areas with high concentrations of single ethnic groupings – thereby further making it possible for different groups to have limited contact. Plenty of rich White, Black and Asian people have limited contact with those from other races – the need for contact simply becomes greater in situations where poverty is experienced and the chances of group tensions emerge between neighbouring but separate communities.

### **Recommendations – Physical**

- Resolve not to build large-scale social housing projects again
- Programme to break-up 'all bad reputation areas' (by demolition and social mix)
- Encourage the reuse of empty homes/flats
- Encourage the unemployed to renovate (and then live in) them
- Encourage increased racial mix as part of the wider social mix initiatives

In the UK the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit set itself the target of 'no-one being significantly disadvantaged by where they live by 2020' but does not produce updates on this every few years (or, if they do, these are not well publicised). This leaves those who don't undertake social demography for a living poorly placed to conduct their own enquiries into progress. The creation by the French of the National Observatory on Critical Urban Areas is an interesting development as it appears to hold out the hope of a body that offers a definitive state of progress/direction of travel update.

### **Recommendations – General**

- Consider establishing a National Regeneration Observatory

### **COHESION**

One of the important messages to emerge from the French work was the need to recognise the multiple groups that can be involved in urban disorder and the multiple possible causes of unrest. That people are Black, for example, may not mean that their dissatisfaction is a race issue – it may well be dissatisfaction with policing. Certainly there does appear to be a major break-down of trust between police and young people in the French suburbs – as has also been common in various British urban disorders stretching back to the 1981 riots. In addition to a general need to tackle police community relations, there is also the need to look for new ways in which young people who feel they are being persecuted by police, can take action. France doesn't appear to have found the answers here but it is clearly a key area that the French and British need to examine.

### **Recommendations – Order and Security**

- Need for Disorder Audits – that ask who is rioting, why and who they see as the target
- Police to seek assistance from private sector brand managers
- Encouragement given to community self-policing
- All areas to have roster of identified police-community intermediaries
- These intermediaries to serve as a *de facto* rapid response unit
- Increased efforts to reach banlieue youth through Muslim women's' groups
- Greater recruitment of minority officers (and who are sympathetic to those in poor areas)
- Look to facilitate police-youth exchanges (work experience in police stations etc.)
- Look for methods to empower young people to (peacefully) address police victimisation

- Create a publicly-funded arms-length National Cohesion Centre to look at the above

## INTEGRATION

France occasionally reminds itself that it is an immigrant nation and that it shared successes with (and was helped by) its colonies. The country may also be on the cusp of breaking with the strong tradition of not gathering data on race or religion – this certainly seems to be a major ‘Elephant in the Room’ for a nation so beset with race and religious worries (notably around the plight of those living in the *banlieue* estates). The country does appear to be making strides with the creation of the new HALDE agency (the nearest France has to the UK’s Commission for Racial Equality) and the new National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity (charged with focusing on troubled neighbourhoods). Such measures are needed as there is evidence of a sizeable minority who hold racist beliefs – even if they don’t commit racist acts.

The French have had far more of a recent colonial legacy to deal with than the UK – notably around the Algerian war and the fate of the *Harkis* who fought for France in the war of independence. France (notably Jacques Chirac) has been good at acknowledging past historical misdemeanours to Jews and those North Africans who fought for the Free French in the Second World War. However, they have also realised the need to discuss but not glorify colonialism/Imperialism – which can be as offensive to those whose ancestors were the perpetrators as it is to those whose families were the victims. The main ‘historical embarrassment’ for the UK is more likely to be slavery although Asians here experienced, or grew up with parents who had, experienced British colonial occupation.

The French have many millions of Muslims who reside there happily but there are also issues that appear to signify a rejection by some of French-ness. Yet the very concept of French-ness is meant to be empowering (the fraternity bit in the Republican ethos of liberty, fraternity and equality). More generally, there are also often high concentrations of certain groups which also appears to create a notion of separation – whether enforced or chosen.

The French appear to have a raft of issues where the representation of the banlieue, youth and Muslims has been either misleading (the media) or inflammatory (politicians – notably Nicolas Sarkozy). The recent French Equal Opportunities Law of 2006 talks of initiatives to combat discrimination in the radio and tv so perhaps that is an avenue that will be pursued vigorously too.

### Recommendations – Race and Immigration

- Identify, if possible, issues on which Islam is seen to break with ideas of Britishness
- Identify, from these areas, where freedoms are actually being infringed

- National Centre to monitor and comment on unfair/inflammatory media and political speech
- Commission artistic work addressing order and cohesion issues realistically
- Identify spaces used by different races and religions and invest in them (parks, cinemas, malls)
- University Research Centre to look at segregation in education, housing and overcoming this
- Look at how mixing between races and religions can be enjoyable/fun (and not forced)
- Look at promoting comedy from minority groups – notably Muslim performers
- (online) measures to assist ancestors of slaves to trace their names back to African roots
- Develop self-help techniques for those with racist thoughts (that want to address them).

# Bibliography

Ali, R. and Geissendorfer, L. (2006), *Cities in Transition*, (Young Foundation, London),

Astier, H. (2005), *French jihadis thrive on alienation*, BBC News, December 5th.

BBC News, (2006), *French immigration bill approved*, BBC, June 17th

Bird, K. (2005), The political representation of visible minorities in electoral democracies: a comparison of France, Denmark, and Canada, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, vol. 11 (4).

Blanc, M. (1998), Social Integration and Exclusion in France: Some Introductory Remarks from a Social Transaction Perspective, *Housing Studies*, Vol. 13 (6).

Bouteldja, N. (2005), Explosion in the suburbs, *The Guardian*, November 7th

Bremner, C. (2006), Football picks up France, *The Times*, July 7th.

Bull, A. et al. (2004), *Social Capital and Grass-Roots Participation: Urban Regeneration in Three European Cities*, paper to European Science Foundation Exploratory Workshop, 17th-18th June.

Burke, J. (2007), Rappers mobilise as Le Pen vote surges, *The Observer*, April 8

Cesari, J. (2005), *Ethnicity, Islam, and les banlieues: Confusing the Issues*, <http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org>

Charbit, T. (2006), *Les Harkis*, (Découverte, Paris).

Chrisafis, A. (2007), No jobs, just work experience, *The Guardian*, April 6.

Chrisafis, A. (2007b), French presidential candidates divided over race census, *The Guardian*, Feb. 24th.

Clark, D. and Southern, R. (2006), Comparing institutional designs for neighbourhood renewal: neighborhood management in Britain and the 'régies de quartier' in France, *Policy & Politics*, vol. 34 (1).

Dikec, M. (2006), Badlands of the Republic? Revolts, the French state, and the question of the banlieues, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, vol. 24, pp. 159-163

DIV (2000), *The French Urban Regeneration Programme*, (DIV, Paris).

EUKN, (undated), *Urban Policy in France*, European Urban Knowledge Network.

EUMC, (2006), *Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia*, European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, (EUMC, Vienna).

Euro-Islam (2007), *France*, <http://www.euro-islam.info>

- Falconer, C. (2006), Why did the banlieues burn? *Radical Philosophy*, March/April.
- Fuller, T. (2005), How Marseille Escaped France's Urban Unrest, *International Herald Tribune*, November 14.
- Garbaye, R. (2002), Ethnic Minority Participation in British and French Cities: A Historical-Institutionalist Perspective, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol. 26 (3).
- Garbaye, R. (2005), *Getting Into Local Power: The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in British and French Cities*, (Blackwell, Oxford).
- Gerges, F. (2004), *Young, Muslim, and French*, interview <http://www.pbs.org/wnet>
- Giry, S. (2006), France and Its Muslims, *Foreign affairs*, October.
- Godayer, L. (2003), *Politique de la Ville: the French City Challenge Programme*, (City of Amsterdam Development Corporation, Amsterdam).
- Governance International (2006), *Study Trip to the Paris Region on Participatory Budgeting*, (Governance International, Birmingham).
- Green, H. et al. (2001), An Experiment in French Urban Policy: Evaluation and Reflection on the Implementation of the Zones Franches Urbaines,' in *Planning Theory and Practice* 2(1): 53-66).
- Guilyardi, C. (2005), French firms aim for racial integration, BBC News website 11th May
- Hall S. and Hickman P. (2002), Neighbourhood Renewal and Urban Policy: A Comparison of New Approaches in England and France, *Regional Studies* vol. 36 (6).
- Hall, S and Hickman, P (2005), Responding to unpopular social housing in Vaulx en Velin, Greater Lyon: an English perspective, *European Journal of Housing Policy*, vol.5, no.1.
- Henley, J. (2004), Imams to be taught French way of life, *The Guardian*, December 8th.
- Henley, J. and Harding, L. (2005), After the Riots, *Salon*, November 10th.
- ILINCPSC (undated), *France*, International Learning & Information Network for Crime Prevention & Community Safety.
- IRCAF (undated), *Primary Education: an International Perspective – Country Description: France*, International Review of Curriculum and Assessment Frameworks, <http://www.inca.org.uk>
- Ireland, D. (2006), *Why is France Burning: A critique of Far Right policies*, Independent Labour Publications.
- Jack, A. (2001), *The French Exception*, (Profile Books Ltd., London).

- Kastoryano R., (2006), *Territories of identities: Immobility and segregation in French banlieues*, June 11th , available from <http://riotfrance.ssrc.org>
- Kaya A., (2005), The Beur uprising. Poverty and Muslim atheists in France, <http://www.eurozine.com>
- Lagrange, H. (2005), An outcast generation, *The Observer*, November 6.
- Levy-Vroelant, C. (2006), *The Riots in France*, presentation to The World in Our Neighbourhoods Seminar, [http://www.haringey.gov.uk/c\\_levy-vroelant.pdf](http://www.haringey.gov.uk/c_levy-vroelant.pdf)
- Loughlin, J., et al. (2004), *The role of the Neighbourhood in Regeneration: Some lessons from Europe*, briefing paper prepared for the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, ODPM, (Cardiff University, Cardiff).
- Marvin, S. et al. (2006), City-Regions: Policy and practice Lessons from France, Germany and the Netherlands, Framework for City-Regions Working Paper 2, (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, London).
- Moss, P. et al. (1999), *Rethinking school: Some international perspectives*, (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York).
- Murray, G. (2006), France: the Riots and the Republic, *Race & Class*, Vol 47. (4).
- Nadeau, J-B, and Barlow, J, (2004), *Sixty Million Frenchmen Can't Be Wrong: What Makes the French So French?* (Robson Books Ltd., London).
- Nicholls, W, (2006), Associationism from Above: Explaining the Failure of France's 'politique de la Ville', *Urban Studies*, vol. 43 (10), pp. 1779-1802.
- Niel, F, (2007), Lost Youth, *New Statesman*, 9th April
- Ossman, S. and Terrio, S, (2006), The French Riots: Questioning Spaces of Surveillance and Sovereignty, *International Migration*, vol. 44 (2).
- Rhein, C. (1998), The working class, minorities and housing in Paris, the rise of fragmentations, in *GeoJournal*, Vol. 46.
- Rigoni, I. (2005), Challenging Notions and Practices: The Muslim Media in Britain and France, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 31 (3).
- Rudosky, C. (2005), The Certeauian Orbit: Spatial Practices in the "Banlieue" film *La Haine*, *Siyahi Interlocal – the Journal of Post-anarchist Theory, Culture and Politics*, April 12.
- Sala Pala V. (2003), *The French 'republican integration model' in practice and in comparative perspective: the political construction and treatment of ethnic minorities housing in France and Britain*, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions Edinburgh, 28 March – 2 April.
- Silver, H. and Wilkinson, H. (1995), *Policies to combat social exclusion: A French-British comparison*, (International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva).

- Silverstein, P. (2000), *Sporting Faith: Islam, Soccer and the French Nation State*, Social Text, V.18 (4).
- Silverstein, P. and Tetreault, C. (2005), *Urban Violence in France*, *Middle East Report Online*
- Simon, P. (1998), *Ghettos, immigrants, and integration the French dilemma*, *Journal of Housing and the Built Environment*, vol. 13 (1)
- Stevens, A. and Monaghan, J. (c. 2006), *Bertrand Delanoë Mayor of Paris*, <http://www.citymayors.com>
- Storper, M. (2002), *The Rise of the Extreme Right in Western Europe: Urban Tensions, Race and the Electoral System*, Working Paper No 9, (School of Public Policy and Social Research, UCLA).
- Storper, M. (2007), *The Foreigner's 10-minute guide to the French Urban Riots of 2005*, [www.ucla.edu](http://www.ucla.edu)
- Streeter, M. (2007), *Good news for the French economy?* The Guardian, April 10th
- URBACT (2006), *Regeneration through Diversity in the Arts and Culture*, La Friche Belle de Mai – Marseilles. (URBACT, Brussels).
- URBED (2006), *Learning from Lille and Roubaix*, (URBED, London)
- US Embassy, (undated), *Housing Policy in France*, US Embassy in France, <http://www.ambafrance-us.org>
- Wilson, S. (2001), *Combating Social Exclusion in France and Britain: Jobs for young people*, Report from a Franco-British Council seminar, *Combating Social Exclusion in France and Britain Jobs for young people*, London, 31 January -1 February 2000.