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Hearing transcripts

2 April 2008 - Morning session

1 Wednesday, 2nd April 2008
2 (10.00 am)
3 SUMMING-UP (continued)
4 (Jury present)
5 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Good morning, members of the
6 jury. A few points from yesterday and the day before
7 just to clear up.
8 Lopes Borges went on to the embankment road at 40 to
9 50 kph which is 25 to 30 mph. Burrell joined the Royal
10 service in 1986 not, as I said, 1996. Mohamed Al Fayed
11 was not the only person to whom Diana mentioned her
12 fears in the summer of 1997. Melissa Henning said Dodi
13 told her that Diana had expressed fears to him of an
14 accident when the boys were not with her.
15 Malibu: I have not referred to all of the evidence
16 relating to this property and Dodi and Diana's interest
17 in going there. Evidence of interest in this property
18 is said to be indicative of the permanence of Dodi and
19 Diana's relationship and I remind you of that.
20 Landmines: I passed quickly over the dossier that
21 Diana had prepared. Simone Simmons told us that Diana
22 was preparing a report that she was going to call
23 "Profiting out of misery", and this, she said, was going
24 to name names and show that the British Government and
25 public figures were profiting from the proliferation of

1

1 landmines in places like Angola and Bosnia. Top of
2 the list of culprits would be the SIS.
3 Incidentally, I think I also told you that
4 Nicholas Soames went on Panorama when he criticised
5 Diana and, in fact, it was not Panorama, it was
6 Newsnight.
7 The final point that I mention is this: on Monday,
8 I referred to the evidence of Simone Simmons that
9 the Duchess of York had received nasty letters from
10 Prince Philip. I mentioned that we heard undisputed
11 evidence from the Duchess of York in which she denied
12 receiving any such letters. All that is correct.
13 However, I mistakenly said that Michael Cole had also
14 said that the Duchess had received such letters. In
15 fact, Cole made different points about the
16 Duchess of York. He said on radio and in a statement to
17 the police that the Duchess of York had discussed with
18 Diana fears that they would be killed. He also said
19 that after the death of Diana, the Duchess wrote to
20 the Queen to ask for forgiveness. The Duchess said she
21 had no recollection of discussing any fears with Diana
22 and denied that she had written a letter to the Queen of
23 the type described by Cole.
24 Again, that evidence was read to you because it was
25 not disputed by any of the interested persons in these

2

1 inquests. Cole stuck to his story when questioned,
2 saying that sources had told him that the Duchess had
3 written such a letter to the Queen. It is for you to
4 decide what you accept.
5 Well, members of the jury, the next heading which
6 I have to deal with is the paparazzi. I turn to
7 the evidence from the paparazzi themselves. In your
8 jury bundle you have the chart at tab 29 and the
9 timeline of the paparazzi movements. As I have said,
10 only one of them, Stephane Darmon, gave live evidence to
11 you. The others refused to do so and the statements
12 that they had made at various times were introduced
13 before you by other witnesses.
14 You will remember Mr Croxford indicated that
15 the issues that he was most anxious to explore were
16 their conduct on the final journey and whether there
17 were more photographs taken by them than we have seen.
18 You may think that the answer to the second question is
19 that there may well have been.
20 Darmon was employed by the Gamma agency and was
21 riding his Honda motorbike for Rat. He told you that
22 they went to Le Bourget earlier in the day. In
23 the journey from the airport they lost sight of the
24 Mercedes. They went to the Ritz and then followed
25 the couple to Rue Arsene Houssaye. Rat had a fight with

3

1 a bodyguard. Then they followed the couple back to the
2 Ritz. He saw Henri Paul outside the hotel. He seemed
3 very joyful. When he saw him, his eyes and the way he
4 acted reminded Darmon of Darmon's father, who was an
5 alcoholic. It was pointed out to him, however, that he
6 had not mentioned this in any of the statements that he
7 had made to the French police and magistrate. Darmon
8 saw the decoy journey round the square.
9 Later Rat told him that the couple had left from
10 the back of the Ritz. Rat said that he had been told by
11 Odekerken. That is consistent with the mobile phone
12 data that you have heard about.
13 Darmon and Rat drove off from the front of the Ritz.
14 There were three to four motorcycles and maybe two to
15 three scooters and several cars. As they approached the
16 Crillon Hotel in the Place de la Concorde, Rat was
17 talking on his mobile phone to a photographer who was
18 close to the Mercedes. At the lights at the junction
19 with the Champs-Elysees, the Mercedes waited for some
20 space in front and then took off like a plane.
21 Darmon followed the Mercedes. He overtook all
22 the cars, including Odekerken's, which had been at
23 the lights. He did not agree with Bonnin that flash
24 photographs were being taken of the passengers in
25 the Mercedes while they were stationary at the lights.

4

1 He drove on to the expressway. He was doing 80 to 100
2 kph, that is 50 to 60 miles per hour. He claimed that
3 the Mercedes disappeared from view, but said that there
4 was no one between him and the Mercedes. No one else
5 was close to them.
6 Members of the jury, his bike has a potential top
7 speed of 174 kilometres per hour. That is 109 miles per
8 hour, but he was, he said, a professional driver who
9 could not afford to take risks. He slowed down. He was
10 joined by a group of photographers who he saw in his
11 mirror and some passers-by.
12 He told the police that he was going at 60 kph,
13 37 mph. He was at the top of the slope to
14 the underpass, "... the whole group was there, four or
15 five cars mingling with the traffic, about three
16 motorbikes and two scooters". He claimed he had never
17 said this and that there must have been
18 a misunderstanding, although he had signed the document
19 recording this. He said that these people had got there
20 later.
21 When he got into the tunnel, the horn of the
22 Mercedes was sounding and there was a lot of smoke. He
23 parked his bike 10 to 15 metres away. He and Rat went
24 towards the car to rescue the occupants. Rat opened
25 the door and then the others arrived. The photographs

5

1 that were taken obviously demonstrate that this cannot
2 be right.
3 He said at least ten photographers were there.
4 Certainly more than those who were there when the police
5 arrived. Rat gave him the film he had taken and Darmon
6 gave it to the police. Two people on a Yamaha motorbike
7 left after the photographs were taken. Benhamou and
8 others left the tunnel with the film. So much for
9 Darmon.
10 Romuald Rat: his statements were introduced by
11 Mr Carpenter. In his first statement of 31st August, he
12 dealt with events at Le Bourget and explained that they
13 lost the Mercedes on the way back when the driver
14 accelerated suddenly. He said that he had had a dispute
15 with a French security officer at Rue Arsene Houssaye.
16 Back at the Ritz, Henri Paul was keeping them
17 informed of what was going on. He described the dummy
18 run. He saw the photographers at the front of the Ritz
19 leaving and realised the couple had left by the rear
20 exit.
21 At Concorde, he saw the Mercedes. There were four
22 or five cars behind it at the lights, a motorbike and
23 a scooter. When the lights changed, the Mercedes sped
24 off to the embankment. He said none of them caught up
25 with the Mercedes because of the speed of the car. He

6

1 said "We tried to catch up with them. I was among
2 the leading pursuers". They carried on, slowing down,
3 and then saw the Mercedes in the tunnel. He claimed
4 that he got onlookers away from the car and then went
5 back to the car and opened the door. That is plainly
6 untrue when you look at the photographs that were taken.
7 Members of the jury, you may want to consider
8 whether the conduct of any individual in the tunnel
9 after the crash demonstrates a deliberate disregard for
10 the lives of others in pursuit of a photograph, and, if
11 so, whether that helps you in determining what was
12 the nature of the pursuit before the crash.
13 Rat claimed that he felt for Diana's pulse and said
14 that a doctor would be arriving. A doctor's car arrived
15 and then he saw someone with an oxygen mask. He claimed
16 that it was only then that he began to take photographs.
17 You know that that is not true.
18 He said that he did not understand why the Mercedes
19 suddenly drove so quickly; "... a normal chauffeur knows
20 that it is not the way that you should shake someone
21 off. He took too many risks". If that assessment of
22 his is accurate, you will want to consider whether it
23 must also apply to any chasing group. His camera and
24 film were taken by the police.
25 In his second statement, he said that no one had

7

1 taken any photographs whilst the Mercedes was in motion.
2 At Concorde, he had been putting his crash helmet back
3 on after using his mobile phone. He saw journalists run
4 away from the scene of the crash, so it was possible
5 that some films were taken away. He called Odekerken
6 after he lost sight of the Mercedes on the expressway.
7 That call, members of the jury, is timed at 17 minutes
8 past midnight.
9 In a statement on 30th September 1997, he said that
10 he spoke to Henri Paul several times outside the Ritz.
11 They spoke about cameras. He was surprised that
12 Henri Paul spoke to them. At one point Rat was with
13 Langevin and one of them said Henri Paul must have been
14 drinking. He was really strange. No mention of that
15 was made in the first statement, taken before publicity
16 was given to the suggestion that Henri Paul was over
17 the limit. He said that none of the photographers had
18 vehicles which could have kept up with the Mercedes.
19 Mr Read confirmed that that was not the case.
20 Serge Benhamou made his first statement on
21 4th September. He was at the Ritz with his Honda
22 scooter. Veres joined him on a Hexagon scooter after
23 Benhamou telephoned him. He went to Rue Arsene Houssaye
24 and then back to the Ritz. He saw Henri Paul there.
25 Henri Paul was cheerful and laughing. He had never

8

1 behaved like that before and usually ignored them. He
2 said to some people that he must have been drinking. He
3 said "All his reactions led me to believe that".
4 The couple left in the Mercedes and sped off. He
5 caught up in the Rue de Rivoli. The Mercedes jumped
6 a red light at Concorde. Benhamou was very close at
7 that stage, like everyone that was following. They all
8 jumped the light. Then he saw the rear lights of the
9 vehicles following the Mercedes. He said, "I was able
10 to follow the convoy from a distance. As they were
11 starting to drive quickly, I could not keep up with them
12 on my scooter". The driver of the Mercedes had wanted
13 to shake them off, but he had not heard him say that.
14 He saw that Henri Paul was at the wheel at Concorde.
15 "I saw the pack turn left in front of Crillon. Pursuing
16 photographers also set off very quickly". He drove at
17 60 kph, that is 37 miles per hour, on the expressway.
18 He lost "the convoy". He went to the Place de l'Alma
19 and later noticed cars stacking up. He went on foot
20 into the underpass and saw the crashed car. He took
21 photographs. He called Veres at 25 minutes past
22 midnight to ask him to come. Benhamou left on his
23 scooter. He left his film with M Dufour who developed
24 it.
25 Christian Martinez made his first statement on

9

1 31st August. Serge Arnal told him that Diana was in
2 Paris. He met Arnal at the Ritz. Martinez was on foot.
3 Arnal had his black Fiat Uno. They went to Rue Arsene
4 Houssaye and then followed them to the Ritz. They
5 waited at the front. When the couple left, they left as
6 well and saw them at Concorde. He saw a 4x4 and a black
7 Peugeot 205 behind the Mercedes. The Mercedes pulled
8 away very quickly at the lights and left everyone
9 standing.
10 Martinez and Arnal followed at a distance, like
11 the two cars ahead of them. Darmon and Rat must have
12 been in front, but he could not see them. When they got
13 to the underpass, they saw the crashed car. They parked
14 outside the tunnel and came back. The first on the
15 scene were Rat, Arnal and Martinez. He took photographs
16 and his film was taken by the police. He said he
17 thought that "Henri Paul was going much too fast ...
18 maybe he swerved to avoid a vehicle that was travelling
19 very slowly in front of him. Then he lost control of
20 the car". If you think that is what happened, you may
21 like to ask how Martinez could have known that.
22 Arnal was going flat out, he estimated at 100 to
23 110 kph, 60 to 70 miles per hour. Some photographers
24 left the tunnel. They were young men, four or five of
25 them. He had tried to telephone the emergency services.

10

1 Some of his photographs were clearly taken before
2 the emergency services arrived.
3 In his second statement, on 1st September, he said
4 that he had in fact left his telephone in his car. He
5 had not tried to telephone the emergency services. On
6 the expressway he had not seen any vehicles apart from
7 the Mercedes they were following. In a further
8 statement, on 1st September, he said that a colleague,
9 Guizard, telephoned them to say that the couple were
10 leaving by the rear exit.
11 In a statement made on 10th October 1997, he said he
12 saw the Mercedes at traffic lights by the Crillon in
13 Concorde. Around it was Guizard in his light 205, Ker
14 in his 4x4, Benhamou on his scooter and Chassery in his
15 black 205. He thought the Mercedes was going to Rue
16 Arsene Houssaye. He said "When you have 25
17 photographers with flash-guns behind you, you do not
18 decide to do something unusual or exceptional".
19 Mr Carpenter agreed that it was a strong inference
20 from the photographs that he must have been in a car
21 that was very close to the Mercedes at the time of
22 the crash and that there was evidence that he had
23 managed to get film out of the tunnel. So much for
24 Martinez.
25 Serge Arnal gave his first statement on 31st August.

11

1 He explained how he met up with Martinez, went to Rue
2 Arsene Houssaye and then back to the Ritz. They saw
3 the dummy run. Later he thought that the couple might
4 have left by the rear exit. They left to try and pick
5 them up in Concorde. He saw Odekerken's 4x4, a scooter
6 and a motorbike with two people on it, Rat and Darmon.
7 He followed them at a distance. As they turned onto
8 the expressway he saw the Mercedes. It accelerated as
9 soon as it turned right. It sped into the first tunnel.
10 Arnal lost sight of it.
11 His colleagues were still in front. He slowed down.
12 He saw the crashed Mercedes in the next tunnel. He
13 drove past it and stopped. By the time he got out,
14 people were around the car. He telephoned the emergency
15 services on 112. In fact, he telephoned directory
16 inquiries, 12, at 23 minutes past midnight. Ten minutes
17 or so after he arrived, he got his camera out. That
18 cannot be true. In his first eight photographs, no
19 other people can be seen. They were obviously taken
20 very soon after the crash had happened.
21 On 1st September, he said that several of his
22 colleagues got away before the police came and some of
23 them had taken photographs. In a later statement, he
24 said that he had called his editor. The call is timed
25 at 27 minutes past midnight.

12

1 Alain Guizard was the editor of the Angeli agency.
2 He gave his first statement on 3rd September. He
3 learned that Diana would be coming to Paris from
4 Sardinia. He went to the airport in his grey/blue
5 Peugeot 205. He went to the Ritz and saw his
6 photographers there. He went off for dinner. He came
7 back to the Ritz, where he saw Martinez. They split up.
8 Later Martinez telephoned him and said that the couple
9 would leave by the rear exit. Guizard pulled forward in
10 his car in Rue Cambon so he could help his photographers
11 with the direction of the car. He followed the car to
12 Concorde where he let Arnal pull in front of him. There
13 were some flashes at this point. This is confirmed by
14 the witness, Bonnin, whose evidence was read to you.
15 You may think that photographs were being taken. If so,
16 you have not seen them.
17 The Mercedes set off very quickly from the lights,
18 leaving two motorcycles and two cars in its wake.
19 Benhamou was on his scooter. Guizard decided to return
20 home, but took the same route as the other vehicles. He
21 drove at 60 to 80 kph; 37 to 50 mph. He saw the crashed
22 Mercedes. He saw Martinez and Arnal. He was not given
23 any film. He did not take any photographs. He went
24 away to Dani Angeli's house and then returned to
25 the scene. He said that when he had been at the back of

13

1 the Ritz, Benhamou said that Henri Paul had been
2 drinking. He had not noticed anything about Henri Paul
3 himself. The only reason Benhamou gave was that
4 Henri Paul was in a different mood from usual. The
5 telephone records show that he had telephoned Martinez
6 at 18 minutes past midnight and the Alpha agency in
7 England at 33 minutes past midnight.
8 David Odekerken gave his first statement on
9 4th September. He said that he was in partnership with
10 Chassery and a third man who was on holiday in Corsica.
11 That is Salmon.
12 Laurent Sola called Chassery, who called Odekerken,
13 to say that the couple were coming to Le Bourget.
14 Odekerken and Chassery went there, Odekerken in
15 his grey/beige Pajero 4x4, Chassery in his black
16 Peugeot 205. Then they went to the Ritz, then to
17 Rue Arsene Houssaye, then back to the Ritz.
18 Henri Paul spoke to the photographers outside
19 the Ritz. Chassery asked Odekerken to join him at
20 the back of the hotel. Odekerken drove there. He was
21 about to park when he noticed that what he called
22 "the procession" had set off. He said he meant the
23 Mercedes and the motorcycles and the cars of
24 the journalists following.
25 Chassery went to get into his vehicle. The convoy

14

1 set off. They lost the convoy and decided to stop work.
2 As they went to Concorde, he saw some camera flashes
3 after the Champs-Elysees. He saw the procession
4 travelling quickly. Chassery went towards the
5 Champs-Elysees. Odekerken decided to go home along
6 the expressway. In the tunnel, he saw the crashed
7 Mercedes. Photographers were taking pictures. He
8 parked outside the tunnel. He telephoned Chassery.
9 Odekerken went into the tunnel and took some
10 pictures. Chassery arrived. Odekerken and Chassery
11 then left. Odekerken went home and then met Sola with
12 Chassery. They gave their film to Sola. They developed
13 it. When they learned that Diana had died,
14 the photographs were not to be used.
15 In an interview on 2nd October 1997, he said that
16 when the Mercedes was at the lights, he saw Arnal's car
17 following. He was on the phone to Rat at the time, who
18 wanted to know where the "cortege" was. There were
19 calls at 19, 20 and 21 minutes past midnight. They had
20 been exchanging information all day. There was
21 a scooter at the lights and Guizard's 205. There were
22 other cars which he could not identify. Rat's bike
23 overtook him after the Mercedes pulled away very fast
24 from the lights.
25 Fabrice Chassery made his first statement on

15

1 4th September. Sola called him and he went to the
2 airport where he met Odekerken. On the way back,
3 the Range Rover effected a sudden, even dangerous, he
4 said, manoeuvre, going from the extreme left-hand lane
5 to take an exit. They followed that vehicle, which led
6 them away from the Mercedes, then to the Ritz and Rue
7 Arsene Houssaye, back to the Ritz.
8 Henri Paul spoke to the photographers outside
9 the Ritz. Chassery thought that the couple would leave
10 from the back. He went there and then telephoned
11 Odekerken. The couple left in the Mercedes. Chassery
12 and Odekerken decided to end there. They separated.
13 Odekerken telephoned him to say that the Mercedes
14 had crashed. Chassery drove to the tunnel. Chassery
15 took photographs. The police arrived. Chassery and
16 Odekerken left. Chassery called Sola. Sola told him to
17 bring the photographs. Chassery called Odekerken and
18 they both went to Sola. Then all three went to Angeli
19 to develop the photographs.
20 In a statement on 5th September, he said that in
21 the evening at the Ritz, Henri Paul seemed happy, had
22 a laugh and spoke to them. Normally he was serious, not
23 really friendly and did not speak to the photographers.
24 Pierre Suu was on a maroon BMW motorbike driven by
25 Jerko Tomic. He made his first statement on

16

1 31st August. He and Tomic had followed the Mercedes
2 from Rue Arsene Houssaye to the Ritz. They missed
3 the departure of the Mercedes from Rue Cambon and
4 followed the wrong vehicles to Rue Arsene Houssaye
5 again. There they learned about the accident and went
6 to the tunnel. A security cordon was in place. Later
7 he followed the ambulance to the hospital.
8 He made a statement to Metropolitan Police officers
9 in 2006. He said he knew James Andanson. Andanson was
10 not in Paris that night. He was not the kind of person
11 to go unnoticed. He said some film had been taken out
12 of the tunnel. One film belonged to Chassery. Another,
13 taken by Martinez, was given to Guizard, who threw it in
14 the river.
15 Pierre Hounsfield was driving a black Volkswagen
16 Golf. He made his first statement on 18th September
17 1997. He worked for the Sipa Agency, in a pool with Suu
18 and sometimes Arsov. He joined Suu and Arsov at
19 Arsene Houssaye. They then followed the couple to
20 the Ritz. Henri Paul spoke to them. Benhamou said,
21 "It is strange, this man never speaks to us and never
22 smiles at us. Something must be happening". By this,
23 he meant that the couple would leave by the rear exit.
24 Nonetheless, Hounsfield, Suu and Arsov missed them. It
25 was agreed Suu would follow the Mercedes and

17

1 the Range Rover which left from the front. Hounsfield
2 met Suu at Arsene Houssaye. They learned of
3 the accident and went to the tunnel.
4 In June 2006, Hounsfield spoke to Metropolitan
5 Police officers. He said he had seen a radar camera
6 near the Alma Tunnel on the night. He said it was by
7 the entrance to the underpass, by the trees separating
8 the sliproad from the expressway. It was a tripod-type
9 and there was a marked police car by it with two
10 uniformed officers. No one else ever says they saw it
11 and we heard undisputed evidence in the form of a report
12 from Gigou that there was no speed camera at work on
13 that route that night. You will recollect that his
14 evidence also dealt with the suggestion that the French
15 authorities had disabled CCTV cameras to ensure that
16 the journey was not filmed. Hounsfield was asked which
17 direction he was coming from and then realised that his
18 route meant he would not have passed the camera. He
19 said he wondered if his mind was playing tricks.
20 Nikola Arsov was the rider of a white BMW
21 motorcycle. His first statement was made on
22 31st August. He went to the Ritz. He was there when
23 the couple returned from Rue Arsene Houssaye. Later he
24 followed the Range Rover from the front of the hotel.
25 He stopped after a time and was making his way back to

18

1 the agency when he saw Darmon by the Alma Tunnel. He
2 stopped. He went and took some photographs. They did
3 not come out because he said his flash was not plugged
4 in. The police were already there.
5 Stephane Cardinale was the driver of a white
6 Citroen AX. He made a statement on 18th September 1997.
7 He went to the Ritz Hotel. He was joined by his
8 colleague, Langevin. He missed the departure from
9 the rear of the hotel; he followed the decoy vehicles.
10 He heard the news at Rue Arsene Houssaye, went to the
11 tunnel, but a security cordon was in place.
12 Jack Langevin was the driver of a grey Volkswagen
13 Golf. His first statement was made on 31st August. He
14 got to the Ritz at about 11 pm. He took the photographs
15 you have seen at the back of the Ritz. The Mercedes
16 left. He went to his car but did not manage to follow
17 the Mercedes. A car that might have been a Peugeot 205
18 seemed to be following it. He gave up. On his way to
19 a friend's house, he saw people blocking the entrance to
20 the tunnel. He went to look. The emergency services
21 were there. He took a few pictures.
22 He made a statement on 1st September. He said that
23 Henri Paul had been merry and showing off. Some
24 photographers said that he was not in his normal state
25 and that he had been drinking. He had not mentioned

19

1 this on 31st August.
2 Laslo Veres was on a Piaggio scooter. His first
3 statement was on 31st August. He had been to Rue Arsene
4 Houssaye and followed the couple back to the Ritz. He
5 heard that the couple had left from the back exit. He
6 stayed in the Place Vendome until after the crash had
7 happened. He can be seen on CCTV film in the square
8 after the crash. As a result of a telephone call, he
9 went to the tunnel. The police let him through and he
10 took some pictures.
11 He made a statement on 22nd October 1997. He said
12 that Henri Paul had spoken to them outside the Ritz.
13 After three sentences, Veres claimed, he realised that
14 Henri Paul was saying incoherent things. Henri Paul
15 spoke to Rat for two to three minutes. He had not said
16 that before. You will remember that Rat said he had
17 spoken to Henri Paul about cameras and Henri Paul had
18 noted references in his notebook.
19 So much then for the paparazzi. I now turn to
20 the reconstruction evidence and, in this regard, you
21 will, I think, find it helpful to have available
22 the plan in your bundle at page 10, which perhaps can be
23 put up on the screen, and also to have available the
24 photographs in your bundle at page 11, but I think it is
25 the plan that we want to look at at the moment.

20

1 Members of the jury, you heard from three experts:
2 Messrs Read, Jennings and Searle. There was
3 a considerable message of agreement between them. None
4 of them came on the scene until many years after
5 the event, so they were at some disadvantage. Further,
6 the initial investigation had taken place on foreign
7 soil, under somewhat different procedures from ours.
8 Questions arise such as whether everything relevant was
9 collected and examined by the French and whether
10 everything that might have been relevant was recorded.
11 Tony Read has spent 28 years in the traffic division
12 of the Metropolitan Police. He has completed courses on
13 HGV, PSV and motorcycles. He has a City and Guilds in
14 Road Accident Investigation and is a member of the
15 Institute of Road Traffic Investigators. He first
16 became involved in this case in the spring of 2004.
17 There were several areas of agreement between
18 the experts. Members of the jury, it is important to
19 keep these in the forefront of your minds as they are
20 important reference points when you come to consider
21 the eye witness evidence on the issues that are in
22 dispute.
23 The eight areas of agreement are:
24 (1) the collision between the Mercedes and the white
25 Fiat Uno occurred in the vicinity of the entrance to

21

1 the tunnel. However, it is not agreed precisely where
2 the impact took place, what was the nature of the impact
3 and what the course was of the two vehicles before
4 impact.
5 Those three matters were the principal areas of
6 disagreement.
7 Continuing with the agreed matters, they are:
8 (2) Red plastic debris came from the rear light
9 cover on the left-hand side of the Uno. The light cover
10 could be dated as having been manufactured between
11 May 1983 and September 1989.
12 (3) Clear plastic debris came from the front
13 indicator cover of the Mercedes.
14 (4) White paint on the right front wing and front
15 area of the front right door of the Mercedes match that
16 of a white Fiat Uno of the period May 1983 to
17 September 1989.
18 (5) A smear of black plastic on the Mercedes was
19 consistent with having come from the rear bumper on
20 a Fiat made at the same time.
21 (6) No one was wearing a seat-belt and wearing one
22 would have increased the prospect of survival. Searle
23 went rather further than this in evidence, saying they
24 would have survived.
25 (7) The speed of the Mercedes was 65 miles per hour

22

1 at impact, plus or minus 5 mph. The speed limit for
2 the road was 31 miles per hour in British terms.
3 The speed of the Mercedes, when it collided with
4 the Fiat, was also between 60 mph and 70 mph.
5 (8) There were no defects in the Mercedes that
6 contributed to the collision.
7 Read told us it would be almost impossible to stage
8 the collision in a pre-arranged manner because
9 the effect on the slower lighter vehicle, ie the Fiat,
10 would be likely to be much greater than on the larger
11 heavier vehicle, ie the Mercedes. This was at a time,
12 of course, when attention was concentrated on the Fiat
13 as being part of a staged accident plan. You may think
14 things have moved on. Also, it would be even more
15 difficult to stage the collision had there been a safety
16 vehicle following the Mercedes, eg the Range Rover.
17 Also, a nine-and-a-half-year-old Fiat would be a very
18 poor choice of vehicle to knock the Mercedes off its
19 path.
20 When questioned about possibilities, Read did not
21 disagree that a blocking vehicle could have been
22 involved. However, as you know, there is no forensic
23 scientific evidence to support such a possibility.
24 The reason the collision was so serious was because
25 the Mercedes collided at such a high speed with one of

23

1 the pillars of the underpass, causing a very high-energy
2 impact. Members of the jury, you may think it was
3 a complete matter of chance whether the Mercedes hit
4 the wall or one of the pillars.
5 At this stage, it may help you to turn to the plan
6 at tab 10 of your bundle. You will see there the marks.
7 Now, as to the marks on the road, the single mark was
8 made by a revolving tyre slipping sideways. I think you
9 are familiar now with where the single mark is on the
10 picture.
11 The double marks were made by the rear wheels.
12 These three marks were all left by the Mercedes.
13 The single tyre mark indicates a movement to the left
14 and then to the right. There is then a movement to
15 the left, to avoid hitting the right-hand wall.
16 The increasing severity of the marks is typical, said
17 Mr Read, of a driver over-correcting and being unable to
18 control his vehicle.
19 The Mercedes' speed at the entry to the underpass
20 was unlikely to have been significantly in excess of the
21 speed at impact, namely 60 to 70 mph.
22 It is impossible to say whether the Fiat came from
23 the sliproad or was on the main carriageway, but if
24 it was on the main carriageway, it would have been
25 visible to the driver of the Mercedes for some time.

24

1 There was some doubt about whether a vehicle coming on
2 to the main carriageway from the sliproad had the right
3 of way. The position appears to be that under French
4 law it probably did. You may like to bear in mind your
5 experience of standing by that sliproad during the view
6 of the scene last October. Debris would not land on the
7 road at the point of impact but would be carried
8 forward. You know that "throw tests" were carried out
9 and you have the results in your bundle to look at.
10 It was also agreed that the overlap of the vehicles
11 at impact was approximately 17 centimetres. The side of
12 the vehicles came together with a glancing blow.
13 The Fiat was going at a maximum of 40 mph. It did
14 not suffer any second impact, and if it had been going
15 any faster, it would have run into the spinning
16 Mercedes. It could, of course, have been travelling at
17 less than 40 mph.
18 Mr Read said it generally takes a driver 1 to 1 and
19 a half seconds to perceive and react to a hazard. It
20 will be more if the driver is impaired. But he agreed
21 that there is no ready reckoner for reaction time.
22 If the Mercedes was in the right-hand lane,
23 the driver would have had to steer to the left when
24 already steering to the left to negotiate the bend. If
25 it was in the left-hand lane, which you may think is

25

1 suggested by the witnesses, it may have drifted across
2 as a result of speed in negotiating the bend or
3 the driver may have intended to take a straight line
4 into the bend and encroached on the right-hand lane or
5 the Fiat Uno may simply have drifted into the path of
6 the Mercedes.
7 Now the experts were not agreed about the precise
8 point of impact and one of the factors relevant to this
9 was whether the French had identified and picked up all
10 the debris. The French were adamant that they had
11 picked up everything that was relevant, but looking at
12 the photographs, it was suggested that they had not.
13 If you look at page 78, you will see an arrow in
14 the bottom of the photograph pointing to "unmarked lens
15 debris".
16 Absent extra debris, Read put the impact with
17 the Fiat 1.5 metres before the start of the tunnel.
18 With the possible extra debris, he put it at 10 metres
19 before the start of the tunnel. Read thought the impact
20 took place with the Mercedes a bit over into the
21 right-hand carriageway and that the left side of the
22 Fiat was close to the centre line. Jennings agreed with
23 that, but Searle put the impact at the start of the
24 single tyre mark and, therefore, the Mercedes must have
25 been entirely in the left-hand lane.

26

1 When Read was cross-examined, a video taken in
2 February 1998 was shown and he agreed that there would
3 physically have been no difficulty in driving through
4 the tunnel at 62 miles per hour, but he did not agree
5 that it was commonplace for drivers to go through it at
6 60 or 70. He agreed that if there had been a blocking
7 vehicle in the left-hand lane and a slow-moving vehicle
8 in the right-hand lane, the driver would really have had
9 a problem.
10 He agreed that the Mercedes could have travelled
11 through the Alexandre III tunnel at 60, 70 or even
12 80 mph and still have been able to brake, slow down or
13 come off at the sliproad, provided that there was no
14 obstruction such as a motorcycle.
15 He said the single tyre mark was consistent with
16 previous loss of control and did not signify the point
17 at which loss of control began. He thought this was
18 a classic example of over-reaction to a hazard or
19 a perceived hazard. There was, in his opinion, no
20 evidence to put the Fiat over the centre dividing line
21 at the point of collision. Nor was there evidence of
22 impact between any vehicles other than the one impact
23 between the Mercedes and the Fiat. He said that the
24 issues between him and Searle were very much matters of
25 degree.

27

1 Jennings agreed that a bright or flashing light
2 could cause a distraction, depending upon (a) the light
3 and (b) where it flashed. A matter you may think of
4 common sense. Jennings agreed with Read about the point
5 of impact with the Fiat: 10 metres before the tunnel if
6 the debris the French did not pick up was attributable
7 to the collision; at the start of the tunnel or a couple
8 of metres before it if not. Either way, the Mercedes'
9 right-hand side would be crossing the centre line or
10 very close to it.
11 Searle had built up an accident investigation team
12 over 25 years. He has investigated over 3,000
13 collisions. He said that it involved a series of
14 speculations to say the collision took place 10 metres
15 back from the tunnel entrance. In his opinion the
16 impact occurred just before the single tyre mark. He
17 said there were three possible explanations why the Fiat
18 was over the centre line, if it was. They were (1)
19 meandering, (2) overtaking and (3) that it moved
20 deliberately to block the Mercedes.
21 In his view, the road into the tunnel could be
22 safely travelled at 65 miles per hour or even faster.
23 He agreed that if the unmarked debris that the French
24 had not picked up did come from the collision, it would
25 put the point of impact back but not, in his view, as

28

1 far as Read had suggested.
2 He agreed rather reluctantly that alcohol impairs
3 nearly all driving abilities, but concluded with the
4 rather surprising statement that if the driver was over
5 twice the drink-drive limit, he, Searle, was not
6 persuaded that this had any relevance and you, the jury,
7 should proceed accordingly. This issue was also dealt
8 with by the toxicology experts.
9 The main issues on the expert evidence relate to,
10 first, where the impact between the two vehicles
11 occurred. There is a difference between 10 metres
12 before the entrance to the tunnel and the start of the
13 tyre mark 1 metre inside the tunnel, so a maximum of
14 just 11 metres. The Mercedes would have covered that
15 distance in less than half a second. Secondly, whether
16 the Mercedes was in the left-hand lane or at or slightly
17 over the centre line. You may think these points depend
18 upon variables that it is difficult, if not impossible,
19 to determine, like whether the French identified all the
20 debris.
21 At the end of the day disputed expert evidence may
22 only take you so far. Of more help, when you come to
23 consider the eye witness evidence, are the various
24 matters on which the experts were agreed. Read said
25 that in common with most road traffic accidents, this

29

1 collision did not appear to have a single cause.
2 The absence of one or more possible causes might have
3 altered the outcome. He mentioned: driver impairment;
4 distraction by the paparazzi; excessive speed;
5 the presence of another vehicle and the need to take
6 avoiding action; unfamiliarity with the vehicle;
7 challenging road layouts -- meaning a left-hand bend and
8 a dip in the road -- and the stress or the euphoria of
9 the situation.
10 To this is perhaps to be added: distraction of the
11 driver by a flash of light. Read and Searle's evidence
12 may help you when you come to consider the narrative
13 verdict.
14 Let me summarise the arguments about a staged
15 accident. I explained to you at the start of my
16 summing-up why I had decided that there was insufficient
17 evidence for you to be sure that this was unlawful
18 killing by staged accident.
19 I also explained to you that if you took the view
20 that there is any satisfactory evidence of it at all,
21 you must take it into account as part of the whole of
22 the evidence in deciding whether verdicts 1 to 4, that
23 are available to you, are established to the necessary
24 standard. I also explained that if the evidence as
25 a whole does not support any of the first four verdicts

30

1 which I identified, then you are entitled to return an
2 open verdict.
3 I have commented upon the evidence which was said to
4 point towards a staged crash as I have gone along and
5 you will appreciate the need to examine it very
6 carefully to see whether or not, on close examination,
7 it in fact amounts to anything at all. You are, of
8 course, the judge of the facts and it is only fair that
9 I remind you, without comment, of some, not all, of the
10 features of how staged accident is put.
11 It includes the following: Diana had expressed fears
12 for her safety before the crash. See, for example,
13 the Mishcon and Burrell notes. She had mentioned
14 the possibly of a car accident in both notes.
15 Could strained relations with some members of the
16 Royal Family or her involvement with the anti-landmine
17 campaign or her involvement with Dodi and the Al Fayed
18 family have prompted some person or persons to decide to
19 kill, injure or scare her in some way?
20 Were her telephone conversations monitored by some
21 person or persons and, if so, were they prepared to do
22 her harm and did they learn of her plans in this way?
23 Are there features of the crash itself which point
24 towards a staged accident, in other words, evidence of
25 a blocking vehicle in front of the Mercedes and

31

1 a motorbike and a bright light behind, used to
2 disorientate the driver?
3 Was a flashing light of this kind a technique used
4 by MI6 -- see the evidence of Tomlinson -- and could
5 rogue MI6 officers have decided to use it here?
6 Was Henri Paul used by the plotters and duped into
7 playing his part, and if so, was this possible because
8 of some connection he had with the intelligence
9 services?
10 Does Tomlinson support that and is that the
11 explanation for money in his physical possession on the
12 night and in bank accounts?
13 Does such a connection provide the explanation for
14 those periods of time on the night of the crash when
15 we don't know where he was?
16 Are unsatisfactory features of the toxicological
17 evidence explained by interference with Henri Paul's
18 samples, which was done so as to make it look as if
19 alcohol was really behind the crash, when that was not
20 in fact the case?
21 I would now like just to summarise the evidence of
22 gross negligence as that may be of some assistance.
23 Let's take first Henri Paul. The complaint is
24 essentially that he drove excessively fast when knowing
25 that he had drunk enough alcohol to affect his ability

32

1 to drive safely and that he was racing to get away from
2 the paparazzi.
3 Lucard said Henri Paul challenged the paparazzi at
4 the rear of the Ritz that they would not catch him and
5 then set off at great speed.
6 Lopes Borges said the Mercedes went off very fast
7 from the Champs-Elysees lights with other vehicles in
8 pursuit.
9 Bonnin said the passenger on the scooter was taking
10 repeated flash photographs when they were stationary at
11 the lights and the Mercedes sped off as soon as it could
12 after being held up.
13 Darmon described it as "taking off like a plane".
14 It overtook Bonnin, going "very, very fast".
15 At the Alexandre III tunnel, Hackett saw a vehicle
16 behind going at at least 70 mph. When it overtook him,
17 it was going left to right and swerving. It was being
18 hindered by a number of motorbikes.
19 Mr Le Ny thought the driver of the Mercedes was
20 "crazy". It was going very fast. He was surprised and
21 shocked at its speed, but made no other criticism of the
22 way in which it was being driven. Mrs Le Ny described
23 the speed as "very fast" and Mr Catheline at just over
24 60 mph; Ronssin, 75 to 80 mph; Gary Dean described
25 the speed as "inordinate", 70 to 80 mph. It was being

33

1 driven too fast and in a very dangerous manner.
2 Remy put it at 87 to 94, but was he describing
3 the Mercedes? When the car overtook him, it made
4 a noise like the roar of an aircraft at take-off.
5 Partouche described the speed as very fast with
6 the engine revving and a motorcycle tailgating.
7 Gooroovadoo's estimate of speed corresponded to the
8 back calculation of the reconstruction experts. He said
9 he hardly had time to say to himself that the driver was
10 mad to drive that fast.
11 You must first decide which of this evidence you
12 accept and then you must ask whether you are sure
13 Henri Paul's driving was so bad as to cross the very
14 high threshold that I have described. An argument in
15 his favour is that while he drove fast, the evidence
16 does not suggest that he was driving inordinately faster
17 than others who use that road and there is little
18 complaint about the manner of his driving, other than
19 excessive speed.
20 Turning to gross negligence on the part of the
21 following vehicles: essentially, the argument is that
22 the paparazzi were racing the Mercedes, having taken up
23 Henri Paul's challenge that they would not catch him,
24 that they did so in such a manner as to create the risk
25 of a fatal crash and that individual drivers drove or

34

1 rode very close to the Mercedes, thereby limiting its
2 freedom of movement and restricting Henri Paul's options
3 at the critical time.
4 Was there conduct not only negligent but also so
5 grossly negligent as to cross the very high threshold
6 I have described?
7 You will need first to decide which vehicles were
8 involved in the chase and the manner of their driving in
9 the course of it. There is evidence that the paparazzi
10 continually accelerated to follow the Mercedes when it
11 must have been plain Henri Paul intended to outrun them
12 and when he had warned them they would not catch him.
13 There is evidence of a number of paparazzi vehicles
14 following the Mercedes to the Place de la Concorde, that
15 a number was still behind it at the Alexandre III tunnel
16 and on the approach to the Alma Tunnel. This was
17 a challenging urban road environment at night, with
18 the sliproad from the right, the bend to the left and
19 the incline into the tunnel.
20 Hackett referred to two or three motorcycles riding
21 very close in the Alexandre III tunnel. He was scared
22 when he saw them. Partouche recalled a compact group of
23 vehicles, including motorcycles just behind the
24 Mercedes, and Gooroovadoo remembered one motorcycle
25 following very closely.

35

1 There is also evidence from Darmon that after
2 the crash some of the paparazzi were more intent on
3 taking the best picture than helping the injured,
4 evidence which might throw some light on their state of
5 mind when driving to the tunnel.
6 Again, members of the jury, you must first decide
7 what evidence you accept as to what the following
8 drivers were actually doing and then you must decide
9 whether it amounted to gross negligence to the high
10 level I have described and was a cause of the collision
11 and the death of Dodi and Diana.
12 These are two significant hurdles. Let me deal with
13 them one by one. First, you will need to be sure about
14 what was actually going on at the critical time. I have
15 summarised the main features of the eye witness
16 evidence, together with that of the paparazzi. I have
17 mentioned that rarely in connection with any fast-moving
18 event does one find an absolutely consistent account
19 from different witnesses.
20 It may be possible for you to disentangle from all
21 the evidence a sequence of events and the involvement of
22 identifiable following vehicles, such that you can be
23 sure of where precisely any vehicle was and the part it
24 played, if any, in causing the crash. But where there
25 is such disagreement about the numbers of vehicles close

36

1 to the Mercedes, whether they were cars or motorbikes,
2 the numbers of people on them or in them and the parts
3 they played, you may find that difficult. It is
4 striking that even witnesses who had essentially
5 the same line of view give different accounts. Obvious
6 examples are Partouche and Gooroovadoo and
7 the Cathelines and the Le Nys.
8 Secondly, if you are able, on the evidence, to
9 overcome that hurdle, you would then have to be sure
10 that the relevant driving not only caused the accident,
11 but was grossly, criminally negligent in the way I have
12 described.
13 We will now have a break for quarter of an hour.
14 There is very little that I have left to cover. I am
15 going to say a word about seat-belts and a word about
16 the medical treatment after the collision and then
17 I shall conclude. So you will be considering your
18 verdict beginning later this morning.
19 (11.10 am)
20 (A short break)
21 (11.28 am)
22 (Jury present)
23 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Members of the jury, returning
24 for a moment to the paparazzi. I told you on Monday to
25 be cautious about their evidence because it had not been

37

1 tested, other than, of course, Darmon, and you may think
2 that they had reason to distance themselves from
3 the Mercedes.
4 You may think that the evidence as a whole, and as
5 Inspector Carpenter agreed, that Darmon and Rat were
6 closer than they accepted, as were Arnal and Martinez.
7 There is doubt that other paparazzi were close in
8 the final stretch.
9 I have been speaking about Mr Read's evidence as to
10 where the Mercedes was and I did mention that -- and
11 I perhaps should emphasise this -- you should not forget
12 that the majority of eye witnesses put it firmly in
13 the left-hand fast lane.
14 Turning then to seat-belts. It is beyond dispute
15 that neither Diana nor Dodi were wearing a seat-belt at
16 the time of the collision.
17 Tebbutt, Diana's driver, said that she normally did
18 wear a seat-belt and this was confirmed by her
19 comptroller/secretary, Gibbins. In the summer of 1997
20 when she was in London, Tebbutt was called on to drive
21 her on three or four occasions a week. Wharfe said she
22 automatically wore one. Trevor Rees told us that
23 generally Dodi did not wear a seat-belt when he was in
24 central London, but he did as he left London, for
25 example when they went over the Hammersmith flyover and

38

1 picked up speed. Trevor Rees was criticised for not
2 ensuring that both his charges had their seat-belts
3 fastened, but he was unable to remember whether he had
4 asked them to do so in the vehicle. Why neither of them
5 had their belts fastened is unclear, but you may think
6 that, as adults, it was their responsibility and not
7 that of their bodyguard.
8 Would wearing seat-belts have made a difference? As
9 a matter of generality, seat-belts ordinarily reduce the
10 severity of injuries and increase survival rates. Would
11 Dodi and Diana have survived had they been wearing one?
12 Read said that wearing one would have increased
13 the prospect of survival.
14 Dr Searle went a little further and said that had
15 they been wearing one, their injuries would have been
16 unlikely to have been fatal. Seat-belts are
17 a significant factor in the cause of fatalities.
18 Both Dodi and Diana suffered very severe injuries
19 and you may think that it is impossible to say that
20 either of them would necessarily have survived had they
21 been wearing a seat-belt. The fact is that the Mercedes
22 hit the 13th pillar and this certainly did contribute to
23 the severity of the collision and the consequential
24 injuries that the passengers suffered because of the
25 very considerable force transmitted to the Mercedes

39

1 through a small area. If you think Diana and Dodi would
2 have survived had they been wearing a seat-belt, you
3 should say so in your narrative verdict.
4 Could Diana have been saved if she had been taken to
5 hospital more quickly?
6 Diana's death was the result of a severe chest
7 injury, the most significant aspect being a laceration
8 of the left superior pulmonary vein. The injuries were
9 consistent with a right-sided impact.
10 As you will recall, the crash probably took place
11 between 12.22 and 12.23 am. You heard many witnesses
12 about treatment at the scene. Dr Mailliez was an
13 off-duty emergency doctor who was returning home from
14 dinner. His call to the emergency services was at
15 12.27 am and there had been another a minute or so
16 earlier.
17 He quickly assessed the circumstances and
18 ascertained that there were two dead and two seriously
19 injured. Obviously, being off-duty, he did not carry
20 full equipment. He handed over to the doctor in
21 the fire rescue vehicle that arrived at 12.32 am. When
22 he left, he expected Diana to survive, but he was
23 unaware that she had severe internal injury.
24 Two vehicles attended. There were five people,
25 including paramedics, in each. The first SAMU ambulance

40

1 arrived at about 12.40 am. Diana was removed from
2 the wreck of the Mercedes at 1 am exactly and put in
3 the ambulance shortly after that so that the doctor
4 could treat her under the best conditions. Now, that is
5 not far short of an hour after the first call to the
6 emergency services, but you have heard that a good deal
7 was going on in the meantime. The ambulance set off at
8 1.41 am, arriving at the hospital at 2.07 am, having
9 stopped on the journey when Diana's blood pressure
10 dropped dangerously.
11 Professor Lienhart, a French expert appointed in
12 February 1998 to report on treatment, interviewed
13 the key players and said that he was satisfied
14 the standard procedure was followed.
15 Members of the jury, different countries operate
16 different systems and, as you have heard, there is, even
17 today, no agreement at international level whether
18 taking the patient immediately to hospital, known as
19 "scoop and run", is preferable to treatment at
20 the scene. It obviously depends to some extent on the
21 nature of the injuries and the position is more
22 difficult until you know what the injuries are. In
23 France, in 1997, the procedure was that doctors
24 routinely went to the scene of serious accidents
25 accompanied by a good deal of medical resource.

41

1 Dr Lejay was on duty as the medical dispatcher at
2 the SAMU centre. In Paris there are always two
3 dispatchers, so if one goes out to the scene, the other
4 takes over. He referred to a timeline. He confirmed
5 that Dr Martino arrived at the scene at 20 minutes to 1
6 with the SAMU ambulance. There was an initial but
7 uninformative situation report at 12.43. Dr Derossi,
8 the other SAMU dispatcher, arrived at 12.50. There may
9 have been a second report to the dispatcher which was
10 not documented. In any event, Dr Lejay says it was not
11 until 1.19 am that Dr Derossi gave a detailed report of
12 the condition of the injured and recommended Diana to
13 La Pitie-Salpetriere Hospital, a recommendation with
14 which Dr Lejay agreed. Admission to the hospital took
15 only a few minutes to arrange. The ambulance in fact
16 departed at 1.41.
17 Dr Lejay was asked why he did not contact
18 La Pitie-Salpetriere Hospital as soon as Dr Derossi
19 arrived at the scene. His answer was that he needed
20 a complete assessment of the injuries and to decide
21 which hospital to approach if La Pitie was not
22 available, but he agreed that when he did telephone
23 Professor Riou, he offered him two multiple trauma
24 victims, which was information that he had had
25 40 minutes before. It is fair to say that he only had

42

1 detailed information about the injuries at 1.19, a few
2 minutes before he called Professor Riou.
3 It was suggested that there was a lost hour between
4 the arrival of Drs Derossi and Martino at the scene and
5 the departure of the ambulance to hospital, but he said
6 that Diana had to be stabilised before transportation
7 and, in particular, her arterial blood pressure had to
8 be recovered.
9 Dr Martino did not give evidence until 24th January.
10 It took us a long time to find him. He is now living in
11 Germany. He was the doctor who treated Diana at
12 the scene. He told us that he arrived at 12.40,
13 inserted a drip and gave sedatives. He thought that
14 Diana may have internal injuries but there was no
15 evidence of them. He used an electrocardioscope and
16 a pressure cuff to check her blood pressure and so
17 forth. She was removed from the crashed vehicle on an
18 olive tree board at 1 am. When removed she had no
19 pulse. He intubated her and performed massage.
20 A satisfactory heartbeat was regained quite quickly.
21 The police record says that she was being treated in
22 the ambulance by 1.18, but you heard from Dr Martino and
23 Dr Derossi that she was probably in the ambulance
24 a little before then. Once there, her arterial pressure
25 dropped again. He gave her dopamine to increase her

43

1 heart rate and blood pressure, inserting two surgical
2 lines, one for the dopamine and the other to replace
3 lost blood. He carried out a detailed examination. He
4 found more serious injuries than had previously been
5 apparent and, in particular, a thoracic injury, as
6 Dr Derossi reported to Dr Lejay.
7 He began the journey to hospital as soon as Diana's
8 arterial pressure had been restored. He asked
9 the driver to go slowly. He stopped the ambulance on
10 the journey because the arterial pressure dropped again.
11 Dr Martino was in charge from the moment he arrived
12 at the scene until the ambulance reached hospital. He
13 denied any deliberate delay. He said he followed
14 correct procedures and gave appropriate care. He could
15 not have set off sooner because he had to stabilise
16 the patient. It took up to 30 minutes in the ambulance
17 to resuscitate and stabilise her. After removal from
18 the car, she had no pulse and no arterial blood
19 pressure. Accordingly he had to perform cardiac
20 massage. Then he had to intubate and ventilate her
21 before putting her in the ambulance. Once in
22 the ambulance, her blood pressure again became
23 dangerously low. During the journey, there was another
24 near-catastrophic fall in blood pressure.
25 La Pitie-Salpetriere, which is the hospital to which

44

1 Diana was taken, is the leading hospital in Paris for
2 people suffering from multiple traumas. Professor Riou
3 agreed to take her. She arrived at six minutes past 2.
4 The situation was bleak. Her blood pressure was not
5 measurable. X-rays showed a right haemothorax; that is
6 blood between the lungs and the thorax on the right
7 side.
8 A general surgeon opened the chest from the sternum
9 to the back, known as a lateral thoracotomy. It was
10 essential to find the source of the bleeding.
11 Professor Pavie arrived and extended the
12 thoracotomy. The source of the bleeding was found.
13 It was coming from the point where the left superior
14 pulmonary vein joins the pericardium of the heart.
15 Professor Pavie said it was difficult to say whether
16 the outcome would have been any different if Diana had
17 been brought to hospital sooner. If a patient arrives
18 at hospital with no arterial pressure, the prospects of
19 success are nearly nil.
20 Professor Pavie is the professor of cardiovascular
21 surgery at La Pitie-Salpetriere Hospital and is
22 President of the French College of Cardiovascular
23 Surgeons. He was called at 2.10 am as a matter of
24 extreme urgency and arrived at the hospital 12 minutes
25 later. Having extended the thoracotomy, he managed to

45

1 stitch up the tear of the pulmonary vein, but sadly
2 efforts to resuscitate Diana failed.
3 He said that in 30 years' experience, he had never,
4 on any occasion, tried to repair a tear in the left
5 superior pulmonary vein where it joins the atrium. Such
6 patients, he said, do not usually make it to hospital.
7 It was put to Professor Pavie that it would have
8 been desirable for him to have been alerted earlier, and
9 that if Diana had arrived at hospital sooner, she could
10 have been saved. He would not agree and strongly
11 defended the French system. She might have been brought
12 to hospital an hour earlier but most probably she would
13 have been dead on arrival. Every case is different and
14 it is not possible to change the whole system for an
15 exceptional case. They could not have known at
16 the scene that she had a tear in the left pulmonary vein
17 which was bleeding into the thorax.
18 In simply practical terms, it would have possible to
19 have taken Diana straight to hospital and to have
20 arrived some time earlier, but those at the scene did
21 not know what the nature and the extent of the injury
22 was. It was not like a knife or bullet wound where
23 the track of the injury is known. A closed wound, you
24 were told, is different. The time that was taken at
25 the scene was largely taken up with trying to stabilise

46

1 Diana and improve her arterial pressure. If those
2 efforts had not been made, she may have died before she
3 ever got to hospital.
4 As I have said, Professor Lienhart was satisfied
5 that the standard procedures were followed. Nobody had
6 previously seen somebody arriving alive at hospital with
7 such injuries. Even with hindsight, he said, nothing
8 should have been done differently.
9 Members of the jury, you may think that doctors are
10 naturally defensive of their own systems. That is one
11 of the reasons why I instructed Professor Treasure to
12 have an independent look at the case. He had recently
13 retired and was an expert in cardio-thoracic surgery.
14 He was President of the European Association for
15 Thoracic Surgery in 2005/2006.
16 The size of the rupture, he said, was in the order
17 of a hand's breadth. He had never seen such an injury
18 in a survivor. Now Professor Treasure [disagrees] with
19 Professor Pavie that, even with hindsight, nothing
20 should have been done differently. He says the best
21 option would have been to carry out what is called
22 a "medial sternotomy". This involves opening up
23 the chest from the front, but you need the right
24 equipment, a saw, and an expert to do it. But this is
25 with the hindsight of knowing where the tear was.

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1 The sensible thing, he said, was done if they wanted, as
2 they did, to keep their options open so that the
3 incision could be extended, as it was, to enable
4 the surgeon to go into the other side. If the chest had
5 been open from the front, an expert surgeon could have
6 controlled the bleeding with a finger and then a clamp.
7 Professor Treasure also made the point that there
8 comes a time when you have exhausted what you can do in
9 an ambulance rather than in a hospital; you simply do
10 not have all the equipment that is available in a fully
11 equipped and fully skilled hospital. He thought that
12 after Diana had been first stabilised at the crash
13 scene, opportunities were lost and she might have been
14 taken to hospital half an hour sooner.
15 He thought it unfortunate that the hospital was not
16 informed sooner that Dr Martino had discovered a right
17 haemothorax. If it had been, the hospital could have
18 brought Professor Pavie there sooner.
19 Professor Treasure was also critical of the massive
20 doses of adrenaline that were administered as this tends
21 to narrow blood vessels.
22 However, looking at the overall picture, he said
23 there was a very low likelihood that Diana's life could
24 have been saved. It was, he said, theoretically
25 possible, but it would have required a number of what he

48

1 describes as "ifs" to have lined up perfectly.
2 These were:
3 (1) If the time to get her to hospital was very
4 short;
5 (2) If the cardiac surgical team had been ready on
6 standby -- this needs an early prior alert;
7 (3) If the chest was opened up from the front.
8 To this day, there is a debate between "scoop and
9 run" on the one hand and "treatment at the scene" on the
10 other. You are not in a position to resolve that
11 difficult policy issue. You have not heard any evidence
12 on it and it is certainly not possible to do so on the
13 strength of one case. You may think that the ambulance
14 team did their best in accordance with the prescribed
15 procedures, albeit the period between the collision and
16 arrival at hospital was a little outside the period
17 expected. But you have heard there were reasons for
18 that. They wanted to get her to hospital in the least
19 poor condition possible. It was obviously going to take
20 some time to get Diana to hospital, and Professor Pavie
21 said that even if she had arrived 23 minutes earlier,
22 which was put to him as a realistic possibility, it
23 would have made no difference.
24 There is no evidence that any of the doctors or
25 members of the ambulance crew deliberately failed to do

49

1 their best for Diana and very little evidence that if
2 any different action had been taken, she would not have
3 died.
4 You will recall that, in your narrative conclusion,
5 you have the option of saying that Diana's death was
6 contributed to by the loss of opportunities to render
7 medical treatment. You should only include that as
8 a cause if you are satisfied of two things: first, you
9 would have to be satisfied that even within
10 the framework of the French system, the treating
11 clinicians lost opportunities to take particular steps
12 to save Diana. Secondly, you would have to be satisfied
13 that if those steps had been taken, Diana would probably
14 not have died. Remember, you should only include this
15 in your narrative verdict if you conclude that things
16 could realistically have been done differently, rather
17 than theoretical possibilities.
18 Let me therefore conclude. So, members of the jury,
19 we come to the point where you are to retire and
20 consider your verdicts, not far from six months to the
21 day when we started last October. You have listened to
22 a vast amount of evidence with, if I may say so, obvious
23 care and great commitment. I am grateful to counsel for
24 sticking to the timescale that was agreed and to you for
25 sitting inconvenient sitting hours that you have

50

1 cheerfully accepted.
2 The conspiracy theory advanced by Mohamed Al Fayed
3 has been minutely examined and shown to be without any
4 substance. There remain the suggestions of whether this
5 might have been a staged accident, but for reasons that
6 I have already explained, it is not open to you to
7 return a verdict of unlawful killing on the part of
8 anyone other than the driver of the Mercedes or
9 the following vehicles or both together.
10 Consider first whether you are satisfied so that you
11 are sure that there was gross negligence on the part of
12 the driver of the Mercedes or the following vehicles or
13 both and that it caused the death of the deceased. If
14 you are not so satisfied, you must go on to consider
15 whether you are satisfied on balance of probabilities of
16 accidental death. In considering each of these possible
17 verdicts, you will consider the evidence that this was
18 a staged accident.
19 If that or anything else results in your not being
20 satisfied to the relevant standard of proof of any of
21 the other verdicts, you will return an open verdict.
22 With each verdict, whether unlawful killing, accident or
23 open, it must be the verdict of all 11 of you.
24 As I mentioned to you at the start, you are to
25 complete one inquisition form for Dodi and one for

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1 Diana. You should write the verdict in section 4 of
2 the inquisition form on the second page. So you may be
3 sure that you get the wording of each verdict exactly
4 right, they are listed in paragraph 1 of your handout of
5 legal directions.
6 The narrative conclusion goes in section 3 of each
7 inquisition form. If you look at the box on page 1 of
8 each form, you will see the introductory passage
9 beginning either "Dodi" or "Diana".
10 After the introductory passage, you will write in as
11 many or as few as you wish of the five causes listed in
12 1 to 5 at paragraph 19 of your handout of legal
13 directions, on the last page of that.
14 If you now look at the top of page 2 of
15 the inquisition form, you will see the sentence
16 beginning, "In addition ..." After that sentence, you
17 will write in as many or as few as you wish of
18 the causes listed at 1 to 3 of paragraph 20 of your
19 handout on legal directions. Please use the form of
20 words in the legal directions.
21 That form of words has been carefully composed so as
22 to be as informative as possible while avoiding any risk
23 of the rules being infringed.
24 Any narrative conclusion you come to, as with your
25 verdict, should likewise be the conclusion of you all.

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1 It is for you to decide which, if any, of the causes
2 I have provided you wish to add to your narrative
3 conclusion.
4 Will you please now retire to consider your
5 verdicts? There is no pressure of time. Take as long
6 as is necessary. If your deliberations are still
7 continuing at 4.15 today or on any other day or
8 thereabouts, I shall adjourn for the day, you will go
9 home and we will resume at 10 o'clock on the following
10 day. I am told that I said something which was a slip
11 of the tongue which ought to be corrected and Mr Burnett
12 will now tell you what it is.
13 MR BURNETT: Sir, my microphones don't appear to be working.
14 Sir, you said "Professor Treasure agrees with
15 Professor Pavie ..." --
16 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: It should be "disagrees".
17 MR BURNETT: It should be, which I hope was obvious from
18 what followed.
19 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Thank you.
20 So can the jury bailiffs now please be sworn?
21 Jury bailiffs (sworn)
22 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Burnett, there is one point
23 that occurs to me. Of course the jury are being
24 provided throughout with the LiveNote transcript. It
25 will take a little time for this morning's LiveNote to

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1 be transcribed and no doubt that can be taken to
2 the jury room and handed in at the appropriate time?
3 MR BURNETT: I am sure everyone would agree with that.
4 Yes, lots of nodding.
5 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Thank you.
6 (11.57 am)
7 (Jury out)
8 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I shall not take a verdict
9 between 1 and 2 on this or any other day, if that is
10 convenient for everyone to know that.
11 (11.58 am)
12 (Adjourned for deliberations)

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