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  annual report and accounts 2002-03

Output and Deliverables

Operations

Objective:

To achieve success in the tasks we undertake.

Performance Measures:
  1. Successful Operations, as measured through achievement of specific Operational Objectives.
     
  2. Proportion of the Armed Forces involved in the prosecution of Military Tasks.
Performance Assessment:
  1. A high degree of success was achieved in all Operations, including overseas in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, the Balkans, and in the UK (including emergency cover during the firefighters' strike). The Trident submarine force maintained a nuclear deterrent capability at sea throughout the year.
     
  2. Activity levels rose considerably from the previous year as a result of greater operational demands. They peaked at 55.6% for the Army in the last quarter during operations in Iraq. The main deployments of the UK's Armed Forces are depicted in Figure 2. The Defence Aim and Military Tasks are available on the Department's website at www.mod.uk.

On-going PSA targets are in italics. See Annex B for a complete table.

Summary

10.  All three Services were heavily involved in operations throughout the year. The deployments to the Gulf and Iraq were the largest and most demanding. But UK personnel were also engaged in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and the Balkans, provided emergency fire-fighting cover in the UK, and continued to support the Police in Northern Ireland. This was therefore an exceptionally busy, and successful, year for the Armed Forces.

Operations in Iraq - Operation TELIC

11.  Following the Gulf Conflict in 1991, United Nations resolutions imposed strict conditions on Iraq including the destruction, removal or rendering useless of its Weapons of Mass Destruction under the supervision of inspectors. Despite significant diplomatic efforts over twelve years, it was with regret that the UK and a number of other nations concluded that this would not be possible without military intervention. Therefore on 20 March 2003, a US-led coalition, with a substantial UK contribution, began military operations against the Saddam Hussein regime.

12.  Although the Operation was US-led, the UK played a significant role in removing the Saddam regime. Operation TELIC, as the UK's contribution was named, saw 46,000 personnel deployed to the region in just eleven weeks. From the first amphibious assault on to the Al Faw peninsula to the fall of Basrah, British forces concentrated on operations in the south of Iraq, enabling the US forces to advance on Baghdad with a speed not seen in previous conflicts. Our aircraft operated in an air campaign remarkable for the level of precision weaponry used. Within four weeks of the start of the Operation, Saddam Hussein's regime was removed and most of Iraq was under coalition control. The success of the military campaign owed much to the determination and professionalism of the coalition's Armed Forces and the civilians who supported them.

13.  We knew this Operation would require us to help provide humanitarian aid and support as soon as we began to take control of regions of southern Iraq, and had planned the Operation on this basis. Our troops quickly switched from offensive to stabilisation operations and to helping provide humanitarian assistance. The UK continues to play a full part in the re-building of Iraq through the establishment of conditions for a stable and law-abiding Iraqi government.

Key Successes

14.  Operation TELIC showed once again why the UK's Armed Forces are respected around the world. The high quality of their training and professional expertise was demonstrated in the skill with which they performed their roles. The tasks required of our Servicemen and women throughout the campaign and in the immediate aftermath of hostilities were numerous and complicated. Their impressive performance in achieving their military objectives so rapidly should not be underestimated.

15.  The Operation showed the effectiveness and wide capability of the equipment and logistics support available to our Armed Forces. This matched and often exceeded expectations, reflecting the benefits of recent operational experience and the value of Exercise SAIF SAREEA II held in Oman in 2001. Our Tomahawk cruise missile capability again proved a particularly useful long-range, stand-off, precision asset. The Shallow Water Mine Sweeping System was used operationally for the first time, enhancing the mine sweeping and clearance capability key to our opening up the southern Iraqi port of Umm Qasr for humanitarian aid. Challenger 2 (our main battle tank), Warrior (an infantry fighting vehicle) and AS90 (a self-propelled artillery piece) were all effective. Dust mitigation measures for Challenger 2 overcame the difficulties that arose in Exercise SAIF SAREEA II. Earlier difficulties with the SA80 A2 rifle were also resolved. The air contribution was marked by greatly increased use of precision guided weapons (some 85% of total UK air-delivered munitions) including the new Storm Shadow missile, reflecting lessons learnt from previous operations. The increased flexibility of multi-role aircraft was demonstrated by the use of Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 aircraft on both reconnaissance and offensive missions.

16.  Overall, operations in Iraq confirmed the 1998 Strategic Defence Review's conclusion that the Armed Forces should develop an expeditionary-based strategy, providing ready, balanced forces able to apply decisive effect in scenarios of varying intensity, frequency and character in an uncertain and unpredictable world.

Use of Reserves
When combat operations ceased, UK troops quickly switched from offensive to stabilisation operations.
When combat operations ceased, UK troops quickly switched from offensive to stabilisation operations and to helping provide humanitarian assistance.

17.  Some 5,000 Reservists took part in the Operation in Iraq in a wide range of roles, from infantry and logistics to more specialised roles such as doctors and air traffic controllers. Further Reservists have been called out to assist the stabilisation force and help with reconstruction. Our Reservists proved their quality beyond doubt, and showed that, as envisaged in the 1997 Strategic Defence Review, they provide a useful and useable force, relevant to modern conflict and capable of integration with Regular forces.

Lessons

18.  As with all major operations and exercises, the Department is undertaking a lessons exercise to identify what we did well, and what we could do better in the future. The results of this work will be used to inform our future programmes. In July we published our 'Early Reflections' on the Operation, an authoritative account of the Operation which also identified some emerging lessons (available on the MOD website http://www.mod.uk). The full lessons programme, covering all elements of the Operation in Iraq, is still underway. We expect to complete this detailed scientific analysis of the effectiveness of our equipment, military strategy and planning processes during the autumn, and we plan to publish a fuller report before Christmas.

Other Overseas Operations

International Terrorism

19.  During the year, the UK continued to play an active part in operations against international terrorism. This included deploying naval forces on interdiction operations in the Mediterranean and Arabian Seas and combat forces in Afghanistan, and support to coalition aircraft operating in the area. We also played an important role in helping the Afghan people rebuild and restore their country and their prosperity.

20.  Between April and July 2002, we deployed a 1,700-strong battle group to support coalition operations against the remnants of Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in eastern Afghanistan. Known as Task Force JACANA, this force, built around 45 Commando, Royal Marines, conducted a series of successful, major operations that denied and destroyed terrorist infrastructure and interdicted the movement of the terrorists.

21.  We are also helping rebuild Afghanistan. Until June 2002, we led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, which helped first the Interim Administration and then the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) to maintain security and stability in Kabul. After the transfer of the leadership of the ISAF, our contribution reduced from 1,500 to around 300 personnel. In March 2003 we began a highly successful programme to use part of our contribution to the ISAF to train Junior Non-Commissioned Officers for the Afghan National Army.

22.  In July 2003 the UK deployed a Provincial Reconstruction Team to the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif and its five surrounding provinces. The role of the team was to aid the extension of the ATA's capacity, the development of a stable and secure environment in the Afghan regions and to stimulate security sector reform and reconstruction. The Team was military led but included representatives from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development. In due course, it may also include personnel from other nations.

Sierra Leone
The UK continued to provide a programme of training and assistance to the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces.
The UK continued to provide a programme of training and assistance to the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces.

23.  The UK maintained an important military commitment in Sierra Leone, supporting the government, providing a programme of training and assistance to their Armed Forces, and advising their Ministry of Defence. Developments were promising: the country has enjoyed its first full year of peace for a decade and democratic elections, free from violence and intimidation, were held in May 2002. In July 2002 the security situation was judged to be sufficiently benign to end Operation SILKMAN (the overarching Operation for UK forces in Sierra Leone), but we continued to provide a UK-led International Military Advisory and Training Team.

24.  Threats remain, most notably from the risk of continuing unrest in Liberia, and the UK will continue to stand by Sierra Leone. To demonstrate our commitment to the settlement process, in February 2003 we deployed a Company Group from 2nd Battalion The Royal Gurkha Rifles and a Type 23 frigate, HMS Iron Duke, to Sierra Leone. This also demonstrated our ability to conduct such deployments rapidly, notwithstanding our involvement in operations elsewhere in the world. We also continued to support the UN Mission in Sierra Leone where the UK provided seven headquarters staff officers, including the Chief of Staff, and fifteen military observers.

The deployment of Army units to Heathrow provided a very visible example of the MOD providing direct support to the Police in countering terrorism in the UK.
The deployment of Army units to Heathrow provided a very visible example of the MOD providing direct support to the Police in countering terrorism in the UK.
The Balkans

25.  NATO's review of operations in the Balkans in March 2002 set out a regional approach to stabilisation operations, allowing a reduction in the numbers of troops deployed across the region of 30% over the year. In March 2003, the UK contributed some 1,350 troops to the NATO Stabilisation Force in Bosnia (SFOR), based in the northwest of the country, maintaining our successful partnership with Canada and the Netherlands. In Kosovo, UK troop numbers reduced significantly to some 350, and lead nation responsibility for Multi-National Brigade Centre was passed to Finland.

26.  Assistance to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is an integral part of Operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo. By the end of March 2003, 32 detention operations had been conducted, half of which involved UK forces.

27.  The UK remained engaged in security sector reform to underpin the efforts of the international community to bring stability to the region. Armed Forces reform is crucial to building a sustainable peace within the region and is an important step in the rehabilitation of nations into the international community. The UK has focused its efforts on practical and effective projects. One example was Operation FLORIAN, which trained some 160 Bosnian ex-service personnel as firefighters.

Military Aid to the Civil Authorities

During fifteen days of strike action by the Fire Brigades Union, Armed Forces personnel attended nearly 20,000 incidents.
During fifteen days of strike action by the Fire Brigades Union, Armed Forces personnel attended nearly 20,000 incidents.

28.  Throughout 2002/03, UK Armed Forces provided specialist support to the civil police. Explosive Ordnance Disposal experts routinely supported the police across the country by examining and making safe suspected explosive devices, whether historical relics, criminal or terrorist in nature. The Armed Forces also provided support to the police and Home Office in countering terrorism in the UK: the deployment of Army units to Heathrow and its environs in February 2003 provided a very visible example of the ability to provide direct support at short notice.

Emergency Fire Cover - Operation FRESCO

29.  The Armed Forces were also called upon to provide emergency fire cover when negotiations between the Fire Brigades Union and the local government employers broke down. Training began in August 2002 and at the peak of the deployment more than 19,000 personnel from all three Services were held ready to provide emergency cover. Although it later proved possible to reduce the number of personnel to 16,000, the commitment only ended with the settlement of the dispute in June 2003.

30.  This contingency cover was deployed for a total of fifteen days of strike action, during which time Armed Forces personnel attended 19,866 incidents. Although inevitably limited in comparison to normal fire service cover, the Armed Forces nonetheless provided basic emergency cover in a professional manner, significantly reducing risks to life and property.

Figure 2: Principal Deployments of the Armed Forces on 1 April 2003
Figure 2: Principal Deployments of the Armed Forces on 1 April 2003
Click on the map to view a larger version.

31.  The primary source of manpower for this Operation was troops training for future deployments. This made it possible to continue to meet operational deployments in the short term, but the disruption of training programmes will have a longer-term impact. The provision of specialist rescue teams drawn from the Royal Navy's and the Royal Air Force's professional firefighters also had a disruptive impact disproportionate to the number of personnel involved.

Military Aid to the Civil Power in Northern Ireland

32.  The Armed Forces continued to play a significant role in supporting the Police Service of Northern Ireland in maintaining law and order, especially in the face of the threat from dissident republican groups. Military patrols supported the police in searching for and capturing terrorists, their weapons and equipment, and in dealing with serious public disorder. The total number of Service personnel committed to Northern Ireland reduced slightly from 14,580 on 1 April 2002 to 14,320 by 1 April 2003.

Counter-Drugs Operations

33.  The Armed Forces also provided valuable assistance to HM Customs and Excise and other anti-narcotics agencies around the world. In particular, in addition to normal commitments Royal Navy ships undertook patrols and joint operations in the Caribbean with US Coast Guard and drug-enforcement agencies. One such operation saw seizure of drugs valued at around 」65M.

Other Military Tasks

Independent Nuclear Deterrent

34.  Throughout the year the UK's Trident submarine force maintained an independent nuclear deterrent capability at sea in support of NATO's strategy of war prevention and as the ultimate guarantee of our national security.

Search and Rescue

35.  The Armed Forces maintained a year-round, 24-hour search and rescue helicopter service, based at eight locations around the British Isles and also on Cyprus and the Falkland Islands. Other Service assets, including the Royal Air Force Mountain Rescue Service and Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft, were also used for search and rescue. Armed Forces rescue services were called out on 1,670 occasions in 2002/03 (compared with 1,790 in 2001/02) and helped 1,230 people, including 61 military personnel.

Security of Overseas Territories

36.  In Cyprus, UK Forces maintained important military facilities within the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. UK forces based in the Falkland Islands continued to demonstrate the Government's commitment to the security of that Territory, including South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. Gibraltar retained its importance as an overseas base for the British Armed Forces, providing valuable support, logistic, communications and training facilities.

Activity Levels of the Armed Forces

37.  Although not a measure of performance, activity levels give some indication of the demands placed on the Armed Forces, particularly when looked at over a period of time (see Table 1, Figure 3 and separate box).

38.  2002/03 was exceptionally busy for all three Services. Activity levels peaked at the height of the Iraq conflict, at which time just under 29% of the trained strength of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines was engaged directly in Military Tasks and operations, compared with a peak of 16.7% in 2001/02, some 55% of whole Army strength (compared to a peak of 26.3% in 2001/02) and about 22% of the Royal Air Force (against a peak of 13.6% in 2001/02). The Royal Air Force flew a total of 57,314 operational hours (including 15,485 hours on Operation TELIC), up over 25% from 2001/02.

Table 1: Percentage of Trained Strength Deployed on Operations and Other Military Tasks1
  2001/022 2002/03
  Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4
Royal Navy/Royal Marines 9.5% 8.4% 16.7% 15.7% 17.5% 13.0% 16.5% 28.5%
Army 21.8% 25.6% 26.3% 23.9% 24.6% 23.9% 32.5% 55.6%
Royal Air Force 11.9% 12.2% 13.6% 13.1% 12.6% 10.9% 19.1% 21.8%

Notes:
(1) Excludes those either preparing for, or recovering from, deployments. Percentages shown are quarterly averages. A list of Military Tasks can be found on the Department's website (http://www.mod.uk).
(2) 2001/02 figures include personnel on Exercise SAIF SAREEA II.


Figure 3: Average Proportion of Trained Strength Deployed on Operations and Other Military Tasks
Figure 3:  Average Proportion of Trained Strength Deployed on Operations and Other Military Tasks
Royal Navy/Royal Marines
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Army
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Royal Air Force
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Activity Levels

What these figures tell us (and what they don't)

Tracking the number and proportion of personnel deployed on operations and other Military Tasks gives us a good indication of how busy our Armed Forces personnel are. It is one of the measures that enable the Department to gauge how much we are asking of our people: whether they are likely to be away from their families for too long and whether they have sufficient time for training and recuperation between deployments. Spending too long on deployments reduces morale, which leads both to retention problems and makes people less effective.

What the figures do not indicate, however, is what further, additional operations or deployments we could undertake (known as 'residual capability'): that is as much about transport, training and logistics as it is about the number of available personnel. Also, depending on the type and number of operations underway, there might be a particular strain on certain specialists, such as logisticians or airfield personnel, which is not identified in the overall activity levels.

What is included in the figures?

The activity levels we track include not just those personnel deployed on operations, but also those on other Military Tasks. A full list of these tasks can be found on the MOD website (http://www.mod.uk) but they include such on-going commitments as counter-drugs operations and military aid to the civil power in Northern Ireland (see paragraphs 32-36). Personnel are often apart from their families whilst undertaking these tasks and so, in that regard, are under as much of a strain as those on operations. Also, they cannot train for other types of activity, which impacts on their readiness. As well as the personnel actually deployed on Military Tasks, there will also be a proportion who are committed to those tasks but not deployed (for example, they might be undertaking specific training in anticipation of deployment or recuperating after returning from deployment).

How does the UK compare?

Different nations have different ways of organising their Armed Forces and reporting their activities and for that reason it is not a straightforward matter to compare activity levels. With that in mind, in the summer of 2003 just over 35% of the US Army and under 6% of the US Air Force were deployed abroad without their families. This roughly compares to over 50% of the British Army and about 22% of the Royal Air Force (see Table 1, although some of them will have been with their families whilst on deployment). Similarly, as at the end of 2002/03 just under 16% of the French Army were deployed, including those undertaking military tasks in France (such as fighting forest fires). Although a far-from-perfect comparison, this gives a feel for just how busy our Armed Forces are.

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Last Updated: 3 Dec 03