Publications and ReportsChapter 8: Ground Operations - Conduct and Lessons
Key lessons
Strategy and planning
8.1. NATO began planning for ground operations in the summer of 1998,
following a tasking from NATO Defence Ministers on 12 June. NATO planning
covered a wide range of potential options designed to assist international
efforts. These ranged from a ground presence in Albania to help halt
arms smuggling through the deployment of a ground force in Kosovo to
enforce a ceasefire or peace settlement (this was the option which was
later developed into the Kosovo Force or KFOR) to an opposed entry into
Kosovo and/or the rest of Serbia. All these options were on the table
in 1998, and were examined by the NATO Military Authorities in consultation
with Allies, who commented on the plans and developed their own supporting
assessments and plans in the normal way.
8.2. Planning a military operation in detail is a significant time
and personnel-intensive undertaking, and NATO and national planning
priorities had therefore to be established. The Allies agreed that the
first priority should be planning for an air operation and a subsequent
peacekeeping operation to be inserted once a peace agreement or ceasefire
had been reached. These were assessed (correctly) to be the most likely
options for military action. There was no consensus in the Alliance
at this stage for detailed operational plans for an opposed ground entry
option to be developed, but the NATO Military Authorities were tasked
to keep the existing initial planning under review. Similarly, military
planners in the UK focused their efforts on the agreed priorities, and
our planners were active in developing national plans for the deployment
and operation of UK forces in support of both air and ground options.
8.3. As the diplomatic situation changed, further plans were developed.
Milosevic’s agreement to the NATO and OSCE Verification Mission proposed
by US Envoy Richard Holbrooke in October 1998 required rapid preparations
for the deployment of unarmed verifiers. The UK realised that the only
way of getting large numbers of verifiers in quickly, and thus to stabilise
the situation in the initial stages of the mission, was to deploy Service
personnel in addition to civilian volunteers. This was an unusual step
to take, but our personnel proved well up to the challenge, and members
of all three Services served with distinction in this difficult mission.
By 10 December, 90 UK Service men and women had deployed, and by the
time the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was withdrawn in March 1999,
there were 138. The UK also provided support in the form of armoured
Landrovers.
8.4. The UK’s preference at that time was well known to be an armed
NATO peacekeeping force, as the only means guaranteed to stabilise the
situation and to give Kosovo Albanians the confidence they needed to
return to their homes (a judgement which was vindicated by events).
However, it was clear that this option was not acceptable at that time,
and we were therefore determined to give the verification alternative
a chance. It proved not to be a long-term solution, but provided an
important breathing space, and averted a humanitarian catastrophe that
winter.
8.5. In December 1998, NATO agreed the deployment of a 1800 strong
NATO-led force to Macedonia, designed to ensure the safety of the members
of the KVM. UK planners were closely involved in the development of
this Extraction Force. We were keen to deploy such a force not just
as a signal of our determination to protect our nationals involved in
the KVM, but also as the first NATO ground presence in the theatre.
We continued planning in parallel for a peacekeeping force taking account
of these developments, and the majority of the Extraction Force was
later incorporated into KFOR, when their original mission was completed.
This included the UK contribution, a company from 1st Battalion Kings
Own Royal Border Regiment, equipped with Warrior armoured infantry fighting
vehicles, some 380 UK personnel in all. Our contribution to the Extraction
Force was the first time UK forces had deployed to a multinational operation
at below battalion strength, and showed that this could be done successfully
under special circumstances.
8.6. While the NATO and OSCE verification missions continued their
work, and in parallel with the ongoing diplomatic negotiations at Rambouillet
and in Paris, preparations for a peacekeeping force continued. NATO
had completed its basic planning for such a force in the autumn of 1998,
although it was recognised that the plans could only be finalised once
the terms of any peace agreement or ceasefire were known. The UK judged
it essential that NATO forces should be ready in significant numbers
to move into Kosovo as soon as any agreement had been reached, and therefore
led the way in the advance deployment of forces into Macedonia.
8.7. The UK’s preparations for a peacekeeping force in Kosovo were
not part of an invasion force, but a sign of our determination to be
in a position to ensure the safety of all citizens of Kosovo as soon
as an agreement had been reached. On 11 February 1999, the UK announced
the deployment to the region of the first elements of the UK contribution
to a NATO peace implementation force, which became the Kosovo force
or KFOR. By 10 March 1999, some 4500 UK personnel had deployed, or were
preparing to deploy, to Greece and Macedonia. These included personnel
under Lieutenant General Sir Mike Jackson, from the Headquarters of
the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC) the headquarters
nominated to launch the peace implementation operation in Kosovo, and
for which the UK is the Framework Nation. By this stage, a number of
our Allies were deploying ground forces to the region, or had declared
their intention to do so.
8.8. Our hopes for an early peace agreement were dashed by Milosevic’s
intransigence, and NATO air operations became necessary. NATO forces
remained ready to deploy quickly into Kosovo in a potential peacekeeping
operation. These forces could have been incorporated into a force put
together to fight its way into Kosovo, but the force would have required
significant restructuring and reinforcement before this became possible.
8.9. However, as Milosevic’s campaign of repression and ethnic cleansing
intensified, our ground forces became the front line providers of urgently
needed humanitarian aid, working in support of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and the host governments. KFOR’s mission was
adjusted to make support to the humanitarian crisis its top priority,
while at the same time the force remained vigilant and prepared for
any attack from Kosovo or the rest of Serbia. NATO also established
a force in Albania (Albania Force or AFOR) to assist in the humanitarian
relief effort in that country, and a sizeable number of NATO personnel
deployed in Macedonia spent some time in Albania helping to construct
refugee camps and providing other support.
8.10. We wanted to keep all military options open in order to maintain
our flexibility of response and to keep Milosevic guessing as to our
intentions. Nevertheless, we recognised the importance of maintaining
Allied solidarity, and this consideration informed the conduct of the
campaign. We therefore preferred to pursue the air campaign as the best
means to achieve our objectives. While we did not rule out a ground
campaign definitively, the Prime Minister and others put the emphasis
at the beginning of the campaign on the fact that such an option would
be difficult, the forces required would take time to put together, and
that it was therefore not our intention or plan to pursue the option
at that stage.
8.11. Nevertheless, we were pleased that Javier Solana, the NATO Secretary
General, was able to make clear at the time of the NATO Summit in late
April that NATO was keeping planning for opposed ground options under
review. Nationally, we planned in detail for such an operation, and
kept in close contact with SACEUR and other Allies. We believed it was
essential for NATO to achieve its objectives before the onset of winter,
and thus planning assumed any ground campaign would need to begin in
the late summer. The size of any UK contribution to such a force (which
NATO estimated could have required some 150,000 - 175,000 personnel)
would have depended on what others were willing to provide, but we were
prepared to provide up to 54,000 personnel from the Army, including
some 12,000-14,000 from the Reserves.
8.12. Increasing discussion, including publicly, about an opposed entry
operation is likely to have had a significant effect on Milosevic. The
UK had made clear its readiness to conduct such an operation on a number
of occasions. President Clinton and Defense Secretary Cohen also made
clear at the beginning of June that the United States had not ruled
out options beyond bombing in order to bring about a resolution. In
future conflicts, and in the lead up to them, while we should always
be aware of the political realities (and we would have been wrong to
have put NATO cohesion at risk), we should try as hard as possible to
keep all options open, and to convince our partners that this is important.
8.13. Following the negotiation of the Military Technical Agreement
with the Yugoslav/Serbian security forces in early June, the deployment
of KFOR into Kosovo went according to plan, with the force deploying
as quickly as possible in order not to allow a vacuum to develop on
the ground. The force which entered Kosovo on 12 June included some
8,000 UK soldiers out of a total of about 20,000, and some 2,500 more
UK personnel joined them in the province within a few days. The spearhead
of the UK’s ground forces (5th Airborne Brigade), consisting of 1400
personnel, was inserted into Kosovo from the concentration area at Brazde,
along the Kacanik Defile, by 8 Chinook and 6 Puma helicopters of the
Support Helicopter Force in less than 3 hours. Our pre-deployment of
forces had helped us to be prepared to get in quickly at the outset
when it mattered, and we were pleased with our ability to rapidly deploy
additional forces who were quickly ready for action. Increasing the
readiness and deployability of ground forces was made a priority in
the Strategic Defence Review, and proved its worth here.
* The decisions made in the Strategic Defence Review were vindicated,
and enabled the UK to play a leading role in KFOR
* There is a need for the UK and its Allies and partners to improve
capabilities in the following areas:
* Readiness, deployability and sustainment
* Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
* Close combat/force protection capability
* Satellite and tactical communications
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Command arrangements
8.14. The UK delegated Operational Control of our land forces to Commander KFOR through General Clark (SACEUR), although national logistics elements remained under UK command. There were also exceptions for some elements of the UK force, including Satellite Communications and Electronic Warfare contingents, which remained under national Operational Command, although in some cases Tactical Control was released to COMKFOR. Once KFOR had deployed, Commander British Forces (COMBRITFOR) in Kosovo was delegated Operational Control of all UK land forces in theatre, including logistic elements but excluding the capabilities mentioned above.
The UK's contribution to the ground operations
8.15. The contribution made by UK armed forces to the NATO Extraction Force, KFOR and AFOR are detailed in Annex C.
The Reserves
8.16. The Reserves make a vital contribution to the Regular Army, as evidenced by the fact that some 800 are currently deployed on operations in the Balkans, including some 340 in Kosovo. Had we proceeded with an opposed entry operation, we would have needed some 12,000 to 14,000 regular reservists and members of the Territorial Army in theatre. (We would have needed to call out more to allow for the percentage of reservists likely to be unavailable for deployment.) Our experience in the Kosovo campaign has underlined the importance of the Reserve Forces, and supported our decisions to enhance their flexibility and responsiveness.
Medical support
8.17. Medical support for KFOR is provided by regular personnel with reservists filling posts on a voluntary basis. UK units deployed with their own integral primary medical care support plus a field hospital facility. This facility has a telemedicine link with the UK for specialist advice. Transport of casualties to the field hospital facility is supplemented by an aeromedical evacuation capability in theatre and back to the UK. We are currently exploring the possibility of developing a multinational hospital facility with allies in Kosovo, on the lines of that provided in Bosnia, in order to share the task of providing hospital care to KFOR forces.
8.18. Planning for medical support to an opposed entry operation assumed a large proportion of the required manpower would be made up from formed TA medical units, with the three regular field hospitals being reinforced by individual reservists and Territorial Army specialist personnel.
Equipment
8.19. There have been many stories in the media since the campaign alleging equipment shortcomings. Very few revealed lessons learned during the Kosovo campaign itself, and in many cases action was already in hand to address these problems. To deal with the main areas:
Sustainability
8.20. The key issues related to sustainability were overstretch (addressed in chapter 6), Strategic Lift (see also chapter 6), Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure, maintaining communications and the logistics chain. As noted above, there is a review underway of stockpile guidance, and this will take into account issues raised during the planning for an opposed ground entry operation.
Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure
8.21. Following lessons from Bosnia and elsewhere, plans had been put in hand to develop a robust Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure (ECI) capability to provide a good standard of accommodation and associated utilities for UK forces from all three Services deployed on operations. This plan provided for accommodation in three stages:
* On initial deployment, troops would use conventional tents which
can be erected quickly to provide protection from the elements;
* For deployments of between 60 days and 6 months, tents would be enhanced
by the addition of utilities such as showers and lavatories, heating
and lighting, to enhance living standards; and
* For deployments lasting over 6 months, a full ECI capability would
be deployed which would use the same utilities package as shorter deployments
but would replace tents with easy-to-erect hard walled accommodation.
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8.22. At the time of the Kosovo operation, these plans were still at the concept stage, but were quickly brought forward through the Urgent Operational Requirement process. Improved Tented Camps, based on the first two stages of the ECI concept, were deployed into theatre as quickly as we could manage it: within eight weeks of deployment into Kosovo (by mid-August), we had provided well-insulated, well-heated tents for 6,000 troops, which were very well received by our forces. Delivery of the utilities package started shortly thereafter. Improved Tented Camps served us well until the deployment of Temporary Field Accommodation, although clearly we would have wished this to have happened sooner.
8.23. The Temporary Field Accommodation project has suffered disappointing delays, partly because of the need to change camp specifications to reflect operational conditions actually encountered in Kosovo and partly because of difficulties encountered by the contractor. When completed, however, Temporary Field Accommodation provides stand alone accommodation of a high standard, capable of withstanding extremes of summer and winter weather. It provides each soldier with his own bunk, together with shower, lavatory, laundry, kitchen, dining, power generation, heating/cooling and water and effluent treatment facilities.
8.24 . We have learned from our experiences in the Kosovo operation and it is planned that the Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure requirement will progress into a programme that will support future operations. The Improved Tented Camp equipment procured for the Kosovo operation will, once returned from Kosovo, form the basis of a reserve for future operations.
Communications
(a) Satellite Communications
8.25. There was a large requirement for Military, deployable satellite communications equipment, particularly as the UK as HQ ARRC Framework Nation supplied the headquarters’ communications. This was successfully met, although difficulties were encountered supplying man-portable satellite equipment for use by senior HQ ARRC commanders. This was overcome through NATO assistance. We are looking at future provision in this area.
(b) Tactical ground communications
8.26. The Army deployed to the region with the CLANSMAN insecure radio system. We have long been aware of the reliability and operational security shortcomings of CLANSMAN, which has been in service since the 1970s. The BOWMAN tactical combat radio system is being procured to replace CLANSMAN, although this project has experienced some difficulties. BOWMAN has now been placed on a Smart Procurement footing to produce an affordable solution that will provide effective capability. Also as part of the Smart Procurement Initiative, we have separated from the BOWMAN project the requirement for a new short range personal role radio and we now plan to deliver these from the end of 2001.
8.27. In October 1999, we started to install a commercial protected communications system in Pristina, which overcame many of the reliability and security shortcomings of the CLANSMAN system. It was announced in February 2000 that a contract had been let to provide wide area communications in the UK sector in Kosovo, as well as in the UK sector in Bosnia, providing modern and reliable communications. As well as improving communications capabilities, this measure will enable some 150 communications personnel to return home. Taking into account pre-tour training and leave, 260 fewer communications personnel overall will need to be committed to UK operations in the Balkans, thus reducing overstretch in this heavily pressed sector.
Maintaining the logistics chain
8.28. The logistics chain to UK land forces in Macedonia and Kosovo ran through Thessaloniki in Greece. Despite some difficulties due to local ill feeling towards the air campaign among the Greek and Macedonian public, we received good co-operation from the Greek and Macedonian authorities. Equipment was moved to Macedonia and then Kosovo by road and rail, the Army’s rail squadron later coming into its own in helping to re-open the Kosovo rail network. This represented the first deployment of UK’s operational rail capability since 1947 and it contributed greatly to the successful deployment of forces. Another key Army capability which performed well were the Port and Maritime units which supervised the disembarkation of UK equipment in Greece and its onward movement. Civilian road haulage contractors were also engaged to move equipment and supplies during the campaign at a cost of about £4 million.
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8.29. The operation emphasised the continued importance of Marchwood Military Port and South Cerney Air Mounting Centre. Use of Marchwood enabled the pre-positioning of equipment and sustainment stocks in secure conditions prior to deployment, and enabled vessels and loads to be prepared in step with the political decision-making process. South Cerney was the staging centre for UK forces deploying as part of the OSCE verification mission and for part of KFOR, and provides accommodation and briefing facilities for forces ready to be deployed by air from nearby air bases at Lyneham or Brize Norton.
8.30. Improving the tracking of our assets has been a high priority for the MOD, in the light of critical but constructive comments in the past from the National Audit Office. We believe that we are now doing much better in this area, enabling efficient supply of required assets to theatre, and tracking assets deployed elsewhere so that they can be re-deployed if needed more urgently elsewhere. This is an issue of relevance to, and achievement in, all three Services.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
8.31. The need for an improved Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability has already been mentioned in the context of air operations, but there is a clear requirement also for ground operations. Using the same collection methods, commanders on the ground should be supplied with information and intelligence as quickly as possible, ideally using the latest digital technology, as used by the US. We are looking at options to deliver such a capability as part of both the land digitisation and joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance programmes.
8.32. We are also looking at much wider provision of night vision technology, for both general surveillance purposes and situational awareness and for weapon sights.
Close combat/force protection capability
8.33. The Kosovo campaign has highlighted the requirement for greater attention to force protection and close combat capability. Had we been required to mount an opposed entry operation, there would have been an emphasis on infantry operations, given the difficult terrain. This sort of operation would have been ideally suited to the light and mobile forces which form part of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces we are now developing following the Strategic Defence Review.
8.34. For future operations with similar requirements in mind, we have procured additional body armour and are looking at the requirement for additional mine protection for our vehicles.
8.35 . A number of known difficulties with the machine gun version of the SA-80, the Light Support Weapon, were reconfirmed during the Kosovo crisis. Although no major problems were reported with the SA-80 rifle itself during the crisis, we were already aware of problems with the weapon, particularly in extremes of climate. We already had action in hand to address this. In 1995 we commissioned trials to assess the reliability of the SA-80 weapon system. The trials identified a number of design problems that affected the both the rifle and the Light Support Weapon’s performance.
8.36. The SA-80 remains overall an effective and extremely accurate weapon which is simple to operate. However, the final trials report, which we received in December 1999, demonstrated that significant improvements in the reliability of the SA-80 can be achieved by making a number of modifications to the weapon. We therefore intend to modify the SA-80 and the Light Support Weapon, to make them amongst the best weapons in the world.
8.37 . We are also assessing whether the modified Light Support Weapon will meet the requirements of all users, for example whether a magazine-fed weapon like the Light Support Weapon can provide sufficient suppressive fire for infantry fire support groups.
8.38. A number of armed forces units are also being issued with the highly capable and accurate Long Range Rifle designed for precision fire support.
Personal Equipment
8.39. We recognise that it is essential that our personnel have confidence in the quality of their personal equipment. We have therefore been making a significant investment in recent years in this equipment (eg boots, combat dress, sleeping systems and load-carrying equipment), which is now of a far higher quality than ever before. This new equipment was used extensively by our forces in Kosovo, and is well liked by our forces.
Chapter 9: Maritime Operations - Conduct and Lessons