Kosovo: Lessons From The Crisis

Chapter 6: Key Defence Capability Issues and Joint Lessons

Joint Lessons

6.1. Experience of the Kosovo campaign, in all three major warfare environments (sea, land and air), underlined the extent to which our operations are joint, and this is borne out by the many lessons which have joint applications. This chapter draws together the key defence and joint capability lessons – lessons which have arisen in the particular context of one aspect of the operation are covered in the separate chapters which address each of these aspects in turn. The chapters which follow are not, however, accounts of operations involving single Services – they describe the conduct of the air, ground and maritime aspects of the campaign, and highlight quite clearly the joint nature of these efforts, forming part as they did of a joint campaign. Just as one example, the air operation involved assets from all three Services – aircraft and missiles from the Royal Navy, Army aerial surveillance assets and Royal Air Force aircraft.

The performance of our people

6.2. UK Service men and women, and civilians, from across the entire spectrum of defence activity, played an outstanding role in the Kosovo conflict, under the greatest of pressures, and are a credit to this country.

6.3. The unprecedented peacetime levels of operational commitment brought about by the Kosovo conflict, coupled with the fact that the changes to the force structure recommended by the Strategic Defence Review were not yet in place (see below), meant that overstretch for many individuals was excessive. It was only through the highest sense of duty from our Service personnel, and sacrifice from their families, that we were able to achieve our objectives. This deserves recognition and our thanks.

6.4. Since last summer, we have worked to reduce force levels where possible – both in the Balkans and elsewhere around the world – in order to reduce overstretch on individuals and units. For example, the proportion of the Army committed to operations (including those preparing for or recovering from operations) has fallen from 47% last summer to 27% – slightly under the level it was at in May 1997. In addition to reducing commitments, our focus has been on two key themes of our ‘Policy for People’:

6.5. We have adopted innovative and flexible approaches to reduce the burden on Service men and women – such as making more use of Reserves (see below), greater use of the Military Provost Guard Service to reduce the onerous guarding task for regular soldiers, and contractorisation of functions where possible – for example in the case of wide area communications in Bosnia and Kosovo (see paragraph 8.27 below). Other measures we have taken include:

• increasing the allowances for separated service (Longer Separated Service Allowance and Longer Service at Sea Bonus), so that those who suffer more than 280 paid days separation in a two year period will receive a £1000 bonus, and those who suffer more than 365 paid days will get £2000. We have also reduced the qualifying periods for these allowances and increased the daily rates at which they are paid; 
• in the Royal Navy, introducing a new 2-year short engagement for sailors to relieve some of the problems of gapping; 
• introducing a new minimum Army engagement of 4 years (rather than 3 as previously) to increase the return on service from soldiers; and 
• in the RAF, work continues to identify a RAF Crisis Manpower Requirement, which will enable a better match of planned resources to commitments. Further measures to ease the burden of overstretch have been introduced in the interim, including the introduction of a Separated Service Recording System and the reduction in levels of non-operational tasking.

6.6. Improvements to operational welfare, both for Service personnel and for their families have included:

• increasing the Welfare Telephone Allowance, twice, from 3 to 20 minutes per week; 
• trialling ‘Electronic Blueys’ to allow families to keep in touch via the internet and, to ensure that this facility is available as widely as possible, we have installed internet terminals at unit and family centres around the country; 
  introducing Post Operational Tour Leave. For the Army this equates to an extra 20 working days leave on return from an operational deployment lasting six months or more. The other Services get extra leave dependent on the time spent on operations and the conditions under which they have served; and 
• for families, introducing greater flexibility into the Concessionary Travel Scheme so that families based overseas can have more choice in how they return to the UK.

6.7. We are also looking ahead to the challenges of tomorrow. We have developed and implemented an Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy so that, for the first time, the Armed Forces collectively have a coherent and overarching strategy within which to develop their personnel policies. This overarching strategy will be underpinned by individual Naval, Army and RAF strategies, and supported by an Action Plan. The Strategy will also be supported by greater use of attitude surveys to seek the views of personnel and their families.

6.8. We recognise too, and are proud of the fact, that civilians throughout the Ministry of Defence worked very hard to help the UK and NATO achieve our objectives, from the headquarters in London, Brussels and in theatre, to all those working in support of military units across the country and in Germany. We have now put in place measures to provide rapid reinforcement of those areas most affected in a crisis, which should ensure that we have sufficient suitably qualified individuals available to sustain the support of operations over a long period if necessary.

The Strategic Defence Review

6.9. The Strategic Defence Review (SDR), the results of which were announced by Lord Robertson in July 1998, stated that we had a fundamental interest in the security and stability of Europe as a whole. In addition it highlighted our determination to be a force for good in the world. Nowhere has our determination to act in defence of these principles been better demonstrated than in the NATO-led Kosovo campaign in 1999.

6.10. The planning assumptions made in the SDR were tested and vindicated during the Kosovo crisis. The SDR planning assumptions are analytical tools used for planning long term force structures. They are not designed as templates for specific operations. As explained during the review, we may in particular circumstances decide to do less than assumptions provide for, or we may be able to do more. We concluded in the SDR that future operations will almost always be conducted in coalition with our partners and Allies. Operations in the Balkans have borne this out. From the value of close inter-Service co-operation to the importance of precision weapons and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities, the SDR conclusions have proved their worth. Our programme to adjust the structure, equipment and capabilities of the forces has been validated. The importance of taking forward the Review cannot be over-stated. It is essential to building armed forces that are capable of serving the UK’s interests for the next fifteen to twenty years. It is also essential for the maintenance of a flexible, deployable and substantial UK contribution in the Balkans.

6.11. While the SDR planning assumptions provide guidance on scales of effort, concurrency and endurance, the agreed SDR force structure is not yet in place nor has full manning been achieved. Consequently, operations in Kosovo last summer led to overstretch which would not have occurred had the SDR been fully implemented. This is regrettable and placed additional strain on our forces. But enhancements and restructuring being conducted under the SDR were so radical that it was always going to take time to implement, and it speaks highly of our armed forces that they rose to the challenge so well. The changes that we are introducing should help to avoid similar problems arising in the future.

6.12. While the costs of the Kosovo deployment have had no impact on the affordability of programmes set out in the SDR, the pace and scale of military operations in the past two years, including Kosovo-related operations, have led to delays in the full implementation of the SDR. Units have been operationally engaged and therefore unable to take forward restructuring. Some force elements, particularly those in the Army’s formation readiness cycle, whose training has been disrupted by the deployment to Kosovo, will not be at full readiness levels as soon as planned. These delays as a result of events beyond our control are disappointing, but the MOD remains committed to full implementation of the SDR, and the process is being taken forward as quickly as possible.

6.13. The MOD’s new strategic planning process, which was introduced following the SDR, ensures that there is a policy-led re-evaluation of defence plans every year. Our experience validated the key assumptions we made in the SDR, which will deliver force structures that are well matched to the sort of operation we faced in Kosovo. But that does not mean we can afford to rest on our laurels. Instead, we have ensured that the lessons we have learned from the operation are fed into the strategic planning process, with our detailed planning assumptions being updated as necessary. This will ensure that our forces continue to evolve and are prepared for the challenges which they are likely to face in the future.

The UK Defence Crisis Management Organisation

6.14. We were pleased with the performance of the UK Defence Crisis Management Organisation during the air campaign. Experience gained in Operation DESERT FOX, the operation against Iraq in 1998, proved invaluable in preparation for the Kosovo operation. The management of the UK aspects of the air campaign was focused on MOD and the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) at Northwood, which together form the Defence Crisis Management Organisation, with Headquarters RAF Strike Command at High Wycombe playing the major supporting role. PJHQ was also the initial point of contact for the commanders in theatre – the NATO operational focus for the air operation was at the Combined Air Operations Centre in Vicenza, Italy, and PJHQ stayed in constant contact with the UK representative there.

6.15. The military effort co-ordinated by PJHQ was truly joint between the three Services. The Army (principally through Headquarters Land Command at Wilton, near Salisbury) assisted in planning for a ground operation to follow the air campaign. We hoped this would be a peacekeeping force, but realised we also needed to prepare to fight our way into Kosovo if Milosevic had continued to reject our demands. The significant role played in the operation by HMS SPLENDID, our first submarine to be equipped with Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM), as well as that played by other naval assets, meant the full involvement of Fleet Headquarters at Northwood. Other headquarters in all three Services were also involved, along with various MOD agencies. Twice daily video conferences at MOD regularly involved PJHQ, Fleet Headquarters, Land and Strike Commands, the Defence Transport and Movement Agency in Andover and the UK Delegation/Military Representative to NATO in Brussels. By this means, and intensive staff contact at all levels, those most closely involved were kept in regular touch with the latest thinking in Whitehall and the MOD headquarters.

6.16. The division of responsibilities within the Defence Crisis Management Organisation is dependent on the particular operation at hand. In the Kosovo operation, there was a very high level of political interest and involvement in both the air and ground operations, and the emphasis was therefore on the MOD to develop national strategy and options, and explain them in detail to Ministers, although PJHQ was heavily involved throughout. In other operations involving UK forces, for example East Timor, PJHQ has played a more prominent role. A key part was played in this process by the Chiefs of Staff who met regularly (usually daily, and often several times a day) to ensure that considered and expert military advice was always available as the crisis developed, assisting the Chief of Defence Staff in his role as primary military adviser to Ministers.

6.17. There was also a considerable co-ordination effort required across UK Government before, during and after the air campaign. Looking specifically at the period of the air campaign, the MOD was the focus for the management of the military aspects. The morning meeting chaired by the Defence Secretary in the Defence Crisis Management Centre located within the MOD in London was attended by representatives of all Government Departments involved in the management of the crisis.

Wider Government Activity

6.18. The Kosovo crisis was a period of intensive activity across UK Government. The overall effort was co-ordinated by regular meetings of the Ministers involved, with the Prime Minister closely involved at all times. Different Government departments took the lead in various areas, but again involved closely all those with an interest in their work. The Foreign Secretary and his officials continued close consultation with Allies and partners, including Russia, in an attempt to find a diplomatic solution, and also prepared in detail with other Government departments for the implementation of any agreement. The Department for International Development led the UK’s response to the humanitarian crisis. It worked closely with the MOD and PJHQ, UK forces in Macedonia and Albania, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Non-Governmental Organisations to provide an emergency response to the tide of humanity forced to flee Kosovo by Milosevic’s persecution. The Cabinet Office played a significant co-ordinating role. The Treasury, Home Office, Department of Health and other Departments were kept closely involved, as appropriate.

6.19. Ministers were concerned to ensure Parliament and public opinion was as fully informed as possible. During the course of the air campaign, there were 13 statements and 6 debates in Parliament, in addition to the daily Press Conferences involving Ministers from MOD and other Departments, as well as senior military officers.

6.20. Government departments worked together closely and effectively, despite the lack of interoperable secure Information Technology (IT) systems. Greater connectivity between IT systems is being investigated, but in the meantime steps are being taken to ensure that MOD secure IT systems are available to users in other Departments. This will speed up the distribution of important material and allow greater information sharing. It will be of considerable benefit in a crisis, but also in day-to-day work. The insufficient number of secure telephone communications systems across Government, and the smaller number which are also interoperable with all Allies, caused some problems, and action is being considered.

The importance of media in military operations

6.21. As a department of State in a mature democracy, we had a responsibility to inform the public about developments in the conflict. Milosevic could not defeat us militarily. But loss of public support had the potential to fracture NATO solidarity and lead to an outcome short of our objectives. Satisfying the media appetite for timely news stories was a major challenge in an age of instant, 24 hour media operations, and in particular given the multinational nature of the operation.

6.22. Information was also important in our campaign against Milosevic. In many ways getting our messages across in the broadcast and written media was as crucial as the military campaign. It was vital to keep public opinion properly informed. Even where the issues were straightforward and as morally clear as they were in Kosovo, at times we had to work hard to prevent a muddying of the waters. We needed to cut through Milosevic’s propaganda and control of broadcast outlets in Kosovo and Serbia to let people know the truth, and to let an informed public decide what was right. We had to get our messages over (and keep on getting them over) to three audiences:

• the public in the UK and Allied countries; 
• Kosovo Albanians and others in the region; 
• Milosevic and his supporters.

6.23. All this had to be co-ordinated with similar responses in Brussels and in NATO capitals. Our focus was on setting up efficient and streamlined systems aimed at ensuring the flow of accurate, timely and truthful information to the media. This included:

6.24. We worked very hard to make sure that the information we provided was timely and accurate. This posed a huge challenge over a long period, but we believe we succeeded. The information we gave was always the best available at the time, and although mistakes were sometimes made, we did not at any stage deliberately distort any information we provided to the media.

6.25. Our decision to have a press conference almost every day of the campaign, involving the other main government departments engaged in the crisis, was vindicated. The effort which we put into these events was matched at NATO and by several of our Allies, and together these press conferences played a key role in making information available every day to a very wide audience, including refugees and Milosevic and his regime. We believe this played an important role in maintaining and demonstrating UK and NATO resolve.

6.26. Use of the internet was successful. The special web site on Kosovo operated jointly by the MOD and the Foreign Office received nearly 7 million hits during the crisis, more than double the usual rate. Many of our readers were from overseas, including within Serbia. In future we plan to make even better use of the internet to get information rapidly to the public.

6.27. In a future operation, we would want to improve our capability to pick up what is being said by the media, particularly coverage of information coming from an adversary, so that we can respond to misleading or wrong stories more quickly. We have set up systems and procedures to do this.

6.28. In-theatre media operations worked satisfactorily. But the "pool" arrangements which we operated for journalists whereby a limited number agree to share material in return for privileged access fast became redundant after forces had entered Kosovo. It was clear that the resourcing of in-theatre media operations, and the training of media operations staff needed to be addressed in the light of Kosovo experience, and this is being pursued.

6.29. However, the single biggest lesson in this area is that the requirement to provide rapid and accurate information will continue to grow, and we need to be ready for this. We have put in place procedures for reinforcement in a crisis, are improving training for staff who deal or who may in the future deal with the media, and are working to heighten awareness of working with the media in general across the MOD.

Intelligence

6.30. Intelligence played an important role in the lead up to and during the crisis in two particular fields:

• informing decision-makers (and the public) of key developments; 
• targeting – the selection and clearance of targets.

6.31. The Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) provided all source intelligence assessments, specialist intelligence collection assets, targeting, imagery and geographic support services before, during and after the Kosovo air campaign. The DIS provided intelligence analysis to the MOD at the strategic level, and contributed to the formation of an overall UK intelligence picture through the Joint Intelligence Committee process, to which the other intelligence agencies also made a significant contribution. Further important intelligence activities included monitoring of the UN arms embargo, the production and distribution of mapping, utilising imagery resources to track refugees and detect mass graves, and the provision of information on atrocities to ICTY.

6.32. The Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) at Northwood had the key national responsibility for operational intelligence, including targeting, but relied heavily on the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) for analytical and imagery support.

6.33. A comprehensive lessons review was undertaken across the intelligence community. Many positive lessons were learnt but improving secure Information and Communications Technology (ICT) at both the strategic (eg within the UK and with coalition partners) and operational (theatre) levels to enable the passage of intelligence and targeting information across and between these levels, is a major concern. Further concerns include the increased demand for imagery arrangements to support information operations and the timely public release of material to the media:

• on the first, we are working to ensure maximum possible transparency with our Allies to ensure personnel working together in a military operation have the same access to intelligence of importance and relevance to the operation; 
• on the second, commanders in theatre are already supplied with good intelligence from the UK, but we are also looking at how best to provide real-time information to the commanders and forces on the ground about the disposition of their opponents, including intelligence material obtained by Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets; and 
• on the last, there was great pressure to release intelligence, particularly imagery, to inform public opinion, but maintenance of operational security also remained important. We are now looking to streamline procedures for the sanitisation, declassification and release of intelligence into the public domain.

6.34. For more details of operational aspects of intelligence, including Battle Damage Assessment, see chapters 8 and 9.

Planning for future military operations

6.35. Planning for future military operations, to be useful and relevant, needs to take into account diplomatic, legal and political factors. Planning should cover as many military options as necessary, but, in practice, priority will usually be given to one or more of these. This was the case with the air campaign option in the Kosovo crisis. In the course of the Kosovo crisis, NATO considered a wide range of options. The priority given to making a success of the air campaign meant that some others were not pursued in detail. But all options remained on the table, as the NATO Secretary General made clear during the campaign. And the bottom line is that maintaining NATO unity made possible the achievement in full of our shared objectives.

6.36. Within this context, planning for a range of options will help maintain our flexibility of action and the highest possible level of uncertainty in the minds of our adversaries. It will also be important in future operations, as was the case in the Kosovo air campaign, that when a clear commitment is made to use force, this is sustained for as long as necessary to achieve the agreed objectives. If potential opponents are convinced of our purpose and determination, they are less likely to push us to the use of force.

Accuracy and the minimisation of collateral damage

6.37. The legal requirement to minimise collateral damage is addressed in more detail in chapter 7, putting this issue into the context in which it was primarily considered during the Kosovo operation. However, it is an issue of importance to joint operations, and operations by all three Services individually, and must be taken fully into account in future planning.

Preparedness for high intensity operations

6.38. Our preparations for a possible opposed ground entry operation reinforced our conviction that it is essential for UK armed forces in all three Services to be trained and equipped for the full spectrum of possible tasks, including the challenges of war fighting (high intensity operations). While our forces need to be trained in the special skills required for peacekeeping and other lower intensity operations, this must not be at the expense of their readiness for more demanding joint, all arms warfighting operations. A serviceman trained and equipped for war may do an effective job on a peacekeeping operation, and can acquire additional special skills for this purpose, but one just trained for peacekeeping is not ready for high intensity operations.

The Reserve Forces

6.39. The UK relies heavily on the contribution made by the Reserves to our Armed Forces and they are integral to our ability to expand our forces in times of crisis. Contingency planning for compulsory mobilisation for Kosovo focused attention on a broad range of Reserves issues - strategic, legislative and procedural. In some areas, mobilisation planning had not been adequately updated since the end of the Cold War, nor did it facilitate the more ready use of Reserves, a principle of the recent SDR and underwritten by new legislation (the Reserve Forces Act 1996). These weaknesses could have affected the Department’s ability to utilise the UK’s Reserve Forces effectively, and anomalies in procedures could have caused presentational difficulties. Several strategic issues concerning the capability of the Reserves identified in the planning process are being addressed by a group within the MOD (the Mobilisation Steering Group), and will be the subject of decisions by Ministers.

Use of asymmetric tactics by our adversaries

6.40. The likelihood of increased use of non-conventional military tactics (otherwise known as asymmetric tactics) by our future adversaries is covered in more detail in the context of NATO air operations in chapter 7. We need to be alive to this in future joint operations, and prepare as fully as possible to deal with it.

Information Operations

6.41. Information operations comprise actions taken to influence decision makers, in support of political or military objectives, by affecting their information, communications and information systems, and command and control systems. Information operations is more an integrating strategy than a new capability, drawing together existing military capabilities, including command and control warfare, with emerging technologies. The concept of information operations is still in the early stages of development, and our ability to influence key decision-makers through carefully targeted information operations is still relatively limited. The full potential of information operations was therefore not realised during the campaign. As a result of the lessons learned from the Kosovo operation, MOD has now developed a framework information operations policy, which will be further defined in the coming months, and has put in place new management structures for information operations which will oversee the development of new capabilities. This will require the commitment of additional resources. Joint doctrine is also being developed by the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre.

Information Superiority

6.42. An improved Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability is of great importance to all three Services. In the Kosovo operation, this came particularly to the fore in the air operation (and is addressed in more detail in chapter 7), but as we look to a joint all-weather precision attack capability and to better inform commanders at all levels, an improved capability would be of benefit across the board. In recognition of the importance of joint applications, and solutions, one of the four 2 Star Capability Managers in the newly-established Central Customer organisation has been given responsibility for Information Superiority. The Central Customer organisation has been specifically designed to construct the forward equipment programme by reference to capability needs rather than ultimate user Service; this should ensure that cross-cutting capabilities such as those associated with Information Superiority receive appropriate resource priority.

Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) Systems

6.43. The Capability Manager (Information Superiority) also has lead responsibility in the area of Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) systems. More details on a number of issues which arose in this area are given in chapters 7 and 8, relating to the effect which they had on air and ground operations. This is an area of crucial importance to future capability, not least given the progress in this field being made by the US in particular. Digitisation is a key challenge which we must meet. We are now making considerable use of e-mail and Video Conferencing facilities, making possible greater (and instant) contacts between individuals and headquarters, and an enormous amount of information is readily available at our fingertips. This is a great asset, but information management and the supporting communications are also key challenges. We need to ensure that the latest technology in this field is available to all those who require it, including the commanders on the ground.

Urgent Operational Requirements

6.44. There were a number of occasions during the campaign when new types or additional supplies of equipment were required. Our procedures provide for the rapid procurement of equipment during operations, through the Urgent Operational Requirement (or UOR) process. The UOR process assists us in using defence resources to best effect, without tying them up unnecessarily in stockpiling all the assets that could conceivably be needed for every kind of military contingency. Getting the balance right requires careful judgement by planners. Expenditure on UORs for Kosovo during financial year 1999/2000 has been some £136 million, with the largest item being the approximately £50 million spent on the linked Improved Tented Camps (ITC) and Temporary Field Accommodation (TFA) projects, providing accommodation for our forces in Kosovo. The equipment bought in this way was specifically required for the operation undertaken. Had the operation been different – for example an opposed ground entry – equipment of other types is likely to have been required and procured.

Logistics

6.45. The new Defence Logistics Organisation was established on 1 April 2000, and comes into a solid inheritance. Certain logistics aspects are dealt with in more detail in chapters 7, 8 and 9, but overall the key issues are the ability to deploy effectively using strategic sealift and airlift, and to sustain our forces in theatre, including Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure and stockpiles of ammunition and other supplies.

Strategic Lift

6.46. During the Kosovo operation, we made considerable use of commercial strategic lift assets, and our current vulnerability and requirement for a strengthened national defence capability in this area was confirmed. On this occasion, the fact that we deployed our land forces in significant numbers earlier than our Allies helped to avoid the worst of the difficulties that result from competition for commercial assets. But we cannot guarantee that we will have this time and flexibility of action next time. Specifically, had we needed to deploy sufficient resources for an opposed entry operation, we would have been likely to require significant strategic sealift and outsize strategic airlift assets. The United States may well have needed all its own assets for its own purposes, and commercial assets of this nature, particularly in airlift which are few in number and not always available, would have been in high demand. In certain cases such assets were registered in countries whose governments were unsympathetic to the NATO campaign, and this caused difficulties. As part of our planning for a possible opposed entry option, a movements plan was produced with details of how we could assemble the significant lift capabilities which would have been required. Given the fact that the UK was planning for such a contingency before others, we assessed this plan to be workable. However, in operations in future where we do not have similar time to prepare, a national strategic sealift and outsize strategic airlift capability will be essential.

6.47. The flexibility of our maritime strategic lift assets in moving significant quantities of heavy equipment, principally by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, including the two Roll-on Roll-off (RO-RO) vessels which they operate on long term charter, confirmed the utility of such a capability. Use was also made of commercial sealift assets to transport assets to the region and to carry out other required tasks so as to release our own vessels for Kosovo-related tasks. The ratio of RO-ROs on ad hoc charter to MOD vessels was two to one.

6.48. Some use was made of airlift in order to deploy resources and personnel into theatre, but because we prepared and deployed well in advance, most heavy equipment was able to deploy by sea. The use of commercial airlift assets was constrained because it was unable to operate to all destinations, due to the risks involved and the difficulties in using aircraft from some countries opposed to the NATO operation. The cost of the air and sea strategic lift for the operation (which includes hire of assets to ‘backfill’ routine tasks elsewhere) was some £16 million.

6.49. The experience of the Kosovo operation has therefore vindicated the conclusions on strategic sealift and airlift in the SDR, designed to maintain our flexibility and speed of response in future operations, in particular for those involving Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF). Work is currently underway on the acquisition of 6 RO-ROs under the Private Finance Initiative. On 16 May 2000, the Government announced that the UK’s future strategic airlift requirement would be met in the short to medium term by leasing four C17 Globemaster aircraft from the Boeing company, and in the longer term, from the latter part of this decade onwards, that our needs would be best met by the A400M aircraft from the Airbus Military Company. At this point, our commitment to A400M is conditional in that it is based on assumptions that are dependent both on our potential partners and on Airbus - on their commitments to sufficient numbers of aircraft at launch and the establishment of a viable programme. The UK will order 25 aircraft in the A400M initial launch.

Financial management and costs

6.50. The additional expenditure incurred by MOD due to operations in Kosovo is currently estimated to be £342 million for the financial year from 1 April 1999 to 31 March 2000, and together with expenditure in 1998-99 of almost £14 million, this provides a total of £356 million. This includes provision for the replenishment of some of the ammunition expended during the air campaign, but decisions have not yet been taken on the replenishment of the majority of ordnance used as future stockpile requirements are assessed.

6.51. The MOD attaches great importance to the financial control of its activities, including operations, and has made significant improvements in this area over recent years, responding positively to constructive criticism from the National Audit Office and others. Civil secretariat staff were deployed with UK forces to theatre, and entered Kosovo with KFOR on day one of the operation.

6.52. The Defence budget does not contain provision for major overseas operations. The MOD has accepted the costs of certain overseas operations where this can be achieved without detriment to other commitments; where it cannot, the Defence Secretary will submit a claim on the Reserve. It has been agreed by the Treasury that the net additional costs of major operations, such as Kosovo and Bosnia, should be a legitimate charge to the Reserve.