Chapter 5: International Co-operation

General

5.1. The fact that we were successful in achieving our objectives represented the co-ordination of effort in a number of fields – political, diplomatic and economic as well as military. In all future crises, we are likely to have similar tools at our disposal, and should use them all to their maximum potential. As was the case in Kosovo, military force should always be the option of last resort.

5.2. Kosovo demonstrated the importance of being able to back up words with action, so that the threat to a potential opponent is credible. It also demonstrated the value of international cohesion. As in Spring 1999, we must in future be prepared to use force for as long as required to achieve our objectives. In the case of Kosovo, the establishment and maintenance of Alliance solidarity was a crucial consideration in planning and executing the NATO campaign.

Bilateral and multilateral co-operation

5.3. The UK kept in regular contact with its Allies and partners both bilaterally and in multilateral fora. The role of each of the international organisations most involved is detailed below. In addition, a key means of co-ordinating policy during the campaign were the significant number of telephone calls between the Prime Minister and his counterparts. The Foreign Secretary also spoke regularly to his opposite number in other Allied and partner countries, as did the Defence Secretary, the International Development Secretary and the Chief of Defence Staff, and officials in all these departments.

5.4. It was particularly important to keep in contact with the countries of the region (see below), and the Prime Minister and other Ministers made several visits to the region, including Albania and Macedonia – those countries most affected by the refugee crisis - to offer solidarity and practical assistance.

NATO

5.5. Our involvement with Kosovo over the last few years has proved the value of the Alliance to the UK and the security of Europe. NATO played a fundamental role in underpinning the diplomatic attempts to find a resolution in the period leading up to the air campaign, in leading the air campaign and other military operations in support, including a major humanitarian effort, and in leading KFOR since the end of the conflict. NATO will remain the organisation of choice for operations of a similar scale and complexity in the future, and certainly for operations where Europeans and the US wish to act together. NATO remains the cornerstone of our security and defence policy.

5.6. Achieving agreement between nineteen Allies is a significant signal of collective determination. Taking decisions by consensus demonstrates solidarity, and helps to achieve and maintain firmness of purpose. These were key strengths of the Alliance during the Kosovo campaign.

5.7. The North Atlantic Council set the political parameters and objectives for the campaign, provided guidance for the NATO Military Authorities and oversaw their activities, assisted by the Military Committee. Neither the Council nor the Military Committee became involved in the micro-management of the campaign, which was left to the military commanders, operating within the framework established by the Council. The Council and the Military Committee also provided invaluable fora for Allies to be briefed by the military authorities on the progress of the operation and to share information.

5.8. NATO co-operated closely with its partners in the region through the well evolved mechanisms for consultation which are part of Partnership for Peace. This and other aspects of co-operation with governments in the region are addressed in paragraph 5.27 below.

5.9. NATO’s integrated military structure proved its worth in the Kosovo operation. Through it, those Allies who participate have been accustomed for many years to working together. NATO had also learned from its experiences in Bosnia, in the bombing campaign in 1995 and in the peacekeeping operation which followed the Dayton Peace Agreement later the same year. Kosovo was a far sterner test than either of these operations, but the basic building blocks of common working practices and technical interoperability in many fields made the task very much easier.

5.10. Lessons have been learned at NATO, and planning procedures and the functioning of the headquarters in Brussels are being updated as a result. NATO and the UK have learned practical lessons on the ways in which NATO planning is conducted and strategic direction is issued through the command chain. The planning procedures for NATO non-article 5 (ie non-collective defence) operations are being considerably streamlined, which should result in speedier operational planning and comprehensive and effective contingency planning in peacetime. Changes in NATO headquarters procedures include the recognition of the need for reinforcement of the media operations section during a crisis, to help meet the demand for rapid information flow. These changes will be tested through exercises.

5.11. The main focus of lessons activity at NATO is now on ensuring that all (but particularly the European) Allies modernise their capabilities to ensure that we are better prepared for future operations. The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which was agreed at the NATO Summit in April 1999, but which originated before the Kosovo campaign, provides a framework for this. It covers many of the areas in which we have learned lessons from the air operation and KFOR, and action on these lessons will therefore be incorporated into work implementing the DCI. The DCI focuses on five key areas of capability that are crucial for the successful conduct of future operations:

* deployability and mobility
* sustainability and logistics
* effective engagement [ie effective weapons and equipment]
* survivability of forces and infrastructure
* NATO Consultation, Command and Control
5.12. Achieving real improvements in capability is, ultimately, a matter for nations, who must be prepared to rethink forward defence programmes and allocate, or reallocate, resources as necessary. Many of the capability enhancements identified in the DCI will not come cheaply, and NATO Allies must be ready to seek solutions to critical shortfalls in strategic lift, precision guided munitions and other areas, either on a national or a multinational basis.

5.13. The implementation of the DCI has already resulted in progress. Important achievements so far include the good start in implementing NATO’s Multinational Joint Logistics Centre concept, which will improve the co-ordination of multinational logistics support to NATO forces, and the development of mechanisms for the exchange of lessons learned from operations involving multinational formations (such as the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force Land (AMF(L)), whose headquarters were used so successfully in Kosovo and Albania). Important work is in hand in other areas, including efforts to increase strategic lift capability and the security of NATO’s Communication and Information Systems (CIS). The UK looks forward to further useful progress through this Initiative.

European Security

5.14. The European Union (EU) played a substantial role in the diplomatic efforts to find a solution from the very outset, and played a key role in applying political and economic pressure on Yugoslavia during the conflict, applying sanctions on Milosevic’s regime, many of which still remain. President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland was the EU’s envoy, and played the key diplomatic role, alongside Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin, in obtaining Milosevic’s agreement to the international community’s demands.

5.15. The Kosovo conflict reaffirmed, however, the reliance of European Allies on the ability of the United States to provide military capability quickly and effectively in large scale operations such as the Kosovo conflict. Areas in which European key capability shortfalls were obvious were:

* precision all-weather strike;
* strategic lift;
* Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance;
* Suppression of Enemy Air Defence/Electronic Warfare;
* Air to Air Refuelling.

5.16. Europe needs to do much better in future. These shortfalls are being addressed through NATO’s DCI and the European Defence Initiative, particularly the Headline Goal agreed at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999. These two initiatives are mutually reinforcing.

5.17. As things stand now, we could not have conducted the air campaign at the same intensity and in the same format without the US. But we have never claimed that Europe should want to or be able to do everything alone. We will continue to have common interests that mean common action. We are also looking to strengthen the ability of the EU to take decisions and to act in response to crises, if necessary militarily, where NATO as a whole is not engaged. We and our European Allies and partners need to be able to pull our weight by investing in the capabilities we all need collectively to conduct demanding operations, both to act effectively in future Alliance operations, or in EU-led or other coalition operations. Those involved on both sides of the Atlantic must also minimise the risk of a technology gap opening up between Europeans and the US, which has been investing heavily in capabilities at the cutting edge of technology, for example in the extensive transmission of data by digital means. We need to work together through the Defence Capabilities Initiative and European Defence Initiative.

5.18. Notwithstanding these problems, there were many positive aspects to the European contribution. European air forces played a significant role in the air campaign, and were able in particular to provide a number of the scarce force multipliers such as Air to Air Refuelling aircraft and intelligence gathering assets – both areas where the UK was able to play a major role.

5.19. The ground force in Kosovo has been predominantly European from the outset. The NATO-led Extraction Force in Macedonia, the first NATO Kosovo-related ground presence in the region, was almost wholly European and was the first ever NATO force to be led by a French officer. KFOR was initially commanded by a UK officer, Lieutenant General Sir Mike Jackson, and the force which entered Kosovo was overwhelming European, with the UK providing about forty percent of the total force at the outset. We were able to deploy UK forces, including the headquarters of the ARRC (for which we are the Framework Nation), quickly to theatre to meet the need for urgent reinforcement at this vital time. Since then, the number of contributors to KFOR has grown (by May 2000) to 39, including 20 non-NATO countries, but European Allies continue to provide the majority of the force. Lieutenant General Jackson was succeeded by a German officer, General Reinhardt, who was in turn succeeded on 18 April by a Spanish officer, Lieutenant General Ortuno. The latter’s headquarters is formed around a nucleus provided by the five-nation EUROCORPS formation.

The United Nations

5.20. Throughout the Kosovo crisis, the UK sought to place the United Nations at the heart of the international community’s response, from the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1160, which imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia early in the crisis, to the agreement on UN Security Council Resolution 1244, confirming the end of the conflict and the establishment of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO force, KFOR.

5.21. We would have welcomed the express authorisation of the UN Security Council through a resolution before the NATO air campaign. This would have represented the strongest possible expression of international support. But discussions at the United Nations in New York had shown that such a resolution could not be achieved. Nevertheless, the UK and our NATO Allies, and many others in the international community, were clear that as a last resort, all other means of resolving the crisis having failed, armed intervention was justifiable in international law as an exceptional measure to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo.

5.22. Despite the lesson from our experience in Bosnia that the international community should be ready sooner to get the civil implementation presence up and running as quickly as possible, progress here was much slower than we would have wished. A complex negotiation between international institutions was required to secure agreement to the structure of UNMIK. The international community needs to be better able in future to establish quickly a civil implementation presence, and this will be one of the issues we will take forward in our dialogue with the UN and UN agencies (see below).

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

5.23. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) played an important role in running the Kosovo Verification Mission. The verifiers provided the international community with eyes and ears on the ground in the tense period between October 1998 and March 1999, creating a vital breathing space during the winter to enable those driven from their homes to find shelter. The OSCE had had no experience of an operation on this scale, but learned quickly, and did a good job. It is now making a valuable contribution to the civil administration and reconstruction of Kosovo, through UNMIK, alongside the EU, the UN and others.

Arms Control

5.24. During the air operation, Russia exercised its rights under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty to inspect Allied forces in Italy and, under the Vienna Document 94, to inspect them in Albania and Macedonia. NATO exhibited the maximum degree of openness consistent with operational security and in keeping with the terms of the two Agreements, both during the inspections and subsequently during a Vienna Document 94 Observation event, held in Macedonia in July. It co-operated closely with the Albanian and Macedonian authorities who had prime responsibility for implementing the Vienna Document 94 on their territory.

5.25. Measures are now being considered in NATO to refine Alliance arms control procedures for collective military operations.

Regional cooperation and links with host governments

5.26. There was good co-operation with host governments in the region throughout the lead up to and during the air campaign. Allies in the region gave considerable support to the forces stationed on their territory. Italy played a crucial role, with numerous NATO aircraft based there, but UK aircraft also operated from France and Germany, and travelled through the airspace of other Allies and partners during their missions. Ground forces regularly travelled through Greece to Macedonia as the build-up of KFOR continued. We received excellent co-operation from the Governments of all these countries.

5.27. The solidarity of our Partnership for Peace partners in the region, and the practical support they offered to the air campaign and to the build up of ground forces, was vital to the achievement of our objectives. NATO could not have conducted the campaign without the support of the neighbouring countries in allowing basing of NATO aircraft, giving overflight rights and in providing Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) facilities for our land forces as they deployed.

5.28. The role played by Albania and Macedonia in particular was outstanding. They gave extensive help to the refugees, supported our ground forces and gave their political support to our objectives.

5.29. Allies, and the international community as a whole, recognised the importance of this contribution by our partners in the region. We had been in regular contact with them throughout the build up to the crisis. This continued during the conflict, and is ongoing today. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the political umbrella for NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), provided a key forum for dialogue with partners during this period, including at the NATO Summit. The Stability Pact launched under the German Presidency of the EU is designed to deepen co-operation with our partners in the region. In all future operations, we should recall the benefits of close co-operation which were emphasised in Kosovo, and maintain maximum transparency, and access for our partners’ leaders to our own.

Cooperation with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), other agencies and non-governmental organisations

5.30. The UNHCR was responsible for co-ordinating the international response to the humanitarian crisis in the region, and good working links were established by both NATO and the UK with the UNHCR at headquarters level. The UNHCR was initially overwhelmed by the sheer scale of the crisis, but we and our other Allies and partners did what we could to assist, and did so in close co-operation with the UNHCR. The UK seconded military planners to UNHCR to help in their efforts. Contacts with Non-Governmental Organisations were conducted in part through UNHCR and partly bilaterally, in the UK and in theatre, with the Department for International Development (DFID) in the lead.

5.31. Our experience during the conflict suggests that more can be done to strengthen links between the military and humanitarian organisations. Specifically, a relationship should be fostered with the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which is generally the lead UN body responsible for co-ordinating the international response to humanitarian crises. Greater understanding of the capabilities, limitations and cultures of the major humanitarian agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations should be encouraged through exchange of information and sharing of expertise. A joint MOD/DFID symposium was held in October 1999 to consider how best to achieve this understanding and take forward co-operation between MOD, DFID, other Government departments and other organisations on humanitarian operations. It was attended by representatives of over 20 international agencies, Non-Governmental Organisations and academic institutions. The need for co-operation at an early stage of planning was agreed, and mutual training opportunities were discussed. The UK is also participating in studies under the auspices of the UN Secretary General into future arrangements for Peace Support Operations.

5.32. DFID and MOD are currently examining ways of improving their co-operation at both the planning and operational stage to further enhance awareness of the humanitarian consequences of military operations and co-ordination of response capabilities. We are always open to dialogue with organisations involved in this field.