Kosovo: Lessons From The Crisis

Chapter 2: Background to the conflict

2.1. Kosovo holds a special place in both Albanian and Serbian history, culture and thinking. It is seen by many Serbians as the cradle of their nation and contains the site of the battle of Kosovo Polje (the "Field of the Blackbirds") where in 1389 a largely Serbian army was defeated by the Ottoman Turks. From the adoption of the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, put in place by Tito, until 1989, Kosovo had enjoyed a high degree of autonomy within Serbia, part of Yugoslavia, including direct representation in institutions at the Yugoslav (federal) level. Kosovo had long had a mixed population, but Serbians were in the minority and felt increasingly vulnerable in a province where local government and services were dominated by the Kosovo Albanian majority. This frustration was exploited by Slobodan Milosevic who swept to power in Serbia in 1989 on a nationalist agenda, which included re-asserting Serbian control of Kosovo.

2.2. From 1989 onwards, Milosevic removed Kosovo’s autonomy and imposed direct rule from Belgrade. The Kosovo Provincial Assembly and Government were dissolved and Kosovo Albanians removed from important state posts, which included most jobs of note. Under a state of emergency, direct rule was enforced ever more repressively by Serbian security forces. This repression included chronic underfunding of education and welfare provision for the ethnic Albanian population. In response, the Kosovo Albanians set up a shadow administration, and drew on funds from those Kosovo Albanians who lived outside the province to fund welfare and education programmes.

2.3. For much of the 1990s, in particular during the first half of the decade, international action focused more on finding a solution to the intense fighting and ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia, as the former Yugoslavia began to disintegrate, than potential difficulties in Kosovo. But Kosovo remained on the international agenda, and efforts were made to try to convince Milosevic of the need to engage in dialogue with the Kosovo Albanians. In addition to calling on Milosevic to open a reasonable dialogue to find a negotiated solution, the international community put consistent pressure on the Kosovo Albanians to organise themselves into a delegation capable of negotiating an agreement with Belgrade.

2.4. Milosevic continued to refuse to offer reasonable terms for dialogue with the Kosovo Albanians and also tried to reduce international involvement in Kosovo, perhaps in the hope that the international community would lose interest. In 1993, Belgrade refused an extension to the mandate of the monitoring mission in Kosovo run by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, later to become the OSCE - the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe). An offer in September 1996 to provide a European Community Monitoring Mission in Kosovo was also refused. From late 1997, the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU), the OSCE and the Contact Group (comprising France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US) focused regularly on the developing situation in Kosovo.

2.5. In December 1997, NATO Foreign Ministers confirmed that NATO’s interest in Balkan stability extended beyond Bosnia to the surrounding region, and expressed concern at the escalating ethnic tension in Kosovo.

2.6. Led by the moderate Ibrahim Rugova, who had been elected "President of Kosovo" in unofficial elections in 1992, the Kosovo Albanians pursued a policy of pragmatic non-violent resistance in response to Belgrade’s repression. But this made little progress, and the continued repression by Milosevic’s regime led to the radicalisation of elements of the Kosovo Albanian population, and the emergence of a new organisation, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which resorted to violent means to try to achieve its objectives.

2.7. The KLA’s escalating attacks on the Yugoslav/Serbian security forces brought ever more heavy-handed responses. These had severe repercussions for the local population, sometimes involving direct violence against civilians. Open conflict broke out in 1998 following violent Yugoslav/Serbian security force operations in the Drenica region in late February and early March which left 30 Kosovo Albanians dead. Following this incident, NATO’s concerns were re-emphasised in a statement by the North Atlantic Council in March 1998.

2.8. The international community, including NATO, condemned all acts of violence in Kosovo, and sought throughout to take an even-handed approach. The arms embargo imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 1160 in March 1998 applied equally to both the Yugoslav/Serbian governments and the KLA. UN, Contact Group, NATO and EU statements clearly condemned terrorism. Belgrade’s right to respond to KLA acts of terrorism was accepted, but only if this involved appropriate and proportionate action. This did not include the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of tanks and heavy artillery which became the norm, and which rapidly eroded sympathy amongst the international community for Yugoslav/Serbian anti-terrorist operations.

2.9. The international community attempted to put pressure on the KLA, but for much of the crisis the KLA was a disparate organisation, with no clear structure or hierarchy. There was a large amount of weaponry freely available to the KLA in Albania, following widespread looting of armouries in the wake of the collapse of the Albanian Government in March 1997, and widespread local sympathy for their aims in the mountainous border regions. The KLA also appeared able to draw on funds from Kosovo Albanians living abroad, and possibly also from criminal activities. Once the KLA’s political leadership was established, with Hashim Thaqi’s emergence as the key figure at the Rambouillet peace talks, it was possible to make the position of the international community known to the organisation more effectively.

2.10. Throughout 1998, diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful, negotiated solution were led by the Contact Group. Intensive shuttle diplomacy between the two sides was conducted by US Envoy Chris Hill. But continued diplomatic efforts were rebuffed by Milosevic. We had no illusions about the difficulty of persuading Milosevic to engage with reasonable international attempts to resolve the Kosovo crisis. Because of the potential humanitarian and regional implications of continued or accelerated repression in Kosovo, it became clear that military options should be considered by NATO as one part of the wider effort by the international community to find a solution. NATO Defence Ministers therefore decided in June 1998 to task NATO military planners to produce a range of options, both ground and air, for military support to the diplomatic process, and by early August the results had been reviewed by the North Atlantic Council. The options considered included a phased air operation, a ground force to implement a ceasefire or peace agreement and - at the top end of the spectrum - a ground force which could enter Kosovo against opposition in order to impose a solution. During the summer, NATO forces conducted a series of air and ground exercises to demonstrate the Alliance’s ability to project power rapidly into the region.

2.11. The violence continued to escalate throughout 1998 as Yugoslav/Serbian security forces conducted large-scale operations against the KLA, who had moved from hit and run attacks to the occupation of "liberated" territory. The operations of the Serbian security forces remained heavy handed. They preferred to fight from a distance, and use heavy weapons, tanks and artillery against positions they believed the KLA occupied. As many of these were in Kosovo Albanian villages, it was the civilians who lived in them who suffered the most. Between 23 August and 5 September, Yugoslav/Serbian security forces launched major offensives in Suva Reka, Lipljan, Stimlje, Malisevo, Glogovac and Prizren. These resulted in Kosovo Albanian civilian casualties, and significant population displacement.

2.12. By mid September 1998, an estimated 250,000 Kosovo Albanians had left their homes because of the tactics of the Yugoslav/Serbian security forces, and some 50,000 were still in the open as the winter approached. It was clear that many could die if the fighting continued and they were prevented from reaching shelter. Widespread destruction of crops and property added to the concerns of the international community about the humanitarian consequences of the crisis.

2.13. On 23 September, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1199, which noted the numbers displaced and without shelter and expressed alarm at the impending human catastrophe in Kosovo. It demanded a ceasefire, the withdrawal from Kosovo of the Yugoslav/Serbian forces involved in civilian repression and the start of real political dialogue. Meeting in Vilamoura in Portugal the following day, NATO Defence Ministers affirmed their resolve and determination to take action if required. NATO also agreed to begin the formal build up and readying of forces to conduct air operations. On 8 October, a Contact Group meeting in London gave US Envoy Richard Holbrooke a mandate for his mission to Belgrade to secure agreement to the requirements of UNSCR 1199. On 13 October, NATO agreed that air strikes could begin by issuing Activation Orders (ACTORDs). On the same day, Holbrooke reported to NATO that Milosevic had agreed to the deployment of an unarmed OSCE verification mission to Kosovo and to the establishment of a NATO aerial verification mission, both aimed to verify his compliance with the requirements of UNSCR 1199.

2.14. Following negotiations with senior NATO military representatives, the Yugoslav/Serbian authorities agreed to reduce the numbers of security forces personnel in Kosovo to pre-crisis levels – to some 12,000 Yugoslav Army (VJ) and 10,000 Interior Ministry Police (MUP) personnel. Despite initial withdrawals, these reduced levels were never achieved, and forces gradually made their way back into Kosovo. On 27 October, NATO agreed to keep compliance of the agreements, which had by then been underpinned by UN Security Council Resolution 1203, under continuous review and to remain prepared to carry out air strikes should they be required, given the continuing threat of a humanitarian crisis.

2.15. There were some doubts as to whether the October agreements would deliver a lasting settlement, but the international community recognised the vital breathing space which they provided. Those who had been forced from their homes would be able to return, and a humanitarian crisis was thus avoided that winter. The international community was therefore determined to try to make the agreements work. The UK played a leading role in both the OSCE and NATO missions. The UK provided significant numbers of personnel for the OSCE mission. The RAF provided two PR9 Canberra reconnaissance aircraft to the air verification mission. The UK also provided personnel for the Verification and Coordination Centre in Macedonia which facilitated liaison between the two operations, including a Brigadier as the head of this centre. In December, NATO agreed to the deployment of a force to Macedonia, designed to ensure the security of the OSCE verifiers, the first deployment of NATO ground forces to the Kosovo theatre of operations. Further details of both the OSCE mission and the NATO Extraction Force are given in Chapter 8. Throughout this period, there was regular dialogue with Russia at NATO in the NATO/Russia Permanent Joint Council.

2.16. Although the situation stabilised for a short time, the violence continued on both sides. The Kosovo Verification Mission played a useful role in giving the international community a direct monitoring presence in Kosovo. But it was unable, under the terms of its mandate, to prevent the build-up of violence. In late December 1998/early January 1999, Yugoslav/Serbian security forces operations began to intensify. The KLA was also active, moving into territory which had been vacated by Yugoslav/Serbian forces as part of their partial compliance with the October agreements. Between 24 and 27 December, Yugoslav/Serbian security forces carried out a major operation in the Podujevo area, killing at least 9 Kosovo Albanians and forcing 5,500 to flee their homes. Heavy fighting followed shortly thereafter in the Decane area. A Serbian café in Pristina was attacked with a grenade on 6 January, and the KLA kidnapped a number of Yugoslav army personnel on 8 January (their release was subsequently negotiated by the Kosovo Verification Mission).

2.17. A particularly brutal example of the way in which Yugoslav/Serbian operations against the KLA involved wider, disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force was the massacre in the village of Racak on 15 January 1999, which left 45 Kosovo Albanians dead. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia described the incident as follows: "On or about 15 January 1999, in the early morning hours, the village of Racak was attacked by forces of the FRY [Yugoslavia] and Serbia. After shelling by VJ [Yugoslav Army] units, the Serbian police entered the village later in the morning and began conducting house-to-house searches. Villagers, who attempted to flee from the Serb police, were shot throughout the village. A group of approximately 25 men attempted to hide in a building, but were discovered by the Serb police. They were beaten and then were removed to a nearby hill, where the policemen shot and killed them. Altogether, the forces of the FRY [Yugoslavia] and Serbia killed approximately 45 Kosovo Albanians in and around Racak." This single incident captured international media attention and also convinced the leaders of the international community that the prospect of a humanitarian catastrophe was again real, and that accelerated activity on the diplomatic and military tracks was necessary.

2.18. Despite a November 1998 Security Council resolution condemning Yugoslavia’s non-compliance with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia refused to allow the Tribunal’s chief prosecutor, Judge Louise Arbour, access to investigate Racak. Belgrade also ordered Ambassador William Walker, the head of the OSCE verification mission, to leave the country when he condemned the killings, although this decision was subsequently suspended following intense international pressure. A Security Council Presidential Statement and EU demarche calling for an independent investigation of the Racak killings fell on deaf ears.

2.19. On 28 January, NATO issued a "solemn warning" to Milosevic and the Kosovo Albanian leadership. This increased military pressure was paralleled by accelerated activity on the diplomatic front. On 29 January, the Contact Group summoned the Yugoslav/Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaderships to talks at Rambouillet in France. Greater emphasis was added to this summons the next day when NATO issued a statement reaffirming its demands, and delegating to the NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, authority to commence air strikes against targets on Yugoslav territory, should such action be necessary.

2.20. The negotiations at Rambouillet in February 1999, co-chaired by the UK and France, presented the Yugoslav/Serbian governments and the Kosovo Albanian delegation with proposals for an equitable and balanced agreement on interim self-administration for Kosovo. The proposals reflected the results of previous rounds of consultations with the parties, US negotiator Chris Hill having spent several months engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Pristina and Belgrade, and would have protected the rights of all sides, including extensive provisions for minority rights. They recalled the international community’s commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, provided for democratic self-government in Kosovo and specified that amendments would require the consent of all parties. The proposals were put to the two sides by a team of negotiators consisting of Chris Hill of the US, Boris Mayorksy of Russia and Wolfgang Petritsch, who represented the EU.

2.21. The Rambouillet Accords were explicitly an interim settlement, which was carefully framed so as not to prejudice the future status of the province. The agreement made provision for an international meeting to be held after three years to determine a mechanism for an enduring settlement for Kosovo. Independence was neither ruled in nor out. Both the Yugoslav/Serbian and Kosovo Albanian delegations were aware that Contact Group policy was opposed to Kosovo independence. Yugoslav/Serbian forces would have stayed in Kosovo under the terms of the proposed Rambouillet settlement to help give the Kosovo Serbian population greater confidence in the agreement. The first round of talks was suspended on 23 February, with both sides expressing broad agreement to the principle of substantial autonomy for Kosovo, and the Yugoslav/Serbian delegation expressing readiness to return to a second round of talks to discuss all aspects of implementation. In the light of this progress, a second round of talks was convened in Paris on 15 March to discuss implementation of the agreement.

2.22. While the talks in France were continuing, the UK was leading the way in preparing for a possible ground force to support any peace agreement which might emerge. Further details are given in Chapter 8.

2.23. At the second round of talks, the Kosovo Albanians accepted the documents negotiated at Rambouillet, and signed the Rambouillet Accords on 18 March. It became clear, however, that the Yugoslav/Serbian side was under instructions not to agree to anything at all. Instead of discussing implementation, they sought to re-open large parts of the political text to which they had previously indicated their agreement. All members of the Contact Group, including Russia, refused to accept this backtracking. It has been suggested since that the Serbian delegation baulked at plans for a NATO-led military peace implementation force. The texts included provision for a multinational military peace implementation force in Kosovo, similar to the highly successful force in Bosnia. This was essential, as the events of the preceding months had made clear that unarmed international verifiers would be unable to uphold any agreement, and would give both sides the confidence they needed to enable a return to normality. It has been claimed that the draft documents would have given the NATO force unprecedented powers of access in Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslavs were therefore right to reject the draft agreement. But this ignores several facts:

* that the Yugoslav/Serbian team at the talks did not suggest that there was any problem with the document at the time;
* that the draft Status of Forces Agreement was similar to those already in force for SFOR in Bosnia, with Yugoslavia having agreed in that context to allow NATO forces to travel through Yugoslavia on the way to and from Bosnia;
* and finally, that the drafts were just that – working documents which were ready for discussion with the Yugoslav/Serbian side. But they refused even to discuss texts.

2.24. With a renewed Yugoslav/Serbian offensive underway in Kosovo, and reports of up to 250,000 internally displaced persons within the province, the talks were adjourned on 19 March. On the same day, and with the intensified Yugoslav/Serbian security force offensive making it impossible for his personnel to do their work, and putting them in direct danger, the OSCE Chairman in Office – the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Knut Vollebaek – announced the immediate withdrawal of the OSCE verifiers. Their mission had not brought the lasting peace that had been hoped for. But that was no fault of the verifiers who had put themselves in considerable danger as they carried out their duties, negotiated local ceasefires and the return of hostages. Most of all, the October Agreement and the efforts of the verifiers had prevented a humanitarian crisis during the winter of 1998/1999. The failure of Milosevic to stick to the terms of the Holbrooke agreement showed that an armed international presence in Kosovo was now the only way of ensuring his compliance. The verifiers withdrew from Kosovo during the night of 19/20 March, without difficulty.

2.25. At the instigation of the Allies, US Envoy Richard Holbrooke flew to Belgrade on 22 March in a last-ditch effort to persuade Milosevic to back down and prevent further suffering on the part of the Kosovo population and the risk of military confrontation. But Milosevic remained intransigent. The nineteen NATO democracies had made every effort to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis, but NATO now had no choice but to act if a humanitarian catastrophe was to be prevented.

2.26. On 23 March, the Prime Minister confirmed to the House of Commons that the UK stood ready with the rest of NATO to take military action. On the same day, following final consultations with Allies, Javier Solana directed NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Wesley Clark to initiate air operations in Yugoslavia. They began at 1900 Greenwich Mean Time the following day, 24 March 1999, and continued until Milosevic agreed to NATO’s demands, 78 days later.

2.27. It was known that a spring offensive against the KLA had been planned, and experience from Summer 1998 – when a quarter of a million Kosovo Albanians were driven from their homes – indicated the likelihood of it being accompanied by civilian casualties, destruction and displacement. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported that by 23 March 1999, assistance had been provided to 400,000 people displaced or otherwise affected by fighting within Kosovo, and to 90,000 refugees outside the province, altogether about a quarter of the total population of the province.

2.28. With the build up of Serbian forces, and the start of their renewed offensive during the Paris talks, it was clear that NATO had to act without delay. Despite the fact that the Serbian offensive was already underway well before the bombing campaign began, NATO was conscious that Milosevic might seize upon military action as an excuse to escalate further the tempo of his operations. But while it was anticipated that the offensive could involve large scale operations against the KLA similar to the summer of 1998, with similar dire consequences for the civilian population, we did not expect the full horror and extent of the brutality, as the Serbian forces set about the widespread ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population of Kosovo. Given the past record of Milosevic and his forces, we believed there would be continued violence and repression, including against civilians, hence our determination to act, but we did not expect the deliberate targeting of civilians on the scale which occurred. On 9 April, the German Defence Minister, Rudolf Scharping revealed details of a Serbian plan, code-named Operation Horseshoe, the existence of which provided evidence that the expulsion of Kosovo Albanians from the province had been considered and planned in advance.