CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES

NATO proved itself to be a capable and effective crisis management organisation. Solidarity and firmness of purpose were key NATO strengths. (Chapter 5)

NATO Allies and EU partners must work together to improve their capabilities through the Defence Capabilities Initiative and the European Headline Goal. This will increase their ability to act and strengthen Europe’s partnership with the US. (Chapter 5)

UK crisis management structures proved to be effective. (Chapter 6)

PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS

Military planning and operations are one part of the overall international effort, and must be co-ordinated with the other means of persuasion at our disposal, primarily political, diplomatic and economic measures. (Chapter 5)

The international community needs to be better able in future to establish quickly a civil implementation presence. (Chapter 5)

The planning and conduct of military operations must continue to reflect political realities and requirements. (Chapter 6)

To maintain our flexibility of action and the highest possible level of uncertainty in the minds of our adversaries, we should plan for as many military options as necessary. (Chapter 6)

When a clear commitment is made to use force, it will be important to sustain this for as long as necessary to achieve the agreed objectives. (Chapter 6)

KEY DEFENCE CAPABILITY LESSONS

The performance by UK personnel was superb, but work must continue to alleviate overstretch and its consequences. (Chapter 6)

Although levels of operational commitment have been much reduced from the peaks of mid-1999, there is a need in the personnel field to focus on the key ‘Policy for People’ issues, making progress towards manning balance in all three Services and investing in and valuing Service personnel and their families. (Chapter 6)

 The conclusions of the Strategic Defence Review were vindicated. (Chapter 6)

The importance of media operations was reinforced. (Chapter 6)

There was in general a good flow of intelligence, but there is a need for better supporting secure communications systems in order to improve the flow of intelligence to those who require it. (Chapter 6)

The importance of the maximum possible accuracy of attack and minimisation of collateral damage in military operations was underlined. (Chapters 6 and 7)

We must continue to prepare our fighting forces in all three Services for the most exacting military tasks. A soldier trained and equipped for war may play an effective role in a peacekeeping operation (and may acquire additional skills for this purpose), but one trained just for peacekeeping is not prepared for high intensity operations. (Chapter 6)

The requirement for, and value of, Reserve forces was reinforced. Areas requiring further work to refine the arrangements for compulsory mobilisation were identified. (Chapters 6 and 8)

We must be prepared for our adversaries to make extensive use of asymmetric tactics in future operations. (Chapters 6 and 7)

Our capabilities for conducting information operations need to be further developed. (Chapter 6)

The conduct of military, including air, operations must reflect political realities. Current doctrine should remain essentially unchanged, but its practical implication should always take account of these wider considerations. (Chapter 7)

Interoperability with French maritime units was successfully achieved, with Royal Navy ships operating under French command for the first time. (Chapter 9)

KEY EQUIPMENT CAPABILITY LESSONS

There is a need for the UK and its Allies and partners to improve capabilities in the following areas:

• Precision joint all-weather attack capability against both static and mobile ground targets (Chapter 7)
• Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) 
• Improved communications/data links, including secure air-to-air and ground communications, better "sensor to shooter" links and satellite communications (Chapters 7 and 8)
• Electronic Warfare/Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (Chapter 7) 
• Air to Air Refuelling (Chapter 7) 
• Battle Damage Assessment (Chapter 7) 
• Strategic lift (Chapters 6, 8 and 9) 
• Readiness, deployability and sustainment (Chapter 8)
• Close combat/force protection capability (Chapter 7)

We must prepare fully to enable UK armed forces to meet the challenge, and reap the benefits, of digitisation. (Chapter 6)

The effective performance of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile in UK service was proved. (Chapter 7)

Aircraft carriers played a useful and versatile role in the operation. (Chapter 9)