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Operations in Iraq:  First Reflections

Chapter 7 – After the Conflict

7.1   The UK’s “Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People”, launched at the Azores Summit on 17 March 2003, outlined a future for Iraq as a stable, united and law-abiding state within its present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, abiding by all its international obligations and providing effective and representative government for its own people. Coalition planning for post-conflict operations, then already well underway, was designed to help Iraq transform to meet these aspirations.  For planning purposes, this phase was divided into three stages with the following broad aims:

STABILITY: To create a sufficiently stable environment to allow transition to follow-on forces and the engagement of civil agencies to begin recovery.

RECOVERY: To develop a secure and stable environment that supports the process of national recovery in order to begin the transition to Iraqi self-government.

TRANSITION: To complete the transition from coalition control to an enduring, peaceful, self-governing Iraq.

7.2   We always recognised that, in practice, the transition from one stage to the next would not necessarily be clear-cut, and that UK forces in southern Iraq would probably have to begin stabilisation operations while fighting continued elsewhere. It was imperative to ensure that our pre-conflict preparations, both across Whitehall and with the US, were as coherent as possible.

7.3   The most important tasks facing UK forces have been to ensure that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people are met, in accordance with our obligations under the Hague and Geneva conventions, and to provide a safe and secure environment.

Humanitarian Assistance

Iraqi children welcome British troops

Iraqi children welcome British troops

7.4   The Government assumed that UN agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) would be unlikely to deploy resources into Iraq for some time after decisive combat operations had ended. It therefore arranged, in conjunction with the US, for UK forces to provide emergency humanitarian aid in southern Iraq until such time as civilian aid agencies could take over. In the event, the humanitarian disaster that many had predicted failed to materialise, largely due to the coalition’s extremely effective targeting policy, which left most of Iraq’s civilian infrastructure undamaged, although much of it was suffering from years of neglect. Our forces acted quickly to provide relief where it was needed, and food, water, fuel, medicines and other essentials were soon available in towns throughout the UK’s area of operations. 1 (UK) Division was greatly helped in this work by the secondment of two specialists from the Department for International Development (DFID).

7.5   Our intention has always been to hand over responsibility for humanitarian assistance to civilian aid agency experts (several of whom have received substantial funding through DFID) as soon as possible. As the security situation in the UK’s area of operations has improved, we have begun this process (for example responsibility for water distribution has been transferred to UNICEF). Nevertheless, UK forces have made a number of valuable contributions to the humanitarian effort:

  • British troops of 187 Squadron, 23 Pioneer Regiment, hand out food and fresh water to the local population in a village just south of Basrah

    British troops of 187 Squadron, 23 Pioneer Regiment, hand out food and fresh water to the local population in a village just south of Basrah

    Our forces played a vital role in liberating the port of Umm Qasr. The port was then opened on 28 March, following intensive mine clearing operations by Royal Navy Mine Counter-Measures Vessels and the Fleet Diving Group, who are acknowledged as the world leaders in this field.
     
  • RFA SIR GALAHAD brought the first shipment of humanitarian aid into Umm Qasr, some 300 tonnes of relief supplies, on 28 March. RFA SIR PERCIVALE followed with a similar cargo on 7 April.
     
  • The Umm Qasr – Baghdad railway is now open following repair work by the Royal Engineers. The line will allow the onward distribution of the UN Oil For Food programme supplies from Umm Qasr.
     
  • On 28 April, UK forces delivered 30 World Health Organisation health kits provided by DFID to the Central Drugs Supply Depot in Basrah: sufficient drugs and medical equipment to provide primary care for 300,000 people for 3 months.
     
  • The Royal Engineers, working with NGOs and the Iraqis, have played a vital role in restoring power and water supplies, which had been deliberately degraded by the former regime. In many areas, those supplies are now better than before the conflict. The Royal Engineers constructed a water pipeline from Kuwait to Umm Qasr, able to deliver up to 2 million litres of drinking water daily. 80% of Basrah now has access to running water - more than before the conflict - and 75% of the city is connected to a sewerage system. UK forces are also working with NGOs to replenish water treatment chemicals.
     
  • Non-political interim advisory councils have been set up in most urban centres in the UK area of operations, with an overarching provincial council now up and running in Basrah province. These councils are designed to address practical local issues until new constitutional arrangements are agreed.

Security

A coalition security patrol with an Iraqi policeman in Al Qurnah

A coalition security patrol with an Iraqi policeman in Al Qurnah

7.6   Although the regime’s power has been swept away, pockets of resistance remain in some areas, and stabilisation operations continuethroughout the country. Several cities suffered from looting immediately following the removal of the regime, especially Baghdad. Initially, calls for coalition forces to do more to protect Iraqi civilians, keep order and prevent looting had to be weighed against the demands of continuing operations to overcome resistance by Iraqi forces, both regular and irregular. It was, however, also important for Iraq to be seen to police itself as soon as possible rather than rely on coalition forces.

7.7   UK forces quickly began to work with senior police figures in Basrah to encourage the Iraqi police back to work. Joint UK/Iraqi police patrols commenced on 13 April, and there are now around 2000 Iraqi police back at work in the city. Similar initiatives took place in towns across the UK area of operations, with the result that Basrah and Maysan provinces were declared permissive by the Humanitarian Operations Centre. As a result, many NGOs and UN agencies, including the World
Food Programme and the World Health Organisation, are now permanently located in Basrah.

7.8   Around Baghdad and in the north of the country, US forces have encountered resistance from small bands of irregular forces loyal to the Ba’ath party, and those whose interests lie in creating instability and economic poverty. The US have launched a number of operations targeted at these subversive elements posing a threat to stability in Iraq. These operations have successfully secured large caches of weapons systems and ammunition, and seized some $10 million in cash and precious metals. More than 1700 hostile irregular forces have been detained.

7.9   While the southern sector has been calmer, the tragic incidents in the town of Al Majar Al Kabir have underlined the continuing risk of localised violence. UK forces will continue to work as their highest priority to improve security and provide the Iraqi people with a solid base on which to rebuild their country.

Reconstruction

7.10   The Coalition Provisional Authority currently has the lead on reconstruction in Iraq. UK civilian and military personnel have played an integral role in ORHA and the CPA from the start.  By mid June the number of UK personnel in CPA offices in Baghdad, Basrah and northern Iraq had risen to over 70, including secondees from MOD, FCO, DFID and the Treasury and experts in policing, customs, finance, law, health and education.

7.11   UN Security Council Resolution 1483 of 22 May established a vital role for the UN in the reconstruction of Iraq. It affirmed Iraq’s territorial integrity, provided for rapid delivery of humanitarian relief, set a timetable for winding down the Oil for Food Programme, lifted sanctions and endorsed an appropriate post-conflict administration for Iraq. It also provides UN cover for any state wishing to contribute troops to the stabilisation force which the coalition is assembling in Iraq. The new Resolution demonstrates the continuing commitment of Security Council members to the future of Iraq and its people and gives the UN the vital role the Government has always envisaged.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

7.12   A key component of the search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq is the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), a joint US/UK/Australian operation comprising about 1400 personnel. In addition to the British second-in-command, the UK has made a significant contribution to the Group, consisting of both military units and analytical expertise. The ISG’s priority is the discovery and elimination of WMD; however, the Group also collects and exploits information relating to terrorism, war crimes, Prisoners of War and material relating to other suspect activity by the regime. The Group is able to draw on personnel from a wide range of civilian and military organisations, and British support has come from both in theatre and the UK. ISG apabilities include debriefing and interrogation of human sources and analysis of recovered documents, computer media and battlefield equipment.

7.13   Building on the knowledge we had of Iraqi programmes prior to the war, the exploitation of physical material recovered in theatre, and the interviewing of Iraqi scientists, technicians and other personnel, the Iraq Survey Group is working hard to identify and exploit all possible intelligence leads relating to WMD. A key objective is to increase our understanding of how the WMD programmes operated. The more we understand about the nature of these programmes and the full extent of the methods used by the Iraqi regime to conceal this activity from the world, the easier it will be to eliminate all remnants of WMD infrastructure and materials in Iraq.

7.14   The UK will continue to provide all support possible to the search for, and destruction of, Iraqi WMD. The task of gathering and collating evidence from all sources is expected to be a long and complex task.


Costs of the Operation

Under longstanding Government arrangements, operational expenditure is met from the Reserve on the basis of net additional costs (in other words, excluding costs that would have been incurred anyway, such as Service salaries). This was the first major operation to be costed under full Resource Accounting and Budgeting principles, which created some additional challenges for finance staff.

Early in the operational planning process the requirement was identified for additional expenditure in a range of areas: urgent equipment enhancements, increases in some logistic stock levels, pre-deployment training, and the charter of strategic air and sea lift. (The UOR process is described in Chapters 2 and 4.)

There has been close consultation between the MOD and the Treasury on the resource requirements of the operation from the outset. The Chancellor announced in his pre-Budget Report to Parliament in November 2002 a ‘£1 billion special reserve in 2002-03 to ensure that resources are available to meet overseas and defence needs in the fight against global terrorism’. In March 2003 the Chancellor increased this figure to £3 billion, to take account of the military campaign and the need for immediate humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people.

Our latest estimates suggest that the costs of equipping and deploying our forces to the Gulf up to the point of starting active operations will be around £700M. The costs of the actual conflict are more difficult to quantify, since these will have to take account of the large quantity of equipment and stores deployed to, and now being returned from, the Gulf. Both equipment and stocks will require inspection and varying degrees of maintenance after their exposure to heat, dust, and movement around the battlefield; some stocks may be damaged and need to be written off. It will therefore take some time to assess accurately the costs of stock consumption, and of damage and losses to equipment, as well as the cost of force recuperation.

MOD was allocated £30M for immediate humanitarian aid to meet our national obligations in the interim period before the security situation stabilised enough to allow civilian agencies to take on humanitarian responsibilities. It is however too early to estimate post-conflict costs at this stage.


War Crimes

7.15   The UK is determined that those suspected of war crimes, including serious breaches of the Geneva Conventions, the laws and customs of war, and crimes against humanity should be held responsible for their actions and brought to justice. UK forces will do all they can to assist in this.

Force Level Adjustments

7.16   The UK’s military contribution to operations in Iraq has now been adapted to the demands of the post-conflict reconstruction phase, so we do not keep personnel in theatre any longer than necessary. The majority of UK forces have already returned from the Gulf, leaving some 14,000 UK Service personnel deployed. A roulement process is in hand, which will be completed over the summer. 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines and 16 Air Assault Brigade (except 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment) have both now been withdrawn. 11 ships and submarines, 11 RFA vessels, and the specialist commercially chartered shipping have returned to the UK; the MCM force is on its passage home. These adjustments will be followed by the replacement of HQ 1 (UK) Armoured Division with HQ 3 (UK) Division, supported by 19 Mechanised Brigade, which we expect to complete by mid-July. Around 90 fixed-wing aircraft and 80 helicopters have returned home, leaving 8 Tornado GR4s in theatre with a number of supporting aircraft, and a balanced rotarywing force of 18 helicopters comprising Chinook, Sea King, Lynx and Gazelle helicopters. Two frigates, a submarine and two RFA vessels remain on operations. This drawdown of forces reflects the change from combat operations to those focussed upon stabilisation and increased security.
The requirement for a continued UK presence in Iraq in support of the Iraqi people is dependent upon a number of factors, including progress made against our military campaign objectives, and potential multinational contributions to stabilisation operations in Iraq. On this latter point, positive discussions continue with a number of nations. We have so far received commitments from nine countries representing a total multinational contribution to the UK area of operations of around 5500 military personnel.


Humanitarian Aid – First Reflections

  • The speed and success of the military operation meant that the humanitarian crisis predicted by many in the media and NGO community never materialised. Where food, water, fuel and other essentials were required in our area, UK forces were generally able to distribute supplies, and they did so in a manner that won praise from many NGOs. The Royal Engineers’ building of a water pipeline from Kuwait to Umm Qasr was vital in maintaining water supplies in southern Iraq. The arrival of RFA SIR GALAHAD into Umm Qasr on 28 March was almost as important symbolically as it was for the 300 tonnes of humanitarian supplies she carried.
     
  • The success of the humanitarian operation should at least partly be attributed to the extensive planning and pre-positioning of supplies that took place before the conflict began, including the secondment of Department for International Development advisers to HQ 1(UK) Armoured Division in theatre. Credit must also go to the rigorous targeting process, and the use of precision guided weapons, which avoided attacks where possible on the essential civilian infrastructure in southern Iraq.
     
  • In terms of planning for the post-conflict phase, we must learn from the difficulties faced in the provision of
    security in the UK area of operations. Our forces have done sterling work in reconstituting the Iraqi police and judiciary, and did as much as was reasonably possible to prevent looting. However, the unexpected speed, extent and consequences of the collapse of Saddam’s security infrastructure has posed challenges for the introduction of new law and order arrangements as rapidly or effectively as we would have wished.

Goto  Annex A - Iraq:  Military Campaign Objectives

Last Updated: 29 Jul 03