In 546BC, Croesus, King of Lydia, was considering the possibility of mounting a pre-emptive attack across the River Halys against his increasingly threatening Persian neighbours. Undecided how to act, he consulted the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi on his prospects for success. "Croesus, if you cross the Halys you will destroy a mighty empire" came the divine response. Delighted, Croesus proceeded to launch his attack, only to suffer a shattering defeat. His empire was annexed by the Persians.

Accurately predicting the future course of military events is a tricky business.

1. The Strategic Defence Review (SDR), which was published in 1998, was foreign policy-led. It sought to assess our essential security interests and defence needs in the light of changes in the international strategic environment. In the first stage of the Review, conducted jointly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD), a "Policy Framework" ¹ was produced, which sought to analyse the world as it was then and as it would develop in the future, looking forward to 2015, and to define Britain’s place within it. This framework informed all subsequent stages of the Review.

2. This paper represents an update of the analysis which underpinned the SDR Policy Framework, placing particular emphasis on the implications of recent events or emerging trends. It also seeks to extend the assessment, where possible, to cover a period of 30 years. This is in recognition of the fact that the impact of many decisions we take today, particularly equipment procurement decisions, will still be felt in 30 years’ time and beyond.

3. It is in the nature of such an exercise that the further one looks ahead, the less confident it is possible to be in the robustness of the analysis. The paper will, therefore, where it is helpful to do so, distinguish between near term and long term trends, and offer more robust analysis of the former. It is not, in any event, the intention of this paper to be precisely predictive. (It is worth noting in this context that even short term predictions cannot be reliable - the two years since the SDR have been even more busy than predicted.) Many of the developments postulated will be generic ones which will unfold gradually across the period. 2030 simply represents the farthest limit of the analysis. We recognise that the paper will contain judgements about the future with which many will disagree. Inevitably events will prove some of our judgements to have been wrong (perhaps this is the only truly certain prediction which we can make). We will need to update our analysis on a regular basis and ensure that our planning processes are sufficiently sensitive to respond to changes.

4. The nature of such analysis tends not to identify the possibility of "shocks", low-probability events with a dramatic impact. Examples might be the emergence of a new deadly disease, global economic depression, collapse of international political institutions or major shifts in patterns of alliances. Not all shocks have a negative impact of course, as the recent removal of the Milosevic regime has demonstrated. But it is in particular the potential negative impact of shocks that we need to be aware of for purposes of contingency planning. Across a 30-year period we must expect a number of such shocks, even if we can’t predict their nature, which have the potential fundamentally to disrupt our carefully laid plans.

5. The purpose of this paper is to provide a strategic context which will influence our internal planning for defence. The paper does not represent a statement of Government policy and should not be so construed. The paper does not attempt to address directly all the factors that will drive the development of defence planning and activity in the shorter term - for example the pressures of current operations and commitments. It is more concerned with guidance on, for example, long term trends which will guide priorities for development of our capabilities.

1. Supporting Essay 2 to the Strategic Defence Review.

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