Delivering Security in a Changing World
Future Capabilities

Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 The Defence White Paper set out our analysis of the future security environment, the implications for defence, our strategic priorities and how we intend to adapt our planning and force structures to meet potential threats.  This policy was an evolution of the strategy contained in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), and built on the conclusions of the 2002 SDR New Chapter and recent operational experience.  Crucially, it demonstrated the need to adapt to the more pronounced threats presented by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the challenges posed to the international community by weak and failing states.  

1.2 The White Paper set out a revised set of assumptions which underpin future planning.  These include:

• An expanded regional focus beyond the core regions set out in the Strategic Defence Review of Europe, the Near East, North Africa and the Gulf, to reflect the requirement to operate further afield across sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, and to meet the wider threat from international terrorism on a global basis.  
  
  
• The need to strike the right balance of capabilities for expeditionary operations to meet the demands of our eight strategic effects - Prevent, Stabilise, Contain, Deter, Coerce, Disrupt, Defeat and Destroy.  
  
  
• The need to optimise our force structure to support three concurrent small and medium scale1 operations (rather than two in the SDR) including the capability to lead or be framework nation for coalition operations where the US is not involved.  
  
  
• The retention of the flexibility to reconfigure for less frequent large scale operations, while concurrently conducting a small scale operation.  The full spectrum of capabilities is not required for large scale operations, as the most demanding operations could only conceivably be undertaken alongside the US, either as a NATO operation or a US led coalition, where we have choices as to what to contribute.  
  
  
• The importance of the continued transformation of our forces to concentrate on the characteristics of speed, precision, agility, deployability, reach and sustainability.  Key to this is our ability to exploit the benefits of Network Enabled Capability, precision munitions and the development of effects-based planning and operations.  
  
  
• The importance of those capabilities which can rapidly come together to achieve specific military effect and then rapidly adapt with other capabilities to achieve what is required by the next operation.  By doing so decisive military effect may be achieved through a smaller number of more capable, linked assets acting quickly and precisely to achieve a desired outcome.  
  
  
• The need to ensure that the organisation of our Armed Forces reflects the reasonable aspirations of our people in the 21st Century in terms, for example, of greater geographic stability in their home lives.  
  
  
• Continued support to the Home Office and other civil authorities charged with the safety and security of the UK, both through routine military tasks and our preparedness to support them in a time of crisis.  

1.3 Based on this analysis the White Paper set out a revised set of 18 Military Tasks, both standing and contingent, with the range of strategic effects our armed forces need to be capable of delivering. Extensive work has been undertaken to identify the future force structure and the development of capability in the longer term. An illustration of how we match capability against military tasks is attached at Annex. As new capabilities come into service such calculations will change, particularly with our increasing focus on effects achieved by combinations of flexible and adaptable forces.

Force Structure Changes - Key Judgements

1.4 In determining where we have the most scope for change within the force structure to allow necessary rebalancing and continued investment in transformational capabilities we have focused on key policy judgements from the White Paper, in particular:

• The need to rebalance and optimise our Armed Forces to meet the demands of the more likely multiple concurrent and enduring small and medium scale operations. This requires the capability to form a third line of communication including deployable Headquarters, and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets and logistics. It also demands that all deployable units should be fully manned, minimising the requirement for individual reinforcements and backfilling.
  
  
• The requirement to enhance our ability to lead or be the framework nation for European (and other coalition) operations where the US is not engaged. To do so we must continue to have the full spectrum of military capabilities to achieve the desired effects at medium scale. For some of our assets such operations have now become the principal driver in determining the size of the force needed.
  
  
• The assumption, based on the experience of the last 10 years, that on enduring operations, once the joint force has been deployed and stability established, lower force levels and generally lighter forces are required. This has particular implications for the levels of maritime sea control, air and heavier offensive land forces required on an enduring basis.
  
  
• The assumption that the most complex large scale operations will only be conducted as part of a US-led coalition. Our primary goal is to maximise our ability to influence at all levels the planning, execution and management of the operation and its aftermath, in support of our wider security policy objectives. Our force structure at large scale should therefore focus on those capabilities which add real weight to the campaign and hence the UK’s ability to influence its outcome. The most important capabilities are those which contribute to:
  
  
  • initial theatre entry and shaping operations;
    
  • intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance;
    
  • precision attack of strategic targets;
    
  • joint land and air offensive operations; and
    
  • post-conflict stabilisation.

• Our aim at large scale is therefore to contribute:
  
  • Special Forces;
    
  • a range of C4ISR assets, forming our own network and integrated with the US network;
    
  • amphibious and carrier strike task groups;
    
  • an air expeditionary task force capable of both long range strike and support to land operations; and
    
  • a land manoeuvre division capable of conducting offensive operations.

• Although the serious impact that the presence of a hostile submarine could have on maritime operations requires us to retain the capability to neutralise such a threat, the potential threat from hostile submarines to most future UK operations is likely to be very low.  We have therefore judged it appropriate to reduce the numbers of platforms optimised for anti-submarine operations, while continuing to enhance the quality of those that remain and ensure that they are able to contribute fully in other capability areas.
  
• Similarly, the air threat to deployed forces has greatly reduced and the capability of our air superiority aircraft and other air defence assets is continuing to improve.  So we need fewer aircraft and fewer ground-based air defence systems to meet the threat.
  
• The effectiveness of modern precision weapons and sensors, which can be used in all weathers, day and night, mean that highly accurate air delivered offensive effects can be achieved with fewer fast jets than before (see diagram above).
  
• While recognising the need to continue to provide appropriate levels of support to the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the more favourable security situation in Northern Ireland allows further reductions in the forces permanently committed to the Province, while retaining an ability to reinforce at short notice.

Methodology

1.5 In addition to routine planning, in January this year the Department set up multi-disciplinary Service and civilian teams to examine 16 thematic workstrands, using the policy baseline established by the Defence White Paper and focusing on the key judgements set out above.  The aim was to identify the optimum sustainable and affordable force structure to deliver the revised policy requirement, while releasing resources to invest in our future priorities.  The workstrands involved a rigorous examination of force structure, specific equipment requirements and supporting infrastructure, manpower and organisational structure.  Set out in the following chapter, by capability area, are the changes we have concluded we should make to the current force structure and our key capability requirements for the future.

Chapter 2: Force Structure Changes »

Last Updated: 26 Jul 04