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Depleted Uranium

Proposal for a Research Programme on Depleted Uranium: Military Considerations

2.1. The current in-service round for Challenger 2 consists of a DU, Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) shot. This round, designated CHARM 3 (CHallenger upARMament Version 3), was developed in the early 1990s to replace the CHARM 1 round. DU rounds were developed to ensure that the UK’s in-service Main Battle Tank (MBT) fleet, comprising Chieftain and Challenger, and the Replacement Tank (subsequently called Challenger 2) would be able to match the threat for the 1990s and beyond. DU CHARM ammunition is, however, only used on operations, not for training. The only other UK, DU based ammunition is the PHALANX round used in maritime close-in point defence systems. Ships at sea fire limited numbers of this ammunition for training and weapons proving, but this is expected to cease within the next two years when existing stocks become exhausted.

2.2 In the 1970s it was assessed that the existing tungsten Kinetic Energy (KE) penetrator for the 120mm main armament, which is the primary weapon system for the MBT, would not be able to penetrate the frontal armour of the next generation of threat MBTs. Critically, the tungsten round lacked the material properties to ensure that sufficient energy was delivered to the target to guarantee penetration of the frontal 60o arc. Scientific research and Operational Analysis (OA) showed that a battle winning UK capability against emerging armour technologies could be achieved by replacing the tungsten penetrator with one made from DU. In late 1979 a development programme, which exploited a high-pressure gun and DU penetrators, commenced at the Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment (RARDE) resulting in the first DU round, CHARM 1. This combination gives the penetration performance increase, over the tungsten shot it replaced, necessary to defeat the future MBT threat.

2.3 Following performance trials and consideration of the legal and health and safety aspects associated with the use of DU, CHARM 1, and subsequently CHARM 3, ammunition was accepted into service. This acceptance was based on an assessment of the results of UK work and a considerable amount of pre-existing data from the US, which was supplied in confidence. At the acceptance meeting for the CHARM 3 ammunition the Ordnance Board noted that the DU in the ammunition was a low specific activity radioactive material and that measures should be taken to keep all radiation exposures as low as reasonably practical. The principal dose reduction measures identified were the need for:

  • Handling guidelines for ammunition; and
  • Measures to prevent inhalation of DU oxide dust (toxic and low-level radiation hazard) in areas contaminated by the destruction of armoured vehicles by CHARM.

2.4. The world has changed substantially since DU was first proposed for use in an anti-armour role. Key changes include the fall of the Soviet Union, the move away from priority addressing only all out war to include peace support operations as part of a coalition, as well as the world wide concern over environmental and health issues. However, in one crucial respect it has not changed. Defeating the armoured capability of MBTs produced by the former Soviet Union nations remains a formidable challenge; indeed that capability has been widely exported to many areas of the world where UK forces might have to operate. DU ammunition remains, therefore, the most operationally effective capability. In operations against any relatively modern (or up-armoured) MBT threat, use of non-DU ammunition would significantly threaten operational success and potentially could lead to increased UK casualties.

2.5. Issues that need to be addressed for the future, and in the context of the next generation of anti-armour weapons, include studies on the types of engagement where DU based ordnance represents the only effective means to counter the threat, the consequences of not using DU, other approaches to defeat heavy armour and the risk to our forces from any DU contamination caused by the use of DU based ordnance or armour by allies and enemies.

WHAT WE PROPOSE TO DO
  • Conduct OA studies to:
    • Determine in what proportion of future scenarios the threat will be sufficient to require the performance level provided by DU
    • Assess the effect of accepting a lower level of performance in those scenarios where the threat is high
    • Establish what other measures are available to mitigate the effect of not deploying DU and determine how they compare in cost and effectiveness terms
    • Determine to what extent the use of DU by allies would represent a risk to UK troops if the UK did not use DU in coalition operations
  • Report outcome of OA studies within MOD

2.6. Studies were conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s on alternative materials and penetrator designs but since that time, work has been directed mainly towards DU penetrator performance improvement although some effort has been directed towards alternative materials. No detailed cost and effectiveness comparison of radical alternatives to DU KE penetrators to defeat threat MBTs (e.g. guided missiles) has been carried out recently. This is an area of research that warrants further study. Advances in materials and design technology also warrant a renewed study into alternatives to current DU ammunition. This latter study would extend the scope of the current research effort on alternative materials and designs for KE penetrators being undertaken within Technology Group 6 (TG6 - Energetic Materials and Terminal Effects) of the MOD Corporate Research Programme (CRP).

WHAT WE PROPOSE TO DO
  • Identify features of the penetrator-armour interaction pointing to the possibility of new materials and designs
  • Examine penetrator performance requirements and new material and design concepts imposing minimal adaptation of the existing gun system
  • Research the most promising material and design options
  • Examine radical alternatives to KE penetrators to defeat MBT armour
  • Report outcome of studies (where doing so does not compromise UK Force effectiveness) in the open literature

Last Updated: 14 Mar 02