Defence IssuesMISSILE DEFENCE: A Public Discussion Paper
Part One: The missile threat
8. Threat is a factor of both capability and intention. We do not have any evidence that any state with ballistic missiles currently has the intention specifically to target them at the UK, or UK interests. Of course, intentions can change quickly, and we could not wait until a direct threat became clear before determining how to defend against it. We are therefore very concerned by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles as a means of their delivery, and continue to monitor developments closely.
9. We currently assess that at present there is no significant threat to the UK from ballistic missiles. Nevertheless, it is a serious cause for concern that some states have developed, or are seeking to develop or acquire ballistic missile capabilities of increasing range. The UK government has in recent years identified a number of countries of concern. We believe them to have active and often relatively sophisticated ballistic missile programmes, and some to be developing weapons of mass destruction. It is this combination of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, coupled with the intent and a demonstrated willingness to use these capabilities, that makes Iraq the most immediate state threat to global security. Elsewhere the most credible potential missile threat comes from North Korea, Iran, and Libya. The threat from these four countries is not identical, nor are they necessarily the only nations that might emerge as threats. Of the four, North Korea has the most advanced longer-range missile programme: a ballistic missile they are currently developing would if successful have the capability to reach the UK. Iraq and some other states would also be capable of targeting UK interests overseas, or British forces deployed in their area.
Ballistic missiles
10. Long-range ballistic missiles are technologically complex weapons systems. They have a short period of powered flight when they are launched towards their destination and then continue on an unpowered, ballistic trajectory, arching back down to reach their target on earth. The three phases of flight for a ballistic missile are boost, mid-course and terminal. Longer-range missiles are designed to travel through space during mid-course, thereby spending a smaller part of their flight in the atmosphere. At these ranges, only the re-entry vehicle (the tip of the missile carrying the warhead) continues to the target. The technologies to develop a re-entry vehicle are complex, both to control the vehicle’s behaviour and to cope with the heating effect when it re-enters the atmosphere. Most ballistic missiles are inaccurate (they are normally unguided once boost is complete): an accuracy of about 1km at a range of about 1250km would be typical of an unguided vehicle. Thus the ability to deliver a ballistic missile on target is also a major technological challenge. Ballistic missiles can carry biological, chemical, nuclear or high explosive warheads, the nature of which is unlikely to be known by the defender prior to the missile landing (or being intercepted).
History of the ballistic missile threat to UK
11. The first ballistic missile threat to the UK emerged in September 1944 with the German V2 attacks on London. The V2 carried a 1000kg high-explosive warhead, and was the forerunner to the ubiquitous SCUD short-range ballistic missile. Thousands of V2s were launched, targeted primarily at London and Antwerp. Indeed, along with Belgium, the UK has had more ballistic missiles fired at its territory than any other country in the world. By the end of the war, German plans were in place to develop an intercontinental capability to hit New York.
12. During the 1950s, the Soviet Union developed longer range ballistic missiles capable of hitting the UK equipped with nuclear warheads. China developed such a capability in the 1970s, but has always had a much smaller arsenal of such weapons.
How ballistic missile programmes evolve
13. Although some countries do buy whole missile systems, most wish to develop self-sufficiency through indigenous programmes. As the indigenous programmes develop, then the emphasis is for increasing qualitative improvements in guidance and propellants. Typically countries begin with a liquid-propellant programme. The technology for these missiles is more readily available (from North Korea normally) and it is easier to develop longer-range liquid-propellant missiles than their solid-propellant equivalents. Most countries then evolve towards solid-propellant programmes, often running the two in parallel. Solid propellant is more reliable and more flexible to use, especially from mobile platforms. This avoids the time-consuming need to fuel the missile prior to firing, and decreases vulnerability to counter-force operations.
14. With the development of even simple missile defence systems, countries are likely to start to look towards the need for advances such as decoys. In addition, an improved accuracy would give the potential for more precise attacks against high-value military targets. However, these long-term projects are costly and technically complex, and we judge that most countries will retain their emphasis on the development of basic missile systems.
15. Countries possessing ballistic missiles are in most cases working to increase the range, reliability and accuracy of their missiles. The proliferation of ballistic missile technologies and knowledge has enabled countries to accelerate missile development times and to develop more capable and longer range missiles. The more countries which possess the technology and know-how to build ballistic missiles, the greater the risk of any single country purchasing a system “off the shelf”.
Missile technology proliferation
16. Proliferation of missile technology can be driven by commercial and economic considerations and also by a desire to exert regional or even global influence. Sharing technology can also result in shared lessons, and general benefits for the domestic missile programme. Technology transfer can take the form of complete missiles and associated support equipment; the provision of production technology; or the provision of assistance to indigenous programmes through the transfer of know-how, technical advice, the loan of scientists, engineers and technicians, or training.
17. The development of commercial space systems poses a particular challenge for those seeking to limit the transfer of technology between civil and military programmes. The technologies required for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) are very similar to those for a satellite launch vehicle. The main differences are in the development of a re-entry vehicle, a guidance system, and a warhead rather than a satellite. A state with a satellite launch capability has thus already acquired many of the key technologies required for an ICBM. In a similar manner, many of the technologies required for weapons of mass destruction can be hidden as parts of legitimate civilian programmes. This greatly complicates the ability to assess accurately the timeframe during which a country might acquire the capability to threaten the UK with ballistic missiles delivering warheads armed with weapons of mass destruction.
The ballistic missile threat today
18. As stated earlier, the combination of capability and intent makes Iraq the immediate state threat to global security. Russia and China retain a range of ballistic missiles which would be capable of delivering weapons from their territory to targets within the UK. Many countries already possess short-range ballistic missiles with the capability to target UK forces deployed overseas. There has also been a slow but steady increase in the number of states possessing medium-range ballistic missiles, increasing the number of potential threats to UK interests such as the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. We recognise that some of our NATO Allies are closer to regions of ballistic missile proliferation, and also that the US has security commitments in areas of the world that we do not.
19. Ballistic missiles owned and operated by states of concern tend to lack accuracy, and in general have more political than military utility. They have in practice been primarily used as weapons of strategic terror against urban targets, such as Iraq’s attacks on Israel. However, the use of warheads armed with weapons of mass destruction gives these missiles strategic utility: the potential to cause large-scale civilian casualties, to deter, and in certain circumstances to achieve significant military effect.
The ballistic missile threat in the future
20. We assess that there is no immediate significant ballistic missile threat to the UK. But we believe that Iraq, North Korea, Iran and Libya are working to obtain longer-range ballistic missiles with the potential ability to target the UK or our deployed forces. When a capability might emerge depends not just on technical factors (in terms of range, accuracy, and ability to design a robust re-entry vehicle) but on a continued political commitment to developing ballistic missiles and the capacity to procure expertise or complete systems from proliferators. It also depends on the effectiveness of international efforts to curb missile proliferation.
21. Achievement of capability is of course not the same thing as intention to use (or to threaten to use) such capability. However, the continuing proliferation of ballistic missile technology and expertise between countries of concern makes it more rather than less likely that the UK will in due course be within range of missiles in the hands of those who may have the intent to impose their will by threat of ballistic missile attack.
Approximate distances to the United Kingdom
8600km
Iraq
22. Iraq fired over 500 SCUD type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War at both civilian and military targets, and fired 93 SCUD-type missiles during the Gulf conflict, at Israel and the Coalition forces stationed in the Gulf region. Further missiles and components were declared to the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) or discovered during challenge inspections. We believe that Iraq covertly retains up to 20 SCUD-type missiles called the Al Hussein, with a range of around 650km, after the Gulf conflict. UN Security Council Resolution 687 permits Iraq to develop missiles up to a range of 150km, and since the Gulf conflict Iraq has been openly developing Ababil 100 and Al Samoud short-range missiles. In the absence until recently of UN inspectors, Iraq has worked on extending their ranges to at least 200km. Iraq has long had ambitions to develop longer-range missile systems with ranges of over 1000km; work on such systems continues, but is able to make only relatively slow progress while UN restrictions remain in place. It would probably not be able to produce such a missile before 2007. While such a missile could be used to target British interests in Cyprus, it could not be used against mainland UK. This prognosis could, however, be rapidly invalidated were Iraq to acquire missiles or technology from North Korea.
23. Iraq has admitted to having had offensive chemical and biological weapon capabilities, which included warheads for the Al Hussein missile filled with nerve agent, anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. It has used chemical weapons against the Iranians and the Kurds. Iraq sought to conceal these programmes from UN inspectors and did not acknowledge its biological weapons programme until 1995. It failed to convince UN inspectors of the accuracy of its declarations about these programmes. It failed to account to UN inspectors for significant amounts of material produced under these programmes. And between 1998 and 2002 it refused to allow UN inspectors into Iraq to continue to investigate these programmes. Iraq has a useable chemical and biological weapon capability, which has included recent production of chemical and biological agents. Iraq can deliver these agents using an extensive range of delivery means including ballistic missiles. Current military planning specifically envisages the use of chemical and biological weapons.
24. Iraq has also long sought a nuclear weapons capability, and continues to do so. We believe it has retained much of its former expertise, but currently lacks certain key components and materials. We believe that if sanctions were lifted, it would take at least five years for Iraq to produce an indigenous nuclear weapon. However, if Iraq obtained fissile material and other essential components from foreign sources Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in between one and two years.
North Korea
25. North Korea has some hundreds of SCUD missiles in service, with ranges of up to 500km. It can produce these itself and they are available for export. It also has in service No Dong missiles, with a range of up to 1300km.
26. In August 1998, North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 as a satellite launch vehicle. This demonstrated that North Korea could produce a missile with a range of about 2000km. It also demonstrated expertise in multi-stage missile technology. The Taepo Dong-2 (another multi-stage missile) is under development, variants of which could have ranges in excess of 5000km and 10,000km. North Korea has since 1999 observed a moratorium on the flight-testing of long range missiles. However, ground-testing and other development activities have continued and a flight test of a Taepo Dong-2 could be carried out within weeks if the moratorium ended. If a Taepo Dong-2 variant with a range of at least 8,600km is developed successfully, North Korea would then have the capability to reach the UK.
27. A particular cause for concern is North Korea’s willingness to sell its missiles and technology widely. North Korea is the world’s biggest supplier of ballistic missiles and related technology to countries of concern. Its unique, state-driven missile export industry is primarily motivated by the need to acquire hard currency. Missiles are North Korea’s most significant export and, by channelling profits back into the programme, an almost self-sustaining missile industry has been developed, supporting the requirements of both the domestic programme and the export market. Foreign sales may also allow North Korea to obtain flight test data from foreign customers during North Korea’s own moratorium on flight-testing. North Korea has provided No Dong missile technology to Iran and Pakistan, enabling them to acquire their own versions. SCUD technology is also available for export, and has been sold to Iran, Syria, Egypt, Libya, UAE and Yemen. Over the last 15 years North Korea has exported at least 400 missiles.
28. North Korea acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. An associated safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) entered into force in 1992. But in 1993 North Korea refused to accept an IAEA inspection to clarify suspicions that it had not declared past production of enough plutonium for at least one nuclear weapon. It gave notice of its withdrawal (subsequently suspended) from the NPT. A 1994 agreement with the US to freeze plutonium production made some progress. But North Korea still has sufficient plutonium in spent fuel rods under IAEA supervision for additional nuclear weapons.
29. Then, in October this year, North Korean admissions to the United States confirmed suspicions that it had been pursuing a covert nuclear weapons programme based on the production of Highly Enriched Uranium, which can be used in nuclear weapons as an alternative to plutonium. This has again raised questions about North Korean intentions and nuclear aspirations, as have statements by North Korean representatives abroad. The IAEA now believe that North Korea is in violation of her international commitments, including the 1992 safeguards agreement. North Korea also has the infrastructure to support the development of chemical and biological weapons.
Iran
30. Iran currently has in service several hundred short-range SCUD and SCUD-type missiles with ranges up to 500km. In addition, based on North Korean No Dong technology, Iran is developing the Shahab-3 missile, with a range of up to 1300km. Following successful tests in 2002, it should be able now to field a limited number, and is working to produce a substantial force. Iran has made no secret of its aspirations to develop a satellite launch vehicle capability. This technology is very similar to that required for longer-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles (as described in paragraph 17). We believe Iran could test such systems by the end of the decade. If it acquired a complete long-range ballistic missile system, it could achieve such a capability more quickly.
31. Iran is seeking to master the full nuclear fuel cycle so that it can develop a totally indigenous civil nuclear power programme. Any such legitimate programme could be exploited for use in a covert nuclear weapon programme. We have longstanding concerns that Iran may be seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, and has acknowledged a past chemical weapons programme. It has also signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, but is capable of producing biological weapons.
Libya
32. Libya has an ageing force of SCUDs. It is now seeking to produce extended-range SCUD missiles, with extensive North Korean assistance that includes the provision of components and equipment. Libya also has an interest in procuring a longer-range capability. We are concerned by persistent reports that Libya retains aspirations for weapons of mass destruction. Libya has subscribed to the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
Non-state actors
33. As the Prime Minister has stated, there is a clear link between the terrorist threat and weapons of mass destruction. However, using long-range ballistic missiles as a means of delivering terrorist weapons is less likely. Developing ballistic missiles from scratch would be beyond the means of a terrorist organisation. Acquisition of a capability off-the-shelf is conceivable, but unlikely in the absence of state sponsorship or complicity. Likewise, a non-state entity is very unlikely to be in a position to operate a ballistic missile force without extensive state-sponsored or state-condoned assistance with land, training, maintenance and spares support. Operating liquid-propellant systems is particularly demanding, because of the need to acquire, store and handle the propellants; but even solid-propellant ballistic missile systems require extensive in-service support. As such, ballistic missiles are a more attractive capability for state actors than for non-state actors. The latter are more likely to seek covert means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, a potential threat we also take very seriously.
Part Two: Responding to the threat >
Last Updated: 26 Mar 03