Second Battle of Cassino (15-18 February 1944)

New Zealand Corps' plan of attack, 17-18 Feb 1944

The next attempt or Second Battle of Cassino was made by Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard Freyberg's newly formed New Zealand Corps, consisting of Major-General Tuker's 4th Indian Division and the 2nd New Zealand Division. These were grouped together in the ad hoc New Zealand Corps, which lacked a proper corps headquarters and which functioned by having the staff of the New Zealand Division carry out both the corps and divisional planning tasks. The New Zealand Corps was attached to the US Fifth Army as it was intended initially that the New Zealand Corps would have a breakout role and capitalise on American success by punching their way out of the Liri Valley. The New Zealand Division with its two infantry and one armoured brigades was ideally suited for a breakout role. Instead they and the Indian troops were tasked with relieving the exhausted Americans and taking the high ground.

An American B17 Flying Fortress bomber over Monte Cassino during the first Allied air raid on the Monastery, 15 Feb 1944

Freyberg initially planned to avoid Cassino and attack from the north in an encircling movement. However, lack of mule transport necessary for resupply in the mountains made that plan impossible. Instead he decided to commit 4th Indian Division to an attack on Monastery Hill while the New Zealanders would attack across the plain, taking the railway station and the town of Cassino itself. It was a repeat of the American attacks on the same approach and in the New Zealand Corps there was pessimism at all levels as to the likelihood of success.

THE BOMBING OF THE MONASTERY

'The Abbey at Monte Cassino was the creation of one of man's noblest dreams... but this morning the tired infantrymen fighting for their lives near its slopes were to cry for joy as bomb after bomb crumbled it into dust.'

Controversy surrounds many of the decisions made in the battles for Cassino and one that still resonates today is the decision to bomb the sixth-century Benedictine abbey that crowned Monastery Hill. Although it was not occupied by the Germans, to the soldiers struggling to reach it, it seemed inconceivable that it was not defended and in planning for its capture the acting commander of 4th Indian Division, Brigadier H K Dimoline asked that it be bombed as part of his division's attack. The monastery walls were 150 feet high and 10 feet thick and, if defended, would be impossible to breach with the weapons available to the infantry soldier. Freyberg's request was for fighter bombers to blast entrance holes in the monastery's vast outer walls as the infantry fought their way onto the hill.

Freyberg made his request that it be bombed to General Alexander, the Army Group Commander, after General Clark initially refused. Alexander agreed. The monastery was bombed on 15 February 1944, not by fighter bombers but by wave after wave of medium and heavy bombers dropping 500 and 1000-lb bombs and incendiaries, leaving it a roofless shell and killing many civilians who were sheltering in it. However, its destruction gave the attackers no advantage. Poor coordination by Freyberg and his staff meant that 4th Indian Division's battalions were not yet in position and the German 1st Parachute Division had time to occupy the ruins before the attack came.

Complete destruction of the Monastery, May 1944

The terrain that the troops were expected to fight and manoeuvre on was an impossible challenge unrealised by the commanders in the valley below. As the American official historian wrote:

The slopes were shaggy with great boulders, sharp ledges and patches of scrub. These natural hideouts sheltered German spandau teams and bomb squads. Enemy outposts were less than 70 yards distant. The slightest movement drew retaliatory fire... There was no elbow room for deployment, no cover behind which to concentrate effectively, no opportunity to withdraw in order to obtain space for manoeuvre.

New Zealand infantry engaging enemy positions

On the night 17/18 February, Indian, Gurkha and British soldiers of 7th Indian Brigade struggled forward against the rocky outcrops protecting the approaches to the monastery. Each battalion in turn attempted to fight its way forward only to be cut down by machine-gun and mortar fire or fall victim to the German 'S' (anti-personnel) mines. By morning they were forced back, clinging on to the little ground that had been won.

On the same night, below them on the plain, two companies of 28 New Zealand (Maori) Battalion advanced in file along the raised railway embankment towards the railway station while engineers behind them bridged gaps to allow tanks to come forward and support the Maori advance. German mortar and artillery fire was zeroed in on this obvious approach forcing the engineers to abandon their work. Despite heavy casualties the Maori troops reached the railway station, but daylight found them isolated and under German tank counterattack with no anti-tank guns to oppose them. They too were forced to withdraw suffering 124 casualties out of the 200 who made the attack. A Maori officer remembered:

We were scared. All through the war we were scared... The Rapido River was in flood and to get to the railway station we had to follow the railway line... it was very dark - our artillery had been landing smoke screens so you couldn't see who you were shooting at...

Indian stretcher bearers bringing a casualty down a mountain track, 19 Feb 1944

The second battle of Cassino cost 4th Indian Division 590 casualties and the New Zealand Division 226. Unknown to the Allies the German defenders had suffered 4470 casualties in the first three weeks of February 1944 and were in no position to repel another heavy attack.

The Third Battle of Cassino (19 February - 23 March 1944) »