As part of the changes to the machinery of government after the general election in June 2001, responsibility for civil protection moved from the Home Office to the new Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office.

This interim revision to the third edition of Dealing with Disaster reflects these and other changes which have occurred since the publication of the third edition. The intention is to correct things which are no longer accurate and to include the bare essentials about key developments. Changes to content have thus been kept to a practical minimum.

A more substantial revision leading to a fourth edition will be undertaken to take into account changes which arise following the introduction of new civil contingencies legislation. The fourth edition will also pay more attention to topical issues (response to Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) incidents, mass evacuation, decontamination, widespread emergencies, public information and so on) which are covered in this revision only to the extent of providing information about, and links to, appropriate sources of information. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat website at www.ukresilience.gov.uk provides much useful information on ongoing developments.

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There are variations from one part of the United Kingdom to another in the roles and responsibilities of central and local government, in the offices held and in the terminology used within governmental and other organisations referred to in this guidance. To try to reflect all these variations would make the text much lengthier and considerably less readable. Accordingly, while much of the principle is universally applicable and has been adopted by publications which reflect the specific arrangements of the devolved administrations, the guidance reflects the arrangements and terminology commonly used in England and Wales.
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FOREWORD BY THE HOME SECRETARY

As my predecessor said in his foreword to the last edition of this document, “disasters can strike suddenly, unexpectedly and anywhere”. We have witnessed over the last couple of years the truth of this statement, both at home and abroad. During this period, many of our perceptions of both risk and the nature of threats and crises have been considerably altered, not least by the events of 11th September 2001. However, some things have not changed. One that certainly has not changed is our continued dependence upon the dedication and professionalism of all those people and organisations involved in the response to and resolution of major emergencies and crises. However, just as our dependence upon the various response organisations, the emergency services, local and central government is understood, we also acknowledge now, more than ever, the importance of coherent strategies and systems for the harmonisation of contingency plans and procedures.

It is with this in mind that this interim revision of the guidelines, taking account of changes in structures, practice and legislation, has been commissioned. I am particularly grateful for the input of the emergency services, local authority organisations, emergency planners and other professional bodies into the redrafting of this guidance. This ensures that the document, together with the sound practice and advice contained within it, is truly owned by all of us. Its message underlines again our total commitment to the protection, care and wellbeing of the public, for whom we all share responsibility. I commend this interim revision of the guidance to you.

DAVID BLUNKETT
1 INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL CONTINGENCY PLANNING ARRANGEMENTS

Background

1.1 Central government’s approach to civil contingency planning is built around the concept of resilience. This is defined as the ability “at every relevant level to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, to handle and recover from disruptive challenges”. The processes which underpin resilience form the fundamental elements of civil protection.

1.2 Civil protection, or civil contingency planning, can be defined as the application of knowledge, measures and practices to anticipate, guard against, prevent, reduce or overcome any hazard, harm or loss that may be associated with natural, technological or man-made crises and disasters in peacetime. The guidance has been produced in order to provide a generic framework for civil protection within which the detailed civil contingency plans of the emergency services, local authorities, government departments and other statutory, commercial and voluntary organisations at local, regional and national level can be prepared.

1.3 The document offers guidance on basic principles which may be tailored to suit local conditions when incorporated into local arrangements. It is not intended either to be prescriptive or to be an operations manual, but to establish good practice based on lessons learned from planning for and dealing with major peacetime emergencies at all levels during recent years.

1.4 Various terms are in common use to refer to different types of major emergency – disaster, crisis and major incident are among the most commonly used by professionals and volunteers involved in civil contingency planning. Each label brings particular associations. Within the emergency services the term ‘major incident’ is used as a preferred term, since there are specific events or circumstances which will initiate a response under the framework of the service’s Major Incident Plan. (The agreed definitions of a major incident are at Annex A.)

1.5 This interim revision will for the main use the term ‘major emergency’ as a generic label which can be applied to a wide range of disruptive challenges, be they slow onset or sudden impact crisis or disaster. We will define a major emergency as:

‘any event or circumstance (happening with or without warning) that causes or threatens death or injury, disruption to the community, or damage to property or to the environment on such a scale that the effects cannot be dealt with by the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations as part of their normal day-to-day activities’.

\[1\text{In this guidance, local authorities are defined as county councils, shire districts and all-purpose authorities.}\]
1.6 This guidance relates mainly to major emergencies occurring on land and within the United Kingdom. But certain types of emergency which occur at sea or abroad may have major ramifications back home, particularly when a number of United Kingdom residents are involved (for example, the investigation of the incident, the reception, welfare of survivors, relatives and friends, repatriation, dealing with environmental impact). The guidance in the following chapters is therefore of relevance to those who may have to deal with such incidents.

1.7 No single organisational arrangement will be appropriate to each and every type of major emergency. Nor will a single organisational planning blueprint meet every need. The key to effective arrangements is to apply sound principles, founded on experience, to the problems in hand.

1.8 There is no single agency within the United Kingdom which has all the skills and resources which may be needed. A government review in 1989 concluded that the response to major emergencies would not be helped by the creation of anything in the nature of a national disaster squad. In the majority of cases, prime responsibility for handling major emergencies remains at the local level where the resources and expertise are found.

1.9 However, specialist advice and expertise are available both at central government level and within neighbouring emergency services and other organisations which may be called upon in support of the local level response.

1.10 Major emergencies have a variety of effects on society and the environment. Thus they demand a combined and co-ordinated response, linking the expertise and resources of statutory organisations (emergency services, local authorities and central government, health service, armed forces, etc.) private sector organisations (transport, utilities, etc.), and voluntary agencies. Appropriate support has to be co-ordinated at local, regional or sometimes national level. This co-ordination of planning, training and exercising for an effective combined response to any type of emergency is fundamental to the achievement of a successful outcome for all who may be involved in responding to a major emergency.

1.11 While many major emergencies may be sudden and unpredictable, certain kinds of activity carry known risks and are subject to legal requirements for assessing risks, putting prevention and mitigation measures in place, and planning the response to an incident. These include known chemical or nuclear hazards at fixed locations, where the most probable types of incident and their likely consequences are largely foreseeable. For this reason it is possible to make detailed plans for appropriate measures and actions in advance. The existence of such plans reduces the likelihood of errors resulting from decisions being taken under crisis conditions. Annex D contains a list of publications which set out requirements specific to particular sectors.
1.12 The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) has a pivotal role in helping to maintain and improve the quality of civil protection. It aims to improve the UK’s resilience to disruptive challenges at every level through anticipation, preparation, prevention and resolution:

- promoting the safety of the community through enhancing the quality of local civil contingency planning
- enhancing the quality of regional and national civil contingency planning by fostering greater resilience in regional and central government arrangements
- enhancing the quality of national resilience by promoting HM Government’s interests in civil protection at an international level.

1.13 The funding of civil protection is currently under review. As it stands at the time of this interim revision, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat pays a grant towards the expenses incurred by local authorities in England and Wales. This grant supplements local authorities’ own commitment to supporting their emergency planning officers (EPOs). The Scottish Executive administers similar arrangements in Scotland through general expenditure funding arrangements. In Northern Ireland, civil contingency planning matters are dealt with by the Central Emergency Planning Unit (CEPU) under the direction of the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister in the Northern Ireland Executive.

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2 See chapter 7 for the CCS role in relation to Lead Government Departments.
2 INTEGRATED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND KEY ORGANISATIONS

Integrated Arrangements for Civil Contingency Planning

2.1 Civil contingency planning arrangements need to be integrated both within and between organisations. They should be an integral part of departmental and organisational planning. Organisations should work both individually and in collaboration with each other on certain key activities.

2.2 The following five activities are fundamental to an integrated approach.

Assessment
Organisations of all types need to examine their own areas, activities and responsibilities and conduct appropriate risk assessments of potential threats or hazards. Anticipatory assessment activities should identify measures which may prevent an emergency occurring in the first place. They should further identify the possible emergencies facing an organisation or community for which joint arrangements should be made. This will help give some levels of priority in planning preparation.

While assessment of higher probability risks facing particular communities or localities is vital, an underlying principle of sound contingency planning is that many types of emergency, for example an aircraft crash, can happen anywhere. Assessment should therefore not be confused with second guessing the exact nature of a possible emergency – planning should be flexible and based on the delivery of functions. Experience has shown that it is advisable to consider ‘worst case’ scenarios.

Ongoing collaborative assessment is also a critical activity during an emergency – risk reduction measures, health and safety requirements, anticipating knock-on effects and managing the provision of appropriate resources.

Prevention
Certain kinds of activity carry known risks and are subject to legal requirements for adopting prevention measures which aim to eliminate, isolate or reduce those risks as far as is reasonably practicable. Legislation, regulations, codes of practice and guidance documents stipulate or recommend measures that are appropriate to preventing many dangerous occurrences or reducing their severity. Annex D contains a list of publications which set out requirements for particular sectors.
Preparation

Preparation involves planning, training and exercising. Plans must provide the basis for an effective integrated response to major emergencies whether they arise from known hazards or unforeseen events. A plan should provide a prepared and agreed framework within which organisations and individuals can work in a concerted manner. They are then in a better position to solve problems when they occur.

There needs to be clear ownership of the plans and commitment to them from senior management. Contingency plans are not simply the domain of contingency planners – they should be seen as an integral part of overall management strategy. This means that when spending or other decisions are made, contingency planning considerations should be included as a matter of course.

Crisis management structures must define roles and responsibilities clearly at all levels. Organisations need to establish and test call-out and activation arrangements. Protocols must aim to ensure an efficient and timely response.

If people are not aware of the contribution which their own and other sections will need to make the result will be a muddled response. The overall response to a crisis will invariably need input from a number of different departments. Effective planning should therefore ensure that arrangements and activities of different departments within an organisation are cohesive.

Contingency planning must build on routine arrangements and should be integrated into an organisation’s everyday working structure. It should make best use of people’s existing skills and knowledge in their own domain of work. Wherever possible, people should perform in an emergency those tasks with which they are already familiar.

Nonetheless, personnel will require some additional training to prepare them for the special circumstances experienced during a major emergency and for any extra dimensions to their role. It is no use having plans in place if people are not trained to perform in accordance with them. It is therefore essential to involve those who will have to respond to any emergency in the planning, training, and plan testing activities.

Regular exercises should test the effectiveness of arrangements for responding to major emergencies. Any lessons learned should then be incorporated into revisions of the plans.

Response

The initial response to a major emergency aims to deal with the first effects. Collaboration, co-ordination and communication are vital. (Priority response tasks are dealt with in Chapter 3.)
With sudden impact emergencies (explosions, major transport accidents, riots) the initial response is normally provided by the statutory emergency services and, as necessary, by the appropriate local authorities and possibly voluntary organisations. Experience of slower onset or less localised emergencies or crises (BSE, the fuel protests of 2000, foot and mouth disease) shows that other organisations may well face the brunt even in the early stages of a major emergency.

A key consideration when assessing and planning appropriate response frameworks for both sudden impact or slower onset emergencies is therefore to identify the trigger points that will prompt an organisation to activate its emergency management arrangements.

Those managing both the initial and longer term response must assess how the emergency is developing and try to anticipate its knock-on consequences. The aim must be to mitigate the effects of the emergency by implementing measures that provide the necessary resources for the longer term response and for ensuring the continuity of critical services.

**Recovery management**

Recovery management encompasses the physical, social, psychological, political and financial consequences of an emergency. Anticipation of consequences and appropriate recovery planning must start right from the beginning of any response. Organisations and communities need to plan, manage and undertake those activities that will provide as rapid a return to normality as possible – for both the community and responders. Lessons from the past emphasise the need to involve the community fully in its own recovery. The promotion and support of self-help activities are important considerations.

2.3 These five activities have collectively been labelled as an Integrated Emergency Management approach (IEM). They are critical activities and we will continue to use this label in this interim revision. However, events over the last few years have prompted some significant extensions in thinking about major emergencies. Firstly, there is greater emphasis than previously on assessment and prevention. Secondly, integrated arrangements for responding to and recovering from major emergencies must not only consider the sudden impact disaster with identifiable scenes (transport accidents, flooding, etc.), but also the ‘creeping crisis’ where a specific scene is less apparent. (epidemics, widespread protest, etc.).

2.4 This wider concept of IEM is geared to the idea of building greater overall resilience in the face of a broad range of disruptive challenges.

2.5 The principal emphasis in developing response and recovery plans must be on responding effectively to the common consequences of incidents or events (rather than the prime focus being on different causes). The generic planning arrangements for responding to a range of emergencies must be cohesive and consistent, whether the emergency arises...
from natural causes, human error, technical failure, or through malicious acts. A plan has to be flexible; it has to work on a public holiday, at the weekend or in freezing weather conditions, and at any location. It will need to be tested against different specific scenarios to determine that it is both appropriate and flexible enough to deliver the required functions in varied circumstances.

2.6 Major emergencies do not respect boundaries, be they physical or organisational, and their consequences often have widespread ramifications. If the response is to be truly effective in meeting the needs of everyone affected then all leaders of the community, industry and commerce have to be aware of the contributions of different organisations.

2.7 The need for mutual aid agreements with parallel organisations should be considered within the planning process. In a major emergency the amount of work may be overwhelming while everyday work will also need to continue. Organisations must explore all options for maintaining critical services not only during the response but also throughout the recovery and aftermath procedures, which may be lengthy.

2.8 There is no one model response to an emergency. The response will need to vary just as the nature and effects will vary. Nevertheless, any response has to be a combined and co-ordinated operation, and certain features will be common to a variety of different eventualities.

- The basic objectives of the combined response will be similar on each occasion.
- The same basic management structure should apply when responding to most eventualities.
- Accurate records will be required for briefings, debriefings, formal inquiries and disseminating information about the lessons learnt.

2.9 For sudden events, the emergency services, i.e. the police, fire, ambulance and coastguard services, maintain a state of readiness so that they can provide a rapid initial response and early alerting of local authorities and other services. All organisations which need to respond quickly to an emergency will have arrangements which can be activated at short notice. These arrangements should be clearly established and promulgated to all who may be involved in the response.

2.10 The emergency services, local authorities, government departments and other organisations such as the utilities, voluntary organisations and faith communities have produced single service (and sometimes single issue) planning documents. This publication draws on them to offer guidance on how the procedures and operations of each of the organisations involved can be combined and co-ordinated to provide an efficient and effective response.

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3 These issues are covered in depth in Chapter 3: Command, Control and Co-ordination.
2.11 At sudden-impact major emergencies which have an identifiable scene or scenes, each service or agency working at the scene(s) has its own particular roles and functions. Some of the key ones are described in the following paragraphs.

**The Police Service**

2.12 The police will normally co-ordinate all the activities of those responding at and around the scene of a land-based emergency. The saving and protection of life is the priority, but as far as possible the scene must be preserved to provide evidence for subsequent enquiries and possibly criminal proceedings. Once life saving is complete, the area will be preserved as a scene of crime until it is established as otherwise (unless the emergency results from severe weather or other natural phenomena and no element of human culpability is involved). Where practicable the police, in consultation with other emergency services and specialists, establish and maintain cordons at appropriate distances. Cordons are established to facilitate the work of the other emergency services and support organisations in the saving of life, the protection of the public and the care of survivors.

2.13 Where terrorist action is suspected as causing an incident, the police will normally take additional measures to protect the scene. These include establishing cordons under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and carrying out searches for secondary devices. They also take initial responsibility for safety management at such incidents for those working within cordons.

2.14 The police oversee any criminal investigation. Where a criminal act is suspected they must undertake the collection of evidence, with due labelling, sealing, storage and recording. They facilitate inquiries carried out by the responsible accident investigation bodies, such as the Health and Safety Executive, or the Air or Marine Accident Investigation Branch.

2.15 The police process casualty information and have responsibility for identifying and arranging for the removal of the dead. In this task they act on behalf of HM Coroner who has the legal responsibility for investigating the cause and circumstances of any deaths involved.

2.16 Survivors or casualties may not always be located in the immediate vicinity of a disaster scene. It is therefore important to consider the need to search the surrounding area. If this is necessary the police should normally co-ordinate search activities on land. Where the task may be labour intensive and cover a wide area, assistance should be sought from the emergency services, the military or volunteers.

**The Fire Service**

2.17 The primary role of the fire service in a major emergency is the rescue of people trapped by fire, wreckage or debris. They will prevent further escalation of an incident by controlling or extinguishing fires, by rescuing people and by undertaking other protective measures. They will deal with

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4 See ‘Arrangements at a disaster scene’ (3.36).

5 Chapter 4 deals more extensively with the role of the police casualty bureau in identifying casualties and fatalities, and also with the role of family liaison officers in dealing with bereaved relatives.

6 The Fire Service is a generic expression which should be understood to comprise individual Fire Authorities and the Fire Brigades they maintain under the Fire Services Act of 1947.
released chemicals or other contaminants in order to render the incident site safe or recommend exclusion zones. They will also assist the ambulance service with casualty handling and the police with recovery of bodies.

2.18 The fire service is likely to take the lead on health and safety issues for personnel of all agencies working within the inner cordon. However, safety of staff should normally be resolved and agreed between relevant agencies at the scene following an appropriate risk assessment. Any conflicts over responsibility for safety should be raised and resolved at multi-agency meetings. The fire service will manage access to the inner cordon under their Incident Command System, liaising with the police about who should be allowed access. It is expected that other agency workers attending the scene will be issued with the appropriate level of personal protective equipment and that they are adequately trained and briefed. However, in the event of any situation which is, or which is suspected to be, the result of terrorism, police will assume overall control and take initial responsibility for safety management, but the main responsibility for rescuing people and saving lives remains with the fire service.

2.19 Although the health service is responsible for the decontamination of casualties, the fire service will in practice often undertake mass decontamination of the general public in circumstances where large numbers of persons have been exposed to chemical and biological substances. This is done on behalf of the health service, in consultation with the ambulance service.

The Ambulance Service

2.20 Ambulance services have responsibility for co-ordinating the on-site National Health Service response and determining the hospital(s) to which injured persons should be taken, which may depend on the types of injuries received. The officer of the ambulance service with overall responsibility for the work of the ambulance service at the scene of a major incident is the Ambulance Incident Officer (AIO). If necessary, the ambulance service will seek the attendance of a Medical Incident Officer (see 2.24).

2.21 The ambulance service, in conjunction with the Medical Incident Officer and medical teams, endeavours to sustain life through effective emergency treatment at the scene, to determine the priority for release of trapped casualties and decontamination in conjunction with the fire service, and to transport the injured in order of priority to receiving hospitals.

2.22 The ambulance service may seek support from Voluntary Aid Societies (British Red Cross, St John Ambulance and St Andrew’s Ambulance) in managing and transporting casualties.

Hospitals

2.23 Hospitals with Major Accident and Emergency Departments have been designated as potential casualty receiving hospitals. They respond to requests from the ambulance service to receive casualties for medical treatment and also provide appropriately trained staff to act as Mobile Medical Teams and Medical Incident Officers.
2.24 A Medical Incident Officer has overall responsibility (in close liaison with the Ambulance Incident Officer) for the management of medical resources at the scene of a major incident. He/she should not be a member of a mobile medical team.

2.25 Other hospitals provide support to receiving hospitals by taking patient transfers etc.

**Public Health**

2.26 The NHS makes public health advice available to the emergency services, NHS organisations and the public on a 24-hour basis. This advice is crucial for the control of communicable diseases and for public health concerns relating to hazards in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents.

**Primary and Community Care Services**

2.27 The provision of primary and community care support is a crucial aspect of the NHS response. These services cover a range of health professions including General Practitioners (GPs), community nurses, health visitors, mental health services and pharmacists, many of whom would need to be involved following a major incident. Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) should therefore be involved in emergency planning processes.

2.28 The role of the coroner is defined by statute. Coroners have responsibilities in relation to bodies lying within their district who have met a violent or unnatural death, or a sudden death of unknown cause. They have to determine who has died, how, and when and where the death came about. This function is regardless of whether or not the cause of death arose within their district. They normally undertake this duty at a formal inquest (though if the incident results in a public inquiry chaired by a judge, a full inquest may not be held).

2.29 Coroners should have an emergency plan relating to multiple fatalities, and coroners’ officers should be familiar with its content. They should also be familiar with the police major incident plan for their own area and with the local authority emergency plan.

2.30 The powers and duties of coroners do not vary with the number of people who are killed or the circumstances in which the deaths occur. A body at the scene of an incident should not be moved without the authority of the coroner and only the coroner may authorise a post-mortem and the release of a body to relatives. In general the police act as the coroner’s officers when dealing with fatalities arising from an incident.

2.31 The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is an executive agency within the Department for Transport. The MCA’s Directorate of Operations consists of separate but integrated branches – HM Coastguard (responsible for Search and Rescue [SAR], Prevention and Response); the Counter Pollution and Response Branch; the Press Office; Survey and Inspection

7 See para 4.33 for exceptions.
Branch (ensures that the UK Fleet meets the correct safety standards and Port State Control of non UK ships); an Enforcement Branch (carries out investigations and prosecutions following breaches of Merchant Shipping legislation); and a Technical Services Branch.

2.32 Co-located with the MCA is the Secretary of State’s Representative (SOSREP). SOSREP is empowered under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 and subsequent legislation to intervene on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport in salvage operations given certain conditions. This includes powers to require that a ship is to be moved to, or is to be removed from, or is not to be moved from a specified area or locality or from UK waters; there are also powers to establish a Temporary Exclusion Zone. SOSREP has similar powers delegated by the Secretary of State of the Department of Trade and Industry, regarding pollution from offshore oil and gas installations. These powers may only be exercised if there is a threat of significant pollution of the UK environment.

2.33 The primary responsibility of HM Coastguard is to initiate and co-ordinate civil maritime search and rescue (and in some cases maritime incidents resulting from an air accident) within the United Kingdom Search and Rescue Region. This includes mobilising, organising and dispatching resources to assist people in distress at sea, in danger on the cliffs or shoreline, or in danger in inland areas due to flooding. Local coastal safety committees based on police force boundaries ensure effective co-ordination of resources between police and coastguard for land based incidents on or adjacent to coastlines. The Counter Pollution and Response Branch is responsible for dealing with pollution at sea and, in conjunction with local authorities, for the shoreline clean-up. It also has responsibility for approving Oil Spill Contingency Plans for Ports and Harbour Authorities and provides appropriate training.

2.34 HM Coastguard may assist other emergency services and local authorities during civil emergencies such as flooding at the specific request of the police or local authority in a limited capacity as follows. They may provide:
   • on scene VHF communications by use of mobile and portable radios, particularly important if RNLI units are deployed
   • communications links between relevant command posts
   • coastguard liaison with other services at appropriate levels of command.

Local Authorities

2.35 Each local authority manages a civil contingency planning function. Civil protection (or emergency planning) personnel act as a hub to co-ordinate the planning, training and exercising within local authority departments. The effectiveness of this hub is fundamental to the discharge of related community responsibilities in an emergency, whatever the cause. Local authority planning is carried out in close co-operation with the emergency services, utilities, many other industrial and commercial organisations, central government departments such as the Ministry of

\[8\text{ Most shire districts will not maintain dedicated full-time emergency planning staff.}\]
Defence or Department of Health, other statutory organisations such as the Environment Agency, and many voluntary agencies.

2.36 The principal concerns of local authorities in the immediate aftermath of an emergency are to provide support for the people in their area. Generally, they do so by co-operating in the first instance with the emergency services in the overall response.

2.37 However, they also have many specific responsibilities of their own. They will use the resources of local authority departments to mitigate the effects of emergencies on people, property and infrastructure and play a key role in co-ordinating the response from the voluntary sector. They also endeavour to continue normal support and care for the local and wider community throughout any disruption.

2.38 In incidents involving multiple fatalities, the coroner’s office will liaise with the local authority on the establishment of temporary mortuaries. As part of the local response, plans should already have been agreed for opening additional spaces at existing public or NHS mortuaries and/or establishing temporary mortuaries. These plans should include how to locate staff.

2.39 As the emphasis moves in time from immediate response to recovery, the local authority will take a leading role to facilitate the rehabilitation of the community and restoration of the environment. Even a relatively small emergency may overwhelm the resources of the local authority in whose area it occurs. Against this possibility plans need to be made which will, in appropriate circumstances, trigger arrangements for mutual aid from neighbouring authorities, delivering cross boundary assistance if required. Arrangements may range from simple agreements offering whatever assistance is available in the event of an incident to more formal arrangements for the shared use of resources. This could include the use of vehicles, equipment and people. (Payment arrangements may need to be included in any agreement.)

2.40 Emergency financial assistance may be available for affected local authorities. This is done under the Bellwin Scheme in England and Wales, and by similar arrangements in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Central Government 2.41 Central government has a role in providing advice or support to the local response and in keeping Parliament informed of progress. The role of central government is covered in Chapter 7.

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*At the time of writing, responsibility for administering these schemes lies with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in England, the Welsh Assembly, The Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Office on behalf of the Northern Ireland Executive.*
2.42 The Environment Agency (EA) has primary responsibilities for the environmental protection of water, land and air in England and Wales. The devolved administrations for Scotland\textsuperscript{10} and Northern Ireland\textsuperscript{11} have similar respective responsibilities. The EA has key responsibilities for maintaining and operating flood defences on certain specified rivers and coastlines. Whenever necessary, the EA’s role is to provide remedial action to prevent and mitigate the effects of the incident, to provide specialist advice, to give warnings to those likely to be affected, to monitor the effects of an incident and to investigate its cause. The EA also collects evidence for future enforcement or cost recovery. It also plays a major part in the UK Government’s response to overseas nuclear incidents.

2.43 Industrial or commercial organisations, including the utilities, may play a direct part in the response to emergencies if their personnel, operations or services have been involved. Organisers of large outdoor and indoor events such as sporting competitions, folk festivals, pop or classical concerts will also have a role in the response to an emergency. Industrial or commercial organisations may give support by providing equipment, services or specialist knowledge\textsuperscript{12}.

2.44 While many private sector organisations contribute to the wider response, many businesses fail as a result of various types of major emergency – storm, flood, fire, terrorism, product contamination or pressure group activity. Experience shows that those businesses which have considered potential hazards and prepared response plans, which often need be no more than a few pages in length, have a much greater chance of surviving than those who are unprepared. The Home Office has produced two documents\textsuperscript{13} to encourage the business community to be better prepared. ‘How Resilient is your Business to Disaster?’ sets out the steps needed to prepare a survival plan, aimed at the small to medium sized business. ‘Bombs – Protecting People and Property’ shows how businesses can reduce their vulnerability to the threat from terrorism.

2.45 Bona fide volunteers can contribute to a wide range of activities, either as members of a voluntary organisation or as individuals. When responding to an emergency, they will always be under the control of a statutory authority. The valuable part which volunteers can play is covered in Chapter 6.

2.46 Military assistance can be sought to support the civil authorities. This has been an important part of many responses to major emergencies in the past.

\textsuperscript{10} In Scotland the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) provides a similar service.
\textsuperscript{11} In N. Ireland the Department of the Environment (Environment and Heritage Service) has similar responsibilities.
\textsuperscript{12} Details of useful relevant publications are contained in Annex D.
\textsuperscript{13} Details of these documents are at Annex D.
2.47 A Ministry of Defence (MOD) pamphlet\(^\text{14}\) sets out the conditions under which military assistance is provided, including the financial aspects. In broad terms there are three categories of Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC).

**Category A:** Assistance to the civil authorities in dealing with an emergency such as a natural disaster or major incident.

**Category B:** Short-term, routine assistance on special projects of significant social value to the civil community.

**Category C:** The full-time attachment of volunteers to social service (or similar) organisations for specific periods.

2.48 Category A MACC is applicable following severe weather conditions including snow, floods, storms and landslides, or other unpredictable and catastrophic events such as major accidents where human life is judged to be in danger (e.g. air or rail crashes, mountain rescue, shipwrecks). Depending on the circumstances, assistance in cases of dire emergency can be authorised by the Commanding Officer of any military unit or establishment at a local level. Resources permitting, assistance will be provided from local resources very quickly.

2.49 For other incidents the nearest Regional Brigade or Army District Headquarters will be able to give advice and should be contacted in the first instance. All Army Regional Brigade and District Headquarters have a 24 hour emergency contact telephone number.

2.50 MACC is one of three strands of Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). The other two are:

- Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP), used only in the maintenance of law and order;
- Military Aid to Other Government Departments (MAGD), used for work of national importance and in maintaining services essential to the life, health and safety of the community.

2.51 Both the operational and financial responsibility for dealing with all categories of civil emergencies lies with the civil authorities and assistance is undertaken under their direction. Service personnel and materiel are not earmarked or put on standby to meet any civil emergency or other task. Consequently, although civil authorities may produce contingency plans in conjunction with service headquarters and units, such plans do not guarantee that a service response will necessarily be available.

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2.52 Whatever the strand of military aid provided, service personnel will
work in organised bodies and will always remain under service command.
The following are some ways in which they can help.

**Obtaining information**
Helicopters and small land based liaison and reconnaissance parties with
an all weather, rough terrain transport and communications capability,
can provide civil central control organisations with an accurate overall
picture of a disaster area so that resources can be put to best use.

**Medical support**
The Defence Medical Services (DMS) comprise the medical services of
the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force. They can help local doctors
and health services by providing extra doctors and medically trained
staff. If required, there are also field ambulance or hospital units with
cross-country capable ambulances and Environmental Health Teams.

**Engineering**
The Services can provide bridging or ferry equipment, boats and
amphibious vehicles for transport over and through flood water, plant for
earth moving and construction and specialised equipment for emergency
water supply or pumping out flood water. They can also supply diving
and salvage teams.

**Extra personnel for specialist tasks**
The Services can provide well organised, disciplined bodies of personnel
where labour-intensive activities demand it. Examples are searching for
the dead and injured, assisting with cordons, helping with the control and
movement of evacuees or assisting with immediate flood prevention.

**Search and Rescue (SAR)**
There are separate rules for Search and Rescue, which is funded by MOD
as a core activity. Information can be obtained from the Aeronautical
Rescue Co-ordination Centre at RAF Kinloss.

2.53 As a general rule, MOD requires to be indemnified or protected
against claims arising from activities which do not fall directly under its
defence remit. The current MOD requirements are outlined in the MOD
pamphlet.\(^1\)

2.54 In cases where human life is not deemed to be in danger, civil
organisations will be required to meet all or some of the costs of the Service
response. These are generally levied either as no-loss costs or as **full**
costs.
- No-loss costs are those that would not have been incurred if the
  assistance had not been given (e.g. the personnel’s travel and
  subsistence, and the cost of material lost, damaged or consumed).
- Full costs are all the direct and indirect costs of providing the service
  (no-loss costs plus e.g. the personnel’s pay and allowances, hire
  charges for material and overheads).

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\(^{1}\) Annex D refers to AC 60421 “Military Aid to the Civil Community - A Pamphlet for
2.55 However, for Category A MACC assistance, MOD has discretion to waive all charges when immediate assistance is required to save human life. Once a decision has been made that a danger to human life exists by the civil authority with overall co-ordination of the incident (normally the Police Incident Commander), costs may be waived for the duration of the response phase.

2.56 When the incident moves into the recovery phase, a danger to human life no longer exists and continued military assistance will therefore be considered as ‘routine’ (Category B). This will be charged at the no-loss cost or full cost rate as determined by MOD. Civil authorities should consider the disengagement of military assistance at this point if costs are to be avoided (usually when overall co-ordination of the incident transfers from the emergency services to the local authorities or other organisations).
3 THE COMBINED RESPONSE: COMMAND, CONTROL AND CO-ORDINATION

Objectives for a Combined Response

3.1 Irrespective of the particular responsibilities of organisations and agencies that may be involved with the emergency response they will all work to the following common objectives:

- saving and protecting life
- relieving suffering
- protecting property
- providing the public with information
- containing the emergency – limiting its escalation or spread
- maintaining critical services
- maintaining normal services at an appropriate level
- protecting the health and safety of personnel
- safeguarding the environment
- facilitating investigations and inquiries
- promoting self-help and recovery
- restoring normality as soon as possible
- evaluating the response and identifying lessons to be learned.

Management Framework

3.2 In order to achieve a combined and co-ordinated response to a major emergency the capabilities of the emergency services must be closely linked with those of local authorities and other agencies.

3.3 A generic management framework has been agreed nationally which embodies the same principles irrespective of the cause or nature of the incident, but remains flexible to individual circumstances. This framework:

- defines relationships between differing levels of management
- allows each agency to tailor its own response plans to interface with the plans of others
- ensures all parties involved understand their relative roles in the combined response
- retains sufficient flexibility of option to suit local circumstances.

3.4 Under the framework, the management of the response to major emergencies will normally be undertaken at one or more of three levels – Operational, Tactical and Strategic. The degree of management required will depend on the nature and scale of the emergency. It is a characteristic of the command and control chain that the management framework tends to be implemented from the bottom up.
3.5 The terms Bronze, Silver and Gold (for operational, tactical and strategic respectively) are in common use in many organisations as substitutes – e.g. ‘Bronze commanders’, ‘Gold Control’. They provide less clarity, however, for those unfamiliar with the topic. Interpretation of what they mean does vary and further confusions can arise if they are equated too closely with rank structures. The terms Operational, Tactical and Strategic are therefore preferred in this publication as making clear the functions.

3.6 At the start of any incident for which there has been no warning the Operational level will be activated first. Either the escalation of the incident or a greater awareness of the situation may require the implementation of a Tactical level and, finally, a Strategic level should this prove necessary.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework of Command/Management</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tactical</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operational</strong></td>
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3.7 In its planning, each agency will need to recognise these three management levels and the functions they need to undertake. This will allow the integration of management processes across agency boundaries. It is not intended that the management levels necessarily predetermine the rank or seniority of the individual discharging the functions.

3.8 If any one agency activates its major incident plans (declares a major incident) then others need to assess their potential involvement and liaison arrangements in line with agreed protocols. It may or may not be necessary for others to start to activate their own major incident plan. The authority to declare a major incident for an organisation is vested in appropriate officers of that organisation. A major incident for one is not necessarily a major incident for others.

**Operational Level**

3.9 The operational level of management reflects the normal day-to-day arrangements for responding to smaller scale emergencies. It is the level at which the management of ‘hands-on’ work is undertaken at the incident site(s) or associated areas.
3.10 First responders will take appropriate immediate measures and assess the extent of problems. There must be due regard to risk reduction measures and the health and safety of personnel. Operational commanders or managers will concentrate their resources on the specific tasks within their areas of responsibility. They will act on delegated responsibility from their parent organisations until other levels of command are established.

3.11 Individual agencies retain full command of the resources that they apply within a geographical area or use for a specific purpose. Each agency should liaise fully and continually with others to ensure an efficient and combined effort. The police will normally act as the co-ordinator of the response at an identifiable scene.

These arrangements will be adequate for the effective co-ordination and resolution of most minor emergencies. However, for more serious incidents that require significantly greater resources it may be necessary to implement an additional level of management. A key function of an operational commander or manager will be to consider whether circumstances warrant a tactical level of management.

**Tactical Level**

3.12 A tactical level of management is introduced to provide overall management of the response. Tactical managers determine priorities in allocating resources, obtain further resources as required, and plan and coordinate when tasks will be undertaken. They must take appropriate risk reduction measures and give due regard to health and safety requirements.

3.13 Where there is an identifiable scene, tactical management is usually undertaken from an Incident Control Point established in the vicinity. Many tactical functions will then be discharged at or close to the scene. However, some agencies, (for example local authorities), will prefer to operate from their administrative offices but will often send liaison officers to enhance co-ordination. Planning must also take into account that there may be a number of individual scenes, or in fact no actual scene to attend (for widespread disruption, health emergencies, if the incident is overseas, etc.).

3.14 Inter agency meetings at appropriate intervals between tactical managers and relevant liaison officers will aim to achieve effective co-ordination. Tactical managers must concentrate on overall general management. While they need to be aware of what is happening at operational level they should leave the responsibility for dealing with that level to operational managers. When the situation warrants it a strategic level of management/command should be established as early as possible.

**Strategic Level**

3.15 In exceptional circumstances, one or more agencies may find it necessary to implement a strategic level of management. Major emergencies can place considerable demands on the resources of the responding organisations, with consequent disruption to day-to-day activities. They may have long-term implications for people or the environment. Such matters require attention by senior management (and possibly also by elected members in local authorities).
3.16 The purpose of implementing a strategic level of management is to establish a framework of policy within which tactical managers will work. Strategic managers will:

- establish a framework for the overall management of the incident.
- determine strategic objectives that should be recorded and subject to regular review.
- rapidly formulate and implement an integrated media policy.
- ensure there are clear lines of communication with the tactical managers/commanders.
- ensure there is long term resourcing and expertise for management/command resilience.
- give consideration to the prioritisation of demands from any number of tactical managers.
- decide on what resources or expertise can be made available for tactical commander requirements.
- undertake appropriate liaison with strategic managers in other agencies.
- plan beyond the immediate response phase for recovering from the emergency and returning to a state of normality.

3.17 Strategic command for major incidents should be seen as standard practice not the exception. It is easy to dismantle if not required and removes the potential for tactical managers/commanders to be reluctant to ask for a strategic level of management/command. The need for a strategic level may arise if tactical management does not have the required resources or expertise available. It may also arise if there is a need to co-ordinate more than one incident/scene for which tactical command has been established. Strategic management is normally undertaken away from any major emergency scene.

3.18 The requirement for strategic management may be confined to one particular agency. However, certain incidents require a multi-agency response at the strategic level when the issues which arise affect the responsibilities or activities of more than one organisation. Experience has shown that such issues can best be dealt with by establishing a Strategic Co-ordinating Group. This does not replace individual agencies’ strategic management mechanisms, which will continue, but complements them to ensure that policy and approaches are effectively co-ordinated.

**Strategic Level:**
- Individual organisation strategic management teams
- Strategic co-ordinating Group with individual agency representatives
- Media Centre

3.19 The purpose of this corporate approach at senior level is essentially to take strategic decisions in relation to the response. Each organisation retains its own responsibilities but co-ordinated senior level discussions ensure that links between strategic decisions are identified and corporate policies agreed.
3.20 The Strategic Co-ordinating Group should be based at an appropriate pre-planned location, away from the noise and confusion of any disaster scene. For most circumstances it will be a police responsibility to establish the Strategic Co-ordinating Group and chair it initially. It is usual to locate the Strategic Co-ordination Group at Police Headquarters in the first instance. However, this may move to the local authority during the recovery phase, when the emergency services may have little or no involvement, or to another relevant agency.

3.21 However, due to the nature of some major emergencies other agencies may wish to initiate its formation and chair the group (for a rabies threat, for example). Chairmanship may at some stage pass from one agency to another (for instance, from police to local authority to manage recovery activities).

3.22 The Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) is normally made up of a nominated senior member from each of the key organisations involved with the response. Each person must be able to make executive decisions in respect of their organisation’s resources without the need to refer back, and to have the authority to seek the aid of others in support of their role.

3.23 The Strategic Co-ordinating Group will need to take account of the features of the particular incident, together with the professional expertise of each of the agencies and their statutory duties. It will consider requests for advice and assistance from individual services and agencies. On occasions it may be necessary to assign the control of specific functions to one or more of the agencies. In some circumstances, such as a terrorist incident, it may be necessary for the police to take executive action in respect of the total incident.

3.24 In the event of a wide area emergency the SCG will need to liaise with similar neighbouring SCGs and, during the recovery phase, with the appropriate Government Office of the Region or devolved administration. Its wider role may encompass central government interests. When appropriate, it provides the focus for communication to and from the lead government department (see Chapter 7). Government advisors or liaison officers may attend SCG meetings depending on the nature of the incident (for example, for nuclear or terrorist incidents).

3.25 The Strategic Co-ordinating Group should develop a strategy for providing information to the public and for dealing with the media. It will often need to designate a media briefing centre and appoint a suitable manager (normally a police media relations officer).

3.26 Further issues which may need to be considered include:
- welfare and support for those dealing with or affected by events, including the relatives and friends of those killed, injured or traumatised
- long term implications for the community or the environment
- visits by VIPs
- inquiries and investigations
- the international dimension.
The Response to Localised Disasters

General principles

3.27 Within the United Kingdom there is substantial experience of major emergencies occurring within the bounds of relatively small areas. To bring some order to the almost inevitable confusion it is important that the emergency services establish control over the immediate area and also build up arrangements for co-ordinating the contributions to the response. Each service needs to establish its own control arrangements but continuing liaison between the services is essential. An effective response depends on good communication and mutual understanding.

3.28 It is generally accepted that the first members of the emergency services to arrive on the scene should make a rapid assessment and report back to their control room – not immediately become involved with rescue. Any immediately available information should be provided about:
- where it is
- what is involved
- which services and resources are present or required.

3.29 As soon as possible, information should be given on hazards (actual and potential), access to the scene, estimates of the number and main types of injuries, possible control and rendezvous points and any other relevant information.

3.30 The control room which receives the initial message should normally, and in accordance with established plans, alert the other emergency services and local authorities. In accordance with their own procedures, those agencies will then alert personnel or activate appropriate response plans to the level they judge necessary. Agreed protocols should be in place for these organisations to alert any relevant commercial, industrial, voluntary or other organisations as appropriate.

3.31 For localised incidents, tactical management is usually undertaken from an Incident Control Point established in the vicinity of the incident site.

3.32 The underlying principle for a major emergency with an identifiable scene is that the police normally assume the management of overall co-ordination. This approach ensures that resources are used to best effect and avoids situations where, for example, resources may be called upon simultaneously by different agencies. This is particularly the case for major emergencies that occur near or across boundaries, or where ongoing or recent restructuring may muddy the waters.

3.33 At each level of management that is implemented (operational, tactical, strategic) there is a need for an individual agency to manage its own activities effectively while contributing to effective liaison and co-ordination meetings with counterparts in other organisations. The three levels of emergency management can be adapted for use by any organisation associated with the response. Adoption of this generally agreed methodology can aid communications and avoid inter-agency confusion.
3.34 Arrangements which will have to be made for the immediate vicinity of a disaster scene include the following.

a) Assessing control measures with regard to reducing risk.

b) Deciding which specific functions should be controlled by which agency after taking due account of:
   - the circumstances
   - the professional expertise of the emergency services and other agencies
   - any statutory obligations
   - the overall priorities at the scene.
   (The utility companies – gas, water and electricity – may be required very early on to render working areas safe.)

c) Setting up an inner cordon to secure the immediate scene and provide a measure of protection for personnel working within the area. All those entering the inner cordon should report to a designated cordon access point. This ensures that they can be safely accounted for should there be any escalation of the incident, and affords opportunity for briefing about the evacuation signal, hazards and control measures and other issues about which they need to be aware. People must have an appropriate level of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) before entering the inner cordon. Persons leaving the inner cordon must register their departure.
d) If practical, an outer cordon may have to be established around the vicinity of the incident to control access to a much wider area around the site. This will allow the emergency services and other agencies to work unhindered and in privacy. Access through the outer cordon for essential non-emergency service personnel should be by way of a Scene Access Control Point. The outer cordon may then be further supplemented by a traffic cordon.

![Diagram of Tactical Level and Incident Control Points (ICPs)]

- Establishing internal traffic routes for emergency and other vehicles (including a one-way system where appropriate).
- Deciding on the location of key functions or facilities. For example:
  - casualty clearing station(s) to which the injured can be taken
  - an ambulance loading point for those who need to be taken to hospital
  - a collection/assembly point for survivors before they are taken to a survivor reception centre
  - possible helicopter landing site(s)
  - a rendezvous point or points for all responding personnel, which may be some distance from the scene in the event of a bomb incident or incidents involving hazardous materials
  - a marshalling area for assembling vehicles and equipment
  - a body holding area which is under cover and protected from public view
  - a media liaison point.

3.35 The possible need for evacuation of the public from the immediate vicinity may also have to be considered at a very early stage. Chapter 4 deals with this in more detail.

3.36 For the majority of major emergencies there are significant benefits for an officer who can represent the interests of the relevant local authorities to be in attendance at the incident control point at tactical level if this is
established. Arrangements should also be in place for calling in liaison officers from other organisations which may need to contribute to the response, for example, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Environment Agency, health organisations, gas, electricity, telephone or water companies, industrial or commercial concerns, or environmental specialists.

3.37 Some functions will by their very nature be discharged outside cordons and away from the scene but need to be considered as essential components of an integrated response.

3.38 It may be appropriate for emergency service or other representatives to be present within the local authority’s emergency/crisis management centre, which provides the focus for the management and co-ordination of all local authority activities.

3.39 Liaison officers at the scene should be clearly identifiable. They should be equipped with their own communications so that they can remain in contact with their organisation to obtain any further support rapidly. Where local authority services might be required at short notice, resources should be assembled nearby so that they are ready for immediate action if called upon by the emergency services.

3.40 If an incident occurs within the perimeter of an industrial or commercial establishment, public venue, airport or harbour, it is important that a Site Incident Officer from the affected organisation should liaise with responding organisations. Such a representative can ease access to facilities within the establishment and act as a link between the establishment’s senior management and the emergency management structure.

3.41 Emergency flying restrictions may be required. Down-draught and noise from helicopters can disrupt rescue and fire-fighting operations, cause hazards to rescue personnel, damage property and destroy evidence. Moreover, the presence of unauthorised aircraft poses confliction hazards to police and rescue helicopters operating in the area. It may therefore be necessary to regulate flights in the vicinity; the National Air Traffic Services (NATS) Instructions for Establishing Emergency Flying Restrictions within the United Kingdom 1989 describe how these restrictions are imposed.

3.42 Liaison with the Civil Aviation Authority will normally be through the police, who will appoint a senior police officer as the Emergency Controlling Officer. All requests relating to imposition, amendment or cessation of flying restrictions should be made through this officer. It may also be necessary to make contact with military air traffic controllers.

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**Key off-scene locations and functions:**

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<th>Location/Function</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local authority crisis / emergency centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Casualty bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rest centres</td>
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<tr>
<td>Temporary mortuary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friends and relatives reception centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving hospitals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Survivor reception centres</td>
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<tr>
<td>Media liaison points</td>
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3.43 Where the response may prove prolonged or complex each service may establish its own management arrangements using a convenient building and/or specially designed vehicles equipped with suitable communications. These vehicles will normally be parked adjacent to each other, provided there are no radio interference problems, and in the vicinity of the disaster.

3.44 During the longer term resolution, when the emergency services may have little or no involvement, co-ordination at the strategic level may be undertaken by the local authority or other appropriate organisation.

Maritime Emergencies

3.45 The objectives of the combined response and a tiered management framework also apply to maritime emergencies. However, the nature of a maritime emergency raises specific management and co-ordination issues that do not arise with land-based emergencies.

Roles and responsibilities

3.46 The off-shore response to a maritime emergency will normally be co-ordinated by the appropriate Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC) or Maritime Rescue Sub Centre (MRSC) of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). However, it is essential that land and maritime authorities liaise at the earliest opportunity to address the particular problems caused by such emergencies. The land-based authorities are responsible for the reception and care of survivors once they are on shore. Further liaison will be required for dealing with wreckage and pollution and to decide on appropriate destinations and berthing arrangements for vessels in distress.

3.47 There are no statutory obligations for the fire service to respond off-shore but arrangements for dealing with fires, chemical hazards and rescue from vessels at sea have been formalised between the MCA and certain brigades.

Co-ordinating Maritime Incidents

3.48 There are a total of 18 Districts around the coast of the UK. Each has a co-ordination centre: either a Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC) or a Maritime Rescue Sub Centre (MRSC). London Coastguard based near the Thames Barrier also covers the River Thames from Teddington to Canvey Island. These co-ordination centres are staffed on a 24-hour basis. They are fitted with computerised command, control and communications equipment which enables the operators to receive distress calls via:

- 999 (or 112) telephone
- VHF and Medium Frequency (MF) radio (voice)
- VHF and MF radio (digital)
- satellite communications (voice, digital, distress beacon alerts).

3.49 Search and Rescue (SAR) operations, whether offshore, inshore or on the coast, are controlled, directed and managed from a single co-ordination
centre (either MRCC or MRSC). Centres are also fitted with direction finding facilities to assist the location of distress calls.

3.50 Pollution and salvage incidents will be co-ordinated from either a Marine Response Centre (pollution) or a Salvage Control Unit (salvage). These units will provide facilities and a focal point for specialists from the respective interests and associated authorities and services. They may be located at the nearest MRCC/MRSC or at a Port or Harbour complex, depending on the circumstances of the incident.

3.51 It is important to remember that maritime incidents have an on-shore dimension. Inter-agency liaison needs to recognise the shore-based consequences at an early stage and make appropriate arrangements.

Terrorist Incidents

3.52 The response to a terrorist incident will be similar to that of any major incident but the police will take overall command of the incident.

3.53 The methodology of some terrorist incidents includes the use of bomb threats, which may in themselves be treated as serious incidents. Certain key activities arise with the management of a bomb threat:
   • police evaluation of the threat with a designated co-ordinator at the threatened location
   • confirmation that a device exists at the threatened location
   • consideration of cordons (dependent on the threat and possibly over 500 metres away)
   • establishing a cordon
   • potential evacuation to a safe distance
   • rendering any suspect device safe
   • gathering of forensic evidence
   • recovery and re-occupation of the scene.

3.54 Not all of these activities will necessarily be carried out in every circumstance, nor will they necessarily occur in the same order. Some recent terrorist incidents have not included warnings. Police methods of managing the scene will depend on circumstances.

3.55 Chapter 4 sets out issues concerning evacuation plans and procedures.

Handling widespread natural disasters

3.56 Historically the United Kingdom has been more fortunate than some other countries, suffering less from the frequency and scale of such natural widespread disasters as storms, flooding or earthquakes. There is sufficient experience, however, to highlight some characteristics of the response to widespread disaster.

3.57 In a generally densely populated country, where widespread disasters are likely to affect large numbers of people, self-help will be the first response. The disaster can overwhelm local resources, disrupt telecommunications and cut off access or egress routes. Further blockage of routes may occur as people attempt to leave an affected area.

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27 See 2.32 for details of the powers of the Secretary of State’s Representative (SOSREP) in relation to salvage and pollution matters.
3.58 However, the initial formal response to a widespread disaster should be similar to any other incident. Where inter-agency strategic management is required, Strategic Co-ordinating Groups, normally meeting in police headquarters, will be established to ascertain the extent of the emergency and to set out policy priorities for the response. In the likely event that the consequences span police areas a number of SCGs may be established and liaison maintained between each group. One SCG might take the lead in agreement with the others. Each SCG would also provide the focus for liaison with central government (see Chapter 7).

3.59 Resources will be stretched by a widespread disaster. The SCG, whilst avoiding tactical decisions, may have to call on the resources which industry, the armed forces and voluntary agencies can provide. Such responses can be mobilised more quickly if plans have been made in advance which address their availability and means of obtaining them. Although there is no single model for dealing with the complex problems which widespread disasters present, the basic principles outlined in this guidance document do not change.

Communications

3.60 Good communications are at the heart of an effective response. Plans must set out arrangements to supplement usual communication facilities and provide properly trained staff. Reliable information must be passed correctly and without delay.

Effective emergency communication involves many information handling activities:

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Essentially, procedures must aim to provide the right people with the right information at the right time in a form that they can understand, assimilate and act upon.

3.61 Planning for emergency communications must therefore pay close attention to procedures, language use, human factors and skilled use of different communication media. Wherever possible, emergency communication procedures must make maximum use of existing skills and routine practices. Appropriate training must be provided for the extra dimensions to communication that emergencies bring.
3.62 Planning should aim to provide an integrated approach to emergency communication through identifying appropriate use of available media:

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<th>Media</th>
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<td>radio</td>
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<td>CCTV</td>
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<tr>
<td>mobile phone</td>
<td>databases</td>
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<td>text messaging</td>
<td>video conferencing</td>
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<td>email</td>
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3.63 While these all play a vital part in a modern-day response, planning should also consider the important role of ‘low-tech’ information transfer – briefings, liaison meetings, use of display boards, paper forms and so on.

3.64 The two major operators in the UK – British Telecommunications plc (BT) and Cable & Wireless plc (C&W) – have set up services for use in the event of civil emergencies and major disasters. These services are able to respond quickly to meet the needs of the emergency services and local authorities where requirements have been discussed with BT and C&W beforehand.

3.65 A wide range of facilities is available that includes simple telephone circuits, fax, ISDN, audio and video conferencing, private circuits (kilostream and megastream) and small switches.

3.66 Emergency services and local authorities have 24 hour access to the respective service provider by using the BT National Emergency Linkline and the C&W Direct Access Response – these are NOT for normal business enquiries (misuse may cause confusion and undue delay to emergency communication). In the event of an emergency these controls will mobilise the resources requested, including an Incident Manager if needed. BT and C&W have a memorandum of understanding for mutual assistance when they are supporting authorities involved with a major emergency. Other licensed operators (OLOs) may also be able to provide support. Arrangements for this will need to be pre-planned.

3.67 A major emergency can produce traffic overload of the Public Service Telephone Network (PSTN). This may occur as members of the public seek assurance about the safety of others and/or from damage by an incident to the telephone systems. In the first instance the telephone operators will apply normal, business-as-usual, traffic management measures. Such action will protect the network but essential services responding to the incident will be subject to the same restriction.

3.68 If a casualty bureau is established, PSTN controllers need notification of the bureau numbers as soon as possible so that they have time to establish the appropriate telephone network controls in order to reduce the likelihood of overloaded telephone exchanges.
3.69 When the public telephone networks do become overloaded, restrictions may need to be invoked. Schemes are available for both the mobile and fixed telephone services to give call preference to registered essential users.

**ACCess OverLoad Control (ACCOLC)**

3.70 Mobile telephone numbers of essential users can be registered via a sponsoring process, for the ACCOLC (ACCess OverLoad Control) scheme. This scheme is supported by the four main mobile telephone operators in the UK. The Police Incident Commander is normally the authority able to invoke ACCOLC. Exceptionally, the Cabinet Office may take this responsibility after consultation with the Lead Government Department. It is important to recognise that this is a two-edged sword: non-registered users, who may nonetheless be important to the emergency in question, may not be so easily contactable once ACCOLC is invoked. Organisations should ensure that appropriate users are registered.

**Government Telephone Preference Scheme (GTPS)**

3.71 Fixed service telephone numbers of essential users can be registered for GTPS (Government Telephone Preference Scheme). The GTPS is available from BT and C&W (and Kingston Communications in the Hull area only). Under GTPS all telephones will still be able to receive calls. Rules for invoking GTPS are similar in principle to those for ACCOLC.

**Emergency Communications Network**

3.72 A private switched telephone network, known as the Emergency Communications Network (ECN), provides a robust emergency communication system via dedicated PABX (private automatic branch exchange) switches. It provides links to local authorities, with connections to police and fire headquarters and a number of central government departments.

3.73 It is managed by the Cabinet Office, where a supervisor maintains the ECN directory. The ECN is continuously available and can have a role in support of the PSTN through all stages of traffic overload management. The ECN enables direct access to the PSTN and Break-In from the PSTN; these features can facilitate communication with mobile telephones at the scene of an incident from mobile telephones.

**ACCOLC and GTPS registration**

3.74 Those responsible for emergency arrangements must register key numbers in advance and ensure they are regularly checked and updated. Key numbers for fixed telephones which will continue to make outgoing calls under GTPS may not necessarily belong to those with a response role and other categories should be considered, such as kidney dialysis patients.
Debriefing, Inquiries and Lessons Emerging

3.75 In order to facilitate operational debriefing and to provide evidence for inquiries (whether judicial, public, technical, inquest or of some other format), it is essential to keep records. Single agency and inter-agency debriefing processes should aim to capture information while memories are fresh.

3.76 A comprehensive record should be kept of all events, decisions, the reasoning behind key decisions and actions taken. Each organisation should maintain its own records. It is important that someone is responsible for overseeing the keeping and storage of the records and files created during the response, and also for assuring the retention of those that existed before the emergency occurred. Any document destruction under routine housekeeping arrangements should be suspended.

3.77 Good record keeping serves a further purpose, whether or not there is a formal inquiry. It allows lessons to be identified and made more widely available for the benefit of those who might be involved in future emergencies. Additionally, chief officers and chief executives will also wish to ensure that there is appropriate follow-up to any lessons which emerge from the debriefing process. Appropriate follow-up will depend on the circumstances but might include revision of plans, procedures and training, strengthening of liaison with other agencies, devising small exercises to test alternative approaches, and so forth.
4 CARE AND TREATMENT OF PEOPLE

4.1 The care of those involved in a major emergency and the way they are treated lie at the heart of the response. In particular, sudden impact major emergencies may cause physical injury, affect people’s mental state or affect their material welfare. Such events are the main focus of this chapter, although dealing with other types of emergency will also generate stresses and strains. In short, welfare considerations embrace anyone who may be affected. Experience and study of major emergencies has identified various key groups of people:
- the deceased
- those who have been injured
- those directly caught up in the emergency occurrence, but who are not physically hurt
- families and friends of the injured, missing or deceased
- rescuers and response workers
- wider sections of the community whose lives are affected or disrupted
- witnesses and spectators.

4.2 In addition to medical assistance or material welfare, some of those who are suffering from the effects of an emergency may need immediate access to social and psychological support. Welfare services (for social, material and psychological support) should be set up in the immediate aftermath and will undoubtedly be needed in the medium and longer term. Much will depend on the nature and scale of events and local circumstances. Local authorities are responsible for co-ordinating the provision of this support. Many local authorities maintain crisis support teams who are specially trained to respond to the particular personal problems associated with emergencies.

4.3 Responders from statutory services or voluntary organisations may also need support. Organisations should have plans in place to monitor the well-being of their personnel and provide appropriate assistance, both in the short and the long term.

The Injured

4.4 The care and treatment of those injured is a high priority response objective.

4.5 Injured survivors may be taken to a casualty clearing station. Medical and paramedical personnel will carry out triage\(^\text{17}\) and any appropriate stabilisation measures before ensuring that casualties are evacuated in

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\(^\text{16}\) See 2.32 for details of the powers of the Secretary of State’s Representative (SOSREP) in relation to salvage and pollution matters.

\(^\text{17}\) Triage is the assignment of degrees of urgency to decide treatment.
accordance with priorities for hospital treatment. The casualty clearing station is usually sited in a building, tent or temporary shelter close to the ambulance loading point.

4.6 The Ambulance Incident Officer (AIO) will be responsible for ensuring:
- the establishment of medical communications on site
- the transport of medical teams
- whether a Medical Incident Officer (MIO) should be appointed
- in liaison with the MIO, conveyance of casualties to appropriate receiving hospital(s).
- transport of casualties to distant specialist hospitals by helicopter where appropriate
- the provision of all ambulance resources necessary for the ongoing treatment of casualties
- the distribution and replenishment of medical and first aid supplies.

4.7 Those who have survived a major emergency with no physical injuries (or with only minor injuries) may nevertheless be traumatised and suffering from shock, intense anxiety and grief. They will, therefore, need to be treated with great sensitivity.

4.8 The local authority, particularly social services departments, will need to co-ordinate both the professional and voluntary sector welfare response. They will need to work closely with health professionals and with police Family Liaison Officers where appropriate.

4.9 Survivors are usually frantic for information about their own relatives, friends and colleagues, information about the incident, number and location of other survivors, and what will happen to them next and when. Their initial needs are likely to include:
- shelter and warmth
- information and assistance with communication
- support in their distress
- food and drink
- first aid to treat minor injuries
- changing, washing and toilet facilities, and perhaps spare clothing.

4.10 They may also need social support beyond these immediate requirements – help in contacting family and friends, transport back home, finding temporary accommodation, and financial advice and assistance.

4.11 Psychological welfare is also important. Some apparently uninjured survivors may display adverse symptoms, immediately or later. For this reason there must be an appropriate mix of social services, medical and police family liaison personnel at survivor reception centres and, if necessary, at rest centres. The responsibility for organising, staffing and providing logistical support at survivor reception centres and rest centres usually rests with the local authority supported by other organisations. The police maintain order and security and provide family liaison officers to the
welfare response if appropriate. The control of access to such centres should aim to prevent uninvited media representatives or onlookers disturbing those inside.

4.12 Survivors will often be able to provide crucial information about what happened and may be important witnesses at any subsequent trial or inquiry. There must be a balance between the requirement to gather evidence from survivors and the reluctance of some to remain at the scene of their distress. For example, prioritising information might help, so that only names and addresses are taken from those anxious to leave with further details being obtained later. Information will usually be gathered by police documentation teams at a survivor reception centre, a secure area to which all survivors who are uninjured or have only minor injuries should be taken.

Friends and Relatives

4.13 Experience has shown that many people will travel to the scene or to meeting points such as travel terminals if they believe their friends or relatives may have been involved in an emergency. If necessary the police, in consultation with the local authority, will establish friends and relatives reception centres at suitable locations. These may be near the scene, in the area of the community affected or at arrival and departure points. Any commercial, industrial or other organisations concerned may also need to be consulted.

4.14 The friends and relatives reception centres will be staffed by police, local authority and suitably trained voluntary organisations. The authorities should also consult and involve representatives of faith organisations when appropriate.

4.15 Those responsible should give the fullest possible information to enquirers seeking news of people who might be affected, while taking care to preserve the privacy of the individual. Proper liaison and control must be in place to ensure that information is accurate, consistent and non-contradictory. General enquirers must know how to obtain information.

4.16 Friends and relatives who may be feeling intense anxiety, shock or grief, need a sympathetic and understanding approach. Experience has shown that one of the most effective ways of supporting next of kin is to use a police Family Liaison Officer together with a trained support worker for each family. The control of access should aim to prevent uninvited media representatives or onlookers disturbing those inside.

Police Casualty Bureaux

4.17 In many emergencies, establishing the identity and whereabouts of people will be a critical issue. The purpose of a police casualty bureau\(^{18}\) is to provide a central contact and information point for gathering and distributing information about individuals who have been, or are believed to have been, involved in an incident.

4.18 For the purposes of the bureau, a ‘casualty’ may be defined as ‘any person who is directly involved in, or affected by the incident.’ This will include survivors, evacuees and the deceased.

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\(^{18}\) Casualty bureau is the common term used for what is properly titled a Casualty and Information Bureau.
4.19 A police casualty bureau has three fundamental tasks:
- to obtain relevant information regarding persons involved or potentially involved
- to assess and process that information
- to provide accurate information to relatives and friends, the investigating and identification officers and HM Coroner (Procurator Fiscal in Scotland).

4.20 When a casualty bureau is required, its early establishment is essential. It will typically be a consideration following declaration of a major incident, although the level of authority needed will differ between police forces. Without such a facility, calls from concerned friends and relatives may swamp control centres, with the potential to inhibit severely the management of the response to the incident. Once the bureau is activated and able to receive calls, the media will publicise a dedicated telephone number.

4.21 The bureau telephone numbers must also be passed as soon as possible to telephone network controllers, control rooms for the other emergency services and local authority (or authorities), receiving hospital switchboards and embassies (if appropriate). These measures will reduce delays and confusion caused by embassies and relatives ringing round for information.

4.22 As part of this process the police will send documentation teams to each receiving hospital, the mortuary, survivor reception centre(s) and possibly rest centre(s) as well as to relatives. Good co-ordination of this activity is essential to avoid unnecessary duplicated visits, particularly to next of kin.

4.23 In order to fulfil its role the casualty bureau will:
- receive enquiries from the general public and file missing person (misper) reports
- record details (including their whereabouts) of survivors, evacuees, the injured and deceased through reports from police documentation teams, receiving hospitals, survivor reception centres, rest centres, friends and relatives reception centres etc.
- formulate a comprehensive list of missing persons
- collate data to support identification of persons involved
- liaise with the ante mortem team\(^9\)
- inform enquirers (by the most appropriate means) of the condition and location of these persons.

4.24 An important principle of the way the casualty bureau operates is that the people who receive information and record enquiries from the general public (the incident enquiry unit) are not involved in the collation and matching processes. They are therefore unable to give information out to enquirers. A separate unit will pass messages on behalf of casualties and operate a call-back service to enquirers when matches have been made, but not in the case of fatalities.

\(^9\) The team responsible for compiling files in respect of each person missing, or believed to be involved and not identified, for comparison with post mortem data and for information of HM Coroner/Procurator Fiscal.
4.25 In the case of fatalities, details are passed to the Identification Commission. The bereaved will then be informed (see Dealing with Fatalities below).

Air Accidents and the Emergency Procedures Information Centre (EPIC)

4.26 In the event of an air crash, the Emergency Procedures Information Centre (EPIC) at Heathrow may open. This is managed by British Airways. If so, its telephone number will be broadcast. Once open, EPIC acts as a central airline information co-ordinating point. It collates information about reservations, next of kin and other relevant data, thereby supporting the work of the police and the coroner.

4.27 If foreign nationals are thought to have been involved, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will refer any enquiries from foreign consulates, embassies or high commissions to the casualty bureau. The police will, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, inform the consular authorities of the death of any of their nationals. Ambassadors or High Commissioners may wish to visit a disaster scene. (Arrangements for VIP visits are discussed in Chapter 5).

Dealing with fatalities

4.28 It is essential that the handling of issues surrounding fatalities is both efficient and sensitive. Dealing with fatalities during major emergencies must recognise the conflict between trying to satisfy:

- the full and proper legal requirements for enquiring into what happened
- the emotional and information needs of the bereaved relatives or friends of the deceased.

4.29 Reports by Lord Justice Clarke20 and Lord Cullen21 highlight existing good practice which provides an appropriate and sensitive service to relatives and also identify the need for improvements, with appropriate recommendations.

4.30 Arrangements must also consider the welfare of those working with unusually high numbers of deceased and human remains.

Procedural requirements

4.31 The authority of HM Coroner is generally required before those who have been pronounced dead can be moved from the scene of the incident. Arrangements are then the responsibility of the police, who will act on behalf of the coroner to implement a body recovery plan.

4.32 The police overall incident commander will appoint a Senior Identification Manager (SIM) to manage and co-ordinate all aspects concerning the identification of victims. The SIM will appoint a senior officer to be responsible for the recovery of the deceased from the disaster site. This officer will formulate a recovery plan together with other relevant persons and agencies. This will include the Coroner, the police Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) and where relevant other investigative agencies.

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20 See Annex D for bibliographical details of the reports on the Thames Safety Inquiry and the Public Inquiry into the Identification of Victims following Major Transport Accidents.

21 See Annex D for bibliographical details of the reports on the Dunblane and the Ladbroke Grove rail crash.
4.33 Bodies (or parts of bodies) should not normally be moved until a medical practitioner or paramedic has pronounced life extinct and endorsed the body label accordingly. This will involve issuing the victim with a unique reference number, which will remain constant throughout the identification process. The removal should take place in a systematic, structured and documented fashion. Exceptionally they may have to be moved beforehand to prevent loss or further damage to the deceased victim or to rescue or provide medical treatment for trapped survivors. If it is necessary to move bodies in an emergency a record should be made of the location of the find and its removal. If possible this should be supported by video or photographic evidence. The structured and documented recovery, including medical practitioner confirmation of death, should recommence at the earliest opportunity.

4.34 The need to preserve evidence at the scene of a major emergency – including that of identifying the deceased – must be borne in mind. For this reason valuables and other property should not be removed from the victim until arrival at the mortuary, and then only on the directions of the pathologist, where they will be documented in a structured fashion. It is also important not to make assumptions about ownership of property. Items found near to or underneath victims must not be recovered with the victim, but dealt with separately.

4.35 Human remains may be taken first to a location designated as a body holding area. This should be under cover and protected from the public view for reasons of security, protection and sensitivity. A body-holding area should only be regarded as a temporary holding point between the site of retrieval and the designated mortuary.

4.36 The usual practice is for bodies to be taken to a temporary mortuary for post-mortems to be carried out. It is the responsibility of the coroner’s office to make arrangements for the transfer of bodies to the mortuary. This is co-ordinated by the police acting on behalf of the coroner’s office using vehicles belonging to undertakers or police, although military transport may also be used for this task. It is essential to establish documented continuity in respect of each aspect of the recovery and transportation process.

Temporary mortuary provision should be an inter-agency activity with the local authority taking the lead. Health and Safety Regulations lay down a number of criteria for establishing a temporary mortuary\textsuperscript{22}. Therefore the identification of suitable buildings, together with arranging the necessary logistical and administrative infrastructure, should form part of the preplanning process. The plan should include storage and examination areas. It should identify separate areas for staff and the bereaved and cover access needs, ideally with separated approaches and facilities for the different groups.

4.37 These arrangements should be reviewed periodically. There needs to be consultation with neighbouring authorities in order to reduce duplication of effort and to develop mutual support systems. Each area needs a clear

\textsuperscript{22} Advice is available from the Coroner’s Officers’ Association.
plan with options to apply if numbers exceed accessible capacity. This entails checking provision in neighbouring areas, within the public system, the burial industry and in the NHS for access and flexibility. Local authorities will find it helpful to refer to the guidance contained in Dealing with Fatalities During Disasters.  

4.38 The task of identifying the dead is undertaken by an Identification Commission, made up of the supervising pathologist, police Senior Identification Manager, police Family Liaison Co-ordinator and specialists such as those in odontology, radiology and fingerprints. The coroner normally chairs the Identification Commission. The functions of the Identification Commission include the compilation of evidence which will lead to the positive identification of the deceased, and controlling the running of the mortuary.  

4.39 Communication arrangements must ensure that there are appropriate links between coroner and staff, the police (including family liaison officers) and the bereaved. Close links to the NHS arrangements are essential. Arrangements must do everything possible to prevent the possibility of multiple contacts and misidentification of fatalities and casualties. When a positive identification has been made it is generally the police who will inform the next of kin once the approval of the coroner has been given to do so. On occasions the next of kin may be part of the identification process.  

**Information and sensitivity**  

4.40 There is a need to cross-refer plans for temporary mortuaries with those for managing friends and relatives reception centres. Information arrangements must ensure that information for the bereaved is timely, honest, understandable and accurate. Information should enable relatives to make informed choices, and responding professionals should not make decisions on their behalf. It is extremely important to differentiate viewing a body for identification from viewing a body for grieving purposes.  

4.41 If the next of kin are involved in the identification process, they should normally be accompanied by a police family liaison officer and a support worker from the multi-agency crisis support team. When next of kin are informed of a death, it should be done in person with the family liaison officer and support worker acting as a team. Visual identification is not a scientific approach and mistakes have been made in the past. This can lead to increased trauma for the families involved, legal difficulties and embarrassment for professional individuals and/or agencies. It is best, therefore, to ensure accurate identification is achieved by using a combination of criteria. This may include fingerprints, dental and other medical records, and/or DNA profiles as appropriate. **Families should never be allowed to view numerous bodies in the hope that they will make an identification.**

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23 Details are at Annex D.
4.42 Relatives may also wish to view the body as part of the grieving process. This should only take place after the victim has been identified. It must be remembered that the decision to view an identified body is that of the family, not the police or any other individual/agency. Once the body is released by the coroner it will be taken to the relevant undertaker where premises are purposely designed for this activity. However, relatives may be anxious to view the body before then. Whatever the circumstances once the body has been identified, the family retain the right to view. To prevent such viewing may not only be unlawful but may seriously impact on the grieving process. Medical staff, social services, religious leaders and independent advisors may provide them with information and support. Once again, it should be emphasised that honest information is to enable relatives to make informed choices, not to persuade them to take a particular course.

4.43 If viewing is arranged at the temporary mortuary, suitable support from trained personnel should be available before, during and after. The police family liaison officer should view the body in advance. The officer should then provide the family with appropriate information about the state of the body in a sensitive and compassionate manner. This should include odour, colour, temperature and details of the nature and extent of any injuries. Prior to the family viewing it may be appropriate to offer a photograph if available to prepare them and explain any injuries. The family should be asked if there is anything else they wish to know.

4.44 Arrangements should ensure that:
• a detailed description of the layout is given to the family before attending
• a separate viewing area is available within the temporary mortuary
• access to this area is not through the main temporary mortuary
• only one body is viewed at a particular time
• a suitable area is available where relatives can regain composure following the viewing
• the body is presented in a manner which takes account of the wishes of the relatives with regard to the preservation of dignity for the deceased
• decisions as to whether it is appropriate to clean property or launder clothing are discussed with relatives (the police Senior Investigating Officer, through the Senior Identification Manager should also be consulted on the issue of cleaning – there may be evidential and/or health and safety aspects which will affect decisions concerning this issue).

4.45 Anyone involved in responding to the needs of bereaved relatives should have an awareness of cultural, faith or religious sensitivities. Advice can be sought from appropriate faith, religious or ethnic groups on what is appropriate. It is still vital that assumptions are not made – relatives should be asked what is appropriate for them.
4.46 In planning an inquest, coroners’ officers should give consideration to the bereaved on a number of issues:

- choosing a suitable venue
- informing relatives of time and place, and the possible delaying of an opening if relatives need time to travel
- privacy for the relatives and protection from media and public access
- suitable information on the processes involved so that relatives know what to expect.

4.47 There is a need for exercises to include testing of plans for dealing with fatalities. Lord Justice Clarke’s report\textsuperscript{24} highlights the need for joint training and exercises which will help provide an appropriate and sensitive service to relatives.

**Children**

4.48 Catering for the needs of children raises specific issues. The emotional effects on children are not always immediately obvious to parents or school staff. At times children find it difficult to confide their distress to adults, often because they know it will upset them. In some children the distress can last for months and may affect academic performance. Relatives and professionals who deal with children need to be aware of the range of symptoms that children may show after a major trauma. They should note any changes in behaviour and alert others as set out in contingency plans. There are a number of key issues to consider.

- a) The relay of accurate information to children as well as adults is vital. Schools are particularly prone to rumour, which adds to distress.
- b) The families of children caught up in a tragedy need full and accurate information as quickly as possible.
- c) Formal debriefing meetings for both children and adults are a very important part of the rehabilitation process. Further information on the special arrangements needed when children are caught up in traumatic events are contained in the booklet ‘Wise before the Event – Coping with crises in schools’\textsuperscript{25}.

4.49 Working with children brings its own particular strains – arrangements must include the welfare needs of support workers.

**Faith, Religious and Cultural Needs**

4.50 Any major emergency occurring in the United Kingdom is likely to involve members of faith, religious and ethnic minorities. Emergency services, local authorities and other responders should bear their needs in mind. In communities where this can be anticipated, suitable arrangements should be built into plans. In cases such as transport accidents it is more difficult to predict who will be affected, but planning should at least identify which organisations can provide help or advice and how to engage them.

4.51 Some people may have language difficulties: help from translators and interpreters may therefore be needed. Any interpreters used should be aware of the principles of responding to major emergencies (and will need appropriate support afterwards). Particular religious requirements relate to medical treatment, hygiene, diet and places for prayer. Depending on the

\textsuperscript{24} Public Inquiry into the Identification of Victims following Major Transport Accidents.

\textsuperscript{25} Details are at Annex D.
faith of the deceased or bereaved there may also be concern about how the
dead are handled, and the timing of funeral arrangements.

4.52 Various sections of the faith communities have well-established
emergency arrangements. It is therefore important to integrate their
requirements into general contingency planning as far as possible. Further
advice on the particular needs of faith communities is available in ‘The
Response of the Faith Communities to Major Emergencies: Some

Staff welfare

4.53 Major emergencies place enormous demands on all involved in the
response. Pressure of work may sometimes be sustained over long periods.
There is a need to look after the physical and psychological welfare of staff
in response organisations.

4.54 Health and Safety at Work legislation requires all employers to follow
safe working practices as far as reasonably practicable. There must be
proper assessment of working conditions and of requirements for suitable
equipment, protective clothing etc.

4.55 Other physical requirements include:
• refreshments at any response scene, especially to provide warmth or
prevent dehydration
• facilities for taking meals away from ‘the front line’
• washing and changing facilities
• medical and first aid facilities
• telephone and transport provision so people can keep home informed
and get home as quickly as practical
• shifts of reasonable length and rotas that ensure proper rest.

4.56 With regard to psychological welfare, management should consider the
need for:
• proper briefing to ensure people know what is happening and what
their contribution will be
• honest information about what to expect where unpleasant or stressful
tasks are involved
• quiet space to prepare, unwind or think
• someone to discuss experiences with, both at the time and afterwards
• providing access to information on sources of help or support
• information about what constitutes a normal reaction
• similar support and information should be available for family
or partners.

4.57 It will be enough for many to talk through issues with their colleagues
or peers, perhaps guided by a suitably trained or experienced person. Some,
however, will require skilled professional help. All services should provide
access to this in a way that ensures confidentiality and overcomes any
cultural resistance.

26 Details are at Annex D.
4.58 In areas of activity that are particularly harrowing it is important to advise recruits (be they professional or voluntary workers) of the nature of the work involved. Training and selection arrangements should aim to ensure that suitable staff are chosen, appropriate training is given and support is available.

Memorials Service or Service of Remembrance

4.59 A memorial service provides an opportunity for those affected to share their grief with others. However, it often has an important national as well as local role and is likely to receive extensive media coverage. For these reasons it is important to consider the organisation and structure of such events very carefully, covering such aspects as timing, invitations, representation and conduct. Planning for such occasions should involve all relevant faith communities, representatives of the bereaved, advisors on media coverage and security, the local community, dignitaries and those who provided different aspects of the response.

Disaster Appeals

4.60 Wherever a disaster occurs people often wish to contribute in some way. Even before any appeal has been launched, unsolicited donations are likely to be received by, for example, the local authority. Dealing with donations and accompanying letters will prove to be a time-consuming task and it will probably be seen to be preferable in every way to launch an appeal fund.

4.61 Establishing an appeal fund can be a complex and sensitive task. Appeal fund management involves co-ordinating the handling of donations, weighing the arguments for and against charitable status, appointing independent trustees and eventually distributing funds to the appropriate beneficiaries – all of these activities are fraught with potential pitfalls. They require extensive research, planning and monitoring in order to maximise the response of the public. Advice is available from a number of sources including the British Red Cross Disaster Appeal Scheme (United Kingdom)27.

Evacuation

4.62 In some circumstances it may be necessary to advise the public on whether they should evacuate a given area or stay put and shelter indoors. Such circumstances include risks to life or health from:

- release or threatened release of radioactive materials
- release or threatened release of other hazardous substances
- spread of fire
- threat of explosion
- damage caused by severe storms
- threat from serious flooding
- threat of environmental contamination.

4.63 The possible need for evacuation in the event of the release, or threatened release, of radioactive material is set out in Arrangements for Responding to Nuclear Emergencies28.

27 Details are at Annex D.
28 Details of this document are at Annex D and so evacuation resulting from the release of radioactive materials is not considered further in this chapter.
4.64 In the event of the release, or threatened release, of non-radioactive hazardous materials, additional information on the nature of the risk may be obtained from the fire service, from chemical data systems and other accredited sources. Currently emergency arrangements exist with the Meteorological Office to forecast the direction and spread of any chemical plume, using information provided from the scene together with remote telemetry.

4.65 The Meteorological Office and/or Regional Weather Centres issue severe weather warnings of severe storms or other adverse weather. In addition, the Meteorological Office issues warnings of abnormally high tides that could possibly lead to flooding to the police and to the Environment Agency. The Environment Agency is responsible for issuing flood warnings to the public and other organisations on specific rivers and coastline.

4.66 It is normally the police who recommend whether or not to evacuate and define the area to be evacuated. Their recommendation will take account of advice from other agencies. The fire service will inform them about risks associated with fire, contamination and other hazards; ambulance and social services can advise on problems associated with moving people who are frail, disabled or at risk for any other reason. Local authorities can advise on the location of pre-designated rest centres and on other possible places of shelter within the area.

4.67 The police can only recommend evacuation and have no power (except within the inner cordon in response to a terrorist incident) to require responsible adults to leave their homes. Past experience has shown that people with domestic pets may be unwilling to leave their homes unless arrangements include their pets.

4.68 In deciding whether to evacuate or not, it is necessary to assess whether bringing people outdoors may put people at greater risk than leaving them where they are to shelter indoors. This is particularly important in the case of the release of hazardous substances, or where terrorist devices may be present. When planning for contingencies, building occupiers should seek professional advice on whether there are areas in the building where people can shelter safely. Such areas must be structurally robust and should be equipped with telephones, first aid facilities, adjacent toilet facilities and a water supply.

4.69 The physical and organisational difficulties of large-scale evacuation should not be underestimated. There are particular problems in evacuating hospitals, prisons and nursing homes. Evacuation is usually a last resort because of the length of time it takes.

4.70 However, when there is a decision to evacuate, evacuation assembly points should be set up near the affected area. If time permits, these should be signposted. People in the affected area should be advised to go to their
nearest evacuation assembly point. People taking prescribed and other medications should be reminded to carry these with them, and particular attention needs to be paid to those with sensory impairment.

4.71 Bearing in mind that evacuation may be at different times of day or night and from locations as different as homes, industrial complexes, shopping malls, venues, ports or airports among others, various methods can be used for warning and informing the public: loud-hailers, tannoy, mobile public address systems, radio or TV announcements, works sirens, display screens, scoreboards and monitors or various combinations of these methods.

4.72 The police will, as far as is practicable, take steps to ensure the security of property left empty after evacuation. In the event of an extended evacuation, the local authority may have planned for, or have to consider, other security arrangements. These may involve a contractor.

4.73 Arrangements for warning, evacuation and for securing property, must take account of any safety risks to emergency service and local authority personnel which arise from exposure to hazards.

4.74 At the evacuation assembly point the dispersal of evacuees to survivor reception centres or rest centres must be co-ordinated. Reception and rest centres should maintain a comprehensive index of evacuees and their whereabouts. The police will need this information initially for casualty bureau purposes. They may also need it later if it they have to interview witnesses.

4.75 In order to account for all evacuees from an affected area it is important to encourage those leaving reception or rest centres to register their intended destination when they leave, whether they are returning home or staying elsewhere. Rest centres should be staffed by local authority personnel and trained volunteers who can provide the appropriate mix of service and support.
5 INFORMATION AND THE MEDIA

Introduction

5.1 Recent years have seen a rapid advance in telecommunication and information technology capabilities. Television channels broadcasting 24 hours a day are now a permanent feature of our everyday lives. The impact made at the scene of a disaster by those engaged in gathering material for the media can be massive and it is vital to prepare for the influx of media representatives – local, national and international.

5.2 The purpose of this chapter is to highlight some of the issues which can arise in satisfying the media’s thirst for information in the event of a major emergency and to suggest arrangements for overcoming those problems.

Assisting the Media

5.3 In the first instance, the task of coping with media pressures usually falls to the police in their role as co-ordinators of the management of the response at and around an emergency scene and with their responsibility for criminal investigation. But there are other aspects – temporary accommodation for victims and perhaps their relatives and friends, safety of damaged buildings, road access and so on – which call for a quick reaction by local authorities. They too must therefore be involved in the media response from the outset. Depending on the nature of events, attention may also focus on industrial operators and commercial or other organisations.

Initial Actions

5.4 Media personnel will arrive very quickly and can quickly reserve all available accommodation in the area. They will often have learnt of a major emergency at the same time as the emergency services. When they arrive, they will expect to have access to the facilities they require. They will also expect an instant response to their requests for information and briefing. Demands from local and regional media will quickly be augmented by demands from national and possibly international media. If these demands are not anticipated, media representatives are likely to add to the confusion.

5.5 Experience has shown the value of dealing immediately with a number of key issues.

Control of access to the emergency scene

5.6 This is a police responsibility, put in place whenever practical. Restricting access aims to allow rescue services to carry out their work unhindered and to preserve evidence at what may be the scene of a crime. It has to be anticipated that the broadcasting media in particular will bring large communications vehicles to the scene. In addition, media helicopters
are often deployed and control of the airspace should be an early consideration.

**Establishing a media liaison point**

5.7 This is a designated point close to an emergency scene, preferably (but not always) outside the outer cordon. It is for the reception of media personnel, checks on their bona fides and briefing on arrangements for reporting, filming and photography. It may be little more than a rendezvous point with further facilities provided at a media centre.

**Nominating a media liaison officer**

5.8 The swift attendance at the scene of a media contact (likely to be from the police) should ease the pressure from the media. Failure to arrange this will prompt media representatives to approach anybody available, which could lend credibility to inaccurate sources. A media contact will take pressure off other responders. However, brief interviews with senior police, fire, and ambulance officers at the site, as well as with specialists from appropriate agencies such as rail or airport officials, will add authority to the information being given.

**Assistance from the Government News Network (GNN)**

5.9 Consideration should be given to seeking reinforcement from one of the eight network offices of the GNN. GNN can supply experienced press officers at any time (at no cost for the first 24 hours). They will arrive with their own communications facilities and technical support equipment. Assistance can range from helping to staff a media centre to acting as liaison officers with the lead government department (see Chapter 7) and handling VIP visits.

5.10 The media will use all means of communication and any available member of the response teams to gather information. It is vital that information is properly co-ordinated and shared so as to avoid the emergence of different or even contradictory messages. The nominated media liaison officer should co-ordinate the media response from the earliest possible stage. Others should deal only with issues that fall within their own area of responsibility unless prior agreement has been reached. Even then, it is important to let everyone else know what they are going to say.

5.11 In addition, at this most difficult initial stage of the response, it may be helpful to bear the following points in mind.

a) On arrival at the scene the media will keep open channels on mobile telephones to ensure instant access to their editors. It is possible to anticipate this and protect the cellular telephone system from saturation by invoking the Access Overload Control for Cellular Radio Telephones (ACCOLC) whereby Providers (Vodafone, Cellnet etc.) will manage the network to ensure priority of access to those organisations which are ACCOLC registered\(^29\). However, once a line is open, it cannot be closed. It is important to remember that invoking

\(^29\) See Chapter 3 under ‘Communications’ for details on ACCOLC registration and invocation.
ACCOLC is a two-edged sword: non-registered users, who may nonetheless be important to the emergency in question, may not be so easily contactable once ACCOLC is invoked.

b) The media may need to be reminded that in the initial response period no-one can know precisely what has happened. Initial statements should focus on what is happening, what the limitations of knowledge are at the time and what is being done to arrive at a fuller appreciation of the situation. If such statements are backed by a commitment to provide accurate information as soon as it is available, media personnel are more likely to attend briefings and thus accept a measure of co-ordination, particularly if the briefings are scheduled at regular intervals.

c) The media will welcome any factual statements, particularly from eye witnesses within the emergency services. However, such statements should not include speculation on causal factors, nor premature or uncorroborated estimates of the numbers of casualties.

d) Care should be taken that information about casualties is not released until details have been confirmed and next of kin informed. It may be necessary to explain that it can take a long time to identify victims. Only the coroner or police may authorise the release of information about individuals.

e) Limitations on the release of information, often because of the need to avoid prejudicing what may become a criminal prosecution, should be clearly and frankly explained.

5.12 There will be great pressure to obtain interviews with survivors and relatives but many will feel too shocked and distressed to give interviews. The first consideration should always be the well-being of the individual. It does, however, relieve pressure on all concerned if a willing and able survivor, relative or friend agrees to speak at a press conference to characterise the events for all. Press officers of involved organisations should support relatives and survivors, advising them prior to any media exposure and helping them to prepare a statement. It should always be borne in mind, however, that some sections of the press may aggressively pursue survivors and relatives and can cause particular distress. Behaviour by the less responsible elements of the media may include harassment, invasion of privacy, intrusion into grief and shock, unwanted involvement of relatives and friends and interviewing or photographing children.

5.13 It is important to develop the best possible relationship with media personnel from the start. Pressure of competition between media teams and individuals will make them sensitive to any restrictions which appear to them to be unfair. If they feel they have been treated unreasonably, some representatives of the media will try to make their own arrangements. This may obstruct rescue work and compromise evidence for any necessary investigation. Well-managed media relations should alleviate these problems. It should also allow positive advantage to be taken of the help which the media can provide, for example by broadcasting appeals for blood donors, publicising details of any evacuation arrangements or broadcasting casualty bureau telephone numbers.
5.14 The management of large numbers of media representatives can be assisted through ‘pooling’ arrangements. A pool might, for example, comprise one television crew, one news agency such as the Press Association, a photographer and a radio reporter. Pooling may be particularly helpful if safety or security considerations restrict access to an emergency scene.

5.15 A pool should only be operated when absolutely necessary. Although a limit can be set on the number of media personnel to be allowed access to the site, such restrictions are seldom welcome and it is best to allow the media to decide who their representatives should be. Additional pooling facilities may be required for overseas media representatives.

5.16 It is helpful to identify suitable sites for coverage of the scene by media personnel who are not included in pooling arrangements at the time.

### A Media Response Organisation

5.17 In the event of a major emergency, the initial actions just described may be no more than holding arrangements. As the situation develops, the need for a comprehensive media response organisation headed by someone who equates to a public relations manager may become apparent. It is recognised that not all organisations or agencies have such a person, but experience has shown it to be extremely helpful. The public relations manager for the emergency can be from the police or appropriate local authority, depending on circumstances and locally agreed plans.

5.18 It is essential for the public relations manager to be fully involved in the senior management arrangements for the emergency, for example by attending Strategic Co-ordination Group meetings, so that he or she is fully in the picture and can plan the media response.

5.19 The public relations manager should oversee all aspects of the media response:

- activities at the media liaison point
- arrangements for the media to visit any scene, possibly including transport where events have occurred in a remote area
- accreditation of media personnel
- management of the media centre when one is established
- monitoring of likely media activities related to the emergency but at locations remote from a primary scene
- monitoring of media coverage
- support of those who choose to be interviewed and protection of the privacy of those who do not wish to be interviewed.

### Media Centre

5.20 A major emergency may also justify the establishment of a media centre to provide working accommodation for media personnel, a news conference and briefing area, facilities for monitoring television, radio and newspapers and a press office with communications equipment. The media centre may be set up by the police or by the local authority or, in collaboration with the police, by the principal organisation or company involved in the emergency.
5.21 Responsibility for establishing the centre should be agreed in advance as part of the planning process. Arrangements should anticipate the need for additional communications facilities to be readily available. It should, wherever possible, be close to any incident scene. Representatives of the major organisations responsible for handling the emergency should staff the centre. These should be people familiar with media relations – information officers wherever possible. Consideration should be given to inclusion of government press officers and seeking assistance from the regional GNN, which has expertise in setting up media centres and also has resources to help run them.

5.22 Experience has shown that arrangements for a media centre to cope with the demands of the media are extensive. The difficulties of setting up a media centre should not be underestimated and plans should be comprehensive yet flexible.

5.23 Buildings should be identified in emergency plans which can be used as a media centre, although experience has shown that facilities can be set up rapidly in many suitable buildings. Such centres offer a number of advantages to all concerned.

a) They provide the media representatives with a known source for the most accurate and up-to-date information which the authorities can make available.

b) Once links with the rescuers and others central to the emergency response are in place and media contacts have been nominated, smooth flows of information can soon be established, compared and co-ordinated.

c) There is a better chance of identifying and dealing with any potential differences in approach. Agreed approaches can be quickly relayed to the emergency services and other control centres.

d) Co-ordinating information from the media centre should help to control media presence at the site, whether this is for photo opportunities or briefing, and assist with the support of those directly affected.

e) Monitoring arrangements may be set up at the media centre to enable all concerned to be aware of what the media are broadcasting or publishing.

f) In the event of a widespread or multi-site disaster, a single media centre could serve as a focus for several media liaison points at differing locations.

g) The same media centre may suffice for both the initial response and the recovery phase.

5.24 Normally, the police will take the initial lead in dealing with the media as part of their role in managing the co-ordination of the response. As the emphasis switches to the recovery phase, the co-ordination management role may pass to the relevant local authority, who might then take the lead in dealing with continued media interest and providing any necessary public advice and information. Close and continuing co-operation between the
police and local authority media teams from the outset will achieve a smooth handover.

5.25 In some circumstances – for example, when the focus of media interest moves to NHS hospitals after the initial phase of the response – it may be appropriate for appropriate Health Service representatives to take control of the media operation. Again, a handover will be smoother if the police (particularly the casualty bureau) and NHS media teams have been working in close co-operation from the outset.

Remote Handling

5.26 In some disasters attention has focused on communities and individuals living many miles from the scene who nevertheless become a centre of media attention. An example is the home town of people killed whilst travelling. This too may require co-ordinated media-handling arrangements to ensure an efficient and coherent response from the authorities, which may need to include measures to protect people from excessive media attention.

Liaison with Central Government

5.27 A major emergency inevitably results in requests for ministerial briefing and statements. It is the responsibility of the lead government department (see Chapter 7) to co-ordinate a consistent and properly considered response by central government. On media matters, therefore, Chief Constables and local authority Chief Executives should look to the emergency centre of the lead government department as their main central government contact, which in turn will direct press officers accordingly.

5.28 In practice, government press officers may need to be quickly available in order to:

• explain the involvement of government or the relevant regulatory body in the response
• be involved with any arrangements for VIP visits
• provide feedback to central government.

5.29 When central government accident investigators are called in, the involvement of the relevant government department press office may continue far beyond the initial stages of a disaster.

Information to the Public

5.30 Any major emergency will result in widespread public interest and concern. It should be anticipated that any large volume of requests for information could overwhelm an organisation and its normal public relations function. Media plans should set out guidance on how best to ensure that the public is regularly informed of essential facts throughout the incident, including details of action being taken and appropriate telephone numbers to contact.

5.31 Under certain legislation, such as the COMAH regulations (Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1998) and REPPIR, the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001, there is a duty to provide information to the public. REPPIR specifically aims to

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30 Bibliographical Details are at Annex D for both.
ensure that members of the public likely to be, or actually affected by, a radiation emergency, are given appropriate information. It is the duty of the site operator to prepare and disseminate prior information; local government is required to ensure that information is received by those actually affected by an emergency. The arrangements to provide this information should be integrated into the wider media response plan.

5.32 The Government Information and Communication Service (GICS), is supporting a BBC initiative called ‘Connecting in a Crisis’

5.33 In the event of an emergency, this framework will provide essential information, warnings, advice and reassurance in the first few hours – the very time when the public are likely to be most in danger and most in need of information about what is happening or what they need to do to protect themselves.

Media Emergency Forum

5.34 The national Media Emergency Forum (MEF) is an ad hoc group of senior media editors, government representatives, local authority emergency planners, blue light services and private industry set up to consider media issues arising from civil contingencies and, since 11 September 2001, from terrorist attacks.

5.35 This work is being mirrored with the inauguration of a number of regional MEFs to give a regional perspective to the national group’s work but more importantly to forge links between government, both local and central, emergency services and the regional and local media.

5.36 Details of your local MEF can be obtained via your local Government News Network office.

Visits by VIPs

5.37 Visits by VIPs, which will be co-ordinated by the police, can lift the morale of those affected as well as those who are involved with the response. A government minister may make an early visit to the scene or areas affected, not only to mark public concern but also to be able to report to Parliament on the response. A government minister visiting the scene may be accompanied by local Members of Parliament. This would be arranged by the Minister’s Private Office. It is possible that the scale of a disaster may, in addition, prompt visits by a member of the Royal Family and/or the Prime Minister. Local VIP visitors may include the Lord Lieutenant, the High Sheriff, religious leaders, local MPs, mayors, chairmen and other elected representatives. If foreign nationals have been involved, their country’s Ambassador, High Commissioner or other dignitaries may also want to visit key locations.

31 Website details are at Annex G.
5.38 Visits to the scene of an emergency need to take account of the local situation and the immediate effects on the local community. It may be inappropriate for VIP visitors to go to a disaster site itself whilst rescue operations are still going on, particularly if casualties are still trapped. VIP visits should not interrupt rescue and lifesaving work and the police must be consulted about the timing of visits.

5.39 VIP visits will inevitably cause some disruption, and visitors will want this to be kept to a minimum. The additional need for security may also cause a problem. However, there are also dividends to be gained from such visits as they may boost the morale of all those involved, including the injured and the emergency services, and give an opportunity to place on record public gratitude for what has been done.

5.40 The emergency services are experienced at handling VIP visits in normal circumstances and many of the usual considerations will apply to visits to a disaster site. However, it may be necessary to restrict media coverage of such visits, in which case pooling arrangements may be made.

5.41 Visiting Ministers and other VIPs will require comprehensive briefing before visiting the site and will require briefing before any meetings with the media.

5.42 VIPs are likely to want to meet those survivors who are well enough to see them. It will be for the hospitals to decide, on the basis of medical advice and respect for the wishes of individual patients and their relatives, whether it is appropriate for VIPs and/or the media to visit casualties. If the media cannot have access to wards, VIPs can still be interviewed afterwards at the hospital entrance about how patients and medical staff are coping. Such VIP visits are best managed by an independent team in close consultation with the police.

Sustainability

5.43 Major emergencies place enormous demands on all involved in the response. Media interest, particularly if it is international, can create pressure throughout a 24-hour period and careful planning of staggered handovers is essential. Chief Constables and local authority Chief Executives will wish to take the sustainability of the level of response to the media into account, and seek mutual aid accordingly. The pooling of resources in a joint media centre should be helpful in this respect. It needs to be remembered that sustainability applies not only to operational personnel but also to those involved in providing clerical support.

5.44 In the much longer term, experience has shown that media interest is revived on anniversaries of events, and chief officers may wish to give consideration as to how these occasions should be handled.
5.45 Where there has been a considerable amount of media attention there will be inevitable strains between media and emergency service interests. There is much to be gained by inviting senior media representatives to meet with senior members of the emergency services some weeks after a disaster to discuss how both sides saw the way information was managed and to identify any lessons to be learned.
6 THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR

Introduction

6.1 Major emergencies can overstretch the resources of the emergency services and local authorities. The value of additional support from the voluntary sector has been demonstrated on many occasions. This chapter addresses the planning principles.

6.2 Those preparing civil contingency plans should be aware of the wide spectrum of operational and support activities covered by the voluntary sector in the United Kingdom.

- There are established organisations that provide a range of services such as Women’s Royal Voluntary Service, the Salvation Army, the British Red Cross Society, St John Ambulance Brigade (or St Andrew’s in Scotland).
- Many individual volunteers have particular skills, but are not necessarily in recognised voluntary organisations: for example, interpreters or representatives from the faith communities.
- Certain organisations contribute specialist skills in various types of activity:
  - search and rescue organisations such as the British Cave Rescue Council (BCRC), Coastguard Response Teams (HM Coastguard’s Auxiliary branch), the Mountain Rescue Council (MRC), the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI), the International Rescue Corps (IRC), search and rescue dog teams
  - groups of doctors such as the British Association for Immediate Care Schemes (BASICS)
  - voluntary radio operators such as the Radio Amateurs Network (RAYNET)
  - Non-Government Organisations (NGOs)
  - organisations which specialise in providing emotional support and counselling such as Cruse Bereavement Care and the Samaritans.

6.3 Annex B sets out examples of the wide-ranging support activities volunteers can provide and of the statutory organisations with which they frequently work.

Planning the Voluntary Sector’s Contribution

6.4 The voluntary sector in the United Kingdom is large and diverse. The skills and expertise available from the voluntary sector may vary from place to place. Experience shows that advance planning makes voluntary activity more effective. Setting up a voluntary sector co-ordinating group at local level can help co-operation between the statutory services and local voluntary organisations. A representative of local authority civil protection
will normally chair such a group. A record of available local voluntary resources should be maintained.

6.5 Joint planning should aim to define a mutually agreed structure. This structure needs to suit local circumstances, be understood by all concerned and have clearly identified points of contact. Arrangements must be kept up to date by regular formal and informal contact at local level.

6.6 One method of involving voluntary organisations in civil contingency planning is to group them where appropriate on the basis of their functions, and link them with the statutory authority responsible for those functions. This functional grouping can clarify the contributions which individual voluntary organisations can make. It can prevent duplicated demands on their services and enable statutory authorities and voluntary organisations to make the best use of the voluntary contribution.

6.7 In some cases there will be one statutory authority and one voluntary organisation linked to a specific function; for example Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI). In other cases, where a voluntary organisation performs a range of functions, it would need to be associated with more than one statutory authority and represented on all the relevant functional groups. In all cases, local emergency planning officers should be fully aware of the level of voluntary service available and the arrangements for its provision.

6.8 It is important to be precise on the accountability of volunteers to a professional agency because of issues of legal liability, including statutory requirements under the Children Act, and because of insurance indemnity issues. Agencies using volunteers may become responsible for the health and safety of volunteers and will need to ensure that they are properly equipped, trained, supervised and supported. Where the voluntary sector could be reasonably expected to work within an inner cordon, they should make arrangements to obtain the necessary skills and personal protective equipment to allow them to operate in safety.

6.9 It is of vital importance that, if an emergency occurs, the voluntary sector should be able to contribute what has been mutually agreed and written into local plans. Voluntary agencies have therefore to be able to demonstrate their capabilities and that their support is reliable, consistent and sustainable to the required standard.

6.10 The statutory and voluntary sectors should be clear about their respective roles in an emergency. They each have their own structures and constraints. Voluntary organisations must appreciate that the statutory services bear the responsibility for the overall emergency response. Equally, the statutory services must develop an understanding of the voluntary sector as a rich resource for personnel, professional skills and equipment.

6.11 There should be agreement and effective plans on the use of volunteers, the decision-making process leading to their call-out and the

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More general issues of planning and preparing are discussed in Chapter 8.
Training and Exercising

6.12 When considering the particular contribution which the voluntary sector can make, it should be noted that established voluntary organisations and volunteer groups will usually have their own training arrangements. They should be able to demonstrate their effectiveness to the local statutory services.

6.13 Additionally, the statutory services and voluntary agencies should aim for joint training and exercising. It is very important that voluntary organisations understand the management framework of the response and how they fit into the response as a whole. There will be some overlap between the functions and capabilities of different voluntary organisations. Joint exercising will identify any problems, ensure plans and procedures are up-to-date and foster working relationships.

6.14 Effective communication, planning and training should aim to identify opportunities for sharing heavy workloads and providing mutual support. General issues of training and exercising are further discussed in Chapter 8.

Alerting, call-out and reporting arrangements

6.15 Plans should include effective procedures for alerting or calling out voluntary organisations. Early alert is desirable because of the lead time needed for contacting and assembling teams in organisations other than the emergency services. Contingency arrangements should reflect this.

6.16 Voluntary organisations should not attend an emergency unbidden. A call-out of volunteers should normally ask them to assemble at a rendezvous point before they are assigned to tasks. Where there are a number of voluntary organisations providing support within the same or related functional areas, a cascade call-out system may prove useful.

6.17 Volunteers should have clear identification. People who need to check identities should be familiar with the kind of documents which are likely to be presented. It is desirable for them to operate in teams, with a leader who has responsibility for their briefing, welfare and debriefing. A prolonged response may require voluntary organisations to operate a shift system. In planning for this the use of prearranged mutual aid from neighbours or from further afield should be considered.

6.18 Volunteers who are not part of any voluntary organisation may also wish to offer their services. The local authority, in conjunction with the police, should establish a volunteer receiving point away from the scene to deal with such approaches. It is important to establish credentials for certain types of activity. If the volunteer receiving point wishes to accept the offer of help, the volunteer can then report to a rendezvous point or other designated position. It should be noted that individual volunteers may require a considerable amount of management and leadership if they are to be effective.
7 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND LEAD DEPARTMENTS

The Lead Government Department Concept

7.1 It is fundamental to the arrangements for dealing with most major emergencies in the United Kingdom that the first response is at the local level. Where local services find that the scale of events puts it beyond the capacity of their own resources, their recourse is usually to mutual aid arrangements with services in adjacent areas. Central government departments with a potential interest in the events in question may limit their involvement to keeping abreast of developments and dealing with parliamentary, media and public enquiries.

7.2 There are occasions, however, when central government becomes more involved. The initial central response should then come from a lead government department. The concept of a lead government department aims to make it clear in advance to all levels of government which department will be in the lead for as many potential challenges as possible. They can thus plan ahead and should be ready to move into action immediately in times of crisis. The list of pre-nominated leads appears on the Civil Contingencies Secretariat website at www.ukresilience.info/handling.htm

7.3 The lead government department is responsible for alerting the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) of the Cabinet Office as soon as it considers that any incident (or potential incident) is likely to require collective consideration by a range of departments. The CCS is then in a position to assess the broad picture. Where the lead is not clear the CCS is responsible for taking the immediate lead until it has the Prime Minister’s endorsement of its advice on which department should take the lead.

7.4 The CCS will be available to lend its support at the earliest opportunity to a lead department and then work in close partnership with it until the resolution of the emergency.

Criteria for choosing LGDs

7.5 The choice of lead government department (LGD) is based on

*The nature of the crisis or emergency.*
There is usually a clear link between the nature of the events in question and the normal business of the government department.

*Access to information.*
Ready access to a flow of up-to-date and accurate information is essential for a Lead Government Department. The chance of achieving this is greater if officials of the department, agencies and organisations concerned know each other and have worked together.
The public information division of the LGD has a special responsibility for ensuring that information originating from central government is consistent with what is being given locally.

**The availability of facilities**
Where events are large-scale or protracted, it may be necessary to use a dedicated emergency room. Those departments most likely to need to act as Lead Government Departments have such facilities.

7.6 The nomination of a Lead Government Department (LGD) does not affect the underlying principle that day-to-day procedures and links should always be used. Local organisations should aim to use normal links with government departments rather than channelling all dealings through the LGD. However, for some major emergencies, the LGD will need to co-ordinate the government response. Local authorities and emergency services have been given details of how to seek clarification of the LGD if necessary.

7.7 All departments have a responsibility to plan, prepare, train and exercise for handling crises and emergencies that might occur within their field of responsibility. They must be ready to take on the leading role on behalf of central government in managing the initial response to a crisis, mitigating its immediate effects, and organising the development of a recovery plan.

**Preparation and Planning**
7.8 Each government department must maintain a state of readiness. It must build up its resilience to shocks and its capacity to lead the response to the emergencies for which it is nominated.

7.9 This means planning, training and exercising (alongside those likely to have a stake in potential crises) so that it is able to pick up the reins quickly and effectively. This preparatory work should ensure that the department is clear about its contacts at local and regional level and with devolved administrations. It must define the working relationships it wants to have with them in the event of an emergency. It should also identify the other departments, devolved administrations and agencies whose interests will be affected and whose assistance will be needed.

7.10 On the immediate, practical level, it must maintain and equip a facility for use as an emergency control centre.

7.11 It must identify the capabilities that the local responders and those at each level of crisis management should be able to call upon (for example: for evacuating large numbers, treating large numbers of casualties, providing accurate and reassuring information, accessing specialist supplies and technical and scientific expertise, and so on). The Department should build up its capabilities so that it is in a position to deal with a number of potential scenarios, looking to the CCS for advice, guidance and support.
7.12 It needs to keep abreast of the changing set of risks, threats and vulnerabilities which bear upon its fields of responsibility, co-operating with the Assessment Directorate of the CCS.

7.13 It must lead negotiations with the Treasury for any necessary additional funds.

Handling an Event

7.14 Departments must move into action immediately an emergency arises where they are designated as having the lead. Normally this will be contained within the Department’s own contingency management arrangements. But where the LGD identifies a potential or actual civil emergency that poses a major disruptive challenge to the UK, and where the Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC) of Ministers (chaired normally by the Home Secretary) may have to be convened to provide central oversight, then it will need to:

a) act as the focal point for communications between central government and any local multi-agency strategic co-ordinating group on the ground; having a government liaison officer on the SCG can be a vital link in this respect;

b) produce a brief, accurate situation report on the nature and scale of the emergency and submit this promptly – along with the first briefing for media purposes – to No 10, the Chairman of the CCC and the head of the CCS;

c) produce as soon as possible a handling plan which offers a clear assessment of whether the emergency is within the scope of the lead government department or whether central co-ordination arrangements need to be invoked; the decision on this will be for the head of the CCS in close consultation with the lead department;

d) draw upon and apply the relevant resources for the emergency in hand;

e) co-ordinate the support needed from other government departments and agencies;

f) take whatever executive decisions and actions are needed to handle the emergency from the centre or to provide specialist advice or assistance which helps the local responders to deal with it;

g) co-ordinate and disseminate information for the public and the media at the national level, collaborating with the News Co-ordination Centre (NCC) of the Government Information and Communication Service (GICS) and any local media relations manager;

h) account to Parliament and lead in the submission of evidence to any subsequent public inquiry;

i) learn and share the lessons from the emergency, again in collaboration with the CCS.

7.15 The way in which a government department performs its lead role will depend on the circumstances. In straightforward cases no special arrangements may be necessary: LGD officials will work from their normal offices or, out of normal working hours, from home. Where circumstances...
demand, the LGD would activate special procedures, such as opening an emergency control centre. It may also need to arrange regular meetings of other involved government departments.

7.16 However these activities are organised, the LGD must ensure that central government does not make duplicated or unjustified requests for information to the local strategic co-ordination group or to those engaged at the scene. It is important that other departments see the LGD as the prime source for all information at government level; they should channel requests for information through the LGD, not through local organisations.

The Role of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)

7.17 The Civil Contingencies Secretariat was not set up to manage all crises, nor is it resourced or designed to do so. The CCS role, under the leadership of the Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC), is to provide the central focus for the cross-departmental and cross-agency commitment, co-ordination and co-operation that will enable the UK to deal effectively with disruptive challenges and crises. This focus goes beyond first response and consequence management and applies to our systems for anticipating and identifying new challenges, for assessing risks. It embraces planning, preparing and exercising for crises so that we build up our resilience to them. It also has a role in identifying lessons learned from particular events, disseminating them to interested parties and for applying systematically the lessons learned.

7.18 In the event of an emergency of a scale or kind that the LGD deems to require central involvement, the CCS will engage so as to enable the department’s Ministers and senior officials to concentrate on strategic decisions. Key objectives will be smooth working between organisations and seamless transition to central co-ordination if required. Working very closely with the department concerned, the CCS will:

a) provide an assessment of immediate needs, and support their provision;

b) establish possible scenarios up to worst case;

c) plan for scaling up, managing logistics and identifying exit criteria;

d) ensure that the centre and other interested departments are kept informed and are prepared to engage;

e) help establish structures, rhythms, routines and data flows for managing the response – in particular facilitating augmentation of the LGD’s resources and public information systems;

f) connect the department with agencies that are able to provide specialist advice and information;

g) decide whether and when to approach the CCC Chairman to convene a meeting, and thereafter provide ongoing support from the centre.

7.19 The CCS starts from the premise that a vital component of the country’s resilience is the ability of central government to manage national capacity and capability effectively. The Secretariat will seek to work in close partnership with LGDs, helping them to:

a) enable and protect their own decision takers;
b) develop their own early warning systems;

c) prepare plans against various eventualities and make sure those plans are properly integrated with those of other departments and agencies;

d) identify the training and exercises needed to test the plans and enable continuous improvements;

e) build up the necessary management and professional expertise to maintain and activate the plans and to know where to turn for reinforcement and augmentation;

f) learn, and share their learning, with other departments.

7.20 Each devolved administration has its own civil protection and lead organisation arrangements. These vary according to the terms of devolution settlements and local administrative arrangements. Each administration has systems for co-ordinating the multi-agency response to major emergencies happening within its borders, or the local response to incidents happening elsewhere. Where the response falls within devolved responsibilities, co-ordination would normally fall to a lead department within the DA itself.

7.21 For incidents contained entirely within a devolved region, and where the response falls within their devolved responsibilities, the DA concerned would normally take full responsibility for planning and for all response and consequence management activities within its authority. It would also liaise, as appropriate with the Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland Offices, with any UK-wide departments or agencies involved in the response and ensure that CCS was briefed as necessary.

7.22 For incidents affecting more than one DA, each would implement its own response, lead department, decision-making and co-ordination arrangements in relation to devolved matters. Additionally they would liaise with local lead organisations in other parts of the UK, departments and agencies with a wider geographical remit and the CCS. This liaison would aim to share information, discuss policy and ensure a co-ordinated response across the UK.

7.23 Certain events may occur which relate to non-devolved matters where, regardless of location, the lead UK government department or organisation would have responsibility for immediate containment. In all such instances, the UK lead would liaise closely with its contacts in the DAs: for example, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency leads on marine safety across the UK and has a presence in all four countries.

7.24 Ministers in the DAs are fully engaged in civil contingency planning. They are members of the CCC. This reflects the wider principle that resilience is an issue that bears on all parts of the UK. It also recognises that those nearest to the area most affected may be the best placed to co-ordinate but also that the response required and the effects of wide-scale incidents may be felt across borders within the UK.
8 THE COMBINED APPROACH TO PLANNING, TRAINING, EXERCISING AND PLAN VALIDATION

Introduction

8.1 At the core of emergency preparedness is that part of the resilience framework which statutory organisations have evolved for joint planning, training and exercising at local level. For an effective response they must combine their expertise and skills and link them with those of other organisations – commercial, industrial and voluntary. This chapter offers guidance on these subjects.

The Combined Approach to Preparedness

8.2 Building resilience requires co-operation between chief officers and their staffs, and such co-operation is itself likely to be more effective if it is properly structured. Experience shows that effective structures often start with the establishment of a police-led strategic emergency co-ordinating group in which chief officers of the emergency services, local representatives of NHS management and local authority chief executives meet at intervals to set strategy, consider plans, procedures, joint training and exercises and identify appropriate funding requirements.

8.3 Representation on such groups needs to evolve for local circumstances. Arrangements need to recognise that boundaries between agencies are not co-terminous and that hazards and risks do not fall neatly within boundaries.

Planning

8.4 In support of the strategic group, working groups will carry out and co-ordinate the necessary detailed planning activities. These lower level arrangements will involve relevant contingency and emergency planning officers whose job is primarily concerned with civil protection in all its forms.

8.5 Sub-groups may arise with responsibility for addressing particular issues – perhaps a forum looking at issues pertinent to an area with a concentration of chemical sites, or a safety advisory group that looks at co-ordinating safety arrangements for sporting and entertainment events in the area. Such groups will need representation from the appropriate specialist sectors concerned.

Types of plan

8.6 The general term of ‘emergency plan’ covers a wide range of plan types which may be generic or which cover specific arrangements for a site, event or function.

a) Generic plans establish the core framework. They may be designed to cater for a wide range of eventualities over a fairly wide geographical area. Generic plans will typically establish:
• aims and objectives of the plan and civil protection policy
• emergency management framework
• definitions of roles and responsibilities
• agreed protocols for alerting and/or calling out responding organisations
• activation arrangements for different levels of response
• arrangements for providing public information and dealing with the media
• key communication arrangements
• welfare arrangements for evacuation and shelter
• frameworks for sharing information on resources
• frameworks for sharing information on community make-up.

The general purpose contingency plans that local government county, district or unitary authorities produce in Great Britain are typical examples of these generic plans.

b) Site-specific emergency plans are prepared for particular sites – industrial plants, airports, stadia etc. Some of these are required by legislation; for example, those required at airports or at certain types of industrial sites in Britain under the COMAH (Control of Major Accident Hazards) regulations\(^\text{33}\).

On-site plans will take into account appropriate features, processes, materials and activities within the boundaries of the site; they will include details of prevention and initial response measures, key personnel, etc.

Off-site plans will be more concerned with what happens around the site – access arrangements, cordons, rendezvous points, public information, evacuation considerations, etc. (Under COMAH regulations, both on-site and off-site plans must be prepared.)

c) Event-specific (or scenario-specific) planning addresses either planned or unplanned events. Planned events include festivals, sporting occasions, state funerals etc. Unplanned events address the issues raised by occurrences such as flooding, epidemics, industrial action etc.

d) Function-specific plans focus on particular functional units within the response: temporary mortuary, casualty bureau, media centre, rest centre, friends and relatives reception centre, etc.

8.7 The strategic emergency co-ordinating group will want to ensure that local plans cover all reasonably foreseeable local eventualities. They should collaborate to ensure compatibility and consistency.

8.8 It is good practice to involve others whose responsibilities are particularly relevant to local resilience. This includes statutory bodies such as the Environment Agency and industrial and commercial organisations. The Health and Safety Executive may also act as a source of expert knowledge and provide information about hazards and risks; such an input may be of value in ensuring that preparedness covers industrial risks for which there is no statutory planning requirement.

\(^{33}\text{Bibliographical details are at Annex D.}\)
Further planning issues

8.9 The strategic emergency co-ordinating group may also want to consider issues which almost invariably cause difficulties during a major emergency.

8.10 Historically, communications have often proved to be inadequate. Each organisation will have its own chain of command and communications arrangement but there needs to be clear and effective communication between the various disciplines and identified lines of demarcation (between and within organisations). It is important at the planning stage to identify the communication requirements of each organisation and ensure that they are able to provide one another with relevant information when an emergency occurs. Testing communication arrangements should be a key consideration for emergency exercises. Having accurate and up-to-date contact lists is critical for effective communication. Their compilation and maintenance is a high priority. Details should include all relevant available means of contacting personnel and include backup arrangements where applicable. Switchboard and direct dial numbers, mobile phone, pagers, email addresses – all should be up-to-date.

8.11 Major emergencies may well affect more than one local authority or police force area. The strategic emergency co-ordinating group should include cross-boundary planning in its overseeing of the combined response. When an emergency spans boundaries, prior arrangements for mutual aid and compatibility with the plans and procedures of neighbours are essential for a truly effective response.

8.12 Plans should take account of the possible need to sustain the response at an unusually intensive level, possibly over an extended period. Arrangements must be able to maintain the response, provide appropriate levels of relief to those engaged in it and recognise that the critical functions of normal business have to carry on in parallel with the emergency response.

8.13 Well-managed and up-to-date information management systems are vital. Organisations should have rapid access to key information – stocks, sources of supply, equipment, personnel, skills, population make-up, geographical or site data, etc.

8.14 Plans and procedures should ensure that existing supplies and critical equipment are checked routinely e.g. mortuary equipment, first aid boxes, grab bags, back up phones, radios and radio batteries etc.

8.15 Co-ordinated arrangements for dealing with the media are critical – see Chapter 5.

8.16 Co-ordinated arrangements for the use of the voluntary sector must be clearly agreed – see Chapter 6.
8.17 Training and exercising must underpin planning and embrace the activities of both full and part-time staff. The strategic emergency coordinating group or its equivalent should oversee the multidisciplinary aspects of activities which, although interrelated, are considered in turn in the following paragraphs.

8.18 **Training** is about equipping people with relevant knowledge and skills. It should raise general awareness as well as addressing specific skills. It should also recognise the importance of building relationships between people who may need to work together under difficult circumstances. Properly structured joint training is critical for realising the full potential of all the agencies involved. Whether dealing with emergency situations is part of day-to-day work or not, major emergencies demand levels of joint working that are exceptional and extend roles beyond the norm.

8.19 **Exercising** is primarily about testing plans and procedures. It will also help to evaluate the need for further training requirements. While exercises obviously provide valuable experiential learning, they should not be confused with basic training. Throwing untrained people into an exercise predisposes a plan to failure and may make it difficult to establish whether the plans and procedures themselves are valid.

### General Awareness

8.20 All those who may be involved in responding to a major emergency, however remotely, should be aware of the management framework within which the response is made. For the emergency services awareness training will include the more detailed aspects of joint operations at and around an emergency scene. For local authorities the emphasis will be on how departments can combine to support the community and emergency services in the initial stages of the response, care for those affected, maintain essential services and engage in recovery processes. Such training might also include elected members, who will need to be aware of the role they may have to play. For other services a general familiarity with the combined response framework may suffice.

8.21 Attention should be drawn to the potential impact of major emergencies:
- the numbers and categories of people who may be affected
- the consequences for victims, responders, their families and friends and the needs which arise
- the inter- and intra-agency communication difficulties
- the degree of disruption and pressure
- the possible scale, duration and complexity of the response
- the huge demand for information from the public and the media.
**Liaison and co-ordination**

8.22 Training should highlight the importance of liaison and co-ordination. Adopting recognised good practice, conveyed through joint training, is crucial to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the combined response.

8.23 There is a need to ensure that key knowledge does not leave with individuals or changing structures. The development of training programmes should consider the need to preserve ‘corporate memory’ in respect of the strategic management of contingency planning.

**Communications**

8.24 The importance of joint planning in communications has already been mentioned. Subjects for training might include familiarisation with other organisations’ terminology, documentation, and call-out arrangements where these are different. Effective use of information technology and how to access information should be part of the training agenda, integrated within and between organisations wherever possible.

8.25 Organisations must consider both their own and other organisations’ information needs:
- who needs information
- what information is needed
- when it is needed
- what channels are available and most suitable
- how to convey information clearly and unambiguously
- how to keep full and proper records
- how to build in feedback mechanisms that ensure information is not only received, but also understood and acted upon appropriately.

**Media relations**

8.26 In addition to the training required on media response arrangements and procedures, those who will need to respond directly to the media should have practical training in interview and news conference techniques.

**Recognition of stress**

8.27 Social and psychological aftercare following a stressful occurrence are often part of the response and recovery process. General training should be given in the recognition of stress in both victims and responders. Where signs are evident, advice and help should be sought as soon as possible.

**The international dimension**

8.28 The degree of mobility in the modern world means that major emergencies will very often involve foreign nationals (major transport accidents are typical examples). Good planning will recognise the consequential additional problems such as the availability of interpreters and involvement of consular and embassy officials. Events such as those in New York in September 2001 and Bali in October 2002 also highlight the need to anticipate the impact of events overseas on UK citizens and response systems and to plan accordingly.
Sources and Types of Training

8.29 In-house training is likely to cater for many of the aspects of the combined response. Other sources are available to complement this and to cover aspects which cannot be dealt with as effectively in house. Some are listed below.

Colleges

8.30 The Cabinet Office Emergency Planning College at Easingwold provides a range of multidisciplinary training in the form of seminars, workshops and courses. It aims to raise awareness of civil protection issues and disseminate good practice and lessons learned. College staff are also available to participate in or conduct off-site events that are tailored to local needs. The college library is also a national centre for the deposit of, and access to, a wide range of literature and other materials on civil protection issues.

8.31 Centrex (the police staff training college at Bramshill) provides a major incident management course primarily for senior police officers. The Fire Service College at Moreton-in-Marsh provides training for officers of the fire service and some joint training courses.

8.32 The Maritime and Coastguard Agency provides training for Emergency Planning Officers, Fire, Police, Ambulance, the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry and Merchant Shipping Company representatives. The training focuses on dealing with maritime disasters and explores the implications for shore-based services.

Government News Network (GNN) Courses

8.33 The Government News Network is willing to assist local authorities and emergency services in mounting training seminars. Experienced staff from GNN offices are available to advise on or participate in events which cover the confrontational issues that can inflame media/official relations. The GNN also run courses in specialist media liaison techniques.

NHS/Medical

8.34 Health Emergency Planning Advisers, Ambulance services and the British Association for Immediate Care Schemes (BASICS) either arrange for or run courses on aspects of the medical response.

Higher and Further Education; Commercial Training Organisations

8.35 Certain institutions run specialised courses on crisis management, disaster management and risk management. Other organisations run training activities on topics such as business continuity, risk assessment, media training etc. Use of a search engine on the internet will identify relevant organisations' websites. Information on some of these may also be obtained from the Emergency Planning College, Easingwold.

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34 See details at Annex F.
Exercising – validating arrangements

8.36 The most effective way to validate the effectiveness of plans (other than real events) is to test and review them regularly. Exercises are a key mechanism for achieving this: to assess the arrangements properly and then to update the plans as appropriate in the light of the experience.

8.37 Exercises are an important management tool for informing and motivating personnel and giving confidence to those who may be required to respond in a crisis. They bring together those who may be involved with responding to an incident and they allow scrutiny of their responses under controlled conditions. Exercises should therefore reflect reality as far as is practicable. They can establish and reinforce relationships between those taking part, often under stressful conditions. They bring people from different areas together to work as a team, to realise clear goals and to get to know and understand each other’s strengths and weaknesses.

8.38 The support and commitment of senior management is crucial to the success of the exercise programme. The clear benefits of exercising for any organisation are:

- minimising the impact of an emergency on people, the community and environment
- increasing significantly the likelihood of the organisation or business surviving adverse events
- minimising interruption to business operation or service provision
- preserving and enhancing reputation
- minimising the social, political, legal and financial consequences of major emergencies
- identifying areas of an organisation’s vulnerability
- reinforcing basic training and providing experiential learning.

8.39 Exercises must not be seen in isolation but rather as part of a programme of validating plans and consolidating learning. They should meet their aims and objectives in the most appropriate manner. They need not necessarily be major undertakings in size, duration or involvement, but good exercises, whatever their format, can take a considerable amount of preparation and follow-up assessment.

Types of exercise

8.40 There are basically three types of exercise, although there are variations on the theme of each of them. The choice of an appropriate exercise is important; it should provide the most cost effective way of achieving its aim and objectives and take into account the possible disruption of normal work activities. The three main types are discussion-based, table top and live exercises. Any component part of the resolution of an emergency can be exercised under each heading.

Discussion-based exercises

8.41 Discussion-based exercises are generally low-cost activities which are often a component of a seminar or other training activity. They are designed to inform participants about the organisation and the procedures which would be used to respond to an incident. Those involved can be either new
to the job or established personnel. This type of event will bring staff together in order to raise their awareness of current developments and thinking.

8.42 Discussion normally centres on a given scenario or set of circumstances. Participants will explore the scenario, its developing circumstances and its consequences. The emphasis of such an exercise is on identifying problems and finding solutions rather than on decision-making. They are usually designed to focus on particular aspects of the response. Problems and findings from the exercise are often shared with a wider audience through panel discussions.

**Table top exercises**
8.43 Table top exercises are a form of role-play exercise. They are a very cost effective and efficient method of testing plans, procedures and people. They provide the few players involved with an excellent opportunity to interact with and understand the roles and responsibilities of the agencies taking part. They can engage players imaginatively and generate high levels of realism.

8.44 Participants will get to know the people with whom they have to work in responding to an emergency. Those who have worked together and know each other will provide a much more effective response than those who come together for the first time when an emergency occurs.

**Live exercises**
8.45 Live exercises range from a small scale single agency test of one component of the response (such as testing casualty bureau arrangements) through to a full-scale multi-agency test of the whole response to an incident. Live exercises provide the best means of confirming the satisfactory operation of emergency communications, and the use of ‘casualties’ can add to the realism. Live exercises provide the only means for fully testing the crucial arrangements for handling the media.

8.46 Whatever type of exercise is chosen it is important to record and evaluate the event. Provision of a succinct report of successes and failures to which management can refer is a vital part of the overall learning process. In the event of a crisis or disaster, previous exercise reports can demonstrate to the community, and to any subsequent formal inquiry, the commitment of the organisation to the safety of people and their surroundings.

8.47 One particular area of the response which needs careful and sensitive exercising is the way survivors and relatives are handled (see Chapter 4). Specific areas to exercise include the care of relatives and survivors at hospitals and reception centres, the support of bereaved during the deceased identification process and the support arrangements for when next of kin are informed. Personnel involved in some or all of these processes should include police, mortuary staff, coroners, social service crisis support teams and trained volunteers.
8.48 There are a number of mandatory exercises run throughout the year by various agencies. Full or partial participation in one or more of these may be helpful in rehearsing some or all of the local response. Examples include emergency exercises undertaken by:

- those operating nuclear installations and COMAH\(^{35}\) sites
- Counter Pollution and Prevention Branch of the MCA
- port and harbour authorities
- airport authorities
- railway authorities
- passenger ship operators.

8.49 It may also be possible to take similar advantage of non-mandatory exercises. It is the task of the strategic emergency co-ordinating group to oversee an integrated exercise programme. It should take account of all forms of exercise to ensure that the most effective use is made of the resources committed to testing response and recovery plans.

8.50 Testing recovery plans is especially problematic. Proper account of the timing and complexity of the recovery process is often difficult to achieve within the confines of a typical exercise. One way of overcoming this is to incorporate an in-depth discussion element of this issue into the exercise at the level of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group. The civil nuclear industry’s Nuclear Emergency Planning and Liaison Group (NEPLG) has also developed protocols in its area for the establishment of a Recovery Working Group, which operates in parallel with the Strategic Co-ordinating Group right from the beginning of the incident response phase. This is a model that may bear further examination by planners.

8.51 Further information on the use of exercises is available in a Home Office leaflet ‘Why Exercise your Disaster Response?’ Details are at Annex D.

8.52 While exercising is of immense value in helping to validate plans, there are other dimensions to validation. Lessons need to be learned from actual emergencies. A review of arrangements may be appropriate as a result of debriefs, reports, investigations or other feedback mechanisms.

8.53 It is important that learning from the past should not be parochial. Practitioners should have a far wider perspective than their immediate domain both when taking feedback from others and when it is appropriate to disseminate information on lessons learned. This should include lessons from ‘near misses’ as well as actual occurrences.

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\(^{35}\) Control of major Accident Hazards.
ANNEX A – DEFINITIONS OF A MAJOR INCIDENT

**Police/Fire Service**


“A major incident is any emergency that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or more of the emergency services, the NHS or the local authority for:

- the initial treatment, rescue and transport of a large number of casualties;
- the involvement either directly or indirectly of large numbers of people;
- the handling of a large number of enquiries likely to be generated both from the public and the news media, usually to the police;
- the need for the large scale combined resources of two or more of the emergency services;
- the mobilisation and organisation of the emergency services and supporting organisations, e.g. local authority, to cater for the threat of death, serious injury or homelessness to a large number of people.”

**National Health Service (including Ambulance Service)**

The broad definition above is also applicable to the NHS, as the wording indicates. For specific NHS purposes, a major incident may be defined as:

“Any occurrence which presents a serious threat to the health of the community, disruption to the service, or causes (or is likely to cause) such numbers or types of casualties as to require special arrangements to be implemented by hospitals, ambulance services or health authorities.”
ANNEX B – EXAMPLES OF VOLUNTARY
SECTOR ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING
STATUTORY SERVICES

Appropriate parts of the voluntary sector should undertake the following activities only if the volunteers receive appropriate training that is recognised by the professional organisation seeking their support.

Welfare

- Staffing rest centres, friends and relatives reception centres, survivor reception centres and family liaison centres.
- Feeding.
- Provision of clothing.
- Advice on entitlements, grants, loans, claims.
- Resettlement of victims, evacuees etc.
- Support and comforting.
- Providing information and advice.

In support of:
Local Authority Social Services
Local Authority Education Department
Local Authority Housing Department
Police family liaison officers.

Social and Psychological Aftercare

- Befriending.
- Providing longer term support.
- Listening skills, welfare support and comforting.

In support of:
Local Authority Social Services
Local Authority Educational Psychologists
National Health Service.

Medical Support

- Support to Ambulance Service.
- First aid and medical aid posts.
- First aid and Medical aid support in reception and rest centres.
- Emergency feeding.
- Auxiliary roles in hospitals.
- Welfare.

In support of:
NHS Ambulance Service
NHS Hospital Trusts.

Search and Rescue

- Mountain, cave, cliff, moor, inland waterways, coastal rescue, coastal or inland flooding etc.
- Supervision of other searchers (e.g. youth organisations).
- Loan of equipment.
In support of:
Emergency Services.

Transport

Transport and escort of homeless, outpatients, next-of-kin, etc to and from airports, railway stations, hospitals, mortuaries, rest centres, hostels, etc.

In support of:
Local Authority Social Services or Housing Departments
Emergency Services
NHS.

Communications

Providing radio and telephone communications and operators.
Vehicles.
Messengers.
Interpreters and translation.

In support of:
Emergency Services
Local Authorities
Utilities.

Documentation

Tracing people nationally and internationally.
Assistance at Casualty Bureau in some local areas.
Logging/diary procedures.
Computer support.

In support of:
Emergency services (especially police)
Local Authority Social Services or Housing Departments
NHS
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
International Committee of Red Cross.

Training and Exercising

Analysis of training needs and capabilities.
Devising instructional programmes.
Joint planning and conduct of multi-agency exercises, including call out arrangements and debrief.
Formulation and dissemination of good practice.

In support of:
Emergency Services
Local Authority departments
National utilities
NHS.

Note

The emergency services may call on military assistance, particularly military search and rescue resources. Voluntary organisations such as cave and mountain rescue may therefore sometimes find themselves working with military units.
ANNEX C – ADDENDUM FOR WALES

For the purpose of this interim revision, this annex covers those aspects in each chapter of the current document on which there is a need to reflect how constitutional and organisational changes have resulted in arrangements specific to emergency planning in Wales. It constitutes an abbreviated version of the Wales National Emergency Co-ordination Arrangements.

- Responsibility for Emergency Planning in England and Wales now rests with the Cabinet Office through the Civil Contingencies Secretariat.
- The Cabinet Office are conducting a major review which is likely to lead to changes in legislation, funding, structures (including the roles of the National Assembly for Wales and the Government Offices of the Regions).

The fundamental strategic principles of integrated emergency management will remain consistent. These principles have been adopted in the Wales National Emergency Co-ordination Arrangements that shows how they will be implemented at an all-Wales level in Wales.

All the agencies appreciate that future editions of Dealing with Disaster will have to reflect the changes which have taken place in Wales since devolution. Some even favour a specific Welsh edition of the document. Until work commences on the 4th edition of Dealing with Disaster, and until the future of emergency planning becomes clearer, the following addendum reflects amendments to the document which are relevant to Wales pending the new Civil Contingencies Bill. This should be read in conjunction with the response structure contained in the Wales National Emergency Co-ordination Arrangements.

Chapter 1 – Introduction and Civil Protection Arrangements
1.9-1.13 The Wales National Emergency Co-ordination Arrangements outline the role of the Welsh Assembly Government in interfacing with the leading response agencies at a national level and in providing links with local Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (SCGs).

Chapter 2 – Local Authorities
In Wales, the Bellwin Scheme is applied through the Welsh Assembly Government.

36 See bibliography (Annex D).
Chapter 3 – The Combined Response

Central Government

The organisation structure described is appropriate for local incidents in Wales. During national emergencies the Emergency Co-ordination Centre (ECC) at the Welsh Assembly Government will help facilitate information flow from Wales to Whitehall and vice versa.

The Wales National Emergency Co-ordination Arrangements outline the role of the Welsh Assembly Government in interfacing with the leading response agencies at a national level and in providing linkages with the local Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (SCGs).

Command, Control and Co-ordination

3.25 During a national emergency in Wales, the Emergency Co-ordination Centre at the Welsh Assembly Government will help facilitate the flow of information between Wales and Whitehall and vice versa. Other briefing lines will continue to exist under this arrangement with certain agencies reporting directly to their parent or lead Department.

3.25 In Wales, the SCGs will liaise with the Welsh Assembly Government and not Government Office of the Region. Other briefing lines will continue to exist under this arrangement with certain agencies reporting directly to their parent or Lead Government Department.

Chapter 4 – The Care and Treatment of People

4.49 In Wales, emergency services, local authorities and others responding to an emergency will be mindful of the additional need to communicate with people through the medium of Welsh.

Chapter 5 – Information and the Media

5.9 Change heading to ‘Assistance from the Government News Network (GNN)/Welsh Assembly Government Communication Directorate’.

In Wales the Welsh Assembly Government Communication Directorate will also be available to assist local response agencies.

5.9 In Wales, management of the press and media at the site of the emergency is the responsibility of the lead agency (usually the police). The Communication Directorate of the Welsh Assembly Government will be able to offer support to the lead agency whenever local resources are stretched during a major or prolonged incident.

5.27 In Wales, the Communication Directorate will liaise with Strategic Co-ordinating Centres to assist in ensuring accurate and consistent statements are made by the Assembly during a major emergency. The Communication Directorate will also liaise with central Government to maintain consistency on reporting lines.

5.28 In Wales, VIPs would also include the Welsh Assembly Government First Minister, Assembly Ministers and local Assembly Members.
Chapter 6 – The Voluntary Sector
As for England.

Chapter 7 – Central Government and Lead Departments
7.5 Access to Information – The Welsh Assembly Government Emergency Co-ordination Centre will act as a conduit between Wales and Whitehall to simplify communication links and to provide consistency in the information relayed. Other briefing lines will continue to exist under this arrangement with certain agencies reporting directly to their parent or Lead Government Department.

7.14 During a national emergency, the Emergency Co-ordination Centre at the Welsh Assembly Government will compile briefing on a national basis for the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. Individual agencies will brief in parallel to the appropriate parent / Lead Government Department.

Chapter 8 – The Combined Approach to Planning, Training and Exercising
Communications Structure for National Emergencies in Wales (Copies of the Wales National Emergency Co-ordination Arrangements can be obtained from the Welsh Assembly Government)
ANNEX D – BIBLIOGRAPHY

Core Guidance
For specific guidance relating to Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and London on generic emergency planning arrangements, see the following three publications.

Dealing with Disaster Together
Information via Scottish Executive Emergency Planning Unit, Justice Dept, GW14, St Andrews House, Regent Road, Edinburgh

Guide to Emergency Planning in Northern Ireland
Information via Northern Ireland Central Emergency Planning Unit, Arches Centre, 11-13 Bloomfield Road, Belfast, BT5 5HD

LELSP Major incident procedure manual (5th edition)
Information via Emergency Procedures Policy Unit, Metropolitan Police Service, New Scotland Yard, Broadway, London SW1H 0BG

Wales National Emergency co-ordination Arrangements
Information via Emergencies and Security Policy Team, National Assembly for Wales, Cardiff Bay, CF99 1NA

Other useful publications
Arrangements for Responding to Nuclear Emergencies, Health and Safety Executive:

Bombs – Protecting People and Property:
published by the Home Office Communication Directorate, Home Office, Queen Anne’s Gate, London, SW1H 9AT.

British Red Cross Disaster Appeal Scheme (United Kingdom), The
available from British Red Cross Society, 9 Grosvenor Crescent, London SW1X 7EJ.

Civil Nuclear Emergency Planning Consolidated Guidance
Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group

Concise guide to customs of minority ethnic religions
Collins D, Tank M, Basith A

Dealing with Fatalities During Disasters
PO Box 276, London SW8 5DT

Death and bereavement across cultures
Routledge, London

Deaths in Major Disasters, The Pathologist’s Role:
A Busuttil and JSP Jones; The Royal College of Pathologists.

Decontamination of People Exposed to Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Substances or Material: Strategic National Guidance
www.ukresilience.info/cbrn/text/tindex.htm
Disasters: Planning for a Caring Response, Disasters Working Party:  
TSO, PO Box 29, Norwich NR3 1GN  www.tso.co.uk  (ISBN 0 11 3213700).

Emergency Planning in the NHS – Health Service Arrangements for dealing with Major Incidents:  
available from the Department of Health, Emergency Planning Co-ordination Unit, Room 603,  
Richmond House, 79 Whitehall, London SW1A 2NS.

Emergency planning for major accidents – Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations  
HSE Books, PO Box 1999, Sudbury, Suffolk CO10 2WA  www.hse.gov.uk  
HSG191 1999 (ISBN 0 7176 1695 9)

Emergency Plans, Health and Safety Executive:  
TSO, PO Box 29, Norwich NR3 1GN  www.tso.co.uk  (ISBN 0 11 883831 8).

Event Safety Guide – a guide to health, safety and welfare at music and similar events  
HSE Books, PO Box 1999, Sudbury, Suffolk CO10 2WA  www.hse.gov.uk  (ISBN 0 7176 2453 6)

Guide to the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999  

Guide to the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996  

Guide to the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations 2001  
– guidance on regulations  

TSO, PO Box 29, Norwich NR3 1GN  www.tso.co.uk  (ISBN 0 11 300095 2)

Guide to Fire Precautions in Existing Places of Entertainment and Like Premises  
PO Box 276, London SW8 5DT (ISBN 0 11 340907 9)

Guidelines for Faith Communities when Dealing with Disasters Major Emergencies, The  
Information via Church of England Board for Social Responsibility, Church House, Great Smith Street,  
London SW1P 3NZ.

Improving Security in Schools:  
TSO, PO Box 29, Norwich NR3 1GN  www.tso.co.uk  (ISBN 0 11 270916 8).

The Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry Part 1 (Lord Cullen)  
HSE Books, PO Box 1999, Sudbury, Suffolk CO10 2WA  www.hse.gov.uk  (ISBN 0 7176 2056 5)

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Instructions for Establishing Emergency Flying Restrictions Within the UK:  

Management of health and safety at work ( Approved Code of Practice and guidance  
HSE Books, PO Box 1999, Sudbury, Suffolk CO10 2WA  www.hse.gov.uk  (ISBN 0 7176 2488 9)

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HSE Books, PO Box 1999, Sudbury, Suffolk CO10 2WA  www.hse.gov.uk  
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British Red Cross, 9 Grosvenor Crescent, London SW1X 7EJ

Report of the Committee on Death Certification and Coroners
Broderick, November 1971.

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Emergency Planning Society

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Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat

Survivors and the Media
Ann Shearer (Broadcasting Standards Council Monograph): John Libbey and Company Ltd.

Thames Safety Inquiry final report by Lord Justice Clarke
TSO, PO Box 29, Norwich NR3 1GN  www.tso.co.uk (ISBN 0101455828)

Tolley’s Handbook of Disaster & Emergency Management: Principles & Practice
Butterworths Tolley, 2 Addiscombe Road, Croydon, Surrey CR9 5AF (ISBN 0 4069 5709 6)

Wise before the Event – Coping with Crises in Schools:
William Yule and Anne Gold, published by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. (ISBN 0 903319 6)
ANNEX E – GLOSSARY

Where appropriate the following definitions are extracted from the relevant emergency services procedures/planning manuals. The harmonisation of these definitions is undertaken by an interdisciplinary working group.

**ACCOLC – Access Overload Control**

The Access Overload Control Scheme gives call preference to registered essential users on the four main mobile networks in the UK if the scheme is invoked during a major emergency.

**Ambulance Incident Officer (AIO)**

The officer of the ambulance service with overall responsibility for the work of that service at the scene of a major incident. Works in close liaison with the Medical Incident Officer (MIO) to ensure effective use of the medical and ambulance resources at the scene.

**Ambulance Loading Point**

An area, preferably hard standing, in close proximity to the Casualty Clearing Station, where ambulances can be manoeuvred and patients placed in ambulances for transfer to hospital. Helicopter landing provision may also be needed.

**Ambulance Safety Officer**

The officer responsible for monitoring operations and ensuring safety of personnel working under her/his control within the inner cordon at a major incident site. Liaises with safety officers from other emergency services.

**Ante mortem data**

Information obtained from family, friends, etc. about a person who is believed to be among the deceased.

**Ante mortem team**

Officers responsible for liaising with the next of kin on all matters relating to the identification of the deceased.

**Bellwin Scheme**

Discretionary scheme for providing central government financial assistance in exceptional circumstances to affected local authorities in the event of a major emergency.

**Body holding area / Body collection point**

An area close to the scene where the dead can be temporarily held until transfer to the temporary mortuary or mortuary.

**Bronze**

Operational commander.
Cascade System
System whereby one person or organisation calls out others who in turn initiate further call-outs as necessary.

Casualty
A person killed or physically or mentally injured in war, accident or civil emergency. For Casualty Bureau purposes the term encompasses any person involved in an incident, including evacuees. In maritime emergencies, it is also used to refer to a vessel in distress.

Casualty Bureau
Police central contact and information point for all records and data relating to casualties, evacuees and others affected by the incident.

Casualty Clearing Officer
The ambulance officer who, in liaison with the Medical Incident Officer, ensures an efficient patient throughput at the Casualty Clearing Station.

Casualty Clearing Station
An area set up at a major incident by the ambulance service in liaison with the Medical Incident Officer to assess, triage and treat casualties and direct their evacuation.

Chemet
A scheme administered by the Meteorological Office, providing information on weather conditions as they affect an incident involving hazardous chemicals.

Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC)
Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC) of Ministers (chaired normally by the Home Secretary) convened to provide central government oversight of a major emergency.

Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)
The Cabinet Office secretariat which provides the central focus for the cross-departmental and cross-agency commitment, co-ordination and co-operation that will enable the UK to deal effectively with disruptive challenges and crises.

COMAH sites
Industrial sites which are subject to the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations.

Command
The authority for an agency to direct the actions of its own resources (both personnel and equipment).

Co-ordination
The harmonious integration of the expertise of all the agencies involved with the object of effectively and efficiently bringing the incident to a successful conclusion.

Co-ordinating group
A group comprising the senior representative at the scene of a major incident from each service or agency present. The group is normally chaired by the police and decides on actions to be taken.
Control
The authority to direct strategic and tactical operations in order to complete an assigned function and includes the ability to direct the activities of other agencies engaged in the completion of that function. The control of the assigned function also carries with it a responsibility for the health and safety of those involved.

Controlled area
The area contained by an outer cordon; the area may be divided into geographical sectors.

Control Room
Centre for the control of the movements and activities of each emergency service’s personnel and equipment. Liaises with the other services control rooms.

Cordon – Inner
Surrounds and protects the immediate scene of an incident.

Cordon – Outer
Seals off a controlled area around an incident to which unauthorised persons are not allowed access.

Crisis management team
Personnel brought together under the Chief Executive to manage and co-ordinate the local authority response to an emergency.

Devolved Administrations
Scottish Executive, Welsh Assembly Government and Northern Ireland Executive.

Emergency Centre / Emergency Control Centre
Local authority operations centre from which the management and co-ordination of local authority incident support is carried out.

Evacuation Assembly Point
Building or area to which evacuees are directed for transfer/transportation to a reception centre or rest centre.

Forward Control Point
Each service’s command and control facility nearest the scene of the incident – responsible for immediate direction, deployment and security.

Friends and Relatives Reception Centre
Secure area set aside for use and interview of friends and relatives arriving at the scene (or location associated with an incident, such as at an airport or port). Established by the police in consultation with the local authority.

Gold
Strategic commander.

Hospital Friends and Relatives Reception Centre
An assembly point at a receiving hospital where friends and relatives can be received and arrangements made for their special needs. The receiving hospital is responsible for establishing the centre.
Identification Commission
Group representing all aspects of the identification process which is set up to consider and determine the identity of the deceased to the satisfaction of HM Coroner.

Incident Officer
An officer at the scene who commands the tactical response of his/her respective service.

Incident Control Point / Post
The point from which each of the emergency services tactical managers can control their services’ response to a land-based incident. Together, the incident control points form the focal point for co-ordinating all activities on site. Also referred to as ‘Silver control’. In London, incident control points are grouped together to form the Joint Emergency Services Control Centre (JESCC).

Inner Cordon
Surrounds and protects the immediate scene of an incident.

Investigating agencies
Those organisations that are legally empowered to investigate the cause of an accident (Air Accident Investigation Branch, Marine Accident Investigation Branch, HSE, etc.)

Integrated Emergency Management (IEM)
An approach to preventing and managing emergencies that entails five key activities – assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery. IEM is geared to the idea of building greater overall resilience in the face of a broad range of disruptive challenges.

Lead Government Department (LGD)
Department which, in the event of a major emergency, co-ordinates central government activity.

Local Emergency Centre (LEC)
Purpose-designed and equipped control centre for the co-ordination of the response to a nuclear emergency emanating from a civil nuclear power station.

Major Disaster Advisory Team (MDAT)
A police service team available at short notice to give advice on certain aspects of major incident management.

Major Incident
A major incident is any emergency that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or more of the emergency services, the NHS or the local authority. A fuller definition is at Annex A.

Major Incident Control Room
Established in protracted emergencies to co-ordinate the overall response, deal with ongoing resource and logistical requirements and provide facilities for senior command functions. Often referred to as ‘Gold Control’.

Major Incident Procedures
Pre-planned and exercised procedures which are activated once a major incident has been declared.
Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC)
HM Coastguard regional centre responsible for promoting the efficient organisation of search and rescue services and for co-ordinating the conduct of search and rescue operations within a search and rescue region.

Maritime Rescue Sub Centre (MRSC)
HM Coastguard unit subordinate to a rescue co-ordination centre and established to complement the latter.

Marshalling Area
Area to which resources and personnel not immediately required at the scene or being held for further use can be directed to standby.

Media Centre / Media Briefing Centre
Central location for media enquiries, providing communication, conference and monitoring facilities, interview and briefing, access to responding organisation personnel and staffed by spokespersons from all the principal services/organisations responding.

Media Liaison Officer
Representative who has responsibility for liaising with the media on behalf of his/her organisation.

Media Liaison Point
An area adjacent to the scene which is designated for the reception and accreditation of media personnel for briefing on arrangements for reporting, filming and photographing, staffed by media liaison officers from appropriate services.

Medical Incident Officer (MIO)
Medical officer with overall responsibility (in close liaison with the ambulance incident officer) for the management of medical resources at the scene of a major incident. He/she should not be a member of a mobile medical team.

Mutual Aid Arrangements
Cross-boundary arrangements under which emergency services, local authorities and other organisations request extra staff and/or equipment for use in a disaster.

Operational level (bronze)
The operational level of management reflects the normal day-to-day arrangements for responding to smaller scale emergencies. It is the level at which the management of ‘hands-on’ work is undertaken at the incident site(s) or associated areas.

Outer Cordon
Seals off a controlled area around an incident to which unauthorised persons are not allowed access.

Overall Incident Commander (Gold)
The designated senior officer in charge of the police response who normally co-ordinates the strategic roles of all the emergency services and other organisations involved.

Hospital documentation team
Team of police officers responsible for completing police casualty record cards in hospitals.
**Post mortem data**
Information obtained from the post mortem examination process.

**RAYNET**
Radio Amateurs Emergency Network.

**Receiving Hospital(s)**
Any hospital selected by the ambulance service from those designated by health authorities to receive casualties in the event of a major incident.

**Rendezvous Point (R.V.P.)**
Point to which all resources arriving at the outer cordon are directed for logging, briefing, equipment issue and deployment. In protracted large-scale incidents there may be a need for more than one rendezvous point.

**Rest Centre**
Building designated by the local authority for the temporary accommodation of evacuees, with overnight facilities if necessary.

**Search and Rescue (SAR)**
Operations for locating and retrieving persons in distress, providing for their immediate needs and delivering them to a place of safety.

**Senior Investigating Officer (SIO)**
The senior detective officer appointed by the senior police officer to assume responsibility for all aspects of the police investigation.

**Silver**
Tactical commander.

**Statutory services**
Those services whose responsibilities are laid down in law: police, fire, ambulance and coastguard services, local authorities, etc.

**Strategic-Co-ordinating Group (SCG)**
A group comprising senior officers of appropriate organisations which aims to achieve effective inter-agency co-ordination at strategic level. This group should normally be located away from the immediate scene.

**Strategic level (gold)**
A strategic level of management establishes a policy and overall management framework within which tactical managers will work. It establishes strategic objectives and aims to ensure long-term resourcing/expertise.

**Survivor Reception Centre**
Secure area set up by local authority to which survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment can be taken for short-term shelter, first aid, interview and documentation.
Tactical level (silver)
A tactical level of management provides overall management of the response to an emergency. Tactical managers determine priorities in allocating resources, obtain further resources as required, and plan and co-ordinate when tasks will be undertaken.

Temporary mortuary
Facility accessible from a disaster area designated for temporary use as a mortuary and adapted for post mortem examinations to take place.

Territorial Departments
The Scotland Office, Northern Ireland Office and Wales Office.

Triage
Process of assessment and allocation of priorities by the medical or ambulance staff at the site or casualty clearing station prior to evacuation. Triage may be repeated at intervals and on arrival at a receiving hospital.

Utilities
Companies providing essential services e.g. gas, water, electricity, telephones.

Voluntary Aid Societies (VAS)
St John Ambulance, St Andrew’s Ambulance and British Red Cross Society.

Welfare co-ordination team
A team normally co-ordinated by the appropriate local authority social services director or deputy to look after the longer term welfare needs of those affected by disaster. The team may include representatives from other local authority departments, police, faith organisations and appropriate voluntary organisations.
ANNEX F – TRAINING COLLEGES

The Emergency Planning College
The Hawkills
Easingwold
York YO61 3EG
Tel: 01347 821406 Fax: 01347 822575
Website: www.epcollege.gov.uk

Centrex
Bramshill
Hook
Hampshire RG27 0JW
Telephone: 01256 602100 Fax: 01256 602223
Website: www.centrex.police.uk

The Fire Service College
Moreton-in-Marsh
Gloucestershire GL56 0RH
Tel: 01608 650831 Fax: 01608 651788
Website: www.fireservicecollege.ac.uk
ANNEX G – USEFUL WEBSITES

Air Accident Investigation Branch ........................................ www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/accidrep/accidrep.htm
Ambulance Service Association ........................................... www.ambex.co.uk
American Society of Professional Emergency Planners ................ www.aspep.org
Animal Management in Disasters .......................................... www.animaldisasters.com/
Audit Commission Community Safety .................................. www.audit-commission.gov.uk/comsafe/
Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies On a Local Level (APELL) ........ www.unepie.org/apell/disasters/lists/technological.html
BASICS ........................................................................ www.basics.freeserve.co.uk
BBC Connecting in a Crisis .................................................. www.bbc.co.uk/connectinacrisis/index.shtml
Benfield Grieg Hazard Research Centre .................................. www.bghrc.com/
Blue Shield (Heritage Protection) .......................................... www.bl.uk/services/preservation/blueshield/
British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy .............. www.bac.co.uk/skipintro.htm
British Civil Defence .......................................................... www.britishcivildefence.org/
British Red Cross ............................................................. www.redcross.org.uk
British Standards Institution ................................................. www.bsi.org.uk/
British Transport Police ...................................................... www.btp.police.uk
Bureau Enquete-Accidents (in English) ................................... www.bea-fr.org/anglaise/
Cabinet Office .................................................................. www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/
Central Office of Information .............................................. www.coi.gov.uk
Chartered Institute of Environmental Health ............................. www.cieh.org.uk
Chief and Assistant Chief Fire Officers Assoc ............................ www.cacfoa.org.uk/main.htm
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Continuity Planner ............................................................... www.continuityplanner.com
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Department of Health ........................................................ www.doh.gov.uk
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Department for Transport ................................................... www.dft.gov.uk/
Disaster Action ........................................... www.disasteraction.org
Disaster Central ........................................ www.disaster-central.com/
Disaster Database (BASICS) ................................ www.basedn.freeserve.co.uk
Disaster & Emergency Management On The Internet ........ www.keele.ac.uk/depts/por/disaster.htm
Disaster Help (FEMA) ...................................... .http://disasterhelp.gov/
Disaster Information ...................................... www.disasters.au.com/
Disaster Research Center, Delaware University ............ www.udel.edu/DRC/
Disaster Survivor Support ................................ www.Egroups.com/group/DisasterSurvivorSupport
Disaster Timeline .......................................... www.disaster-timeline.com
Disasters & Catastrophes .................................... http://members.tripod.com/~dogw/LINKS.HTM
Drinking Water Inspectorate ................................. www.dwi.detr.gov.uk/h2oinfo.htm
Emergency Information Infrastructure Partnership ......... www.emforum.org/home.htm
EMGold (Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Response Association/USA) . www.disasters.org/emgold
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Emergency Planning Society ................................ www.emergplansoc.org.uk
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Fire Service College ....................................... www.fireservicecollege.ac.uk
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Health & Safety Executive .................................... www.open.gov.uk/hse/hschome.htm
Home Office .................................................. www.homeoffice.gov.uk
Home Office (Terrorism) ..................................... .www.homeoffice.gov.uk/atoz/terrorists.htm
House of Commons .......................................... www.parliament.uk/commons/hsecom.htm
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<td>International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters</td>
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The website of the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat (www.ukresilience.gov.uk) provides many other useful links. It is a useful starting point for finding up-to-date information on developments in civil protection issues.
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