PROPOSED
NEW STRUCTURE FOR THE OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING
SUMMARY
ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO SEPTEMBER 2000
CONSULTATION DOCUMENT
March
2001
The following summary of the responses received
covers the main areas of the proposals on
which comments were made.
NB: It should be noted that not every consultee who
replied to the consultation document made
detailed comments on every section of the
document. The comments of consultees which are
reported cannot therefore necessarily be taken
as representative.
Forty-five written responses were received by the
due date and divided into the following
categories:
|
·
Regulatory Bodies
9%
·
Employers Organisations
29%
·
Law Firms
13%
·
Academics/Others
16%
|
·
Consumer Organisations
11%
·
Former Civil Servants
11%
·
Local Authority/Central Govt 9%
·
Trade Unions
2%
|
The percentage of responses from each of these
interest groups is illustrated above.
A list of respondents is given at Appendix 1. The
responses are available to view by appointment
at the DTI Library, Tel: 020 7215 5006/5007,
[note: one respondent wished their response to
be treated as confidential and this is
therefore not available to view].
A more detailed summary of the
responses is given in Appendix 2.
Summary
A majority of the responses
(3-1) was in favour of the proposals
for a board structure for the Office of Fair
Trading (to be renamed the Fair Trading
Authority).
However, a number commented on the
composition of the Board preferring that the
Director General of Fair Trading in his new
role as Chairman of the Board should be the
sole official representative on the Board.
There were some concerns about the
effect a Board structure might have on the
speed of the decision making process and a
number of claims for board representation
including from the devolved administrations
and special interest groups.
Despite these concerns, there was support,
particularly from those respondents engaged in
business for the collegiate aspect and greater
breadth of experience that would be applied to
decisions made by a board.
On the question of the size of the
board, the general view was for around eight
non-executive members who possessed varied
business experience, with expertise in matters
of competition and consumer protection.
On the question of whether board members should be
full or part time, of those who supported the
proposals and expressed a view on this issue,
there were more who favoured the idea of there
being part time members, as this would provide
greater flexibility and a larger number
individuals eligible to be members.
Opinion was divided 2 to 1 in favour on
the question of publication of the board’s
programme, minutes of meetings, attendance
records and opinions, provided confidential
material is not released.
APPENDIX
1
Allen & Overy
Lord
Borrie QC
British
Retail Consortium
Campaign for Real Ale (CAMRA)
Centrica plc
CMS Cameron McKenna
Combined Merchants (UK) Ltd
Confederation of British Industry (CBI)
Confederation of Passenger Transport UK
Consumers’ Association
Department of the
Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR)
Alexander
Falconer
Clive Howard-Luck
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
Local Authorities Committee on Trading Standard (LACOTS)
Martin
Howe
Independent Committee for the
Supervision of Standards of Telephone
Information Services (ICSTIS)
Japanese Embassy
Joint
Working Party on Competition Law of the Bars
& Law Societies of the UK
H H Liesner
James McDonald
Professor J K Macleod
Ian Mitchell
National Association of Citizens Advice Bureau
National Association of Estate Agents
National Consumer Council
Norton Rose
Library
Ofgem
ONdigital
Powergen
Radio, Electrical & TV Retailers Association (RETRA)
Aidan Robertson
Scottish Advisory Committee on Telecommunications
Scottish Association of Master Bakers (SAMB)
Scottish
Consumer Council
Shadow Strategic Rail Authority
Simkins
Partnership
Small Business Service (DTI)
The Takeover Panel
Tesco
Trading Standards Institute
Transco
Christian Twigg-Flesner
UNIFI
David Whibley
APPENDIX
2
SUMMARY
OF REPLIES TO CONSULTATION PAPER ON PROPOSED
NEW STRUCTURE FOR THE OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING
(OFT)
Introduction
A total of 49 written
responses had been received by 9 February.
The replies fall into the following
categories:
Strong support for proposals:
30 responses
Seeking appointment to board:
2 responses
Neutral:
4 responses
Critical of proposals:
6 responses
Oppose proposals:
3 responses
Late receipts:
4 responses
Thirty respondents from a
variety of backgrounds, companies, business
interest organisations, regulatory bodies, law
firms and academics, welcomed the proposals,
although some had concerns on various points
of detail.
Six responses mostly from the
legal profession or former civil servants were
not in favour of the proposals.
The principal concern was that there
was no overriding need to change current
arrangements and that the new proposals might
introduce delay.
Three respondents were
particularly critical of the proposals, one
being a former DGFT. All three doubted the ofgem model was a valid comparison; all
doubted the reforms would lead to the desired
objectives and there was concern about
introducing delay into the decision-making
process.
There were four respondents
whose comments were neutral or who had little
or no comment; i.e. the Takeover Panel
indicated it had “no comment”.
Some responses were brief, no
more than a paragraph or sentence expressing
support for the reforms but some responses
were papers analysing various points in detail
(whether for or against).
Below is a more detailed synopsis.
Summary
1)
According to the proposals for
the Authority for the Office of Fair Trading,
the powers of the Director General of Fair
Trading would be transferred to the Board of
the new Authority.
There was majority support for this proposal, with
respondents favouring the idea of a collegiate
structure with a breadth of expertise,
strengthening the role of the body and
bringing it into line with other regulatory
bodies, in the light of the authority’s
increased powers and responsibilities.
“Depersonalising” the role of DGFT
and increasing the breadth of experience on
which decisions were based were felt to be
important, as was reducing excessive
“political” input from Government.
These arguments were echoed in some detail by the
CBI, ofgem, ICSTIS, Confederation for
Passenger Transport UK, centrica, Consumers’
Association, Scottish Consumer Council,
Transco, TESCO and academics (Twigg-Flesner,
Macleod and Macdonald), the CBI stressing how
the reforms would avoid excessive power
resting with an unelected individual.
Those who were not in favour of reform, for example
Lord Borrie QC, a former DGFT, and Aidan
Robertson, a law firm, argued that the OFT in
its present form is sufficiently accountable
and independent to deal with its
responsibilities current and future.
They doubted the validity of
comparisons with utility regulators (OFT has
been in existence far longer and its work is
more varied).
Lord Borrie QC felt a board structure
could lead to a weakening in decision making.
H H Liesner, a former civil servant,
argued that the current system leads to
greater consistency in decisions.
ONdigital, a commercial digital TV
operator, considered the consultation paper
did not demonstrate how the proposed
arrangements would improve on current practice
and did not offer alternative models for the
authority.
2)
Members
would be appointed by the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the Chairman through the
usual Nolan procedures.
Only two respondents commented. Simkins Partnership, a law firm, criticised the proposals,
suggesting that Ministerial appointment of
members might compromise their objectivity.
Allen and Overy, another law firm,
pointed out the DGFT is currently appointed by
the Secretary of State.
3)
The
Authority would be a Non-Ministerial
Government Department and its staff would be
civil servants.
There were concerns that OFT staff lack practical
business experience.
These came from the National Consumer
Council and from Combined Merchants (UK) Ltd,
from the cement industry, who supported the
reforms.
Two respondents with a legal background
who were not in favour of the reforms, the
Simkins Partnership and Aidan Robertson,
argued that recruitment and training of more
expert staff would contribute to the
achievement of the desired objectives without
the need for a board.
4)
The
new Authority should:
·
be
independent;
·
encompass
a broad mix of interests and skills within the
decision making process;
·
Avoid
conflicts of interest;
·
be
fully accountable through working arrangements
which are open and clear;
·
be
able to act swiftly and effectively.
This proposal attracted the most comment.
Independence in terms of the functioning of the
Board was explained in the consultation paper
as the role and functioning of the Board not
being too closely defined in legislation.
Of those who supported reform,
ICSTIS,
centrica, and the Consumers’ Association
endorsed this view whilst Powergen and CMS
Cameron McKenna, a law firm, felt all
functions of the board must be clearly
defined, a view strongly supported by the CBI,
who suggested the board’s functioning be
laid down in secondary legislation.
Centrica agreed with legislation to
specify which powers and duties could be
undertaken by staff, along the lines of the
Utilities Act 2000.
Of those who were not in favour of reform, Allen
and Overy doubted whether reform would lead to
more independence, a view shared by the Bar
and Law Societies.
ONdigital thought the decisions of the
present OFT were just as independent and
transparent as those of other regulatory
bodies.
Flexible
working arrangements
Of those who supported reform, the National
Consumer Council indicated it was right the
board should concentrate on strategy.
Martin Howe, a former OFT Director of
Competition Policy, queried whether much
significant material would escape the
board’s attention, a view echoed by the
British Retail Consortium, who wanted specific
statutory guidelines to cover this.
This view was shared by the CBI who
stated that, in addition to being involved
with strategy, the board should oversee the
activities of the Fair Trading Authority.
Ofgem considered that for the board to be
independent, the Director must avoid
consulting Ministers about board functions.
Of those not in favour of the
proposals, H H Liesner commented this area was
not properly explored in the consultation.
Ensuring
a broad mix of experience
This aspect also attracted considerable comment.
Responses from both those in favour and
those against the proposals favoured a
“mixed” board of around eight experienced
individuals with a majority of non-executive
members, although the CBI wanted legislation
to specify both a maximum and a minimum number
of board members.
LACOTS and the Trading Standards Institute felt it
was important for Local Government to be
represented on the board.
The Consumers’ Association and CAMRA
felt there must be some consumer
representation.
UNIFI, the bank and financial services
employees’ union, felt there must be a
member to represent the interests of trade
unionists.
The Scottish Consumer Council stressed
the need for a Scottish member to respect
devolution and Scottish interests.
The CBI were opposed to officials, apart from the
Director serving on the board, as they doubted
they would take up a position different from
that of their managers.
The CBI also recommended that members
have extensive business experience, a view
shared by others, notably Combined Merchants
(UK) Ltd. In addition the CBI felt there was a risk that members might
have a “partisan” attitude towards their
own area of industry or business.
Small Business Service, a DTI agency, recommended
that there should be a member to represent
small business interests.
Of those who were not in favour of the proposals, H
H Liesner; and Allen and Overy agreed with the
idea of a “mixed” board but, like the CBI,
were concerned about members favouring
business interests with which they had
previously been associated. The Bar and Law
Societies, like the CBI, did not want FTA
officials, other than the Director, on the
board as the officials’ expertise might not
necessarily be pertinent to particular issues
being considered.
DETR favoured representation of Local
Government and Scottish and Welsh interests.
Alexander Falconer, a former Member of
the European Parliament, favoured
representation of trade unions and Scottish
interests.
Avoiding
conflicts of interest
Of those who were in favour of reform, ICTSIS, the
Consumers’ Association and one academic,
James Macdonald,
favoured transparent systems to avoid
conflicts.
Two academics, Macleod and
Twigg-Flesner, favoured the idea of a
“panel” of individuals qualified to sit on
the a board.
Having a large number of eligible
individuals would, in their opinion, help to
avoid conflicts of interest arising.
BRC suggested there should be a
specific mechanism for redress, in cases where
conflicts of interest were believed to have
affected board decisions.
This view was endorsed by the CBI who
proposed Judicial Review for such cases.
Centrica had confidence in the Nolan
procedures if these were applied strictly but
considered it inevitable that conflicts of
interest would arise.
The National Consumer Council
considered that if members withdrew from
meetings as a result of potential conflicts,
it might lead to decisions being taken by too
few people.
It is worth noting that both the CBI
and Tesco were concerned about how “personal
interest” might be defined or interpreted.
Of those not in favour of the proposals, Allen and
Overy suggested the option of a “panel” to
form a board and the Bar and Law Societies
stated it would be difficult to avoid
conflicts of interest, especially if part-time
members were employed.
This, they suggested, would create
difficulties for the board’s operations.
Act
swiftly and effectively
Of those in favour, Martin
Howe was concerned about the effect on the
speed of decision making and whether members
would cope with the board’s workload.
The CBI and Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer, a law firm, were also concerned
about the possibility of delay.
This
was echoed by those not in favour of the proposals.
Lord Borrie QC and ONdigital felt the reforms would lead
to delays in decision-making.
The Bar and Law Societies doubted decisions would be made
more quickly.
Accountability.
The Authority must be accountable to
the Secretary of State, Parliament and the
public.
This aspect also attracted
considerable comment.
Of those who were in favour of reform,
ICSTIS were concerned about how quickly
members’ opinions might be published.
Professor Macleod disagreed with
publication of members’ opinions, as this
would undermine the “collegiate” spirit of
the board.
CMS Cameron McKenna also took this
view, whilst supporting reform, they were
against the idea of publishing members’
opinions.
They believed publication of such
opinions might lead to legal challenges to
decisions.
Ofgem were strongly against publication
of minutes, opinions and records of attendance
as this would be difficult for reasons of
confidentiality and because it might inhibit
frank discussion by board members.
In contrast to this, the
Radio, Electrical & TV Retailers
Association (RETRA), centrica, and the
Consumers’ Association, favoured the
publication of minutes and opinions, as well
as records of attendance.
The CBI and Tesco both agreed with
this, providing commercially sensitive
information was not disclosed.
Of
those who supported the proposals, ten respondents stated specifically
that they wanted publication of minutes, opinions and attendance
records and only four said this would be undesirable (one favoured
publication of minutes only).
The CBI and BRC favoured the idea of the board’s
annual report being submitted to Parliament
for debate, as well as being given to the
Secretary of State.
This view was taken a step further by
the National Consumer Council who argued that
in the annual report, non-executive board
members should draw the attention of
Parliament and the public to issues of
concern.
The Consumers’ Association and
centrica wanted an annual report to a
committee of the House of Commons.
Of
those not in favour of the proposals, H H Liesner and Allen and
Overy noted that publishing details of why members had voted in
a particular way could lead to problems if commercially sensitive
information were involved.
The Bar and Law Societies felt that it would be simpler
to achieve accountability with an individual DGFT, than with a
board of members, by publishing the reasons for the DGFT’s decisions. They were also concerned about how quickly minutes and records
of members’ opinions might be published.
Conclusion
A majority of the responses were in favour of the idea of a board
structure for the FTA, although some had
concerns about individual points of detail.
For example, ofgem considered that for
the board to be independent, the Director must
avoid consulting Ministers about board
functions and the CBI were concerned about the
effect a board might have on the speed of
decision making.
Despite these concerns, there was
support, particularly from those respondents
engaged in business for the collegiate aspect
and greater breadth of experience that would
be applied to decisions made by a board.
On the question of the
structure of the board, the general view was
for around eight non-executive members who
possessed varied business experience, with
expertise in matters of competition and
consumer protection.
Members should be appointed on the
basis of merit and business experience but
should not represent any particular interest
faction.
Some respondents, for example the
Trading Standards Institute, considered that
exceptions should be made for sectors whose
interests would be affected by board
decisions, such as trade unions, consumer
representatives and local government.
Some, for example the Scottish Consumer
Council, also considered it was important for
Scotland and Wales to have representation to
take account of devolution.
On the question of whether
board members should be full or part time, of
those who supported the proposals and
expressed a view on this issue, there were
more who favoured the idea of there being part
time members, as this would provide greater
flexibility and a larger number individuals
eligible to be members.
This view was supported by
Tesco. A
number of respondents shared the CBI’s view
that the DGFT should be the only FTA official
to sit on the board or to have voting rights.
Opinion was divided 2 to 1 in favour on the
question of publication of the board’s
programme, minutes of meetings, attendance
records and opinions, provided confidential
material is not released.
Both Tesco and the CBI, for example,
took this view, in contrast to Allen and Overy
and the Bars and Law Societies who were
against this particular proposal.
A few respondents considered substantive reform of
the organisation’s role and functions to be
more important than reform of its structure
and operation.
For example ONdigital, who did not
support the proposals, considered changes in
the OFT’s organisation should not be
undertaken until after the proposals in
respect of the merger control legislation are
implemented.
Late
Responses
There
were four late responses.
Of those who supported the proposals,
British Sky Broadcasting Ltd favoured a mix of
executive and non-executive members, with
outside members being in the majority.
The International Underwriting
Association of London also supported the
proposals but emphasised that appointments to
the board must be made on an impartial basis.
Two
late respondents, both from the legal profession, were critical
of the proposals.
Travers Smith Braithwaite were concerned about impartiality
in the appointment of board members and the possibility of conflicts
of interest arising. Slaughter and May were not convinced of need
for change and concerned about the possibility delays.
DTI
Consumer Affairs 4
February
2001

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