Nuclear security
Security arrangements against the theft of nuclear materials and against sabotage of nuclear facilities is one aspect of ensuring that material of potential proliferation concern is appropriately protected from wrongful use. It complements the nuclear material and accountancy "safeguards" system. The DTI participates in the international debate about standards of physical protection and ensures through our national regulations that UK civil nuclear material and facilities meet international obligations and guidance on security measures for them, taking into account the likely level of the threat against them. An appropriate legal framework is in place for security regulation. The arrangements include standard setting, approving site security plans and regular inspections and security exercises.
The Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003 update and consolidate previous security regulation of the UK civil nuclear industry. The Regulations came into force on 22 March 2003 except for the transport provisions which will come into force on 22nd September 2003. The Regulations carry forward the main substance of the previous regulatory regime, but bring the previous requirements together to provide a single, comprehensive legislative basis for regulation of the civil nuclear industry. The Regulations make provision for the protection of nuclear material, both on sites and in transit, against the risks of theft or sabotage, and for the protection of sensitive nuclear information, such as site security arrangements. They will be enforced by OCNS, which is part of the Department of Trade and Industry.
The DTI is also represented on the Police Authority of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) Constabulary which polices UKAEA, BNFL and Urenco sites.
In the UK, civil nuclear operators must have site security plans dealing with the security arrangements for the protection of nuclear sites and nuclear material on such sites. The arrangements cover, for example, physical protection features such as fencing, CCTV and turnstile access, the roles of security guards or the UKAEA Constabulary at the more sensitive sites, the protection of proliferation sensitive data and technologies and the trustworthiness of the individuals with access to them. From 22nd September 2003 transporters of sensitive nuclear material will have to be approved by the Secretary of State.
The Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS), which has been part of DTI since 1 October 2000, is the security regulator for the UK’s civil nuclear industry. It is responsible for setting security standards for the industry and enforcing compliance and, through the Standing Committee on Police Establishments (SCOPE), reviews police numbers and tasking at licensed nuclear sites policed by the UKAEA Constabulary.
The DTI’s Quinquennial Review of the UKAEA Constabulary in 2002 set out a recommendation for the transfer of the Constabulary from the UKAEA to a statutory Police Authority. The review concluded that there would be significant benefits in the Constabulary operating under a “stand-alone” basis. This will require primary
legislation.
The Director of Civil Nuclear Security published his first annual report on the work of OCNS on 11 June 2002. The
second annual report was published on 25 June 2003
(PDF, 
310Kb). OCNS also undertakes vetting of nuclear industry personnel with access to sensitive nuclear material or information. It works in close conjunction with policy officials in the DTI’s Energy Innovation and Business Unit, with other government departments and agencies as appropriate, and with overseas counterparts.
International framework
The UK is a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material which came into force in 1987 under the auspices of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Broadly speaking, the Convention obliges those countries which are parties to it to meet defined standards of physical protection for international transport of nuclear material and to co-operate in the recovery and protection of stolen nuclear material, and it also promotes international co-operation in the exchange of information relating to physical protection systems for nuclear material in international transport. Responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for domestic nuclear facilities and nuclear material in domestic use, storage or transport rests with the State. The IAEA’s document "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities" (INFCIRC/225/Rev4) however provides a useful basis for guiding States in designing, implementing and regulating a system of physical protection for their sites and transport of different categories of nuclear material. The UK follows this guidance closely in its own domestic regime. OCNS functions as the UK’s competent security authority as recommended at INFCIRC/225/Rev4, 4.2.3.2.
The UK has assisted the IAEA for some years in a number of its programmes designed to improve standards of security world-wide by providing experts from OCNS for the International Physical Protection and Advisory missions and for training courses on physical protection run by the IAEA. The UK, through OCNS, has also provided some bilateral assistance to a few countries to upgrade the physical protection systems at some of their more sensitive facilities.
Currently the UK is assisting the IAEA in its efforts to encourage more States to become a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to review and further enhance the practical ways of improving standards of physical protection for nuclear material world-wide. Further information on the IAEA's activities in this area are available on the IAEA's website
http://www.iaea.org.
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