OPENING SPEECH BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, JACK STRAW, IN A DEBATE ON IRAQ, HOUSE OF COMMONS, LONDON, MONDAY 25 NOVEMBER 2002

Mr Speaker,
I beg to move 'that this House supports UNSCR 1441 as unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council; agrees that the Government of Iraq must comply fully with all provisions of the Resolution; and agrees that, if they fail to do so, the Security Council should meet to discuss what action to take.'

On 7 November, I made a statement to the House about the negotiations on the new UN Security Council Resolution.

I said then that I hoped a large majority of the Security Council would vote in favour of the Resolution. The following day, on the 8 November, Security Council Resolution 1441 was adopted unanimously.

All five permanent members supported it, as did countries as diverse as Mexico, Cameroon, Ireland and Syria.  The Resolution represents the considered view of the international community that Iraq must end its decade of defiance of the United Nations.

For the United Kingdom, support for the UN has always been a central tenet of our foreign policy.  It is the embodiment of our belief in an international order of peace and security.  The Charter of the United Nations is a robust document.  It provides in Chapter VII for mandatory obligations to be binding on all member states, and it makes clear that these Resolutions may be backed by military action.

Today, Iraq stands in breach of nine separate Chapter VII Security Council Resolutions and it has completely ignored 23 out of 27 UN obligations. That cannot be allowed to go on.

As President Bush said to the UN General Assembly on 12 September, the United Nations had either to enforce the writ of its own Resolutions or risk becoming irrelevant.  The Security Council responded to his challenge.

Negotiations on Resolution 1441 were long and intensive. It was some eight weeks in gestation. That period was one of unrelenting high level diplomatic contacts. The Prime Minister made frequent phone calls to President Bush and spoke regularly to other heads of government. I had daily, sometimes hourly, contacts with my counterparts.  But the success of this diplomatic activity owes much to the expertise and professionalism of many British officials, in New York, London and around the world.

FOUR KEY QUESTIONS

In this speech I want to describe the process of inspection set out in 1441, then to answer four key questions which I know are on the minds of RHMs and HMs on both sides of the house. 

The questions are these:

First: what constitutes a material breach? 

Second: who decides and what happens if there is a material breach? 

Third: would there be a second Security Council Resolution to approve any military action? 

Fourth: if HMG were to decide that military action was necessary, would the House be able to vote on this, and if so when?

THE STEPS IRAQ MUST NOW TAKE

Resolution 1441 has one central aim: the peaceful disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction through an effective inspection regime.  Although it is a complex Resolution, it is carefully constructed.  It sets out in its Operative Paragraphs the steps which Iraq must now take clearly and deliberately.

At its outset, in paragraph 1, the Resolution makes clear that Iraq 'has been and remains in material breach of its obligations' under existing Security Council Resolutions, in particular through its 'failure to co-operate with United Nations inspectors and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'.

In paragraph 2, it clearly states that this is Iraq’s 'final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations'.

Paragraph 9 sets out the demand that Iraq confirms within seven days of the Resolution being passed its intention to comply fully with this Resolution.  Iraq has now sent two letters in response to this paragraph – one nine pages long, the latest thirteen pages.  Despite their verbosity, we are treating them as a 'yes'.

The next deadline is 8 December; by this time under paragraph 3, Iraq must have provided to UNMOVIC, the IAEA and the Security Council an 'accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and other delivery systems'.

Dr Blix and Dr El Baradei have already given Iraq advice for this disclosure. Aside from indications from intelligence – some set out in the dossier we published on 24 September - the Government of Iraq will have to account for large stocks of WMD which the previous UNSCOM Reports, the last of which was prepared in January 1999, said were unaccounted for.  This material included:

Inspections by UNMOVIC and the IAEA will resume in Iraq by Wednesday 27 November, four weeks ahead of the Security Council’s deadline. Under paragraph 5, the Inspectors will be required to update the Security Council on progress by 26 January.  

Paragraphs 4, 11 and 12 deal with non-compliance, which I shall come to in a moment. Paragraph 13 then reminds Iraq that it has been repeatedly warned 'that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations'.

A MATERIAL BREACH

Mr Speaker let me now deal with the four questions I raised in my opening.  First, what constitutes a material breach.

I have already explained [paras 18-19 above] that Iraq remains in material breach of previous resolutions, but that SCR 1441 offers Iraq a final opportunity to comply.  Paragraph 4 says a further material breach arises where there are 'false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq … and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and co-operate fully in the implementation of, this Resolution'.

Paragraph 4 therefore defines in general terms what a further material breach will consist of.  As with the definition of this type it is never possible to give an exhaustive list of all conceivable behaviours which it covers.  That judgement has to be made against the real circumstances which arise.  But I can reassure the House that material breach means something significant: some behaviour or pattern of behaviour which is serious.  Amongst such breaches could be action by the Government of Iraq seriously to obstruct or impede the inspectors, to intimidate witnesses, or a pattern of behaviour where any single action appears relatively minor but the actions as a whole add up to something deliberate and more significant: something which shows Iraq’s intention not to comply.

Paragraph 4 concludes by saying that any further material breach will be reported to the Council 'for assessment' under paragraphs 11 and 12. Paragraph 11 directs the inspectors to report to the Security Council any interference or failure to comply with its disarmament obligations – making it clear that these include all the other relevant UNSC Resolutions, as well as 1441.  Paragraph 12 then has the Security Council 'convening immediately upon a report under paragraphs 4 and 11 to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council Resolutions in order to secure international peace and security'.

This brings me on to the second question: who decides and what happens if there is a further material breach.

If there is evidence of a false statement or omission in the Iraqi Declaration, together with a failure to comply with the Resolutions or to co‑operate with the inspectors, this can be reported to the Security Council as a further material breach either by a Security Council member or by the inspectors. The Council will in any case undoubtedly require the opinion of the inspectors.

There is then a clear requirement for an immediate meeting of the Security Council to make 'an assessment' of the alleged breach and to consider the situation and the need for full compliance. Where the breach is so flagrant – say, a physical attack on the inspectors – the decision will have been made by the Iraqis to reject any thought of compliance. The Security Council will undoubtedly then act. It is of course possible, however, that there is credible evidence of a further material breach, but the Security Council is unable to reach a conclusion.

A SECOND RESOLUTION?

This brings me to the next question I posed – will there be a second Security Council Resolution if military action proves necessary.

1441 does not stipulate that there has to be a second Security Council Resolution to authorise military action in the event of further material breach by Iraq.  This was an alternative discussed amongst members of the P5 during the weeks of negotiation: but no draft to this effect was ever tabled nor put to the vote.  Instead, every member of the Council accepted this text.

I should make it clear to the House, as I did on 7 November, that the preference of the British Government, in the event of a material breach is that there should be a second Resolution authorising military action.  The faith now being placed in the Security Council by all members of the United Nations, including the US, requires the Council to show a corresponding level of responsibility.  So far it has more than done so.  I believe it will do so in the future.  But we must reserve our position in the event that it does not.  In any event, Saddam Hussein needs to be in no doubt of the resolve, now, of the United Nations to require him to comply.  That is the reason, in paragraph 13, that the language of 'serious consequences' is used in the event of his non-compliance.  So the discussion that will take place in the Security Council in the event of a material breach will be on the understanding that action will follow.

VOTE ON MILITARY ACTION

The fourth question concerns military action by the UK, whether the House will have a vote on this, and when.

Mr Speaker, no decision on military action has yet been taken by Her Majesty’s Government and I fervently hope that none will be necessary.  1441 sets out a clear, straightforward pathway to peace for Saddam Hussein, if only he will take it.  We have, however, got this far in terms of Saddam Hussein’s compliance only because active diplomacy has been backed by the credible threat of force.  For that threat to remain credible, it is crucial that we make proper preparations.  As the UN process moves forward so should our preparedness for military action in the event that this process fails. It is in this context that our Ministry of Defence has been looking carefully at what would be required.  It is taking steps to ensure that we have servicemen and servicewomen available in the right numbers and with the right skills and equipment.  The more prepared we are, the greater the likelihood of full compliance by Saddam Hussein, without the use of force.

My RHF SofS for Defence is winding the debate for the Government and will of course respond to questions raised.

If force does become necessary, any decisions which HMG make will be careful, proportionate and consistent with our obligations in international law.

Any decision by HMG to take military action will be put before the House very quickly.  I hope that this will be before any military engagement; but, as the House has always accepted, there are some circumstances in which the safety of our forces requires an element of surprise.  As I told the Foreign Affairs Committee in evidence on 25 September: 'We, in government, have no difficulty at all about the idea of a substantive motion at the appropriate time',  [subject to the condition I have just mentioned.]

SADDAM'S CHOICE

Iraq has taken a step towards compliance with 1441.  But we must be realistic. Saddam Hussein’s record of deceit, delay and defiance is well established.  Saddam now faces a clear choice.  He can take the pathway to peace set out in the Resolution or, by frustrating the inspectors and defying the international community’s will, he can provoke military action.

He can choose the path of full co-operation, leading to the suspension of sanctions and the readmittance of Iraq to the family of nations, or he can expose his people to the serious consequences cited in Resolution 1441. The choice is his.

The UN Secretary General. Kofi Annan spoke for the world community as a whole when, as 1441 passed, he said: ‘I urge the Iraqi leadership – for the sake of its own people, and for the sake of world security and world order – to seize this opportunity, and thereby begin to end the isolation and suffering of the Iraqi people. If Iraq’s defiance continues, however, the Security Council must face its responsibilities.’

This position is backed by the European Union. In a statement adopted at the General Affairs and External Relations Council of EU Foreign Ministers on 18 November, it urged the Iraqi Government 'to grasp this final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations. This is the only way for Iraq to avoid further confrontation.'

And NATO, at its Summit in Prague last Friday issued a statement explicitly endorsed by all 19 members:

'NATO Allies stand united in their commitment to take effective action to assist and support the efforts of the UN to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq, without conditions or restrictions, with UNSCR 1441.' 

And, following 1441, the Arab League also made clear that Iraq should work with the Inspectors.

OIL FOR FOOD

The real losers of Saddam’s brutal dictatorship have been the Iraqi people themselves.

Their suffering has been immense under a regime which murders, tortures and rapes political opponents and ethnic minorities, which has used poisonous gas to kill thousands of its own people, and which ignores the plight of its own sick and hungry.

Since 1991, bilaterally and through the European Union, the UK has given over £100 million in aid to Iraq.

Later today, we expect the UN to adopt a British-drafted Resolution extending the Oil for Food programme for another six months. 

There has been much propaganda peddled by the Iraqi regime and some of its apologists elsewhere about the Oil for Food programme.  Yet this UN programme is the Iraqi people’s lifeline.  While Saddam spreads stories of rising death rates and drug shortages, the latest UN reports tell a very different story.  Acute malnutrition rates in Iraq are now half the level they were before ‘Oil for Food’ began in 1996.  Devastating conditions like polio, diphtheria and diarrhoea in children are now less widespread than they were when Saddam’s forces invaded Kuwait.

Oil for Food’s delivery of hi-tech medical equipment, like brain scanners, means ordinary Iraqis now have access to advanced medical treatment. Billions of pounds of goods of all types are being delivered each year. 

Our policy has increased the supply of humanitarian goods to the Iraqi people. Saddam’s policy has been to try to frustrate the Oil for Food programme – Iraq has failed to spend over £1.5 billion allocated by the UN for humanitarian goods.

OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

There are those who say that we should do nothing on Iraq because other countries are subject to Security Council Resolutions too.

Iraq is the only country which is in such clear and serious violation of a whole series of UN obligations under Chapter VII of its Charter. But we want to see other Security Council Resolutions implemented and we are working tirelessly to achieve that in Liberia, in the FRY, in Libya, and of course in respect of Israel/Palestine.

Mr Speaker

Far too many people on all sides have perished needlessly in this terrible conflict.  We mourn for them all, but the deaths there are always more starkly brought home to us when they are of British citizens.  One British citizen, Yoni Jesner, was killed on 19 September in a suicide bombing.  Another, Iain Hood, a worker for the UN under contract from DFID, was killed on Friday last in Jenin; it seems as a result of fire by a member of the IDF.  As soon as I heard the news I spoke to the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr Netanyahu, who promised me an immediate investigation (and my RHF Secretary of State for International Development and I sent messages of condolence to his family).

Grim though the situation in the Occupied Territories and Israel is, there are some positive developments we should not overlook.  There is now a process of negotiation going on, under the leadership of the so-called Quartet of the UN, US, EU and Russian Federation, which is making progress towards agreement on how we get to a settlement.  Determined moves to break the cycle of violence in the Occupied Territories continue.  Palestinian reform efforts are succeeding.

There is now an international consensus on the need for a settlement based on two states.

We support, and are engaged in, all this. And I assure the House that wherever we can enhance our support in any way, we shall. 

CONCLUSION

We have no quarrel with the Iraqi people.  We want to help them restore Iraq to its proper place in the community of nations, abiding by its international obligations and free from the burden of sanctions.

This can happen only once Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction have been destroyed, in line with a decade of United Nations Resolutions.

We hope that can be done by peaceful means, and we shall give the weapons inspectors every support.

But ultimately the choice falls to Saddam alone.  Resolution 1441 is his 'final opportunity' to take the pathway to peace.  But no one should be in any doubt of the world’s resolve if he fails to take it.