Fighting poverty to build a safer world
A strategy for security and development
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Published by the Department for International Development
March 2005
Foreword

We live in an interdependent world. We are connected to other people and countries through trade, travel, culture, ideas and business. This enriches our lives. But these close connections can also give rise to threats when conflict, crime and environmental pollution cross borders. No country – rich or poor – can stand aside from these challenges. Neither can DFID, and that’s why we too must consider how our programmes and expertise can help address international threats such as conflict or terrorism.

DFID works for poor people in poor countries. Even in times of peace, the poor are worst affected by violent crime, lawlessness and state-sanctioned abuse. And in times of war, millions of poor people have been killed, injured or displaced across the developing world.

Wars kill development as well as people. The poor therefore need security as much as they need clean water, schooling or affordable health. In recent years, DFID has begun to bring security into the heart of its thinking and practice. But we need to do more. As the Prime Minister said in his speech to the World Economic Forum this year, “it is absurd to choose between an agenda focusing on terrorism and one on global poverty”.

This strategy shows how DFID, through its commitment to fighting poverty, can help tackle insecurity among the poor. It explains our approach to the complex but important connections between security and development. And it sets out how DFID, working with poor people and their governments and international partners, can help build a more secure future for us all.

Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP
Secretary of State for International Development
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1. Rich and poor people all want to live in safety and security. No country – however prosperous – can remain aloof from the effects of insecurity elsewhere. In today’s world, we understand that security is a global need and that countries must work together to achieve it.

2. Security and development are linked. Insecurity, lawlessness, crime and violent conflict are among the biggest obstacles to achievement of the Millennium Development Goals; they also destroy development. Poverty, underdevelopment and fragile states create fertile conditions for conflict and the emergence of new security threats, including international crime and terrorism.

3. The central message of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change is that security and development are linked, and that we need global progress on both. The Panel’s recommendations will be discussed at this year’s Millennium Review Summit, when the world meets to assess progress toward the Millennium Development Goals. In 2005, the UK holds the Presidencies of the G8 and the European Union. This year provides an unprecedented opportunity to make real progress in tackling some of the most important challenges to our collective security and well-being, including poverty, disease and climate change. Now is the right time for DFID to consider what security and development mean for us.

4. Poor people cite safety and security as a major concern; they say it is as important as hunger, unemployment and lack of safe drinking water. They talk about fear of attack, injury or physical abuse, often at the hands of precisely those institutions that are meant to protect them, or as a result of violent conflict or lawlessness. They explicitly link security to personal security. Given its importance to the well-being of the poor, we believe that supporting poor people’s physical security is a vital part of reducing poverty.

5. Promoting the security of the poor is, however, not the same thing as promoting the security of states. It is possible to increase state security, for example through stronger border controls, without improving the security of poor people who live within them. Indeed, security measures by the state can be implemented in ways that increase poor people’s insecurity.

6. DFID’s role is to promote the security of the poor locally, nationally and internationally, as part of our work in reducing poverty. We are already doing a lot to support partner countries in preventing and managing conflict, to improve governance and the rule of law, and to reduce inequality and exclusion. DFID contributes to post-conflict peacebuilding, and is strengthening its work in fragile states. But we can do more. Reducing conflict and promoting poor people’s security is not yet a regular feature of our programmes or partnerships.

1 See Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states, DFID, 2005.
7. This does not mean subordinating poverty reduction to short-term political interests or to work on anti-terrorism. Nor does it mean big shifts in the existing allocation of UK development assistance – this will continue to remain focused on the world’s poorest countries and people. It does mean bringing poor people’s security more squarely into our work.

8. Aid alone is not enough. Development cannot progress where there is instability. The security community on its own cannot build the institutions and opportunities necessary to prevent conflict. We need better collaboration between development, defence and diplomatic communities to achieve our respective and complementary aims.

9. This strategy explores the link between security and development. It suggests ways in which the international system can be more effective, and in the final section, outlines how DFID will respond.2

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2 Because this work adds to DFID’s existing policy, it does not consider the links between security and trade, climate change, HIV and AIDS, debt and fragile states, which are covered elsewhere in DFID’s policy work.
Chapter 2: Security and development are linked

10. Insecurity is a barrier to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Violent conflict can destroy progress built up over time and set back the prospects for development for decades to come. Crime and lawlessness impede growth and development, discouraging foreign investment and domestic economic activity. They also make delivery of effective services to poor people even harder.

Poor people suffer most from insecurity

11. Poor people suffer disproportionately from insecurity. They are often the worst affected by direct forms of violence, including violent crime, sexual violence and violations by local police and security personnel. Poor women are especially vulnerable. Domestic violence is a leading cause of death and injury to poor women worldwide and women are more likely than men to be victims of sexual violence outside the home. Most victims of human trafficking are poor people seeking to escape poverty and discrimination. Again, women and children are particularly at risk.

12. Poor people do not suffer only from the effects of violent conflict. New kinds of security threats also take their toll. International terrorism, for example, affects poor countries directly. Casualties from international terrorism between 1998 and 2004 in Africa and Asia totalled nearly 28,000 people, compared with 5,000 people in North America and Western Europe combined. Terrorist attacks also critically damage economies. The effect of the Bali bombings was to reduce Indonesia’s economic output by as much as 0.5% of GDP. The World Bank estimates that as a result of the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States, global GDP was reduced by 0.8%, and some 10 million additional people were left in poverty as a result.

13. Crime also has an impact on development, damaging the investment climate of poor countries. International organised crime and illicit drug production are closely linked. And revenues from illegal drugs play a role in financing arms purchases, which prolong conflict (Box 1).

Box 1: Illegal drugs production and conflict

The cultivation, production and trafficking of illicit drugs fuels disorder and instability in many parts of the world. In Afghanistan, where much of the world’s heroin originates, the drugs trade is a major factor in sustaining conflict and its impact is felt in neighbouring Central Asia, where it has exacerbated the spread of crime and HIV and AIDS. In Colombia, which produces around 75% of the world’s cocaine, the drugs industry has intensified the internal conflict. As much as 95% of global opium production is in countries in, or emerging from, civil war.
Poverty increases the risks of insecurity

14. Poor countries are most at risk of violent conflict. Research on civil war shows that lower levels of GDP per capita are associated with a higher risk of violent and more prolonged conflict. All other things being equal, a country at $250 GDP per capita has an average 15% risk of experiencing a civil war in the next five years. At a GDP per capita of $5,000, the risk of civil war is less than 1%.

15. Violent conflicts also have regional and global effects that can exacerbate other forms of insecurity. Civil wars create territory that is outside government control, which are fertile environments for international crime and illicit arms trafficking.

16. Conversely, enhanced security can help strengthen fragile states by creating better conditions for private investment, which in turn can help stimulate economic growth. In Yemen, for example, stronger coastal security would reduce the illegal plunder of valuable fishing stocks along the country’s 2,000-kilometre coastline, and contribute to the development of a productive national fishing industry.

17. Economic decline and shocks also increase the likelihood of conflict and insecurity. Sustained economic decline can interact with weak or predatory government institutions in a downward spiral leading to increased risk of conflict, state violence and collapse. For example, the 1998 financial crisis in East Asia caused income to fall in Aceh, Indonesia by about 10%, leading to heightened conflict. Rapid urbanisation, which can be a result of economic growth as well as a force for growth, can – when poorly planned and managed – give rise to new forms of urban violence.

18. Inequality and exclusion exacerbate insecurity. Where ethnic minorities are subject to political discrimination, conflict is ten times more likely to occur. Poverty and lack of access to basic services contribute to perceptions of injustice that can motivate people to violence.

19. Poor governance, including mismanagement of natural resources, also increases the risk of insecurity. Insecurity deters the type of long-term, private investment that generates economic growth and job creation. It increases dependence on primary commodities.

20. Countries dependent on natural resources such as oil and minerals face a higher risk of violent conflict than other countries. High value resources such as diamonds, timber and coltan provided finance for insurgent groups in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burma. Fragile states create an environment in which terrorism and international criminal activity can thrive, as Afghanistan has shown.

What does this mean for us?

21. In an interdependent world, insecurity can easily spread. Development agencies cannot ignore the impact that security threats at all levels – local, national and global – have on poor people. At the same time, the world community cannot ignore the critical role of poverty and inequality in increasing risks for us all. We need to ensure that, as an international community, we make progress on both security and development. DFID is already doing a great deal, but we can do more.
Chapter 3: What we are already doing

22. Since the 1990s, there has been growing recognition that to reduce poverty we need to do a number of things. In addition to economic growth and better health and education, good governance, legitimate and functioning state institutions, respect for human rights, fairness and inclusion are also vital. In recent years, development agencies have focused on the importance of capable, accountable states that can deliver services, rights and protection to their citizens.

23. But donors have not always been sensitive to the impact of their programmes on the stability of partner countries. Sometimes they have adopted a technical approach that has ignored or — at worst — exacerbated conflict, within a country and for its neighbours (Box 2).

Box 2: Economic reform and conflict in Yugoslavia

In the 1990s, individual states were emerging from the collapse of Yugoslavia. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommended a conventional stabilisation programme with federal authorities, using the machinery of federal government, which ran counter to the trend towards political and administrative devolution, and exacerbated tensions in a fragile political environment. Failure to provide support for groups hurt by reform led to increased inequality. The result of these policies was increased economic insecurity for vulnerable groups, which helped foster the emergence of political extremism.

24. Nevertheless, we are learning. Development agencies are paying more attention to risk factors linked to conflict and insecurity, and are developing practical approaches that help prevent or reduce conflict.

What is DFID doing?

25. DFID is introducing political analysis to its work, using an approach known as ‘Drivers of Change’ to understand what is likely to bring about positive change in countries and how to encourage powerful groups to take account of poor people’s needs (Box 3). DFID has so far carried out Drivers of Change studies in 15 countries.
26. DFID is also paying greater attention to the different access of particular social groups to services and opportunities, and to institutionalised discrimination, which increases the risk of violent conflict. Tackling social exclusion and inequality is an increasingly important part of DFID’s work (Box 4).

27. DFID is looking at the role of natural resources in fuelling conflict and corruption, and strengthening the capacity of public sector regulators to manage primary commodities transparently. DFID hosts the UK-led Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, a voluntary scheme operating in Nigeria, Azerbaijan and elsewhere that encourages oil, gas and mining companies to publish what they pay in revenues and governments to publish what they receive. DFID is also working with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to support the Kimberley Process, which aims to stop the illicit trading of diamonds – a trade that has fuelled conflict and insecurity in countries such as Angola and Sierra Leone.

Box 3: Growing insecurity in Bangladesh

In the 1990s, Bangladesh achieved one of the fastest rates of poverty reduction in the world. Progress was made in food security, literacy and employment. Life expectancy rose and the number of poor people fell, but insecurity grew. Criminality, corruption and violence have become widespread and international concern has been expressed about Bangladesh’s potential to become a harbour for terrorists. The Government of Bangladesh’s response has included a crackdown on violent crime, but a longer-term strategy to address insecurity is needed. DFID Bangladesh commissioned a Drivers of Change political analysis, which led to new thinking about how to tackle the underlying causes of insecurity. DFID’s work in Bangladesh now includes new initiatives on governance reform, police reform and, together with the Bank of Bangladesh, support to improve financial regulations in line with recommendations by the inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force.

Box 4: Social exclusion in Nepal

Addressing social exclusion is a DFID priority in Nepal, where discrimination based on caste and ethnicity is a major cause of civil war. Some 90% of Nepal’s Dalit caste live below the poverty line; their life expectancy is five years shorter than other citizens. Ways of addressing exclusion include affirmative action programmes and strengthening organisations that represent excluded groups.

28. A functioning financial sector underpins individual and state security. A weak or dysfunctional financial sector stunts economic growth and makes financial flows less transparent and more vulnerable to abuse. DFID supports financial sector development across Africa and Asia. This support can help governments to clamp down on illicit financial activities and trade, and to insulate the financial sector from the potentially destabilising effects of financial and economic crises.

3 The Financial Action Task Force is an independent, inter-governmental body that promotes anti-money-laundering measures around the world, with a Secretariat based at the OECD.
The UK has long highlighted the dangers posed by small arms proliferation, and supports an international agreement on tighter control over arms transfers. DFID is working with other government departments to combat the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. DFID’s work includes helping countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and Uganda develop national action plans to tackle small arms proliferation, including the collection and destruction of such weapons.

DFID contributes to programmes for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. DFID’s focus is to help create social and economic opportunities that will enable ex-combatants to rejoin their communities and avoid a return to fighting, for example in Sierra Leone.

**Security and justice sector reform**

DFID is also gaining expertise in safety, security and access to justice (SSAJ) programmes, and security sector reform (SSR), in collaboration with others across Whitehall. These programmes reflect an important advance in development thinking; i.e. that well-run security and justice sectors are essential ‘services’ that responsible states should provide to their citizens, including poor people. SSR supports the development of a professional security sector in partner countries to meet legitimate security needs under civilian, democratic control. Ensuring that security forces are accountable as well as efficient is a goal of SSR programmes. SSAJ programmes support the development of timely, fair, accessible and affordable justice for all citizens, including the poor, so that people can be safe and their property secure.

DFID presently supports SSR or SSAJ initiatives in 24 countries. In Malawi, for example, DFID supports the training of community police officers. In Nigeria, an ‘Access to Justice’ programme is improving both formal and community policing, and people are reporting noticeably better police performance. In Jamaica, DFID is working with other UK government departments and international partners to help the Government of Jamaica produce a national security strategy, which considers security issues in the context of the economic, social and political development of the country.

Taken together, we have a range of ways of promoting the security of the poor, but there is more we can do. We need to be more consistent in applying these approaches across our country programmes. And we need to focus more on regional and cross-border sources of insecurity. Conflict and its impact on poor people rarely stop at national borders, and we need to be able to respond flexibly.

**Contributing to global security**

At a broader level, DFID’s work on poverty reduction also benefits global security. While there is no evidence that poverty directly contributes to terrorism, or that terrorists are from poorer communities, terrorist leaders do exploit the issue of poverty as a means of mobilising popular support and legitimising their actions. Many of the structural factors that increase the risk of terrorism also matter for development: unmet political and economic aspirations, lack of jobs for skilled labour, weak states and poor governance.
35. DFID supports poverty reduction, good governance and social inclusion in many poor countries at risk of terrorism. DFID’s support to education reform, adult literacy and skill development also helps reduce this risk. In Pakistan, for example, we are working with the government to improve the quality of and access to state schools, and considering how education delivered through religious schools, or madrassas, can be improved. We are also seeking opportunities to promote a more inclusive, and therefore stable, society (Box 5).

**Box 5: Tackling insecurity in Pakistan**

In Pakistan, conflict, terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferation and illegal drug production and trafficking are a cause of insecurity for poor people as well as of international concern. International organisations and donors are working with the Government of Pakistan to address these threats to Pakistan’s national security and to global security. DFID’s strategy aims to enhance the accountability of the state to its citizens, give people better access to justice and help to build inclusive political institutions. An important part of DFID’s new country assistance plan for Pakistan is to increase opportunities for poor people to participate in decision-making at all levels of government.

36. Failures of governance can radicalise groups and, where territorial control is lacking, provide safe havens and bases for launching terrorist attacks. Certain conflicts, such as that between Israel and Palestine, have iconic significance for international terrorism. DFID works to address many of these conflicts, including support for the Middle East peace process (Box 6).

**Box 6: The Middle East peace process**

Only a political settlement to the Middle East conflict will offer lasting prospects for economic growth, poverty reduction and security in the region. DFID is working with other international partners to help create a viable Palestinian state. We supported the establishment of a Negotiations Support Unit which has built Palestinian capacity to participate effectively in final settlement talks, and, through the EU, we are enabling the Palestinian Authority to deliver improved safety and security to the Palestinian people.

37. More needs to be done to improve our analysis of the links between poverty and the long-term risk factors associated with terrorism. This is also true for our understanding of the links between illegal drugs production and poverty in different parts of the world. DFID works closely with other UK departments and international partners to identify alternatives to illegal drug production in poor countries (Box 7).
38. But this does not mean that aid should be put at the service of global security. Poverty reduction is a UK and an international goal in its own right. Countries that signed the UN Millennium Declaration shared a vision of a fairer, more equal world as the most sustainable basis of our collective global security. Changing development priorities to meet security goals would only serve to compromise both. Instead, we need to improve policy and practice on how development and security goals can be pursued in a mutually reinforcing way.

**Box 7: Alternative livelihoods in Afghanistan**

The livelihood of many poor, rural Afghans depends on growing opium poppy. But illegal narcotics production is destroying the development and security of Afghanistan, as well as the wider region. The UK leads international support to the Government of Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics strategy. DFID supports this with over £20 million worth of projects that reduce the dependence of poor farmers on illegal poppy cultivation, by generating alternative livelihoods. This includes helping farmers, and particularly women, to diversify their income by growing different crops and raising animals, as well as generating new, non-agricultural opportunities. DFID’s support to build an effective Afghan state is also crucial in trying to crack down on the drugs business.
Chapter 4: Development and security working together

39. Development, defence and diplomacy need to work together. It is not possible to address present threats to human and global security without close collaboration. But this is challenging. Security and development people do not regularly talk to each other. And some development people worry that working with security counterparts risks diverting aid for political purposes.

40. There are some genuine differences between security and development approaches. DFID’s primary concern is Low Income Countries, where we spend 90% of our bilateral aid, mainly in Africa and Asia. Many international security threats, however, are linked to networks operating in Middle Income Countries. DFID does work in some Middle Income Countries, which have an important role to play in regional stability (Box 8). DFID will spend around £225 million in Middle Income Countries in 2005-06.

Box 8: DFID’s Middle Income Country Strategy, 2005-2008

A third of the world’s poor live in Middle Income Countries (MICs). But MICs are over-aided in relation to levels of poverty, receiving nearly half of all bilateral aid worldwide. DFID works with MICs both bilaterally and through multilateral organisations. We are seeking to improve the targeting of multilateral aid on the poor, and pushing for trade reform and other international policies that create the right conditions for poverty reduction and economic growth.

41. In some cases, security and development people have different timeframes. Those working in security must sometimes focus on achieving immediate, short-term objectives; for example bringing hostilities to an end, or preventing an outbreak of fighting between warring factions. Development workers, on the other hand, tend to focus on longer-term objectives, such as improvements in political and economic governance, reductions in inequality and discrimination, and the creation of sustainable livelihoods. This can create frustrations on both sides. Development may be slow, especially in post-conflict situations, until conditions are right. And by virtue of the focus on short-term outcomes, security work may inadvertently undermine the institutional foundations necessary for long-term development (Box 9).
42. Security and development communities can operate in different ways. Development agencies have learned that country-led, partnership approaches – where national partners are in the lead – work best. This may result in fewer bilateral development staff working in-country, as multilateral agencies and national partners play the leading role. In some cases, this will be at odds with the highly operational role of international security forces, who may feel they lack international development partners to work with on the ground.

43. Human rights is an important area where the security and development communities need to work together more closely; for example, to tackle abuses during conflict and to establish post-conflict justice and security. During armed conflict, it is important to act promptly to ensure compliance with international human rights and international humanitarian law. Security concerns should not be a justification for allowing violations of human rights.

44. There are examples of good collaboration. Since 2001, DFID, the Ministry of Defence, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have been working together on the Global and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools. The Conflict Prevention Pools have provided opportunities to learn more about each other’s aims, approaches and experience. Most of DFID’s security sector reform, small arms and light weapons, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration work is managed through the Pools (Box 10).

**Box 9: Remittances – security and development in tension?**

In Somalia, poor families depend heavily on informal remittances through the *Hawala* system. *Hawala* remittances amount to more than five times foreign aid to Somalia. Globally, remittances make up a large percentage of the GDP of many poor countries, and are a critical source of income in post-conflict situations. But informal financial systems such as remittances also provide opportunities for financing international criminal activity, conflict and terrorism. The international Financial Action Task Force sets out specific steps countries should take to ensure financial transparency. These are not always easy for countries with weak capacity to implement. Heavy-handed approaches can push informal systems ‘underground’, while adversely affecting poor people. The closure of *Hawala* outlets in the US and UK after the 11 September terrorist attacks left many Somali families destitute. Many charity organisations operating in health and education were forced to close. DFID works with other UK government departments and international partners to ensure that international requirements for financial transparency do not penalise the poor, by restricting access to remittances and other financial services.

**Box 10: The UK Conflict Prevention Pools**

The Conflict Prevention Pools were established as a mechanism to improve the UK’s effectiveness in conflict prevention, management and resolution. They bring together expertise in defence, development and diplomacy, and are supported by HM Treasury and the Cabinet Office. There are two mechanisms: the Global Pool, chaired by the Foreign Secretary, and the Africa Pool, chaired by the Secretary of State for International Development. The Pools principally finance longer-term work, including post-conflict institution building, but also fund shorter-term responses to new crises. Other governments are looking to learn lessons and to build on the UK experience.
45. More recently, the UK Government has established an inter-departmental unit to coordinate work on post-conflict reconstruction. The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit will help countries put in place quickly the civilian capabilities needed for a stable environment in the aftermath of war, so that reconstruction can begin.

46. Development agencies can and should play an active role after conflict has ended, to ensure the right foundations are laid in the short term for longer-term state building and poverty reduction. Security and development communities also need to forge stronger links between programmes for the demobilisation of ex-combatants, and programmes for their successful reintegration in peacetime society.

47. Successful collaboration can produce dramatic results. In post-conflict Sierra Leone, an integrated UK strategy clarified the responsibilities of each government department at the outset. Working with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, DFID focused on reintegrating ex-combatants into productive civilian life, improving standards of policing, and capacity building for key ministries, including defence.

48. DFID is also helping the Government of Sierra Leone create a more inclusive society so as to reduce the risk of future conflict. The exclusion of youth was widely seen as a major source of conflict in the region. Although the situation remains fragile, it is improving.

49. As Sierra Leone demonstrates, development and poverty reduction cannot happen in isolation. Development agencies must work with defence and diplomacy to achieve progress. We should not be afraid to disagree. There will be differences of opinion, but we must ensure that action to tackle global threats does not undermine the development of capable and accountable states, which can deliver services and rights to poor people.
Chapter 5: A more effective international system

50. The UK cannot tackle global insecurity alone. A stronger, more integrated international system which can prevent and respond is needed.

51. The United Nations plays a vital role in promoting global security. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has greatly expanded its work on peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. This has coincided with a sharp decline in the number of internal conflicts worldwide, from 42 in 1989 to 27 in 2003. But there have also been failures – including failures to halt large-scale ethnic cleansing and genocide.

52. The international community must act to protect ordinary people from catastrophic suffering and violence. We should never allow an atrocity like the 1994 genocide in Rwanda to occur again. While protecting citizens is first and foremost the duty of states, the international system must be able to respond when states fail in their responsibilities to protect ordinary people.

**Progress on security and development – the UN High Level Panel**

53. We need an international system where the goals of security and development are pursued side by side. Rich and poor countries alike need both security and development. We cannot achieve one without also achieving the other. This is the central proposition of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which published its report in December 2004.

54. The report, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, sets out groundbreaking proposals for reform of the international system, including the UN. It shows how, in an interdependent world, we are only as safe as the weakest state among us, or the most vulnerable group of people. As a result, our collective security can only be achieved through addressing a range of global threats – including poverty, disease and environmental degradation. To address these, the report calls on the international system to make progress on both security and development.

55. The UK Government supports the analysis and broad thrust of the UN High Level Panel. DFID is working with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, other government departments and international partners to ensure that its recommendations are taken forward (Box 11).
56. In order to achieve security and development, we believe that development resources should be focused on achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It would be all too easy to unravel the international consensus for aid to be used in the fight against poverty, by allowing development budgets to be diverted to tackling high-profile threats such as terrorism or weapons of mass destruction. These threats affect rich and poor alike and urgently need to be addressed. But the distinct contribution of development assistance is to tackle the longer-term, underlying causes of global insecurity linked to poverty and inequality.

57. DFID will therefore continue to argue that bilateral and multilateral agencies, such as the EU and UN, should use their development budgets to finance activities which constitute Official Development Assistance (ODA) under internationally-recognised criteria, and that these budgets should not be diverted toward technical assistance for short-term global or national security objectives.4

58. Aid programmes should be linked to performance against poverty reduction and not to performance against global security goals. In a joint policy paper with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and HM Treasury, Partnerships for poverty reduction: rethinking conditionality, we explain the circumstances in which DFID would consider reducing or interrupting aid. These include a) if a country moved significantly away from poverty reduction objectives or outcomes, or the agreed objectives of a particular aid commitment – for example through an unjustifiable rise in military spending, or a substantial deviation from the agreed poverty reduction programme, (b) when a country is in significant violation of human rights or other international obligations, or (c) when there is a significant breakdown in partner government financial management and accountability, leading to the risk of funds being misused through weak administration or corruption.

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Box 11: UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change

The UN High Level Panel was established to recommend practical measures to address threats to global peace and security. The Panel’s report proposes action against a range of global threats including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation, war and violence within states, the spread and use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism and transnational organised crime. The Panel’s report will form an important contribution to the Millennium Review Summit. It makes a wide range of recommendations, including the establishment of a UN Peacebuilding Commission, and recognition of a collective international responsibility to protect citizens in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent, and criteria for Security Council endorsement of the legitimate use of force in such circumstances.

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4 ODA criteria are defined by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, in agreement with Member States.
Humanitarian emergencies and humanitarian space

59. The international humanitarian system must be able to respond effectively to humanitarian crises. Despite many successes, some weaknesses remain, as shown by the crisis in Darfur. Donors were slow to appreciate the enormity of the crisis, slow to mobilise sufficient resources and slow to engage. Humanitarian agencies struggled to find experienced staff in sufficient numbers. There was a lack of leadership and coordination among different agencies.

60. DFID is a leading supporter of the ‘Good Humanitarian Donorship’ initiative, which brings together over 22 countries keen to push reform. In December 2004, the Secretary of State for International Development made proposals for further improvements (Box 12), and there are important lessons to be learned from the recent earthquake and tsunami in Asia.

Box 12: UK proposals for a stronger humanitarian system

- A $1 billion UN fund to help the UN respond quickly to humanitarian emergencies in the early stages and to finance neglected crises.
- Powers for UN humanitarian coordinators in-country to assess needs, make plans, allocate resources and coordinate agencies.
- Enhanced role for the European Community’s Humanitarian Office to support victims of ‘forgotten emergencies’.
- Increased investment in disaster risk reduction by development agencies. Where practical, the UK will allocate up to 10% of each natural disaster response to mitigate the impact of future disasters.
- Performance benchmarks to measure the speed and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance.

61. Increasingly, the UN is called on to manage complex peace support operations involving both civilian and military personnel. These integrated missions bring together the different parts of the UN system in a single, coordinated framework. The UK supports the concept of UN integrated missions, and is pushing for further improvements in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation’s Integrated Mission Planning Process.

62. At the same time, integrated missions should not result in the ‘politicisation’ of humanitarian activities, where aid is allocated for political ends rather than genuine need. If this were to happen – or be perceived to happen – then the safety of humanitarian workers could be compromised, and their access to affected populations limited. Integrated mission planning must take account of these dangers. Humanitarian assistance must remain neutral, impartial and independent. When military and civilian agencies operate in the same environment, every effort should be made to ensure that their roles and mandates remain distinct. The UK Government is supporting the UN’s review of the experience with integrated missions, to consider how best to ensure this happens.
63. However, we live in a world where aid is seen by some as a weapon of war, and where humanitarian principles are sometimes unknown, misunderstood or deliberately ignored (for example by the killing of aid workers). In some circumstances, it is only possible to carry out humanitarian or development work alongside military forces seeking to establish general security for local populations. DFID cooperates with UK military forces to deliver relief when humanitarian organisations cannot, either because of insecurity or when the military’s logistical capabilities are needed to fill emergency requirements, for example during the recent tsunami disaster in Asia. We are also supporting the NGO Military Contact Group, which provides a forum for dialogue between UK NGOs and the UK military.

**Peacekeeping**

64. As long as conflict continues to be a feature of our world, global peace and security will depend, in part, on international peacekeeping. We know from experience that effective peacekeeping requires a clearly defined and well-understood mandate, and adequate troops and resources to implement that mandate successfully. Many UN peacekeeping operations in the past have faltered or failed as a result of weaknesses in one or both of these conditions; for example, in Bosnia, Somalia and Angola.

65. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and DFID have drawn up a UK Action Plan for improving international peacekeeping. The Action Plan details how the UK will support the UN to improve planning, management and leadership of multi-dimensional peace support operations, boost capacity for rapid deployment of troops and police, and prevent and address serious misconduct by UN peace support troops and UN staff.

66. It is critical to ensure there are adequate numbers of UN peacekeepers. Without these, UN peacekeeping operations risk repeating the failures of the past. The UK is committed to increasing the number of troops available for international peacekeeping, including through the development of EU Battlegroups capable of responding at short notice to UN requests for peacekeeping missions around the world.

**Regional organisations**

67. Regional organisations are increasingly called upon to play a leading role in regional security and conflict management, whether alone or in tandem with the UN or governments. However, regional organisations do not always have the capacity to fulfil this role.

68. Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced more conflict in recent decades than any other continent or region in the world. And it is no coincidence that Africa lags behind the rest of the world in progress towards the Millennium Development Goals.

69. The UK is committed to building African capacity to address Africa’s security. Through the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, for example, the UK is providing £12 million for the African Union’s peace support operation in Darfur. We are also supporting G8 efforts to help build African peacekeeping capacity, including a UK commitment to train 17,000 African peacekeeping troops by 2010.
Peacebuilding

70. While effective peacekeeping may be essential to end a conflict, it is not enough. In the recent past, two-fifths of countries that emerged from conflict relapsed into conflict within five years. This conflict trap can be broken with serious investment in peacebuilding measures. Essential post-conflict peacebuilding measures include disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes and building the public institutions that provide security, transitional justice and reconciliation, and basic social services.

71. The UN High Level Panel identifies inadequate peacebuilding as a major weakness in the international system. Peacebuilding efforts are unsystematic, poorly coordinated and underfunded. And there is no established mechanism to bring together the various international organisations that have a role to play – including the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, bilateral donors and regional organisations. There is an urgent need to improve this state of affairs. The High Level Panel recommends the establishment of a UN Peacebuilding Commission. The UK welcomes this recommendation.

The European Union

72. The European Union (EU) is in a unique position to ensure that security and development policies complement each other and that equal weight is given to both. The EU provides over half of all development assistance worldwide. The EU’s range of policies, from development to trade to security; its partnerships with different regions, including Africa; and its ability to work across borders can all be used to contribute to a safer world for all. This means giving as much weight to human security as to the security of states.

73. The EU needs a more coherent policy on security and development. DFID will work together with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to make this a reality. The European Security Strategy (ESS) sets out a vision for the EU’s contribution to global security. As the ESS is developed, the UK will work to ensure that full weight is given to threats to our collective security arising from poverty, disease and environmental degradation.

74. Further work is also needed for EU Member States to adopt a common approach to identify and address the risks of state failure. Conflict prevention should be as important as crisis management and response. The EU needs to revitalise the Gotenburg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, which sets out an agenda for action by the EU and Member States including improved early warning systems and comprehensive plans for countries where there is a significant danger of conflict. These plans should cover all EU policies that may exacerbate or reduce the risk of conflict, including those on trade and on the environment.
75. The Cotonou Agreement between the EU and Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific provides a good example of this. The agreement focuses on reducing poverty and is founded on the principles of partnership and ownership, so that new initiatives are agreed jointly between all parties. It is also common practice to ensure that economic, social and political objectives within Cotonou are mutually reinforcing. The UK will encourage the EU to apply this model of working to other regional agreements, including those where both security and development objectives will be pursued.

76. The EU has a major role to play in promoting African solutions to conflict in Africa. Through the EU, the UK contributes to the African Peace Facility, which finances the work of the African Union and sub-regional organisations to build capacity for peace support operations and conflict management. In collaboration with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, DFID will work to secure adequate EU funding for the African Peace Facility in the next Financial Perspective and continued EU support for capacity building in the African Union and sub-regional peace and security structures.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund

77. Established with a mandate to focus on economic and financial issues, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have traditionally avoided direct engagement with security issues. This is beginning to change, with increasing recognition that violent conflict and insecurity are significant barriers to reducing poverty and promoting economic growth.

78. There are specific areas where progress is needed. The World Bank needs to continue to develop new ways of working with Low Income Countries with poor governance, policies and institutions. In some cases, this means that the World Bank should work with UN agencies to determine the most effective package of diplomatic, security and economic assistance. It should also respond positively when partner governments request that the security sector is included in a World Bank Public Expenditure Review. The IMF should better incorporate conflict analysis into Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance agreements.
Chapter 6: Priorities for DFID

79. How can DFID and other development agencies be more effective in promoting the security of the poor? Although we are already doing a lot, there is scope to do more. In some cases, this involves expanding existing activities; in other cases it means doing new things, or doing old things differently. So what will DFID do?

80. Some things will not change. The UK Government produced two White Papers, in 1997 and 2000 respectively, which commit UK development assistance to the aim of reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. In 2002, the poverty focus of UK development assistance was confirmed in law with the passage of the International Development Act.

81. This position will not change, nor should it. UK development assistance helps build global peace and stability for the longer term, by reducing inequality and exclusion, supporting the development of capable, responsible states and reducing conflict. Money spent on reducing poverty is money spent for a more secure world.

82. The White Papers and the International Development Act, together with the commitment to spend 90% of bilateral aid in Low Income Countries, define how DFID can – and can’t – work on security. For example, DFID cannot use UK development assistance to finance programmes whose primary objective is tackling threats to UK or global security. Nor will DFID open programmes in countries on the basis of UK or global security considerations alone – there would have to be a prior and compelling poverty reduction case. But we and other development agencies can support programmes that enhance the human security of the poor in developing countries, and, in so doing, benefit everyone’s safety, whether rich or poor.

83. There are two ways we can improve our effectiveness in supporting the security of the poor: by working differently through our programmes and working more intensively with other parts of the UK Government.

Integrating conflict and security into our work

84. We know that safety and security are key concerns for the poor, and that conflict is a major constraint to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The challenge is to turn this knowledge into routine practice, so that conflict reduction and the security of poor people are considered in our bilateral and multilateral programmes. There are eight specific ways DFID will do this.

85. **First, we will pay greater attention to the regional and global dimensions of conflict and insecurity**, and to how they impede progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. We need to understand how threats to security originating in other countries affect the poor in countries where we work. This means international development agencies – including DFID – looking beyond our existing areas of geographical and policy expertise to understand, for example, how international terrorism and organised crime affect the poor in Low Income Countries.

86. It also requires development agencies to think – and in some cases act – regionally, because many security threats, such as small arms trafficking, do not stop at national borders and are best tackled at regional level. DFID will create greater capacity to work regionally and we will work more closely with regional organisations, such as the African Union, that have a conflict prevention mandate.

87. **Second, we will pay greater attention to countries that play a critical role in promoting regional stability – or instability**. This will include poor countries, such as Angola, as well as Middle Income Countries, such as South Africa. We will work in some of these countries through our bilateral programmes. Elsewhere, we will work through multilateral agencies, including the European Union, which operate in a wider range of Middle Income Countries than DFID; for example, in the Middle East and North Africa.

88. **Third, we will consider security as a basic entitlement of the poor**, like health or education. To this end, we will make support for effective and accountable security and justice systems a more regular feature of our work. This means expanding the number of countries where we support security sector reform (SSR) and safety, security and access to justice (SSAJ) initiatives, either directly or through the Global and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools.

89. Security and justice sector reform should be routinely considered in our programme design, and we will promote stronger collaboration between UK development, diplomatic and defence professionals in supporting these reforms. We will also explore how SSR and SSAJ programmes can be integrated into a single framework which incorporates human rights.

90. **Fourth, we will re-focus our work on governance to include more direct support for the security of the poor**. This means fostering governance that reduces conflict and promotes stability, especially in countries emerging from civil war. While every situation will be different, this is likely to include:
   - An accountable political system with appropriate checks and balances on power, including the executive.
   - Provision of basic services including health and education, but also security and justice.
   - Effective, transparent management of primary commodities and procurement procedures, to reduce opportunities for corruption, conflict financing and use of proceeds from organised crime, and to generate overall improvements in public finance and expenditure systems.
   - The ability to manage and recover from macroeconomic shocks such as a dramatic rises or falls in oil prices, which are politically as well as economically destabilising.
91. **Fifth, in addition to the conflict work we carry out through the Global and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools, we will integrate more elements of conflict reduction work into our programmes.** This includes work on control of small arms and light weapons, and support for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes. This will require building up conflict-related expertise in specific areas, such as DDR. It will also encourage us to think more systematically about how conflict management relates to other aspects of our work, such as health, education, economic growth and good governance.

92. **Sixth, we will make more use of political and conflict analysis in our programme design.** We have tools for this purpose (Strategic Conflict Assessments and Drivers of Change analysis) but we need to employ these more systematically across our programmes. While political change and conflict are complex processes, we know that a purely technical approach to poverty reduction is not enough. If we want to reduce conflict and support progressive change, we must understand better what is likely to drive these processes.

93. **On the other hand, we must be able to act quickly and decisively when opportunities arise to prevent conflict and support peace, even when our information is limited.** The need for analysis should not become an excuse to delay action, especially when rapid action can make a difference.

94. **Seventh, we will engage with a wider range of civil society organisations,** including faith-based groups, who do not speak our development language. Development agencies need to build relationships with groups that have different views about what constitutes development, and who play an important role in the lives and beliefs of poor people — for example, local church networks or mosque associations. DFID is currently developing a strategy to guide our engagement with faith groups in countries where we work, and we will build on this to broaden our range of contacts. We will also pay more attention to the role of religious institutions in education.

95. We will also consult with a wider range of donor countries and agencies. Donors such as Saudi Arabia, India and the Islamic Development Bank disburse billions of pounds in aid to Low Income Countries every year. These donors have a critical role to play in supporting progressive change that will benefit the poor, especially in countries with large Muslim populations.

96. **Eighth, we will respond as far as possible to requests from new countries for support in implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).** After the High Level Summit in March 2005, we expect the EITI to set global best practice in transparent accounting for payments and revenues from the oil, gas and mining sectors. We will encourage other donors to provide the necessary finance to support interested countries with implementation, and we will consider how to expand the principles of the EITI to other commodities, such as timber. DFID will also continue to support initiatives that involve the private sector in promoting security, such as the Kimberley process.
**Working with other parts of the UK Government**

97. In an insecure world, development alone is not enough to reduce poverty. Nor can the security community by itself prevent conflict. Development, diplomatic and defence professionals must work together to achieve common aims. Through the Global and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools, we have a successful track record of working together. And we have a new opportunity through the recently established Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit.

98. But we can do more to collaborate on UK Government strategies that affect Low Income Countries and the poor. This includes strategies to reduce the threat of international terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking and other forms of international crime and conflict prevention. Work is also needed to identify countries at risk of instability or conflict, sufficiently far in advance to be able to take remedial action.

99. To facilitate this, where useful, DFID will pool expertise and analysis with other government departments through joint working groups and staff exchanges. This includes seconding staff as appropriate to contribute to HMG objectives in countries where we do not ourselves have programmes, but where our expertise is sought on governance, state building or promoting progressive change.

100. These changes represent a major programme of work for DFID and mark the beginning, not the end, of a process of incorporating the security of the poor better into our work.
DFID, the Department for International Development: leading the British government’s fight against world poverty.

One in five people in the world today, over 1 billion people, live in poverty on less than one dollar a day. In an increasingly interdependent world, many problems – like conflict, crime, pollution, and diseases such as HIV and AIDS – are caused or made worse by poverty.

DFID supports long-term programmes to help tackle the underlying causes of poverty. DFID also responds to emergencies, both natural and man-made.

DFID’s work forms part of a global promise to:

• halve the number of people living in extreme poverty and hunger
• ensure that all children receive primary education
• promote sexual equality and give women a stronger voice
• reduce child death rates
• improve the health of mothers
• combat HIV & AIDS, malaria and other diseases
• make sure the environment is protected
• build a global partnership for those working in development.

Together, these form the United Nations’ eight ‘Millennium Development Goals’, with a 2015 deadline. Each of these Goals has its own, measurable, targets.

DFID works in partnership with governments, civil society, the private sector and others. It also works with multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, United Nations agencies, and the European Commission.

DFID works directly in over 150 countries worldwide, with a budget of nearly £4 billion in 2004. Its headquarters are in London and East Kilbride, near Glasgow.

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Published by the Department for International Development. Printed in the UK, 2005, on recycled material containing 80% post-consumer waste and 20% totally chlorine free virgin pulp.