The causes of conflict in Africa

Consultation document
The causes of conflict in Africa
Promoting poverty reduction, peace and stability in the world are key objectives of British Government policy. In July 2000 the Government announced that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence, in association with the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury, would work more closely together to improve the effectiveness of Britain’s contribution to peace keeping, conflict prevention and conflict management in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the world.

This draft paper examines the causes and consequences of conflict in Africa. Its aim is to stimulate discussion and contribute to Britain’s longer term policy on tackling Conflict in Africa.

The British Government would welcome any comments you may have on this paper by 30 April 2001.

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DFID  Department for International Development
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EU  European Union
Frelimo  Governing Political Party, Mozambique
G8  Group of Eight leading industrial nations
HIPC  Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IMF  International Monetary Fund
Interahamwe  Hutu armed militia (Rwanda)
MPLA  Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
OAU  Organisation of African Unity
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
RUF  Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SADC  Southern African Development Community
UNITA  National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
Summary

Conflict in Africa

- Has dramatically increased in level and scale throughout the 1990s. In January 2000 over half of African countries were affected.
- Is caused by inequality, economic decline, state collapse and history.
- Has changed in nature; wars are now predominantly regional.
- Has increasingly affected non-combatants over the past decade as a result of increasing factional fighting and violent action against the civilian population.
- Has caused as many deaths each year as are caused by epidemic diseases, and has uprooted millions of people.
- Is constraining economic growth on the continent as a whole. Its economic impact crosses state borders.
- Has resulted in a marked reduction in food production and serious losses of infrastructure.
- Must be tackled because of the human suffering and also because of the impact on global security and the environment.
- Requires a stronger and more focused international effort encompassing conflict prevention, reduction, resolution and peace building, in order to respond effectively and break the conflict cycle.
The Background to Conflict in Africa

Emerging Independence

1. The birth of the OAU in 1963 heralded the beginning of the end of Africa’s colonial era. At its inception OAU had 32 independent member States. There are now 53. From the beginning, the OAU recognised the imperfections of national boundaries. It made the choice that, if Africa was to remain stable, the boundaries that existed at independence should remain inviolate. This principle was enshrined in a 1964 resolution and has remained OAU policy since then.

2. As a founding principle, the OAU signalled its intention to “to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa”. Many African countries fought hard to gain their independence. In the former Portuguese colonies, the struggle was both lengthy and bitter. The overthrow of the Salazar regime in the mid 1970s created a power vacuum. In Angola, the collapse of weak transitional arrangements left three liberation movements in armed competition. In Mozambique, Frelimo had only partially consolidated its authority in the North of the country when it found itself in power. Both countries became victims of a cold war proxy confrontation and a South African campaign fought by the former apartheid regime, which sought to destabilise the “front line” states.

3. However, most countries in Africa went through a relatively smooth transition to independence. Adherence to OAU principles guaranteed a high level of national stability within the continent. The majority of newly independent countries defined the role of the state in development terms, seeking to harness national resources towards ensuring economic growth. The structures and institutions of the state, however, remained relatively undeveloped through the 1960s, the focus being on building those institutions that allowed for the exploitation and management of resources. There emerged an African leadership system, based on centralisation of power and patronage networks that allowed little popular involvement in government at national or local level.

4. The Horn of Africa was an exception. The Somalis never accepted their externally imposed borders and for decades unsuccessfully pursued the vision of a greater Somalia. The UN’s acquiescence when Ethiopia ended the federation with Eritrea compounded the problems of the region. The continuing problems of Sudan also arise from failure to establish a political structure that adequately reflects the real differences of the South. The inability to resolve these issues has sustained conflict at different levels of intensity over the past thirty-five years.

The Cold War

5. The Cold War led to the emergence of East-West spheres of influence in Africa. A system of client states emerged, in which the leaders were maintained in power in return for their allegiance to one of the superpowers. In countries such as Somalia, Zaire and Sierra Leone a corrupt leadership was sustained while the institutional basis of the state continued to atrophy. The Horn of Africa and Southern Africa were of particular strategic interest to the great powers. Arms flows and military expenditure increased dramatically in these two regions during the Cold War. The major powers and their allies were actively engaged in military training and a number of foreign forces including the Cubans and the Chinese had a substantial presence on the continent.

6. Cold war interests directly fuelled two major conflicts. In 1975, South Africa intervened in Angola to prevent the MPLA coming to power. The MPLA were seen as a communist surrogate, a perception that was reinforced by the arrival of 12,000 Cuban troops to support the MPLA. The perceived communist threat to Southern Africa intensified the conflict and reduced Western pressure on apartheid South Africa. In 1977, Somalia had built up sufficient military strength to attack Ethiopia in the Ogaden region. Ethiopian forces, with considerable Cuban assistance, repulsed the offensive. Soviet Bloc support to Ethiopia sustained and prolonged conflict throughout the region during the 1980s.

7. During this era the scale of conflict was no greater than was being experienced in Asia. Aid flows remained high because the major powers were motivated to ensure the continuing support of client states. But there was a cost. Where conflict did erupt, strong centralised governments enforced their authority through large
standing armies. These same armies were to become a threat to stability in Africa once external support was withdrawn. At the end of the Cold War, there was little effective demobilisation in Africa and the remnants of large African armies still remain in the continent, contributing to new areas of conflict or sustaining factional irregular armed groups which threaten both domestic stability and security.

8. During the Cold War state-to-state arms transfers involved primarily heavy, high maintenance equipment – tanks, transport aircraft and jet fighters. The scale was colossal. In 1988 alone, at the end of the Cold War, they amounted to more than $4 billion. By 1995, they had dropped to $270 million. However, state to state flows were replaced by a major growth in commercial arms dealing and illegal arms trafficking in low maintenance light weaponry, primarily items such as the AK 47 rifle and rocket propelled grenade launchers. (See also paragraphs 45 and 64.)

The New World Order

9. In 1990, the Secretary General of the OAU presented a report to his Council of Ministers on the changes taking place in the world and their implications for Africa. In this he stated that “the strongest likelihood does exist for the emergence of a new geopolitical balance of forces as well as a new international economic order that could further deplete and marginalise Africa.” These fears were well founded. Conflict became more widespread through the 1990s. Poor economic management weakened highly centralised states. The inability to provide basic levels of policing and social services helped to lead to the weakening of state authority. Internal conflict increased dramatically throughout the 1990s. In extreme cases, fragmentation encouraged the formation and proliferation of splinter groups, which in turn divided into warring factions. The very nature of conflict changed. The civilian population increasingly became the target of conflict in factional wars and subjected to particularly high levels of violence and abuse. This resulted in massive displacement as well as social and economic distress.

10. Terrible levels of ethnic violence and genocide, as witnessed in Rwanda and Burundi, re-emerged in the last decade of the century. The political exploitation of ethnic discrimination in Africa has its roots in colonial history. In general, it is more often used as a means to sustain conflict and is rarely a primary cause. Yet, the increasing marginalisation of the poor has provided fertile ground for those promoting ethnic conflict as a means of sustaining their own control over power. Ethnic violence is now becoming part of the culture of conflict in Africa.

11. As a number of ailing, autocratic leaders in Africa lost control and external support, several states collapsed. Failed states such as Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Zaire became centres of regional insecurity. African countries increasingly intervened militarily in neighbouring states and justified their actions on the grounds of necessary self protection. Conflict became increasingly regional in nature as collapsed states threatened the security of their neighbours.

12. By 2000, over half the countries in Africa and 20% of the population were affected by conflict. There were eleven major conflicts with more than a thousand war related deaths a year. The extent of conflict was greater than in any other region in the world.

The Current Context of Conflict

13. Four distinct types of conflict are now evident.

Conventional warfare – wars of attrition

14. The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was the only conventionally fought war in Africa during the last decade. It was fought with regular troops along a defined series of fronts. Targets and objectives were primarily military and strategic. The war made extensive use of expensive technology such as heavy artillery and jet fighters. The increasing cost of such warfare has tended to make these conflicts self-limiting in Africa.

Factional warfare

15. Factional wars are fluid by nature. There is rarely a defined front line and fighting is frequently opportunistic rather than strategic. Warfare is low tech and small arms are the main weapons. Such wars are not costly and can easily be sustained without external support. Frequently these conflicts move rapidly from the original cause to revolve around the exploitation of commercial, mineral and natural resources.

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1 Report of the Secretary General on the fundamental changes taking place in the world and their implications for Africa: Proposals for an African response. (Fifty second ordinary session of the Council of Ministers).
2 See Appendix 1 for a chronology of conflicts in Africa.
Factions will seek to involve, exploit and control a significant proportion of the civilian population in order to sustain the conflict. Countries currently affected by factional warfare are Somalia, Liberia (internally), Uganda (internally) Namibia and potentially Cote D’Ivoire.

**Genocide and ethnic based conflict.**

16. The last decade has seen the re-emergence of genocidal and ethnically based conflict. Centrally directed and involving the virulent use of propaganda, these conflicts spread like wildfire and leave a huge death toll, massive displacement, fear and confusion. Ethnic and genocidal fighting tends to be extremely low tech using knives, machetes and occasionally small arms. A distinguishing characteristic is the speed with which genocidal attacks take place and the high degree of central organisation and planning involved.

17. Burundi remains the country at most immediate risk of genocide. The potential also exists in the DRC in the Kivu region. A number of other countries, most notably Nigeria, are experiencing outbreaks of ethnic and religious violence. Cote D’Ivoire is also at risk.

**The "new warfare" – regional conflict**

18. All three elements of warfare have coalesced into what can be described as Africa’s "new warfare" – regional conflict. In this type of conflict, conventional state forces are frequently engaged in the protection of key installations, or may find themselves engaged in capital-intensive, attritional warfare with other states. Extensive use is also made of factional forces that act as proxies and as a forward line of protection for conventional forces. These proxy forces are encouraged to be self-sustaining through the exploitation of natural resources. Ethnic conflict has increasingly been sanctioned or exploited to gain support for the continuation of the conflict.

19. The trend towards regional conflict continues. Previously contained internal conflicts spark off regional intervention. The war in the DRC involves the armed forces of eight countries while the DRC has sought to take the war back into Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. In the last year, the war in Sierra Leone has developed a similar regional dimension, as has the prolonged conflict in Angola. The Sudan conflict has retained its strong regional dimension. Fourteen African countries are currently engaged in these four regional conflicts.
The following map identifies the main conflict areas in Africa and the countries involved. (to be inserted)

The Impact of Conflict

The Human tragedy

20. During the last two decades, sub-Saharan Africa has been the most conflict-affected region in the world. Ten of the 24 most war-affected countries between 1980 and 1994 were African, and four of these (Liberia, Angola, Mozambique and Somalia) were ranked within the five most severely affected countries in the world. Conflict has been responsible for more death and displacement than famine or flood. The scale and nature of warfare have directly affected the lives of many millions of Africans. The main elements of this tragedy are the millions of uprooted people who have lost their homes and livelihood, the increasing numbers of direct civilian casualties and increased levels of violence, abuse and mutilation suffered by non-combatants.

Displacement

21. Africa has the highest level of internal displacement in the world and some of the largest refugee flows, the majority from countries in conflict. In 2000, almost eleven million people in Africa were internally displaced. This is an increase of two million during the past year and is the second consecutive increase in two years, after five years in which the numbers remained relatively stable. Sudan, Angola, the DRC and Congo Brazzaville account for the majority of this increase. In 1999, thirteen African countries each had 100,000 or more displaced persons, compared to eight such countries at the start of the decade. Internally displaced persons now outnumber refugees by a ratio of three to one. Taking refugees and internally displaced people together, 14 million people in Africa are uprooted.

Civilian casualties

22. War in Africa causes increasing suffering for civilians. They suffer death and injuries and the indirect consequences of famine and epidemic disease that have followed in the wake of war. Since 1960 over eight million people have died either directly or indirectly as a result of war in Africa, of whom five and a half million were civilians. (Appendix 1 lists the conflicts with the highest deaths). The Global Burden of Disease Study established that in 1990, 6% of all deaths in the world were caused by physical violence. In sub-Saharan Africa the figure was 13% with one in six males dying from violent causes. Almost 1 in 20 of all deaths in Africa are clearly attributable to war. Epidemiological projections suggest that by 2020, injuries caused by war will have become the eighth most important factor (after tuberculosis) incurring a disease burden on society.

23. In Africa, the number of civilian casualties has continued to increase year by year, unlike in other parts of the world as is demonstrated in this graph. Recent events suggest that this trend is continuing.

Violence

24. The most disturbing aspect of conflict in Africa is the increasing use of extreme violence, especially over the last ten years. Violence is now deliberately targeted at civilians rather than armed groups, and at entire groups rather than individuals. In the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Mozambique, Northern Uganda, Sudan and Angola, violence has taken appalling forms. Mutilation, torture of women and children, violent rituals and the forcible involvement of relatives, children and spouses in killing and rape are used as a means of waging war primarily by militia groups and by some state proxies. In some instances, such violence is part of ritual that binds
militia groups together. Extreme violence can be used as a means of humiliation or revenge. More frequently, it is used as a means of intimidation, as is the case with the RUF in Sierra Leone. Here, mutilation was brutally applied as part of a strategy to stop people from voting or from gathering the harvest or to spread control over territory by sheer terror and fear, thus avoiding the need to fight. There is a danger that extreme violence of this kind will erode the social fabric of African societies and further hasten state collapse.

- **Child soldiers**

25. Children have become one of the main targets of violence and in turn are being used to perpetuate it. Children are deliberately indoctrinated into a culture of violence and used as a specific instrument of war. Militia groups and irregular armed forces such as the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, the Interahamwe in Rwanda / DRC, the RUF in Sierra Leone, UNITA in Angola, and formerly Renamo in Mozambique, have made a practice of forcibly recruiting children and initiating them through acts of violence against their own community. The intention is to create a fighting force that is separate, reckless towards others and has a tactical advantage over adult conventional forces.

There are now approximately 350,000 child soldiers worldwide, of whom some 200,000 are in Africa.

**The economic impact of conflict in Africa**

26. Africa’s development is threatened by conflict. Armed conflict has become one of the most important causes of poverty in Africa, leading to displacement of people, and the destruction of communities’ livelihoods. The effects of war cut across all levels of the economy down to the level of the household. War has a direct and immediate economic impact through the physical disruption it creates, denying access to land, key resources or markets. Some of the effects of conflict are less tangible. Insecurity is the least conducive climate for domestic savings and internal or external investment. Nor is the impact of war limited to the area of conflict. War damages regional infrastructure, markets and investment confidence across a wider region. The regional spread of conflict jeopardises stable and successful countries.

27. The World Bank estimates that conflict in Africa is causing a loss of 2% annual economic growth across the continent. Conflict in Africa has also created a substantial loss of opportunity. Lost either through the inability of states to invest in their own populations or through high military spending which has squeezed out effective investment in the economy. The continent as a whole is seen as a high risk by potential external investors because of armed conflicts.

- **National impact on production and livelihoods**

28. In the majority of African economies the most direct impact of war is on production and household livelihoods. War can deny people access to their land at critical growing or planting periods, increase the costs of agricultural inputs, disrupt markets and restrict sales of produce. The use of landmines for example, in countries like Angola has severely limited access to land for the long term. Agricultural production and family livelihoods have suffered dramatically as a result. A study undertaken by the International Food Policy Research Institute determined that African countries had suffered production losses of up to 45% (in Angola). Average production losses through conflict were 12%. War also seriously affected growth in the agricultural sector by 3% per annum. War has therefore been responsible for increasing the gap in food production for large parts of Africa and in some countries created a substantial requirement for imported food and food aid. (See Appendix 2 for Key Indicators for Africa).

- **Loss of infrastructure**

29. War has seriously damaged Africa’s infrastructure. Roads, rail, ports, electricity, water supply, sewers and telecommunications have all been affected. During war there has been a dearth of investment in and maintenance of infrastructure. Over the past twenty years Africa has lost over fifty per cent of its transport infrastructure, many of the losses due to conflict. This loss has both an immediate and a long-term impact on African economies. In immediate terms, it increases impoverishment. For example, South Sudan has almost no viable road network as a result of years of civil war. This severely harms the livelihood of the population, who are dependent on trading cattle for cereals as their means of survival. Countries such as Angola and DRC are now totally dependent on air transport because of the collapse of infrastructure and insecurity. Countries affected by...
war also suffer from weak, fragmented and highly unstable markets. This in turn contributes to another characteristic of war-affected economies: hyperinflation and a volatile currency.

The costs of war

- Refugees and internal displacement

30. Internal displacement and refugee flows have a serious effect on the economy and the environment. The denial of access to the land by military factions has led displaced people to congregate in cities and surrounding areas. Uprooted populations lose access to any means of production and put enormous pressure on government services. Refugees and the internally displaced put pressure on fuel and water resources. The World Bank estimates that in Africa the total direct costs of refugees to their hosts is in the region of $530 million per year.

- Effects on services

31. Recent wars have led to the destruction of the basic social infrastructure. Schools and health centres are increasingly the targets of military activity. During the fifteen-year war in Mozambique, over 40% of health centres and schools were destroyed. The situation is similar in most conflict-affected countries. Social provision is also squeezed by increased military expenditure. A long-term consequence is reduced access to education and health care. The resulting large numbers of young uneducated men helps create the circumstances that sustain conflict.8

- Governance and investment

32. Changes in the quality of governance resulting from conflict further contribute to the economic losses of war. It is common for armed crime to increase substantially during a period of conflict. Business then concentrates on reducing its exposure to risk by supporting those activities that require no long term investment and by making strategic alliances with armed groups either for protection or gain. This is followed by a downward spiral in both domestic savings and inward investment. The economy becomes dependent on the exploitation of easily extractable natural resources. Government revenue suffers and the state becomes criminalised. Commercial and state interests can become combined in sustaining conflict, as dual economies develop in which military business partnerships jointly trade, exploit resources and pay for the conflict.

- Debt burden

33. Conflict also contributes to unsustainable debt. For example, approximately US$1.4 billion of external debt arrears to the International Financial Institutions plus more than US$9 billion to the Paris Club owed by the DRC is estimated to arise indirectly from military expenditure. There are currently 13 Highly Indebted Poor Countries that are affected by conflict. The World Bank has identified 10 countries (9 in sub-Saharan Africa: Burundi; Central African Republic; Congo; DRC; Ethiopia; Liberia; Sierra Leone; Somalia and Sudan) that are either not progressing towards qualifying for debt relief under the HIPC framework or where conflict has delayed progress.

- Regional economic impact

34. The effects of conflict are rarely confined to one country. The increasing trend towards regional conflicts has led to sharp increases in military expenditure for neighbouring countries and a corresponding reduction in social expenditure. The World Bank estimates that countries bordering conflict zones increase their own military expenditure by $114 million on average. This excludes non-government security expenditure, private security outlays by firms and individuals, and off-budget military expenditures. The interrelated nature of African economies also means that the costs of war within a region generally result in economic costs for neighbouring countries. These include production losses through loss of opportunities for migration, trade losses, increased costs of policing and the costs of supporting refugees.

- International impact

35. Conflict also has a major effect on the environment through uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources. Organised crime also benefits from conflict in Africa, through arms deals, money laundering and drug smuggling. Europe in particular has to cope with the consequences of the increasing flows of asylum seekers and economic migrants from Africa. The failure to find effective solutions to conflict in Africa also damages the reputation of the United Nations. Africa now takes up sixty per cent of the Security Council’s time and considerable international resources have been devoted to

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The Causes of Conflict

36. An effective response to African conflict requires agreement on and understanding of its causes. Past responses to conflict have often failed to understand the context within which conflict has operated or to address causes. It is possible to distinguish between the root causes of conflict, the secondary causes that enable and sustain conflict and the tertiary causes or the drivers that hinder resolution.

Root Causes

● Inequality

37. Inequality between groups is probably the foremost cause of conflict in Africa. It is inequality between groups – rather than individuals – that increases the prospects of violent conflict. It exists on three mutually reinforcing levels: economic, social and political. In countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda, political power and its benefits were monopolised by one group. Unequal access to power perpetuated a similar lack of access to resources and revenue. Where group inequality occurs there is also differential access to education (as has notably been the case in Burundi). This plays a key role in sustaining inequalities. Where a society is divided into two pre-dominant groups, growing inequality between them often leads to conflict.

● State collapse

38. The collapse of state institutions has caused internal and regional conflict. Collapse is rarely sudden, but arises out of a long degenerative process that is characterised by predatory government operating through coercion, corruption and personality politics to secure political power and control of resources. The state finds itself unable any longer to provide basic services or security to its people and loses its legitimacy. The collapse of infrastructure completes the break up of the state. The combination of breakdown of institutions and physical infrastructure coupled with the use of ethnic violence creates the conditions in which violence becomes self-sustaining and factional warfare develops, as has happened in Liberia and Sierra Leone. One faction may predominate over time, but this does not necessarily result in resolution of conflict. Rather it leads to the creation of “shell states”, where the leadership wishes to maintain the fiction of statehood. When this happens, state building will be a complex task and the process of democratisation can easily become a vehicle for consolidating personal rule.

● Economic decline and economic shock

39. Continuous economic decline plays a major part in state collapse and conflict. Economic shock is a more direct and potent cause. This can take various forms ranging from natural catastrophe to sudden large shifts in terms of trade. The Ethiopian famine of 1974 was the main factor in the overthrow of Haile Selasse’s government and the violence that ensued. Famine can cause mass displacement increasing pressure on scarce resources. Other economic shocks have similar effects. The sudden shift in the terms of trade in Nigeria in 1992/3 halved Nigeria’s income, introduced hyperinflation and led to violence and the overthrow of the government.

● History

40. Many conflicts occur where there is a tradition of resolving problems by violent means. Political violence is entrenched and the instruments of the state such as the army, the police and the judiciary sustain the process. Other historical processes may provoke violence. History in places such as the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi created a state model based on the artificial creation and abuse of ethnicity to maintain power. A past pattern of conflict is one of the best predictors of future conflict. Deeply entrenched historical patterns of violence are amongst the most difficult to resolve as they require major societal and political change.

● Natural resource wealth

41. Africa accommodates two types of resource based conflict: wars of resource scarcity and wars of abundance. The most common conflicts of scarcity relate to the control of grazing and water rights for nomadic people.

42. Countries whose economies are dependent on natural resources such as oil and minerals, face a very high risk of conflict. In these wars of abundance, groups compete for control of these resources, which become the “prize” for controlling the state and can lead to coups, as in Sierra Leone and the DRC. Unfair exploitation of resource rich regions can lead to secession. Abundant resources can also attract external intervention. The role of the private sector is critical in wars of abundance, as belligerents rely on its capacity to exploit and commercialise the resources. Frequently, the military have become involved in developing their own commercial companies. Such wars become self-financing, self-sustaining, and therefore less open to mediation.

Secondary Causes

- Unemployment, lack of education and population pressure
43. Countries with high levels of unemployment among young men and where male educational levels are low face a far higher risk of conflict. Throughout Africa, factional conflict has drawn on a pool of marginalised or socially excluded young men. Increasing insecurity of land tenure in Rwanda and the high levels of rural unemployment provided a ready group of participants in the genocide there. The conflict in Liberia was fought by socially marginalised young men.

- The abuse of ethnicity
44. Political leaders and belligerents in Africa have made increasing use of ethnic hatred. Such abuse prolongs conflict, creates long term divisions that reduce the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts. The war in the DRC provides a ready example of the abuse of ethnicity. Elements of the DRC government have openly provoked ethnic tensions in the Kivus with the intention of destabilising areas under Rwandan influence. Equally elements of the Ugandan armed forces have exploited ethnic differences in order to benefit commercially from the conflict. In both instances community divisions have been deepened and there have been a greater number of fatalities and injury than are experienced in more conventional fighting.

- Availability of arms
45. The ready availability of small arms in Africa is a major factor in sustaining and fuelling conflict. Considerable supplies of small arms are in circulation from previous wars. For example, between 1972 and 1990, Ethiopia and Somalia imported $8 billion worth of small arms and light weapons. In 1992, the Angolan government distributed an estimated 700,000 rifles to the population for their defence against UNITA. Caches of arms exist throughout the continent and Africa has active trading networks that move arms between countries. However imports of arms, primarily from former Soviet Bloc countries, continue to grow and to sustain conflict. The increasing capacity within Africa to manufacture ammunition has removed yet another constraint on the use of small arms. The ready availability and relatively low cost\(^{10}\) of small arms has been coupled with the emergence of a network of both local and international dealers who trade arms for minerals or other resources. This has been a major factor in prolonging African conflicts, which have become self-sustaining conflicts and consequently less amenable to external mediation or intervention.

Tertiary Causes

- Regional and interlocking conflicts
46. A large swathe of Africa from Sudan to Angola, passing through the Great Lakes and the DRC, is caught up in a series of multiple and interlocking conflicts. The duration of conflict therefore increases with the complexity of regional intervention, and the interrelationship of one conflict with another.

- The conflict cycle
47. Parts of Africa have settled into a conflict cycle in which states or factions move from low-level crisis or open war into long-term and protracted conflict and then back to low level crisis. Often the greatest risks occur when a fragile peace is not properly consolidated. This was demonstrated in Sierra Leone last year. In some cases, states or factions have entered into a framework that provides for “consensual” conflict, where belligerents have more to gain from sustaining low-level conflict than from its resolution.

- Lack of guarantors
48. Internal conflicts are mostly resolved when the parties involved have arrived at a stalemate, frequently a political and military balance. When either party to a conflict feels that it has a perceived advantage or disadvantage, it continues to fight, spurred on by the

\(^{10}\)Throughout Africa the usual market price for the ubiquitous AK 47 assault rifle remains steady at US $25.
prospect of victory or a desire to negotiate from a more advantageous position. A “hurting stalemate” where all belligerents have lost, provides opportunity for resolution of conflict. In many cases, the opportunities for resolution are lost because of the lack of credible external guarantors to the peace process. This is particularly important when dealing with demobilisation and disarmament, where the stakes are high for the belligerent groups in terms of the potential loss of power and personal security.

**Inadequate and inappropriate mediation**

49. External mediation is frequently offered in times of conflict, yet the past decade has seen few obvious successes. While the option for peaceful resolution of conflict must always be available, poor mediation processes can make the situation worse and prolong conflict by giving combatants time to rearm and reorganise as has happened in the DRC and Angola. Peace processes that are based on inadequate analysis and rushed timescales can push the parties to conflict into untenable positions and threaten their power base or chances of survival. Greater emphasis on securing and maintaining a cessation of hostilities as the first priority is critical. Peace processes need to be able to draw on a wider spectrum of arrangements for transitional government to provide the conditions in which a stable peace, which addresses the fundamental causes of conflict, can be established.

**Misplaced humanitarian assistance**

50. There are increasing dangers that much needed humanitarian assistance can cause wars to be intensified or prolonged. Where wars are fought through factional or proxy forces there is little recognition or respect for international humanitarian standards. Such forces seek to control humanitarian assistance as a means of conferring greater political legitimacy on themselves and control over the population. Relief supplies may also provide the focus for increasing tension and fighting between groups that receive supplies and their neighbours, as was the case in South Sudan, Somalia in 1995 and Zaire in 1996 demonstrated the problems that occur when humanitarian assistance becomes the key element in a resource-starved environment and therefore subject to predatory behaviour. Humanitarian agencies increasingly recognise that they face a major dilemma in meeting the needs of victims without providing the means to resume fighting.
Africa Responses to Conflict

- **Inclusive Government**
  51. Conflict prevention will not be effective unless it is based on Africa's own experience and capacity to respond to crisis. Africa provides examples of some of the world's longest lasting conflicts. It also provides examples of enduring recoveries from conflict. A key element in Africa's success stories is a commitment to inclusive government and institutions as a means of managing ethnic or regional inequalities.

- **Restoring the legitimacy of the state**
  52. Mozambique's successful emergence from conflict has been in no small part due to its success in re-legitimising the state in the eyes of its population. This was done through a strong commitment to re-establishing and delivering basic services, thereby demonstrating the value of national government. The restoration of education and health care were the two essential services. In both cases, effective service delivery is dependent on a system that requires the state to manage and co-ordinate resources and take responsibility for their sustained delivery. Currently in Somalia there is increasing local pressure to move back to statehood. This is driven by the recognition that basic services cannot be sustained or managed at local level.

- **Dealing with the climate of impunity and the need for reconciliation**
  53. The increasingly violent nature of factional conflict and the deliberate use of ethnicity to promote conflict create deep divisions in society. The reintegration of combatants into society has become more difficult over the last decade because of the violence they have inflicted on the community. South Africa has paved the way in addressing the issues of post conflict reconciliation. Other countries in Africa have recognised that reconciliation must be tempered with a clear commitment to ending the climate of impunity for the unacceptable use of violence. Effective conflict resolution in Africa depends on processes of reconciliation and justice, which should operate at both national and local level to reintegrate people into their communities.

- **Economic diversification and growth**
  54. Botswana is one of the few countries in Africa to have managed its mineral wealth in a manner that does not fuel instability. In part this has been achieved by clear and well-defined state control over diamond income and the exploitation of resources. This has been coupled with a commitment to diversify the economy. There are lessons for other countries such as Sierra Leone and Angola in how to better manage mineral resources and develop strategies for economic diversification and reinvestment in services, two key elements in conflict prevention.

- **Regional economic integration and mutual security**
  55. Many African countries see economic integration and the development of robust regional structures as a means of encouraging mutual security and responding to some of the economic pressures that fuel conflict, for example by facilitating the free movement of labour.

**Regional Responses**

**The OAU**
  56. Since its foundation, the OAU has been concerned with threats to development caused by internal and cross border conflicts. It sees its role as working within the UN framework to take primary responsibility for identifying the causes of conflict and providing early warning of conflict in Africa. It also has responsibility for mobilising support and assistance for post conflict reconstruction. In 1993 the OAU established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution whose operational activities are supported by an OAU Peace Fund. The OAU has further strengthened its early warning capacity by establishing a Conflict Management Centre. Political and bureaucratic difficulties have meant that the OAU mechanisms for conflict management have remained relatively weak and under-resourced. Most of the member states wish to confine the role of the OAU to early warning, preventive diplomacy and monitoring peace processes. They would not wish it to engage in regional peacekeeping or establishing mutual security arrangements between states.
Regional structures

57. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa, are the main regional organisations engaged in conflict prevention and resolution. All three are involved in preventing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and are also involved in mediation and conflict resolution activities. There is considerable international and African interest in the role that these regional organisations play in regional peacekeeping and peacemaking either through mandated operations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter or in their own right.

Mutual security

58. The concern of regional organisations with peace enforcement has dominated their security agenda at the expense of more effective mechanisms for mutual security within the region. The recent spillover of conflict from Liberia and Sierra Leone into Guinea demonstrates the limits to intervention and the need to contain the spread of regional conflict through mutual security and collective defence. There is a need for simple but reliable structures for security co-operation that can stabilise relations, prevent the spillover of conflicts, secure emerging common values and, perhaps, lay the foundation for new security regimes. In the absence of effective crisis response structures, regional peace keeping initiatives will continue to be ad hoc, poorly implemented and driven by the interests of the strongest in the region.

International Responses

The United Nations

59. An effective and credible United Nations is critical to addressing conflict in Africa. A series of failed peacekeeping operations over the past decade has seriously damaged UN credibility in the continent. This has contributed to a developing climate of impunity, reluctance by the international community to take part in peacekeeping operations and a poor response to peacebuilding activities. Kofi Annan recognised the need for action in his special report to the Security Council in 1998. More recently the Brahimi report made recommendations to improve the UN’s capacity in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Implementation of Brahimi’s recommendations will strengthen UN conflict resolution capacity in Africa.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund

60. The Bank and IMF are critical actors in post conflict reconstruction and the Bank has recently established a post conflict reconstruction fund that enables it to respond more rapidly to the immediate needs for support once peace has been established. The Bank and the IMF have concluded that the key issues for post conflict financing are: timeliness and speed of engagement; the amount of financial resources available for post conflict reconstruction work; the level of concessionality attached to resources; and how resources are delivered. The involvement of the Bank and the IMF is critical to post conflict reconstruction. They can help to release other funding and maintain donor and investor confidence.

International and Bilateral actions

61. Concern over conflict in Africa has moved up the international agenda. A number of initiatives have been launched in the past few years and conflict in Africa is now on the G8 agenda. The Miyazaki meeting of foreign ministers in July 2000 launched initiatives on small arms, illicit trade in diamonds, international civil police, the impact of development policies on armed conflicts and the impact of armed conflict on children. The World Bank, IMF and OECD are beginning to recognise that conflict is one of the major obstacles to development. The European Union is working to develop its capacity to address conflict. The Rapid Reaction Facility is designed to enhance the EU’s capacity to intervene fast and effectively in crisis points outside the EU.

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11The OAU also recognises the Arab Maghreb Union (known by its French acronym UMA) in the North and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the Central African sub region. The East African Community is also in the process of establishing a military cooperation and mutual security structure.
13“The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa” - report of the Secretary General of the UN to the Security Council, April 1998, which outlined a framework of action whose main elements were: more effective peace making through a more unified approach to mediation and the development of more effective sanctions and arms controls, enhanced peace-keeping capacity and responsiveness, improved co-ordination and standards of humanitarian action and timely and high quality post conflict peace-building.
African peacekeeping and peace enforcement capacity

62. Enhancing African peacekeeping capacity attracts widespread international interest. The US, France and the UK are currently the main providers of support and training. However, a common approach has not been developed. The Brahimi report provides the basis for a much-needed common strategy for improving the effectiveness of peacekeeping. It emphasises that effective UN peacekeeping in Africa requires larger forces, with more effective command and control structures and enhanced levels of interoperability. It also stresses the importance of training troops to understand and operate with more robust “rules of engagement” and that effective peacekeeping and peace enforcement requires good military skills.

63. Improved peacekeeping capacity in Africa is essential if we are to learn the lesson of failure – as in the case of Rwanda – or weak performance – as in the case of Sierra Leone – because of painfully slow and partial deployments. The poor performance of some African peacekeeping forces has been the result of “systems failures” where troops have not been paid, ammunition has not been available, or where troop behaviour demonstrated a lack of accountability. More effective African peacekeeping will therefore need to be linked to effective security sector reform.

Small arms and light weapons

64. There are a number of small arms initiatives underway in Africa. These include the ECOWAS moratorium on light weapons, the East African Action programme on illicit arms trafficking and the SADC arms protocol. Most progress has been made in SADC, where implementation structures are well advanced and based on regional police cooperation with Interpol. Other regions are making slower progress with implementation structures, although some have progressed in establishing regulatory frameworks. Control of small arms in Africa is especially difficult due to the porous nature of most borders, weak and under resourced enforcement capacity, high levels of surplus stocks and well established illegal supply chains. Recent conflicts have exacerbated the problem, as state actors have distributed weapons to local militias, defence forces and irregular armed forces. (Recent examples are to be found in Sudan, DRC and Angola.)

Exploitation of resources to fuel conflict

65. International attention has recently been focused on the role that diamonds play in fuelling conflict. The UK has strongly supported efforts to introduce better controls over rough diamonds. The object is to disrupt the illegal trade in diamonds and to reduce the possibilities for their use as payment for the illegal purchase of weapons. The work of three expert UN panels in the last year demonstrated that diamonds are only one element in a far wider exploitation of mineral and natural resources. Trade in coltan (cobalt tantalite), cobalt, gold, timber and oil may play a more important role in fuelling conflict. But, there has been some progress in trying to ensure that the wealth derived from mineral resources is used for development. The construction of the oil pipeline in Chad by the World Bank has set a precedent by establishing international regulation of Chad’s oil income so that it may not be used for military expenditure. The critical role oil revenues play in war economies such as Sudan and Angola underlines the value in establishing international standards of accounting and transparency for multinational companies.

Local mediation and peace-building activities

66. The role of civil society in mediation and peace-building has been a major element of international support to conflict prevention and resolution. It is particularly important when responding to conflict arising from disputes over the sharing of scarce resources. For example, civil society in Kenya has helped to resolve conflict between pastoralist groups. Civil society has a broader role to play in African conflict. Peace and security depends on major changes in attitude within society. This is particular the case where society has become polarised. For example, the church leadership in Rwanda have come to recognise their own engagement in the genocide. The church remains a potent political force in Burundi, where other elements of civil society can also perpetuate the divisions within society. Far too often peace processes are seen as the prerogative of combatant forces. In many of Africa’s wars, lasting peace will depend on “demilitarising the mind” and developing a social
climate that seeks to sustain peace. Demobilisation and the reintegration of combatants are critically dependent on societies’ ability to accept combatants back into the community. DFID funded activities in Northern Uganda demonstrated the importance that support to community reintegration and mediation processes could play in providing the basis for reintegrating violent factional forces into the community.
Part IV

A comprehensive framework for conflict prevention in Africa

Commitment and support to addressing conflict in Africa
67. International concern over the adverse effects of conflict in Africa has been steadily increasing since the mid 1990s. Initiatives to address the problem have had limited impact. There is no magic solution that can stop the cycle of conflict. As wars become more entrenched, it becomes inevitable that they become less amenable to external intervention. This only serves to emphasise the need for a long-term commitment to a broad and comprehensive framework that seeks to build on African successes, re-establish the authority of the United Nations and build on international and bilateral actions.

68. Concerted international action is required to halt the spread of conflict. Measures that will assist include:
- Greater coherence between foreign policy, security and development objectives
- An early warning mechanism and a common strategic framework to deal with failing and fragile states, which would include a commitment to state building where necessary.
- Ensuring that aid does not exacerbate conflict in line with OECD guidelines.
- International willingness to commit to post-conflict reconstruction and longer term peacebuilding, specifically reconstruction of accountable military and police forces along with a functioning and independent judiciary.

Recognising the threat of regional conflict
69. Large parts of Africa are affected by a series of regional interlocking conflicts. Past action has been based on the premise that intra-state conflict has been the main problem. It is now evident that conflict is increasingly regional and fought through various state alliances, and frequently through proxy groups of irregular armed forces. This suggests the need to develop new approaches to international intervention and mediation:
- Effective Peacekeeping will require new military, political and humanitarian strategies for dealing with the localised nature of conflict and specific mechanisms for dealing more effectively with irregular armed forces.
- Recognising that most regional conflict is centred around collapsed, failing or fragile states e.g. Sierra Leone, DRC, Somalia, we must devise better effective mechanisms to develop effective modern states.

Dealing with small arms proliferation and control of light weapons
70. to resort to violence and war in order to resolve disputes or grievances. The factors motivating supply and demand for light weapons by both State and non-State actors are complex, involving both considerable surplus stocks, illicit transfers within Africa and continuing external supplies. The following measures are key:
- Support for the implementation of small arms moratoriums with adequate structures and mechanisms.
- Support to European and international regulation of arms trafficking.
- Improved regulatory mechanisms in producer and exporting countries.
- Action against illegal transfer and transport of arms.
- International support for the disposal and destruction of weapons surplus to national security needs.

International action on resource exploitation
71. The battle for control and exploitation of natural resources is a critical element in all of the conflicts in Africa. The exploitation of these resources will almost inevitably involve international business and investors. In many instances the international business community will find themselves protecting their legally acquired and legitimately managed investments in the area. However, conflict also encourages the proliferation of opportunistic businesses operating for quick returns and high profits in areas of risk. Responsible investment could make a major contribution to conflict resolution in the following ways:
- International investment standards for conflict affected areas and agreed international standards of financial transparency and accountability.
- Integrated investment planning in conflict countries – i.e. aid – business partnership – to enhance economic diversification.
- Measures for external monitoring and international management of mineral resources in conflict areas.
- Improved international controls and mechanisms for illegal exploitation of resources, including international action on money laundering and sequestration of illegally acquired assets.

**Effective and appropriate support to African mediation structures.**

72. Effective conflict prevention in Africa will require the evolution of more stable and equitable political structures. This in itself poses a major challenge for the OAU and the regional organisations. New political dispensations can rarely be effectively imposed from outside. In order to develop, they will require peace processes that tackle the fundamental causes of instability; and transitional processes that ensure a lasting ceasefire and that allow the creation of a public climate favourable to change and a broad constituency for peace. This will be assisted by

- Support for the development of regional mediation structures with credible African guarantors.
- Recognition and support for civil society to rebuild and reinforce a culture of peace within society.
- Support for reconciliation processes and mechanisms for reintegration of combatants.

**More effective and appropriate peace support interventions**

73. The changing nature of peacekeeping demands in Africa mean that larger scale and more rapidly deployable forces will be required. Sharing responsibility for action will require that African forces maintain or increase their current capacity to participate in peacekeeping operations, develop the capacity to work effectively and jointly with other forces and develop a greater command and control capacity. Effective African peacekeeping capacity is ultimately dependent on accountable and well-trained national forces. The international community can assist by:

- A co-ordinated international response to building Africa’s peacekeeping capacity through training programmes and exercises that share a common framework.
- Support to the development of effective regional political and military crisis management structures.

- Recognising through programme design, the links between effective African peacekeeping capacity and security sector reform.
- Recognising the need for joint responsibility for global and African peacekeeping and mechanisms to support force projection and deployment including through European or international partnership arrangements/facilities.

**Effective humanitarian action**

74. The chances of responding effectively to humanitarian needs in Africa are being steadily eroded by restricted access to those in need and an increasing disregard for humanitarian principles. Humanitarian agencies need to understand the risks posed in conflict areas by being the main provider of resources – and establish ways of working by which these risks can be minimised. However, greater protection for humanitarian values will also be achieved through the establishment of the International Criminal Court and promotion of the concept of individual responsibility for war. More effective humanitarian action will be assisted by:

- International promotion of humanitarian standards with all combatant groups.
- Specific action to protect children from abduction and combat.
- Developed humanitarian strategies for safeguarding access to those in need.
- Political action to complement humanitarian action.
- Judicial and police support to humanitarian actions.

**The Role of the UK**

75. The Department for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence have a shared interest in reducing conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. By combining forces and adapting shared strategies they can have a greater impact. The Government’s conflict prevention initiative is an important step in improving the capacity of the UK government to work with others to address Africa’s conflicts.

76. The UK’s conflict prevention strategy will be based on our experience in mediation and our engagement in peacekeeping and peacekeeping training and security sector reform programmes. The United Kingdom’s response and actions will draw on our role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, our political and developmental
representation within Africa and our role within the International Financial Institutions and UN humanitarian and development system.

77. The Government expects its new arrangements for conflict prevention in Africa will provide the basis for a comprehensive plan of action linking immediate needs to longer-term strategy.

78. The most pressing needs are for actions that will contain the spread of regional conflict in the Great Lakes region and in West Africa in and around Sierra Leone. UK conflict prevention work in Africa will focus on the following areas:

- Small arms and light weapons controls – The UK will enhance its support for the control of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Africa. It will support domestic and European measures to better regulate the arms trade including the transport and shipment of weapons. It will support greater efforts to control the international trade. The UK will assist national and regional arms control and destruction programmes in Africa.
- Inclusive development – The UK will continue to encourage responsible investment practices in areas of conflict and encourage responsible international investment. The UK will continue to work with the International Financial Institutions to encourage more stable and diverse economic activity.
- Reduction in the exploitation of mineral and other natural resources for the purposes of war – The UK will work with others to examine and assist ways of limiting the exploitation of such resources for the purpose of conflict. We will also seek to identify and promote the means by which such resources are safeguarded and managed in a way that reduces conflict and ensures that they benefit the population.
- Inclusive government – The UK will work with others to support development efforts that reduce individual and group inequality. We will promote commitments to develop services that are inclusive and responsive to all groups and sectors. The UK will also work with others to support and help develop strategies for reconciliation, reintegration and justice in conflict affected countries.
- Security Sector reform – The UK will continue to identify countries where British involvement in security sector reform and increased accountability of the security forces to democratic authority will enhance peace and security and help reduce conflict.
- Regional security bodies – The UK will support actions and international coordination that will lead to enhanced common and mutual security in Africa.
- African peacekeeping capacity – the UK will work with the United Nations, the US, and within the EU to develop an agreed programme of action to support and enhance Africa’s peacekeeping capacity in line with the approaches suggested in the Brahimi report.
# Appendix 1:

## Chronology of conflict in Africa

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<td>Post Independence War</td>
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<td>Independence</td>
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<td>Independence war</td>
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### Appendix 2: Key Indicators for Africa

The causes of conflict in Africa – consultation document – March 2001

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Appendix 3:

ONGOING PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

MINURSO 1991 –
UNMIBH 1995 –
UNMOP 1996 –
UNMIK 1999 –
UNIFIL 1978 –
UNOMIG 1993 –
UNIKOM 1991 –
UNMOGIP 1949 –
UNDOF 1974 –
UNTSO 1948 –
MONUC 1999 –
UNAMSIL 1999 –
UNFICYP 1964 –
UNMIK 1999 –
UNMEE 2000 –

Map No. 4000 Rev. 16    UNITED NATIONS
August 2000

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

The causes of conflict in Africa – consultation document – March 2001
### Appendix 4

**Inventory of the effects of conflict on Poverty**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loss of Public Entitlements</th>
<th>Direct impacts of conflicts on Assets and Livelihoods</th>
<th>Indirect Impacts of conflict</th>
<th>Sectoral and Regional</th>
<th>Households and communities</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collapse of instruments of public order: military, police etc.</td>
<td>Growing macro insecurity of states and regimes. Decline in their capacities (to tax, provide public goods, ensure security) associated with a shrinking revenue base and reduced public spending</td>
<td>State loss of monopoly of violence to armed opposition groups. Distribution of public goods and services skewed on geographical, social and gender basis</td>
<td>Insecurity: civilians at risk from violence, rape, crime, seizure of assets. Diminished access to public services including health and education etc. hence higher disease, infant mortality, smaller school enrolments etc.</td>
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<td>Loss of market/livelihood entitlement</td>
<td>Destruction and decay of physical capital, communication infrastructure; withdrawal of land and labour force from production (eg due to landmines, population displacement)</td>
<td>Macroeconomic costs: stagnant or falling GNP; exports, imports, trade imbalances; hyperinflation and exchange rate depreciation; dis-investment; capital flight; increased debt</td>
<td>Decline of formal economy relative to regional and local war economies; increased uncertainty; high transaction costs; failure of price mechanisms; market segmentation; food production affected; major disparities between war affected and other regions</td>
<td>Contraction in formal employment; decline in real wages; forced asset sales; destruction of subsistence livelihoods; food shortages; changes in gender division of labour; shortages, entitlement failures and declining consumption</td>
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<td>Loss of civil and social entitlements</td>
<td>Destruction of social capital (institutions, values, networks) through population displacement, diminished trust etc.</td>
<td>Diminished sense of citizenship based on shared rights and obligations. Shrinking of civil society</td>
<td>Existing institutions unable to cope with stresses and dislocations induced by conflict (eg refugee influx). Heighten competition for resources and conflicts between previously co-operating regions/ethnic groups/communities</td>
<td>Local communities weakened; existing safety nets and coping mechanisms insufficient or break-down. Proliferation of vulnerable groups (refugees, displaced, orphans, female and child headed households, HIV victims etc.)</td>
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<td>Reverse entitlements/New forms of social inequality</td>
<td>Asset transfers; direct appropriation of assets, land, sources of livelihood from vulnerable groups, displaced populations</td>
<td>Rent-seeking by those with access to state and military power, reinforcing macro-economic distortions and undermining capacities of the state</td>
<td>New forms of inequality associated with privatisation of violence; rent seeking by those controlling weapons, transport routes, food distribution, minerals and natural resources, access to aid etc.</td>
<td>Heightened insecurity and exploitation of vulnerable groups. Increased gender violence. Emergence of new groups dependent on war for livelihoods but also potentially at risk; child soldiers, demobilised combatants, war wounded, etc.</td>
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Source: Adapted from Luckham et al (1999)