London Underground Limited: A report on passenger
and other services supplied by the company
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On 30 October 1990 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry referred
to the Commission certain questions concerning the efficiency and costs
of and the service provided by London Underground Limited (LUL) in supplying
passenger and other services (see Appendix 1.1). LUL is a wholly-owned
subsidiary company of London Regional Transport (LRT) which is closely
involved in LUL's affairs. For example, LRT receives Government grant
for public transport in London and apportions LUL's share to the company,
and in consultation with the Government, it determines LUL's fares policy.
We were grateful for LRT's and LUL's complete cooperation in the inquiry.
We discuss here the main issues arising from the reference which required
a wide-ranging inquiry covering most aspects of LUL's affairs. A summary
of our recommendations appears at the end of the report in Chapter 15.
We indicate priorities for action in paragraph 1.47.
The public's perception of an erratic, overcrowded and poorly maintained
service in many areas is broadly correct, although the picture for the
Underground as a whole is more favourable. For the most part the deficiencies
in the levels of service are the result of chronic underinvestment in
both new capacity and the replacement and renewal of existing assets,
an unforeseen dramatic growth in traffic and the disruption arising from
radically improved safety provisions. Even with unlimited availability
of investment funds the time-scale for any marked alleviation of overcrowding
would not be felt for a long time because it would require the construction
of new lines, and these take 15 years or so from conception to completion.
One such line, EastWest crossrail, from Paddington to Liverpool Street
has been approved by the Secretary of State for Transport. LUL believes
that a ChelseaHackney Line will also be necessary if congestion is
to be substantially reduced and the Secretary of State is safeguarding
this route. Meanwhile LUL expects that significant levels of regular inconvenience
and discomfort will continue to be suffered by passengers as demand grows.
At a less visible but nevertheless critical level, LUL estimates that
it will take at least ten years to bring its permanent way up to standard,
and this is on the uncertain assumption that the necessary funds will
be available. On a more encouraging note there is the prospect of a reduction
in disruptions resulting from smoke alarms when LUL's safety programme
is complete (see paragraphs 14.121 and 14.123).
LUL set four Business Goals in June 1990:
(a) The maximum number of trains to be running in the peak, at regular
intervals, by end of September 1990. This meant single figure cancellations
for the network as a whole.
(b) An escalator service to meet customer expectations by April 1991.
This meant no more than 35 escalators out for any reason. Emphasis was
to be placed on minimising the downtime of individual machines.
(c) A welcoming and customer-friendly environment by April 1991. This
had implications for cleanliness, staff presence and attitudes, technology
(d) Asset maintenance and renewal so that the system performed well
and looked good. This would be a five-year programme covering track, signalling,
escalators, stations and trains.
LUL has failed so far to meet the first goal because of particular problems
with rolling stock on the Victoria and Piccadilly Lines. LUL believes
that financial constraints will continue to make it difficult to achieve
although we note that LUL has been close to it in some months. The second
goal has been achieved by LUL, but it told us that budgetary constraints
were now likely to cause some slippage. This would in our view be particularly
unfortunate because passengers find shortcomings here extremely irritating.
The third goal is also likely to suffer as a result of the recent action
to cut costs: LUL said that a number of things which contribute to cleanliness,
appearance and customer friendliness had been deferred. Present indications
are that the fourth goal will not be achieved within the targeted time-scale.
In the terms of reference, we are asked first of all whether in supplying
its services LUL could improve its efficiency and thereby, without affecting
targeted improvements in levels of safety or in the quality of the service
provided, reduce its costs. We have taken account of two general considerations
and four particular factors in assessing LUL's performance.
The first of the general considerations is that we have in our discussions
with LRT and LUL discerned a conflict between LUL's commercial objective
of generating enough cash to cover both operating costs and the funding
of renewals and replacements, and LRT's and hence LUL's legal obligation
to have due regard to London's public transport needs. This has to be
seen against the background of a market where substantial real price increases
are judged to be politically unacceptable. The second consideration is
that LUL has to operate within a financial framework which does not facilitate
the development of a consistent long-term policy in respect of the setting
of fares and the planning and funding of investment. One aspect of this
is the provision of ring-fenced funding to finance new lines while LUL's
fundamental requirement to maintain and upgrade the existing network is
to a great extent starved of the necessary funds.
The four particular factors are:
(a) the weight of safety considerations after the King's Cross fire
in November 1987;
(b) the present state of the Underground;
(c) the steep increase in passenger miles over recent years; and
(d) changes in LUL's senior management and in its management structure.
The issue of safety on the Underground has occupied a great deal of
senior management time since the King's Cross fire and required the implementation
of major programmes of safety works. Without implying any criticism of
LUL's making safety its first priority, the intensive efforts to improve
levels of safety must necessarily have reduced the time available for
other matters, including the pursuit of improvements in operating efficiency.
The Underground is an old system which, as we have already indicated,
has over many years not been renewed at a rate necessary to sustain an
efficient rapid transit railway. The most heavily used parts are generally
at deep level in narrow diameter tunnels served by trains which are amongst
the smallest in the world. Here, significant constraints on improving
performance or increasing capacity are the tunnel size, tight curvatures,
the great difficulties in the way of increasing platform lengths, and
the difficult geography of existing stations including an insufficient
provision of lifts and escalators to cope with present traffic volumes.
These inadequacies have been exacerbated by an increase of around 50
per cent in passenger demand over the last decade which has overstretched
the system and frequently increased congestion to levels requiring the
temporary closure of stations.
There have been significant changes in LUL's senior management in recent
years. The Chairman was appointed in March 1989, the Managing Director
in August 1988, the Engineering Director in January 1989 and the Finance
Director as recently as February 1991. LUL has over this period been seeking
to change its culture from a largely reactive style to one of proactive
planning and management. In November 1988 it decided to establish ten
line businesses with all other activities becoming supportive to those
businesses. Good progress has been made but as implementation is not complete,
it is too early to reach any conclusion on whether the new structure will
deliver improvements in efficiency. At this interim stage, management
recognises that LUL is doing unnecessary business with itself in the form
of internal contracts, resulting in duplication of effort and of staff.
After taking these reservations into account, we have concluded that
LUL could improve its efficiency and reduce its costs without the effects
on safety and quality of service mentioned in paragraph 1.5. There are
particular weaknesses in cash control both in securing fares income and
in control of spending, and in management information systems generally.
Despite the devolution of certain responsibilities to line businesses
the staff of LUL's central directorates has shown a threefold increase
since 1986. There are sound reasons for much of this increase but LUL
recognises that there is some duplication of effort (see paragraph 1.19).
It also said that in the post-King's Cross fire atmosphere of crisis,
staff were thrown at the problem of safety in excessive numbers, and it
intended that the number of staff should be sensibly managed down. In
this connection we strongly support LUL's more recent work on risk assessment
aimed at making the best use of available funds. LUL has told us that
labour practices which restrict productivity (some unofficial and some
embodied in agreements-see paragraph 1.34) still exist and that it intends
to deal with them in the course of its current value analysis programme.
It conceded that there was substantial scope for improvements in the efficiency
of rolling stock maintenance but said that it was partly dependent on
modernising its depots.
We have also been asked whether the quality of service provided could
be improved without any increase in costs: it follows from paragraph 1.12
that it could, but this does not imply that the resulting level of service
would be satisfactory.
The last broad question in the terms of reference is the extent to which
a higher quality of service might generate higher net revenue. The short
answer is that real fares increases justified by improved quality of service
would increase net revenue. However, leaving aside the matter of whether
LUL would be allowed to introduce significant real fares increases (see
paragraph 1.21), it would not be possible for LUL's present ticketing
system to reflect quality improvements in different parts of the network
in the fares for the particular services concerned.
Investment in the Underground
The need for investment in the Underground at a much higher level than
in the past has been recognised on all sides. In order to provide an acceptably
modern network, LUL sees the need for an average expenditure of £700
million to £750 million a year over the remainder of the decade,
excluding the cost of new lines and extensions to existing lines. By comparison,
investment over the last five years averaged £290 million a year
at 1990/91 prices. On the basis of current provisional funding guidelines,
LUL plans to invest £384 million, also at 1990/91 prices, in 1991/92.
Given the fierce competition for scarce Government funds, it is unlikely
that the Government will meet the whole investment need foreseen by LUL.
Equally it is unrealistic to expect increased efficiency on the part of
LUL, imperative though this is, to bridge the gap. In our view there will
have to be an enhanced contribution from real increases in fares.
The balance between Government finance and real fares increases is a
matter for the Government to determine in consultation with LRT. We would
merely observe that Government policy in this matter needs to be clear
and to recognise, as far as it is feasible to do so, the long planning
horizon, ten years or more, necessary for the efficient management of
a modern railway. LUL must play its part. Its recent investment plans
have been unrealistic and resulted in considerable problems when these
plans failed to match the funding available and had to be scaled down.
LUL must plan on the basis of the resources likely to be available.
As regards the contribution from increasing efficiency, we have noted
LUL's productivity target of 2 per cent each year on average over five
years and have recommended that it should be seen as a minimum target
to be achieved. The unions have indicated to us their willingness to cooperate
in measures to improve productivity but, above all, it will require firmer
and more systematic direction by senior management than has been evident
in the recent past. It seems to us that financial constraints have provided
the spur for the currently proposed reductions in costs rather than a
sustained drive for improved efficiency. Both the taxpayer and the fare-paying
passenger are entitled to value for money. LUL needs to demonstrate on
a continuing basis that it is making the best use of existing resources
in an efficient and businesslike way.
We now turn to the special questions in the terms of reference:
(a) the scope for improvements in efficiency and manpower productivity
and the appropriateness of the management structure;
Taking management structure first, we found that it was designed to
facilitate a more commercial approach, to reduce the number of management
tiers and to meet criticisms in the aftermath of the King's Cross fire
that the Underground was under-managed. We also found that the resulting
spans of control, at near double the accepted practice, were too wide
for effective control; that the introduction of the client and internal
contractor concept had resulted in fragmentation of responsibility and
duplication of effort; and that the present level of devolution to line
businesses needed to be developed further, as LUL planned to do. We have
recommended that LUL should review its Headquarters structure with the
aim of reducing spans of control below double figures and that it should
take steps to clarify responsibility and eliminate duplication by October
We have already indicated in general terms the scope for LUL to improve
its efficiency and manpower productivity (see paragraph 1.12). We review
particular matters in more detail under subsequent headings.
(b) the method of determining the level and structure of fares
and the relationship of fares both to cost structures and to the level
of peak and off-peak demand on the network;
LRT, and hence LUL, have not been able to raise fares in real terms
by as much as they wished because of Government concern over the fares
increases proposed, although in principle the Government supports an element
of real pricing in LUL's pricing policy. At the same time LUL's ability
to change its fares structure has been constrained by requests from the
Government not to raise individual fares by significantly more than the
average fares increase. We believe this has damaged LUL's ability to achieve
both the objectives of its fares policy and to plan ahead, and we have
made a number of recommendations aimed at improving matters.
Many of the costs of providing LUL's services are not specific to the
operation of individual services at particular times of day and this raises
formidable allocation problems. Nevertheless, in our view, the allocation
of costs on a regular basis to specific lines, and where appropriate sections
of lines, at different times of the day would help LUL to set fares which
more truly reflect costs and help to identify those services which are
not covering their marginal costs of operation. LUL needs to develop a
clear pricing policy and to produce the cost data necessary for its successful
implementation. We have recommended accordingly.
(c) the management of LUL's investment programme and the appraisal
and management of individual capital projects;
LUL has acknowledged that its past record of project management has
been unsatisfactory but over the past two years it has, we believe, taken
steps to assess the resources required for managing the increased level
of project activity arising from the significantly enlarged investment
programme. We have made a number of recommendations further to improve
matters particularly by establishing procedures for monitoring overruns
or overspends and making better use of LUL's computerised project management
The planning process within the Underground Investment Programme (UIP)
has in the past been based on unrealistic assumptions about future levels
of funding which cause problems in arriving at well-considered investment
plans. We are concerned that LUL has not always considered enough options
in looking at investment. Increased effort here would help it to respond
with greater flexibility to funding constraints. More fundamentally, we
have recommended that the UIP for future years should be based on the
three scenarios approach recently proposed by LUL-Treasury guidelines,
essential and desirable levels of expenditure; and should spell out the
implications of different levels of funding, including the interrelationship
between projects and the effect on the achievement of Business Goals.
We have also recommended that LUL should, within the next UIP, make more
systematic use of information on cost benefit ratios and the financial
impact of projects in arriving at its project priority ranking, and that
it should ensure that a full risk assessment of investment in safety is
in place by the end of 1991.
On the matter of investment appraisal, we have concluded that LUL should
do more to present options to the LRT Board, including the different funding
implications, and more to assess the effect of delaying projects on its
costs. We have recommended accordingly and made a number of other recommendations
concerning particularly the basis for assessing projects, the need to
carry out systematic sensitivity analysis and to base maintenance and
renewal of such key assets as the permanent way, rolling stock and signalling
on an optimal replacement policy which takes account of costs, revenue
and passenger benefits.
(d) the efficiency of LUL in adjusting services to match demand
and whether greater efficiency would increase net revenue;
We have been impressed by the technical modelling capability of LUL
in its planning to match services to demand. It has not, however, been
able to deliver its planned service. We are also concerned that it has
tended to concentrate on peak services and has not given enough attention
to off-peak services.
LUL's recent review of service levels showed that there are areas where
operating costs can be reduced. We are concerned that these savings only
appear to have been identified and brought forward as a result of a cash
crisis, though LUL told us that these potential cost savings would have
been identified and introduced in due course. This suggests to us that
LUL does not routinely scrutinise its services as rigorously as it should.
We have recommended an annual review of all investment and operating expenditure
affecting capacity in order to ensure that the balance between expenditure
in different areas is appropriate.
In the central area during peak periods LUL provides as many trains
as practicable within the current operating constraints, which as we indicate
in section (e) may be only marginally alleviated by improvements in efficiency.
There is otherwise no scope for increasing supply by means other than
investment to increase capacity. At other times, and outside the central
area, there may well be further scope for modifying services to match
demand more closely but the absence of the necessary cost information
makes evaluation difficult. We have found that there is a particular need
to determine the costs and benefits involved with services at the margins
of the operating day and at weekends. We have recommended that such analyses
should be conducted every two years and that the first should be completed
within one year.
We have made a number of other recommendations in the areas of passenger
benefits and operating decisions, the effect of the one-day Travelcard
on the evening peak and forecasts of demand, all aimed at improving LUL's
efficiency in adjusting services to match demand and thereby increasing
(e) the extent to which any deficiency in the quality of service
is the result of inefficiency and in particular whether there is scope
for improving the quality of LUL's service by making more effective and
efficient use of existing resources;
LUL has been slow in developing the information and methods it needs
to determine optimal maintenance and renewal policies, but it is now working
to put this right. This is important because improvements here will enable
LUL to make better use of its resources and so improve its services.
Cancellations and failure to achieve regular service intervals exacerbate
overcrowding on the Underground. We have found that there is scope for
reducing cancellations across the network through more vigorous and well-directed
management action. We have recommended that action taken by Northern Line
management to reduce cancellations should be applied to other lines, where
appropriate, by October 1991. We have also made a number of specific recommendations
which seek to achieve a reduction in rolling stock failure rates. Disruptions
to the regular running of services arise for a number of reasons, some
of which are not within LUL's control, for example smoke or fire alarms
and security alerts. Within LUL's control are delays and disruptions arising
from equipment failures or human error. We have concluded that LUL's failure
to achieve regular service intervals has resulted, in part, from insufficient
management attention to these matters within its control. We have made
recommendations aimed at improving LUL's performance in this area, including
the speed of restoration of services after disruption.
The measures we have suggested will be useful but they do not address
the capacity constraints on the network. We would expect them to effect
only a marginal improvement in overcrowding.
(f) the scope for improving operational capacity, reducing overheads
and, with due attention to safety, securing reductions in operating, maintenance,
repair and renewal costs particularly by improving working practices,
optimum timing of work and contracting out appropriate work;
We have said in sections (d) and (e) that LUL provides as many trains
as practicable during peak periods in the critical central area and that
only marginal improvements are currently feasible. There is, however,
substantial scope for reducing overheads and, without affecting safety,
securing reductions in operating and maintenance costs, as we have indicated
in paragraph 1.12.
LUL has told us that customs and practices which constrain productivity
are prevalent in certain areas and in some instances are condoned by local
managers. Furthermore, negotiated collective agreements contain terms
which, in themselves, may inhibit improvements in productivity. Planned
preventative maintenance work on rolling stock is out of phase with the
availability of that stock. Planned maintenance intervals do not reflect
real need and could lead to over-frequent maintenance and excess costs;
nor are they effectively linked to managing or containing failures. Maintenance
turnround times are excessive and may lead to higher costs. Performance
in the incorporation of approved modifications, particularly those related
to safety, has been unsatisfactory. We have made recommendations in all
As to contracting out, we have noted that the bulk of maintenance and
renewals work is carried out in-house. The trade unions and some local
managers are opposed to the principle of competitive tendering and the
position is particularly delicate because of the safety implications of
contracting out in a railway environment. We have recommended that LUL
should pursue a policy of increasing competition in all areas where external
contractors are competent to tender for work and can operate within LUL
defined and controlled safety standards.
(g) the quality and effectiveness of LUL's systems of allocating
costs to its business units and divisions and for monitoring and controlling
We have commended LUL's line contribution and related approaches to
the identification, monitoring and control of its costs. However, LUL's
intra-business charging system, which intends to ensure that costs are
borne by those units which incur them, appears to be unduly complex and
to involve work and negotiation disproportionate to its objective. We
have recommended that LUL should review this system with a view to simplifying
LUL has employed and been set a target for total costs per train mile
as a measure of its efficiency. We have recommended that this measure
should be supplemented by a variety of measures related to other important
operational characteristics such as numbers of employees and/or value
of assets employed, and that LUL should also make use of measures of profitability
related to passenger journeys and passenger miles.
(h) whether LUL makes full commercial use of assets, including
the use and redevelopment of properties in its operational use, and in
the provision of ancillary services and concessions.
LUL and London Transport Property (LTP) have wholeheartedly adopted
the principal recommendations of the MMC's 1985 report on the efficiency
and costs of the British Railways Board in its property activities. Their
procedures are commendable and senior staff have adopted a proactive approach
to property development and estate management. However, we have concluded
that two effects of the financial regime within which LUL operates have
been to discourage an optimal disposal strategy for LUL's assets and to
cause or contribute to the postponement of a number of highly profitable
commercial projects capable of significantly enhancing LUL's secondary
income in respect of additional commercial units, state-of-the-art vending
machines and platform telephones following proposals in LUL's Retail Business
As far as advertising on the Underground is concerned, we have concluded
that London Transport Advertising (LTA) could be lighter on its feet in
responding to changing market conditions and so optimising its realised
prices. We have also found that LTA's method of apportioning costs appears
to be inadequate, in particular, for revealing the extent of any cross-subsidisation
between LUL, London Buses Ltd (LBL) and Docklands Light Railway Ltd (DLR)
and for facilitating the rationalisation of the historically large number
of advertising sites on the Underground through the identification of
those from which the revenues obtained are insufficient to cover costs.
We have made a number of recommendations (some addressed to the Department
of Transport (DTp)) aimed at improving matters in these areas.
Certain other matters arising from our inquiry are, in our view, particularly
Operating within the external financing limit (EFL) system in an uncertain
environment requires strong competent management. Whatever the reasons
for changes in income or expenditure, it is important for there to be
proper control over cash flow and commitments, so that swift management
action can be taken. LUL's financial control proved to be inadequate in
1990/91. Its other arrangements associated with such matters as project
control (especially in relation to cash as against value of work done)
were similarly inadequate to enable prompt and suitable remedial action.
We have made a number of recommendations aimed at improving LUL's control
over cash flow and commitments which we trust will reinforce its own endeavours
in this direction. We have in particular recommended that responsibility
for the monitoring of cash overspends and bringing these to the notice
of the individuals responsible and for the management and control against
the capital grant should be firmly placed on the company's Finance Director,
who should nominate one specific individual to monitor and control all
the elements comprising the EFL. We are glad to note that LUL has decided
to cease making a slippage allowance in its project expenditure budgets.
We have also recommended a rearrangement of existing EFL procedures to
permit a measure of flexibility to cover expenditure phasing variations.
We have made a number of other recommendations aimed at improving the
presentation of LUL's results, including additional measures of efficiency.
Management information systems
There is widespread dissatisfaction within LUL about the quality of
its management information and internal management reports. We have concluded
that both the number and volume of reports are excessive and that they
are insufficiently focused on the key areas of management performance.
Moreover they are insufficiently directed towards the provision of financial
information and, in particular, financial measures and efficiency ratios.
We have recommended an urgent review of these reports and that it should
specifically take account of the latter need. We have also concluded that
on-line information should be more widely available and should be made
more comprehensive in its coverage and we have recommended accordingly.
The various external strategic planning exercises which influence a
major part of LUL's strategy have a wide range of social benefit objectives.
The internal objectives set for LUL are based on financial and quality
of service targets. Nevertheless, LUL is required to carry out its investment
appraisals using cost benefit analysis criteria including passenger benefits
and external benefits. We have concluded that LUL is faced with conflicting
objectives to an unusual degree and have recommended that LUL should put
forward proposals to establish a clear framework of objectives for agreement
by DTp by the end of 1991.
The business plans prepared by the lines for 1990/91 show a wide variation
in both style and content. This may indicate a lack of clarity about their
purpose. We have concluded that there is a need for a more standardised
structure for line business plans and have recommended that LUL should
take steps to identify the best practice in the existing line business
plans and to incorporate this within the central guidelines for future
Priorities for action
In the conclusions to the individual chapters of our report we make
a number of recommendations which are summarised in Chapter 15. There
are six matters which we believe should collectively have priority:
(a) control of cash against the EFL;
(b) management information systems;
(c) utilisation of manpower;
(d) fares policy and levels;
(e) management of investment programme and projects; and
(f) renewal and maintenance of the network.
The recommendations which require particular attention in those areas
have been set out in bold type in Chapter 15.
Our inquiry has naturally concentrated on areas where LUL's performance
could be improved but in our overall assessment of the public interest
it is right that we should also recognise achievements on the Underground
in recent years. Since the King's Cross fire, comprehensive safety management
systems have been established involving LRT as well as LUL. There has
been a marked improvement in the efficiency with which LUL physically
resources and manages its many investment projects. The Underground Ticketing
System (UTS) has been successfully implemented and substantial progress
made with One Person Operation (OPO) of trains by conversion of eight
of LUL's ten lines. Some 60 station modernisation schemes have been completed
and the network appearance improved, particularly at the heavily used
central area stations. Not least the Central Line Refurbishment Project
has been commenced at a total cost of some £700 million at 1990/91
As we have already made clear, the efficiency with which LUL uses its
present resources still leaves much to be desired. LUL is a long way from
providing an acceptably modern network. Provision of such a network is
important to the future of London and indeed to the United Kingdom as
a whole, and will require massive investment by LUL over a long period.
However, past failures to renew the system cannot be laid at the door
of the present leadership of LUL.
The present management will be judged, at least in part, by its ability
to persuade the Government to commit a stable investment programme for
major improvements and extensions to the system, and to recognise the
importance of real fares increases in matching revenues to costs. Recent
history suggests inadequate performance by LRT and LUL in getting their
case across to DTp and/or by the Department in getting the case across
to HM Treasury (HMT). The travelling public has been the principal victim
of under-funding and will no doubt be so for a number of years to come.
LUL has so far failed to grapple adequately with the problems associated
with cash control, particularly in regard to investment projects. This
is a major task and requires a substantial change in approach if the EFL
difficulties which arose in 1990/91 are not to be repeated in 1991/92
and subsequently. We are also particularly concerned that there are serious
shortcomings in LUL's management information systems; that LUL lacks a
clear pricing policy and the data necessary for its successful implementation;
that LUL has not yet got to grips either with customs and practices which
it says constrain productivity in certain areas, or with negotiated collective
agreements containing terms which, in themselves, may inhibit improvements
in productivity; that LUL's investment programme has been based on unrealistic
assumptions about future levels of funding; and that the renewal and maintenance
of the network has been neglected. All these matters point to a lack of
rigorous management of LUL's activities over a long period.
We have to say whether in relation to any matter falling within the
questions set out in the terms of reference LUL is pursuing a course of
conduct which operates against the public interest. We have noted in paragraph
1.48 substantial achievements by LUL. We have also made it abundantly
clear that there are serious failings. In some cases LUL commenced appropriate
action to put matters right in the course of our inquiry but, for example,
it is too early to say whether improvements introduced in the critical
area of control of expenditure, and in particular in the control of cash
outgoings, will be successful. Some deficiencies, particularly in regard
to the renewal of the network, will, after many years of neglect, require
substantial assistance from the Government if they are to be put right.
There is room for differences of opinion as to whether LUL itself has
taken adequate steps to remedy existing failings. Bearing in mind that
there is a relatively new senior management team which needs a reasonable
period of time fully to prove itself, and the severe financial constraints
under which it operates, we feel that LUL deserves the benefit of any
doubt about the consequences of its present conduct. We therefore refrain
from concluding that, at this time, LUL is pursuing a course of conduct
which operates against the public interest, although if adequate remedies
are not found for the deficiencies we have identified, the result in terms
of the level of service provided by LUL may indeed be contrary to the
It is clear from the range of our recommendations that many things necessary
for improvement in LUL's performance are not yet in place. LUL cannot
be expected to take instant action in all areas. With this in mind we
have in paragraph 1.47 listed the areas which we believe should have priority,
and in these and in some other areas we have, where appropriate, agreed
with LUL specific target dates for implementation of our recommendations.
These targets must be met.
||Background and statutory framework
||Management and organisation, and planning
||Financial framework and control
||Management information systems
||Industrial relations, pay and employment policies
||Efficient use of manpower
||Operational capacity and management of existing resources
||Matching services to demand
||Commercial use of assets
||Quality of service
||Summary of recommendations
||List of signatories
|(The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate)
||The reference and background
||List of interested third parties
||Case studies of two line businesses
||LUL Board Safety Committee
||LUL Safety Management Group: terms of reference
||LUL Finance Committee: terms of reference
||LUL Executive Committee: terms of reference
||LUL senior management structure
||Duties of Line General Managers
||Analysis of forecast overrun, 1990/91
||Comparison of achieved actual at period 12 with latest
forecast out-turn for 1990/91
||Regular management information reports
||Trade union membership at 6 September 1990, analysis
by main function
||RNC machinery: composition of Sectional Councils
||Proposed new negotiating machinery
||Proposed new negotiating machinery: terms of reference
||Summary of industrial action, 1980 to 1990
||LUL passenger rolling stock
||Rolling stock depots
||Scheduled train maintenance cycles
||Scheduled maintenance of rotating machines
||Scheduled cleaning cycles
||Engineers' train fleets
||Inventory of premises and structures
||Demand: information, modelling and forecasting
||Schedule of income and expenditure for property, advertising
and ancillary services, 1987/88 to 1994/95
||LT Property: divisional structure
||Retimetabling the Bakerloo Line
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