General Utilities PLC, The Colne Valley Water Company
and Rickmansworth Water Company: A report on the proposed merger
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Summary
On 7 September 1989 the Secretary of State asked us to investigate the
proposed merger between The Colne Valley Water Company (Colne), Rickmansworth
Water Company (Rickmansworth) and water enterprises carried on under the
control of General Utilities PLC (GU), the United Kingdom subsidiary of
Compagnie Générale des Eaux (CGE).
Colne and Rickmansworth are two of the 29 statutory water companies
(SWCs) which, with the ten water services public limited companies (WSPLCs),
supply water in England and Wales. CGE controls four SWCs including Lee
Valley Water Company (Lee), which has common boundaries with Colne and
Rickmansworth. Colne, Lee and Rickmansworth have been associated for a
number of years in a scheme to take water from the River Thames. Because
of a possible expansion to this scheme, and other economies which are
expected to result from the proposed merger, the Boards of Colne, Lee
and Rickmansworth have decided that it would be appropriate to merge.
The arrangements would involve a share exchange being made by Three Valleys
Water Services PLC (Three Valleys) which has been set up for that purpose.
If the merger proposals were accepted, Three Valleys would be controlled
through GU by CGE.
The reference (Appendix 1.1) was the first to be made under sections
29 and 30 of the Water Act 1989 (the Water Act) (Appendix 1.2) which requires
the Secretary of State to refer to the Commission certain mergers between
water enterprises.1
The supply of water and sewerage services in England and Wales is subject
to price control. In order to maintain a balance between the need to ensure
that water undertakers can finance their functions and the interests of
customers in relation to their charges, annual price increases are limited
to RPI plus a factor known as K, set initially for each water undertaker
by the Secretary of State for the Environment. Future reviews of K (and
of the services provided by the industry generally) will be carried out
by the Director General of Water Services (DGWS). The review process will
be based on the assumption that there is a sufficient number of independently
managed companies to enable the DGWS to make comparisons of efficiency
and other criteria between companies and therefore to set Ks which reflect
both the circumstances of the individual company and of the industry generally.
This assumption is reflected in section 30 of the Water Act, which provides
that in determining, in relation to a merger between water enterprises,
whether any matter operates or may be expected to operate against the
public interest, the Commission are required to have regard to the desirability
of giving effect to the principle that the number of water enterprises
which are under independent control should not be reduced so as to prejudice
the DGWS's ability to make comparisons. Section 30 also provides that
we are to have regard to the desirability of achieving any other purpose
so far only as we are satisfied that the other purpose can be achieved
in a manner that does not conflict with that principle or that the achievement
of that other purpose is of substantially greater significance in relation
to the public interest.
The Commission have concluded that the proposed merger involves a reduction
in the number of water enterprises under independent control which may be
expected to prejudice the DGWS's ability to carry out his functions under
the Water Act. The Commission have also concluded that certain purposes
related to the merger, including cost and financial savings, cannot be fully
achieved without the merger and, therefore, without prejudice to the DGWS's
ability to make comparisons.
The Commission have decided that, unless the cost savings arising from
the merger are made available to consumers as lower water charges, the
purposes of the merger would not be of substantially greater significance
in relation to the public interest than the prejudice to the DGWS's ability
to discharge his duties and could not be brought about except in a manner
which conflicts with that principle. We have therefore concluded that
the proposed merger may be expected to operate against the public interest.
We have, however, recommended that the merger might be allowed if the
parties undertook to seek a new appointment for Three Valleys as a water
enterprise and to ensure that the benefits of some £60 million which
they expect from the merger were taken into account in the calculation
of a K value for that new appointment. The effect on the average user
at the end of the ten-year period would be that water charges should be
at least 6 per cent lower than if the merger did not take place.
Full text
Contents |
Chapters |
|
| Chapter
1 |
Summary |
| Chapter
2 |
The water industry |
| Chapter 3 |
The principal parties to the proposed merger |
| Chapter 4 |
The events leading up to the merger, the merger
proposals and the companies' views on the effects of the merger |
| Chapter 5 |
The views of water companies |
| Chapter 6 |
The views of the Director General of Water Services |
| Chapter 7 |
The views of the Department of the Environment |
| Chapter 8 |
The views of other parties |
| Chapter 9 |
The views of the main parties |
| Chapter 10 |
Conclusions |
| |
List of signatories |
| Glossary |
|
Appendices |
|
| (The numbering of the appendices
indicates the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
The reference and background |
| 1.2 |
Sections 29 and 30 of the Water Act 1989 |
| 2.1 |
Yardstick competition and the role of comparators |
| 2.2 |
The price-fixing formula for water undertakers |
| 2.3 |
Map showing WSPLC's as at 1 April 1985 and SWC's
as at 12 September 1989 |
| 2.4 |
Statistical data on water companies |
| 3.1 |
Colne: financial information |
| 3.2 |
Lee: financial information |
| 3.3 |
Rickmansworth: financial information
|
| 3.4 |
GU: financial information |
| 3.5 |
CGE: financial information |
| 4.1 |
The financial effects of the proposed merger
and the structure of the merged enterprise |
| 9.1 |
Analysis of the impact on K of saving arising
from the merger |
| 9.2 |
Assurances given to NALGO and GMB by the companies |
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