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Mr Speaker.

The House already knows a great deal about the deployment of British troops to Afghanistan - I went through much of the detail during my statement on Monday afternoon.

I do not intend to repeat that detail. But I am delighted to be able to take this opportunity to answer the questions that have been raised and to clear up a number of misconceptions.

But let me begin by making three points to set the context for the rest of what I will say. It is essential that, in discussing the detail of these deployments, we do not lose sight of the bigger picture.

First. We are right to act in Afghanistan. The terrorist attacks in the United States last September were only possible because Usama bin Laden and al Qaida had been able to draw on the support and shelter offered by the Taliban regime. Had we done nothing, there was no doubt that bin Laden and his accomplices would have carried out further attacks. Attacks, perhaps, by now, in the United Kingdom. We were right to act, in self defence, under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

We were right to act to prevent Usama bin Laden and al Qaida from posing a continuing terrorist threat. And we were right to act to break the links between Afghanistan and international terrorism and to reintegrate Afghanistan as a responsible member of the international community, to ensure that those links are not established again.

Second. The action that the international community has taken has been remarkably successful. As I said on Monday, Afghanistan is now a very different country. The decision to deploy considerable military force against the terrorists and their supporters has been vindicated. Usama bin Laden and his al Qaida network have been dealt a heavy blow. The Taliban regime, whose support was so important for al Qaida, is no more.

And the decision to deploy the International Security Assistance Force to Kabul to help the Interim Authority to maintain security in the capital has also been vindicated. Afghanistan is beginning to return to normality. Given its recent history, this is, perhaps, hard to believe. But I saw this change for myself when I visited Kabul some weeks ago - market stalls full of food, people out on the street, normal life slowly returning.

And third. British Forces have played a vital role in this success. I need not run through this contribution in detail again. But it has been considerable. British forces have a reputation, right around the world, for their skill and professionalism. Time and again they have made a massive contribution to bringing stability to the world's trouble spots. Afghanistan is the latest example. We take immense pride in all that they do and in the credit that they bring to the United Kingdom. And let me take this opportunity to note our appreciation of the widespread support within this House for the work that British Forces have done in Afghanistan and for the work that they will continue to do. It means a great deal to our troops - and to their families.

But let me turn now to the more detailed issues and questions that have been raised.

First on the International Security Assistance Force. As the House is aware, the United Kingdom agreed to take on the leadership of this Force from its inception for a limited period of time. We took on this role for a number of reasons. It was a job that had to be done, and done well, if the Bonn Agreement was to have the best possible chance of success. The United Kingdom was particularly well placed to do this. Our Armed Forces had the right capabilities and experience in expeditionary operations and rapid deployments. We knew that we could provide effective command structures and enablers to get a force in and up and running in the timescale required. We were right to take on this responsibility.

The fact that we have been leading the Force is reflected in the number of British troops that we have deployed to Kabul - up to 1,800 personnel, along with another 300 or so to repair Kabul International Airport. Of course, the actual size of our contribution fluctuates from day to day. The sort of capabilities we need change over time. And we are also limited, to a certain extent, by the capacity of the local airstrips.

We have made clear that we would hand over our leadership of the ISAF after three months. We have always planned to transfer this responsibility by the end of April.

As I said in the House in January, and again two days ago, Turkey has indicated an interest in taking over as Lead Nation of the ISAF. We are in detailed discussions on this with Turkey. Good progress was made when a joint UK/US team of officials and military officers visited Ankara last week. We are making more progress in further military technical discussions with the Turks this week.

That these negotiations take time should surprise no-one. What is at issue is the transfer of the leadership of a large and complicated multinational force that has a demanding task to fullfil. Of course, Turkey wants to get it right, to make sure that they have the right structures, and, where necessary, the right support, to ensure that the ISAF is as successful up to June as it has been so far.

Turkey will certainly need continuing contributions of troops from other nations. Certainly the United Kingdom will continue to have troops in the ISAF after we have handed over the lead. We have promised Turkey that this will be the case. Other nations have done so as well. That does not change our determination to draw down the number of British troops deployed as part of the ISAF at that point. As I have made clear on a number of occasions, we are looking to make a significant reduction in the number of British troops - but not to withdraw them completely.

As for the wider future of the ISAF, the House will know that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 permits the Force to remain in Kabul for six months - that is until 20 June. As I said on Monday, the UNSCR may well be renewed, extending the duration of its deployment within its existing Area of Responsibility. Certainly it is clear that such a Force will have a continuing role to play in bringing security to Kabul and its immediate surroundings.

And let me make clear that speculation that the ISAF will become a NATO force or a European Union force or anything other than a 'coalition of the willing' is just that - speculation.

There has also been speculation about a possible expansion of the ISAF's Area of Responsibility. This is set out clearly in UN Security Council Resolution 1386 and in the Military Technical Agreement between the ISAF and the Afghan Interim Administration. The security situation outside Kabul is very different from the situation in the city. What is clear is that, ultimately, security in Afghanistan is a matter for the Afghans themselves. We will continue to look at how we can help them in this, especially through the ongoing process of Security Sector Reform.

Mr Speaker.

Before I move on to talk about the deployment of 45 Commando, let me repeat that the United Kingdom is committed to the continued success of the ISAF. Transferring our role as Lead Nation will not change that. The Force has done great work - not just by patrolling the streets of Kabul, important though that is. Helping to train the first battalion of the new Afghan National Guard; helping, for that matter, the new police force with such basic needs as pens and notepads, all help ensure the future stability of Afghanistan.

Mr Speaker.

The deployment of 45 Commando Group to Afghanistan is entirely consistent with our campaign objectives. Nor does it undermine or even threaten to undermine our support for ISAF. Since the military campaign began, we have made clear our determination to act to prevent Usama bin Laden and Al Qaida from posing a continuing terrorist threat. That is why British forces have been involved in operations on the ground in Afghanistan for some months now.

And we have also made clear that rooting out the remaining elements of al Qaida will take time. That was a constant theme of our statements in the early days of the military deployment. Even in the early days after 11 September, defence analysts were rightly pointing out that search and strike operations against Al Qaida and Taliban elements were likely to continue into the Spring. Certainly, Al Qaida ceased to exist as a coherent force some months ago. And the Taliban regime has long since been removed from power.

But, as the recent US-led Operation Anaconda has demonstrated, sizeable elements of Al Qaida and the Taliban remain in Afghanistan, hidden away in the remoter areas of the country. We must deal with these. The threat of attack from these groups and individuals remains high. And, if we did not deal with them, they would threaten all that the Afghan people and their supporters in the international community have achieved so far. They would certainly work to retain Afghanistan as a base for training and organising terrorism. And, left to regroup, there is no doubt that Al Qaida and its supporters would continue to pose a direct threat to states outside Afghanistan, including to the United Kingdom.

That is why we are deploying 45 Commando Group to join United States troops in continuing operations against these Al Qaida and Taliban remnants. It is simply continuing the work that we started last October. In no sense is it 'mission creep'.

The decision to deploy 45 Commando Group is good sense. They are able to deploy quickly - having been held at high readiness on HMS Ocean in the Arabian Sea and in their bases here in the United Kingdom. They are also trained to be able to manoeuvre quickly across difficult terrain. The Royal Marines are expert in mountain and cold weather warfare - they have trained in this role since the 1970s. All Royal Marines undertake mountain training every year - 45 Commando last did so only last December. Elements of 3 Commando Brigade exercise in Norway every year. They are equipped to fight in Arctic conditions.

The Commando Group is also able to sustain itself. It must be able to call upon the support of heavy weapons too. Naturally, the Commando Group is equipped with machine guns and mortars. It also has a battery of 105 millimetre Guns - a formidable piece of highly mobile artillery.

Just as importantly, 45 Commando have a long history of operating and training alongside US forces - including in Northern Iraq and Kosovo. The Royal Marines possess highly-skilled Forward Air Controllers who train regularly with US forces.

So 45 Commando are ideally placed to join troops from the United States, and a number of other nations - the House should not forget that troops from several nations took part in Operation Anaconda - in further operations against al Qaida and Taliban remnants in Afghanistan. That is why we have decided to deploy them. Our decision is not - absolutely not - as some have suggested - anything to do with British public opinion being more ready to accept the possibility of casualties than US public opinion. That suggestion deserves the contempt I know it has already received.

Some have tried to read things into the fact that we have chosen to deploy the Group now. This decision was taken following a formal request from the United States at the very end of last week and in close consultation with them. It is not because the Americans, or the other coalition forces, are exhausted or need to be rescued or somehow failed. They did not; they fought in Operation Anaconda and they won against a heavily armed enemy dug into prepared defensive positions in the rocks and caves. We should applaud their success, not try to decry it as some have done.

The Opposition Defence Spokesman, in here yesterday, suggested that we were deploying this force without dedicated air support.

As we have made clear time and again, the Commandos will operate alongside the United States. They will be able to call on an extraordinary array of air power. And the expert military advice that I have received is that there is no need to augment coalition air power with our own strike aircraft in support of this particular deployment. The House should be aware that British Forces have recent experience of co-operating with the United States and drawing on their close air support during ground operations in Afghanistan.

As the Commanding Officer of 45 Commando made clear on the radio this morning, we routinely train with US forces and use common procedures. He is quite content with the arrangements for fire support. So am I.

That is not to say that the Royal Air Force has no role here. It does, most obviously through the Chinook helicopters that we are also deploying, but also through the whole range of reconnaissance, air transport, and air to refuelling that has supported the coalition so successfully since last October. These assets will, I am sure, continue to play an important role in future operations - including those that 45 Commando may undertake.

Some have suggested that this deployment will contribute to the supposed 'overstretch' of the Armed Forces. Certainly our three Services are extremely busy. That is also true of the Royal Marines. This time last year, no-one could have predicted that more than 6,000 British Service Personnel would be engaged in operations in Afghanistan. But there is no doubt that it is right that they are there. And we keep these commitments under review and always assess them against routine programmed activities, where necessary making adjustments to ensure the necessary balance between operations and other tasks.

And it is worth remembering that Royal Marines were first put at high readiness for operations in Afghanistan in late October last year. 45 Commando have been at high readiness - some on board HMS Ocean and others at home in Arbroath - since mid-November. So we have been ready for an operation of this sort for some months now. There is no overstretch.

There have also been questions and concerns about the command and control arrangements in place for 45 Commando Group.

45 Commando Group is entirely separate to the International Security Assistance Force. It will have separate command and control arrangements.

ISAF comes under national command, although the US CENTCOM has responsibility for ensuring that there is no conflict between ISAF activities and those that continue as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

45 Commando Group comes directly under CENTCOM's command. Brigadier Roger Lane and the Headquarters of 3 Commando Brigade will, therefore, be embedded in the American-led coalition headquarters at Bagram.

This means that the ISAF commander, Major General McColl will not have authority over the 45 Commando Group. Brigadier Lane will not have command over the ISAF. They command distinct forces with distinct jobs to do.

Other nations who have contributed troops to the ISAF are in exactly the same situation. It will not have escaped the notice of the House that Denmark, France, Germany, and Norway have all sent ground forces to participate in Operation Anaconda, while other elements of their Armed Forces remain in Kabul under General McColl.

Mr Speaker.

Our decision to deploy 45 Commando Group to Afghanistan is not one that was taken lightly. But it is the right decision. The remaining Al Qaida and Taliban elements must be dealt with. We shall continue to pursue them until the job is done. We must complete this task in full. The events of 11 September have shown us what could happen if we do not.

That is why I am not prepared to put a precise date on when we will bring these troops back home. Obviously this decision will be taken in the light of the circumstances on the ground and in the light of the tasks that these troops may undertake. Our exit strategy is that we will leave when the task is completed.

I welcome the fact that there is so much support within the House for this deployment and widespread appreciation of why it is so necessary.

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