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Mr Speaker.

I am grateful for the opportunity to set out the Government’s position on international terrorism.  It is wholly proper that we do so again.  The threat posed by Usama Bin Laden and his Al Qaida terrorist network and our response to this threat are matters that this House should debate on a regular basis.  That we can - that we do – these are key differences between ourselves and the repressive regime that we are fighting in Afghanistan.

Yesterday, I returned from visiting Washington, where I had discussions with, among others, the United States Secretary for Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.   We discussed the future direction of the campaign, how we can sustain its momentum, and how we can strengthen the coalition.

I repeated again that the United Kingdom remains steadfast in its commitment to the campaign against international terrorism.  Since 11 September, the United Kingdom has stood beside our closest ally, the United States.   We will conduct this campaign together for as long as it takes.

And many other nations stand with us too – as the House is aware, many others making significant offers of military support.

From the outset, we have responded positively to the United States’ requests for military assistance, by allowing them to use the air base at Diego Garcia, by firing our own Tomahawk Cruise Missiles, and by providing air to air refuelling and reconnaissance aircraft.

And, as my Rt Hon Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces announced last Friday, we have significantly increased our contribution to the continuing military campaign.  An Amphibious Task Force, maritime patrol aircraft, and transport aircraft have all joined the forces that we had already made available.

The United States has made no secret of how much they value our support.  Mr Rumsfeld made this clear in our joint press conference on Tuesday.  He repeated that the United States values our involvement in the planning and prosecution of the military campaign.  They welcome the particular expertise that we have in a number of key capabilities and the considerable experience, talent, and skill that our Armed Forces provide.

We have long enjoyed a uniquely close relationship with the United States.  The tragedy of 11 September has made relationship closer still. 

Mr Speaker.  At the start of this campaign, we set ourselves a number of campaign aims.  Let me take this opportunity to restate them to the House today.

First, our wider campaign aims – those that we hope to achieve in the longer-term.  We aim:

·        to do everything possible to eliminate the threat posed by international terrorism; 

·        to deter states from supporting, harbouring, or acting complicitly with international terrorist groups. 

·        to reintegrate Afghanistan as a responsible member of the international community and end its self-imposed isolation.

Second, let me set out again the immediate aims of the action that we are undertaking in Afghanistan.  We aim:

·        To bring Usama bin Laden and Al Qaida to account.

·        To prevent Usama bin Laden and Al Qaida posing a continuing terrorist threat.

·        To ensure that Afghanistan verifiably ceases to harbour and sustain international terrorism and the associated terrorist training camps.

·        And, since Mullah Omar has not complied with the United States’ ultimatum, we require sufficient change in the leadership there to ensure that Afghanistan’s links to international terrorism are broken.

It is important to remind ourselves that achieving these aims – and particularly the longer-term aims - will not be possible by military means alone. This campaign will be fought on many fronts and by many different means. 

·        With diplomacy – we have already formed a strong coalition with nations of all religions, from right across the world. 

·        With financial measures – we have frozen the bank accounts of terrorist paymasters all over the world. 

·        And with humanitarian aid – $700 million has already been pledged to house and feed the refugees in Pakistan. My Right Honourable Friend, the Secretary of State for International Development, will say more about this later today.

My immediate responsibility is for the military aspect of this campaign.

The Ministry of Defence’s contribution to achieving the campaign aims is focused on achieving three military objectives:

·        To destroy the terrorist camps;

·        To pressurise the Taliban regime to end its support for Usama bin Laden;

·        To enable us to mount future operations in Afghanistan.

We know that many of those who carried out the terrorist attacks of 11 September were trained in camps in Afghanistan.  Such training cannot be allowed to continue.  That is why we have put these camps out of action. 

And we must use military means to pressurise the Taliban regime to end its support for Usama bin Laden.  They did not listen to our warnings.  That is why we are applying direct military pressure.

And it is because we need to maintain this pressure on the Taliban, using all appropriate military means at our disposal, that we must create the right conditions for future military operations in Afghanistan.

Our military objectives are being achieved.  Since military action began on 7 October, nine terrorist camps have been destroyed – including all those that were known to be in use when the campaign started.  We have disrupted Al Qaida’s ability to train in the open.  This will have restricted their ability to carry out further attacks.  We have, therefore, achieved our first military objective – to destroy the terrorist camps. 

Of course, terrorist camps can be rebuilt.  Terrorists can hide and return later.  So we continue to press home attacks on terrorist targets, including the caves where they hide. 

On our second military objective – pressurising the Taliban regime to end its support for Usama bin Laden and Al Qaida - we have attacked significant elements of their military installations.  Nearly forty Taliban military facilities have been attacked - all are damaged and many are destroyed. Taliban forces deployed in the field are being attacked.  Significant amounts of armour, vehicles, equipment, and stores have been destroyed – including some 150 military vehicles and over 50 artillery pieces. 

The focus of recent military action has shifted significantly towards attacking Taliban forces in the field, thereby aiding the Northern Alliance and others who are also fighting them.  This is increasing the pressure on the Taliban regime still further.

We have not yet achieved this second military objective.  The Taliban regime is still supporting Usama bin Laden and Al Qaida.  But we have good evidence that we are getting there.  The Northern Alliance is growing in strength.  We have reports from some areas of local disaffection with the Taliban regime, its brutality, its barbarity, and its hypocrisy.  There are encouraging signs that the Taliban regime is feeling the pressure. 

On our third military objective - we have certainly created the conditions for future military operations in Afghanistan.  Nine of their airfields have been attacked and put out of action.  Their air force is effectively no more.  Their Air Defence and Early Warning systems have been wrecked.  The coalition has air supremacy at medium and high altitude.  Coalition aircraft can fly lower and engage targets in the Taliban’s front line.  And ground troops can be deployed, as the United States proved in the raids on Kandahar nearly two weeks ago. 

We never expected military action to be easy and to produce instant results.  It will take time and it will take patience. 

There are those who have, perhaps, become too ready, in recent years, to assume that military force will bring rapid and effortless success.  They assume that the campaign in Afghanistan will be like those to expel Iraq from Kuwait or to drive Milosevic’s forces out of Kosovo. 

There are, of course, some similarities.  An obvious example is the early use of air power.  Its use to gain air superiority enables other operations to proceed with much lower risk than would otherwise be the case.  Another comparison is the need to deploy and sustain forces far away from their usual bases.  Yet another example is the importance of wide international support.  The Gulf conflict saw, as now, a great global coalition, standing against Saddam Hussein.  The Kosovo campaign too, although led by NATO, involved many countries from outside the Alliance.

There are, however, also significant differences.  In Kosovo, the enemy was a major and sophisticated standing army.  For our forces to operate in safety required an intensive effort – much more so than we have seen over Afghanistan – to reduce the military capability and the power, of the Yugoslav Army.  In Kosovo, the enemy was a modern state – albeit a badly governed one - but still a country with a relatively advanced infrastructure that was being used to support its military forces. There were, therefore, more targets, and they were more obvious.

Compare that to Afghanistan and the Taliban regime.  Afghanistan has seen 22 years of almost continuous war.  Much of its infrastructure was destroyed or damaged long before the first coalition bomb fell on 7 October.  Neither Al Qaida nor the Taliban have standing armies as we understand the term. 

So our approach must, therefore, be different.  Intelligence is always important in any conflict but it is crucial to this one.  We have to engage relatively small and often elusive targets.  This is no easy task.  Good intelligence is essential.

A conventional military campaign aims to take control of territory. That was how we pursued our aims in the Gulf and in Kosovo.  But that is not how we will conduct the campaign in Afghanistan.  We are not fighting a unified state, but fanatical terrorists and their obsessive supporters.  

At times we may need to deploy forces within Afghanistan.  At times we will help Afghans opposed to the Taleban.  Indeed, much of the current air campaign – eighty per cent or so – is directed against the Taleban front line with the Northern Alliance.  Certainly when the Taleban regime falls, we may need to help stabilise the situation within Afghanistan.  But we do not need to focus on gaining ground to the same extent as in a conventional campaign.

It is not possible to predict precisely how long this campaign will take.  What I can say - what we have always said - is that we are in this for the long haul.  Our assignment last week of additional forces – forces that we can sustain and support for long periods – is a clear demonstration of our resolve to see this through to the end.  This campaign will continue for as long as it takes to achieve our aims.

There were difficult times during the Kosovo campaign.  We did not falter then.  Look at the result.  Kosovar Albanians have been able to return home.  The region is already showing signs of stability.  And, two years after the end of military activity, Slobodan Milosevic is now in court. 

We will pursue those responsible for the terrorist atrocities of 11 September with the same vigour, and for as long as it takes, until they are brought to account. To get there, we must be patient and determined.

As my Right Honourable Friend the Prime Minister said to the National Assembly for Wales on Tuesday, the only hope that the terrorists in Afghanistan have of victory is that we lack the will or the courage to take them on. They think that we will lose our nerve. They could not be more wrong. 

We will not lose our nerve, because those responsible for the attacks of 11 September must be brought to account.  They cannot be allowed to get away with the murder of thousands of innocent people. 

And we must ensure that those responsible are never again able to carry out such acts.  That is why we are acting in self-defence.  The events of 11 September demonstrated that Usama bin Laden and his Al Qaida network are entirely prepared to slaughter as many people as they can to pursue their perverted objectives.  They have killed on a number of occasions.  Left alone, they will do so again.  We are right to take military action – we have no choice.

And we know that Usama bin Laden and Al Qaida can only carry out these attacks with the support of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.  That is why they moved there some years ago.  That is where they find a safe haven and the support they need to carry out their terrorist atrocities.

We gave the Taliban regime the opportunity to end their support for Al Qaida and to hand them over.  We waited weeks before we began the military campaign.  But the Taliban would not move.  We were, therefore, forced to act.  We always said that, if they would not comply with our ultimatum, we would act to bring about sufficient change in the leadership of Afghanistan to ensure that their links to international terrorism are broken.  That is what we are now doing.  The Taliban could still comply.  But, unless they do, we will be forced to continue the military action that is now well underway.

And it is important for those who are critical of our action in Afghanistan to consider carefully what other course of action would achieve our aims?

How else should we bring those responsible for the hi-jacking of the planes and the deliberate murder of thousands of ordinary people to account?

How else should we act to prevent Usama bin Laden and the Al Qaida network from killing possibly thousands more American or British or European civilians?

How else could we exercise our responsibility to the British people to defend them from the threat of random fanatical terrorist attacks?

Let me make it quite clear.  I would much prefer Usama bin Laden and his associates to give themselves up.

I would prefer the Taliban to surrender the terrorists and to close down the terrorist camps.

I would certainly prefer not to have to send British forces into action.

But these are not choices we have.

We must not allow ourselves to forget that the threat posed to us by bin Laden, his associates, and his Taliban supporters is very, very real.

We are determined to bring them to account.  Our means to do so grows stronger by the day.

Increasing the United Kingdom’s contribution to this campaign is a clear indication of our resolve. The retention of a substantial naval presence in the region, including Royal Marines, ensures we have in place a highly capable and flexible military force.  Other forces based here in the United Kingdom are also at a high state of readiness.  We are capable of deploying these forces quickly and of projecting fighting capability when this is required.  We demonstrated this in both Sierra Leone and Macedonia.

Let me explain what immediate readiness means.  It means that troops are at very short notice to move – that their equipment is in battle-ready condition.  It does not imply that they will be committed to action immediately.  Depending on the nature of the campaign, they may be.  But I have already explained that this is a different type of campaign.  As it proceeds, intelligence will bring to light opportunities to take action.  Once a specific action has been identified, we will need to give our troops the necessary additional preparation and training required to carry out the specific operation. 

Let me also emphasise that, acting, always, in accordance with International Law, the coalition is ready to do everything required to achieve our objectives.  That includes, where necessary, the use of cluster bombs.

Against certain targets, they are the best and most effective weapons we have.  Where that is the case, the coalition is entitled to use them – otherwise we will be putting our own ground forces at unnecessary risk.  What we will not do is act in ways that are contrary to International Law.  

Others will be concerned about so-called ‘carpet bombing’.  This inaccurate and outmoded term gives the impression that the coalition is engaged in indiscriminate attacks.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  The coalition makes carefully directed strikes against legitimate terrorist and military targets.  That includes heavy bombers dropping ‘long sticks’ of bombs against large area targets such as terrorist training camps or Taliban forces deployed in the field.  As with any target, we take enormous care to avoid risk to civilians.  When long sticks are dropped, the safety margins are appropriately larger than those for single bombs.

I am also aware that many are uneasy about the risk of causing civilian casualties.  Military action is, of course, never without risk.  But we do everything we possibly can to avoid risks to innocent civilians.  The claims of the Taliban regime meet be treated with considerable scepticism.   They have been completely unreliable in the past and there is no reason to believe what they are saying today.

Mr Speaker.  We do not take the decision to deploy forces lightly. Putting United Kingdom military personnel in harm’s way is something that no government wants to do. But we must not forget why we are engaged in this campaign. We must not forget what happened on 11 September.  And we must not forget that, if we do not act, Usama bin Laden and his supporters will continue to pose a threat to global stability and the lives of innocent people all over the world. We have no choice but to act – and to act decisively. 

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