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Annex B
British Chemical Warfare Defence During the Gulf Conflict

GLOSSARY

AC – Hydrogen Cyanide (Blood Agent)
ACU – Air Conditioning Unit
AFU – Air Filtration Unit
AHQ – Air Headquarters
APDS – Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot
ASMA – Air Staff Management Aid
ATP – Allied Tactical Pamphlet
BAOR – British Army Of the Rhine
BFBS – British Forces Broadcasting Service
BZ – Psychochemical Agent
CAM – Chemical Agent Monitor
CARC – Chemical Agent Resistant Coating
CARM – Chemical Agent Resistant Material
CBATEB – Chemical and Biological Agent Technical Evaluation Board
CBD – Chemical and Biological Defence
CBDE – Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment
CBFME – Commander British Forces Middle East
CBW – Chemical and Biological Warfare
CCA – Contamination Control Area
CDE – Chemical Defence Establishment
CDS – Chief of the Defence Staff
CG – Phosgene (Choking Agent)
CHEBDA – Chemical and Biological Defence Adviser
COLPRO – Collective Protection
COS – Chief Of Staff
CRADU – CAM Remote Alarm and Display Unit
CRADU 2 – CAM Remote Alarm and Display Unit Mk II
CS – Riot Control Agent
CSS – Combat Service Support
CW – Chemical Warfare
DIS – Defence Intelligence Staff
DKP – Decontamination Kit Personal
DM – Adamsite (Vomiting Agent)
DNBCC – Defence Nuclear Biological and Chemical Centre
DoD – Department of Defense
ECt50 – Effect Ct50
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FAM – Field Alarm Module
FFMA – Forward Force Maintenance Area
FMA – Force Maintenance Area
GA – Tabun (Nerve Agent)
GB – Sarin (Nerve Agent)
GD – Soman (Nerve Agent)
GF – Cyclosarin (Nerve Agent)
GVIU – Gulf Veterans’ Illnesses Unit
H/HD – Sulphur Mustard (Vesicant Agent)
HN – Nitrogen Mustard (Vesicant Agent)
HQ BFME – Headquarters British Forces Middle East
ICt50 – Incapacitation Ct50
IPE – Individual Protective Equipment
IRFNA – Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid
JHQ – Joint Headquarters
JNCO – Junior Non-Commissioned Officer
JOC – Joint Operations Centre
KWTP – Kit Water Testing Poisons
LCD – Liquid Crystal Display
LCt50 – Lethal Ct50
LED – Light Emitting Diode
MEF – Marine Expeditionary Force
MOB – Main Operating Base
MOD – Ministry of Defence
MPDS – Multipurpose Decontamination System
NAIAD – Nerve Agent Immobilised enzyme Alarm and Detector
NAPS – Nerve Agent Pretreatment Set
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC – Nuclear Biological and Chemical
NBC DPC – Nuclear Biological and Chemical Defence Policy Committee
OSAGWI – Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illness
P2S – Pralidoxime Mesylate
PB – Pyridostigmine Bromide
REME – Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
RGID – Reconfigured Graseby Ionics Detector
RVD – Residual Vapour Detector
SACEUR – Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SIBCA – Sampling and Identification of Biological and Chemical Agents
SICS – Ship Installed Chemical System
SNOME – Senior Naval Officer Middle East
STANAG – Standardisation Agreement
STO – Survive To Operate
TACCON – Tactical Control
TFA – Toxic Free Area
UCP – Unhardened Collective Protection
UKLF – United Kingdom Land Forces
UNSCOM – United Nations Special Commission
USMC – United States Marine Corps
VX – Nerve Agent

NOTES

1. A glossary of the acronyms used in this report is included at Annex B.

2. ‘Gulf Veterans’ Illnesses: A New Beginning’, dated 14 July 1997.

3. OSAGWI and MOD Case Narrative: ‘Kuwaiti Girls’ School’, dated 11 March 1998.

4. ‘Dead Animals During the Gulf Conflict’, dated 6 April 1998.

5. ‘Background to the Use of Medical Countermeasures to Protect British Forces During the Gulf War (Operation GRANBY)’, dated 28 October 1998.

6. Background information about CW agents, and particularly those mentioned in this report, is included in Annex A.

7. Although Iraq has claimed that they fired 93 SCUD missiles during the Gulf conflict, there is no evidence that any of them were fired with chemical warheads.

8. The Joint Headquarters (JHQ) was the military headquarters in the UK from where Operation GRANBY was run. The Joint Force Commander, who was based at JHQ, had direct command over the Commander British Forces Middle East (C BFME), who was based at HQ BFME in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

9. MOD Statement: ‘Iraqi CW Capability During the Gulf War: Agent 15’, dated 9 February 1998.

10. The Operational Requirements branch of the MOD play an important role in the procurement of new equipment. They are responsible for setting out the detailed requirement that each new piece of equipment is supposed to meet.

11. CBDE had previously been known as the Chemical Defence Establishment (CDE), but had changed its name immediately after the Gulf conflict. It is now the Chemical and Biological Defence Sector, DERA (CBD Porton Down).

12. Royal Navy ships were already deployed to the Gulf on the Armilla Patrol.

13. The NBC warning and reporting chain for RN ships was not fully integrated into the chain that was established for Operation GRANBY, with messages for the UK being passed back to Fleet HQ rather than to JHQ. This was partly because ships operate with a very different NBC philosophy to their shore-based counterparts, which meant that orders for forces on land were frequently irrelevant to them.

14. ‘Survive To Operate’ is the generic term for the ability of military forces to defend themselves and protect themselves in both conventional and NBC environment, it comprises active and passive defence and recuperation, NBC is a facet of passive defence.

15. The Force Maintenance Area provided all of the logistical support that was required to maintain 7 Armd Bde and then 1 (UK) Armd Div.

16. See 'A Review of the Alleged Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl on 19 January 1991' - to be published in the New Year.

17. Tactical Control is a NATO State of Command, which the British Army interpreted as being a situation where the subordinate force had already received its missions and tasks, and the commanding force could only co-ordinate its movement, real estate and local defence.

18. There was no comparable detector for blister agent, partly due to the slow pace of technological development in this field, and partly because blister agent was considered unsuitable for downwind attacks.

19. For detailed information about how nerve agents work, see Annex A.

20. A section consisted of eight to ten individuals, and there were three sections to a platoon.

21. The EOD Kit was used by British EOD personnel in the initial testing of the tank of liquid that was found at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School in August 1991 (see OSAGWI and MOD Case Narrative published on 11 March 1998). It is not clear whether the chemicals in the kit used on this occasion had been replaced shortly before use, or whether they were out of date.

22. Two American FOX vehicles were used in the incident at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School (see the OSAGWI and MOD Case Narrative dated 11 March 1998).

23. A ‘STANAG’ is a NATO Standardisation Agreement. These are issued to ensure the standardisation and interoperability of equipment used by NATO member countries.

24. The logistics base for 7 Armd Bde, and then 1 (UK) Armd Div, was known as the Force Maintenance Area (FMA), and was located in Al Jubayl, with many units from the United States Marine Corps (USMC), with whom 1 (UK) Armd Div were originally intended to fight. However, when it was decided that the British Division would fight with the US VII Corps, who were based closer to the Iraqi border, a Forward Force Maintenance Area (FFMA) was set up, some 300 km to the north east of Al Jubayl, near Al Qaysumah.

25. For an example of a CAM responding to IRFNA, see the OSAGWI and MOD Case Narrative: ‘Kuwaiti Girls’ School’, dated 11 March 1998.

26. There is also evidence that the hand-held alarm provided for local NBC warning was confused with NAIAD’s alarm, as was the temperature alarm on the blood banks at 32 Field Hospital. Also the sound of the warning tone emitted by the device fitted to vehicles to indicate the vehicle is reversing.

27. The personal decontamination kits are described below, under ‘Contamination Control’, while NAPS and ComboPen are described under ‘Medical Countermeasures’.

28. Not withstanding this instruction there is evidence that the standard procedure in theatre was dress state zero at medium threat level.

29. However, it was also noted that these high temperatures would have the effect of reducing the persistency of chemical agents, and contamination times, and so some felt that there was little need to provide COLPRO for Rest and relaxation facilities.

30. Fullers Earth was a substance that removed chemical warfare agents from a surface by absorbing them.

31. Further information about the use of medical countermeasures can be found in the MOD paper ‘Background to the Use of Medical Countermeasures to Protect British Troops during the Gulf War (Operation GRANBY)’, published in October 1997. In addition, a Fact-Finding Team has conducted a study into how the anti-biological warfare agent immunisation programme and the administration of NAPS were implemented in-theatre. A report is being prepared on the basis of their work, and will be published when complete.

32. Al Jubayl, where the FMA was based, was the port of entry for many of the UK troops who were deployed to theatre.

33. For greater accuracy, the Ct exposure should be defined as the integral of concentration against time (Ct = òC(t).dt) which allows for instances where an individual is exposed to a concentration of agent that varies over time.

34. The dosage of an agent that will prevent an individual from performing the tasks assigned to them will vary from circumstance to circumstance. For example, slight miosis caused by a low dosage of agent will incapacitate a fighter pilot, while having little effect on an infantryman.

35. It must be stressed that the values of ECt50, ICt50, and LCt50 are estimates, extrapolated from the doses found to have these effects on animals.

36. The vapour density of air is 1.

Last Updated: 10 Oct 01