



Managing sex offenders in the community

*A Joint Inspection on
Sex Offenders*

2005

FOREWORD

It is important to both the police and probation services that sex offenders should be managed effectively in the community. The public would be highly critical if this did not happen. Accordingly we feel this inspection is timely for a number of reasons. First, because in recent months there has been a specific focus by the National Probation Directorate on improving the assessment and management of high risk of harm offenders prompted by HM Inspectorate of Probation's concerns about this subject, expressed in the Annual Report for 2004/2005.

Encouragingly, recent developments within the National Probation Service have included an Assessment and Management of Risk of Harm Action Plan managed by a National Improvement Programme Board, which addresses a number of issues. Secondly, a quality assurance system for the Offender Assessment System (OASys) has been issued to probation areas for immediate implementation. Finally, we are also aware that the Association of Chief Police Officers is developing a Public Protection Manual for the police which should be available in the early part of 2006.

However, despite this context of positive and encouraging action to improve the assessment and management of high risk of harm offenders, many of the findings from this inspection were disappointing. We found a lack of integrated and accountable case management of sex offenders in the community, the delivery of which was poorly coordinated and inconsistent. MAPPA meeting minutes were not always integrated with probation and police records. Staff were failing to adequately record all their contact with sex offenders, colleagues in other agencies and actions and decisions they had taken. In other words, some staff were retaining too much information in their heads that should have been recorded on agency files.

The inspection also discovered a lack of clarity about the purpose, frequency and legal basis of home visits by the police and if, and how effectively the Sex Offender Register contributes to the management of sex offenders in the community. The frequency of planned home visits by the police should be based on the use of Risk Matrix 2000 and OASys where available; however, there were variations in the number of times in a year the police would visit sex offenders. It should also be noted that although there was a low rate of reconviction in the sample of 100 cases we inspected, this result should be viewed with some caution.

Our greatest concern was the poor use of OASys, a system that can help practitioners benchmark their own assessments with those of colleagues. Probation case managers were not completing and reviewing OASys properly, if at all, which makes it more difficult to demonstrate that contact is purposeful.

In 2002 we identified a number of areas of work that required attention in our report *Protecting Children from Potentially Dangerous People – An Inter-agency Inspection on Children's Safeguards*. The present joint sex offender inspection found that most of the areas of work were either only partially addressed or still outstanding three years later. However, the sex offender inspection also confirmed some of the positive findings of the Children's Safeguards report, for example the high level of collaboration between police and probation services and the potential of the Violent and Sex Offender Register.

Overall we conclude that a more joined up strategic approach at a national and local level between police and probation for work with sex offenders and public protection would be helpful. The status and position of the Strategic Management Board should be reviewed. There are as well a number of human resource issues that need to be addressed such as

workload, cover for absence and the even application of welfare facilities for staff. However, the most pressing issues are filling the gap in training for police and probation staff in the assessment and management of risk of harm and ensuring police officers have regular 'intrusive supervision'.

The future work on the assessment and management of risk of harm by relevant agencies working together is a step in the right direction. It is our hope that the results of this inspection and our next joint inspection on Public Protection, involving HM Inspectorate of Prisons as well as HM Inspectorates of Probation and Constabulary, will help take this work forward. We also aim to help the National Offender Management Service develop its relationship with the police in England and Wales in the effective management of high profile offenders.

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Definitions

OASys is a comprehensive risk/needs offender assessment tool developed by the prison and probation services. It has five main components:

- 1) **Risk of reconviction and offender related details.** This includes case identification, offending information, offence analysis, assessment of factors linked to offending, health and other considerations, such as accommodation, education, employment and employability.
- 2) **Risk of serious harm, risk to individuals and other risks.** This includes a screening section, full analysis, risk management plan and harm summary section. There are four levels of risk of harm:
 - **Low** – no significant, current indicators of risk of harm
 - **Medium** – there are identifiable indicators of risk of harm. The offender has the potential to cause harm but is unlikely to do so unless there is a change in circumstances, for example failure to take medication, loss of accommodation, relationship breakdown, drug or alcohol misuse
 - **High** – there are identifiable indicators of serious risk of harm. The potential event could happen anytime and the impact of the event would be serious
 - **Very high** – there is an imminent risk of serious harm. The potential event is more likely than not to happen imminently and the impact would be serious. A risk of serious harm was defined as ‘a risk which is life threatening and/or traumatic, and from which recovery, whether physical or psychological, can be expected to be difficult or impossible’.
- 3) **The OASys summary sheet** which draws together the above information and includes a scoring schedule.
- 4) **Supervision and sentence planning.** This includes an outline plan for PSRs only, an initial plan and a review plan including transfer and termination.
- 5) **Offender self-assessment.** A questionnaire which gives the offender an opportunity to record their views.

There is also a confidential section for information that must not be disclosed to the offender and a form to use to obtain information from other parties.

RM 2000 is a specialist actuarial assessment based on static factors to predict the likelihood of sex offender reconviction. It is mainly used by the police. Risk Matrix score categories have been given labels – low, medium, high and very high – for the practical purpose of dividing convicted sexual offenders into groups that represent the likelihood of reconviction. OASys should trigger the use of RM 2000. Where there is a disparity between OASys (OGRS2 and the total score for sections 1-12) and RM 2000 regarding the likelihood of reconviction, RM 2000 takes

precedence. OASys can be used to provide additional guidance to other behaviours related to offending and specific factors which could affect the imminence associated with risk of harm. (Sources: OASys – Additional Operational Guidance – Version 1 May 2003 NPD, Scoring Guide for Matrix 2000.4, April 2003 Version, David Thornton, PhD.)

Acronyms

ACC	Assistant Chief Constable
ACO	Assistant Chief Officer
ACPC	Area Child Protection Committee
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
BCU	Basic Command Unit
CDRP	Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership
CID	Criminal Investigations Department
CO	Chief Officer
ESI	Effective Supervision Inspection
FIB	Force Intelligence Bureau
FTC	Fixed Term Contract
HMI Probation	HM Inspectorate of Probation
HMIC	HM Inspectorate of Constabulary
ISP	Initial Supervision Plan
IT	Information technology
LCJB	Local Criminal Justice Board
MAPPA	Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements
MAPPP	Multi-Agency Public Protection Panel
MP	Member of Parliament
NOMS	National Offender Management Service
NPD	National Probation Directorate
NPS	National Probation Service
OASys	Offender Assessment System
OGRS	Offender Group Reconviction Scale
PSR	Pre-sentence report
RM 2000	Risk Matrix 2000
RSO	Registered Sex Offender
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, Target set
SMB	Strategic Management Board
SOPO	Sexual Offences Prevention Order
SPO	Senior Probation Officer
VCO	Victim Contact Officer
VCU	Victim Contact Unit
ViSOR	Violent and Sex Offender Register

1. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Strategy and approach

- 1.1** At a national level we found there was a strategic imbalance between the NPS and the police regarding the management of sex offenders in the community. There was a clear steer given to the NPS, with comparatively little guidance given to the police with the exception of that provided locally.
- 1.2** A joint national strategic approach would help to address the lack of development and inconsistencies at a local level in planning and resource allocation for this area of work.
- 1.3** We found there were a number of issues that needed a local joint strategic approach:
- accommodation for sex offenders
 - achieving a common understanding of the concepts of intelligence and information
 - clarity about the responsibility of probation areas for sex offenders who were no longer subject to an order or licence but continued to be supervised as RSOs by the police
 - ensuring that structural changes in each agency were complementary
 - appointment of MAPPA coordinators or managers
 - maximising the potential of ViSOR.

Implementation and planning

- 1.4** Whilst MAPPA coordinators had contributed to the development of SMBs and the operation of MAPPA as a whole, in the last year SMBs had been struggling to achieve the right membership and level of attendance at meetings. Although SMBs had aspirations to achieve the tasks that were set out in the MAPPA Guidance, they were not at present adequately fulfilling their role.
- 1.5** There was no overarching joint strategy or policy for victims. Considering that there was always a direct victim, more evidence of work by case managers on victim issues and victim awareness with sex offenders was needed.
- 1.6** Although the MAPPA Guidance encouraged the participation of offenders in MAPPA to manage their own risk, the majority of sex offenders in our sample were not directly involved in these meetings or the decisions that were being made about them. In most cases probation staff were ensuring that sex offenders were aware of their responsibilities under an order or licence.

- 1.7** Copies of the minutes from MAPPA meetings were not always contained in police or probation case files. Consequently, in the majority of cases, actions from MAPPA meetings were not integrated into ISPs, supervision plan reviews or ViSOR.
- 1.8** We were pleased to find that probation and police staff were clear about their role of protecting the public from sex offenders and they were also aware of a range of interventions that were available. However, probation staff had not received any training about the Sexual Offences Act 2003 that contained a number of new civil preventative orders. There was also a need to evaluate current interventions to establish What Works.
- 1.9** Demand for one of the main interventions, accredited sex offender programmes, exceeded supply that led to unacceptable delays. Consequently, case managers had to ensure that sex offenders remained motivated for long periods of time before starting their programme, which was sometimes difficult. Some sex offenders could not obtain employment until they had completed a programme because it was only run during the day. This had an impact on the sex offender's quality of life. This was recognised by staff who tried to achieve a balance between the priority of protecting the public and quality of life issues for the sex offender.
- 1.10** Access to one other intervention – surveillance – was found to be limited, with requests having to be balanced against competing demands. This was a concern however with the increasing number of SOPOs being made which will need to be enforced.
- 1.11** In interview front line staff demonstrated an understanding of diversity issues, but this was not evidenced in the case files nor were diversity issues adequately addressed organisationally.
- 1.12** In our sample of 100 sex offenders, one had been reconvicted of a further sexual offence. However, any interpretation of this result should be made with caution due to the large number of variable factors involved. Sex offenders can be reconvicted many years after an initial sexual offence. No link can be made with any certainty between this result and the way the 100 cases were managed in the community.

People

- 1.13** There was a lack of clarity about the number of RSOs an individual police officer could manage, with substantial differences between areas. Most police officers who managed RSOs were detectives and specialists, but some police officers had additional unrelated tasks. Absences were generally managed within units, which was not always satisfactory for long-term absences, when managing high risk of harm cases.
- 1.14** Despite the specialist nature of the work, objectives in staff appraisals were not related to managing sex offenders or public protection. Specific training for both police and probation staff and members of the SMB was generally lacking. Support

for staff, such as counselling services, was available but inconsistently promoted or applied within organisations.

Processes and procedures

- 1.15** Overall police and probation staff were clear about the difference between the likelihood of sexual offending and risk of harm which was assessed using RM 2000 and OASys respectively. Several probation staff felt OASys was time-consuming and cumbersome. In the majority of the cases inspected, case managers were not completing OASys within 15 working days of the order or licence or reviewing OASys every 16 weeks. Therefore the assessment of risk of harm, risk management plans and ISPs were assessed as unsatisfactory mainly because they were not completed on time. Case managers were not reassessing risk after a significant incident had occurred.
- 1.16** The process for deciding at what MAPPA level a sex offender should be managed varied within and between areas. There was evidence of other types of meetings taking place that were not part of MAPPA. The majority of case managers attended MAPPA meetings, whereas police officers attended less frequently. However, both police and probation involvement in child protection arrangements could have been better. Case managers in particular found MAPPA helpful and supportive. Some actions from MAPPA meetings were not executed or reviewed at subsequent meetings.
- 1.17** Police generally visited sex offenders as planned. There was no legal basis or power under an Act of Parliament for the police practice of visiting sex offenders at home. Guidelines on the purpose of home visits were not available in every area.
- 1.18** The NPS had a system for reviewing cases where offenders had committed a serious further offence, but there was no equivalent system for the police. In MAPPA Level 2 and 3 cases an inter-agency approach for reviewing serious further offences would be beneficial.

Performance management

- 1.19** SMBs were beginning to assess performance. Some police forces had made progress by monitoring their work with sex offenders and calculating unit costs. Probation areas monitored accredited sex offender programmes. Most staff could give examples of when MAPPA had contributed to the early apprehension of sex offenders, but this was not measured. In the 100 cases we inspected resources could have been more effectively allocated and used to achieve planned results.
- 1.20** Probation and police staff knew what worked when managing sex offenders in the community, but this was based mainly on their own experience rather than research. Case managers needed to consider methods that were most likely to be

effective with sex offenders, based on research and formally sharing good practice with each other. In most cases case managers had addressed community integration issues and motivated sex offenders by reinforcing work undertaken by others. Although risk of harm had not been reduced in the majority of cases, risk had been contained which we believe was due in part to the use of MAPPA. Enforcement of orders and licences by probation staff was satisfactory but could be improved and more attention given to pre-release work.

Partnerships

- 1.21** Links between the SMB and LCJB, ACPC and CDRPs were weak. Apart from jointly funded posts there was little evidence of other joint initiatives under MAPPA, or joint performance management. MAPPA communication and media strategies needed to be developed. SMBs continued to deal with boundary and membership issues. The status and position of SMBs in relation to other bodies within the criminal justice system was unclear. They had all either just advertised or appointed lay advisers.
- 1.22** Regional work that was focused on public protection clearly added value to local arrangements in terms of consistency, performance and the transfer of MAPPA cases across borders. The transfers of these cases were generally working satisfactorily with some exceptions.
- 1.23** Police and probation management oversight of high and very high risk of harm cases needed to be improved. In the majority of cases appropriate action had been taken in response to a public protection issue; however, police and probation staff were not always responsive to changes in risk of harm. Case manager contact with sex offenders by office and home visits in some cases was generally good, although there should be more liaison with others who provided interventions particularly the police.
- 1.24** Police and probation staff identified several ways they could work more effectively together including co-location. Police officers managing sex offenders wanted more recognition for the work they did, in terms of increased resources and legal powers, more training and specialised and intrusive supervision.

Recommendations

The Home Office/ACPO/NPD/NOMS should ensure that:

1. *SMBs have a statutory basis, are appropriately located within the criminal justice system, are accountable and are fulfilling their role as described in the MAPPA Guidance*
2. *a joint training programme for police and probation staff involved in working with sex offenders is developed including the following elements:*
 - *assessment and management of risk of harm*
 - *current legislation and new powers that are available.*

Chief Constables should ensure that:

3. *properly trained specialist officers are managing sex offenders in the community who are supervised centrally and receiving dedicated 'intrusive supervision'.*

The Home Office/ACPO/NPD/NOMS should ensure that:

4. *a national agreed minimum standard is implemented setting out the joint use of RM 2000 and OASys and the purpose and frequency of home visits to sex offenders commensurate with their risk of harm, and coordinating such visits with other agencies, in particular probation areas.*

The Home Office/ACPO should ensure that:

5. *a review of legislation is commenced to support current police practice in the assessment and management of sex offenders in the community.*

The NPD/NOMS/Probation Boards should ensure that:

6. *a full and timely OASys is completed to an agreed standard for all sex offender cases.*

2. BACKGROUND

Purpose of the inspection

- 2.1 The purpose of the inspection was to assess the progress, quality and effectiveness of the implementation of MAPPA and the interventions used by the police and NPS in relation to the joint management of sex offenders in the community. The inspection also aimed to identify good practice. Recommendations would be made to contribute to improving the effectiveness of arrangements for the management of sex offenders in the community.

History

- 2.2 HMI Probation last inspected this area of work in 1998 (*Exercising constant vigilance: The Role of the Probation Service Protecting the Public from Sex Offenders*). The report recommended, amongst other things, an evaluation of the work done with sex offenders using the results to establish a consistent national set of sex offender programmes.
- 2.3 The Sex Offender Act 1997 was implemented from the 1 September 1997, placing a duty on police services to establish and maintain a Sex Offender Register. The Act imposed a requirement on certain sex offenders to notify the police of their name(s) and address(es) and any changes in details in order to ensure that information contained within the police national computer was kept fully up to date. Since the Sex Offender Act 1997 there have been a number of legislative provisions to manage sex offenders in the community such as the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which introduced sex offender orders and extended sentences. More recently the Police Reform Act 2002 made amendments to the sex offender order and the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 strengthened the requirements under the Sex Offender Act 1997. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 repealed all the relevant legislation and reintroduced most of the provisions with some improvements. These included sex offenders having to inform the police of a change in their notified details within three days rather than 14 days, and all sex offenders having to reconfirm their details annually. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 also introduced a number of new civil preventative orders.
- 2.4 The Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, with effect from the 1 April 2001, placed a duty on police and probation services, as responsible authorities, to make arrangements for the assessment and management of risks posed by sexual, violent and other offenders who may cause serious harm to the public. The Criminal Justice Act 2003, with effect from 5 April 2004, included provisions for HM Prison Service to be included as a responsible authority, the appointment of lay advisers and placed a duty on a number of agencies to cooperate. The arrangements were known as Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements or MAPPA. Substantial

guidance was issued in March 2003 and updated in October 2004 to take into account the changes in the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

Protecting Children from Potentially Dangerous People – An Inter-agency Inspection on Children’s Safeguards

2.5 *Protecting Children from Potentially Dangerous People – An Inter-agency Inspection on Children’s Safeguards* was a joint inspection by HMI Probation and HMIC undertaken in 2002. The focus of the report was the initial working arrangements for the protection of the public, and children in particular, from dangerous people, examining the work of the police and probation services to develop and maintain MAPPA as set out in the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. The report was one of three reports produced concerning safeguarding children (the other two reports were *Safeguarding Children – A Joint Chief Inspectors’ Report on Arrangements to Safeguard Children* involving eight Inspectorates published in October 2002 and *Safeguarding Children – The NPS Role in the Assessment and Management of Child Protection Issues* by HMI Probation published in January 2003). The main findings of the report, which overlap with themes from the present inspection, are reproduced with a short commentary of what we found and concluded three years later that:

- the level of cooperation and collaboration between the police and probation services at all levels and in every area visited was impressive. *Commentary: This continues to be the case*
- overall there was inconsistency in MAPPA for the assessment and management of very high risk of harm offenders and an absence of national guidance. *Commentary: Inconsistencies still exist despite full and detailed guidance having been issued*
- although the legislation required the police and probation services to establish MAPPA, it did not place a duty on other agencies to cooperate. This led to varying degrees of involvement. *Commentary: The Criminal Justice Act 2003 and subsequent guidance addressed the issue of placing a duty on other agencies to cooperate; however, even though some progress had been made there was still room for improvement*
- the resourcing of MAPPPs varied due to the absence of a nationally agreed funding formula. *Commentary: No change. We believe this finding would now refer to the resourcing of MAPPA rather than just MAPPPs*
- relevant national standards, performance measures, targets for, and arrangements to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of MAPPPs were being developed but were not yet in place. *Commentary: Little change and we would include MAPPA rather than just MAPPPs*
- formal links between ACPCs and MAPPPs had not been established in most areas. *Commentary: There was insufficient evidence of formal links between the SMBs of MAPPA and ACPCs*

- both police and probation staff in most areas did not have access to relevant joint training opportunities. *Commentary: No change*
- in some areas visited offenders required to register with the police under the Sex Offender Act 1997 and assessed as a lower risk of harm were not subject to sufficient monitoring. *Commentary: Little change; however, the issue about what the optimum frequency of visits should be in relation to the assessment of likelihood of reconviction and risk of harm needed to be debated and resolved. Any increase in the overall frequency of police visits will have resource implications*
- the development of ViSOR was a positive initiative which had the potential to make a significant contribution to sex offenders' management. *Commentary: We continue to agree that ViSOR has great potential, dependent on the prompt input of quality data in a consistent way across all police forces.*

2.6 There were four recommendations and one of those recommendations covered the remit of this report. It is reproduced below, with a brief commentary about the progress we found had taken place.

ACPO and the NPS should:

- *ensure that a national framework for MAPPA is implemented as a matter of priority in order to develop a more consistent approach to the assessment and management of very high risk of harm offenders, This should include: a) structure, including membership of MAPPPs; b) information sharing; c) referral thresholds and assessment procedures for MAPPPs; d) risk management procedures and plans; e) appropriate resourcing; f) monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of MAPPPs; g) minimum training expectations; h) MAPPP links with ACPCs. **Commentary:** The MAPPA Guidance was issued in March 2003 and updated in 2004. It was a comprehensive document that covered all of the points in the recommendation, although for police and probation areas we visited the allocation of resources to MAPPA varied. In addition, there was dissatisfaction that the funding of MAPPA had not attracted extra resources from the centre. The implementation of the Guidance in areas was not consistent.*

2.7 The number of RSOs is rising. Consequently the number of cases where there will be both probation and police involvement will also increase. The growing workload for both police and probation means that the quality of assessment and management of sex offenders becomes crucial. We were primarily interested from an operational context whether the present legislation, policy, procedures, IT and MAPPA had a positive or negative impact on the police and probation staff who on a daily basis carried out the difficult task of managing sex offenders in the community.

3. METHODOLOGY

- 3.1** At the time the inspection was being planned the early results of Professor Hazel Kemshall's work *'Evaluating the effectiveness of sections 67 and 68 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act (2000) in strengthening the Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements'* were shared with the lead inspector. Kemshall's study included results from a detailed questionnaire to all police and probation areas in England and Wales about a number of issues concerning MAPPA. The scope and methodology for this inspection took into account the work of Professor Kemshall and her team. We examined in particular how front line police and probation staff managed sex offenders in the community and whether their work was supported by senior and middle managers and MAPPA.
- 3.2** A joint inspection framework was developed and a schedule of questions was created for various individuals and groups (Appendix I). Advance evidence was also requested from the five police and probation areas. Both the advance evidence and questionnaires covered strategy and approach, implementation and planning, people, processes and procedures, performance management and partnerships. The model was partly based on the European Excellence Model, a model that all probation areas had been using annually as a self-assessment tool for their organisation.
- 3.3** Five areas were selected which were representative of rural and urban parts of the country. They were Norfolk, Gwent, Merseyside, Devon & Cornwall and West Yorkshire.
- 3.4** Each probation area submitted a list of all sex offenders which it was supervising on the 1 September 2004. A sex offender was defined as an offender who was being supervised having been convicted of a sexual offence. The term 'sexual offence' described a wide variety of criminal acts. Schedule 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 lists most sexual offences but not all. For the purposes of this inspection a sexual offence was defined as an offence or the threat to commit an offence of a sexual nature to which the victim does not or cannot give genuine consent. It included offences that involved no physical contact between the sex offender and victim, for example indecent photographs of children.
- 3.5** From each area a sample of 20 cases was identified ensuring that it was representative by race and ethnicity, gender and whether the case was included or not included in the MAPPA process. Police and probation areas were then asked to select up to six cases from the sample of 20 where, in their view, active and substantial joint work between police and probation staff was taking place in the management of the case.
- 3.6** The fieldwork took place over three days in each area. Senior and middle managers from both agencies, the MAPPA coordinator if the area had such a post, representatives of the SMB and probation case managers and police officers working with the six cases were all interviewed.

3.7 Twenty probation case files and a number of police files were inspected side by side in each area. In total 100 cases were inspected using a case assessment form which captured information about the quality of assessment, interventions and outcomes of each case. Inspectors scored answers to questions as either:

- **poor** (there was no evidence at all that a specific task had been done or clear evidence that the task was done badly)
- **not sufficient** (some evidence of the task being done, but either insufficient evidence to demonstrate a good standard or evidence the work was not good enough)
- **sufficient** (evidence the task was completed to a good enough standard), or
- **excellent** (evidence the task was done to an exemplary standard).

All questions were answered based on evidence that was found on the case files. Guidance notes were provided for specific questions.

3.8 Where possible we have compared the results from this inspection with the results for all sex offender cases in 29 probation areas that had been inspected under ESI.

3.9 There was a probation and police record in 86 cases. One of the reasons a police file was not always available in every case was because the sex offender had committed a sexual offence which did not require registration with the police as a sex offender.

3.10 The majority of sex offenders in the sample were white males. Over half were aged between 31 and 50 years old, and nearly three-quarters were unemployed or unavailable for work. The current offence for nearly half the sample was a sexual assault. There were 14 cases of rape and 13 cases involving indecent photographs of children. There were a small number of cases of indecent exposure and familial child offences. There was one case of sexual grooming. The majority of offenders were subject to a licence and in 18 cases an extended sentence. One offender was subject to a SOPO.

3.11 Each probation and police area visited received feedback after the fieldwork had taken place.

4. STRATEGY AND APPROACH

Probation

- 4.1 The NPS Business Plan for 2004/2005 entitled 'Bold Steps' identifies as one of the Key Priorities for it to work purposefully with other criminal justice agencies to protect the public. There was a link made between MAPPA and contributions to LCJBs delivering Public Confidence and Narrowing the Justice Gap targets. Within Stretch Objective 5 – Managing and reducing dangerousness – several developments, results of reviews and pilot projects in relation to sex offenders were described. Stretch Objective 6 addressed services to victims of serious sexual and other violent crime.
- 4.2 The NPD issued a NPS Sex Offender Strategy in September 2004. The strategy was not published under a Probation Circular, consequently there were no specific actions for probation areas to carry out. The areas we visited tended to circulate the strategy to relevant staff and, apart from West Yorkshire which had completed an audit in January 2005, not much more had been done. At the same time as the Sex Offender Strategy was issued the NPD published '*Public Protection and Community Safety – Approved Premises and Offender Housing Strategy for Higher Risk Offenders*'. Since then Probation Circular 20/2005 *Implementation of National Sex Offender Strategy* was issued on the 21 March 2005 after the fieldwork for this inspection had been completed. Probation areas were expected to carry out an audit of their work with sex offenders against the key objectives of the strategy and submit the results of their audit to regional managers by the 31 May 2005.
- 4.3 Probation areas' local Business Plans for 2004/2005 did not explicitly mention work with sex offenders, except generally in relation to managing and reducing dangerousness, reducing the number of serious further offences and the timely preparation of risk management plans. The number of sex offenders completing accredited programmes also contributed to an overall target. Norfolk Probation Area had a 'Strategy for working with sex offenders' which was part of its staff handbook that needed to be revised in relation to the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
- 4.4 The ACO in probation areas would have a subject responsibility for public protection, they would be a member of the SMB but their operational involvement varied. For example, some public protection ACOs would chair MAPPA Level 3 meetings, recall offenders on parole and deal with media issues, other ACOs would have no operational involvement at all.

Police

- 4.5 In contrast at a national level sex offenders or more generally public protection was not an area of work that was such a specific or visible priority for police forces. The National Policing Plan for 2005/2008 focused on volume crime such as burglary,

vehicle crime, robbery and drug related crime. As a result, police forces tended to connect their work with sex offenders with the National Policing Plan and local strategies under a number of different headings: protecting vulnerable people, public reassurance, persistent offenders, violent crime and dangerous offenders.

- 4.6** There were exceptions. For example, Norfolk Constabulary's Operational Support Area Plan for 2004/2005 included objectives to review the Family Protection Unit which contained the public protection unit, identifying best practice for developing a proactive approach to policing of RSOs and developing intelligence links with areas and the FIB. Devon & Cornwall Constabulary had in place a Dangerous Offender Strategy which outlined resources required and committed, training and lines of accountability. West Yorkshire Crime Divisional Policing Plan had two relevant objectives: to develop a MAPPa SMB Plan by March 2005 and review the functions and resources of Public Protection Teams. The police we interviewed who worked with sex offenders, however, often commented that they had to ensure that their work was not overlooked or marginalised. Resourcing was also raised as an issue in many areas.
- 4.7** The importance of a supportive and knowledgeable ACC for this area of work was emphasised to us, particularly as work with sex offenders was competing with many other priorities in a force. The ACC was the gateway to resources and influencing BCU commanders. They would sometimes have a role on the SMB and operationally they would be involved in decisions about disclosure and on rare occasions in individual cases.

Strategic Management Boards

- 4.8** The MAPPa Guidance identifies the core features of the role of the SMB as monitoring and evaluating the operation of MAPPa, establishing connections with other public protection arrangements such as ACPCs, CDRPs and LCJBs, to prepare and publish the Annual Report, plan the longer term development of MAPPa and identify and plan how to meet common training and developmental needs of those working in MAPPa.
- 4.9** SMBs were normally chaired by senior managers from police, probation and more recently prisons. They should be providing direction and prioritising the activities of MAPPa. However, most SMBs were embryonic in development and had only been functioning at a basic level for the last 12 months. Issues of membership, geographical boundaries, representation and changes in representation had taken some time to resolve. SMBs relied on the effectiveness of their board members as agency representatives to disseminate information to the right people in their own organisation or any other organisations that they represented.
- 4.10** There was an absence of timely business plans. The focus of SMBs had been the publication of the annual MAPPa reports and the appointment of lay advisers. There were examples of SMBs responding reactively to crises, such as a sex offender absconding from prison or an MP raising issues about the use of approved

premises for sex offenders from outside an area. In both examples it was clear that the SMB had functioned as a forum for agencies to jointly discuss the issues. In one case this had led to an improvement in the working relationships between senior staff involved. Only now were the SMBs we interviewed beginning to address training, joint training, performance information, and reviewing MAPPA. Overall, we found that the SMB had little direct impact on operational staff. There were, however, aspirations to run the SMB in a similar fashion to ACPCs, for example undertaking case reviews, examining performance and planning joint training.

- 4.11** *What have SMBs achieved since their formation?* The structure and operation of MAPPA was implemented largely without any active involvement of the SMBs as a body, but by individual senior managers from police and probation. In one area the view was that the SMB had formed but had yet to perform or achieve anything. In another, the SMB had achieved a greater awareness of MAPPA amongst a number of agencies including health and those involved with victims. In a third, a survey amongst practitioners in a number of agencies established that some had never heard of MAPPA. In others, the main area of achievement related to establishing cooperation strategically and operationally between agencies.

Local police and probation commitment to work with sex offenders and public protection

- 4.12** One example of police and probation commitment to work with sex offenders and public protection generally was demonstrated by the existence of joint funded posts. For example, Norfolk and Devon & Cornwall had MAPPA coordinators. Gwent had a MAPPA registrar to provide essential administrative support and maintain the database of offenders. From a police perspective, commitment to MAPPA was also demonstrated by the rank of the officer attending these meetings. A number of police forces we visited recognised that the appropriate rank of officer was not always attending and that there was room for improvement in this area. In two forces, it was policy that an officer of at least the rank of Detective Inspector would attend MAPPA meetings, and in West Yorkshire this included screening meetings with SPOs to decide at what level of MAPPA the offender should be managed.

Allocating police resources

- 4.13** There was a lack of clarity over the optimum number of sex offender cases, which should be managed by individual officers, resulting in an 'ad hoc' approach to resource allocation and planning for working with sex offenders. Table 1 shows the variation in the planned frequency of unannounced visits according to the sex offender's risk of reconviction across the five police areas visited. Importantly, it was not clear whether the frequency of visits was being influenced by evidence of effectiveness in managing sex offenders safely in the community. There were clear advantages in terms of value for money, more effective coordination of resources

and better management of the case if police and probation staff coordinated their contact with individual sex offenders.

Table 1: Frequency of planned unannounced police home visits in relation to the sex offender's risk of reconviction

Risk of reconviction	Very High	High	Medium	Low
Police Force				
Force A	Three months unless deemed more regular	Three months	Four months	Six months
Force B	Monthly	Three months	Six to 12 months	First visit only and then as and when intelligence dictates
Force C	Constantly monitored and subject to MAPPP and management strategy	At least every three months	At least every six months	At least every 12 months
Force D	Subject to management strategy, arrest or obtain a SOPO	Three months – more frequent visits maybe required	Four months	Six months
Force E	One month	One month	Three months	12 months

Structural arrangements for the management of sex offenders in police forces and probation areas

4.14 There were a number of different structural arrangements for managing RSOs in police forces and in probation areas. In some police forces related units were grouped together, although this did not always facilitate communication between each unit. In one probation area, there was no specialised public protection team therefore all probation officers could manage sex offenders. In another, there was a probation service public protection unit but arrangements for police officers varied. In a third, specialised police units were situated within divisional intelligence teams with a central public protection team providing policy, intelligence and investigative support. Similar arrangements existed in yet another area with dangerous offender officers located within the remit of BCU commanders and a central public protection unit which included the MAPPA coordinator, a social worker and two officers dedicated to assessing the risk of new cases.

4.15 The effectiveness of police and probation staff working together was affected by structural changes in both agencies. For example, in one probation area the public protection unit supervised all sex offenders whatever their risk of harm. In an effort to use resources efficiently they now only managed high or very high risk of harm sex offenders. For the police officers managing RSOs in this area, the change in the allocation of work in probation was a concern. Instead of having contact with only a small number of probation staff in the public protection unit they would now

have to engage with a larger number of probation officers. The lesson here was that police and probation areas needed to consider the impact of any proposed structural change on the effectiveness of both agencies to protect the public.

The management of intelligence and information in police forces and probation areas

- 4.16** The management of intelligence was familiar to police staff but less so for probation. For police forces the task was how to grade and record intelligence, sometimes on two or more systems, and how that intelligence was accessed, shared and acted on. There was often duplication, for example maintaining a force intelligence system, and ViSOR which was managed in different ways. In one police area police officers would submit an intelligence log to their FIB after a visit to a sex offender and note on ViSOR that the log had been submitted. In another, the BCU force intelligence would deal with local information and pass it to the public protection unit who would update ViSOR and, if necessary, task a sex offender visiting officer.
- 4.17** At the time of the fieldwork (January to March 2005) ViSOR was in the process of being implemented in all police forces. A number of implementation issues had been experienced in relation to access to the system, data cleansing and back record conversion; the latter in particular having considerable resource implications for forces. Probation staff were generally unaware of ViSOR or had limited knowledge of it. In one area there was agreement that eventually the MAPPA registrar, who had already undertaken basic training in ViSOR, would have access. In another, police officers co-located in probation premises had a computer terminal with access to ViSOR. Whatever the technical difficulties, however, it was clear that ViSOR has enormous potential for the joint management of sex offenders across England and Wales.
- 4.18** For probation staff, intelligence or information was recorded in the third party section of a case file and shared at MAPPA meetings. When receiving information probation staff would often consult their line manager to seek advice about its status and whether it should be shared or not. The sharing of intelligence or information between police and probation, other than through MAPPA, was less clear and often based on personalities and the quality of working relationships. There was some evidence that police intelligence was not always shared with probation and vice versa. Some probation staff were very clear about not compromising any surveillance operation that was taking place or ongoing investigation and protecting any sources. Most case managers also ensured that sex offenders were aware that probation would be working jointly with the police. There was no guidance for front line probation staff and information sharing protocols were not user-friendly documents. There were a number of untapped sources of intelligence such as behaviour and contacts of offenders in prison, the post-programme reports about sex offenders once they had completed an accredited programme and the wealth of information in both police and probation contact logs. Overall there was a need for a common understanding of the terms

'intelligence and information'. One of the recommendations of the Bichard Inquiry (Bichard, M. (2004) *The Bichard Inquiry*, London: The Stationer Office) was the production of a Code of Practice covering record creation, review, retention, deletion and information sharing. Although the recommendation related to the police, the Code of Practice may be usefully shared and applied to probation and other agencies under MAPPA. This point was also identified by Professor Hazel Kemshall in her research (Kemshall, H et al (2005).

- 4.19** The integration of police liaison officers in prisons with police intelligence systems and MAPPA varied considerably. The general view was that this area of work could be improved with a long-term operational interest in sex offenders in prison rather than just before they were released. A number of staff commented that there was a need for greater involvement by prisons in MAPPA.

Accommodation and sex offenders

- 4.20** High risk of harm offenders usually have the least stable housing status and this was particularly the case with sex offenders. One aspect of accommodation was access to housing, where the housing was situated and what type was available. The other aspect was whether sex offenders had housing related support needs which, subject to assessment and eligibility, would qualify them for Supporting People services. Although there was an NPS Approved Premises and Offender Housing Strategy for Higher Risk Offenders, strategically there was very little in place at an area level. In our case sample the most common specialist interventions that sex offenders were referred to, which were provided by other agencies, were for accommodation, employment and basic skills.

- 4.21** If there was an issue for SMBs to tackle accommodation would be high on the list. The Devon & Cornwall information exchange protocol was concerned with MAPPA and housing sex offenders. There was an explicit commitment within the document that housing authorities in the area would not apply a blanket ban (that would have been illegal) on sex offenders which had occurred implicitly in other areas. Those areas with approved premises were better placed, but there was still the problem of move on accommodation. Police would refer accommodation issues to probation. There was no evidence of probation areas using Supporting People arrangements for this group of offenders, with the exception of Gwent. There was some evidence of a regional approach, and in two areas there was supportive housing schemes for high risk of harm offenders. Much more could be done in terms of a better understanding of housing rights, stronger links with local authorities and the development of comprehensive protocols for accommodating sex offenders.

Police and community impact situations

- 4.22** The reaction of a local community to the presence of a sex offender can be dramatic. The expectation was that police forces should have contingency

arrangements for any likely community impact situation that may arise. It was often the case that the specialist units who managed sex offenders would have to proactively engage with their BCU colleagues to create community impact assessments otherwise they would not be done. There was a danger the task would become a specialist public protection task rather than a task for BCUs with support from a central unit.

Continuity of contact with police and probation

4.23 Probation involvement with RSOs comes to an end when either an order or licence expires. Contact with the police often continues. In one area, due to a lack of resources, the CO refused to allow probation staff to carry out assessments on sex offenders, who were not supervised by the probation area, to enable the police to apply for a SOPO. In another example, information from MAPPA meetings was used by police to apply for a SOPO when a sex offender's licence was coming to an end. MAPPA should be the vehicle for continued involvement of either police or probation even when their statutory duty for a sex offender had ceased.

Strengths

- At a national level the NPS had addressed the strategic issues concerning sex offenders through the NPS Business Plan, Sex Offender Strategy and related accommodation strategy.
- There was a link between a well run and resourced police unit for managing sex offenders and a senior manager (ACC) who was supportive and knowledgeable about this area of work.
- The appointment of a MAPPA coordinator in some areas.
- The potential benefits of ViSOR.

Areas for improvement

- The National Policing Plan does not specifically refer to the police role of managing sex offenders or to public protection generally.
- There was no joint strategic document by the police and NPS concerning the joint management of sex offenders in the community.
- SMBs needed to improve on a number of fronts to achieve the expectations described in the MAPPA Guidance.
- Consistency of police attendance at MAPPA meetings.
- Deciding what the optimum number of sex offenders an individual police officer should manage.
- A joint understanding between police and probation staff about the management of intelligence and information in the context of the recommendation in the Bichard Inquiry (Bichard 2004) for a Code of Practice.

- The inclusion of police liaison officers in prisons into local police intelligence systems and MAPPA.
- The development of local strategies or protocols for accommodating sex offenders.
- Prioritising contingency planning for community impact situations.
- Clarity about the continuing involvement of either police or probation with sex offenders when their statutory responsibility ends.

Good practice

The SMB in Merseyside had planned to select Level 1, 2 and 3 cases to review, using a quality assurance/MAPPA evaluation form. The SMB would be examining, amongst other things, the assessed level of risk and whether it was appropriate, whether meetings were convened and properly chaired and that action points were carried out. Strengths and areas for improvement would be fed back. The SMB would then have direct evidence of the effectiveness of its MAPPA using this approach as a performance management tool. This process was enshrined in a joint police probation MAPPA protocol which included the quality assurance/MAPPA evaluation form as an appendix.

Good practice

In Devon & Cornwall Constabulary work had been undertaken to estimate the growth of RSOs in the next five years to match resources to workload and also take into account the impact of ViSOR.

5. IMPLEMENTATION AND PLANNING

Victims

- 5.1** There was little evidence that the needs of victims were being addressed strategically either by police or probation. Senior managers from both agencies referred to victim needs being met mainly through the probation area's VCU and the MAPPA process. In our case sample nearly half the cases involved contact with the victim of the offence, and in 62% of cases there were current child protection concerns which had been identified by probation staff, with the offender being the main source of risk to the child. VCOs would often attend MAPPA meetings and in Devon & Cornwall victim issues were a standing item on the agenda of MAPPA meetings. Case managers kept VCOs up to date concerning changes in parole dates, conditions in the licence such as no contact with the victim or exclusion from specific geographical areas. Victim issues should also be taken into account when assessing risk of harm and be included as an objective in supervision plans and risk management plans. Accredited programmes for sex offenders also addressed victim empathy. All victim contact documentation would be separate from the offender case file or contained in the third party section (although in one area victim information was on the offender contact log – this was brought to the attention of senior managers). There was less evidence that probation case managers discussed victim issues with sex offenders. In our case sample in just over a third of all cases victim issues were not adequately addressed.
- 5.2** Once the order or licence with associated conditions had expired and direct probation involvement had ceased, the focus on victim issues by the police was less clear. Police officers commented that victim issues tended to receive less attention over time unless the victim was a child in which case child protection procedures would be in place. However in West Yorkshire Police copies of the victim statement and a summary of the evidence were attached to the file to provide greater awareness of the offence and the victim's perspective.

The Sexual Offences Act 2003

- 5.3** The Sexual Offences Act 2003 came into force on the 1 May 2004. This was a major piece of legislation. Part 1 of the Act defines various sexual offences. Part 2 covered revised notification requirements on sex offenders and introduced new civil preventative orders; the most relevant order in the context of this report was the SOPO, which replaced the sex offender order and restraining order. It was therefore surprising to find that in probation areas there was very little training on the provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The implementation of the Act was seen mainly as an issue for the police. Most case managers had sought information about the Act themselves or asked police colleagues. In one police area training had not been delivered to front line staff even though they had visited every sex offender to notify them of the changes the Act had made. In Norfolk, the MAPPA

coordinator had run briefing sessions for police and interested probation staff. In Gwent Probation Area a summary of the Act had been produced and in addition in West Yorkshire a description of the main implications of the Act for probation staff was included. The impact of the Act on probation staff had been minimal to date but this was likely to change. SOPOs can be made on conviction. PSR writers should be familiar with SOPOs, as well as new offences such as 'grooming'. Probation staff needed to know when sex offenders had potentially breached a SOPO or sex offender registration requirements in addition to ensuring that sex offenders were aware of their obligations and responsibilities under the Act.

The role of probation and police staff protecting the public

- 5.4** Probation and police staff were clear about their role in protecting the public from sex offenders. Probation staff saw their role as primarily minimising the risk of harm and the likelihood of reoffending of sex offenders. To do this involved assessment, monitoring, referral to programmes and accommodation schemes. Working closely with police colleagues was key, coordinating contact with home visits and office visits. Generally probation staff managed offenders in the community by identifying triggers that may increase a sex offender's likelihood of offending, as well as helping offenders learn tactics to avoid risky situations. At the same time they were aware how sex offenders can manipulate and groom people they meet including staff. In one case the probation officer noted that a sex offender had changed his appearance for a police photograph and had also observed him in a shop asking about a special miniaturised camera. Both these observations were shared with the police officer in the case and appropriate action was taken.
- 5.5** Police officers saw their role as keeping up to date with visits to sex offenders, reviewing risk after each visit, attending MAPPA meetings and linking with probation staff including hostels or approved premises. West Yorkshire Police line managers prioritised cases according to RM 2000 and dealt with problems and concerns about specific offenders raised by their officers. When interviewed police officers in West Yorkshire consistently identified assessing and managing risk as a core part of their role. In other forces, however, even though assessing and managing risk was part of their job description, it was rarely mentioned. Both police and probation staff identified networking skills as essential to enable them to gather information from each other and other agencies such as social services, housing and health.

Interventions used by police and probation staff

- 5.6** There were standard interventions with sex offenders with which both police and probation staff were familiar. Most frequently mentioned were approved premises and accredited programmes. Table 2 represents the interventions used in our case sample which were mainly restrictive (to minimise the risk of harm by monitoring or restricting activities) rather than constructive (to reduce the likelihood of reoffending

by attending an accredited sex offender programme or office-based supervision sessions). More than one intervention could apply to a single case.

Table 2: Types of intervention commonly used with sex offenders by police and probation staff

Interventions	%
Residing at approved premises	33
Accredited sex offender programme: planned (23%) currently attending (22%) or finished (11%)	55
Office-based supervision sessions	91
Monitoring of movements	47
Restrictions on associations	51
Restrictions on residence	48
Restrictions on movement – Prohibited areas	26
Restrictions on movement – Curfew	14
Restrictions on activities and possessions	11
Electronic monitoring	4
Surveillance	1

5.7 The above interventions could be part of an inter-agency risk management plan agreed at MAPPA Level 2 or 3 meetings. They could be included as additional requirements in orders or licences (which in our sample were implemented sufficiently in 84% of relevant cases). Other interventions mentioned were funding from the Public Protection Unit, NPD, for escorting sex offenders, disclosure and constructive interventions such as accommodation, employment and psychological or psychiatric input. In the 100 cases we inspected interventions and their level or intensity were not proportionate to the assessment of risk of harm in 35% of cases which indicates that either more or less input was required in those cases to manage risk of harm.

5.8 Interventions were seen by some police officers as predominantly a task for probation. However police officers did undertake intervention activity – visiting sex offenders in their homes, undertaking surveillance, applying for SOPOs – and this was likely to be a reflection of the way in which the term ‘intervention’ was being interpreted.

5.9 SOPOs were becoming an increasingly important intervention by the police. We found that many of the findings in Knock, K et al (2002) *The Police Perspective on Sex Offender Orders: A preliminary review of policy and practice* Police Research Series Paper 155, applied to SOPOs. In particular, we noted the variation in take-up of SOPOs in the areas we visited and it was apparent that there was a link between a high number of orders and the presence of a central point of contact. However, concerns were also raised by some police officers over insufficient capacity to enforce and monitor the increasing number of SOPOs being made and it was suggested that there was scope for these orders to be supervised by a dedicated

officer. The issue of the need for additional resources to manage SOPOs, especially in the absence of performance indicators, was also a prevalent perception with regard to sex offender orders at the time of the research study in 2002.

Accredited Sex Offender Programmes

- 5.10** There was generally excess demand for places on accredited sex offender programmes that resulted in long waiting times, in some cases over a year. Consequently it was common to find probation areas prioritising sex offenders assessed as having the highest risk of harm for a place on an accredited programme. In only 37% of cases we inspected did the accredited programme commence within the national standard (within 20 working days of the commencement of the order or licence). A programme was deemed to have commenced when the first psychometric test had been administered or any pre-programme work had been undertaken) or there was a valid reason for delay. In just over half the cases, where there was a delay, purposeful work was carried out in the meantime.
- 5.11** Where no accredited programme was planned, even though the offender was eligible, in nearly a third of cases no reason was recorded to explain why the offender had not been referred. The most common reasons that were recorded were the offender's learning capability or mental health problems. Other reasons given were insufficient capacity to run enough programmes and no evening or weekend provision for offenders who were working. Assessors agreed with the reason given in 65% of cases. Staff turnover had an impact on a probation area's ability to maintain programmes. In large geographical areas staff could not easily cover each other. If an evening programme was not available sex offenders would usually have to delay obtaining employment until they had completed the programme.
- 5.12** Some case managers did not think current accredited sex offender programmes were ideally suited for a number of sex offenders including internet offenders, offenders with learning difficulties, young offenders (18-23), offenders who had been abused themselves, offenders who have severe drug or alcohol misuse and deniers. This may explain why there were 37 cases where no accredited sex offender programme was planned to take place.

Public protection versus quality of life issues

- 5.13** *How do police and probation staff achieve a balance between protecting the public and the needs of the sex offender, or quality of life issues?* Interventions in a sex offender's life can be intrusive. Restrictions on where they live, who they associate with, the need to disclose information about their past offending to people they meet and to potential employers may all be justified to protect the public. There was a

spread of views about achieving a balance between protecting the public and quality of life issues. One view was to focus on public protection. An offender's quality of life was secondary or incidental. Other staff recognised that sex offenders will need somewhere to live, employment and a social life, but they also had to be prepared to live under restrictions. One ACO put it this way "*While we are very focused on public protection and ensuring that sex offenders don't commit further crimes we are very aware that we have to treat them individually, fairly and with respect*".

- 5.14** A recent article (Levenson, J., and Cotter, L. (2005) *The Impact of Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: 1,000 Feet From Danger or One Step From Absurd?* International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 49 (2) p168-178: Sage Publications) questioned the effectiveness of prohibiting sex offenders living within close proximity to schools and parks in several states of America. The result of such prohibitions for some sex offenders involved living some distance from support systems of family and friends. This led to increased isolation, financial and emotional stress and decreased stability. We are not suggesting that any decision to prohibit sex offenders from certain areas would be wrong in principle, it is a matter of whether such prohibitions actually work and whether the negative impact on the sex offender can be addressed. There was a danger that such restrictions, coupled with limitations of access to accommodation, would result in sex offenders being accommodated together in the same location, which was evidenced in one area we visited.
- 5.15** Employment was an issue which tested the balance between public protection and the needs of the sex offender. There were limited opportunities for sex offenders to fill their day if they could not find employment. Under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 and the Criminal Justice Act 2003, offenders convicted of specified sex offences and other offences were liable to disqualification from working with children. Probation Circular 17/2005 *Disqualification Orders* issued on the 14 March 2005 to probation areas gave clear instructions about the action probation staff should take. However staff needed to be vigilant. In one case a sex offender wanted to work in a particular place of employment and maintained that only adults worked there. A police officer established from the potential employer that her 15 year old daughter could have gained employment there.
- 5.16** Too many restrictions could backfire and encourage sex offenders to hide their activities. The potential for reduction or withdrawal of restrictions on the other hand was seen as a motivator, enabling the sex offender to demonstrate change and achieve targets. One case manager said "*It's about measuring risk of harm and reconviction, measuring quality of life and family issues and balancing these*". Quality of life issues required community involvement which, apart from circles of support or similar schemes, was highly unlikely.

Sex offender involvement

- 5.17** *Were sex offenders involved in setting objectives or managing their own risk?* In over half the ISPs there was no evidence that the plan was shared with the offender or they participated in the process. However in 73% of cases there was evidence that steps had been taken to ensure that the offender understood the requirements of the order, licence or sex offender registration usually through a formal induction process.

Diversity

- 5.18** *With the emphasis on protecting the public from the activities of sex offenders were diversity issues monitored and addressed?* This was not seen as a specific priority for senior managers although, where diversity issues had been identified, there was evidence that they were being managed appropriately and sensitively by both police and probation staff. The organisations represented on SMBs had their own policies on race and diversity therefore there was a tendency for SMBs as a body not to address diversity in relation to MAPPA sufficiently. Diversity issues were identified by front line staff in interview, but this was often not reflected in the case files. ISPs were not sensitive to diversity issues in over two-thirds of cases mainly because the discrimination section in OASys was blank or noted as 'not applicable' with no explanation about how the judgement was made. Literacy and dyslexia were adequately addressed in 72% of cases. Arrangements for interventions to take into account race equality and wider diversity issues and the delivery of interventions being sensitive to these issues was evidenced in 60% and 70% of cases respectively, figures which could be improved.
- 5.19** Probation staff mentioned examples of older sex offenders who needed sheltered accommodation or wheelchair access, or advice and support concerning sexual orientation. In one area, the police gave an example of an Asian offender who disclosed to the visiting police officer that he had experienced a racial incident. Subsequently a joint visit was made with a member of the racial incident team. Diversity issues never distracted staff from the need to protect the public. Staff were clear that a physical disability, for example, did not mean a sex offender's risk of harm was reduced.

Good practice

In Gwent Probation Area in May 2004 an audit of 25 PSRs prepared on sex offenders during 2003/2004 was undertaken. The audit identified that PSR authors had not attended basic training about the risk factors relevant to sexual offending. The reports examined did not adequately address risk of harm and likelihood of reoffending related to sexual offending. As a result of the audit, all PSRs on sex offenders were now prepared by staff in the public protection unit who had received appropriate training.

Strengths

- Police and probation staff working with sex offenders were clear about their role to protect the public.
- There was a good awareness of the range of interventions available to manage sex offenders in the community, as well as trying to achieve a balance between protecting the public and quality of life issues.
- In some areas VCOs attended MAPPA meetings.

Areas for improvement

- There was a lack of training for probation staff about the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
- Work with victims was not given sufficient attention strategically and jointly by both police and probation, and staff were not addressing victim issues adequately.
- There were not enough places on accredited sex offender programmes and a lack provision of groups in the evening.
- There was insufficient evidence of purposeful work with sex offenders while they were waiting to commence a programme.
- Staff demonstrated sensitivity to diversity issues, but this was not evidenced on case files nor was diversity addressed sufficiently within organisations.

6. PEOPLE

Police

- 6.1 In most police forces we visited there were dedicated police officers who managed RSOs with titles such as public protection officer, sex offender officer and dangerous offender officer. In some areas they were detectives. There was no benchmark for the number of RSOs each officer should manage and how many times an RSO should be visited and whether the visit should be by one officer or a pair of officers. It was therefore difficult to understand how the establishment of visiting officers was arrived at. For some staff the variations in the size of sex offender units did not always reflect the number of sex offenders managed in the unit. In one area there was a central public protection unit based at police headquarters. The unit supported the work of co-located teams of dangerous offender officers and case managers in probation premises. The co-located teams had access to both police and probation information systems. In some areas visits to RSOs were undertaken by beat officers who sometimes encountered problems gaining access to their homes. From the point of view of the RSO, this may be because the beat officer was in uniform and could attract the attention of local people.

Probation

- 6.2 In probation areas the dedicated resource for sex offenders and public protection most often mentioned was the MAPPA coordinator. There were also staff delivering the sex offender programmes. The ACO in Merseyside echoed what had been mentioned by many, that MAPPA work had not attracted any extra funds and the workload was growing all the time.
- 6.3 In over half the 100 cases we inspected there had been a change in the case manager and police officer supervising the sex offender. A probation or police officer supervised the majority of sex offenders rather than any other grade or rank.

Absence management

- 6.4 In both police and probation there were fragile arrangements in place to cover sickness and vacancies and cover tended to be managed internally within units. In probation areas, if there was a long-term absence the line manager would reallocate high risk of harm cases in the community and retain cases where the offender was in custody. In one probation area there was a back-up system for the case manager for all MAPPA cases. In another, however, staff were organised in clusters and the expectation was that colleagues within the cluster would cover

each other for short-term absences. Sex offender accredited programmes were vulnerable as only a limited number of staff were qualified to provide replacement cover. With both police and probation, senior managers tended to accept mutual cover arrangements within units even though the likelihood was that over time staff would be under pressure and this would inevitably impact on the quality of work.

Workload

- 6.5** Workload was an issue for both police and probation staff. Police officers in some areas described the workload as heavy and ever increasing. There were significant variations in the number of offenders managed by individual police officers – between 40 and 200 RSOs in the areas we visited. Sometimes this was in addition to other duties. In one force the MAPPA coordinator role had expanded due to the need to ensure that ‘every point was covered’ with regard to information sharing. In one probation area the ACO Public Protection had introduced measures to reduce the caseload of case managers in the public protection unit to 25 cases – 10 cases in the community and 15 in custody– which was broadly welcomed by staff.
- 6.6** Probation case managers confirmed that they had managed higher case loads and coped by keeping contact logs up to date but ISPs and reviews were secondary. *“It’s a struggle to keep on top of them”* one member of staff commented. This practice was evident from our results presented in Table 3. The ESI percentage was based on sex offender cases in 29 probation areas.

Table 3: Comparison of cases within the joint SOTI and general sex offender cases from the ESI concerning ISPs

% Above the line (Excellent/Sufficient)	SOTI	ESI
Does the ISP meet the content and timing requirements of national standards and, where appropriate, draw on MAPPA assessments, assessments by other agencies’ and previous probation service assessments?	23%	49%
Was the content of the plan appropriate to the needs of the case?	31%	–
Are SMART objectives set in the ISP taking account of the risk and need assessment?	26%	49%

- 6.7** The results in Table 3 were poor compared to the average results from ESI. This was not just about case managers failing to complete ISPs on time. There were often sections that were not completed or other assessments were not referred to. Apart from the objectives not being SMART, in 42% of cases they did not always address the issues that needed attention concerning offending behaviour and community integration. In only 15% of cases had progress against supervision plan objectives been reviewed every 16 weeks in line with the national standard, and in 33% was the content of the reviews appropriate to the needs of the case.
- 6.8** Managing sex offenders was time-consuming for case managers. This was mainly because face-to-face contact was usually above national standards and often

attendance at MAPPA meetings was required. Unlike other cases, if there was a crisis with a sex offender all other work had to be put on hold and action taken immediately.

Appraisal objectives and public protection

- 6.9** Objectives in staff appraisals should reflect the objectives contained in the local areas business plan. If the business plan does not include public protection objectives it was likely that none would be found in staff appraisals. The staff we interviewed had very few objectives that related to managing sex offenders or public protection. Some examples of objectives from probation staff were: completing and improving the quality of OASys assessments, risk assessments being completed with five working days (a current national target), referring cases to the VCU within 14 working days and attending appropriate training. In a couple of areas a minority of staff had not been appraised at all.

Staff training

- 6.10** SMB members had not received any formal training for their role. In West Yorkshire and Norfolk SMB members had been invited to observe MAPPA meetings and in West Yorkshire attend a regional MAPPA seminar. Overall, however, there was little evidence of joint training events for police and probation staff. Most SMBs recognised the need for joint training and some had set up training subgroups. In November 2003 the South-West Region produced a Regional Risk Training Strategy with a proposal that there should be four levels of training for various sets of staff.
- 6.11** In two of the police forces visited, staff attended the Lancashire Management of High-Risk Offenders course although, in one of these, new staff had yet to receive this training. In another, police officers visiting sex offenders were line managed in the BCU which held the training budget, consequently their training needs were not always met. In West Yorkshire risk of harm training provided by probation was available for police officers. West Yorkshire Police had a training plan which ensured staff attended six different core courses.
- 6.12** All probation staff had attended OASys training and some had received training to complete RM 2000. Most probation staff had attended the case manager training associated with accredited sex offender programmes. In Norfolk Probation Area an SPO had been appointed for six months to lead a 'Risk Uplift Project' currently focused on OASys risk assessment which would address training needs. Training in the assessment and management of risk was patchy. There had not been any substantial programme of training in this area of work for some years, which was clearly needed. This has been recognised by the NPD and it was committed to lead on a long-term project to develop a training package on risk management training to support areas (Probation Circular 10/2005).

Staff welfare

- 6.13** *What support mechanisms were in place to support staff undertaking a difficult job?*
- Managing sex offenders on a day-to-day basis can have a negative impact on staff. In police forces counselling was either mandatory (usually annually) or voluntary. Police officers themselves had mixed views about whether counselling should be mandatory or voluntary. In the police forces we visited there was also some evidence of intrusive supervision where welfare issues could be raised. Monthly one-to-one supervision has traditionally been a strength in probation. Many case managers felt they could discuss issues in supervision with their line manager. In probation areas staff delivering the sex offender programme were given set appointments for debriefing and counselling; however, there was no provision for case managers except access to whatever scheme was available to all staff. In one area a case manager attended a training course concerned with internet offenders. He was disturbed by what he saw and sought counselling through his employer. He advised managers and was told “*perhaps the job’s not for you*” which had an impact on his confidence. In another area a case manager described working in a “*macho culture where you did not ask for help*”. Although these responses were not typical, not all staff working with sex offenders received sufficient support from their respective organisations.

Strengths

- Dedicated police officers who managed RSOs were trained detectives.
- Regular supervision for probation staff.

Areas for improvement

- Arrangements for covering absence.
- Regular dedicated intrusive supervision for police officers.
- Establishing a fair and manageable workload for staff.
- Appraisal objectives should reflect the task of managing sex offenders and protecting the public.
- Adequate provision of training for all staff, particularly in risk assessment and management.
- Sufficient support for staff working with sex offenders.
- Completion of good quality OASys on time in every sex offender case.

Good practice

In Norfolk Constabulary a Power Point presentation for new staff about the public protection unit and sex and dangerous offenders described the structure of the unit, the offender demographics, basic operations, database system and current legislation. More importantly the presentation covered the purpose of a home visit, the information that should be gathered and disclosure issues. There were also comprehensive guidance notes available on the new offences, notification requirements and civil preventative orders under the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

7. PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES

Sex offenders and MAPPA

- 7.1** Sex offenders can come under MAPPA if they are RSOs (category 1) or receive a sentence of imprisonment of 12 months or more for a specified sexual offence (category 2), or at the end of registration or end of statutory supervision (Category 3). Whether sex offenders come under MAPPA was not usually the issue, although it maybe on rare occasions. The issue was what MAPPA level should the sex offender be managed. In probation this question was addressed firstly by the completion of OASys and assessing the risk of harm. Depending on the risk of harm, and in discussion with the SPO, a decision would be made on whether the case should be a Level 1 (ordinary risk management single agency), Level 2 (local inter-agency risk management) or Level 3 (Multi-Agency Risk Management Panel or MAPPP for the critical few). If a Level 2 or 3 meeting takes place it may either be a one off meeting or review dates would be set. Most referrals to MAPPA meetings were by probation or the police but other agencies could refer cases. In more than one area there was a view that MAPPA Level 2 meetings were often called because of accommodation issues. Probation case files and police records did not clearly identify whether a case was within MAPPA (Category 1, 2 or 3) or what Level (1, 2 or 3) it was being managed or the sex offender's current risk of harm. In our case sample 73% of cases were MAPPA Level 2, with 14% Level 1 and 14% Level 3.

MAPPA coordinators or managers

- 7.2** There was a MAPPA coordinator in two of the areas visited. We found that the role straddled both strategic and operational work. Strategically it included attending SMB meetings, operationally delivering training, acting as a consultant and chairing meetings. In one of the two areas, the MAPPA coordinator was the Chair for all Level 3 (MAPPP) meetings which on average amounted to between eight and ten meetings a week. They ensured the right cases were managed at Level 3 and that risk assessments and plans were prepared and executed, if necessary bringing to account senior managers from both police and probation. They also gathered as much information as possible on new cases and carried out a full review of all documentation. They had a role ensuring consistency of chairing at Level 2 meetings. Generally probation staff initially discussed cases with their line manager or the MAPPA coordinator/registrar. Often staff would refer to line managers or MAPPA coordinators even if there were clear guidelines in place. The MAPPA coordinator was seen as the 'gateway' for MAPPA cases. We agree with Kemshall et al (2005) that a dedicated individual, such as a MAPPA coordinator or manager, contributed to effective MAPPA.

Other meetings

- 7.3** Other meetings were being held outside the MAPPA or in addition to MAPPA Level 2 and 3 meetings. The meetings had a number of different purposes such as screening and quarterly reviews. In one area a case manager arranged a 'professionals meeting' for the purpose of deciding whether the information that had been accumulated justified convening a MAPPA meeting. There were also references to 'mini MAPPPs' – a meeting to get core agencies around the table. In some areas the same staff attended both Level 2 and 3 meetings. From interviews with staff it was clear that not all front line police and probation staff were fully aware of MAPPA or knew how to make referrals.

Assessment tools

- 7.4** OASys and RM 2000 were the main assessment tools all staff were using to assess sex offenders. The police completed a RM 2000 in 89% of cases we inspected. In 12 cases it was not clear from the RM 2000 what the rank of the person completing the assessment was. Most assessments were completed by a constable. There was little evidence of management oversight, as the majority of assessments were not countersigned. The period of time taken to complete a RM 2000 could be improved. Just over half the assessments were completed within one week of registration, 23% within a month, 8% within three months and 18% over three months.
- 7.5** In one probation area a dynamic risk assessment for sex offenders was used by some case managers, but it had not been validated. Case managers described how actions from assessments were carried out through supervision plans, risk management plans, MAPPA meetings and ViSOR. There were several comments about OASys being cumbersome and time-consuming. Results from the case sample were poor. In only 59% of cases was the content of the assessment of the likelihood of reoffending appropriate to the needs of the case, mainly because evidence boxes were not used to justify scores. In most cases there was a likelihood of reoffending score. In 15 cases neither OASys nor OGRS2 was used which was a concern.
- 7.6** Table 4 illustrates the poor quality of the risk of harm assessments completed by case managers compared to an average of ESI scores. The disappointing results were partly due to the assessments and reviews not being completed on time and sometimes the reviews were not completed at all.

Table 4: Comparison of cases within the joint SOTI and general sex offender cases from the ESI concerning risk of harm assessments

% above the line (Excellent/Sufficient)	SOTI	ESI
Has a satisfactory risk of harm assessment been completed using OASys where applicable and drawing where relevant on MAPPA assessments, assessments by other agencies' and previous probation service assessments, and covering victim issues where appropriate		
At the start of supervision?	30%	59%
Then at least every 16 weeks?	15%	37%
Following any significant incident that might give rise to concern?	18%	51%
Was the <u>content</u> of the assessment appropriate to the needs of the case?	44%	–
Was there appropriate higher/senior and middle/line management involvement in the assessment?	32%	53%
Is there a close fit between the interventions planned and the assessed risk of harm?	67%	78%

Risk management plans

- 7.7** The risk management plan sets out how a sex offender's risk will be managed by the probation case manager in terms of frequency and type of contact, actions by other agencies involved in the case and should cross-reference to any recent or planned MAPPA meeting. Most case managers indicated that they rarely reviewed risk management plans, and monitoring of cases was done mainly through MAPPA meetings or through supervision with line managers. It was therefore concerning to find that for high or very high risk of harm cases, only in 21% had the case manager completed a satisfactory risk management plan within five working days of the commencement of the order or licence. During the fieldwork period of the inspection Probation Circular 10/2005 *Public Protection Framework, Risk of Harm and MAPPA Thresholds* was issued (February 2005). This circular clarified a number of issues. It specified what should be covered in a risk management plan and emphasised the need to review the plan on a regular basis or when significant new information was obtained or events occurred.

Actions from MAPPA meetings

- 7.8** Several police and probation staff were not confident that every action from MAPPA meetings was followed through or that there were sufficient audits or quality assurance systems in place to monitor practice. The integration of staff plans and action to manage individual cases with the actions of MAPPA meetings was crucial.

Having access to the notes of MAPPA meetings on the case file helps achieve such integration. However in our case sample MAPPA minutes were not found in probation case files in just under a quarter of cases and were not in police records or on ViSOR in over a third of all relevant cases. It was no surprise therefore to find that in 85% of relevant cases the ISP did not integrate the MAPPA action plan or one from another risk management meeting. In high or very high risk of harm cases just 13% of supervision plan reviews integrated MAPPA action plans or ones from other risk management meetings or child protection conferences. This was a poor result.

7.9 As one police officer said “*Often there was no review meeting so it was down to the integrity of the individual officer to complete an action*”. We found the notes of meetings did not always capture actions agreed or review actions set at a previous meeting. One explanation given for bad minute taking was the lack of administrative support. This issue was identified by Kemshall et al (2005) and requires attention, as ultimately poor administrative support impacts on the delivery of a quality inter-agency risk management plan.

Table 5: Comparison of cases within the joint SOTI and general sex offender cases from the ESI concerning risk management plans and staff involvement in child protection arrangements

% Above the line (Excellent/Sufficient)	SOTI	ESI
(For high/very high risk of harm cases only)		
Has a good quality risk management plan been produced under MAPPA or other inter-agency arrangement?	50%	58%
Is this risk management plan being executed appropriately, with effective liaison between the agencies, particularly police and probation, including on accommodation issues?	42%	66%
Has the risk management plan been appropriately reviewed?	40%	66%
(For child protection cases only)		
Has there been probation and police involvement in child protection arrangements – e.g. core group or case conference – and liaison between agencies to reduce the risk to the child(ren)?	59%	80%

Table 6: How often cases were reviewed under MAPPA and staff attendance at meetings

How often has the case been reviewed under MAPPA?	No evidence of a review	25%
	Monthly	8%
	Quarterly	32%
	Every six months	3%
	Irregular	32%
Are the frequency of MAPPA meetings sufficient in the circumstances of the case?	Yes	63%
	No, should be more frequent	37%
	No, should be less frequent	0%
Is there evidence that the sex offender has been informed of the MAPPA meetings decisions?	Yes	32%
	No	68%
Does the case manager attend the meeting?	Yes	92%
	No	8%
Does the police officer attend the meeting?	Yes	74%
	No	26%

7.11 Table 5 illustrates the need for an improvement in the production of good quality inter-agency risk management plans and their execution and review. The poor result for probation and police involvement in child protection arrangements may be because front line staff had to attend meetings in more than one public protection process, whether it be MAPPA, child protection, mental health or domestic violence, which can be complex. This was recognised in Probation Circular 10/2005 which stressed the need for probation staff to ensure coordination and communication between MAPPA and other risk management processes. Table 6 shows that the majority of cases under MAPPA were reviewed either quarterly or on an irregular basis. Sex offenders were not always involved in the MAPPA process. There needed to be a more consistent approach between areas about the appropriate level of involvement of offenders in MAPPA. Most case managers and police managed to attend MAPPA meetings, but it was clearly more difficult to achieve for police officers.

MAPPA and front line staff

7.12 Whatever the inconsistencies, the MAPPA process and procedures were generally seen as helpful and supportive by staff from both services. Probation case managers felt less isolated sharing the responsibility of managing sex offenders with other agencies through MAPPA. In Devon & Cornwall, co-location of police and probation staff was seen as being of additional benefit. A number of police and probation staff also commented that MAPPA was a useful vehicle for gaining access to accommodation for offenders where difficulties had been encountered. There was also a counter view that MAPPA was taking away the ability of case managers to make decisions on their own, until approval could be obtained at a MAPPA meeting.

The difference between the likelihood of reoffending and risk of harm

- 7.13** There was a tendency for staff to refer to ‘risk’ of reoffending rather than ‘likelihood’. Even so staff were clear about the difference between likelihood of re-offending and the risk of harm. Most police officers were aware that RM 2000 was concerned with the likelihood of a sex offender being reconvicted rather than their risk of harm, and in West Yorkshire both police and probation staff referred to recent joint training that had taken place.

Home visits by the police

- 7.14** One of the main tasks for police officers was making unannounced visits to a sex offender’s home address. Table 7 shows how planned visits compared to actual visits.

Table 7: Comparison between planned and actual home visits by the police to sex offenders

Time period	Planned	Actual
Weekly	3%	0%
Monthly	22%	15%
2 Monthly	6%	10%
3 Monthly	26%	30%
4 Monthly	3%	3%
5 Monthly	0%	3%
6 Monthly	23%	20%
7 Monthly	0%	2%
8 Monthly	2%	0%
9 Monthly	2%	2%
10 Monthly	0%	2%
11 Monthly	0%	2%
12 Monthly	14%	13%

- 7.15** Actual weekly or monthly visits were 10% lower than planned and took place two or three monthly. The difference between planned and actual visits could have been because the police officer had to visit the home more than once before finding the sex offender at home. Six to 12 monthly planned visits were broadly in line with actual visits. The shorter the time period for a planned visit the less likely it would take place. Over half of the sex offenders in our sample were visited between once a week and once every three months.
- 7.16** The police have no right of access to a sex offender’s home. A minority of sex offenders were aware of the legislation and did not always allow entry. We heard about sex offenders who had been in contact with a solicitor because they had felt harassed. We felt that in certain exceptional circumstances access to a sex offender’s home would be necessary. This was an area of police practice that needed to be supported by legislation.

7.17 Norfolk Constabulary had produced an excellent *aide-memoire* on the purpose of such visits. In other areas there were no guidelines resulting in police officers drawing up their own checklist for home visits. In addition, submission of intelligence reports following home visits was found to be inconsistent across the forces visited. In only one force, Devon & Cornwall, was an intelligence submission found to have been made in every case. Probation case managers were also not clear what the purpose of home visits were except that there was a national standard. However like police officers, case managers used a home visit to check for possible triggers or opportunities for offending.

Serious further offences

7.18 *If a sex offender commits a serious further offence were there mechanisms in place to review the case?* All probation staff were aware that there was a process (Probation Circular 54/2003 '*Notification, screening and review system for Serious Further Offences (SFOs) committed by supervised offenders*' issued on 28 October 2003), but their depth of knowledge varied considerably. Many case managers knew that if a serious further offence was committed by an offender on their caseload the case file would be removed and a senior manager would prepare a report. It was disappointing that the majority of probation staff were not aware of the learning points from Full Reviews prepared on serious further offences even though, in most areas, there was evidence that lessons learnt had been issued to staff. Apart from the NPS system there was no equivalent system in the police forces we visited, with the exception of Devon & Cornwall Constabulary and West Yorkshire Police where 'in force' reviews were mentioned and in Devon & Cornwall a case had resulted in a formal joint debrief by probation and police. There was, however, little evidence of SMBs having a role in this area of work.

Surveillance

7.19 Requests for surveillance were submitted via the tasking process, but the view was that these were being prioritised in the context of a focus by police forces on volume crime. Generally surveillance was difficult to obtain. In one police area surveillance packages were submitted through the tasking and coordinating process. However, it was commented that they were rarely implemented due to a lack of resources and, if they were implemented on high risk of harm sex offenders, it was rarely for the duration requested. Police officers working with sex offenders would have welcomed an enhanced in-house surveillance capability to enable them to be more proactive. Many officers were trained in static surveillance but this skill was not used due to their workload.

Strengths

- The process and procedures of MAPPA were viewed as helpful and supportive.
- Staff were clear about the difference between the likelihood of offending and risk of harm.

Areas for improvement

- It was not immediately clear from police and probation case files what the sex offender's current risk of harm was or what level under MAPPA they were being managed. A front sheet which tracked changes in risk of harm and the level of MAPPA management would be helpful.
- There were differing arrangements for the referral of cases to MAPPA Level 2 and 3 meetings, with other additional meetings taking place outside MAPPA.
- Just under half of the RM 2000s were completed over a week after the sex offender had registered. RM 2000 was often not dated or signed or detailing the name and the rank of the person who had completed the assessment. Also the assessments were rarely countersigned which would have been evidence of management oversight.
- All aspects of OASys required urgent attention in terms of quality, timeliness and management involvement.
- MAPPA meeting action plans were not integrated with ISPs or reviews.
- Actions from MAPPA meetings were not always followed through.
- Sex offenders were not sufficiently involved in the MAPPA process.
- The purpose of police home visits to sex offenders was not always clear and the legal basis for such visits needed to be strengthened.
- Although there was a process in place in probation for reviewing serious further offences, there was not an equivalent process in the police. A multi-agency approach for the completion of reviews of serious further offences should be considered when appropriate.
- There was a lack of resources for surveillance.

Good practice

In West Yorkshire the Assessment and Management of Risk of harm policy guidelines and MAPPA and a similar document concerned with child protection were joint police probation procedures issued by West Yorkshire Probation Board and West Yorkshire Police. The policy guidelines described processes that could be used by both police and probation staff.

8. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

Strategic Management Boards and performance management

- 8.1** The SMBs have a key role for performance management. Performance management information was obtained in relation to the MAPPA Annual Reports. In Gwent the SMB had identified that it needed to set up a subgroup for reviewing MAPPA processes, policies and procedures. One SMB had started to look at statistics concerning the number of cases dealt with by MAPPA, but acknowledged that they needed to look at qualitative and not just quantitative issues. There was no evidence of any joint targets having been developed by the SMBs in the areas we visited.

Police and performance management

- 8.2** The level and detail of performance management information collected by forces varied widely. One force had performance indicators for visits to RSOs on a monthly and quarterly basis for three geographical areas. One performance indicator was defined as 100% of visits to be completed within a set time of being sent out according to the risk of the sex offender. For example, for high or very high risk cases 100% of visits were to be completed within one month of being sent out. The quarterly report contained an analysis of the performance of each area commenting on factors such as increases in visits, sickness and vacancies which had effected performance. In another force, because of a lack of resources, very limited performance information was kept on the number of home visits undertaken. West Yorkshire Police was found to keep the most detailed performance information, recording the number of SOPOs (it had 70 SOPOs as of March 2005), breaches or recalls, arrests, MAPPA meetings attended and staff sickness.

Cost-effectiveness

- 8.3** There was little evidence that cost-effectiveness was monitored For the cases we inspected resources allocated were assessed as being consistent with the risk of harm and likelihood of reoffending in 71% and 78% of cases respectively. Overall resources were used efficiently to achieve planned results in 62% of cases which needed to be improved. In West Yorkshire Police it was able to calculate the unit cost per sex offender based on staff time, mileage and other factors. Gaining this information led the Chief Inspector to believe that a specialist unit was more cost-effective and the quality of work produced was better. In all probation areas there was performance data on the accredited sex offender programmes such as the number of participants and completions. In Norfolk and Gwent Probation Areas

staffing costs for running the accredited sex offender programmes were recorded. In Norfolk the unit cost per offender ranged from £4,000 to just above £5,000.

What Works with sex offenders

- 8.4** *Do probation staff know ‘What Works’ when managing sex offenders in the community?* Our results indicated that case managers could do better as shown in Table 8.

Table 8: Comparison of cases within the joint SOTI and general sex offender cases from the ESI concerning methods used, sequencing of interventions, pre-release work and the reduction and containment of risk of harm

% Above the line (Excellent/Sufficient)	SOTI	ESI
Has consideration been given to the methods likely to be most effective with the sex offender (e.g. type and pace of activity, accredited programme or hostel provision)?	64%	85%
Have appropriate interventions been carried out, with the timing and sequencing reflecting the offender’s risk of harm and likelihood of reoffending?	57%	68%
(Only for licence cases)		
Was the quality and degree of pre-release work by probation staff consistent with the assessment of risk and need and the offender’s motivation and his/her capacity to change?	60%	66%
(Only for cases assessed high or very high risk of harm at the start of supervision)		
Is there evidence of a reduction in risk of harm?	26%	38%
Is there evidence that the risk of harm has been successfully contained?	81%	–

- 8.5** The unsatisfactory results for a reduction in risk of harm have to be viewed in the context that some sex offenders will be a high or very high risk of harm whatever constructive interventions were applied. What was more important, as far as protecting the public was concerned, was how effective probation, police and other agencies were in successfully containing the risk of harm posed by sex offenders. The results for this question were more encouraging. Although we have no direct evidence, we would be surprised if the existence of MAPPA had not contributed in some way to this result.

- 8.6** There was an assumption by probation staff that accredited programmes must work. There were a number of research studies concerned with the question of whether community-based treatment reduced the likelihood of sex offenders reoffending. However there were debates about how you effectively measure reoffending rather than reconviction. Such issues were beyond the scope of this inspection. Without trying to simplify a complex area of research, the majority of evidence indicates that sex offenders who were treated in the community were

reconvicted less than those that were untreated, however it depended on a large number of variables. For example, the type of offence (rape or a sexual offence committed within a family) and what period of time was taken into account (two, six, ten or 20 years) after the treatment had finished.

- 8.7** In our sample five sex offenders had been convicted of an offence committed since the commencement of their order or licence. One was convicted of a further sexual offence, and four for a non-sexual or non-violent offence. However it is important to bear in mind that the period of time the 100 sex offenders had been supervised in the community at the time of the inspection varied from between six months to three years.
- 8.8** Several case managers worked with sex offenders on a one-to-one basis but they did not know whether their work was effective. However when case managers were asked to identify in their view what worked when managing sex offenders in the community, there was a rich seam of ideas and thoughts. Establishing a relationship, being clear about the purpose of supervision and working on the offence were seen as important. Reinforcing what sex offenders had learnt on accredited sex offender programmes and applying their learning to real situations certainly fits with the philosophy of What Works research. However our results revealed that in a quarter of all cases work directed at community integration and motivating the offender by reinforcing the work undertaken by others was not sufficient.
- 8.9** Case managers acknowledged the need to constantly assess, review and monitor life style and family relationships. One case manager advised that sex offenders *“have to lie to themselves before they lie to other people”*. Remaining vigilant and not being complacent was a theme. From our sample case managers needed to give more attention to long-term community integration issues and ensuring sex offenders maintained contact with mainstream organisations to address criminogenic needs thus sustaining any positive changes. Joint working between police and probation staff was seen by all staff as an effective way of managing sex offenders in the community.
- 8.10** It maybe unrealistic to expect individual police and probation areas to evaluate their own interventions. A national initiative was needed to help police and probation areas know what interventions work when managing sex offenders in the community apart from accredited sex offender programmes. Kemshall et al (2005) made a similar point about developing practice standards for risk management that would include those interventions known to assist effective community management of high-risk offenders.

MAPPA protecting the public

- 8.11** *Has MAPPA contributed to the early apprehension of sex offenders?* This was difficult to measure. Anecdotally information sharing through MAPPA had led to early recall to prison of sex offenders. In our sample ten out of 13 cases subject to

breach or recall took place within national standards timescales. There was one example where surveillance was instigated by a MAPPA meeting which led to the arrest of a sex offender who was in the company of a six year old child. There were many examples of arrests being made based on information and action under MAPPA which had prevented a serious offence taking place and thus protected potential victims.

Sharing good practice

- 8.12** Working with sex offenders was a difficult, demanding and complex task. Identifying and sharing good practice would ensure that practitioners were operating to the highest standard. In probation areas there were a variety of ways good practice was shared, either in practice meetings or team meetings where cases were discussed. In one area professional development sessions ‘fizzled out’ although it was not clear why. In West Yorkshire police officers met every three to four months to discuss issues and attended seminars on new legislation. Generally in both agencies the majority of discussions about practice occurred informally between colleagues. Most of the staff we interviewed agreed that sharing good practice needed to be improved, with more formal opportunities provided to facilitate this.

Strengths

- Some police forces had begun to develop performance management systems.
- There was mainly anecdotal evidence that MAPPA had contributed to the early apprehension of sex offenders.

Areas for improvement

- Most SMBs had yet to implement any performance management systems.
- There was little evidence of either police or probation capability to measure cost-effectiveness and the efficient use of resources.
- Although individually probation staff demonstrated knowledge of what worked based on their own experience of managing sex offenders in the community, there was little evidence that research findings were being used or that sharing good practice took place formally.
- Some of the interventions or methods of offender management used when managing sex offenders had not been evaluated.

Good practice

Merseyside Police ‘Sex Offenders Force Policy and Practitioners Guide’ was a comprehensive outline of the MAPPA process, legislation, force structure, minimum standards for visits and management strategies. It needed to be updated due to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, however it was a useful document for front line staff.

*Good
practice*

*Devon & Cornwall Constabulary Crime Policy and Sex Offender
Guidance covered risk assessment, classification of risk, procedures,
MAPPA, frequency and purpose of home visits.*

9. PARTNERSHIPS

Strategic Management Boards' links with other bodies

- 9.1** In most areas the Chief Constable and CO of probation were members of the LCJB, with other senior managers represented on subgroups. There was little evidence of the work of the SMB and LCJB either being inter-connected or integrated in any way. In one area LCJB, MAPPA and public protection or issues related to sex offenders were occasionally raised under the umbrella of enhancing public confidence. In another, the LCJB had not covered MAPPA type issues. In a third, there was a view, confirmed by documentary evidence, that the LCJB was court orientated and focused on achieving convictions, without sufficient regard to post-sentence issues. However there had been presentations to the LCJB in Merseyside to increase awareness of MAPPA. The West Yorkshire LCJB Action Plan for 2003/2006 refers to the effective implementation of MAPPA under an action for support for vulnerable and intimidated witnesses. SMBs' links with bodies such as the LCJB, ACPC and CDRP were not strong. Such links were described as 'very ad hoc' or 'piecemeal'. Kemshall et al (2005) found that links with ACPCs were well developed but less so with LCJBs and CDRPs. Any linkage we found was dependent on SMB members also sitting on the same boards, committees and partnerships. Senior managers in police and probation would attend ACPCs and middle managers would attend ACPCs and CDRPs. There had been presentation about MAPPA to ACPCs in Norfolk and West Yorkshire, and in Gwent the MAPPA Annual Report had been agreed with each CDRP.

Regional work

- 9.2** In some areas there was joint regional activity concerned with public protection. There were clear benefits of regional work concerning consistency and performance management. Regional work was particularly impressive in the North-West Region where a Risk and Public Protection Group met consisting of ACOs and Chief Superintendents. MAPPA coordinators met in a separate meeting. In the South-West Region a Multi-Agency Public Protection Strategy had been produced identifying a number of action points that were to be taken forward by a Steering Group consisting of police, probation and prison representatives.

Joint work at area level

- 9.3** There was little evidence that work had been undertaken to consider joint resource implications for MAPPA except in areas where joint posts were funded or co-location of staff had occurred, or in areas who were considering co-location or joint administration for the SMB. All areas emphasised the fact that there had never

been any specific funding for MAPPA from central government. There was no evidence of processes and structures between organisations for joint performance management of any kind.

- 9.4** At all levels of their respective organisations, police and probation had the strongest working relationship, with differing degrees of concern about the involvement of social services, housing and health. The impression from front line staff was that other agencies were more engaged than several years ago. Housing or accommodation was often an issue for those working with sex offenders. In Norfolk stability within the staff groups of individual organisations ensured the development of good working relationships over time which was seen as facilitating effective liaison between agencies.

The role and status of the Strategic Management Board

- 9.5** SMBs in some areas continued to grapple with different agency boundary issues and appropriate representation. It was helpful when SMB members from Health (West Yorkshire) or Social Services (Merseyside) were able to represent their colleagues from other authorities, thus reducing complexity and the number of members around the table. Ensuring consistent attendance was a problem. This was partly because of the ambiguity surrounding the role and status of the SMB within the criminal justice system. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 defined who the responsible authorities and duty to cooperate agencies were but the SMB was not mentioned. Section 3 of the MAPPA Guidance gives a full description of the role of the SMB which was a vehicle for the responsible authorities to discharge their duties under the Act. The SMB was viewed by some people as a free floating entity which did not report to anyone. Members of the SMBs in two areas thought that they should be a subgroup of the LCJB and would then be accountable to another body and would fit into an already existing structure. Views differed widely about the role of the SMB, including whether it should exist at all on the basis that its work could be done through local CDRPs or Chief Officer Groups.
- 9.6** Apart from getting membership and attendance right, all SMBs had been focused on appointing lay advisers although it was too early to assess their impact or contribution.
- 9.7** Despite the problems SMBs faced forming an identity and role, members did have aspirations about the future. They agreed that SMBs should be reviewing cases and tackling the issues that had arisen in MAPPA meetings at a strategic level, such as housing and mental health. In one area the SMB also saw a role in relation to performance management and quality assurance and in ensuring the wider involvement of other agencies, for example the Fire Brigade with their expertise about the behaviour of arsonists.

Transfer arrangements

- 9.8** A thematic report by HMI Probation *Movement of Cases. An Inspection of the Effectiveness of Arrangements for Handling the Movement of Offender Cases Between Probation Areas*, published in August 2004 noted that in the majority of MAPPA Level 3 transfer cases in the sample, the MAPPA coordinators were not used as the brokering point. ACO involvement was also not always sought as was required. The report informed Probation Circular 52/2004 *Case Transfer Instructions* which was issued in September 2004. Acknowledging that the thematic report and the circular had only been distributed three months before our fieldwork commenced, there were mixed views about cross-border issues and transfers of cases under MAPPA. Under the circular a MAPPA meeting must be held before a MAPPA case was transferred. One ACO had experience of areas trying to transfer a MAPPA case without going through the MAPPA process. Some hostels insisted that a MAPPA meeting should take place before they would accept a sex offender. We found a more positive picture of the role of the MAPPA coordinator and the transfer of MAPPA cases. In Devon & Cornwall regional meetings of MAPPA coordinators and a directory of MAPPA coordinators had improved the timely exchange of information. From our interviews with staff communication between MAPPA coordinators or ACOs about transfer issues generally seemed to work, but there were still disturbing accounts of areas not adhering to agreed transfer arrangements or prisoners arriving in an area without prior warning.

Joint work between police and probation staff

- 9.9** There were a small number of cases, from those selected by areas, as examples of joint work between police and probation where there was, in reality, little evidence of joint working except at MAPPA meetings. Considering the nature of the cases and the joint work that was taking place, in only 15% of our sample were liaison responsibilities clearly defined by the case manager. However evidence was present in 64% of cases that the case manager had liaised with others who provided interventions. In nearly half of the cases that were discussed at MAPPA meetings, there was not sufficient evidence of communication between police and probation staff outside those meetings. A police officer commented that better communication would result if case managers were issued with work mobile phones. On rare occasions, mainly because of human error rather than a conscious decision by police and probation staff, information was not shared.
- 9.10** From interviews with police and probation staff it was evident that they were not always recording the contact they had with each other. Sometimes this was because they discussed several cases at one time and did not record the result of the discussion in each offender's file. There were examples where action was taken by police and probation staff but the recording on the file did not reflect this. In our case sample in 17 out of 40 cases, where a change in risk of harm had been identified by the case manager, it was unclear whether the change had been notified to appropriate agencies and managed by probation taking into account

victim issues where relevant. In relation to the police the figures were 15 out of 32 cases.

- 9.11** Joint visits had taken place in 13% of the cases in our sample but, due to information not being recorded, it was not always clear why a joint visit had taken place, what information was gained and what further actions were required. When interviewing police and probation staff there was a clear understanding of each other's role. This was best illustrated by a case where the police carried out detailed monitoring of the activities of a sex offender in the community. The case manager on the other hand had more face-to-face contact with the sex offender in order to establish, for example, the sex offender's preoccupations. The combination of information from the police and case manager provided a fuller picture of the sex offender, which contributed to the assessment and management of risk of harm.
- 9.12** The frequency of appointments arranged by case managers conformed to at least the minimum national standards in 73% of cases and was excellent in 6%. A home visit by a case manager was undertaken within the required timescale in two-thirds of all cases and just under half of all cases contact by interviews and home visits exceeded national standards. In 73% of high or very high risk of harm cases a home visit by the case manager had taken place.
- 9.13** In 82% of high or very high risk of harm cases, where a potential public protection issue had arisen, appropriate action by probation staff had been taken. However management oversight of high or very high risk of harm cases within probation and the police was sufficiently in line with national and area policy in only 46% of cases which needed to be improved.

Police aspirations

- 9.14** Police officers of all ranks involved in managing sex offenders wanted more recognition within their respective forces for the work they carried out in terms of the priority given to the work and the resources allocated, particularly surveillance capability. A national course for officers engaged in supervising and visiting RSOs and more intrusive supervision at all levels would be welcome. The importance of a knowledgeable and supportive ACC for this area of work was seen as crucial. Having legal powers that reflected the present practice of completing home visits to sex offenders and gaining entry if necessary was also seen as essential for the future development and effectiveness of managing sex offenders in the community.

Suggested improvements from police and probation staff

9.15 For both police and probation staff the following improvements were mentioned:

- continuing to improve communication between police and probation
- co-location of police and probation staff either in a central unit and/or locally
- more joint training
- the appointment of a MAPPA coordinator
- more power to bring other agencies to account for not carrying out actions from MAPPA meetings
- more accommodation for sex offenders
- managing sex offenders who were either not registered or did not come under MAPPA
- more interventions available for sex offenders who are currently ineligible for accredited programmes.

9.16 There could still be improvements in communication between police and probation staff. For example, information from previous police investigations was not always available to inform risk assessments. Not all probation staff were aware of police expertise and the resources available to police officers. Beat officers were not always aware of curfew conditions. There was also rarely coordination between police and probation concerning home visits. We found just two cases where police and probation staff had adjusted their respective home visits in a coordinated way.

Strengths

- There was evidence of a strong working relationship between police and probation, with increased engagement from other agencies.
- With some exceptions, the transfer of cases subject to MAPPA was working satisfactorily, with MAPPA coordinators having a key role in this process.
- Regional work on public protection had contributed to achieving consistency and sharing best practice.
- The enthusiasm and professional commitment of both police and probation staff for their work and their aspiration to continue to develop and improve their effectiveness to protect the public.
- Potential benefits of co-located teams of police and probation staff.
- Police and probation staff were clear about their different roles.

Areas for improvement

- There was little evidence of links between the SMB and the LCJB.
- There was scope for more joint work on performance management and internal and external communication.
- Police and probation staff did not always record their contact with each other.
- In the majority of cases home visits by police and probation staff were not coordinated.
- There was a lack of management oversight of individual sex offender cases.

Good practice

In Merseyside Probation Area there was evidence of action to strengthen the links between MAPPAs and ACPCs. In each ACPC the local child protection unit was notified of any MAPPA meeting being held in respect of an offender who posed a risk to a child. As a result of this practice better quality advice and intelligence was available to MAPPA meetings.

APPENDIX I

JOINT INSPECTION INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

SOTI GLOBAL QUESTIONNAIRE

Questions	Questions for?
1.0 Strategy and Approach	
1.1 Were the national framework and priorities clearly communicated to the area?	Lead Senior Officer
1.2 How does the National Framework feed into your Force Crime Strategy?	Head of CID Line Manager
1.3 How were the National Framework and Force Crime Strategy communicated?	Line Manager
1.4 Does MAPPAs public protection and work with sex offenders feature in your Strategic Business Plan and communication plan?	Lead Senior Officer ACO
1.5 Is there a local action plan or business plan?	Line Manager
1.6 What are your priorities and how are they determined?	SMB
1.7 Are the needs of victims integrated in the relevant strategies?	Lead Senior Manager Head of CID Line Manager ACO
1.8 Are there clear policies and procedures concerning disclosure and the protection of potential victims?	Lead Senior Manager Head of CID Line Manager ACO
1.9 Has the area reviewed its practice against the objectives in the NPS Sex Offender Strategy and made efforts to apply the principles in the strategy?	ACO
1.10 Does the area have a strategic approach tackling the accommodation needs of sex offenders through Supporting People arrangements?	Lead Senior Manager Head of CID Line Manager ACO
1.11 Does the area have a strategic approach/plan which covers resources, training, communication and process issues (e.g. IT)?	Lead Senior Manager Head of CID Line Manager ACO
1.12 Has the area nominated a champion-lead officer at a senior level – how effective is their commitment demonstrated?	Lead Senior Manager Head of CID Line Manager ACO
1.13 How is the commitment to MAPPAs, public protection and working with sex offenders demonstrated? Tell us something about your direct involvement?	Lead Senior Manager Head of CID Line Manager ACO

1.14 How does the force/probation area manage intelligence?	Head of CID Line Manager ACO
1.15 How does the force/probation area manage intelligence and what direction are you given?	Police Officer Case Manager
1.16 Describe how your public protection work is organised?	Head of CID Line Manager ACO
1.17 Are you using (Police) Are probation staff being used (Probation) – to carry out risk assessments for applications for SOPOs?	Head of CID Line Manager ACO
1.18 What are the lines of accountability within the organisation for operational work?	Lead Senior Manager Head of CID Line Manager ACO
1.19 Who are you accountable to?	Police Officer MAPPA Coordinator Case Manager
1.20 At what stage are you at with the implementation of ViSOR and have there been any issues with implementation?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer ACO Case Manager (adapt)
1.21 What is the role of police liaison officers in prisons, for example their participation in prison risk management meetings and the use of intelligence from prisons in the community?	Head of CID Line Manager ACO
1.22 How do you link with police liaison officers in prisons – what is your level of involvement?	Police Officer Case Manager
1.23 What contingency arrangements are there for community impact situations?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer
1.24 How are issues of notification of people coming into the area and disclosure issues dealt with?	Lead Senior Officer Line Manager ACO
2.0 Implementation and Planning	
2.1 What is your role with public protection work and specifically sex offenders?	Lead Senior Officer Line Manager ACO
2.2 What is your role with public protection work and specifically sex offenders and how does it link with the ACC?	Head of CID
2.3 What is your role with public protection work and specifically sex offenders and who do you have most links with?	Police Officer Case Manager
2.4 What is your role and function and how does it contribute to the effective management of sex offenders in the community?	SMB MAPPA Coordinator
2.5 How do you see your role supporting MAPPA?	MAPPA Coordinator

2.6	Have the provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 been implemented and how?	Lead Senior Officer Head of CID Line Manager ACO
2.7	How has the implementation of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 impacted on your role?	Police Officer Case Manager
2.8	What range of interventions with sex offenders are available?	Line Manager Police Officer ACO Case Manager
2.9	Are there any issues around interventions used with sex offenders concerning access and availability?	Line Manager Police Officer ACO Case Manager
2.10	What interventions are actually used, for example surveillance, and are interventions evaluated? Are outcomes measured?	Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
2.11	Are interventions in sex offenders' lives balanced with the needs of the offenders and quality of life issues?	Line Manager ACO Police Officer Case Manager
2.12	Are diversity issues identified and acted on with regard to working with sex offenders?	ALL
2.13	How are sex offenders included in MAPPAs and is there a core acceptance criteria for MAPPAs referrals? Are you satisfied all sex offenders come within MAPPAs?	Line Manager
2.14	How many sex offenders are there?	Line Manager
2.15	How are victims' needs taken in to account?	Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
3.0	People	ALL
3.1	What are the resources dedicated to MAPPAs, public protection and working with sex offenders?	
3.2	Are there any workload issues?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer ACO Case Manager
3.3	What training has been given to ensure knowledge and competence particularly in the assessment and management of risk?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer ACO Case Manager
3.4	How does MAPPAs and public protection feature in individual appraisal (PARs, PDRs) and objectives?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer ACO Case Manager

3.5	What is the rationale for the allocation of human resources for this area of work?	Lead Senior Officer Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer ACO Case Manager
3.6	What contingency plans are in place for sickness and vacancies – who covers the work? How are decisions of prioritisation made?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer ACO Case Manager
3.7	What human resources support mechanisms are in place?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer ACO Case Manager
3.8	What is your employment status – FTC, secondment?	MAPPA Coordinator
3.9	Who is your line manager – who gives you supervision?	MAPPA Coordinator
3.10	What training have you received for the role?	MAPPA Coordinator SMB
3.11	Do you have any contact with other staff undertaking the same job in other areas?	MAPPA Coordinator
3.12	Where are you physically located and is this location in your view the best place?	MAPPA Coordinator
3.13	Do you chair meetings and are there any tasks that you feel are outside your remit?	MAPPA Coordinator
3.14	How do you think your role will change and develop in the future?	MAPPA Coordinator
3.15	What is your view of the quality of joint work between the police and probation staff?	MAPPA Coordinator
3.16	What joint training has been undertaken and arranged – how is it funded and evaluated?	SMB
4.0	<u>Processes and Procedures</u>	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
4.1	What processes and procedures are in place for MAPPA, public protection and working with sex offenders?	Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
4.2	Are staff clear about the difference between likelihood of reoffending and risk of harm?	Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
4.3	What assessment tools are used?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
4.4	Have staff been trained in the use of risk assessment tools?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager

4.5 How are actions from assessments being carried out?	Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
4.6 How is information recorded?	Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
4.7 Are there guidelines on practice? For example the purpose of home visits to RSOs?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
4.8 How are MAPPAs cases identified?	Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
4.9 Can you describe arrangements for the chairing of the SMB and how issues of attendance are addressed and the process for the production, launch and circulation of the Annual Report?	SMB
4.10 How does IT support processes?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
4.11 How are cases tracked across agencies?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
4.12 Are there any mechanisms for reviewing cases where reoffending takes place particularly serious reoffending?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
4.13 How are risk management plans monitored and reviewed?	Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
4.14 How are requests for surveillance prioritised?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
4.15 How is information and intelligence shared and what is the role of IT in this function?	MAPPAs Coordinator
4.16 Are processes and procedures helpful or a hindrance?	Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
5.0 Performance Management	
5.1 What performance information do you keep and how is it used?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer ACO Case Manager

5.2	What performance information is available and how is it used?	Head of CID Line Manager ACO
5.3	What do you monitor, how do you do it and how does it effect policy and strategy?	SMB
5.4	Have you developed systems for monitoring cost-effectiveness of cases? How do you know resources are appropriately targeted?	Senior Lead Officer Head of CID Line Manager ACO
5.5	How is good practice identified and shared?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer ACO Case Manager
5.6	Do staff know What Works when managing sex offenders in the community? Is there any evaluation of outcomes?	Line Manager Police Officer Case Manager
5.7	Has MAPPA contributed to the early apprehension of sex offenders?	Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer ACO Case Manager
5.8	Have any joint targets been developed?	SMB
5.9	What do you think you have achieved since you existed?	SMB
6.0 Partnerships		
6.1	What representation does the force/probation area have on the LCJB?	Senior Lead Officer Head of CID ACO
6.2	Are MAPPA or public protection issues or issues related to sex offenders specifically ever raised within the LCJB, are such issues in the LCJB Business Plan or is there a person on the LCJB who represents those issues?	Senior Lead Officer Head of CID ACO
6.3	Within your current role what engagement do you have with other bodies such as the LCJB, CDRP, ACPC or SMB of MAPPA and other partners?	ALL
6.4	Do you have a lay adviser and if so what is your experience of the role so far?	Senior Lead Officer Head of CID ACO SMB
6.5	What are the funding arrangements for MAPPA?	SMB Senior Lead Officer ACO
6.6	To what extent do you think the duty to cooperate agencies actually cooperate?	Senior Lead Officer Head of CID Line Manager ACO Police Officer Case Manager

6.7	How does the SMB link with other bodies such as the LCJB, CDRP and ACPC? What are the connections and how do they work?	SMB
6.8	What is the structure of the SMB of MAPPAs and are there any geography or boundary issues?	SMB
6.9	How effectively are cross-border issues and case transfers addressed under MAPPAs?	Senior Lead Officer Head of CID Line Manager Police Officer ACO Case Manager MAPPAs Coordinator
6.10	Is there a joint approach to communication?	Senior Lead Officer Head of CID Line Manager ACO
6.11	Has any work been undertaken to consider the joint resource implications of MAPPAs and public protection work generally?	Head of CID ACO
6.12	What processes and structures are in place to ensure joint performance management?	Head of CID ACO
6.13	How effective is liaison with other agencies?	Head of CID ACO
6.14	How do you see the role of the SMB developing in the future?	SMB
6.15	What would you see changed or improved or in overall terms offer any suggestions how the system could be improved? Are there any specific difficulties, blockages or barriers?	ALL