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Home Office - Building a safe, just and tolerant society/
Author: David Blunkett
Published: 15 July 2004

Review of the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000
The Home Secretary's Response to Lord Carlile of Berriew's Report on the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000
Thank you for your detailed report on the operation of the Terrorism Act, in 2002 and 2003.

Your report raises numerous issues. I would like to take this opportunity to respond to them formally and to provide an indication of the progress that has been made since its publication. I will be placing a copy of the response in the House library and on the Home Office website.

Special Advocates

The Law Officers have considered the comments made in your Report. Preliminary steps are being taken to formulate draft guidance and/or training for special advocates which will require consideration by the Law Officers, and consultation with relevant stakeholders.

Stop and Search Powers

Although you agreed that the stop and search powers under section 44 of the Act remain necessary and proportional to the threat from terrorism, you raised particular issues about their operation particularly highlighting the need to ensure that searches are restricted to terrorist articles. Further important issues were outlined in Lord Justice Brooke’s judgement on the use of the powers at the East London Arms Fair.

Recently published guidance sets out the mechanisms which forces should adopt in applying and justifying the use of section 44 stop and search powers. Officers are required to review fully the intelligence on each authorisation and clearly show the link between that intelligence and the geographic extent of the location in which the powers will be used.

Furthermore, the newly established Home Office Stop and Search Action Team works to ensure that stop and search as a police power is used fairly and as effectively as possible in the prevention and detection of crime. Specifically we wish to increase the confidence of the black and ethnic minority community in the use of the power, and where appropriate reduce disproportionality.

TRANSEC

The searching of control authority staff, introduced within the last year, is now bedding in well and sensible practices have been derived from the TRANSEC protocol. A few local issues needed to be addressed and have now largely been resolved.

In respect of flight crews, TRANSEC inspectors monitor staff search standards as part of their compliance regime. If it was found that lower standards were in place, appropriate action would be taken with the airport.

Special Branch Ports Accommodation

We recognise that in order for Special Branch officers at ports to be able to exercise their examining officer powers under Schedule 7, there must be basic facilities to support that function. Port operators also understand this.

Schedule 7 does not specify the sorts of facilities that should be provided and the level of facilities provided to Special Branch varies across the UK from port to port according to local circumstances. The requirements can change depending on changes to the profile of the port.

Para 14(10(b) of Schedule 7 gives the Secretary of State a power to issue notices to port managers requiring them to provide, at their own expense, specified facilities for the purposes of the embarkation and disembarkation of passengers. The power has not been used. Rather than jeopardise good working relationships at ports, we opted instead to negotiate with the police, and representatives of port operators, a national Memorandum of Understanding setting out what facilities should be provided. Negotiations are being taken up by the Border Agencies Working Group with a view to developing a more co-ordinated approach.

Schedule 7 paragraph 8

You highlighted the ambiguity over examining officers powers under Schedule 7 concerning the scope of paragraph 8. We will legislate in order to remove any uncertainty.

Repealing section 17 (6) of Schedule 7

You recommend the repeal of section 17(6) of Schedule 7, whereby an examining officer is not permitted to request from the owner of a ship or aircraft ‘specified information’ if that information is required to be provided to immigration officers under the Immigration Act 1971. We accept this recommendation and will repeal as soon as a suitable legislative vehicle becomes available.

Passenger Manifests

Passenger and goods information is key to effective controls at our air and seaports. Work remains to be done on ensuring consistent and effective information is collected. The generally good relationship between the enforcement agencies and the industry will continue to develop this.

Security at Small Ports and Airfields

The report acknowledges good regional Special Branch working and stresses that small ports operators and pilots of smaller aircraft are highly vigilant. The government recognises the contribution made by business and the community and the good relationships they have with Special Branch.

TRANSEC, Police and the Security Service are working together to update the joint guidance package that is given to airfield operators and pilots to help them identify suspicious behaviour. The guidance will also give clear instructions as to what action they should take. In addition, best practice from around the UK is currently being processed to develop updated guidelines for enforcement agency activity at General Aviation sites. Appended to these guidelines will be a menu of options to assist in the provision of intelligence led co-ordinated activity.

The border agencies are engaged in a series of joint working initiatives to identify and combat external threats to UK borders at small ports and airfields. Information is held centrally on all small airports, airfields, heliports and flying schools and is regularly updated.

A number of work strands are in place and are kept under constant review, including for example the training and screening of flight students.

Multi agency threat and risk assessment (MATRA) work has been rolled out to 44 airports in the UK. The work has been successful in getting a joined up approach to the totality of airport security, beginning the process of a more effective and coherent response to the threat both international, national and local. We are now looking to trial the MATRA process at sea ports.

12 hour Notification Period

Paragraph 12(3) of Schedule 7 says that where an aircraft is used to transport goods (rather than people), it may not call at or leave a non-designated airport unless 12 hours' notice is given, in writing, to a constable for the police area in which the port is situated. Police will accept a faxed message to a given location within a force area.

The previous National Co-ordinator of Ports Policing advised Special Branch officers that no discretion was to be permitted, except in urgent cases (eg Ambulance cases), to ensure absolute control over the use of non-designated airfields and to ensure unanimity across the country.

We will, of course, give further consideration to your suggestion.

Use of Video Hearing Systems

We have no objection in principle to the recommendation that video hearing systems be employed for extensions of detention under the Terrorism Act. We will consult further on this issue.

Statistics on the Use of Authorisations for Obtaining Fingerprints

You recommend that statistics on the use of authorisations for obtaining fingerprints should be made available. We have no objection to this in principle and will, again, consult further.


Cross-Border Issues

You raise several issues of cross-border working – specifically (a) whether differing roles and functions of the police, Crown Prosecution Service (in England and Wales) and Procurators-Fiscal (in Scotland) impede cross-border activity and (b) whether warrants for arrest, search and seizure can be used with sufficient flexibility so as not to impede cross-border policing activity.

Initial consultation with the Scottish Executive and the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS) has suggested that the use of warrants in cross-border scenarios has not been subject to sufficient testing in respect of the differing legal systems in Scotland and England. Further, there appears to be no uniform method adopted throughout Scotland in the use of warrants in terrorist investigations. There may be value in Crown Office and the Procurator Fiscal Service issuing guidelines to Area Procurators Fiscal. This would ensure that a consistent approach is adopted across Scotland and would ensure that the progress of an investigation will not be impeded should it extend elsewhere in the UK.

We will, of course, continue to examine the cross-border functioning of the Terrorism Act in conjunction with the relevant departments and agencies.

I hope that this has gone some way in responding to the recommendations that you have made. We will continue to keep the legislation under scrutiny, amending and improving where necessary.

We shall of course continue to provide all the administrative support necessary to carry out your review process.

Thank you once again for your Report.

Lord Carlile of Berriew QC's Report on the Operation of the Terrorism Act in 2002 and 2003

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