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The relative availability of work-life
balance practices to lone parents
in Britain

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The Relative Availability of Work-life Balance Practices to Lone Parents in Britain

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

About the study

- The aim of the study is to investigate whether the availability of work-life balance practices to an employee is influenced by them being a lone parent. The study explores the availability of these practices to lone parents compared with their availability to employees who are not lone parents and, in particular, partnered parents.
- The analysis focuses on six major work-life balance practices: parental leave, paid leave at short notice, subsidised child-care, flexi-time, home working and job sharing.
- The study examines the factors which may affect the availability of work-life balance practices. These factors are divided into two subsets: *individual characteristics* including gender, age, marital status, age of child, ethnicity, education, union membership, occupation and job characteristics (hourly wage, working hours, etc.) and *workplace characteristics* including industrial sector, size of the workplace, the proportion of women in the workplace and union recognition.
- The study is based on data from the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS98). Thus, the survey was conducted prior to the introduction of several statutory entitlements in the 1999 Employment Relations Act. WERS98 collected data from nearly 30,000 employees and 3,000 workplaces with more than 10 employees across Great Britain, nearly 1,000 of these workplaces were part of the WERS90-98 panel survey. However, this study on lone parents and the availability of work-life balance practices uses data on only about 20,000 employees and around 1,500 workplaces (i.e. those for which matched employee and workplace surveys are available). Findings are based on employees' perceived availability of work-life balance practices.

Key findings

- The overall finding is that, although access to work-life balance practices differs between lone parents and other employees, it is not being a lone parent per se which affects this access. It is certain individual characteristics that lone parents commonly share and the types of workplaces that they are employed in which directly influence access to these practices.
- The most commonly available practice was paid leave at short notice with 46 per cent of all employees and 41 per cent of lone parents reporting that this was available to them. Flexi-time was reported to be available to 32 per cent of employees and 35 per cent of lone parents, followed by parental leave (27 per cent and 30 per cent), job sharing (14 per cent and 15 per cent), home working (9 per cent and 8 per cent) and subsidised child-care (4 per cent and 6 per cent).
- Compared to other employees, lone parents were only significantly less likely to report that they had access to paid leave at short notice (41 per cent for lone parents and 46 per cent for employees who were not lone parents). Compared to partnered parents, lone parents were significantly more likely to report they had access to flexi-time (30 per cent and 34 per cent) but less likely to report that working from home (10 per cent and eight per cent) and paid leave at short notice (46 per cent and 41 per cent) were available to them.

Individual characteristics

- Of the individual characteristics found to have an affect on employee access, lone parents are more likely than either employees who are not lone parents and/or partnered parents: to be female, to be non-white, to be younger, to have a lower hourly wage, to work less hours, to have shorter tenure, to have lower educational levels, to not be on a fixed-term contract, to not be a union member and to not be a manager or a professional but work in personal services.
- Of the work-life balance practices where there are significant differences in provision between lone parents and either other employees and/or partnered parents:

paid leave at short notice was less likely to be reported to be available by women, younger employees, those working in personal and protective services and employees on fixed-term contracts;

flexi-time was more likely to be reported to be available by union members and non-white employees; and

the opportunity to work from home was less likely to be considered to be available by women, younger employees and non-whites but more likely to be available to union members and employees working in personal and protective services.

- Those employees with a lower hourly wage, a shorter job tenure and lower levels of education, who work less hours and who are not managers or professionals are less likely to have access to work-life balance practices.
- Other individual characteristics found to determine the availability of work-life balance practices, irrespective of marital status, are being recently involved in a training programme (availability of work-life balance practices increases) and being on a temporary contract (availability varies depending on the work-life balance practice).

Workplace characteristics

- Of the workplace characteristics found to have an affect on employee access, lone parents are more likely than either employees who are not lone parents and/or partnered parents to be employed in workplaces: with a higher proportion of women, with a higher proportion of younger people, with higher dismissal and resignation rates and without either a human resources representative or union recognition in negotiations. Lone parents are also more likely to work in education but less likely to work in the manufacturing and the electrical and gas sectors.
- Of the work-life balance practices where there are significant differences in provision between lone parents and either other employees and/or partnered parents:

the option of paid leave at short notice is less likely to be available in workplaces with a higher proportion of younger employees, with higher dismissal and resignation rates and which do not have a human resources representative;

flexi-time is more likely to be available in workplaces with higher proportions of women and younger employees in the workforce and is less likely in workplaces without union recognition; and

the opportunity to work from home increases with the proportion of women in the workplace

and the resignation rate but declines with the increase in the proportion of younger employees and the dismissal rate. It is also less likely to be available if there is no human resource representative.

- Employees working in manufacturing and education were less likely to report that work-life balance practices were available to them whereas those in the electrical and gas sectors were more likely to report access to these practices.
- Other workplace characteristics found to affect the availability of work-life balance practices, irrespective of marital status, are: workplace size and establishment status (independent or multiple site), although reported availability varies depending on the work-life balance practice; the level of employee discretion over their work (those employees with a lot of discretion over their work have more access to the availability of work-life balance practices); and certain industrial sectors, for example the finance and the health sectors.

Overview of the report

- Section 1 outlines the current policy context and reasons for the increasing demand for work-life balance practices.
- Section 2 discusses various work-life balance practices and how they are being implemented.
- Section 3 provides a brief description of the WERS98 data set including the survey design.
- Section 4 outlines the theories explaining why employers choose to provide work-life balance practices including a review of the relevant literature with emphasis on the explanatory variables to be included in the analysis.
- Section 5 outlines the variables used in the analysis including the indicators of work-life balance practices (the six practices outlined above), the individual characteristics and the workplace characteristics. There is also a discussion of how lone parents differ from other employees with regards to these variables.
- Section 6 describes the methodology and how to interpret the results of the analysis of the availability of work-life balance practices.
- Section 7 provides the results of the analysis of the availability of work-life balance practices to lone parents and examines the individual and workplace characteristics which influence this availability.
- Section 8 presents the conclusions of the study.
- The appendices contain tables of the data (weighted and unweighted) used in the analysis, the results of the analysis and further details of the methodology.

1. INTRODUCTION AND POLICY CONTEXT

The aim of the study is to investigate whether the availability of work-life balance practices to an employee is influenced by them being a lone parent (a parent, of a dependent child aged 18 or under, who is not living with a spouse or partner). The study explores the availability of these practices to lone parents compared with their availability to employees who are not lone parents and, in particular, partnered parents. It examines the individual and workplace characteristics, which may affect the availability of work-life balance practices to employees. The analysis focuses on six major work-life balance practices: parental leave (non-statutory); subsidised child-care (a workplace nursery or help with the cost of child-care); flexi-time (flexible working hours); home working (working at or from home in normal working hours); job sharing (sharing a full time job with someone else); and paid leave at short notice¹.

Policy context

The Labour government has made the reduction of child poverty (and families living in poverty) a major tenet of its policy programme since its election in May 1997. It is estimated that one in three children in Britain are living in poverty (4.5 million children); most of these come from lone parent families and from no-work families (Piachaud and Sutherland, 2000). The provision of paid employment for parents is believed to be a primary conduit for these children to leave poverty.

Many of the developed countries of the world have actively encouraged families in poverty to increase their labour market participation by linking welfare programmes to some measure of hours worked (Elwood, 2000; Blank, 2001; Caracciolo, 2001; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001)². This trend was especially strong in the latter part of the 1990s. The British government has similarly introduced and/or strengthened labour market oriented policies for poor families, primarily via the Working Families Tax Credit and the New Deal for Lone Parents (Blundell and Hoynes, 2001).

The Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) was introduced in October 1999, replacing the previous Family Credit (FC) scheme. There have been three major studies considering the impact of the WFTC (Blundell *et al.*, 1998; Gregg *et al.*, 1999; Paull *et al.*, 2000). There is some disagreement between these studies as to the overall labour market effect of the policy on poor families, with a tendency of females to lower their labour market participation rates in response to increases in their male partner's participation rate. Nevertheless, they are consistent in their conclusion that the participation rates of lone parents will rise (between 1.6 and 2.2 per cent).

¹ For the first five measures, employees were asked 'if you personally needed any of these arrangements, would they be available at this workplace?' For the sixth measure respondents were asked 'if you needed to take a day off work at short notice, for example to look after a sick family member, how would you usually do it?' It should be noted that the data used in the report (WERS98) was collected prior to the introduction of the statutory right to unpaid 'time-off for dependants' to cover emergencies and to parental leave. These issues are discussed at greater length in sections 4 and 5.

² These countries include the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and some members of the EU (Caracciolo, 2001).

The New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) was introduced across Britain in 1998 (a limited prototype programme was in place from mid 1997). Although the NDLP is relevant for all lone parents claiming Income Support in Britain, the primary target is lone parents whose youngest dependent child is already in the second term of primary school (aged five years and three months or more). These parents are offered a combination of help with job search, training, and limited child-care: the uptake on this offer is close to 90 per cent. The vast majority of people participating in the NDLP are females (95 per cent) and by the end of October 2000, 43 per cent of those participating (88,810 people) had left the programme for employment (DfEE, 2001). Early work exploring the possible impact of the NDLP suggests that the programme will have a substantial impact, increasing the chances of leaving Income Support to enter employment by five per cent to nine per cent, depending on factors such as the time already spent on income support (McKnight, 2000).

The potential effectiveness of the government's total labour market oriented programmes is estimated to be high, resulting in 1.0 to 1.85 million children moving out of poverty by 2002 (Piachaud and Sutherland, 2000). The success of these programmes obviously relies on growth in overall employment and in the latter half of the 1990s the growth in employment in Britain has been exceptionally high. At five per cent to six per cent, the 2001 unemployment rate in the UK was the lowest it has been for a generation³.

These Government policies and the rising propensity for women to enter the labour market, to stay there when having children, and to return after child rearing are leading to many more parents with dependent families entering the labour market (Bevan *et al.*, 1999). Changes in the labour supply of women and the greater sharing of household, non-labour market work across parents has led to an increased demand from workers (male and female) for work-life balance practices. Rising numbers of elderly people in the population has increased the need for elder care, further strengthening this demand (Department of Trade and Industry, 2001a). The families concerned cover the full socio-economic spectrum. The Government has recognised the desire, and often the need, these families have for work-life balance policies.

'Families are the core of our society, but they are under pressure. Women and men struggle with choices over work and family responsibilities...The Government is pledged to support families and children...We want to encourage more family friendly employment...' (Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 1998).

Whilst adopting a multi-pronged approach to encouraging work-life balance working environments⁴ (including the National Childcare Strategy, extended maternity and parental leave entitlements, paid adoptive leave, the minimum wage, and the new WFTC), the major component of the Government's programme is the Work-Life Balance campaign. This campaign includes a large scale public awareness strategy; producing and distributing

³ Ellwood (2000) argues that this reliance on the overall state of the labour market means that shocks and recessions in the developed economies could not only reverse this declining trend in child poverty but perhaps exacerbate the original problem. Recent terrorist actions and the threatened recession suggest that these trends need to be monitored.

⁴ Work-life balance policies can cover an array of worker benefits including the provision of flexible working arrangements and leave arrangements. This report will investigate the availability of six major work-life balance policies: parental leave, paid leave at short notice, subsidised child-care, flexi-time, home working, and job sharing. Further discussion of these and other work-life balance policies are provided in section 2.

information to individuals and firms concerning their legal rights and obligations, ways in which the work-life balance practices can be implemented, and the potential gains from implementation⁵.

Firms are increasingly aware that there may be gains to implementing work-life balance policies including retaining and attracting staff, increasing morale, lowering absenteeism and raising productivity. Typically using a case study approach, several studies in Britain have found net gains for firms who have introduced these practices (surveys are provided in DfEE, 2000a; DTI, 2000; Forth *et al.*, 1996; and Dex and Scheibl, 1999 and 2001).

It is generally assumed that the individual employee also gains from the availability of these policies (Department of Trade and Industry, 2001b). It is not clear, however, that all workers have equal access to such programmes. Studies for the US reveal that women in high paid managerial and professional employment are more likely to have access to work-life balance policies than lower paid, lower skilled females (Deitch, and Huffman, 2000).

It is important that work-life balance benefits are also available to those employees at the lowest end of the income scale, in order to help those families who are trying to move out of poverty. This is especially so for lone parent families who often have no alternative source of assistance with the joint demands of parenting and employment. Indeed, the effectiveness of the Government's anti-poverty programme may be impaired if lone parents cannot find family friendly employment. Helping lone parents to find better jobs through training and search assistance will be of little long term benefit if constraints such as child-care issues and flexibility to care for a sick child or attend a parent-teacher meeting cannot be catered for in the employment relationship.

This report explores the relative availability of work-life balance policies to lone parents in the British labour force and investigates the determinants of this availability at both the individual and the workplace level.

Studies exploring the characteristics of firms who have work-life balance provisions or of employees who have access to them tend to use data either at the workplace or at the employee level (Kelly and Dobbin, 1999; Dex and Scheibl, 2001; Guthrie and Roth, 1999; Hogarth *et al.* 2001). This report makes use of new linked workplace and employee data which enables us to simultaneously consider which workplaces are more likely to offer work-life balance practices; what types of individuals are more likely to receive them; and the interaction between individual availability conditional upon the workplace they are employed in (and vice versa). Using linked data on over 20,000 individuals and almost 1,500 workplaces from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98), this study analyses the relative availability of six employer provided work-life balance policies to lone parents; parental leave, paid leave at short notice, subsidised child-care, flexi-time, home working, and job sharing.

⁵Including a selective funding programme - the Work-Life Balance Challenge Fund - to further encourage firms (DfEE, 2000b)

2. MEASURES OF WORK-LIFE BALANCE POLICIES

In the postwar period, work policies and benefits were often shaped by the norms of an 'ideal' worker who worked full time and left unpaid household work to someone else (Williams, 2000). Increasingly workers are having to cope with both of these roles, thus work-life balance corporate policies have been introduced and can be divided into two categories (Bailyn, 1993; Bailyn, Drago, and Kochan, 2001).⁶ One category provides services such as subsidised or on-site day care, sick-child-care services, employee assistance programmes, and on-site meal preparation to help employees fulfill the standards of the ideal worker. The other category is comprised of benefits that allow employees flexibility to deviate from the model of the ideal worker to better balance work and family concerns.

One major dimension of this second category of work-life balance benefits is leave policies. Currently, all pregnant employees are entitled to 18 weeks of ordinary maternity leave and women who have completed one year of service with their employer are able to take additional maternity leave. Moreover, mothers and fathers are legally entitled to 13 weeks of unpaid parental leave to be used over the first five years of the child's life. Paternity leave, although not a current statutory entitlement, is scheduled to take effect in 2003. Recent measures in the Employment Bill (DTI, 2001c) will increase ordinary maternity leave (paid) to 26 weeks and additional maternity leave (unpaid) to 26 weeks; grant paternity leave of two weeks (paid); enable adoptive parents to take paid adoptive leave; and grant parental leave for parents of disabled children of 18 weeks⁷. In other countries there is less of a distinction between types of leave and workers may be provided with a fixed term of leave which they can divide between medical and family leave⁸. Employers are, typically, able to offer more generous benefits, in both compensation and time allowed off (including time off for emergencies), and these additional leave policies are an important category of employer-sponsored work-life balance policies. Surveying for WERS98 took place prior to the changes brought in under the Employment Relations Act 1999, when maternity leave entitlement was 14 weeks, with women required to serve two years service in order to qualify for additional maternity leave, and parental leave was not a statutory entitlement.

A second dimension of work-life balance policies that allow deviations from the ideal worker norm includes those provisions that change the regular work schedule. One major example in this category is job sharing initiatives in which (typically) two employees work part-time to share the responsibilities and total hours of one full time position. Allowing workers to choose to work part-time in the absence of a formal job sharing arrangement is another example.

Other policies in this category are flexi-time working schedules in which workers have greater control over when they put in their hours each week at work. Another class of work-life

⁶ Case study examples of employer-sponsored work-life balance policies are described in Bureau of National Affairs (1986), Bravo (1995), and Bevan *et al.* (1999).

⁷ The legislation outlined here regarding extended maternity leave, and the introduction of paternity leave and adoption leave was implemented under the Employment Act 2002 on 6 April 2003. Parents of children with a disability are also entitled to 18 weeks (unpaid) parental leave.

⁸ For example, under the American Family and Medical Leave Act, employers with more than 50 employees must provide employees with a minimum of 12 weeks of (unpaid) family and medical leave, which includes the British concepts of maternity, paternity, and parental leaves, each year (Budd and Brey, 2000). Employers can offer some payment during this leave if they wish and/or offer longer periods of leave.

balance policies comprises those policies that allow workers to telecommute and work from home⁹, which are also being taken forward through the Employment Bill. Recent proposals from the Work and Parents Taskforce (2001) will allow parents of children aged under six years old, or disabled children under 18 years old, a statutory right to request to work flexible hours and place on employers a statutory duty to consider these requests seriously (Bain, 2001; DTI, 2001d).

As discussed previously, lone parents may have fewer resources available to them to manage the often competing aims of parenthood and employment. They, in particular, might need these types of work-life balance policies to enable them to move into steady (longer tenure) employment patterns which is the aim of the Government's anti-poverty programmes.

A variety of important research issues emerge from these work-life balance policies. Are these policies utilised by individual employees and are they effective? (Haley *et al.*, 2001; Thompson *et al.*, 1999; Waldfogel, 1998). Are employees willing to pay for them? (Drago *et al.*, 2001). Should they be mandated as a matter of public policy? (Heymann, 2000). Are these policies sufficient by themselves to reconcile the conflicts of increased demands at both work and home? (Bailyn, 1993). And, when are these policies adopted? (Bardoel *et al.*, 1999; Deitch and Huffman, 2001; Osterman, 1995). It is this last question that is the focus of this report.

⁹ A more extensive list of types of work-life balance practices is provided in Department of Trade and Industry, (2001a) and Work and Parents Taskforce (2001).

3. DATA

The study is based on data from the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS 98)¹⁰. WERS 98 is the fourth in a series of workplace employment relations surveys. It was sponsored by DTI, ACAS, the Economic and Social Research Council and the Policy Studies Institute. Previous surveys were carried out in 1980, 1984 and 1990¹¹.

The 1998 survey¹² is the largest of its kind conducted anywhere in the world. Over 3,000 managers were interviewed, together with nearly 1,000 worker representatives (where present). New to the 1998 survey was a follow-up questionnaire of employees in the surveyed workplaces; nearly 30,000 employees participated. The large sample size and high response rate¹³ means that the data is statistically representative of all British workplaces with more than 10 employees¹⁴.

WERS98 data were released in 1999. There have been, so far, no studies specifically considering lone parent access to work-life balance practices using this (or earlier versions of this) data set. There have been a limited number of studies of related issues using earlier versions of the WERS data set (Millward *et al.*, 1999), smaller cross-sectional studies (Forth *et al.*, 1996 and Hogarth *et al.*, 2001), case studies (Bevan *et al.*, 1999), or the Labour Force Survey (Work and Parents Taskforce, 2001). However, the linkable employee surveys add a major, and very valuable, component to these existing studies¹⁵.

¹⁰ Department of Trade and Industry (1999). Workplace Employee Relations Survey: Cross-Section, 1998 (computer file). 4th ed. Colchester: The Data Archive (distributor), 22 December 1999. SN: 3955.

¹¹ The first was the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1980 (WIRS80), the second and third were carried out in 1984 and 1990 (WIRS84 and WIRS90). WERS98 is the first to include detailed questions pertaining to work-life balance practices.

¹² The main volume of findings, 'Britain at Work,' based on the cross-sectional survey, was published in September 1999. Its companion volume, 'All Change at Work,' published in May 2000, provides analyses based on the panel survey and also draws on the findings from earlier WERS surveys.

¹³ The response rates were 80 per cent for the management interviews, 82 per cent for the worker representative interviews and 64 per cent for the employee questionnaire.

¹⁴ For more detail on the survey, see Airey, C. *et al.*, 'The Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) 1997-8: Technical Report (Cross Section and Panel Surveys)', *WERS98 Data Dissemination Service*, NIESR, London.

¹⁵ Following the completion of the preliminary version of this report, two working papers by Dex and Smith (2001a and 2001b) have become available. These papers consider employee's access to work-life balance practices, and which workplaces make these practices available, respectively. These papers also use the WERS98 data sets. However, they do not link the data and the number of workplaces included in their analysis is not constrained to match those where employee surveys were returned (which leads to different mean values for workplace variables). The authors also do not explore the impact of lone parent status. In general, where overlap does occur, the results in these papers are broadly consistent with those presented in this report.

4. WORK-LIFE BALANCE PRACTICES IN THE WORKPLACE CONTEXT

There is a range of alternative explanations available in the literature as to why employers might choose to establish work-life balance practices in their workplaces. Three theories are relevant to this analysis: neoclassical economic, internal labour market, and institutional (or neo-institutional) explanations.

The neoclassical economics explanations of employer-provided benefits focus on employer decision-making in spot labour markets. The use of non-pecuniary benefits as a tool to attract employees is well documented in the labour supply literature (Killingsworth, 1983). Economic theory suggests that firms will introduce work-life balance policies if they increase profits either via an increase in productivity or by lowering the costs associated with higher wages or higher turnover and/or absenteeism (Glass and Fujimoto, 1995; Department of Trade and Industry, 2001b, page 8). The firm has a range of non-pecuniary benefits that it could introduce but it would only choose to offer work-life balance benefits if it thought that there was a sufficient level of demand amongst its current and potential employees (Guthrie and Roth, 1999).

In this theory, changes in the labour supply of women and the division of household non-labour market work across parents has led to an increased demand from workers (male and female) for work-life balance practices. Nevertheless, this demand appears to be stronger amongst female employees (Baroel *et al.*, 1999). Thus a positive relationship between workplaces with a large proportion of female employees and the presence of these benefits is expected (Guthrie and Roth, 1999). However, it is not clear that women of different occupations and income levels rank the array of possible work-life balance benefits equally (Ingrams and Simons, 1995, and Kelly and Dobbin, 1999).

Internal labour market explanations of employer-provided benefits stem from the employers' need to develop employee commitment. Firms invest in workers and they want workers to invest in firm-specific human capital and have high levels of commitment. Thus, Osterman (1995) argues, firms provide non-pecuniary benefits such as work-life balance practices when they face difficulties employing high quality workers into work tasks that require high levels of commitment and non-supervised performance (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Empirically, this implies that measures of internal labour market and high commitment work systems, such as the presence of training, longer tenure levels, higher general education levels, job ladders, work teams, and employee seniority will be important for the availability of work-life balance practices.

In contrast, institutional theories emphasise that organisations respond not only to economic factors, but also to the institutional environment (Guthrie and Ross, 1999; Kelly and Dobbin, 1999). In this model, firms are essentially pressured into adopting work-life balance policies by various institutions including trade unions¹⁶. Unionisation of a work group can bring about two important changes in the workplace. One, to the extent that the right to strike results in collective bargaining power that is greater than the individual, labour's bargaining power will increase. This increased bargaining power might allow unions to negotiate work-life balance policies. Two, union representation can change the nature of workplace decision-making

¹⁶ A prominent example in Guthrie and Ross (1999) and Kelly and Dobbin (1999), though not relevant in the present empirical context, is the legal environment such as laws and administrative rulings.

from a neoclassical focus on the marginal employee to a median-voter model with a focus on average preferences (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). If the average worker has a greater preference for work-life balance policies than the marginal worker, unionised workplaces are likely to have a greater frequency of these policies.

In the remainder of this report, a holistic approach is adopted. The focus of the analysis is the relative availability of work-life balance practices to lone parents and not testing between competing theories of employer-adoption of work-life balance practices. This conceptual framework, however, is instructive in that it provides a basis for the empirical specifications and the control variables to be included in the regression analysis.

5. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION

Adopting a holistic approach implies incorporating a range of variables capturing both the characteristics of the individual employees and those of the workplace they are employed in. These variables can be considered in groupings, beginning with the indicators of the work-life balance practices. For the individual employee data these groups are: demographic characteristics; job characteristics; education; and occupation. At the workplace level, the variables are grouped according to workplace structural characteristics; workplace demographics; workplace pay; workplace say (measures of the workers' ability to express their views); workplace employment dynamics; and industry.

Table A1.1 (in Appendix A1) presents descriptive statistics and variable definitions for the data being used. It provides the weighted means and standard errors of the work-life balance measures for the full sample (representing British employees at workplaces with at least ten employees) and the means for lone parents only in columns 1 to 3 respectively. Columns 4 and 5 provide the unweighted means and the standard deviations for the full sample and column 6 lists the unweighted means for lone parents. However, columns 4-6 represent the survey responses and are not representative of the population because these values are unweighted.

Table A1.2 provides more detailed information of the mean values of the variables for different subgroups and on the tests for significant differences in these mean values. It considers if the mean values are significantly different between the full sample, lone parents and those who are not lone parents in columns 1 through to 4, and between all parents, lone parents and parents with partners in columns 5 through to 8. Using weighted data, column 1 provides full sample means for the variables of interest¹⁷, column 2 provides the means for the lone parents, column 3 the means for all those who are not lone parents (referred to as 'all those employees who are not lone parents') and column 4 tests the confidence of the difference across the mean values for lone parents and all others. (Variables are highlighted in column 4 where there are significant differences between the two samples.) Columns 5 through to 8 provide similar information for lone parents relative to all parents and to partnered parents only (again using weighted data). Table 1 presents values for those variables where a significant difference is found. Combining the information in Tables A1.1 and A1.2 provides a good basic understanding of the variables to be used in this report.

¹⁷ These values differ slightly to those in Table A1.1 since Table A1.1 reports values for all of the employees surveyed (the full specified sample) whereas the calculations in Table A1.2 only includes employees where there are no missing survey replies (observations) across the range of variables included in the table.

Table 1 Significant differences in variable means: lone parents relative to (a) all employees or (b) to parents only

	(a) lone parents relative to all employees				(b) lone parents relative to parents only			
	all employees	lone parent	not lone parent	difference in means of	all parents	lone parent	partnered parent	difference in means of
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(2) - (3)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(6) - (7)
	mean	mean	mean		mean	mean	mean	
<u>individual variables</u>								
home work	0.092	0.079	0.093	-0.014	0.098	0.076	0.102	-0.026 **
paid leave	0.456	0.409	0.458	-0.049**	0.453	0.412	0.459	-0.047**
flexible times	0.316	0.345	0.315	0.030	0.308	0.342	0.303	0.039 *
age	39.406	37.564	39.509	-1.945***	39.097	37.745	39.291	-1.546***
age 2	1688.6	1479.4	1700.3	220.900***	1590.4	1494.8	1604.1	-109.300***
female	0.471	0.524	0.468	0.056**	0.463	0.544	0.451	0.093***
child04	0.143	0.298	0.134	0.164***	0.338	0.284	0.346	-0.062***
child511	0.200	0.456	0.185	0.271***	0.474	0.455	0.477	-0.022
child12	0.198	0.450	0.184	0.266***	0.478	0.464	0.480	-0.016
child018	0.418	1.000	0.386	0.614***	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000
ethnicity	0.036	0.058	0.034	0.024*	0.042	0.060	0.040	0.020
hourly wage	7.202	6.878	7.220	-0.342	7.764	6.912	7.886	-0.974***
hours	36.035	34.769	36.105	-1.336*	35.439	34.430	35.583	-1.153*
hours squared	1473.0	1387.5	1477.8	-90.300**	1447.4	1367.2	1458.9	-91.700**
tenure	5.365	4.623	5.407	-0.784***	5.544	4.641	5.674	-1.033***
part-time	0.249	0.292	0.247	0.045*	0.294	0.301	0.294	0.007
fixed term	0.025	0.017	0.026	-0.009**	0.024	0.020	0.024	-0.004
union member	0.379	0.362	0.380	-0.018	0.436	0.370	0.446	-0.076***
CSE	0.126	0.165	0.124	0.041*	0.157	0.167	0.156	0.011
O level	0.268	0.322	0.265	0.057**	0.302	0.316	0.300	0.016
Degree	0.150	0.096	0.153	-0.057***	0.152	0.107	0.159	-0.052***
managers	0.090	0.063	0.091	-0.028***	0.097	0.062	0.102	-0.040***
profs	0.118	0.101	0.119	-0.018	0.138	0.109	0.142	-0.033**
personal	0.080	0.104	0.078	0.026**	0.091	0.097	0.090	0.007
other occup	0.119	0.139	0.118	0.021	0.106	0.141	0.101	0.040***

Table 1 Significant differences in variable means: lone parents relative to (a) all employees or (b) to parents only, continued

	(a) lone parents relative to all employees				(b) lone parents relative to parents only			
	all employees	lone parent	not lone parent	difference in means of	all parents	lone parent	partnered parent	difference in means of
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(2) - (3)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(6) - (7)
	mean	mean	mean		mean	mean	mean	
<u>workplace variables</u>								
wp age	39.459	38.020	39.539	-1.519	40.439	37.504	40.860	-3.356 **
wp ppn female	0.472	0.493	0.470	0.023	0.477	0.505	0.473	0.032 **
wp ppn part-time	0.249	0.278	0.247	0.031 **	0.251	0.284	0.246	0.038 ***
wp ppn youth	0.061	0.058	0.061	-0.003	0.047	0.056	0.046	0.010 ***
wp ppn old	0.160	0.153	0.161	-0.008 *	0.159	0.154	0.160	-0.006
wp ppn ethnicity	0.040	0.050	0.040	0.010	0.042	0.050	0.040	0.010 *
wp ave wage	7.205	7.126	7.209	-0.083	7.496	7.179	7.542	-0.363 ***
wp rew. seniority	0.467	0.516	0.464	0.052 **	0.502	0.534	0.497	0.037
wp rew. grade	0.722	0.711	0.723	-0.012	0.740	0.704	0.746	-0.042 **
wp union recognition	0.581	0.612	0.580	0.032	0.660	0.623	0.666	-0.043 **
wp grievance proc	0.651	0.694	0.649	0.045 **	0.693	0.693	0.693	0.000
wp hr rep	0.454	0.430	0.455	-0.025	0.471	0.427	0.478	-0.051 ***
wp employment change	0.066	0.046	0.067	-0.021 *	0.052	0.046	0.053	-0.007
wp dismissals	0.013	0.017	0.013	0.004	0.011	0.016	0.011	0.005 **
wp resignations	0.135	0.148	0.134	0.014	0.117	0.145	0.113	0.032 ***
manufacturing	0.271	0.239	0.273	-0.034	0.258	0.227	0.262	-0.035 *
electrical	0.007	0.005	0.007	-0.002 *	0.007	0.005	0.008	-0.003 ***
construction	0.035	0.023	0.035	-0.012 ***	0.035	0.021	0.037	-0.016 ***
hotels	0.044	0.043	0.044	-0.001	0.023	0.041	0.020	0.021 **
education	0.082	0.110	0.080	0.030 *	0.128	0.126	0.129	-0.003
health	0.115	0.144	0.113	0.031 *	0.132	0.153	0.129	0.024
number of obs	18511	923	17588		8397	1010	7387	
number of strata	70	70	70		70	70	70	
number of psu	1353	1353	1353		1432	1432	1432	

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998. The point estimates and standard errors account for the stratification and clustering in the sampling procedure. * significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, *** significant at 99%.

5.1 Indicators of work-life balance practices

The indicators of a work-life balance practice used in this study incorporate examples of both categories of work-life balance policies (policies catering for the ideal worker model or those allowing for deviations from this model) discussed in section 2 above, they are:

1. parental leave;
2. home working (working at or from home in normal working hours);
3. subsidised child-care (a workplace nursery or help with the cost of child-care);
4. flexi-time (flexible working hours);

5. job sharing (sharing a full time job with someone else); and
6. paid leave at short notice.

For the first five measures, employees were asked 'if you personally needed any of these arrangements, would they be available at this workplace?' For the sixth measure respondents were asked 'if you needed to take a day off work at short notice, for example to look after a sick family member, how would you usually do it?'

It should be noted that employees are asked if the policy is available. The reported responses are measuring perceived availability, which might be different to actual availability, since (for example) employees may not know that a practice is available to them (discussion of employer responses is provided in Appendix A2.2). It is expected that parents would be more aware of the availability of work-life balance policies: they have the greatest incentive to pay attention to the provision of these practices in their workplace; they are perhaps more likely to be informed of these policies by their employer; and they are more likely to be a member of a social group where others are making use of such provisions. This effect may be stronger for parents with partners than lone parents, especially if a minimum resource level is required to take advantage of a practice being available. For example, low income households may not have sufficient resources for unpaid parental leave or the lower working hours involved in job sharing. This would give them less incentive to be knowledgeable about the availability of these practices at their workplace. These issues will be returned to in the discussion of the empirical results below.

Considering the responses for those employees to be included in the empirical analysis in this report (see Table A1.2), paid leave at short notice is the most commonly available practice with 46 per cent of all employees and 41 per cent of lone parents reporting that this would be available to them (and this difference in means is significant at the 95 per cent confidence level)¹⁸. The next most commonly available policy is flexi-time (with 32 per cent and 35 per cent) followed by parental leave (27 per cent and 30 per cent). The availability of job sharing is very similar for the two groups (14.3 per cent for all employees and 14.7 per cent for lone parents) as is home working (nine per cent and eight per cent). However, lone parents (5.5 per cent) are more likely to report the availability of the relatively rare practice of subsidised child-care than employees in general (3.5 per cent)¹⁹.

Nevertheless, for each practice, the majority of employees do not respond that it would be available to them if they needed it. Indeed, it is more common for two thirds or more of the employees to perceive that a given practice would not be provided for them. One in four employees responded that none of these policies are available to them and 60 per cent of employees replied that one policy is available. This shows that the availability of work-life balance practices is perceived by employees to be limited²⁰. However, these results are

¹⁸ 30 per cent of lone parents report that parental leave would be available to them compared to 27 per cent of those who are not lone parents, however, this difference is significant at the 85 per cent confidence level.

¹⁹ These values are very similar to those presented in Cully *et al*, 1999, page 146: they calculate mean values for workplaces with 25 or more employees, the calculations here are for all workplaces with ten or more employees.

²⁰ Comparing these results with the answers provided from the unweighted workplace surveys (where individual employees returned surveys), 15 per cent of workplaces do not have at least one of these work-life balance policies available (with the exception of flexi-time measures which are not included in the workplace survey) and 47 per cent of workplaces offer only one policy.

based on data collected prior to the introduction of various leave entitlements by the government and the Work-life Balance campaign²¹.

Comparing lone parents with partnered (married or cohabiting) parents, lone parents are significantly less likely to respond that home working or paid leave at short notice is available (both at the 95 per cent confidence level) but they are significantly more likely to respond that flexi-time is available than are parents with partners (at a 90 per cent confidence level). Thus, significant differences were found for one practice (paid leave at short notice) when comparing lone parents and employees who were not lone parents and three practices (paid leave at short notice, flexi-time and home working) when comparing lone parents and partnered parents.

5.2 Individual characteristics

For the individual employee data, the explanatory variables are grouped according to: demographic characteristics; job characteristics; education; and occupation.

Demographic variables reflect the needs of the employees and their potential demand for work-life balance practices. The demographic characteristics included are: the age of the employee; gender; presence of a dependent child below 5; dependent child aged 5-11; dependent child aged 12 to 18; and the ethnic origin of the respondent (this is a binary variable set equal to zero if respondent is white and otherwise equal to one).

The average age of employees is 39.4 years, whereas amongst lone parents this is lower at 37.6 years (Table A1.2). The average age of parents is a few months less than the employee average and lone parents are on average almost a year and a half younger than partnered parents (a strongly significant difference, see Table 1). Similarly, 47 per cent of employees are female, but 52 per cent of lone parents are female. Most employees (70 per cent) are in a couple (married or cohabiting), as are 88 per cent of the parents. Thus 12 per cent of parents (or five per cent of employees) are lone parents. Less than half of employees have a dependent child living with them (42 per cent). The distribution of children is evenly spread across the child age bands, although, amongst parents, lone parents are significantly less likely to have preschool aged children. Non-whites make up 3.6 per cent of employees and 4.2 per cent of all parents but they are significantly more likely to be lone parents (six per cent).

Thus working lone parents are more likely to be younger, female, and have older children than partnered parents. There is also a significantly greater proportion of non-whites amongst the lone parents than across employees as a whole (at the 90 per cent confidence level).

The *job characteristics* of the individual are captured in their normal hourly wage; usual hours worked; tenure in current job; training provided by the employer in last 12 months; part-time status (less than 30 hours per week); fixed-term contract; temporary contract; and if they are currently a union member.

Lone parents earn on average 32 pence per hour less than the average person (who earns £7.20 per hour), see Table A1.2. Considering only parents, however, lone parents earn 85 pence an hour less than all parents and almost a pound (97 pence or 12 per cent) per hour

²¹ The Prime Minister launched the Work-Life Balance campaign in March 2000. Its aim is twofold: to convince employers of the economic benefits of work-life balance, by presenting real-life case studies; and to convince employers of the need for change. The campaign supports employers through the Challenge Fund, and its guidance materials.

less than partnered parents. Lone parents also work more than an hour less per week and they have the shortest tenure (the tenure in their current job is 4.6 years compared to the employee average of 5.4 years or the partnered parent average of 5.7 years). They have, however, similar access to training schemes and are as likely as partnered parents to work part-time (around 30 per cent) or be on fixed-term contracts (2 per cent). Lone parents are significantly less likely to be union members than are partnered parents (37 per cent relative to 45 per cent), although their membership rates are similar to all employees (36 per cent to 38 per cent).

The *education* measures reveal that 20 per cent of employees did not progress with formal education beyond the end of A-levels. Lone parents are significantly less likely to have a degree than all employees or partnered parents. They share a similar proportion of vocational qualifications (40 per cent) to parents with partners and to employees in general.

Nine occupation categories are included (the finest division possible given the data). Lone parents are less likely to be managers or professionals, especially compared to partnered parents. Otherwise they share a similar distribution across the occupations as do parents with partners. Relative to employees who are not lone parents, lone parents are less likely to be managers (6.3 per cent compared to nine per cent) but more likely to be employed in personal services (10.4 per cent compared to eight per cent).

5.3 Workplace characteristics

A range of workplace variables are included, these are grouped according to: workplace structural characteristics; workplace demographics; workplace pay; workplace say; workplace employment dynamics; and industry.

Beginning with *workplace structural characteristics*, the factors considered are: workplace size (number of employees on the pay roll 12 months previously); the age of the workplace (in years); whether or not the workplace is part of a multi-enterprise establishment; and if the workplace operates a formal training scheme. Lone parents, partnered parents and employees as a whole tend to be employed in workplaces with similar workplace structural characteristics, with the exception of workplace age, where there is some evidence that lone parents are more likely to be employed in 'younger' (newer) workplaces than are parents with partners.

The *workplace demographic* measures include the proportion of the workforce who are female; working part-time (less than 30 hours per week); who are youths (less than 21 years old); who are approaching retirement age (aged over 50 years); and non-white. Workplace demographics are included as control variables but also because they allow us to consider if there is apparent segregation happening at the workplace level. This does appear *a priori* to be the case: lone parents are more likely to be employed in workplaces with more women, more part-timers, more youths, and more non-white employees than partnered parents. By including individual and workplace demographics it is possible to more fully explore these relationships in the regression analysis.

Three measures of *workplace pay* are included: the average full time workplace wage; the affect of age and years of service (seniority) upon the full time workplace wage; and affect of job grade/classification upon the full time wage. Lone parents are more likely to work in lower paid workplaces (see Table A1.2), significantly so when compared only with parents with partners. They can expect a lower average workplace wage of eight per cent (£7.18 per hour rather than £7.54 per hour) relative to partnered parents. Lone parents are more likely to be

employed in workplaces where pay rises are based on seniority than are employees who are not lone parents (51.6 per cent compared to 46.4 per cent), and they are less likely to be employed in workplaces where pay rises are based on job grade than are parents with partners (70.4 per cent relative to 74.6 per cent).

The seven indicators of the scope for *workplace say* are: the proportion of employees working in formally designated teams (on average, 70 per cent of all employees); the proportion of non-managerial employees in quality circles (on average, 22 per cent of employees); workplaces where individuals have a lot of discretion over their work (23 per cent of all employees); workplaces where individuals have some discretion over their work (45 per cent of all employees); a union is recognised in negotiation procedures (58 per cent of all employees); the presence of a group grievance procedure (65 per cent of all employees); and the survey respondent is a human resources or personnel manager (45 per cent of all employees). Over this range of measures, lone parents' *workplace say* measures display similar average values to those for all employees except that lone parents are significantly more likely to work in workplaces with a written grievance procedure in place. Lone parents are, however, less likely to be employed in workplaces with a human resources representative (five percentage points less) and are less likely to be employed in workplaces with union recognition (4.3 percentage points less) compared to other employed parents.

There are four measures of *workplace employment dynamics*: employment change (relative to total workplace employment over the previous 12 months); dismissals (relative to total workplace employment over the previous 12 months); resignations (relative to total workplace employment over the previous 12 months); and difficulties filling vacancies in the workplace. Total employment change in the workplaces averages 6.6 per cent, with a one per cent dismissal rate, and a 14 per cent resignation rate (Table A1.2). Perhaps surprisingly, workplaces reported difficulties filling almost a quarter of their job vacancies. Lone parents are significantly less likely to be employed in workplaces with high labour turnover as measured by employment change. However, relative to partnered parents they are more likely to be employed in workplaces with both high dismissal and resignation rates.

A range of 12 *industry* measures are also included, these follow the standard industry classification definitions. Lone parents are less likely than the average employee to be employed in workplaces in the electrical and gas, and the construction sectors, they are more likely to be employed in education or health. Compared with other working parents only, however, this tendency to concentrate in health and education does not occur. Instead, lone parents are more likely to be employed in hotels and less likely to be employed in manufacturing.

6. METHODOLOGY AND ECONOMETRIC TECHNIQUE

Multivariate regression techniques are used to explore the determinants of the availability of work-life balance practices at both the individual and the workplace level. Probit analyses are implemented for each of the six individual measures of work-life balance practices using the full weighted data set. (The need to weight the WERS98 data when carrying out probit analysis is explained in Appendix A2.1 and in Deaton, 1998).

If a specific work-life balance practice is available, as defined above, the indicator $d_i=1$ where d_i is a binary realisation (equal to 1 is the practice available and zero otherwise). The probability of availability is given by:

$$\Pr(d_i=1) = \Pr(a_i > 0) = f(\beta X_i)$$

where X_i is a vector of the explanatory variables thought to influence the provision of the work-life balance practice, β is the vector of coefficients capturing the impact of each explanatory variable on the probability of the practice being available and f is the standard normal distribution function (Greene, 1997). These probit regressions are run for all of the six measures of work-life balance practices to be considered.

The probit estimates for the full (weighted) data sample are presented in Table A1.3. Columns 1 through to 6 provide results for each work-life balance measure. The overall test of the explanatory power of the regressors is clearly significant for all the regressions and whilst the pseudo R^2 measures are not high, they are comparable with those found in other similar studies. Overall, the estimates are generally well defined and of the expected sign.

The probit coefficients are reported, followed by the estimated marginal effect (in square brackets). Standard marginal effect calculations are reported: evaluating variables at their sample means, the marginal effects are calculated as the change in the probability for a small change in the independent continuous variable or for a discrete one unit change in the dummy (binary) variables.

The relative impact of the explanatory variables on the probability of an employee responding that a work-life balance practice is available can be calculated from these marginal (or differential in the case of the dummy variables) effects and from the mean of the dependent variable (final row of Table A1.3). For example, in column 1 a small increase in the average age of the employee would result in a 0.010 percentage point fall in the probability of parental leave being available (from 0.266 to 0.256), or a drop of 3.8 per cent. The calculation is similar for dummy variables. A female employee is 0.077 percentage points more likely to report that parental leave is available, and relative to the weighted sample mean of 0.266, this point estimate implies an increase of 28.6 per cent in the probability that the employee responds that parental leave is available at their workplace (from 26.6 per cent to 34.2 per cent).

The first five independent variables in Table A1.3 are a series of dummy variables capturing the parental and marital status of the individual employees, the omitted variable is partnered (married or cohabiting) parents. This implies that the impact of each of the five measures of parental and marital status is being compared to that of an employee who is a partnered parent. For example, looking across Table A1.3, individual employees (single or partnered) with no children are less likely to report that parental leave and subsidised child-care work-life balance practices are available to them than are partnered parents. However, there are no

significant differences for lone parents with children in any of the three age bands (a single asterisk depicts significance at a 90 per cent confidence level, two asterisks denote significance at a 95 per cent confidence level). The results will now be considered in more detail at an aggregate level. See Appendix A3.1 for a fuller explanation of how to interpret the regression results, and a discussion of how to interpret the results for each work-life balance practice, using parental leave as an example.

7. RESULTS

7.1 The results in aggregate

Columns 1 through to 6 of Table 2 provide results for each work-life balance measure reported in Table A1.3. Each entry indicates the direction of the impact of those coefficients found to have a significant impact in the full regressions reported in Table A1.3. A single asterisk indicates significance at 90 per cent confidence and two asterisks indicate significance at 95 per cent confidence. The most striking result from Table 2 is that for all of the six dependent variables (work-life balance practices) considered, lone parent status does not have a significant impact upon them, i.e. being a lone parent does not affect the availability of these practices to an employee. This result will be further tested in section 7.2 below.

Of the remaining explanatory variables, the first of those that have a significant impact on four or more of the work-life balance measures is being a female. Female employees were significantly more likely to report that the options of parental leave, subsidised child-care and job sharing were available to them but significantly less likely to consider they had the opportunities for paid leave at short notice and for home working. The other demographic variable that impacts on four or more measures is ethnicity (non-white status). Non-white employees were significantly less likely to report that parental leave, subsidised child-care, and home working were available to them but significantly more likely to respond that flexi-time and job sharing were available.

Of the job characteristics of the individual employee, a higher hourly wage is found to be associated with greater probability of availability of work-life balance practices; as is longer job tenure; and recent training. Employees who are union members are more likely to report that they have parental leave and job sharing available to them but they are less likely to respond that flexi-time and home working is available.

Employees with higher education levels have a greater probability of reporting that work-life balance practices are available to them. In particular, post-graduates are more likely to report that all forms of the work-life balance practices are available to them, with the exception of paid leave at short notice. Similarly, the white collar occupations of managers, professionals, associate professionals, and clerks are more likely to report that work-life balance practices are available to them.

Amongst the workplace variables, results for workplace structural characteristics are mixed. Employees in larger workplaces report greater availability of parental leave and subsidised child-care, but a lower probability of paid leave at short notice and flexi-time. A multi-enterprise structure is associated with less flexi-time, home working and subsidised child-care but more paid leave at short notice.

Of the workplace demographic variables, the proportion of females in the workplace is the only characteristic that has a significant impact on four, or more, of the work-life balance practices. It appears that the more women there are employed in a workplace, the more likely that the work-life balance policies of parental leave, subsidised child-care, flexi-time, home working and job sharing will be available to the employee. Of the remaining workplace variables, only working in education has a significant impact on four or more practices. Employees in this sector are less likely to report that paid leave, flexi-time, home working and job sharing are available to them.

Table 2. Summary of baseline results

	<u>parental leave</u>	<u>paid leave</u>	<u>child-care</u>	<u>flexi-time</u>	<u>home work</u>	<u>job share</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<u>individual variables</u>						
single no children	- **		- *			
married no children	- **	+ *	- **			- *
age	- **	+ **			+ **	
age2		- **			- **	
female	+ **	- **	+ **		- **	+ **
ethnicity	- **		- **	+ *	- *	+ **
hourly wage	+ *	+ *	+ *		+ *	+ **
hours	+ **	+ **				+ **
hours squared	+ **	- **	+ **			+ **
tenure	+ **	+ **	+ **			+ **
training	+ **			+ **	+ **	+ **
part-time						+ **
fixed term		- **	- *			- **
temporary		- **		+ *		+ *
union member	+ **			- **	- **	+ **
education other	- **					- **
CSE	- **		+ *			- *
A-level				+ **	+ **	+ **
degree				+ **	+ **	+ **
post graduate	+ **		+ **	+ **	+ **	+ **
vocational qualification					- **	
managers	+ **		+ **	+ **	+ **	+ **
profs			+ **	+ **	+ **	+ **
assoc prof			+ **	+ **	+ **	+ *
clerk		+ **	+ **	+ **	+ **	+ **
craft				+ *	+ *	
personal	+ **	- **			+ **	
sales	+ **			+ **	+ **	
operative		- **				
<u>workplace variables</u>						
wp size	+ **	- *	+ **		- **	
wp age				- **	- **	
wp multi-enterprise		+ **	- **	- **	- **	
wp training		+ **				
wp ppn female	+ **		+ **	+ **	+ *	+ **
wp ppn part-time		- **		- *		
wp ppn youth		- **		+ **	- **	
wp ppn old	- **					
wp ppn ethnicity			+ **			
wp ave wage		+ **				+ *
wp rew. seniority				- *		
wp teams	+ **		+ **			
wp lot disc			+ **	+ **	+ *	
wp some disc			+ **	+ **		
wp union recognition	+ **			+ **		+ **
wp grievance proc	+ *			+ **		
wp hr rep		+ **	+ **		+ *	
wp dismissals		- **	+ *		- *	
wp resignations		- **	- **		+ *	
wp dif. vacancies		+ *			- *	

Table 2. Summary of baseline results, continued

	<u>parental leave</u>	<u>paid leave</u>	<u>child-care</u>	<u>flexi-time</u>	<u>home work</u>	<u>job share</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
manufacturing		- *	- **			- **
electrical		+ **		+ **	+ **	
construction		- **				
wholesale			- **		- **	- **
hotels		- **				
transport			- **			- **
finance		- **	- **			
other business					+ **	- *
public				+ **		+ **
education		- **		- **	- **	- **
health	- **					
constant	- **	- **	- **	- **	- **	- **
number of obs	20337	20337	20337	20337	20337	20337
number of strata	70	70	70	70	70	70
number of PSUs	1492	1492	1492	1492	1492	1492
model F test	14.67**	21.39**	10.20**	10.21**	22.70**	13.80**
Log likelihood	-10877		-2504		-4454	-7079
Pseudo R2	0.080		0.212		0.2781	0.166

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998. Each entry indicates the direction of the impact of those coefficients found to have a significant impact in the baseline regressions (Table A1.3). * significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%. (The point estimates and standard errors used in these calculations account for the stratification and clustering in the sampling procedure.)

There is thus a strong association between a subset of employees' individual demographic, job, education and occupational characteristics and the availability of work-life balance practices. The size of their workplace, if it is in a multi-enterprise structure and the proportion of females in their work force are also important. Whether or not an employee is a lone parent, however, does not appear to influence the availability of work-life arrangements in either direction, this finding will be further explored in section 7.2 below.

Of these explanatory variables found to be important, Table 1 reveals that lone parents have significantly different average values for these characteristics (compared to either all those who are not lone parents or to partnered parents) in the cases of being a female, ethnicity, hourly wage, tenure, being a union member, level of education, being a manager, being a professional, the proportion of females in the workplace, and being employed in the education sector. In most cases, lone parents have lower average values for these characteristics and this is associated with less reported availability of work-life balance practices²². Lone parents are, however, more likely to be employed in workplaces with a large proportion of females in the workplace which is positively associated with the reported availability of work-life balance policies. Further exceptions occur with being a trade union member, ethnicity, and being female where the impacts on availability are found to be mixed. The lower average union membership rates of lone parents would suggest that they have greater provision of flexi-time and home working but less parental leave and job sharing available to them (discussion of the complex role of unionism on work-life balance practices is provided in Budd and Mumford, 2001). The greater tendency for non-whites to be lone parents is associated with less

²² In the cases of the hourly wage, hours squared, tenure, being a manager, or being a professional, lone parents have lower average values for these characteristics and all of these characteristics are associated with greater provision of work-life balance policies (as denoted by the positive impacts in Table 2). In the case of education, however, lone parents are more likely to be employed in the education sector and this sector is negatively associated with the provision of work-life balance practices.

parental leave and subsidised child-care provisions but more flexi-time and job sharing opportunities. The greater number of females amongst lone parents suggests they will have less paid leave at short notice and opportunity for home working but they are likely to have more parental leave, job sharing opportunities and subsidised child-care provisions.

The selection criterion of having a significant impact on 'four or more' measures of work-life balance practices is of course entirely arbitrary. If impacting on three or more of these measures is instead chosen then other important explanatory variables would include: age, hours worked, fixed-term contract, temporary contract, CSE, A-level, degree, personal services, sales, proportion of youths in the workplace, workers having a lot of discretion over work, union recognition in the bargaining process, presence of a human resources representative, dismissals, resignations, manufacturing, electrical, and wholesale trades.

Of these explanatory variables, significant differences (at the 90 per cent confidence level) in the mean values for lone parents compared to all those who are not lone parents or to partnered parents were found (see Table 1) for age, hours worked, fixed-term, CSE, degree, proportion of youths in the workplace, union recognition in the bargaining process, the presence of a human resources representative, dismissals, resignations and being employed in the manufacturing or electrical sectors. In the cases of hours worked, having a degree, union recognition, the presences of a human resource representative, and being employed in the electrical sector, lone parents are less likely to have the characteristic and this results in a lower probability that work-life balance provisions are reported as being available. Lone parents are also less likely to be on fixed-term contracts or employed in the manufacturing sector, however, (given the negative coefficients for these characteristics in Table 2) resulting in greater reported provision of work-life balance policies. Finally, in the cases of age, CSE, personal services, dismissal and resignation rates, and the proportion of youth in the workplace the impacts on the reported availability of work-life balance policies found in Table 2 are mixed²³.

In terms of the theories presented in section 4, there is modest support for each of them. For the neoclassical theory, which predicts that work-life balance policies reflect labour market supply and demand pressures, the demographic variables reflecting labour market supply (especially the proportion of the workplace who are female) are significant in several of the models. The employment dynamics variables (workplace dismissals, resignations, and difficulty filling vacancies) which reflect labour market demand, however, are not strong predictors of these work-life balance policies. For the internal labour market theory, the presence of workplace training is found to increase the likelihood of offering paid leave at short notice and workplaces which provide employees with a lot of discretion are more likely to have subsidised child-care, flexi-time and home working supporting the internal labour market explanation. Lastly, union representation and the presence of a human resources representative are both positively associated with several of the policies which is consistent with the institutional theory.

²³ Lone parents are younger on average and this results in greater availability of parental leave but less paid leave at short notice or home working provisions. Lone parents are more likely to have completed their formal education at the CSE level and this is associated with less reported parental leave and job sharing but more subsidised child-care access. The greater tendency for lone parents to work in personal services is positively associated with parental leave and home working but negatively with paid leave at short notice. Lone parents tend to be employed in workplaces with higher dismissal rates (resulting in less paid leave at short notice and home working but more reported subsidised child-care access) and higher resignation rates (implying less paid leave at short notice and subsidised child-care but more home working). Finally, the greater tendency for lone parents to be employed in workplaces with a large proportion of youths results in a lower probability of reported paid leave at short notice and home working opportunities but more flexi-time provision.

7.2 Exploring the impact of lone parent status

The limited impact of being a lone parent on the provision of work-life balance practices was further considered by dividing the sample into subgroups and testing the significance of the lone parent dummy variable in each case. The subgroups were: the private sector; the public sector; males; females; whites; non-whites; full time employees; part-time employees; those not living with a partner; parents of children aged below five; parents of children aged five to 11; parents of children aged 12 to 18; those with CSE as their highest education level; those with O-level as their highest education level; those with A-level as their highest education level; those with a degree as their highest education level; post-graduates; those with other education as their highest education level; and parents only. In none of these 19 subgroups was the dummy variable for lone parents found to have a consistently significant impact²⁴ (see Table A3.1 in Appendix A3).

It may be argued, however, that merely including a dummy variable is not an adequate test because lone parent status may be impacting on the effect of other explanatory variables found to have a significant effect on the probability of work-life balance practices being available. For example, low education levels might have a larger negative impact on this availability for lone parents.

A range of interactive measures (lone parent status interacted with each explanatory variable considered to have an important impact in the baseline regressions) were considered. Results for these measures when included in the full (baseline) regression (see Table A1.3) for each of the six measures of work-life balance practices are reported in Table A1.4. None of these interactive measures were found to have a consistent significant impact on the probability of work-life balance practice provision at standard confidence levels.

This range of interactive measures was then further considered by dividing the sample into the 19 subgroups discussed above and testing the significance of the inclusion of each interactive measure in each subgroup, the interactive measures were again found to be ineffective. Lone parents do not appear to be receiving differential access to work-life balance practices given their individual or workplace characteristics and, thus, to be receiving differential treatment from employers and/or the market.

This similarity in coefficients for lone parents and all those who are not lone parents (or lone parents and parents with partners) is further confirmed in Tables A3.2 and A3.3 (respectively) where the full results for the baseline regressions of each of these subgroups are provided.

²⁴At the 95 per cent confidence level, a significant impact was never found for more than two measures of work-life balance practices within a subgroup and was more typically found to be insignificant for all six measures within each subgroup.

Finding a significant difference (at the 95 per cent confidence level) between relevant coefficients is rare and never occurs for more than one of the six measures of work-life balance practices²⁵.

These findings from the subgroup analyses support the conclusion that being a lone parent does not in itself alter the relative availability of work-life balance practices in Britain.

²⁵ The results in these Tables can also be interpreted in a more general manner. For example, considering the results presented for lone parents in columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 of Table A3.2, female lone parents are significantly more likely to report that subsidised child-care and job sharing are more available to them. This may reflect, however the greater tendency of women to report availability: considering only male or only female subgroups, there is no significant effect found for lone parents (see Table A3.1). There is no significant difference between male and female lone parents in their reported availability of parental leave, paid leave at short notice, flexi-time or home working revealed in Table A3.2.

8. CONCLUSION

Problems of balancing work-life conflicts are a major policy concern and the focus of significant research. Recent Government policies to increase the participation of lone parents in the labour market and the rising propensity for women to enter the labour market, to remain after having children, and to return sometime later are leading to many more parents with families entering the labour market. The greater sharing of household non-labour market work across parents has led to an increased demand from workers (male and female) for work-life balance practices. Rising numbers of elderly people in the population has increased the need for elder care, further strengthening this demand. The families concerned cover the full socio-economic spectrum.

The Government has recognised the desire, and often the need, that families have for work-life balance policies especially lone parent families. Using data on over 20,000 individuals and almost 1,500 workplaces across Great Britain from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98), the relationship between being a lone parent and the availability of six major work-life balance policies is analysed: parental leave, paid leave at short notice, subsidised child-care, flexi-time, home working, and job sharing.

Lone parents are, on average, less likely to report access to paid leave at short notice than employees who are not lone parents. Lone parents are less likely to respond that working from home arrangements or paid leave at short notice are available to them but more likely to report that flexi-time provisions are than are parents with partners.

The individual characteristics that affect the probability of an employee responding that work-life balance practices are available to them (and the direction of this affect) are their age (mixed), being female (mixed), ethnicity (mixed), hourly wage (positive), hours worked (positive), tenure (positive), being recently involved in a training programme (positive), having a fixed-term contract (negative), having a temporary contract (mixed), being a union member (mixed), higher education levels (positive), and occupation (positive with white collar occupations).

The workplace characteristics that are associated with the availability of work-life balance practices (and the direction of this affect) are workplace size (mixed), multi-enterprise establishment (mixed), proportion of females in the workplace (positive), proportion of youths in the workplace (mixed), employees having a lot of discretion over work (positive), union recognition in the bargaining process (positive), presence of a human resource representative (positive), the dismissal rate (mixed), the resignation rate (mixed), and a range of industry measures.

Results from the multi-variable regression analysis in this report indicate that lone parents do not appear to be receiving differential access to work-life balance practices given their individual and workplace characteristics. The similarity of the estimated coefficients suggest that lone parents do not appear to be receiving differential access to work-life balance practices given their individual or workplace characteristics and, thus, to be receiving differential treatment from employers and/or the market.

Differences in the relative availability of work-life balance practices to lone parents are found to be due to them having significantly different average values of a subset of the above individual and workplace characteristics. In particular, of the range of individual characteristics

found to have a significant impact on this reported relative availability, lone parents are more likely to: be female, be younger, be non-white; have a lower hourly wage, have shorter tenure, not be a union member, have lower education levels, work less hours; work in personal services; and be less likely to be on a fixed-term contract. Also, lone parents are more/less likely to have these characteristics sometimes when compared to employees who are not lone parents and other times when compared to those employees who are partnered parents.

Similarly, of the workplace characteristics found to impact on the relative availability of work-life balance practices, lone parents are more likely to be employed in workplaces with a: high proportion of females in the workplace, high proportion of youths in the workplace, less presence of a human resources representative; less union recognition in negotiation; higher workplace dismissal and resignation rates; and in the manufacturing and electrical and gas sectors. Again, lone parents are more/less likely to have these characteristics sometimes when compared to employees who are not lone parents and other times when compared to those employees who are partnered parents.

To conclude, although access to work-life balance practices is found to differ between lone parents and other employees, it is not being a lone parent per se which affects this access. It is certain individual characteristics that lone parents commonly share and the types of workplaces in which they are more likely to be employed which directly influence access to these practices. Although the question cannot be resolved here, it is the issue of why lone parents have these (relative) characteristics and are more likely to be employed in particular workplaces which clearly warrants future research.

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Table A1.1 Summary statistics: unweighted and weighted, continued.

	weighted			unweighted			variable description
	full sample		lone parent	full sample		lone parent	
	mean	s. error	mean	mean	s. dev.	mean	
education other	0.261	0.006	0.234	0.221	0.415	0.181	education other
CSE	0.121	0.003	0.165	0.108	0.310	0.158	CSE or equivalent, GCSE (grades D-G)
O-level	0.261	0.005	0.268	0.258	0.437	0.297	O level or equivalent
A-level	0.147	0.004	0.136	0.159	0.365	0.155	A level or equivalent
degree	0.155	0.004	0.096	0.188	0.390	0.148	degree or equivalent
postgrad	0.054	0.002	0.043	0.067	0.250	0.060	post grad degree or equivalent
vocational qual	0.373	0.005	0.397	0.376	0.484	0.396	vocational qualification
managers	0.086	0.003	0.063	0.108	0.310	0.088	managers and senior administrators
profs	0.129	0.004	0.101	0.170	0.376	0.152	professionals
assoc prof	0.089	0.004	0.081	0.103	0.303	0.103	associate professional and technical
clerk	0.159	0.005	0.145	0.206	0.404	0.207	clerical and secretarial
craft	0.104	0.005	0.101	0.079	0.270	0.066	craft and skilled service
personal	0.083	0.005	0.104	0.073	0.260	0.087	personal and protective services
sales	0.096	0.006	0.108	0.075	0.263	0.079	sales operator, sales assistant
operative	0.129	0.008	0.158	0.086	0.280	0.099	operative and assembly
other occup	0.124	0.005	0.139	0.101	0.302	0.118	other occupational group
<u>workplace variables</u>							
wp size	645.5	121.429	656.1	285.8	643.2	292.8	employees on pay 12 months previously
wp age	38.691	1.405	38.020	36.386	44.652	34.663	age of the current workplace
wp multi-enterprise	0.758	0.013	0.742	0.793	0.405	0.795	wp is one of multiple wps in enterprise
wp training	0.470	0.011	0.487	0.509	0.359	0.526	formal training scheme operates
wp ppn female	0.492	0.008	0.493	0.498	0.284	0.518	proportion of the workforce female
wp ppn part-time	0.260	0.008	0.278	0.237	0.261	0.265	proportion of the workforce part-time
wp ppn youth	0.058	0.003	0.058	0.052	0.099	0.052	proportion of the workforce below 21
wp ppn old	0.161	0.003	0.153	0.157	0.113	0.154	proportion of the workforce over 50
wp ppn ethnicity	0.042	0.003	0.050	0.042	0.091	0.055	proportion of the workforce non-white
wp ave wage	7.258	0.082	7.126	7.543	2.721	7.411	wp average full time wage
wp rew. seniority	0.501	0.016	0.516	0.512	0.500	0.547	age & years service affect full time wage
wp rew. grade	0.736	0.014	0.711	0.755	0.430	0.737	job grade/classification affect full time wage
wp teams	0.689	0.011	0.722	0.712	0.361	0.728	ppn employees in formally designated teams

Table A1.1 Summary statistics: unweighted and weighted, continued

	weighted			unweighted			variable description
	full sample		lone parent	full sample		lone parent	
	mean	s. error	mean	mean	s. dev.	mean	
wp circles	0.217	0.009	0.215	0.223	0.318	0.222	ppn non-managerial in quality circles
wp lot disc	0.222	0.014	0.211	0.225	0.417	0.214	indiv employees have a lot of discretion over work
wp some disc	0.450	0.017	0.476	0.454	0.498	0.457	indiv employees have some discretion over work
wp union recognition	0.613	0.014	0.612	0.628	0.483	0.631	union recognised in negotiation
wp grievance proc	0.658	0.014	0.694	0.659	0.474	0.680	group grievance procedure
wp hr rep	0.487	0.014	0.430	0.450	0.497	0.421	respondent is HR or personnel manager/officer
wp employment change	0.060	0.009	0.046	0.047	0.283	0.038	employment change rel. to total employment
wp dismissals	0.013	0.001	0.017	0.012	0.030	0.015	dismissals relative to total wp employment
wp resignations	0.138	0.005	0.148	0.131	0.176	0.139	resignations relative to total wp employment
wp dif. vacancies	0.246	0.010	0.227	0.231	0.319	0.233	difficulties filling vacancies
manufacturing	0.233	0.011	0.239	0.143	0.350	0.130	manufacturing
electrical	0.006	0.000	0.005	0.041	0.199	0.030	electrical
construction	0.029	0.003	0.023	0.048	0.213	0.030	construction
wholesale	0.145	0.006	0.164	0.127	0.332	0.126	wholesale
hotels	0.042	0.004	0.043	0.042	0.200	0.044	hotels
transport	0.060	0.005	0.062	0.062	0.241	0.068	transport
finance	0.040	0.003	0.040	0.055	0.228	0.051	finance
other business	0.084	0.005	0.069	0.092	0.289	0.091	other business
public	0.088	0.005	0.075	0.100	0.300	0.101	public services
education	0.104	0.005	0.110	0.123	0.328	0.126	education
health	0.134	0.007	0.144	0.121	0.326	0.157	health
other	0.033	0.003	0.026	0.046	0.209	0.045	other
number of obs	28215		923	28215		1417	
number of strata	70		70				
number of psu	1782		1353				

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998. The weighted point estimates and standard errors account for the stratification and clustering in the sampling procedure. Additional information on variable definitions is available by request from the authors.

Table A1.2 Variable means: lone parents relative to (a) all employees or (b) to parents only.

	(a) lone parents relative to all employees				(b) lone parents relative to parents only			
	full sample	lone parent	not lone parent	difference in means of	all parents	lone parent	partnered parent	difference in means of
	(1) mean	(2) mean	(3) mean	(2) - (3)	(5) mean	(6) mean	(7) mean	(6) - (7)
<u>individual variables</u>								
parental leave	0.268	0.304	0.266	0.038	0.307	0.308	0.306	0.002
home work	0.092	0.079	0.093	-0.014	0.098	0.076	0.102	-0.026 **
job share	0.143	0.147	0.143	0.004	0.159	0.144	0.161	-0.017
child-care	0.035	0.055	0.034	0.021	0.048	0.055	0.048	0.007
paid leave	0.456	0.409	0.458	-0.049 **	0.453	0.412	0.459	-0.047 **
flexible times	0.316	0.345	0.315	0.030	0.308	0.342	0.303	0.039 *
age	39.406	37.564	39.509	-1.945 ***	39.097	37.745	39.291	-1.546 ***
age2	1688.6	1479.4	1700.3	-220.900 ***	1590.4	1494.8	1604.1	-109.300 ***
female	0.471	0.524	0.468	0.056 **	0.463	0.544	0.451	0.093 ***
married	0.697	0.000	0.736	-0.736 ***				
child04	0.143	0.298	0.134	0.164 ***	0.338	0.284	0.346	-0.062 ***
child511	0.200	0.456	0.185	0.271 ***	0.474	0.455	0.477	-0.022
child12	0.198	0.450	0.184	0.266 ***	0.478	0.464	0.480	-0.016
child018	0.418	1.000	0.386	0.614 ***	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000
ethnicity	0.036	0.058	0.034	0.024 *	0.042	0.060	0.040	0.020
sing04	0.015	0.288	0.000	0.288 ***				
sing511	0.020	0.386	0.000	0.386 ***				
sing1218	0.017	0.326	0.000	0.326 ***				
sing011	0.036	0.674	0.000	0.674 ***				
sing018	0.053	1.000	0.000	1.000				
hourly wage	7.202	6.878	7.220	-0.342	7.764	6.912	7.886	-0.974 ***
hours	36.035	34.769	36.105	-1.336 *	35.439	34.430	35.583	-1.153 *
hours squared	1473.0	1387.5	1477.8	-90.300 **	1447.4	1367.2	1458.9	-91.700 **
tenure	5.365	4.623	5.407	-0.784 ***	5.544	4.641	5.674	-1.033 ***
training	2.447	2.512	2.443	0.069	2.484	2.507	2.481	0.026
part-time	0.249	0.292	0.247	0.045 *	0.294	0.301	0.294	0.007
fixed term	0.025	0.017	0.026	-0.009 **	0.024	0.020	0.024	-0.004
temporary	0.040	0.052	0.039	0.013	0.035	0.055	0.033	0.022

Table A1.2 Variable means: lone parents relative to (a) all employees or (b) to parents only, continued.

	(a) lone parents relative to all employees				(b) lone parents relative to parents only			
	full sample	lone parent	not lone parent	difference in means of	all parents	lone parent	partnered parent	difference in means of
	(1) mean	(2) mean	(3) mean	(2) - (3)	(5) mean	(6) mean	(7) mean	(6) - (7)
union member	0.379	0.362	0.380	-0.018	0.436	0.370	0.446	-0.076 ***
education other	0.261	0.234	0.263	-0.029	0.207	0.228	0.204	0.024
CSE	0.126	0.165	0.124	0.041 *	0.157	0.167	0.156	0.011
O-level	0.268	0.322	0.265	0.057 **	0.302	0.316	0.300	0.016
A-level	0.146	0.136	0.147	-0.011	0.127	0.134	0.126	0.008
degree	0.150	0.096	0.153	-0.057 ***	0.152	0.107	0.159	-0.052 ***
postgrad	0.048	0.043	0.048	-0.005	0.053	0.044	0.054	-0.010
vocational qual	0.381	0.397	0.380	0.017	0.397	0.389	0.398	-0.009
managers	0.090	0.063	0.091	-0.028 ***	0.097	0.062	0.102	-0.040 ***
profs	0.118	0.101	0.119	-0.018	0.138	0.109	0.142	-0.033 **
assoc prof	0.084	0.081	0.084	-0.003	0.093	0.087	0.094	-0.007
clerk	0.155	0.145	0.155	-0.010	0.140	0.151	0.138	0.013
craft	0.114	0.101	0.114	-0.013	0.108	0.094	0.110	-0.016
personal	0.080	0.104	0.078	0.026 **	0.091	0.097	0.090	0.007
sales	0.101	0.108	0.101	0.007	0.088	0.108	0.085	0.023
operative	0.140	0.158	0.139	0.019	0.139	0.150	0.137	0.013
other occup	0.119	0.139	0.118	0.021	0.106	0.141	0.101	0.040 ***
<u>workplace variables</u>								
wp size	597.193	656.070	593.911	62.159	761.623	641.931	778.780	-136.849
wp age	39.459	38.020	39.539	-1.519	40.439	37.504	40.860	-3.356 **
wp multi-enterprise	0.724	0.742	0.723	0.019	0.774	0.762	0.775	-0.013
wp training	0.461	0.487	0.459	0.028	0.500	0.496	0.500	-0.004
wp ppn female	0.472	0.493	0.470	0.023	0.477	0.505	0.473	0.032 **
wp ppn part-time	0.249	0.278	0.247	0.031 **	0.251	0.284	0.246	0.038 ***
wp ppn youth	0.061	0.058	0.061	-0.003	0.047	0.056	0.046	0.010 ***
wp ppn old	0.160	0.153	0.161	-0.008 *	0.159	0.154	0.160	-0.006
wp ppn ethnicity	0.040	0.050	0.040	0.010	0.042	0.050	0.040	0.010 *
wp ave wage	7.205	7.126	7.209	-0.083	7.496	7.179	7.542	-0.363 ***

Table A1.2 Variable means: lone parents relative to (a) all employees or (b) to parents only, continued.

	(a) lone parents relative to all employees				(b) lone parents relative to parents only			
	full sample	lone parent	not lone parent	difference in means of	all parents	lone parent	partnered parent	difference in means of
	(1) mean	(2) mean	(3) mean	(2) - (3)	(5) mean	(6) mean	(7) mean	(6) - (7)
wp rew. seniority	0.467	0.516	0.464	0.052 **	0.502	0.534	0.497	0.037
wp rew. grade	0.722	0.711	0.723	-0.012	0.740	0.704	0.746	-0.042 **
wp teams	0.701	0.722	0.700	0.022	0.728	0.728	0.728	0.000
wp circles	0.224	0.215	0.224	-0.009	0.231	0.213	0.234	-0.021
wp lot disc	0.227	0.211	0.228	-0.017	0.228	0.211	0.231	-0.020
wp some disc	0.446	0.476	0.445	0.031	0.466	0.483	0.464	0.019
wp union recognition	0.581	0.612	0.580	0.032	0.660	0.623	0.666	-0.043 **
wp grievance proc	0.651	0.694	0.649	0.045 **	0.693	0.693	0.693	0.000
wp hr rep	0.454	0.430	0.455	-0.025	0.471	0.427	0.478	-0.051 ***
wp employment change	0.066	0.046	0.067	-0.021 *	0.052	0.046	0.053	-0.007
wp dismissals	0.013	0.017	0.013	0.004	0.011	0.016	0.011	0.005 **
wp resignations	0.135	0.148	0.134	0.014	0.117	0.145	0.113	0.032 ***
wp dif. vacancies	0.230	0.227	0.230	-0.003	0.226	0.231	0.225	0.006
manufacturing	0.271	0.239	0.273	-0.034	0.258	0.227	0.262	-0.035 *
electrical	0.007	0.005	0.007	-0.002 *	0.007	0.005	0.008	-0.003 ***
construction	0.035	0.023	0.035	-0.012 ***	0.035	0.021	0.037	-0.016 ***
wholesale	0.151	0.164	0.151	0.013	0.137	0.163	0.134	0.029
hotels	0.044	0.043	0.044	-0.001	0.023	0.041	0.020	0.021 **
transport	0.057	0.062	0.057	0.005	0.058	0.059	0.057	0.002
finance	0.046	0.040	0.047	-0.007	0.044	0.037	0.046	-0.009
other business	0.085	0.069	0.086	-0.017	0.072	0.068	0.073	-0.005
public	0.072	0.075	0.071	0.004	0.077	0.076	0.077	-0.001
education	0.082	0.110	0.080	0.030 *	0.128	0.126	0.129	-0.003
health	0.115	0.144	0.113	0.031 *	0.132	0.153	0.129	0.024
other	0.034	0.026	0.035	-0.009	0.028	0.025	0.028	-0.003
number of obs	18511	923	17588		8397	1010	7387	
number of strata	70	70	70		70	70	70	
number of psu	1353	1353	1353		1432	1432	1432	

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998. The point estimates and standard errors account for the stratification and clustering in the sampling procedure. * significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, *** significant at 99%.

Table A1.3 The availability of work life balance practices

	<u>parental leave</u>	<u>paid leave</u>	<u>child-care</u>	<u>flexi-time</u>	<u>home work</u>	<u>job share</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<u>individual variables</u>						
single parent child 0-4	-0.067 [-0.021]	-0.060 [-0.023]	0.301 [0.015]	0.025 [0.009]	0.008 [0.001]	0.131 [0.025]
single parent child 5-11	0.016 [0.005]	-0.097 [-0.038]	0.210 [0.010]	0.115 [0.041]	-0.003 [-0.000]	-0.079 [-0.014]
single parent child 12-18	0.078 [0.025]	0.033 [0.013]	-0.259 [-0.007]	0.133 [0.047]	0.024 [0.002]	-0.182 [-0.029]
single no children	-0.212** [-0.064]	0.048 [0.019]	-0.146* [-0.005]	-0.010 [-0.004]	-0.079 [-0.006]	-0.010 [-0.002]
married no children	-0.193** [-0.060]	0.058* [0.023]	-0.232** [-0.008]	-0.061 [-0.021]	-0.032 [-0.003]	-0.074* [-0.013]
age	-0.031** [-0.010]	0.029** [0.011]	-0.020 [-0.001]	-0.004 [-0.002]	0.048** [0.004]	-0.015 [-0.003]
age2	0.186 [0.059]	-0.344** [-0.135]	0.109 [0.004]	0.122 [0.042]	-0.475** [-0.038]	0.158 [0.029]
female	0.243** [0.077]	-0.074** [-0.029]	0.194** [0.007]	0.057 [0.020]	-0.095** [-0.007]	0.215** [0.039]
ethnicity	-0.202** [-0.060]	-0.026 [-0.010]	-0.315** [-0.008]	0.160* [0.057]	-0.179* [-0.012]	0.087** [0.017]
hourly wage	0.006* [0.002]	0.007* [0.003]	0.000* [0.000]	-0.01 [-0.003]	0.015* [0.001]	0.005** [0.001]
hours	0.017** [0.005]	0.05** [0.020]	0.023 [0.001]	-0.003 [-0.001]	0.017 [0.001]	0.029** [0.005]
hours squared	0.000** [-0.000]	-0.001** [-0.000]	0.000** [-0.000]	0.000 [-0.000]	0.000 [-0.000]	0.000** [-0.000]
tenure	0.013** [0.004]	0.011** [0.005]	0.021** [0.001]	0.001 [0.000]	0.008 [0.001]	0.012** [0.002]
training	0.025** [0.008]	0.004 [0.002]	0.001 [0.000]	0.034** [0.012]	0.034** [0.003]	0.026** [0.005]
part-time	-0.061 [-0.019]	0.006 [0.003]	0.068 [0.003]	0.090 [0.031]	0.153 [0.013]	0.188** [0.036]
fixed term	-0.11 [-0.034]	-0.277** [-0.105]	-0.06* [-0.002]	-0.106 [-0.035]	0.008 [0.001]	-0.164** [-0.027]
temporary	-0.066 [-0.020]	-0.433** [-0.160]	0.020 [0.001]	0.119* [0.042]	-0.092 [-0.007]	0.141* [0.028]
union member	0.093** [0.030]	0.043 [0.017]	0.003 [0.000]	-0.14** [-0.048]	-0.245** [-0.019]	0.085** [0.015]
education other	-0.222** [-0.067]	-0.027 [-0.011]	-0.065 [-0.002]	0.062 [0.021]	-0.090 [-0.007]	-0.187** [-0.032]
CSE	-0.186** [-0.056]	0.006 [0.003]	0.183* [0.008]	0.047 [0.016]	0.022 [0.002]	-0.112* [-0.019]
A-level	0.043 [0.014]	0.056 [0.022]	0.041 [0.002]	0.111** [0.039]	0.23** [0.021]	0.094** [0.018]
degree	0.037 [0.012]	-0.024 [-0.009]	0.12 [0.005]	0.138** [0.049]	0.373** [0.037]	0.172** [0.033]
post graduate	0.249** [0.084]	-0.034 [-0.013]	0.307** [0.015]	0.336** [0.124]	0.597** [0.075]	0.289** [0.061]
vocational qualification	-0.037 [-0.012]	-0.008 [-0.003]	0.076 [0.003]	-0.037 [-0.013]	-0.101** [-0.008]	-0.042 [-0.008]
managers	0.267** [0.090]	-0.072 [-0.028]	0.449** [0.025]	0.49** [0.183]	1.423** [0.282]	0.381** [0.083]

Table A1.3 The availability of work life balance practices, continued.

	<u>parental leave</u>	<u>paid leave</u>	<u>child-care</u>	<u>flexi-time</u>	<u>home work</u>	<u>job share</u>
	-1	-2	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
profs	0.079 [0.026]	-0.125 [-0.049]	0.37** [0.018]	0.229** [0.082]	1.048** [0.162]	0.263** [0.053]
assoc prof	0.065 [0.021]	-0.084 [-0.033]	0.329** [0.016]	0.382** [0.141]	0.931** [0.142]	0.141* [0.027]
clerk	0.07 [0.023]	0.226** [0.089]	0.362** [0.017]	0.415** [0.152]	0.697** [0.085]	0.452** [0.098]
craft	-0.044 [-0.014]	-0.007 [-0.003]	0.132 [0.005]	0.154* [0.055]	0.361* [0.037]	-0.012 [-0.002]
personal	0.175** [0.058]	-0.171** [-0.066]	0.243 [0.011]	-0.069 [-0.023]	0.387** [0.041]	0.081 [0.015]
sales	0.156** [0.051]	-0.089 [-0.035]	0.186 [0.008]	0.178** [0.064]	1.046** [0.167]	-0.007 [-0.001]
operative	0.095 [0.031]	-0.201** [-0.078]	0.225 [0.010]	0.124 [0.044]	-0.241 [-0.016]	0.091 [0.017]
<u>workplace variables</u>						
wp size	0.051** [0.016]	-0.057* [-0.022]	0.133** [0.005]	-0.031 [-0.011]	-0.103** [-0.008]	0.013 [0.002]
wp age	0.026 [0.008]	-0.243 [0.096]	-0.723 [-0.026]	-1.593** [-0.549]	-2.672** [-0.212]	0.068 [0.012]
wp multi-enterprise	-0.027 [-0.008]	0.143** [0.056]	-0.32** [-0.014]	-0.122** [-0.043]	-0.17** [-0.015]	-0.042 [-0.008]
wp training	0.016 [0.005]	0.166** [0.065]	-0.055 [-0.002]	-0.095 [-0.033]	-0.025 [-0.002]	0.105 [0.019]
wp ppn female	0.355** [0.112]	-0.036 [-0.014]	0.500** [0.018]	0.526** [0.181]	0.308* [0.024]	0.805** [0.145]
wp ppn part-time	-0.042 [-0.013]	-0.413** [-0.163]	-0.021 [-0.001]	-0.275* [-0.095]	-0.116 [-0.009]	-0.145 [-0.026]
wp ppn youth	0.084 [0.027]	-1.016** [-0.400]	0.474 [0.017]	0.68** [0.234]	-1.42** [-0.112]	0.134 [0.024]
wp ppn old	-0.348** [-0.110]	-0.038 [-0.015]	-0.365 [-0.013]	0.067 [0.023]	0.144 [0.011]	-0.014 [-0.003]
wp ppn ethnicity	0.292 [0.092]	0.04 [0.016]	1.016** [0.037]	0.067 [0.023]	0.327 [0.026]	-0.123 [-0.022]
wp ave wage	0.005 [0.002]	0.032** [0.013]	0.023 [0.001]	0.008 [0.003]	0.015 [0.001]	0.016* [0.003]
wp rew. seniority	0.001 [0.000]	-0.016 [-0.006]	-0.036 [-0.001]	-0.075* [-0.026]	-0.087 [-0.007]	0.052 [0.009]
wp rew. grade	-0.008 [-0.002]	0.038 [0.015]	-0.081 [-0.003]	0.03 [0.010]	-0.034 [-0.003]	0.011 [0.002]
wp teams	0.103** [0.032]	-0.061 [-0.024]	0.336** [0.012]	-0.017 [-0.006]	-0.09 [-0.007]	0.096 [0.017]
wp circles	0.02 [0.006]	0.035 [0.014]	-0.049 [-0.002]	0.114 [0.039]	-0.006 [-0.000]	0.04 [0.007]
wp lot disc	0.073 [0.023]	-0.068 [-0.027]	0.34** [0.015]	0.149** [0.052]	0.153* [0.013]	0.024 [0.004]
wp some disc	0.056 [0.018]	-0.024 [-0.009]	0.209** [0.008]	0.1** [0.034]	0.07 [0.006]	0.033 [0.006]
wp union recognition	0.160** [0.050]	0.063 [0.025]	-0.054 [-0.002]	0.14** [0.048]	-0.003 [-0.000]	0.235** [0.041]
wp grievance proc	0.074* [0.023]	-0.028 [-0.011]	0.034 [0.001]	0.103** [0.035]	0.014 [0.001]	-0.019 [-0.003]
wp hr rep	0.043 [0.014]	0.188** [0.074]	0.341** [0.013]	0.045 [0.016]	0.105* [0.008]	0.034 [0.006]

Table A1.3 The availability of work life balance practices, continued.

	<u>parental leave</u>	<u>paid leave</u>	<u>child-care</u>	<u>flexi-time</u>	<u>home work</u>	<u>job share</u>
	-1	-2	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
wp employment change	-0.049 [-0.015]	-0.042 [-0.016]	-0.091 [-0.003]	-0.026 [-0.009]	0.078 [0.006]	0.038 [0.007]
wp dismissals	-0.02 [-0.006]	-1.757** [-0.691]	1.926* [0.070]	-0.344 [-0.119]	-1.863* [-0.148]	0.618 [0.112]
wp resignations	-0.036 [-0.011]	-0.28** [-0.110]	-1.404** [-0.051]	0.21 [0.072]	0.416* [0.033]	-0.236 [-0.043]
wp dif. vacancies	-0.087 [-0.027]	0.1* [0.039]	-0.016 [-0.001]	-0.035 [-0.012]	-0.149* [-0.012]	-0.055 [-0.010]
manufacturing	-0.09 [-0.028]	-0.177* [-0.069]	-0.623** [-0.017]	-0.154 [-0.052]	0.02 [0.002]	-0.57** [-0.087]
electrical	0.000 [0.000]	0.261** [0.104]	0.079 [0.003]	0.333** [0.123]	0.496** [0.060]	-0.197 [-0.031]
construction	0.033 [0.010]	-0.36** [-0.135]	-0.412 [-0.010]	-0.019 [-0.007]	0.1 [0.009]	-0.103 [-0.017]
wholesale	-0.024 [-0.007]	-0.098 [-0.038]	-0.715** [-0.016]	-0.062 [-0.021]	-0.379** [-0.024]	-0.323** [-0.050]
hotels	-0.175 [-0.052]	-0.23** [-0.088]	0.122 [0.005]	0.033 [0.012]	0.055 [0.005]	-0.084 [-0.014]
transport	0.078 [0.025]	-0.154 [-0.060]	-0.612** [-0.013]	0.021 [0.007]	0.262 [0.026]	-0.323** [-0.048]
finance	-0.072 [-0.022]	-0.205** [-0.079]	-0.628** [-0.013]	0.219 [0.079]	0.134 [0.012]	-0.166 [-0.027]
other business	0.05 [0.016]	-0.098 [-0.038]	-0.221 [-0.007]	0.109 [0.039]	0.283** [0.028]	-0.227* [-0.036]
public	0.083 [0.027]	0.04 [0.016]	-0.04 [-0.001]	0.638** [0.242]	0.209 [0.019]	0.272** [0.056]
education	-0.131 [-0.040]	-0.659** [-0.236]	-0.13 [-0.004]	-0.612** [-0.178]	-0.351** [-0.022]	-0.309** [-0.048]
health	-0.241** [-0.071]	0.075 [0.030]	-0.236 [-0.007]	-0.085 [-0.029]	-0.242 [-0.016]	-0.178 [-0.030]
constant	-0.638** -0.28	-1.824** -0.291	-2.524** -0.585	-0.878** -0.308	-3.938** -0.544	-2.2** -0.351
industry joint F test	**	**	**	**	**	**
occupation joint F test	**	**	**	**	**	**
number of obs	20337	20337	20337	20337	20337	20337
number of strata	70	70	70	70	70	70
number of PSUs	1492	1492	1492	1492	1492	1492
model F test	14.67**	21.39**	10.20**	10.21**	22.70**	13.80**
obs. P	0.267		0.036		0.090	0.150
pred. P (at x bar)	0.247		0.014		0.036	0.100
Log likelihood	-10877		-2504		-4454	-7079
Pseudo R2	0.080		0.212		0.2781	0.166
Dependent variable mean	0.266	0.452	0.036	0.311	0.09	0.146

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998. Each entry contains the probit coefficient, and marginal effect [in square brackets] from a probit model weighted by individual sampling weights. The data are weighted to account for the stratification and clustering in the sampling procedure. * significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%.

Table A1.4 Interacting lone parent status with the main explanatory variables: full sample

	<u>parental leave</u>	<u>paid leave</u>	<u>child-care</u>	<u>flexi-time</u>	<u>home work</u>	<u>job share</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
single parent status	-0.001	0.003	0.002	-0.011	0.000	0.025**
interacted with age	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)
	[-0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[-0.004]	[-0.000]	[0.004]
single parent status	-0.098	-0.128	0.448*	0.125	0.015	0.309*
interacted with female	(0.160)	(0.155)	(0.254)	(0.135)	(0.190)	(0.169)
	[-0.030]	[-0.050]	[0.025]	[0.044]	[0.001]	[0.066]
single parent status	-0.002	-0.001	0.014	0.008	-0.001	0.009
interacted with hours	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)
	[-0.001]	[-0.000]	[0.000]	[0.003]	[-0.000]	[0.002]
single parent status	-0.022	0.004	0.008	-0.014	-0.002	0.016
interacted with tenure	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.020)
	[-0.007]	[0.002]	[0.000]	[-0.005]	[-0.000]	[0.003]
single parent status	0.015	-0.010	0.016	0.001	0.015	0.025
interacted with training	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.023)
	[0.005]	[-0.004]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.005]
single parent status	-0.159	0.105	0.030	0.169	0.374*	-0.238
interacted with	(0.146)	(0.139)	(0.245)	(0.141)	(0.213)	(0.171)
union membership	[-0.047]	[0.041]	[0.001]	[0.061]	[0.040]	[-0.037]
single parent status	-0.055	-0.246	-0.452	0.362**	0.415	0.037
interacted with	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.378)	(0.160)	(0.307)	(0.211)
education other	[-0.017]	[-0.094]	[-0.010]	[0.134]	[0.046]	[0.007]
single parent status	0.259	-0.093	-0.371	0.089	0.451**	0.165
interacted with A-level	(0.160)	(0.165)	(0.272)	(0.183)	(0.194)	(0.191)
	[0.088]	[-0.036]	[-0.009]	[0.031]	[0.052]	[0.033]
single parent status	-0.047	-0.073	-0.616**	-0.159	-0.035	-0.158
interacted with degree	(0.182)	(0.200)	(0.310)	(0.170)	(0.180)	(0.182)
	[-0.015]	[-0.028]	[-0.012]	[-0.052]	[-0.003]	[-0.026]

Table A1.4 Interacting lone parent status with the main explanatory variables: full sample, continued.

	<u>parental leave</u> (1)	<u>paid leave</u> (2)	<u>child-care</u> (3)	<u>flexi-time</u> (4)	<u>home work</u> (5)	<u>job share</u> (6)
single parent status	0.250	-0.421	0.302	0.299	0.471*	0.076
interacted with	(0.253)	(0.268)	(0.300)	(0.257)	(0.273)	(0.260)
post graduate	[0.085]	[-0.156]	[0.015]	[0.110]	[0.055]	[0.014]
single parent status	0.058	0.019	0.084*	-0.028	-0.157	0.190**
interacted with	(0.056)	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.066)	(0.149)	(0.070)
work place size	[0.018]	[0.007]	[0.003]	[-0.009]	[-0.012]	[0.034]
single parent status	0.369	-1.129	3.019*	-1.480	-3.473	0.230
interacted with	(1.063)	(1.149)	(1.635)	(1.514)	(2.526)	(1.338)
work place age	[0.116]	[-0.444]	[0.107]	[-0.510]	[-0.271]	[0.041]
single parent status	-0.161	0.155	-0.214	-0.179	0.189	-0.154
interacted with wp	(0.147)	(0.139)	(0.239)	(0.150)	(0.186)	(0.178)
multi-establishment	[-0.048]	[0.061]	[-0.006]	[-0.059]	[0.017]	[-0.025]
single parent status	-0.331	0.382	-0.130	0.234	-0.154	-0.678**
interacted with	(0.259)	(0.283)	(0.441)	(0.265)	(0.313)	(0.307)
wp proportion female	[-0.104]	[0.150]	[-0.005]	[0.081]	[-0.012]	[-0.121]
single parent status	-0.056*	0.012	-0.010	0.003	0.000	-0.023
interacted with	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.035)
wp ave wage	[-0.018]	[0.005]	[-0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[-0.004]
single parent status	-0.101	0.222	-0.387	-0.016	-0.091	-0.095
interacted with wp	(0.147)	(0.152)	(0.270)	(0.139)	(0.167)	(0.179)
lot of discretion	[-0.031]	[0.088]	[-0.009]	[-0.006]	[-0.007]	[-0.016]
single parent status	0.206	-0.054	0.033	0.276*	0.047	0.118
interacted with wp	(0.146)	(0.141)	(0.255)	(0.151)	(0.199)	(0.170)
union recognition	[0.069]	[-0.021]	[0.001]	[0.101]	[0.004]	[0.023]

Table A1.4 Interacting lone parent status with the main explanatory variables: full sample, continued.

	<u>parental leave</u> (1)	<u>paid leave</u> (2)	<u>child-care</u> (3)	<u>flexi-time</u> (4)	<u>home work</u> (5)	<u>job share</u> (6)
single parent status	-0.168	-0.053	-0.232	0.034	0.027	0.100
interacted with wp	(0.126)	(0.117)	(0.191)	(0.115)	(0.155)	(0.156)
human resource rep	[-0.050]	[-0.021]	[-0.006]	[0.012]	[0.002]	[0.019]
single parent status	-0.304*	0.261	0.151	0.137	-0.020	-0.322
interacted with wp	(0.183)	(0.226)	(0.296)	(0.200)	(0.295)	(0.317)
employment change	[-0.096]	[0.103]	[0.005]	[0.047]	[-0.002]	[-0.058]
single parent status	-5.721**	0.648	-4.520	-1.066	-0.338	-1.859
interacted with wp	(2.512)	(1.407)	(2.864)	(1.487)	(2.130)	(2.889)
dismissals	[-1.803]	[0.255]	[-0.160]	[-0.367]	[-0.026]	[-0.332]
single parent status	0.868**	-0.185	1.882**	0.414	-0.832	0.309
interacted with wp	(0.403)	(0.391)	(0.798)	(0.382)	(0.567)	(0.515)
resignations	[0.274]	[-0.073]	[0.067]	[0.143]	[-0.065]	[0.055]
single parent status	0.282	0.009	0.027	0.082	-0.022	-0.121
interacted with wp	(0.177)	(0.181)	(0.337)	(0.186)	(0.202)	(0.248)
dif. vacancies	[0.089]	[0.004]	[0.001]	[0.028]	[-0.002]	[-0.022]
model F test	12.089**	16.908**	10.397**	8.295**	18.963**	10.834**
Dep variable mean	0.27	0.45	0.04	0.31	0.09	0.15
number of obs	20337	20337	20337	20337	20337	20337
number of strata	70	70	70	70	70	70
number of PSUs	1492	1492	1492	1492	1492	1492

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998. Each entry contains the probit coefficient, standard error (in round brackets) and marginal effect [in square brackets] for the interactive variables, the regression also includes all the variables in the baseline regression (Table A1.3). The probit model is weighted by individual sampling weights. The standard errors account for the stratification and clustering in the sampling procedure. * Statistically significant at the 90% level, ** Statistically significant at the 95% level.

APPENDIX A2. Unweighted results

A2.1 The survey design and the need to weight the data

As with all sample surveys such as WERS98 (as opposed to a population survey or a census), there are tensions between the competing aims of the sample size, data collection methods, the representativeness of the information from the survey, and the time and cost involved in the sampling process. The most straight forward sample survey design would be to simply randomly sample the population in sufficiently large numbers that all minority groups are adequately covered to enable reliable estimates concerning, for example, their behaviour. Unfortunately, such an approach does not often meet the time and cost criteria.

The WERS98 survey has a two layer design structure (for a more detailed explanation see Airey *et al.*, 1999). The population was first divided into 72 distinct groups (strata) according to six categories of workplace size within each of the twelve major groupings in the Standard Industrial Classification (Forth and Kirby, 2000). Differential sampling probabilities were then applied across these strata to ensure adequate coverage of rarer types of workplaces in the survey. For example, smaller workplaces were over sampled and those in manufacturing were under sampled. If these differential sampling probabilities are not allowed for when carrying out analysis, possible sources of bias can be introduced (for example, the estimate of the mean number of workers in each workplace in the population will be too low).

From those workplaces surveyed, employees were then selected for surveying. As discussed previously, the WERS98 includes workplaces of ten or more employees. For those workplaces with 25 or less employees, all of the workers were approached to complete a survey (this is essentially a population survey of the workforces in these workplaces). For workplaces with more than 25 employees, a random sample of the workforce took place to find 25 employees who would be surveyed. Note then, the employee survey is not a sample across the whole population, only across those workforces that had already participated in the first stage of the survey.

It could be expected that employees within a workplace are more similar than those working in different workplaces, this is known as clustering. In the extreme, if all workers in a workplace were merely clones of each other then it would only be necessary to survey one worker for each workplace and the number of employee surveys would approach the number of workplaces sampled (Deaton 1998). The estimate of the true variance in characteristics of the population will be under estimated by such a sample. By only allowing for employees to be surveyed from workplaces included in the first stage, the WERS98 design therefore introduces possible inefficiencies due to clustering which also need to be allowed for in analyses.

The WERS98 data set is issued with variables that can be used to weight and thereby suitably adjust the sample data so as to overcome design difficulties. These weights have also been constructed so as to allow for more minor complications, including the non-response rate of 20 per cent amongst workplaces and 36 per cent for individual employees (Forth and Kirby, 2000). If the data are not weighted, the descriptive statistics produced will not represent the population and could be misleading (a simple explanation is provided in Purdon and Pickering, 2001; a fuller explanation including relevant formulae is found in Deaton, 1998). Similarly, depending on what form of multi-variable analysis is carried out, the data may also need to be weighted in regression analysis (Deaton, 1998).

The data have accordingly been weighted throughout this study. Weighted and unweighted results for the summary statistics are provided in Table A1.1 to enable the reader to make comparisons of the extent of the weighting impacts. Thereafter only weighted results are reported (although results for the first set of full sample regressions are also provided using unweighted data in Appendix A2)

The WERS98 data set is a cross-sectional survey, carried out at a point in time (panel data are only available for the survey of employers, Airey et al., 1999). This can lead to additional interpretation difficulties. For example, respondents are asked to recall some information from the past (such as ‘how long have you been employed in this job’). Furthermore, some of the responses may be treated as occurring simultaneously when in fact one may have led to the other (such as training in the previous twelve months and current salary) and issues of possible reverse causation can arise. These and other possible modelling difficulties using cross-sectional data are well rehearsed in a range of text books (see Greene, 1997) and should be remembered when interpreting results in this report.

A2.2 Recorded availability of work-life balance practices at the employee and workplace level

With the exception of flexi-time, WERS98 contains both individual and workplace measures of the availability of work-life balance policies. For the workplace-level questions, the manager with day-to-day responsibilities for personnel matters was interviewed and for the work-life balance policies, this individual was asked questions very similar to the individual questions described in subsection 5.1. The main difference in the wording between the individual questions and the workplace questions is that while the individual questions ask whether the policies are available to the individual respondent, the workplace questions ask whether the policies are available to any non-managerial employees.

The (weighted) mean values of the individual responses of availability and those for the workplaces are:

	<u>individual reported</u> <u>availability</u>	<u>workplace reported</u> <u>availability</u>
parental leave	0.272	0.441
home work	0.092	0.184
job share	0.159	0.399
paid leave	0.452	0.625
child-care	0.040	0.131

Workplace respondents are considerably more likely to say that a work-life balance practice is available. Issues concerning the awareness and the availability of work-life balance policies at both the employee and workplace level are discussed in Budd and Mumford, 2001b.

Table A2.1 Variable means: lone parents relative to (a) the full sample or (b) to parents only, using unweighted data.

individual variables	(a) lone parents relative to the full sample				(b) lone parents relative to parents only			
	full sample	lone parent	not lone parent	difference in means of	full sample	lone parent	not lone parent	difference in means of
	(1) mean	(2) mean	(3) mean	(2)& (3) t-test	(5) mean	(6) mean	(7) mean	(6)& (7) t-test
parental leave	0.279	0.312	0.278	2.201	0.268	0.315	0.318	-0.227
home work	0.114	0.113	0.114	-0.156	0.125	0.110	0.127	-1.639
job share	0.166	0.152	0.167	-1.237	0.174	0.149	0.177	-2.360
child-care	0.034	0.047	0.033	1.868	0.042	0.048	0.041	0.880
paid leave	0.499	0.451	0.502	-3.023	0.479	0.448	0.483	-2.117
flexible times	0.336	0.352	0.335	1.061	0.317	0.348	0.313	2.177
age	39.451	37.724	39.541	-6.411	39.406	37.978	39.584	-5.809
age2	1684.8	1490.3	1695.0	-9.365	1610.687	1511.600	1624.235	-5.265
female	0.487	0.535	0.485	3.007	0.462	0.553	0.449	6.250
married	0.699	0	0.736	-221.177	0.880	0.000	1.000	.
child04	0.141	0.291	0.134	10.398	0.338	0.278	0.346	-4.447
child511	0.194	0.451	0.181	16.205	0.468	0.445	0.471	-1.599
child12	0.196	0.473	0.182	17.475	0.484	0.489	0.484	0.331
child018	0.412	1	0.381	169.077	0.041	0.060	0.038	2.805
ethnicity	0.036	0.06	0.035	3.088	0.036	0.058	0.034	1.791
sing04	0.014	0.282	0	19.015	0.015	0.288	0	13.346
sing511	0.019	0.378	0	23.677	0.02	0.386	0	16.807
sing1218	0.017	0.34	0	21.803	0.017	0.326	0	16.672
sing011	0.033	0.66	0	42.287	0.036	0.674	0	34.427
sing018	0.05	1	0	.	0.053	1	0	.
hourly wage	7.517	7.085	7.54	-3.302	7.202	7.115	8.218	-7.852
hours	37.492	36.364	37.552	-2.807	36.864	36.120	36.966	-1.980
hours squared	1552.7	1479.7	1556.5	-2.580	1534.458	1464.615	1544.008	-2.660
tenure	5.408	4.739	5.443	-5.82	5.599	4.760	5.714	-7.989
training	2.663	2.746	2.659	0.783	2.725	2.740	2.723	0.155
part-time	0.188	0.232	0.186	3.242	0.240	0.238	0.241	-0.224
fixed term	0.028	0.023	0.028	-1.131	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.037
temporary	0.034	0.038	0.034	0.68	0.031	0.040	0.030	1.523

Table A2.1 Variable means: lone parents relative to (a) the full sample or (b) to parents only, using unweighted data, continued.

	(a) lone parents relative to the full sample				(b) lone parents relative to parents only			
	full sample (1) mean	lone parent (2) mean	not lone parent (3) mean	difference in means of (2)& (3) t-test	full sample (5) mean	lone parent (6) mean	not lone parent (7) mean	difference in means of (6)& (7) t-test
union member	0.391	0.38	0.392	-0.695	0.448	0.391	0.456	-3.958
education other	0.219	0.184	0.22	-2.750	0.261	0.181	0.177	0.351
CSE	0.113	0.153	0.11	3.505	0.137	0.150	0.135	1.312
O-level	0.266	0.312	0.263	3.124	0.288	0.308	0.286	1.451
A-level	0.161	0.16	0.161	-0.086	0.145	0.155	0.143	0.998
degree	0.182	0.141	0.184	-3.644	0.188	0.153	0.193	-3.222
postgrad	0.059	0.049	0.06	-1.543	0.064	0.050	0.066	-2.047
vocational qual	0.382	0.402	0.381	1.293	0.400	0.394	0.400	-0.389
managers	0.11	0.089	0.112	-2.356	0.090	0.085	0.124	-4.053
profs	0.154	0.133	0.155	-1.891	0.183	0.147	0.188	-3.451
assoc prof	0.103	0.102	0.103	-0.138	0.106	0.104	0.106	-0.199
clerk	0.211	0.204	0.211	-0.533	0.172	0.206	0.167	2.871
craft	0.085	0.075	0.085	-1.194	0.085	0.069	0.087	-2.052
personal	0.068	0.094	0.067	2.794	0.084	0.087	0.084	0.367
sales	0.079	0.088	0.079	0.963	0.068	0.086	0.066	2.160
operative	0.092	0.103	0.092	1.09	0.092	0.099	0.091	0.806
other occup	0.097	0.113	0.097	1.515	0.091	0.117	0.087	2.815
<u>workplace variables</u>								
wp size	257.902	261.356	257.721	0.158	597.193	261.745	285.864	-1.060
wp age	36.305	34.303	36.41	-1.425	37.094	34.565	37.440	-1.970
wp multi-enterprise	0.763	0.774	0.762	0.789	0.804	0.792	0.805	-0.956
wp training	0.507	0.525	0.506	1.555	0.539	0.531	0.540	-0.732
wp ppn female	0.481	0.491	0.481	1.080	0.485	0.502	0.482	2.082
wp ppn part-time	0.224	0.254	0.222	3.484	0.233	0.259	0.230	3.272
wp ppn youth	0.053	0.056	0.053	0.730	0.043	0.053	0.042	3.392
wp ppn old	0.156	0.152	0.156	-1.040	0.157	0.154	0.157	-0.930
wp ppn ethnicity	0.04	0.052	0.039	3.106	0.040	0.052	0.038	3.481

Table A2.1 Variable means: lone parents relative to (a) the full sample or (b) to parents only, using unweighted data, continued.

	(a) lone parents relative to the full sample				(b) lone parents relative to parents only			
	full sample (1) mean	lone parent (2) mean	not lone parent (3) mean	difference in means of (2)& (3) t-test	full sample (5) mean	lone parent (6) mean	not lone parent (7) mean	difference in means of (6)& (7) t-test
wp ave wage	7.499	7.257	7.512	-3.113	7.205	7.312	7.747	-5.336
wp rew. seniority	0.494	0.531	0.492	2.307	0.529	0.546	0.527	1.125
wp rew. grade	0.75	0.741	0.75	-0.604	0.759	0.735	0.762	-1.882
wp teams	0.716	0.736	0.715	1.734	0.739	0.744	0.738	0.466
wp circles	0.231	0.224	0.231	-0.632	0.224	0.227	0.243	-1.408
wp lot disc	0.225	0.207	0.226	-1.358	0.234	0.214	0.237	-1.667
wp some disc	0.45	0.462	0.449	0.748	0.457	0.463	0.456	0.444
wp union recognition	0.602	0.612	0.601	0.667	0.669	0.625	0.675	-3.102
wp grievance proc	0.657	0.678	0.656	1.427	0.692	0.678	0.694	-1.012
wp hr rep	0.431	0.391	0.433	-2.55	0.420	0.384	0.425	-2.476
wp employment change	0.05	0.041	0.051	-0.933	0.066	0.040	0.044	-0.402
wp dismissals	0.011	0.014	0.011	1.971	0.010	0.013	0.009	3.385
wp resignations	0.128	0.137	0.127	1.751	0.112	0.135	0.109	4.723
wp dif. vacancies	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.038	0.217	0.225	0.216	0.896
manufacturing	0.167	0.146	0.168	-1.783	0.271	0.140	0.157	-1.512
electrical	0.045	0.034	0.046	-2.021	0.048	0.031	0.051	-3.323
construction	0.056	0.037	0.057	-3.142	0.054	0.034	0.056	-3.628
wholesale	0.133	0.143	0.133	0.887	0.121	0.139	0.119	1.728
hotels	0.042	0.044	0.042	0.370	0.024	0.043	0.022	3.137
transport	0.061	0.072	0.061	1.243	0.063	0.067	0.063	0.571
finance	0.064	0.057	0.064	-0.837	0.056	0.052	0.057	-0.565
other business	0.092	0.078	0.093	-1.643	0.074	0.079	0.073	0.662
public	0.09	0.1	0.089	1.048	0.094	0.099	0.093	0.588
education	0.097	0.108	0.097	1.105	0.154	0.134	0.157	-1.994
health	0.107	0.139	0.106	2.854	0.117	0.143	0.114	2.486
other	0.046	0.042	0.046	-0.525	0.039	0.041	0.039	0.243
number of obs	18511	923	17588		8397	1010	7387	

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998.

Table A2.2. The availability of parental leave or home working: unweighted data.

	parental leave			home work		
	coef.	t-value	dF/dx	Coef.	t-value	dF/dx
<u>individual variables</u>						
lone parent child 0-4	-0.143	-1.70	-0.044	-0.131	-0.96	-0.014
lone parent child 5-11	0.001	0.01	0.000	0.140	1.43	0.018
lone parent child 12-18	0.074	1.01	0.025	0.086	0.86	0.011
lone no children	-0.237	-8.06	-0.074	-0.101	-2.49	-0.011
married no children	-0.197	-7.54	-0.062	-0.030	-0.87	-0.003
age	-0.028	-3.59	-0.009	0.041	3.57	0.005
age2	0.000	1.36	0.000	-0.000	-2.85	-0.000
female	0.189	7.34	0.061	-0.132	-3.84	-0.015
ethnicity	-0.181	-3.22	-0.551	-0.188	-2.44	-0.019
hourly wage	0.004	1.64	0.001	0.017	5.99	0.002
hours	0.017	3.50	0.056	0.024	2.94	0.003
hours squared	0.000	-4.14	0.000	-0.000	-1.67	-0.000
tenure	0.011	3.40	0.004	0.003	0.66	0.000
training	0.027	8.65	0.009	0.035	8.17	0.004
part-time	-0.027	-0.50	-0.009	0.199	2.28	0.025
fixed term	-0.121	-2.06	-0.038	0.080	1.04	0.010
temporary	-0.085	-1.49	-0.027	-0.122	-1.22	-0.013
union member	0.117	4.70	0.038	-0.251	-7.19	-0.028
education other	-0.191	-5.65	-0.060	-0.200	-3.68	-0.021
CSE	-0.146	-4.09	-0.046	-0.011	-0.19	-0.001
A-level	0.062	2.04	0.020	0.180	4.16	0.023
degree	0.063	1.86	0.021	0.271	6.27	0.035
postgrad	0.216	4.53	0.074	0.458	8.21	0.071
vocational qual	-0.046	-2.18	-0.015	-0.103	-3.56	-0.012
managers	0.221	4.18	0.075	1.148	11.98	0.246
profs	0.021	0.40	0.007	0.797	8.29	0.137
assoc prof	0.069	1.35	0.023	0.672	6.97	0.115
clerk	0.060	1.32	0.020	0.455	4.81	0.064
craft	-0.052	-0.95	-0.017	0.226	2.13	0.030
personal	0.060	1.13	0.020	0.043	0.37	0.005
sales	0.127	2.25	0.043	0.819	7.48	0.155
operative	0.047	0.86	0.015	-0.404	-2.84	-0.036
<u>workplace variables</u>						
wp size	0.000	2.32	0.000	-0.000	-2.06	-0.000
wp age	0.000	0.34	0.000	-0.003	-6.80	-0.000
wp multi-enterprise	0.022	0.82	0.007	-0.155	-4.36	-0.019
wp training	0.052	1.68	0.017	0.005	0.11	0.001
wp ppn female	0.323	5.10	0.105	0.035	0.39	0.004
wp ppn part-time	0.029	0.40	0.009	-0.163	-1.55	-0.019
wp ppn youth	-0.160	-1.15	-0.052	-1.043	-3.99	-0.120
wp ppn old	-0.296	-2.90	-0.096	0.096	0.69	0.011
wp ppn ethnicity	0.327	2.75	0.106	0.131	0.80	0.015
wp ave wage	0.012	2.14	0.004	0.021	3.00	0.002
wp rew. seniority	0.025	1.17	0.008	-0.035	-1.20	-0.004
wp rew. grade	0.036	1.46	0.011	-0.036	-1.05	-0.004
wp teams	0.073	2.34	0.024	-0.055	-1.24	-0.006

Table A2.2. The availability of parental leave or home working: unweighted data, continued.

	parental leave			home work		
	coef.	t-value	dF/dx	Coef.	t-value	dF/dx
wp circles	-0.026	-0.80	-0.008	-0.007	-0.15	-0.001
wp lot disc	0.043	1.51	0.014	0.129	3.29	0.016
wp some disc	0.024	0.99	0.008	0.085	2.47	0.010
wp union recognition	0.185	6.14	0.059	0.097	2.25	0.011
wp grievance proc	0.02	0.77	0.006	-0.071	-2.00	-0.008
wp hr rep	0.018	0.80	0.006	0.106	3.44	0.012
wp employment change	-0.032	-0.90	-0.010	-0.024	-0.46	-0.003
wp dismissals	-0.166	-0.39	-0.054	-1.280	-1.77	-0.147
wp resignations	-0.172	-2.13	-0.056	-0.027	-0.23	-0.003
wp dif. vacancies	-0.012	-0.37	-0.004	-0.113	-2.40	-0.013
manufacturing	-0.142	-2.50	-0.045	-0.141	-1.76	-0.015
electrical	-0.102	-1.49	-0.032	0.260	2.96	0.036
construction	-0.121	-1.78	-0.038	-0.169	-1.83	-0.017
wholesale	-0.059	-1.01	-0.019	-0.303	-3.48	-0.029
hotels	-0.146	-1.99	-0.045	0.090	0.82	0.011
transport	-0.091	-1.40	-0.029	0.097	1.08	0.012
finance	-0.164	-2.59	-0.051	-0.001	-0.02	-0.000
other business	-0.053	-0.90	-0.017	0.183	2.35	0.024
public	0.129	2.20	0.043	0.125	1.55	0.016
education	-0.167	-2.82	-0.052	-0.336	-4.06	-0.032
health	-0.236	-3.90	-0.072	0.042	0.49	0.005
constant	-0.627	-3.10		-3.547	-10.97	
obs. P			0.279			0.111
pred. P (at x bar)			0.260			0.057
number of obs	20401		20401	20401		20401
LR chi2(64)	1867		1867	3289		3289
Prob > chi2	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000
Log likelihood	-11138		-11138	-5447		-5447
Pseudo R2	0.077		0.077	0.232		0.232

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998.

Table A2.3. The availability of job sharing or subsidised child-care: unweighted data.

individual variables	job sharing			child-care		
	coef.	t-value	dF/dx	coef.	t-value	dF/dx
lone parent child 0-4	-0.074	-0.71	-0.015	0.196	1.40	0.010
lone parent child 5-11	-0.085	-0.97	-0.016	0.102	0.85	0.005
lone parent child 12-18	-0.216	-2.34	-0.039	-0.116	-0.80	-0.005
lone no children	-0.004	-0.13	-0.001	-0.129	-2.33	-0.005
married no children	-0.005	-0.15	-0.001	-0.162	-3.25	-0.007
age	-0.008	-0.85	-0.002	-0.015	-0.99	-0.001
age2	0.000	0.58	0.000	0.000	0.26	0.000
female	0.165	5.59	0.034	0.195	4.12	0.009
ethnicity	-0.008	-0.12	-0.002	-0.133	-1.30	-0.005
hourly wage	0.003	0.89	0.001	0.003	0.83	0.000
hours	0.024	4.15	0.005	0.019	1.86	0.001
hours squared	-0.000	-5.88	-0.000	-0.000	-2.30	-0.000
tenure	0.009	2.39	0.002	0.016	2.59	0.001
training	0.025	6.65	0.005	0.010	1.71	0.000
part-time	0.185	3.11	0.040	0.021	0.20	0.001
fixed term	-0.097	-1.48	-0.019	0.031	0.32	0.001
temporary	0.051	0.81	0.011	0.046	0.44	0.002
union member	0.142	5.03	0.030	0.039	0.86	0.002
education other	-0.226	-5.44	-0.043	-0.232	-3.10	-0.009
CSE	-0.135	-3.00	-0.026	-0.033	-0.45	-0.001
A-level	0.079	2.24	0.017	0.066	1.18	0.003
degree	0.154	3.95	0.033	-0.030	-0.50	-0.001
postgrad	0.180	3.34	0.040	0.163	2.06	0.008
vocational qual	-0.040	-1.62	-0.008	0.075	1.91	0.003
managers	0.359	5.48	0.086	0.339	3.08	0.020
profs	0.307	4.90	0.070	0.155	1.45	0.008
assoc prof	0.202	3.27	0.045	0.202	1.92	0.010
clerk	0.539	9.83	0.131	0.246	2.53	0.013
craft	0.037	0.48	0.008	-0.056	-0.42	-0.002
personal	0.113	1.82	0.024	0.101	0.92	0.005
sales	0.045	0.60	0.009	0.243	1.68	0.013
operative	0.089	1.13	0.019	0.121	0.87	0.006
<u>workplace variables</u>						
wp size	0.000	1.30	0.000	0.000	6.91	0.000
wp age	-0.000	-0.82	-0.000	-0.000	-0.75	-0.000
wp multi-enterprise	0.072	2.17	0.014	-0.181	-3.63	-0.009
wp training	0.054	1.49	0.011	0.043	0.70	0.002
wp ppn female	0.825	10.97	0.168	0.339	2.81	0.015
wp ppn part-time	-0.026	-0.32	-0.005	-0.097	-0.72	-0.004
wp ppn youth	0.071	0.41	0.015	0.151	0.53	0.007
wp ppn old	0.023	0.19	0.005	-0.743	-3.55	-0.032
wp ppn ethnicity	0.053	0.38	0.011	0.594	2.91	0.026
wp ave wage	0.021	3.22	0.004	0.009	0.89	0.000
wp rew. seniority	0.052	2.07	0.011	-0.076	-1.87	-0.003
wp rew. grade	0.034	1.14	0.007	0.008	0.17	0.000
wp teams	0.066	1.72	0.013	0.087	1.33	0.004
wp circles	0.010	0.26	0.002	-0.124	-1.97	-0.005
wp lot disc	0.039	1.14	0.008	0.105	1.82	0.005

Table A2.3. The availability of job sharing or subsidised child-care: unweighted data, continued.

	job sharing			child-care		
	coef.	t-value	dF/dx	coef.	t-value	dF/dx
wp some disc	0.047	1.63	0.010	0.204	4.11	0.009
wp union recognition	0.311	8.52	0.061	0.072	1.18	0.003
wp grievance proc	-0.030	-1.00	-0.006	0.033	0.66	0.001
wp hr rep	0.034	1.29	0.007	0.297	7.05	0.014
wp employment change	0.010	0.23	0.002	-0.097	-1.24	-0.004
wp dismissals	0.876	1.56	0.179	2.209	2.66	0.097
wp resignations	-0.268	-2.63	-0.055	-1.144	-5.68	-0.050
wp dif. vacancies	-0.086	-2.20	-0.018	0.097	1.55	0.004
manufacturing	-0.571	-8.06	-0.092	-0.507	-4.51	-0.016
electrical	-0.333	-4.23	-0.056	0.089	0.81	0.004
construction	-0.231	-2.78	-0.042	-0.504	-3.31	-0.014
wholesale	-0.436	-6.14	-0.073	-0.708	-5.19	-0.019
hotels	-0.115	-1.37	-0.022	0.338	2.84	0.021
transport	-0.395	-4.92	-0.065	-0.565	-3.82	-0.015
finance	-0.224	-3.22	-0.041	-0.735	-5.68	-0.02
other business	-0.343	-4.98	-0.059	-0.139	-1.34	-0.005
public	0.196	3.07	0.044	0.032	0.33	0.001
education	-0.343	-5.25	-0.060	0.041	0.40	0.002
health	-0.199	-2.99	-0.037	-0.024	-0.24	-0.001
constant	-2.391	-10.03		-2.178	-5.38	
obs. P			0.169			0.035
pred. P (at x bar)			0.124			0.018
number of obs	20401		20401	20401		20401
LR chi2(64)	3169		3169	914.28		914.28
Prob > chi2	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000
Log likelihood	-7692		-7692	-2648		-2648
Pseudo R2	0.171		0.171	0.147		0.147

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998.

Table A2.4. The availability of paid leave at short notice or flexi-time: unweighted data.

individual variables	paid leave			flexible times		
	coef.	t-value	dF/dx	coef.	t-value	dF/dx
lone parent child 0-4	-0.039	-0.48	-0.016	-0.056	0.83	0.025
lone parent child 5-11	-0.132	-1.89	-0.052	0.067	0.93	0.024
lone parent child 12-18	0.053	0.74	0.021	0.090	1.25	0.033
lone no children	0.047	1.69	0.019	0.024	0.82	0.008
married no children	0.090	3.63	0.036	-0.031	-1.21	-0.011
age	0.018	2.57	0.007	-0.011	-1.43	-0.004
age2	-0.000	-2.93	-0.000	0.000	2.05	0.000
female	-0.071	-2.87	-0.028	-0.033	-1.29	-0.012
ethnicity	-0.081	-1.53	-0.032	0.080	1.48	0.029
hourly wage	0.005	2.06	0.002	-0.009	-3.40	-0.003
hours	0.046	8.98	0.018	-0.010	-2.05	-0.003
hours squared	-0.001	-9.76	-0.000	-0.000	-1.12	-0.000
tenure	0.014	4.52	0.005	-0.003	-0.81	-0.001
training	-0.001	-0.33	-0.000	0.027	8.66	0.010
part-time	-0.033	-0.62	-0.013	0.007	0.13	0.002
fixed term	-0.302	-5.23	-0.118	-0.043	-0.74	-0.015
temporary	-0.371	-6.30	-0.144	0.095	1.78	0.034
union member	0.065	2.71	0.026	-0.105	-4.23	-0.037
education other	0.022	0.70	0.009	0.017	0.55	0.006
CSE	0.016	0.48	0.006	0.078	2.23	0.028
A-level	0.046	1.52	0.018	0.103	3.38	0.037
degree	-0.041	-1.24	-0.016	0.102	3.03	0.037
postgrad	-0.036	-0.75	-0.014	0.264	5.41	0.098
vocational qual	-0.002	-0.11	-0.001	-0.052	-2.48	-0.018
managers	0.030	0.61	0.012	-0.063	9.77	0.187
profs	-0.041	-0.84	-0.016	0.179	3.57	0.065
assoc prof	0.063	1.34	0.025	0.411	8.51	0.154
clerk	0.261	6.16	0.104	0.429	9.96	0.159
craft	0.053	1.09	0.021	0.010	0.20	0.004
personal	-0.150	-2.93	-0.059	-0.229	-4.46	-0.077
sales	-0.082	-1.52	-0.033	0.219	4.09	0.080
operative	-0.133	-2.82	-0.053	0.043	0.83	0.015
<u>workplace variables</u>						
wp size	-0.000	-0.94	-0.000	-0.000	-0.32	-0.000
wp age	-0.000	-0.38	-0.000	-0.002	-6.31	-0.001
wp multi-enterprise	0.110	4.39	0.044	-0.114	-4.34	-0.041
wp training	0.099	3.40	0.040	-0.107	-3.53	-0.038
wp ppn female	-0.063	-1.04	-0.025	0.430	6.95	0.152
wp ppn part-time	-0.390	-5.74	-0.156	-0.210	-3.05	-0.074
wp ppn youth	-0.898	-6.44	-0.358	0.558	4.39	0.197
wp ppn old	0.190	1.99	0.076	0.229	2.32	0.081
wp ppn ethnicity	0.133	1.17	0.053	0.052	0.44	0.018
wp ave wage	0.027	5.08	0.011	0.009	1.63	0.003
wp rew. seniority	-0.047	-2.31	-0.019	-0.049	-2.34	-0.017
wp rew. grade	0.031	1.36	0.012	0.059	2.48	0.021
wp teams	-0.011	-0.39	-0.004	0.015	0.50	0.005
wp circles	0.030	0.97	0.012	0.065	2.03	0.023

Table A2.4. The availability of paid leave at short notice or flexi-time: unweighted data, continued.

	paid leave			flexible times		
	coef.	t-value	dF/dx	coef.	t-value	dF/dx
wp lot disc	0.008	0.30	0.003	0.123	4.40	0.044
wp some disc	-0.025	-1.12	-0.010	0.074	3.18	0.026
wp union recognition	0.049	1.72	0.019	0.191	6.53	0.066
wp grievance proc	0.005	0.20	0.002	0.077	3.06	0.027
wp hr rep	0.115	5.46	0.046	0.054	2.45	0.019
wp employment change	-0.063	-1.92	-0.025	-0.020	-0.60	-0.007
wp dismissals	-1.722	-4.18	-0.686	0.388	1.03	0.137
wp resignations	-0.253	-3.34	-0.101	0.094	1.31	0.033
wp dif. vacancies	0.030	0.97	0.012	-0.048	-1.52	-0.017
manufacturing	-0.152	-2.88	-0.060	-0.141	-2.55	-0.049
electrical	0.329	4.69	0.130	0.333	4.97	0.125
construction	-0.295	-4.82	-0.115	-0.067	-1.03	-0.023
wholesale	-0.095	-1.74	-0.038	-0.077	-1.35	-0.027
hotels	-0.254	-3.60	-0.100	0.176	2.57	0.064
transport	-0.092	-1.54	-0.037	0.017	0.28	0.006
finance	-0.116	-1.91	-0.046	0.113	1.83	0.041
other business	-0.056	-1.02	-0.022	0.088	1.56	0.032
public	0.126	2.20	0.050	0.859	14.70	0.329
education	-0.682	-11.90	-0.255	-0.597	-10.12	-0.182
health	0.006	0.10	0.002	0.071	1.22	0.025
constant	-1.453	-7.37		-0.545	-2.79	
obs. P			0.489			0.327
pred. P (at x bar)			0.479			0.31
number of obs	20644		20644	20401		20401
LR chi2(64)	3666		3666	2775.3		2775.3
Prob > chi2	0.000		0.000	0		0
Log likelihood	-12471		-12471	-11508		-11508
Pseudo R2	0.128		0.128	0.1076		0.1076

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998.

APPENDIX A3. Subgroup regression results

A 3.1 Parental leave: an example

Column 1 of Table A1.3 lists results for the availability of parental leave. The probit coefficients are reported, followed by the standard error associated with this point estimate (in round brackets) and the estimated marginal effect (in square brackets)²⁶. The first five independent variables are a series of dummy variables capturing the parental and marital status of the individual employees, the omitted variable is partnered (married or cohabiting) parents. Whilst individual employees with no children (lone or partnered) are less likely to report that parental leave is available to them than are partnered parents, there is no significant difference for lone parents with children in any of the three age bands.

Continuing down column 1 reveals a series of general results. Those less likely to report that parental leave is available to them are older (aged over 50) employees; non-whites; the lower educated (CSE and below); employees working with a disproportionately large number of older workers; and employees in the health industry.

On the other hand, those who are more likely to report that parental leave is available to them are: women²⁷; employees with longer tenure; employees who have recently been involved in a training programme; union members; post-graduates; managers; employees working in personal services or sales; employees working in larger workplaces; employees who work with higher numbers of female co-workers; employees who work in workplaces with quality teams in operation; and employees who work where a union is recognised in the negotiation processes for pay and conditions.

The relative sizes of these effects can be calculated from the marginal (or differential in the case of the dummy variables) effects presented in square brackets in Table A1.3 and the mean of the dependent variable (final row of Table A1.3). For example, a small increase in the average age of the employee would result in a 0.010 percentage point fall in the probability of parental leave being available (from 0.266 to 0.256), or a drop of 3.8 per cent. The calculation is similar for dummy variables. A female employee is 0.076 percentage points more likely to report that parental leave is available, and relative to the weighted sample mean of 0.266, this point estimate implies an increase of 28.6 per cent in the probability that the employee responds that parental leave is available at their workplace (from 26.6 per cent to 34.2 per cent).

The largest positive (of the significant) marginal effects on the probable availability of parental leave (those above 0.05 percentage points) are found for: females; postgraduates; managers; employees in personal services and sales; employees working with a large proportion of females in the workforce; or employees who work where a union is recognised in the bargaining process.

²⁶ Standard marginal effect calculations are reported: evaluating variables at their sample means, the marginal effects are calculated as the change in the probability for a small change in the independent continuous variable or for a discrete one unit change in the dummy (binary) variables.

²⁷ Cully et al., (1999, page 146) provide a simple comparative table where they find relative gender responses to availability vary with private and public sector employment and with the specific work-life balance practice being considered.

The largest negative effects are found for: workers without children; non-whites; employees educated at CSE or below; employees working with a large proportion of older (aged over 50) workers in the workforce; or employees working in the health sector.

The strongest of all these effects is associated with working with a larger proportion of females in the workforce, where the marginal effect is 0.112 percentage points or an increase of 42 per cent in the mean probability of an employee reporting that parental leave is available to them.

This analysis is continued for all of the remaining five measures of work-life balance practices presented in Table A1.3. Table 2 presents a summary of these results (see subsection 7.1).

Table A3.1. The availability of work-life balance practices to lone parents: subgroup estimates.

	<u>parental leave</u>	<u>paid leave</u>	<u>child-care</u>	<u>flexi time</u>	<u>home work</u>	<u>job share</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<u>Baseline Results</u> (comparable with Table A1.3, sample size 20337).						
lone parent	0.014	-0.043	0.122	0.098	0.01	-0.052
	[0.004]	[-0.017]	[0.005]	[0.035]	[0.001]	[-0.009]
Dependent variable mean	0.266	0.452	0.036	0.311	0.09	0.146
<u>Private Sector</u> (sample size 13727)						
lone parent	0.003	-0.042	0.122	0.067	-0.053	-0.03
	[0.001]	[-0.016]	[0.003]	[0.023]	[-0.004]	[-0.004]
Dependent variable mean	0.243	0.43	0.026	0.296	0.087	0.095
<u>Public Sector</u> (sample size 6610)						
lone parent	0.021	-0.037	0.124	0.18	0.119	-0.114
	[0.008]	[-0.015]	[0.010]	[0.067]	[0.012]	[-0.034]
Dependent variable mean	0.327	0.509	0.064	0.349	0.096	0.279
<u>Males</u> (sample size 10191)						
lone parent	0.05	-0.077	-0.013	0.057	-0.036	-0.079
	[0.014]	[-0.031]	[-0.000]	[0.018]	[-0.002]	[-0.008]
Dependent variable mean	0.232	0.503	0.027	0.258	0.106	0.089
<u>Females</u> (sample size 10146)						
lone parent	-0.006	-0.055	0.161	0.109	0.014	-0.114
	[-0.002]	[-0.020]	[0.009]	[0.041]	[0.001]	[-0.028]
Dependent variable mean	0.304	0.397	0.046	0.367	0.073	0.208
<u>Whites</u> (sample size 19604)						
lone parent	0.012	-0.041	0.119	0.107*	0.001	-0.036
	[0.004]	[-0.016]	[0.005]	[0.037]	[0.000]	[-0.006]
Dependent variable mean	0.267	0.452	0.037	0.309	0.09	0.145
<u>Non-whites</u> (sample size 733)						
lone parent	-0.06	-0.032	-0.206	0.178	0.213	0.01
	[-0.017]	[-0.012]	[-0.004]	[0.067]	[0.007]	[0.002]
Dependent variable mean	0.255	0.445	0.033	0.377	0.091	0.174
<u>Full time</u> (sample size 16378)						
lone parent	0.037	-0.062	0.13	0.065	-0.004	0.061
	-0.071	-0.073	-0.149	-0.074	-0.083	-0.133
	[0.012]	[-0.025]	[0.005]	[0.022]	[-0.000]	[0.010]

Table A3.1. The availability of work-life balance practices to lone parents: subgroup estimates, continued.

	<u>parental leave</u> (1)	<u>paid leave</u> (2)	<u>child-care</u> (3)	<u>flexi time</u> (4)	<u>home work</u> (5)	<u>job share</u> (6)
Dependent variable mean	0.276	0.522	0.038	0.288	0.107	0.135
<u>Part-time</u> (sample size 3959)						
lone parent	-0.051 [-0.014]	0.063 [0.018]	0.067 [0.002]	0.133 [0.051]	0.211 [0.007]	-0.317 [-0.062]
Dependent variable mean	0.238	0.249	0.03	0.378	0.04	0.179
<u>Not partnered</u> (sample size 6083)						
lone parent	0.236** [0.078]	-0.098 [-0.037]	0.253** [0.008]	0.109 [0.039]	0.068 [0.004]	-0.056 [-0.010]
Dependent variable mean	0.268	0.413	0.034	0.327	0.072	0.142
<u>Parent of child aged<5</u> (sample size 2752)						
lone parent	-0.127 [-0.047]	-0.024 [-0.009]	-0.056 [-0.003]	0.059 [0.020]	-0.151 [-0.013]	0.095 [0.018]
Dependent variable mean	0.371	0.466	0.072	0.296	0.108	0.176
<u>Parent of child aged 5-11</u> (sample size 2875)						
lone parent	0.052 [0.018]	-0.166* [-0.064]	0.454** [0.013]	-0.013 [-0.005]	-0.01 [-0.001]	-0.084 [-0.014]
Dependent variable mean	0.297	0.454	0.04	0.321	0.087	0.159
<u>Parent of child aged 12-18</u> (sample size 2770)						
lone parent	0.195** [0.062]	0.073 [0.029]	-0.179 [-0.002]	0.178* [0.062]	0.053 [0.003]	-0.166 [-0.025]
Dependent variable mean	0.251	0.438	0.034	0.305	0.101	0.141
<u>Women's work</u> (sample size 6928)						
lone parent	-0.097 [-0.031]	0.05 [0.019]	-0.119 [-0.004]	0.099 [0.037]	0.18 [0.010]	-0.32 [-0.074]
Dependent variable mean	0.293	0.385	0.042	0.362	0.054	0.217
<u>CSE</u> (sample size 2236)						
lone parent	-0.27 [-0.070]	-0.044 [-0.017]	-0.102 [-0.001]	-0.013 [-0.004]	0.15 [0.002]	-0.186 [-0.020]
Dep variable mean	0.229	0.428	0.038	0.267	0.036	0.093

<u>O-Level</u> (sample size 5326)						
lone parent	0.075 [0.026]	0.002 [0.001]	0.452** [0.020]	0.06 [0.021]	-0.343** [-0.011]	0.01 [0.002]
Dependent variable mean	0.297	0.457	0.033	0.31	0.054	0.157
<hr/>						
<u>A-Level</u> (sample size 3226)						
lone parent	0.219 [0.080]	-0.137 [-0.054]	-0.092 [-0.001]	0.16 [0.061]	0.258* [0.034]	0.116 [0.026]
Dependent variable mean	0.32	0.484	0.038	0.364	0.101	0.188
<hr/>						
<u>Degree</u> (sample size 3819)						
lone parent	-0.207 [-0.069]	0.128 [0.051]	-0.27 [-0.013]	-0.143 [-0.049]	-0.14 [-0.031]	-0.335 [-0.071]
Dependent variable mean	0.328	0.477	0.056	0.338	0.215	0.218
<hr/>						
<u>Post-Graduate</u> (sample size 1282)						
lone parent	0.096 [0.037]	-0.316 [-0.122]	0.791** [0.109]	0.475* [0.186]	0.214 [0.075]	-0.032 [-0.009]
Dependent variable mean	0.404	0.466	0.092	0.392	0.315	0.263
<hr/>						
<u>Other education</u> (sample size 4436)						
lone parent	-0.063 [-0.013]	-0.155 [-0.058]	-0.344 [-0.001]	0.275** [0.095]	0.118 [0.003]	-0.138 [-0.012]
Dependent variable mean	0.158	0.422	0.016	0.271	0.028	0.072
<hr/>						
<u>Employee briefing</u> (sample size 18334)						
lone parent	0.01 [0.003]	-0.053 [-0.021]	0.073 [0.003]	0.12* [0.043]	-0.001 [-0.000]	-0.066 [-0.012]
Dependent variable mean	0.275	0.458	0.039	0.315	0.09	0.153
<hr/>						
<u>Parents</u> (sample size 8397)						
lone parent	0.015 [0.005]	-0.028 [-0.011]	0.075 [0.004]	0.091 [0.032]	0.014 [0.001]	-0.069 [-0.012]
Dependent variable mean	0.307	0.453	0.048	0.308	0.098	0.159

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998. Each entry contains the probit coefficient for the lone parent dummy variable and marginal effect [in square brackets] from the specified subgroup probit model. The probit model is weighted by individual sampling weights and includes the variables from the baseline regression (Table 3). The point estimates and standard errors account for the stratification and clustering in the sampling procedure. * significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%.

Table A3.2. Subgroup regression results: lone parents and all those not lone parents.

	parental leave		paid leave		child-care		flexi - time		home work		job share	
	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
individual variables												
child aged 0-4	0.242 [0.080] { 0.000}	-0.134 [-0.044] { 0.458}	-0.011 [-0.004] { 0.821}	-0.005 [-0.002] { 0.978}	0.353 [0.016] { 0.000}	0.305 [0.011] { 0.266}	-0.043 [-0.015] { 0.259}	-0.183 [-0.063] { 0.280}	0.13 [0.011] { 0.029}	0.228 [0.002] { 0.378}	0.063 [0.012] { 0.153}	0.609 [0.102] { 0.007}
child aged 5-11	0.072 [0.023] { 0.061}	-0.121 [-0.041] { 0.399}	0.013 [0.005] { 0.701}	-0.130 [-0.050] { 0.377}	-0.087 [-0.003] { 0.292}	0.320 [0.011] { 0.129}	0.088 [0.031] { 0.013}	-0.171 [-0.060] { 0.226}	0.007 [0.001] { 0.896}	0.100 [0.001] { 0.618}	0.003 [0.001] { 0.948}	0.438 [0.062] { 0.008}
child aged 12-18	0.088 [0.028] { 0.031}	0.040 [0.013] { 0.814}	-0.095 [-0.037] { 0.011}	-0.102 [-0.039] { 0.547}	0.132 [0.005] { 0.051}	-0.216 [-0.007] { 0.404}	0.041 [0.014] { 0.358}	-0.044 [-0.015] { 0.793}	0.001 [0.000] { 0.986}	0.330 [0.002] { 0.156}	0.004 [0.001] { 0.927}	0.333 [0.047] { 0.089}
age	-0.022 [-0.007] { 0.052}	-0.065 [-0.022] { 0.251}	0.028 [0.011] { 0.005}	0.020 [0.008] { 0.709}	-0.012 [-0.000] { 0.611}	-0.031 [-0.001] { 0.698}	-0.007 [-0.002] { 0.507}	-0.044 [-0.016] { 0.369}	0.053 [0.004] { 0.001}	-0.002 [-0.000] { 0.981}	-0.012 [-0.002] { 0.316}	-0.092 [-0.013] { 0.139}
age2	0.095 [0.030] { 0.510}	0.619 [0.208] { 0.391}	-0.336 [-0.132] { 0.005}	-0.145 [-0.055] { 0.828}	0.021 [0.001] { 0.888}	0.147 [0.005] { 0.888}	0.149 [0.051] { 0.271}	0.580 [0.204] { 0.359}	-0.512 [-0.040] { 0.005}	0.093 [0.001] { 0.929}	0.105 [0.019] { 0.470}	1.393 [0.191] { 0.070}
female	0.246 [0.077] { 0.000}	0.178 [0.060] { 0.261}	-0.069 [-0.027] { 0.033}	-0.193 [-0.074] { 0.254}	0.156 [0.005] { 0.025}	0.582 [0.017] { 0.046}	0.050 [0.017] { 0.191}	0.216 [0.076] { 0.193}	-0.095 [-0.007] { 0.058}	-0.001 [-0.000] { 0.997}	0.183 [0.033] { 0.000}	0.663 [0.089] { 0.000}
ethnicity	-0.208 [-0.061] { 0.014}	-0.191 [-0.061] { 0.438}	-0.040 [-0.016] { 0.605}	0.226 [0.088] { 0.402}	-0.320 [-0.008] { 0.015}	-0.651 [-0.011] { 0.161}	0.174 [0.062] { 0.079}	0.122 [0.044] { 0.626}	-0.200 [-0.013] { 0.040}	0.337 [0.003] { 0.489}	0.109 [0.021] { 0.395}	0.024 [0.003] { 0.940}
hourly wage	0.004 [0.001] { 0.216}	0.045 [0.015] { 0.019}	0.007 [0.003] { 0.088}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.984}	-0.001 [-0.000] { 0.797}	-0.004 [-0.000] { 0.919}	-0.010 [-0.003] { 0.018}	-0.010 [-0.003] { 0.551}	0.015 [0.001] { 0.000}	0.039 [0.000] { 0.071}	0.004 [0.001] { 0.335}	0.030 [0.004] { 0.074}
hours	0.015 [0.005] { 0.029}	0.047 [0.016] { 0.045}	0.049 [0.019] { 0.000}	0.063 [0.024] { 0.002}	0.022 [0.001] { 0.152}	0.040 [0.001] { 0.320}	-0.004 [-0.001] { 0.590}	0.000 [0.000] { 0.998}	0.020 [0.002] { 0.050}	-0.030 [-0.000] { 0.419}	0.030 [0.005] { 0.000}	0.015 [0.002] { 0.600}
hours squared	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.009}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.119}	-0.001 [-0.000] { 0.000}	-0.001 [-0.000] { 0.003}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.874}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.761}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.182}	0.000 [0.000] { 0.761}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.260}	0.001 [0.000] { 0.177}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.000}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.628}
tenure	0.014 [0.004] { 0.002}	-0.007 [-0.002] { 0.686}	0.011 [0.004] { 0.009}	0.013 [0.005] { 0.484}	0.018 [0.001] { 0.053}	0.063 [0.002] { 0.017}	0.002 [0.001] { 0.644}	-0.013 [-0.005] { 0.459}	0.007 [0.001] { 0.232}	0.031 [0.000] { 0.128}	0.011 [0.002] { 0.056}	0.037 [0.005] { 0.058}

Table A3.2. Subgroup regression results: lone parents and all those not lone parents, continued.

	parental leave		paid leave		child-care		flexi - time		home work		job share	
	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
training	0.024 [0.008] { 0.000}	0.044 [0.015] { 0.011}	0.005 [0.002] { 0.268}	-0.007 [-0.003] { 0.688}	0.001 [0.000] { 0.028}	0.063 [0.002] { 0.000}	0.033 [0.011] { 0.000}	0.057 [0.020] { 0.002}	0.033 [0.003] { 0.000}	0.059 [0.000] { 0.009}	0.025 [0.005] { 0.000}	0.054 [0.007] { 0.007}
part-time	-0.079 [-0.025] { 0.236}	0.291 [0.101] { 0.255}	-0.010 [-0.004] { 0.892}	0.124 [0.048] { 0.606}	0.039 [0.001] { 0.792}	0.797 [0.036] { 0.054}	0.083 [0.029] { 0.251}	0.169 [0.061] { 0.488}	0.159 [0.013] { 0.211}	-0.182 [-0.001] { 0.674}	0.191 [0.036] { 0.021}	0.210 [0.031] { 0.501}
fixed term	-0.104 [-0.032] { 0.152}	-0.158 [-0.051] { 0.618}	-0.268 [-0.102] { 0.003}	-0.568 [-0.191] { 0.109}	-0.056 [-0.002] { 0.852}	0.098 [0.003] { 0.852}	-0.086 [-0.029] { 0.262}	-0.685 [-0.193] { 0.065}	0.029 [0.002] { 0.799}	-0.499 [-0.002] { 0.303}	-0.142 [-0.023] { 0.078}	-0.792 [-0.062] { 0.086}
temporary	-0.072 [-0.022] { 0.374}	0.190 [0.067] { 0.499}	-0.446 [-0.165] { 0.000}	-0.355 [-0.127] { 0.188}	0.009 [0.000] { 0.944}	0.081 [0.003] { 0.884}	0.111 [0.039] { 0.117}	0.057 [0.021] { 0.831}	-0.190 [-0.013] { 0.210}	0.959 [0.022] { 0.048}	0.168 [0.033] { 0.059}	-0.174 [-0.021] { 0.656}
union member	0.106 [0.033] { 0.006}	-0.014 [-0.005] { 0.919}	0.037 [0.014] { 0.344}	0.132 [0.051] { 0.337}	-0.008 [-0.000] { 0.813}	0.057 [0.002] { 0.813}	-0.149 [-0.051] { 0.000}	0.066 [0.024] { 0.645}	-0.264 [-0.020] { 0.000}	-0.014 [-0.000] { 0.943}	0.096 [0.017] { 0.019}	-0.145 [-0.019] { 0.400}
education other	-0.212 [-0.064] { 0.000}	-0.307 [-0.098] { 0.062}	-0.010 [-0.004] { 0.805}	-0.222 [-0.083] { 0.184}	0.004 [0.000] { 0.008}	-0.944 [-0.020] { 0.008}	0.043 [0.015] { 0.359}	0.452 [0.167] { 0.006}	-0.116 [-0.009] { 0.094}	0.215 [0.002] { 0.449}	-0.174 [-0.029] { 0.004}	-0.265 [-0.033] { 0.219}
CSE	-0.170 [-0.051] { 0.002}	-0.413 [-0.126] { 0.027}	0.007 [0.003] { 0.873}	0.008 [0.003] { 0.969}	0.252 [0.011] { 0.759}	-0.082 [-0.002] { 0.759}	0.045 [0.016] { 0.314}	0.052 [0.019] { 0.745}	0.009 [0.001] { 0.908}	0.123 [0.001] { 0.697}	-0.091 [-0.016] { 0.143}	-0.164 [-0.021] { 0.476}
A-level	0.032 [0.010] { 0.478}	0.255 [0.090] { 0.137}	0.064 [0.025] { 0.130}	-0.065 [-0.025] { 0.688}	0.083 [0.003] { 0.089}	-0.507 [-0.011] { 0.089}	0.108 [0.038] { 0.010}	0.254 [0.093] { 0.222}	0.203 [0.018] { 0.001}	0.688 [0.009] { 0.001}	0.082 [0.015] { 0.088}	0.212 [0.033] { 0.281}
degree	0.041 [0.013] { 0.366}	-0.157 [-0.051] { 0.445}	-0.015 [-0.006] { 0.704}	-0.157 [-0.059] { 0.445}	0.173 [0.007] { 0.013}	-0.899 [-0.015] { 0.013}	0.144 [0.051] { 0.003}	-0.025 [-0.009] { 0.904}	0.368 [0.036] { 0.000}	0.211 [0.002] { 0.354}	0.176 [0.034] { 0.001}	0.006 [0.001] { 0.978}
postgrad	0.236 [0.079] { 0.000}	0.359 [0.130] { 0.184}	-0.008 [-0.003] { 0.901}	-0.452 [-0.158] { 0.091}	0.320 [0.015] { 0.178}	0.484 [0.025] { 0.178}	0.328 [0.120] { 0.000}	0.672 [0.259] { 0.014}	0.569 [0.070] { 0.000}	1.106 [0.031] { 0.001}	0.280 [0.058] { 0.000}	0.340 [0.058] { 0.242}
vocational qual	-0.034 [-0.011] { 0.275}	-0.065 [-0.022] { 0.584}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.998}	-0.110 [-0.042] { 0.351}	0.100 [0.003] { 0.456}	-0.150 [-0.005] { 0.456}	-0.026 [-0.009] { 0.399}	-0.265 [-0.092] { 0.023}	-0.110 [-0.008] { 0.020}	0.156 [0.001] { 0.283}	-0.040 [-0.007] { 0.307}	0.168 [0.024] { 0.229}

Table A3.2. Subgroup regression results: lone parents and all those not lone parents, continued.

	parental leave		paid leave		child-care		flexi - time		home work		job share	
	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
managers	0.272 [0.091] { 0.000}	0.113 [0.039] { 0.692}	-0.099 [-0.039] { 0.143}	0.677 [0.265] { 0.020}	0.514 [0.028] { 0.781}	0.119 [0.004] { 0.000}	0.471 [0.175] { 0.000}	0.596 [0.228] { 0.038}	1.392 [0.269] { 0.000}	6.278 [0.998] { 0.006}	0.390 [0.085] { 0.000}	0.317 [0.053] { 0.349}
profs	0.074 [0.024] { 0.312}	0.165 [0.057] { 0.552}	-0.140 [-0.054] { 0.084}	0.351 [0.137] { 0.162}	0.451 [0.022] { 0.009}	-0.310 [-0.008] { 0.485}	0.228 [0.082] { 0.002}	0.123 [0.044] { 0.673}	1.026 [0.155] { 0.000}	5.763 [0.987] { 0.015}	0.256 [0.052] { 0.002}	0.387 [0.066] { 0.215}
assoc prof	0.042 [0.013] { 0.582}	0.409 [0.148] { 0.123}	-0.110 [-0.043] { 0.142}	0.549 [0.216] { 0.031}	0.416 [0.021] { 0.004}	-0.358 [-0.008] { 0.393}	0.368 [0.135] { 0.000}	0.455 [0.172] { 0.064}	0.909 [0.135] { 0.000}	5.498 [0.983] { 0.018}	0.135 [0.026] { 0.095}	0.145 [0.022] { 0.633}
clerk	0.058 [0.019] { 0.380}	0.367 [0.131] { 0.090}	0.219 [0.087] { 0.000}	0.551 [0.216] { 0.014}	0.436 [0.021] { 0.004}	-0.192 [-0.005] { 0.557}	0.409 [0.150] { 0.000}	0.459 [0.172] { 0.040}	0.687 [0.082] { 0.000}	5.102 [0.924] { 0.026}	0.451 [0.097] { 0.000}	0.624 [0.116] { 0.015}
craft	-0.080 [-0.025] { 0.314}	0.459 [0.168] { 0.128}	-0.032 [-0.013] { 0.677}	0.632 [0.248] { 0.022}	0.215 [0.009] { 0.034}	-0.891 [-0.015] { 0.034}	0.138 [0.049] { 0.124}	0.505 [0.191] { 0.076}	0.363 [0.037] { 0.056}	4.077 [0.786] { 0.068}	-0.035 [-0.006] { 0.741}	0.081 [0.012] { 0.849}
personal	0.164 [0.054] { 0.035}	0.396 [0.144] { 0.103}	-0.194 [-0.075] { 0.015}	0.366 [0.144] { 0.142}	0.322 [0.015] { 0.072}	-0.051 [-0.002] { 0.913}	-0.071 [-0.024] { 0.370}	-0.372 [-0.120] { 0.168}	0.376 [0.039] { 0.029}	4.837 [0.929] { 0.036}	0.066 [0.012] { 0.427}	0.344 [0.057] { 0.263}
sales	0.145 [0.047] { 0.080}	0.394 [0.142] { 0.160}	-0.096 [-0.037] { 0.233}	0.344 [0.135] { 0.259}	0.206 [0.008] { 0.978}	0.012 [0.000] { 0.000}	0.140 [0.049] { 0.065}	0.826 [0.316] { 0.005}	1.018 [0.159] { 0.000}	6.009 [0.993] { 0.009}	0.013 [0.002] { 0.898}	-0.638 [-0.061] { 0.117}
operative	0.079 [0.025] { 0.265}	0.235 [0.083] { 0.363}	-0.216 [-0.083] { 0.006}	0.145 [0.056] { 0.579}	0.244 [0.010] { 0.000}	0.215 [0.007] { 0.000}	0.109 [0.038] { 0.194}	0.348 [0.129] { 0.190}	-0.385 [-0.023] { 0.045}	5.216 [0.937] { 0.016}	0.025 [0.004] { 0.833}	0.504 [0.089] { 0.187}
workplace variables												
wp size	0.047 [0.015] { 0.000}	0.104 [0.035] { 0.052}	-0.059 [-0.023] { 0.064}	-0.023 [-0.009] { 0.742}	0.124 [0.004] { 0.392}	1.668 [0.053] { 0.000}	-0.03 [-0.010] { 0.178}	-0.067 [-0.024] { 0.193}	-0.101 [-0.008] { 0.001}	-0.294 [-0.002] { 0.027}	-0.016 [-0.003] { 0.575}	0.157 [0.021] { 0.003}
wp age	0.060 [0.019] { 0.865}	0.294 [0.099] { 0.795}	0.323 [0.127] { 0.472}	-1.364 [-0.521] { 0.252}	-0.824 [-0.028] { 0.011}	-0.678 [-0.034] { 0.011}	-1.576 [-0.542] { 0.003}	-2.969 [-1.046] { 0.045}	-2.527 [-0.197] { 0.001}	-7.090 [-0.042] { 0.006}	0.059 [0.011] { 0.901}	0.133 [0.018] { 0.916}
wp multi-enterprise	-0.020 [-0.006]	-0.066 [-0.022]	0.131 [0.051]	0.440 [0.161]	-0.309 [-0.013]	-0.570 [-0.018]	-0.113 [-0.039]	-0.253 [-0.092]	-0.180 [-0.015]	0.002 [0.000]	-0.038 [-0.007]	-0.092 [-0.013]

Table A3.2. Subgroup regression results: lone parents and all those not lone parents, continued.

	parental leave		paid leave		child-care		flexi - time		home work		job share	
	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
wp training	{ 0.642}	{ 0.678}	{ 0.006}	{ 0.003}	{ 0.076}	{ 0.017}	{ 0.074}	{ 0.010}	{ 0.991}	{ 0.506}	{ 0.617}	
	0.021	-0.067	0.168	0.222	-0.022	0.076	-0.090	-0.129	-0.011	-0.249	0.119	-0.224
	[0.007]	[-0.022]	[0.066]	[0.085]	[-0.001]	[0.002]	[-0.031]	[-0.045]	[-0.001]	[-0.001]	[0.021]	[-0.031]
	{ 0.684}	{ 0.693}	{ 0.003}	{ 0.176}	{ 0.912}	{ 0.185}	{ 0.443}	{ 0.886}	{ 0.258}	{ 0.098}	{ 0.239}	
wp ppn female	0.386	-0.078	-0.054	0.352	0.552	-0.169	0.541	0.433	0.296	0.510	0.835	0.767
	[0.121]	[-0.026]	[-0.021]	[0.134]	[0.019]	[-0.005]	[0.186]	[0.153]	[0.023]	[0.003]	[0.150]	[0.105]
	{ 0.001}	{ 0.846}	{ 0.687}	{ 0.376}	{ 0.775}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.240}	{ 0.104}	{ 0.365}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.078}	
wp ppn part-time	-0.047	0.269	-0.433	-0.113	-0.001	-1.068	-0.312	0.123	-0.065	-0.608	-0.095	-1.197
	[-0.015]	[0.090]	[-0.170]	[-0.043]	[-0.000]	[-0.034]	[-0.107]	[0.043]	[-0.005]	[-0.004]	[-0.017]	[-0.164]
	{ 0.691}	{ 0.473}	{ 0.001}	{ 0.761}	{ 0.398}	{ 0.042}	{ 0.743}	{ 0.779}	{ 0.430}	{ 0.494}	{ 0.012}	
wp ppn youth	0.172	-1.011	-1.017	-0.801	0.592	0.658	0.761	-0.801	-1.391	-3.036	0.146	-0.918
	[0.054]	[-0.339]	[-0.400]	[-0.306]	[0.020]	[0.021]	[0.261]	[-0.282]	[-0.109]	[-0.018]	[0.026]	[-0.126]
	{ 0.461}	{ 0.247}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.261}	{ 0.453}	{ 0.003}	{ 0.289}	{ 0.016}	{ 0.103}	{ 0.564}	{ 0.329}	
wp ppn old	-0.356	-0.304	-0.012	-0.300	-0.470	1.128	0.087	-0.055	0.113	1.168	-0.020	-0.193
	[-0.112]	[-0.102]	[-0.005]	[-0.115]	[-0.016]	[0.036]	[0.030]	[-0.019]	[0.009]	[0.007]	[-0.004]	[-0.026]
	{ 0.031}	{ 0.587}	{ 0.957}	{ 0.587}	{ 0.234}	{ 0.681}	{ 0.916}	{ 0.714}	{ 0.112}	{ 0.933}	{ 0.741}	
wp ppn ethnicity	0.257	0.977	0.082	-0.620	1.018	0.025	0.060	0.377	0.352	-0.637	-0.099	-0.435
	[0.081]	[0.328]	[0.032]	[-0.237]	[0.034]	[0.001]	[0.021]	[0.133]	[0.028]	[-0.004]	[-0.018]	[-0.060]
	{ 0.169}	{ 0.053}	{ 0.684}	{ 0.230}	{ 0.637}	{ 0.775}	{ 0.510}	{ 0.149}	{ 0.422}	{ 0.655}	{ 0.518}	
wp ave wage	0.009	-0.065	0.031	0.040	0.025	-0.226	0.007	0.018	0.016	0.021	0.016	0.000
	[0.003]	[-0.022]	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.001]	[-0.008]	[0.003]	[0.006]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.003]	[-0.000]
	{ 0.341}	{ 0.046}	{ 0.003}	{ 0.225}	{ 0.259}	{ 0.448}	{ 0.560}	{ 0.279}	{ 0.613}	{ 0.073}	{ 0.990}	
wp rew. seniority	0.000	0.012	-0.027	0.179	-0.039	0.255	-0.081	0.093	-0.085	-0.165	0.061	-0.076
	[0.000]	[0.004]	[-0.011]	[0.068]	[-0.001]	[0.007]	[-0.028]	[0.033]	[-0.007]	[-0.001]	[0.011]	[-0.010]
	{ 0.990}	{ 0.925}	{ 0.538}	{ 0.159}	{ 0.249}	{ 0.068}	{ 0.431}	{ 0.152}	{ 0.251}	{ 0.184}	{ 0.630}	
wp rew. grade	0.004	-0.123	0.035	0.051	-0.091	-0.175	0.034	-0.024	-0.043	0.275	0.016	-0.012
	[0.001]	[-0.042]	[0.014]	[0.020]	[-0.003]	[-0.006]	[0.012]	[-0.009]	[-0.003]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[-0.002]
	{ 0.915}	{ 0.390}	{ 0.487}	{ 0.693}	{ 0.596}	{ 0.443}	{ 0.840}	{ 0.494}	{ 0.131}	{ 0.751}	{ 0.936}	
wp teams	0.117	-0.115	-0.038	-0.447	0.372	-1.034	-0.007	-0.228	-0.083	-0.176	0.111	-0.129
	[0.037]	[-0.039]	[-0.015]	[-0.171]	[0.013]	[-0.033]	[-0.002]	[-0.080]	[-0.007]	[-0.001]	[0.020]	[-0.018]
	{ 0.023}	{ 0.543}	{ 0.537}	{ 0.014}	{ 0.005}	{ 0.912}	{ 0.188}	{ 0.298}	{ 0.452}	{ 0.107}	{ 0.533}	
wp circles	0.018	0.002	0.038	0.002	-0.035	-0.288	0.113	0.214	-0.005	-0.081	0.039	-0.039
	[0.006]	[0.001]	[0.015]	[0.001]	[-0.001]	[-0.008]	[0.039]	[0.076]	[-0.000]	[-0.000]	[0.007]	[-0.005]

Table A3.2. Subgroup regression results: lone parents and all those not lone parents, continued.

	parental leave		paid leave		child-care		flexi - time		home work		job share	
	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	{ 0.767 }	{ 0.992 }	{ 0.539 }	{ 0.992 }	{ 0.352 }	{ 0.141 }	{ 0.237 }	{ 0.964 }	{ 0.713 }	{ 0.555 }	{ 0.849 }	
					0.788;							
wp lot disc	0.076	0.003	-0.078	0.060	0.341	0.157	0.148	0.216	0.153	0.273	0.029	-0.107
	[0.024]	[0.001]	[-0.031]	[0.023]	[0.014]	[0.005]	[0.052]	[0.078]	[0.013]	[0.002]	[0.005]	[-0.014]
	{ 0.142 }	{ 0.984 }	{ 0.204 }	{ 0.722 }	{ 0.530 }	{ 0.021 }	{ 0.182 }	{ 0.100 }	{ 0.182 }	{ 0.615 }	{ 0.601 }	
					0.005;							
wp some disc	0.055	0.082	-0.025	-0.092	0.219	-0.122	0.097	0.149	0.070	0.259	0.034	-0.028
	[0.017]	[0.027]	[-0.010]	[-0.035]	[0.008]	[-0.004]	[0.034]	[0.053]	[0.005]	[0.002]	[0.006]	[-0.004]
	{ 0.193 }	{ 0.555 }	{ 0.631 }	{ 0.486 }	{ 0.715 }	{ 0.057 }	{ 0.227 }	{ 0.290 }	{ 0.157 }	{ 0.506 }	{ 0.852 }	
					0.042;							
wp union recognition	0.144	0.402	0.069	-0.055	-0.050	0.299	0.118	0.367	-0.005	0.130	0.239	0.348
	[0.045]	[0.130]	[0.027]	[-0.021]	[-0.002]	[0.008]	[0.040]	[0.126]	[-0.000]	[0.001]	[0.042]	[0.045]
	{ 0.004 }	{ 0.016 }	{ 0.222 }	{ 0.753 }	{ 0.233 }	{ 0.043 }	{ 0.017 }	{ 0.948 }	{ 0.592 }	{ 0.000 }	{ 0.071 }	
					0.675;							
wp grievance proc	0.071	0.123	-0.026	-0.019	0.013	0.330	0.103	0.126	0.010	0.088	-0.021	0.147
	[0.022]	[0.041]	[-0.010]	[-0.007]	[0.000]	[0.011]	[0.035]	[0.044]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[-0.004]	[0.019]
	{ 0.108 }	{ 0.369 }	{ 0.594 }	{ 0.892 }	{ 0.148 }	{ 0.034 }	{ 0.349 }	{ 0.870 }	{ 0.635 }	{ 0.689 }	{ 0.330 }	
					0.899;							
wp hr rep	0.054	-0.150	0.186	0.183	0.357	-0.205	0.046	0.102	0.109	0.095	0.041	0.074
	[0.017]	[-0.050]	[0.073]	[0.070]	[0.013]	[-0.006]	[0.016]	[0.036]	[0.009]	[0.001]	[0.007]	[0.010]
	{ 0.141 }	{ 0.281 }	{ 0.000 }	{ 0.139 }	{ 0.655 }	{ 0.324 }	{ 0.416 }	{ 0.067 }	{ 0.560 }	{ 0.389 }	{ 0.635 }	
					0.000;							
wp employment change	-0.041	-0.425	-0.053	0.297	-0.101	-0.215	-0.032	0.132	0.071	0.370	0.040	-0.247
	[-0.013]	[-0.143]	[-0.021]	[0.114]	[-0.003]	[-0.007]	[-0.011]	[0.046]	[0.006]	[0.002]	[0.007]	[-0.034]
	{ 0.369 }	{ 0.057 }	{ 0.399 }	{ 0.204 }	{ 0.942 }	{ 0.576 }	{ 0.482 }	{ 0.461 }	{ 0.178 }	{ 0.481 }	{ 0.443 }	
					0.454;							
wp dismissals	0.420	-5.917	-1.785	-1.577	2.502	-0.275	-0.310	-1.165	-1.746	-3.038	0.819	-2.748
	[0.132]	[-1.986]	[-0.703]	[-0.603]	[0.085]	[-0.009]	[-0.106]	[-0.411]	[-0.136]	[-0.018]	[0.147]	[-0.377]
	{ 0.545 }	{ 0.022 }	{ 0.031 }	{ 0.236 }	{ 0.659 }	{ 0.665 }	{ 0.378 }	{ 0.117 }	{ 0.229 }	{ 0.320 }	{ 0.426 }	
					0.059;							
wp resignations	-0.123	0.810	-0.264	-0.427	-1.637	-0.026	0.179	0.643	0.441	0.096	-0.276	0.623
	[-0.038]	[0.272]	[-0.104]	[-0.163]	[-0.055]	[-0.001]	[0.062]	[0.227]	[0.034]	[0.001]	[-0.049]	[0.085]
	{ 0.393 }	{ 0.073 }	{ 0.055 }	{ 0.282 }	{ 0.937 }	{ 0.209 }	{ 0.089 }	{ 0.058 }	{ 0.896 }	{ 0.131 }	{ 0.270 }	
					0.000;							
wp dif. vacancies	-0.107	0.184	0.099	0.167	-0.023	-0.952	-0.039	0.115	-0.152	-0.065	-0.048	-0.192
	[-0.034]	[0.062]	[0.039]	[0.064]	[-0.001]	[-0.019]	[-0.014]	[0.040]	[-0.012]	[-0.000]	[-0.009]	[-0.026]
	{ 0.052 }	{ 0.311 }	{ 0.109 }	{ 0.380 }	{ 0.100 }	{ 0.534 }	{ 0.537 }	{ 0.106 }	{ 0.785 }	{ 0.526 }	{ 0.414 }	
					0.877;							
manufacturing	-0.079	-0.205	-0.179	-0.185	-0.577	0.219	-0.151	-0.363	0.042	-0.765	-0.531	-1.061
	[-0.024]	[-0.066]	[-0.070]	[-0.069]	[-0.015]	[0.008]	[-0.051]	[-0.121]	[0.003]	[-0.003]	[-0.081]	[-0.100]
	{ 0.377 }	{ 0.484 }	{ 0.069 }	{ 0.529 }	{ 0.681 }	{ 0.241 }	{ 0.288 }	{ 0.803 }	{ 0.100 }	{ 0.000 }	{ 0.006 }	
					0.024;							
electrical	0.019	-0.489	0.248	0.650	0.100	0.973	0.349	-0.400	0.507	0.353	-0.172	-1.099
	[0.006]	[-0.138]	[0.099]	[0.255]	[0.004]	[0.083]	[0.129]	[-0.125]	[0.061]	[0.004]	[-0.028]	[-0.067]

Table A3.2. Subgroup regression results: lone parents and all those not lone parents, continued.

	parental leave		paid leave		child-care		flexi - time		home work		job share	
	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	not lone (5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
construction	{ 0.861}	{ 0.193}	{ 0.045}	{ 0.106}	{ 0.181}	{ 0.047}	{ 0.372}	{ 0.004}	{ 0.507}	{ 0.216}	{ 0.031}	
	0.035	0.000	-0.361	-0.644	-0.388	0.507	-0.015	-0.312	0.133	-0.947	-0.069	-1.216
	[0.011]	[0.000]	[-0.136]	[-0.212]	[-0.009]	[0.026]	[-0.005]	[-0.101]	[0.012]	[-0.002]	[-0.012]	[-0.072]
	{ 0.734}	{ 1.000}	{ 0.002}	{ 0.127}	{ 0.398}	{ 0.922}	{ 0.439}	{ 0.465}	{ 0.134}	{ 0.642}	{ 0.035}	
wholesale	-0.036	0.035	-0.081	-0.625	-0.767	0.661	-0.066	-0.174	-0.362	-1.180	-0.337	-0.222
	[-0.011]	[0.012]	[-0.032]	[-0.217]	[-0.016]	[0.039]	[-0.023]	[-0.059]	[-0.023]	[-0.003]	[-0.052]	[-0.027]
	{ 0.689}	{ 0.905}	{ 0.369}	{ 0.032}	{ 0.292}	{ 0.601}	{ 0.603}	{ 0.017}	{ 0.017}	{ 0.006}	{ 0.575}	
hotels	-0.180	0.037	-0.235	-0.237	0.126	1.070	0.062	-0.745	0.056	-0.630	-0.082	-0.362
	[-0.053]	[0.012]	[-0.090]	[-0.087]	[0.005]	[0.082]	[0.022]	[-0.207]	[0.005]	[-0.002]	[-0.014]	[-0.039]
	{ 0.145}	{ 0.922}	{ 0.052}	{ 0.494}	{ 0.081}	{ 0.685}	{ 0.067}	{ 0.749}	{ 0.325}	{ 0.587}	{ 0.468}	
transport	0.110	-0.507	-0.159	-0.064	-0.560	0.300	0.047	-0.683	0.315	-1.055	-0.319	-0.534
	[0.036]	[-0.145]	[-0.062]	[-0.024]	[-0.011]	[0.012]	[0.016]	[-0.197]	[0.032]	[-0.002]	[-0.048]	[-0.052]
	{ 0.291}	{ 0.132}	{ 0.153}	{ 0.846}	{ 0.640}	{ 0.740}	{ 0.063}	{ 0.111}	{ 0.051}	{ 0.033}	{ 0.216}	
finance	-0.049	-0.837	-0.202	-0.475	-0.609	-2.823	0.221	0.060	0.157	-0.593	-0.149	-0.740
	[-0.015]	[-0.207]	[-0.078]	[-0.165]	[-0.012]	[.]	[0.080]	[0.021]	[0.014]	[-0.002]	[-0.024]	[-0.061]
	{ 0.618}	{ 0.024}	{ 0.045}	{ 0.166}	{ 0.091}	{ 0.091}	{ 0.172}	{ 0.892}	{ 0.417}	{ 0.259}	{ 0.254}	{ 0.084}
other business	0.053	-0.064	-0.084	-0.469	-0.243	-0.243	0.102	-0.007	0.305	-0.409	-0.196	-1.231
	[0.017]	[-0.021]	[-0.033]	[-0.164]	[-0.007]	[-0.007]	[0.036]	[-0.002]	[0.030]	[-0.002]	[-0.032]	[-0.080]
	{ 0.591}	{ 0.829}	{ 0.392}	{ 0.117}	{ 0.296}	{ 0.296}	{ 0.473}	{ 0.984}	{ 0.033}	{ 0.404}	{ 0.169}	{ 0.008}
public	0.094	-0.347	0.047	-0.107	-0.043	-0.043	0.648	0.356	0.210	-0.172	0.278	-0.167
	[0.030]	[-0.105]	[0.019]	[-0.040]	[-0.001]	[-0.001]	[0.245]	[0.133]	[0.019]	[-0.001]	[0.058]	[-0.021]
	{ 0.337}	{ 0.241}	{ 0.639}	{ 0.733}	{ 0.854}	{ 0.854}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.326}	{ 0.165}	{ 0.729}	{ 0.017}	{ 0.653}
education	-0.123	-0.072	-0.660	-0.699	-0.133	-0.133	-0.617	-0.722	-0.318	-1.120	-0.295	-0.675
	[-0.037]	[-0.024]	[-0.237]	[-0.236]	[-0.004]	[-0.004]	[-0.179]	[-0.212]	[-0.020]	[-0.003]	[-0.045]	[-0.064]
	{ 0.176}	{ 0.816}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.017}	{ 0.538}	{ 0.538}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.049}	{ 0.051}	{ 0.030}	{ 0.008}	{ 0.086}
health	-0.239	-0.350	0.092	-0.302	-0.231	-0.231	-0.092	-0.196	-0.226	-0.752	-0.182	-0.183
	[-0.070]	[-0.108]	[0.036]	[-0.111]	[-0.006]	[-0.006]	[-0.031]	[-0.066]	[-0.015]	[-0.002]	[-0.030]	[-0.023]
	{ 0.011}	{ 0.279}	{ 0.380}	{ 0.336}	{ 0.310}	{ 0.310}	{ 0.482}	{ 0.580}	{ 0.141}	{ 0.125}	{ 0.120}	{ 0.632}
constant	-0.994	-0.240	-1.759	-2.219	-2.890	-2.890	-0.823	-0.386	-4.147	-7.479	-2.310	-1.443
	{ 0.000}	{ 0.852}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.063}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.006}	{ 0.735}	{ 0.000}	{ .}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.354}
model F test	15.048	1.526	22.19	3.021	11.136	3.486	10.071	2.74	22.573	189.225	13.526	3.354
dep variable mean	0.264	0.308	0.454	0.412	0.035	0.055	0.309	0.342	0.091	0.076	0.146	0.144

Table A3.2. Subgroup regression results: lone parents and all those not lone parents, continued.

	parental leave		paid leave		child-care		flexi - time		home work		job share	
	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone	not lone	lone
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
number of obs	19327	1010	19327	1010	19327	1010	19327	1010	19327	1010	19327	1010
number of strata	70	69	70	69	70	69	70	69	70	69	70	69
number of PSUs	1492	1487	1492	1487	1492	1487	1492	1487	1492	1487	1492	1487

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998. Each entry contains the probit coefficient, marginal effect [in square brackets], and probability values {in curly brackets} from the specified sample probit model. The probit model is weighted by individual sampling weights and includes the variables from the baseline regression (Table 3) with the exception of the lone parent (and related) dummy variables. The point estimates and standard errors account for the stratification and clustering in the sampling procedure.

Table A3.3 Subgroup regression results: lone parents and partnered parents.

	parental leave		paid leave		child-care		flexi - time		home work		job share	
	partnered (1)	lone (2)	partnered (3)	lone (4)	partnered (5)	lone (6)	partnered (7)	lone (8)	partnered (9)	lone (10)	partnered (11)	lone (12)
individual variables												
child aged 0-4	0.191 [0.067] { 0.001}	-0.134 [-0.044] { 0.458}	0.013 [0.005] { 0.836}	-0.005 [-0.002] { 0.978}	0.263 [0.012] { 0.022}	0.305 [0.011] { 0.266}	-0.01 [-0.003] { 0.874}	-0.183 [-0.063] { 0.280}	0.107 [0.009] { 0.225}	0.228 [0.002] { 0.378}	0.034 [0.006] { 0.643}	0.609 [0.102] { 0.007}
child aged 5-11	-0.016 [-0.006] { 0.739}	-0.121 [-0.041] { 0.399}	0.026 [0.010] { 0.574}	-0.130 [-0.050] { 0.377}	-0.137 [-0.006] { 0.189}	0.320 [0.011] { 0.129}	0.125 [0.042] { 0.008}	-0.171 [-0.060] { 0.226}	0.05 [0.004] { 0.452}	0.1 [0.001] { 0.618}	-0.025 [-0.005] { 0.658}	0.438 [0.062] { 0.008}
child aged 12-18	-0.088 [-0.030] { 0.177}	0.04 [0.013] { 0.814}	-0.069 [-0.027] { 0.248}	-0.102 [-0.039] { 0.547}	0.071 [0.003] { 0.596}	-0.216 [-0.007] { 0.404}	0.041 [0.014] { 0.515}	-0.044 [-0.015] { 0.793}	0.022 [0.002] { 0.791}	0.33 [0.002] { 0.156}	-0.09 [-0.017] { 0.222}	0.333 [0.047] { 0.089}
age	0.021 [0.007] { 0.455}	-0.065 [-0.022] { 0.251}	0.010 [0.004] { 0.646}	0.020 [0.008] { 0.709}	0.013 [0.001] { 0.773}	-0.031 [-0.001] { 0.698}	-0.012 [-0.004] { 0.621}	-0.044 [-0.016] { 0.369}	0.003 [0.000] { 0.934}	-0.002 [-0.000] { 0.981}	0 [-0.000] { 0.988}	-0.092 [-0.013] { 0.139}
age2	-0.349 [-0.120] { 0.328}	0.619 [0.208] { 0.391}	-0.089 [-0.035] { 0.737}	-0.145 [-0.055] { 0.828}	-0.389 [-0.016] { 0.434}	0.147 [0.005] { 0.888}	0.237 [0.080] { 0.433}	0.58 [0.204] { 0.359}	0.063 [0.005] { 0.882}	0.093 [0.001] { 0.929}	0.004 [0.001] { 0.992}	1.393 [0.191] { 0.070}
female	0.049 [0.017] { 0.376}	0.178 [0.060] { 0.260}	-0.108 [-0.043] { 0.081}	-0.193 [-0.074] { 0.254}	0.296 [0.013] { 0.008}	0.582 [0.017] { 0.046}	0.182 [0.062] { 0.024}	0.216 [0.076] { 0.193}	-0.091 [-0.007] { 0.326}	-0.001 [-0.000] { 0.997}	0.306 [0.058] { 0.000}	0.663 [0.089] { 0.000}
ethnicity	-0.183 [-0.060] { 0.234}	-0.191 [-0.061] { 0.439}	0.077 [0.031] { 0.574}	0.226 [0.088] { 0.402}	-0.347 [-0.010] { 0.069}	-0.651 [-0.011] { 0.161}	0.251 [0.090] { 0.182}	0.122 [0.044] { 0.626}	-0.184 [-0.013] { 0.218}	0.337 [0.003] { 0.489}	0.244 [0.051] { 0.275}	0.024 [0.003] { 0.940}
hourly wage	-0.002 [-0.001] { 0.607}	0.045 [0.015] { 0.019}	0.009 [0.003] { 0.078}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.984}	-0.001 [-0.000] { 0.787}	-0.004 [-0.000] { 0.919}	-0.009 [-0.003] { 0.261}	-0.01 [-0.003] { 0.551}	0.018 [0.001] { 0.007}	0.039 [0.000] { 0.071}	0.005 [0.001] { 0.179}	0.03 [0.004] { 0.074}
hours	0.008 [0.003] { 0.411}	0.047 [0.016] { 0.045}	0.027 [0.011] { 0.004}	0.063 [0.024] { 0.002}	0.019 [0.001] { 0.302}	0.04 [0.001] { 0.320}	0.004 [0.001] { 0.733}	0 [0.000] { 0.998}	0.036 [0.003] { 0.018}	-0.03 [-0.000] { 0.419}	0.043 [0.008] { 0.000}	0.015 [0.002] { 0.599}
hours squared	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.201}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.120}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.006}	-0.001 [-0.000] { 0.003}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.185}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.874}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.236}	0.000 [0.000] { 0.761}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.162}	0.001 [0.000] { 0.177}	-0.001 [-0.000] { 0.000}	0.000 [-0.000] { 0.628}
tenure	0.012 [0.004] { 0.052}	-0.007 [-0.002] { 0.686}	0.013 [0.005] { 0.057}	0.013 [0.005] { 0.484}	0.039 [0.002] { 0.004}	0.063 [0.002] { 0.017}	-0.006 [-0.002] { 0.387}	-0.013 [-0.005] { 0.459}	-0.003 [-0.000] { 0.778}	0.031 [0.000] { 0.127}	0.006 [0.001] { 0.435}	0.037 [0.005] { 0.058}

Table A3.3 Subgroup regression results: lone parents and partnered parents, continued.

	parental leave		paid leave		child-care		flexi - time		home work		job share	
	partnered (1)	lone (2)	partnered (3)	lone (4)	partnered (5)	lone (6)	partnered (7)	lone (8)	partnered (9)	lone (10)	partnered (11)	lone (12)
training	0.028 [0.010] { 0.000}	0.044 [0.015] { 0.011}	0.009 [0.004] { 0.160}	-0.007 [-0.003] { 0.688}	0.015 [0.001] { 0.169}	0.063 [0.002] { 0.028}	0.037 [0.013] { 0.000}	0.057 [0.020] { 0.002}	0.02 [0.002] { 0.020}	0.059 [0.000] { 0.009}	0.03 [0.006] { 0.001}	0.054 [0.007] { 0.007}
part-time	0.034 [0.012] { 0.732}	0.291 [0.101] { 0.256}	-0.049 [-0.019] { 0.643}	0.124 [0.048] { 0.606}	0.128 [0.006] { 0.502}	0.797 [0.036] { 0.054}	0.093 [0.032] { 0.425}	0.169 [0.061] { 0.488}	0.223 [0.020] { 0.140}	-0.182 [-0.001] { 0.674}	0.264 [0.052] { 0.029}	0.21 [0.031] { 0.501}
fixed term	-0.164 [-0.054] { 0.147}	-0.158 [-0.051] { 0.618}	-0.228 [-0.088] { 0.113}	-0.568 [-0.191] { 0.109}	-0.056 [-0.002] { 0.760}	0.098 [0.003] { 0.852}	-0.195 [-0.062] { 0.137}	-0.685 [-0.193] { 0.065}	-0.069 [-0.005] { 0.699}	-0.499 [-0.002] { 0.303}	-0.144 [-0.024] { 0.254}	-0.792 [-0.062] { 0.086}
temporary	-0.046 [-0.016] { 0.728}	0.19 [0.067] { 0.498}	-0.466 [-0.173] { 0.001}	-0.355 [-0.127] { 0.188}	0.108 [0.005] { 0.552}	0.081 [0.003] { 0.884}	-0.151 [-0.049] { 0.288}	0.057 [0.021] { 0.831}	-0.151 [-0.011] { 0.569}	0.959 [0.022] { 0.048}	0.055 [0.010] { 0.701}	-0.174 [-0.021] { 0.656}
union member	0.112 [0.039] { 0.029}	-0.014 [-0.005] { 0.919}	0.096 [0.038] { 0.101}	0.132 [0.051] { 0.337}	-0.072 [-0.003] { 0.447}	0.057 [0.002] { 0.813}	-0.19 [-0.064] { 0.002}	0.066 [0.024] { 0.645}	-0.259 [-0.021] { 0.001}	-0.014 [-0.000] { 0.943}	0.108 [0.020] { 0.066}	-0.145 [-0.019] { 0.400}
education other	-0.112 [-0.038] { 0.118}	-0.307 [-0.098] { 0.062}	-0.089 [-0.035] { 0.250}	-0.222 [-0.083] { 0.185}	0.194 [0.009] { 0.392}	-0.944 [-0.020] { 0.008}	0.167 [0.058] { 0.027}	0.452 [0.167] { 0.006}	-0.051 [-0.004] { 0.653}	0.215 [0.002] { 0.449}	-0.041 [-0.007] { 0.650}	-0.265 [-0.033] { 0.219}
CSE	-0.054 [-0.018] { 0.426}	-0.413 [-0.126] { 0.027}	0.04 [0.016] { 0.533}	0.008 [0.003] { 0.969}	0.439 [0.025] { 0.058}	-0.082 [-0.002] { 0.759}	0.121 [0.042] { 0.086}	0.052 [0.019] { 0.746}	-0.109 [-0.008] { 0.312}	0.123 [0.001] { 0.698}	-0.081 [-0.014] { 0.422}	-0.164 [-0.021] { 0.476}
A-level	0.045 [0.016] { 0.577}	0.255 [0.090] { 0.137}	0.079 [0.031] { 0.245}	-0.065 [-0.025] { 0.687}	0.01 [0.000] { 0.930}	-0.507 [-0.011] { 0.089}	0.139 [0.048] { 0.048}	0.254 [0.093] { 0.222}	0.196 [0.018] { 0.018}	0.688 [0.009] { 0.001}	0.128 [0.025] { 0.109}	0.212 [0.033] { 0.281}
degree	0.114 [0.040] { 0.163}	-0.157 [-0.051] { 0.445}	-0.053 [-0.021] { 0.440}	-0.157 [-0.059] { 0.445}	0.129 [0.006] { 0.421}	-0.899 [-0.015] { 0.013}	0.143 [0.050] { 0.072}	-0.025 [-0.009] { 0.904}	0.351 [0.036] { 0.000}	0.211 [0.002] { 0.354}	0.204 [0.041] { 0.035}	0.006 [0.001] { 0.978}
postgrad	0.376 [0.139] { 0.000}	0.359 [0.130] { 0.184}	-0.023 [-0.009] { 0.836}	-0.452 [-0.158] { 0.091}	0.335 [0.019] { 0.082}	0.484 [0.025] { 0.178}	0.252 [0.090] { 0.028}	0.672 [0.259] { 0.014}	0.493 [0.059] { 0.000}	1.106 [0.031] { 0.001}	0.322 [0.070] { 0.004}	0.34 [0.058] { 0.243}
vocational qual	0.042 [0.015] { 0.311}	-0.065 [-0.022] { 0.584}	-0.079 [-0.031] { 0.095}	-0.11 [-0.042] { 0.351}	0.097 [0.004] { 0.223}	-0.15 [-0.005] { 0.457}	-0.064 [-0.022] { 0.175}	-0.265 [-0.092] { 0.023}	-0.098 [-0.008] { 0.148}	0.156 [0.001] { 0.283}	-0.112 [-0.020] { 0.153}	0.168 [0.024] { 0.229}

Table A3.3 Subgroup regression results: lone parents and partnered parents, continued.

	parental leave		paid leave		child-care		flexi - time		home work		job share	
	partnered (1)	lone (2)	partnered (3)	lone (4)	partnered (5)	lone (6)	partnered (7)	lone (8)	partnered (9)	lone (10)	partnered (11)	lone (12)
managers	0.147 [0.052] { 0.200}	0.113 [0.039] { 0.693}	0.002 [0.001] { 0.987}	0.677 [0.265] { 0.020}	0.617 [0.044] { 0.034}	0.119 [0.004] { 0.781}	0.411 [0.150] { 0.001}	0.596 [0.228] { 0.038}	1.525 [0.315] { 0.000}	6.278 [0.998] { 0.006}	0.389 [0.086] { 0.014}	0.317 [0.053] { 0.349}
profs	0.051 [0.018] { 0.656}	0.165 [0.057] { 0.553}	-0.177 [-0.069] { 0.170}	0.351 [0.137] { 0.162}	0.807 [0.063] { 0.003}	-0.31 [-0.008] { 0.485}	0.253 [0.090] { 0.029}	0.123 [0.044] { 0.673}	1.161 [0.191] { 0.000}	5.763 [0.987] { 0.015}	0.22 [0.045] { 0.085}	0.387 [0.066] { 0.215}
assoc prof	0.066 [0.023] { 0.590}	0.409 [0.148] { 0.123}	-0.078 [-0.031] { 0.556}	0.549 [0.216] { 0.031}	0.736 [0.058] { 0.010}	-0.358 [-0.008] { 0.393}	0.366 [0.133] { 0.002}	0.455 [0.172] { 0.064}	1.009 [0.163] { 0.000}	5.498 [0.983] { 0.018}	0.221 [0.045] { 0.049}	0.145 [0.022] { 0.633}
clerk	0.152 [0.054] { 0.172}	0.367 [0.131] { 0.090}	0.194 [0.077] { 0.112}	0.551 [0.216] { 0.014}	0.886 [0.074] { 0.001}	-0.192 [-0.005] { 0.557}	0.442 [0.161] { 0.000}	0.459 [0.172] { 0.040}	0.83 [0.115] { 0.000}	5.102 [0.924] { 0.026}	0.536 [0.124] { 0.000}	0.624 [0.116] { 0.015}
craft	-0.224 [-0.073] { 0.064}	0.459 [0.168] { 0.128}	0.059 [0.023] { 0.648}	0.632 [0.248] { 0.022}	0.836 [0.070] { 0.012}	-0.891 [-0.015] { 0.034}	0.244 [0.087] { 0.053}	0.505 [0.191] { 0.076}	0.381 [0.041] { 0.089}	4.077 [0.786] { 0.068}	0.006 [0.001] { 0.971}	0.081 [0.012] { 0.849}
personal	0.233 [0.084] { 0.038}	0.396 [0.144] { 0.103}	-0.076 [-0.030] { 0.564}	0.366 [0.144] { 0.142}	0.582 [0.040] { 0.031}	-0.051 [-0.002] { 0.913}	-0.1 [-0.033] { 0.371}	-0.372 [-0.120] { 0.168}	0.451 [0.051] { 0.043}	4.837 [0.929] { 0.036}	0.055 [0.011] { 0.665}	0.344 [0.057] { 0.263}
sales	0.347 [0.127] { 0.012}	0.394 [0.142] { 0.161}	-0.063 [-0.025] { 0.655}	0.344 [0.135] { 0.258}	0.787 [0.066] { 0.026}	0.012 [0.000] { 0.978}	0.248 [0.088] { 0.034}	0.826 [0.316] { 0.005}	1.257 [0.235] { 0.000}	6.009 [0.993] { 0.009}	0.056 [0.011] { 0.717}	-0.638 [-0.061] { 0.117}
operative	0.18 [0.064] { 0.176}	0.235 [0.083] { 0.363}	-0.249 [-0.096] { 0.042}	0.145 [0.056] { 0.579}	1.048 [0.099] { 0.001}	0.215 [0.007] { 0.000}	0.2 [0.070] { 0.113}	0.348 [0.129] { 0.190}	-0.32 [-0.021] { 0.240}	5.216 [0.937] { 0.016}	0.105 [0.020] { 0.529}	0.504 [0.089] { 0.187}
workplace variables												
wp size	0.043 [0.015] { 0.002}	0.104 [0.035] { 0.052}	-0.088 [-0.035] { 0.075}	-0.023 [-0.009] { 0.742}	0.117 [0.005] { 0.000}	1.668 [0.053] { 0.392}	-0.018 [-0.006] { 0.440}	-0.067 [-0.024] { 0.193}	-0.081 [-0.007] { 0.030}	-0.294 [-0.002] { 0.027}	-0.015 [-0.003] { 0.671}	0.157 [0.021] { 0.003}
wp age	0.177 [0.061] { 0.724}	0.294 [0.099] { 0.795}	0.243 [0.096] { 0.679}	-1.364 [-0.521] { 0.252}	-1.411 [-0.059] { 0.218}	-0.678 [-0.034] { 0.011}	-1.598 [-0.541] { 0.011}	-2.969 [-1.046] { 0.045}	-2.361 [-0.194] { 0.012}	-7.09 [-0.042] { 0.006}	0.729 [0.135] { 0.249}	0.133 [0.018] { 0.916}
wp multi-enterprise	-0.088 [-0.031] { 0.000}	-0.066 [-0.022] { 0.000}	0.185 [0.072] { 0.000}	0.44 [0.161] { 0.000}	-0.44 [-0.024] { 0.000}	-0.57 [-0.018] { 0.000}	-0.129 [-0.044] { 0.000}	-0.253 [-0.092] { 0.000}	-0.258 [-0.024] { 0.000}	0.002 [0.000] { 0.000}	-0.075 [-0.014] { 0.000}	-0.092 [-0.013] { 0.000}

Table A3.3 Subgroup regression results: lone parents and partnered parents, continued.

	parental leave		paid leave		child-care		flexi - time		home work		job share	
	partnered (1)	lone (2)	partnered (3)	lone (4)	partnered (5)	lone (6)	partnered (7)	lone (8)	partnered (9)	lone (10)	partnered (11)	lone (12)
	{ 0.160}	{ 0.678}	{ 0.005}	{ 0.003}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.076}	{ 0.041}	{ 0.074}	{ 0.004}	{ 0.991}	{ 0.341}	{ 0.616}
wp training	-0.041	-0.067	0.132	0.222	-0.203	0.076	-0.065	-0.129	-0.027	-0.249	0.117	-0.224
	[-0.014]	[-0.022]	[0.052]	[0.085]	[-0.008]	[0.002]	[-0.022]	[-0.045]	[-0.002]	[-0.001]	[0.022]	[-0.031]
	{ 0.570}	{ 0.693}	{ 0.106}	{ 0.177}	{ 0.200}	{ 0.912}	{ 0.472}	{ 0.443}	{ 0.791}	{ 0.258}	{ 0.246}	{ 0.239}
wp ppn female	0.454	-0.078	0.186	0.352	0.203	-0.169	0.619	0.433	0.162	0.51	0.979	0.767
	[0.156]	[-0.026]	[0.073]	[0.134]	[0.008]	[-0.005]	[0.210]	[0.153]	[0.013]	[0.003]	[0.181]	[0.105]
	{ 0.007}	{ 0.846}	{ 0.318}	{ 0.376}	{ 0.533}	{ 0.775}	{ 0.002}	{ 0.240}	{ 0.481}	{ 0.365}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.078}
wp ppn part-time	-0.082	0.269	-0.734	-0.113	-0.083	-1.068	-0.327	0.123	-0.343	-0.608	-0.106	-1.197
	[-0.028]	[0.090]	[-0.290]	[-0.043]	[-0.003]	[-0.034]	[-0.111]	[0.043]	[-0.028]	[-0.004]	[-0.020]	[-0.164]
	{ 0.622}	{ 0.473}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.761}	{ 0.806}	{ 0.398}	{ 0.063}	{ 0.743}	{ 0.184}	{ 0.430}	{ 0.565}	{ 0.012}
wp ppn youth	-0.392	-1.011	-0.999	-0.801	1.025	0.658	0.519	-0.801	-0.853	-3.036	0.29	-0.918
	[-0.135]	[-0.339]	[-0.394]	[-0.306]	[0.043]	[0.021]	[0.176]	[-0.282]	[-0.070]	[-0.018]	[0.054]	[-0.126]
	{ 0.283}	{ 0.247}	{ 0.010}	{ 0.261}	{ 0.068}	{ 0.453}	{ 0.150}	{ 0.289}	{ 0.178}	{ 0.103}	{ 0.445}	{ 0.329}
wp ppn old	-0.298	-0.304	-0.111	-0.3	-0.498	1.128	0.067	-0.055	0.128	1.168	-0.242	-0.193
	[-0.103]	[-0.102]	[-0.044]	[-0.115]	[-0.021]	[0.036]	[0.023]	[-0.019]	[0.011]	[0.007]	[-0.045]	[-0.026]
	{ 0.249}	{ 0.586}	{ 0.721}	{ 0.586}	{ 0.305}	{ 0.234}	{ 0.810}	{ 0.916}	{ 0.753}	{ 0.112}	{ 0.467}	{ 0.742}
wp ppn ethnicity	0.334	0.977	0.12	-0.62	1.127	0.025	0.014	0.377	0.062	-0.637	-0.646	-0.435
	[0.115]	[0.328]	[0.047]	[-0.237]	[0.047]	[0.001]	[0.005]	[0.133]	[0.005]	[-0.004]	[-0.119]	[-0.060]
	{ 0.211}	{ 0.053}	{ 0.689}	{ 0.230}	{ 0.008}	{ 0.637}	{ 0.965}	{ 0.510}	{ 0.859}	{ 0.422}	{ 0.067}	{ 0.518}
wp ave wage	-0.001	-0.065	0.024	0.04	0.035	-0.226	0.007	0.018	-0.004	0.021	0.023	0
	[-0.000]	[-0.022]	[0.010]	[0.015]	[0.001]	[-0.008]	[0.002]	[0.006]	[-0.000]	[0.000]	[0.004]	[-0.000]
	{ 0.901}	{ 0.046}	{ 0.028}	{ 0.225}	{ 0.080}	{ 0.259}	{ 0.490}	{ 0.560}	{ 0.819}	{ 0.613}	{ 0.021}	{ 0.990}
wp rew. seniority	-0.053	0.012	-0.017	0.179	-0.041	0.255	-0.121	0.093	-0.082	-0.165	0.054	-0.076
	[-0.018]	[0.004]	[-0.007]	[0.068]	[-0.002]	[0.007]	[-0.041]	[0.033]	[-0.007]	[-0.001]	[0.010]	[-0.010]
	{ 0.306}	{ 0.925}	{ 0.782}	{ 0.159}	{ 0.689}	{ 0.249}	{ 0.056}	{ 0.430}	{ 0.282}	{ 0.251}	{ 0.388}	{ 0.630}
wp rew. grade	0.045	-0.123	0.032	0.051	-0.034	-0.175	0.055	-0.024	0.011	0.275	-0.057	-0.012
	[0.015]	[-0.042]	[0.013]	[0.020]	[-0.001]	[-0.006]	[0.019]	[-0.009]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[-0.011]	[-0.002]
	{ 0.485}	{ 0.389}	{ 0.630}	{ 0.693}	{ 0.774}	{ 0.596}	{ 0.368}	{ 0.840}	{ 0.894}	{ 0.131}	{ 0.453}	{ 0.936}
wp teams	0.08	-0.115	-0.121	-0.447	0.486	-1.034	-0.046	-0.228	-0.09	-0.176	0.171	-0.129
	[0.027]	[-0.039]	[-0.048]	[-0.171]	[0.020]	[-0.033]	[-0.016]	[-0.080]	[-0.007]	[-0.001]	[0.031]	[-0.018]
	{ 0.283}	{ 0.543}	{ 0.169}	{ 0.014}	{ 0.004}	{ 0.005}	{ 0.577}	{ 0.188}	{ 0.394}	{ 0.452}	{ 0.085}	{ 0.533}
wp circles	0.144	0.002	0.147	0.002	-0.01	-0.288	0.103	0.214	-0.086	-0.081	0.006	-0.039
	[0.049]	[0.001]	[0.058]	[0.001]	[-0.000]	[-0.008]	[0.035]	[0.076]	[-0.007]	[-0.000]	[0.001]	[-0.005]

Table A3.3 Subgroup regression results: lone parents and partnered parents, continued.

	parental leave		paid leave		child-care		flexi - time		home work		job share	
	partnered (1)	lone (2)	partnered (3)	lone (4)	partnered (5)	lone (6)	partnered (7)	lone (8)	partnered (9)	lone (10)	partnered (11)	lone (12)
	{ 0.092}	{ 0.992}	{ 0.061}	{ 0.992}	{ 0.941}	{ 0.352}	{ 0.274}	{ 0.237}	{ 0.506}	{ 0.713}	{ 0.949}	{ 0.849}
wp lot disc	0.027	0.003	-0.165	0.06	0.433	0.157	0.201	0.216	0.163	0.273	0.178	-0.107
	[0.009]	[0.001]	[-0.065]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.005]	[0.070]	[0.078]	[0.015]	[0.002]	[0.035]	[-0.014]
	{ 0.720}	{ 0.984}	{ 0.026}	{ 0.721}	{ 0.008}	{ 0.530}	{ 0.010}	{ 0.182}	{ 0.072}	{ 0.182}	{ 0.043}	{ 0.601}
wp some disc	0.165	0.082	-0.146	-0.092	0.204	-0.122	0.155	0.149	0.052	0.259	0.128	-0.028
	[0.057]	[0.027]	[-0.057]	[-0.035]	[0.009]	[-0.004]	[0.053]	[0.053]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.024]	[-0.004]
	{ 0.013}	{ 0.555}	{ 0.044}	{ 0.486}	{ 0.146}	{ 0.715}	{ 0.027}	{ 0.227}	{ 0.516}	{ 0.157}	{ 0.125}	{ 0.852}
wp union recognition	0.133	0.402	0.108	-0.055	-0.081	0.299	0.082	0.367	0.057	0.13	0.196	0.348
	[0.045]	[0.130]	[0.043]	[-0.021]	[-0.003]	[0.008]	[0.027]	[0.126]	[0.005]	[0.001]	[0.035]	[0.045]
	{ 0.061}	{ 0.016}	{ 0.160}	{ 0.753}	{ 0.542}	{ 0.233}	{ 0.252}	{ 0.017}	{ 0.514}	{ 0.592}	{ 0.028}	{ 0.071}
wp grievance proc	0.08	0.123	0.001	-0.019	0.086	0.33	0.107	0.126	0.009	0.088	0.001	0.147
	[0.027]	[0.041]	[0.000]	[-0.007]	[0.003]	[0.011]	[0.036]	[0.044]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.019]
	{ 0.183}	{ 0.369}	{ 0.991}	{ 0.892}	{ 0.462}	{ 0.148}	{ 0.088}	{ 0.349}	{ 0.914}	{ 0.635}	{ 0.991}	{ 0.330}
wp hr rep	-0.024	-0.15	0.207	0.183	0.298	-0.205	0.102	0.102	0.093	0.095	0.021	0.074
	[-0.008]	[-0.050]	[0.082]	[0.070]	[0.013]	[-0.006]	[0.035]	[0.036]	[0.008]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.010]
	{ 0.643}	{ 0.281}	{ 0.001}	{ 0.139}	{ 0.005}	{ 0.655}	{ 0.095}	{ 0.416}	{ 0.217}	{ 0.560}	{ 0.753}	{ 0.635}
wp employment change	0.002	-0.425	-0.249	0.297	-0.284	-0.215	-0.072	0.132	0.152	0.37	0.004	-0.247
	[0.001]	[-0.143]	[-0.098]	[0.114]	[-0.012]	[-0.007]	[-0.024]	[0.046]	[0.012]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[-0.034]
	{ 0.982}	{ 0.057}	{ 0.001}	{ 0.204}	{ 0.078}	{ 0.942}	{ 0.442}	{ 0.482}	{ 0.192}	{ 0.178}	{ 0.963}	{ 0.443}
wp dismissals	-0.435	-5.917	-2.73	-1.577	4.374	-0.275	-0.272	-1.165	-2.587	-3.038	1.411	-2.748
	[-0.150]	[-1.986]	[-1.078]	[-0.603]	[0.182]	[-0.009]	[-0.092]	[-0.411]	[-0.212]	[-0.018]	[0.261]	[-0.377]
	{ 0.691}	{ 0.022}	{ 0.030}	{ 0.235}	{ 0.011}	{ 0.659}	{ 0.791}	{ 0.378}	{ 0.068}	{ 0.229}	{ 0.226}	{ 0.426}
wp resignations	-0.097	0.81	-0.197	-0.427	-1.765	-0.026	-0.064	0.643	0.23	0.096	-0.459	0.623
	[-0.033]	[0.272]	[-0.078]	[-0.163]	[-0.073]	[-0.001]	[-0.022]	[0.227]	[0.019]	[0.001]	[-0.085]	[0.085]
	{ 0.689}	{ 0.074}	{ 0.373}	{ 0.282}	{ 0.006}	{ 0.937}	{ 0.756}	{ 0.090}	{ 0.411}	{ 0.896}	{ 0.124}	{ 0.269}
wp dif. vacancies	-0.123	0.184	0.132	0.167	0.215	-0.952	-0.088	0.115	-0.081	-0.065	-0.071	-0.192
	[-0.042]	[0.062]	[0.052]	[0.064]	[0.009]	[-0.019]	[-0.030]	[0.040]	[-0.007]	[-0.000]	[-0.013]	[-0.026]
	{ 0.139}	{ 0.312}	{ 0.144}	{ 0.379}	{ 0.179}	{ 0.100}	{ 0.332}	{ 0.538}	{ 0.496}	{ 0.785}	{ 0.530}	{ 0.414}
manufacturing	-0.085	-0.205	-0.285	-0.185	-0.74	0.219	-0.071	-0.363	-0.424	-0.765	-0.452	-1.061
	[-0.029]	[-0.066]	[-0.111]	[-0.069]	[-0.023]	[0.008]	[-0.024]	[-0.121]	[-0.029]	[-0.003]	[-0.073]	[-0.100]
	{ 0.559}	{ 0.485}	{ 0.061}	{ 0.528}	{ 0.031}	{ 0.681}	{ 0.639}	{ 0.289}	{ 0.039}	{ 0.100}	{ 0.018}	{ 0.006}
electrical	0.200	-0.489	0.184	0.650	0.094	0.973	0.394	-0.400	0.248	0.353	-0.157	-1.099
	[0.072]	[-0.138]	[0.073]	[0.255]	[0.004]	[0.083]	[0.146]	[-0.125]	[0.025]	[0.004]	[-0.026]	[-0.067]

Table A3.3 Subgroup regression results: lone parents and partnered parents, continued.

	parental leave		paid leave		child-care		flexi - time		home work		job share	
	partnered (1)	lone (2)	partnered (3)	lone (4)	partnered (5)	lone (6)	partnered (7)	lone (8)	partnered (9)	lone (10)	partnered (11)	lone (12)
	{ 0.180}	{ 0.193}	{ 0.279}	{ 0.106}	{ 0.774}	{ 0.181}	{ 0.026}	{ 0.373}	{ 0.307}	{ 0.507}	{ 0.403}	{ 0.031}
construction	0.083	0.000	-0.371	-0.644	-0.914	0.507	0.028	-0.312	-0.447	-0.947	-0.155	-1.216
	[0.029]	[0.000]	[-0.140]	[-0.212]	[-0.017]	[0.026]	[0.010]	[-0.101]	[-0.025]	[-0.002]	[-0.026]	[-0.072]
	{ 0.602}	{ 1.000}	{ 0.021}	{ 0.127}	{ 0.023}	{ 0.398}	{ 0.880}	{ 0.439}	{ 0.066}	{ 0.134}	{ 0.478}	{ 0.034}
wholesale	-0.092	0.035	-0.222	-0.625	-0.814	0.661	-0.031	-0.174	-0.695	-1.18	-0.483	-0.222
	[-0.031]	[0.012]	[-0.086]	[-0.217]	[-0.019]	[0.039]	[-0.010]	[-0.059]	[-0.037]	[-0.003]	[-0.071]	[-0.027]
	{ 0.528}	{ 0.905}	{ 0.116}	{ 0.032}	{ 0.021}	{ 0.291}	{ 0.844}	{ 0.604}	{ 0.002}	{ 0.017}	{ 0.012}	{ 0.574}
hotels	0.027	0.037	-0.572	-0.237	0.128	1.07	0.265	-0.745	-0.125	-0.63	0.07	-0.362
	[0.009]	[0.012]	[-0.207]	[-0.087]	[0.006]	[0.082]	[0.095]	[-0.207]	[-0.009]	[-0.002]	[0.013]	[-0.039]
	{ 0.899}	{ 0.922}	{ 0.001}	{ 0.495}	{ 0.726}	{ 0.081}	{ 0.217}	{ 0.068}	{ 0.629}	{ 0.325}	{ 0.791}	{ 0.468}
transport	0.172	-0.507	-0.258	-0.064	-0.616	0.3	-0.1	-0.683	-0.124	-1.055	-0.454	-0.534
	[0.061]	[-0.145]	[-0.099]	[-0.024]	[-0.015]	[0.012]	[-0.033]	[-0.197]	[-0.009]	[-0.002]	[-0.065]	[-0.052]
	{ 0.236}	{ 0.134}	{ 0.092}	{ 0.846}	{ 0.135}	{ 0.640}	{ 0.542}	{ 0.064}	{ 0.573}	{ 0.051}	{ 0.020}	{ 0.216}
finance	-0.128	-0.837	-0.31	-0.475	-0.338	-2.823	0.171	0.06	-0.056	-0.593	-0.15	-0.74
	[-0.043]	[-0.207]	[-0.118]	[-0.165]	[-0.010]	[.]	[0.060]	[0.021]	[-0.004]	[-0.002]	[-0.025]	[-0.061]
	{ 0.385}	{ 0.024}	{ 0.037}	{ 0.165}	{ 0.320}	{ 0.092}	{ 0.391}	{ 0.892}	{ 0.834}	{ 0.260}	{ 0.414}	{ 0.084}
other business	0.113	-0.064	-0.237	-0.469	-0.128	-0.128	0.341	-0.007	0.091	-0.409	-0.121	-1.231
	[0.040]	[-0.021]	[-0.091]	[-0.164]	[-0.005]	[-0.005]	[0.124]	[-0.002]	[0.008]	[-0.002]	[-0.021]	[-0.080]
	{ 0.434}	{ 0.829}	{ 0.107}	{ 0.116}	{ 0.677}	{ 0.677}	{ 0.064}	{ 0.984}	{ 0.675}	{ 0.405}	{ 0.553}	{ 0.008}
public	0.042	-0.347	-0.022	-0.107	0.182	0.182	0.677	0.356	-0.075	-0.172	0.337	-0.167
	[0.015]	[-0.105]	[-0.008]	[-0.040]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.255]	[0.133]	[-0.006]	[-0.001]	[0.074]	[-0.021]
	{ 0.772}	{ 0.241}	{ 0.888}	{ 0.733}	{ 0.588}	{ 0.588}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.326}	{ 0.714}	{ 0.730}	{ 0.059}	{ 0.653}
education	-0.049	-0.072	-0.864	-0.699	0.099	0.099	-0.587	-0.722	-0.569	-1.12	-0.324	-0.675
	[-0.017]	[-0.024]	[-0.302]	[-0.236]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[-0.170]	[-0.212]	[-0.033]	[-0.003]	[-0.051]	[-0.064]
	{ 0.732}	{ 0.816}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.017}	{ 0.748}	{ 0.748}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.049}	{ 0.013}	{ 0.030}	{ 0.053}	{ 0.086}
health	-0.290	-0.350	0.045	-0.302	0.073	0.073	-0.179	-0.196	-0.579	-0.752	-0.285	-0.183
	[-0.093]	[-0.108]	[0.018]	[-0.111]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[-0.058]	[-0.066]	[-0.033]	[-0.002]	[-0.046]	[-0.023]
	{ 0.056}	{ 0.279}	{ 0.778}	{ 0.336}	{ 0.821}	{ 0.821}	{ 0.264}	{ 0.581}	{ 0.013}	{ 0.125}	{ 0.109}	{ 0.631}
constant	-1.527	-0.24	-0.882	-2.219	-3.781	-3.781	-1.1	-0.386	-3.008	-7.479	-3.03	-1.443
	{ 0.013}	{ 0.852}	{ 0.095}	{ 0.063}	{ 0.001}	{ 0.001}	{ 0.045}	{ 0.735}	{ 0.000}	{ .}	{ 0.000}	{ 0.354}
model F test	5.082	1.522	12.598	3.014	11.708	3.486	5.903	2.737	14.59	18.745	10.399	3.347
dep variable mean	0.306	0.308	0.459	0.412	0.048	0.055	0.303	0.342	0.102	0.076	0.161	0.144
number of obs	7387	1010	7387	1010	7387	1010	7387	1010	7387	1010	7387	1010
number of strata	70	69	70	69	70	69	70	69	70	69	70	69
number of PSUs	1432	1427	1432	1427	1432	1427	1432	1427	1432	1427	1432	1427

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998. Each entry contains the probit coefficient and marginal effect [in square brackets], and probability values (in curly brackets) from the specified sample probit model. The probit model is weighted by individual sampling weights and includes the variables from the baseline regression (Table A1.3) with the exception of the lone parent (and related) dummy variables. The standard errors account for the stratification and clustering in the sampling