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Energy Sources
Nuclear Power -  Safety and Security -  Security

Nuclear Security

Why is security so important?

Security arrangements against the theft of nuclear materials ensure that material of potential proliferation concern is appropriately protected from wrongful use. It complements the nuclear material and accountancy "safeguards" system - [click here for more information on nuclear safeguards - checking whether Kevin Casey will migrate this]. It is also important that nuclear facilities and nuclear material are protected against criminal or malevolent acts because of the potential risk to public health, safety and the environment. Security at nuclear sites is kept under regular review in the light of the prevailing threat and has been significantly enhanced since the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001.

Who has responsibility for policy matters regarding nuclear security?

The DTI has policy responsibility for the security of the UK’s civil nuclear sites. The DTI participates in the international debate about standards of physical protection and ensures through our national regulations that UK civil nuclear material and facilities meet international obligations and guidance on security measures for them, taking into account the likely level of the threat against them.

What legislation governs this area?

A legal framework is in place for security regulation and arrangements in place include the issue of technical guidance, regular inspections and security exercises.

The Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003 make provision for the protection of nuclear material, both on sites and in transit, against the risks of theft and sabotage, and for the protection of sensitive nuclear information, such as site security arrangements. The Uranium Enrichment Technology (Prohibition on Disclosure) Regulations 2004 make it an offence to make an unauthorised disclosure of uranium enrichment technology. This technology is used in the civil nuclear industry and can also be used in the development of nuclear weapons.

Consultation on amending regulations

On 23rd December 2005 we opened a consultation about making changes to the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003 to ensure complete coverage over the industry including new bodies such as the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, as well as extending coverage to include uranium enrichment technology off-site and uranium enrichment software on-site. [***Click here for the consultation document with full details - check what's happening with this consultation***]. The consultation will close on 17th March 2006. We welcome written comments on the proposals. If you prefer to offer comments orally, or wish to discuss the proposals, we will hold a meeting to do so on March 6th 2006 (please contact us if you wish to attend).

Who regulates the industry?

The Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS), which is part of DTI, is the security regulator for the UK’s civil nuclear industry. It is responsible for approving security arrangements within the industry and enforcing compliance. OCNS also undertakes vetting of nuclear industry personnel with access to sensitive nuclear material or information. It works in close conjunction with policy officials in DTI’s Nuclear Policy Directorate, with other government departments and agencies, and with overseas counterparts. Through the Standing Committee on Police Establishments (SCOPE), OCNS reviews police numbers and tasking at licensed nuclear sites policed by the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC).

In the UK, civil nuclear operators must have site security plans dealing with the security arrangements for the protection of nuclear sites and nuclear material on such sites. The arrangements cover, for example, physical protection features such as fencing, CCTV and turnstile access, the roles of security guards and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the protection of proliferation-sensitive data and technologies and the trustworthiness of the individuals with access to them. Transporters of sensitive nuclear material also have to be approved by the Secretary of State.

Annual Reports

The Director of Civil Nuclear Security published the latest OCNS annual report on 25 July 2005:

application/pdf (1066Kb)

For previous annual reports go to the DTI Publications site.

OCNS have also published a guidance document on how the needs of security have to take account of the need for information to be available for use - "Finding a Balance":

application/pdf (248Kb)

The Civil Nuclear Constabulary

The DTI’s Quinquenial Review of the UKAEA Constabulary in 2002 set out a recommendation for the transfer of the Constabulary from the UKAEA to a statutory Police Authority. The review concluded that there would be significant benefits in the Constabulary operating under a “stand-alone” basis. Under the provisions of the Energy Act 2004, a new Civil Nuclear Police Authority (CNPA) has now been created, and it took responsibility for the renamed Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) with effect from 1 April 2005. The Authority contains independent membership, as well as representatives of the main nuclear operators. Representatives from DTI, OCNS and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) observe the Authority’s proceedings.

International framework

The UK is a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which came into force in 1987. Broadly speaking, the Convention obliges those countries which are parties to it to meet defined standards of physical protection for international transport of nuclear material and to co-operate in the recovery and protection of stolen nuclear material. It also promotes international co-operation in the exchange of information relating to physical protection systems for nuclear material in international transport. Responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear facilities and nuclear material in use, storage or transport rests with the State. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) document "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities" (INFCIRC/225/Rev4) provides a useful basis for guiding States in designing, implementing and regulating a system of physical protection for their sites and transport of different categories of nuclear material. The UK follows this guidance closely in its own domestic regime. OCNS functions as the UK’s competent security authority as recommended in INFCIRC/225/Rev4.

The UK has assisted the IAEA for many years in its programme designed to improve standards of nuclear security worldwide by providing experts from OCNS to contribute to the drafting and revision of its guidance documents, for the International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions and for training courses on physical protection run by the IAEA. The UK, through OCNS, has also provided some bilateral assistance to a few countries to upgrade the physical protection systems at some of their more sensitive facilities. As part of its commitment to the G8 Global Partnership Initiative against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, the UK is continuing to develop its strategy for improving nuclear security in Russia and former Soviet Union states.

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