

**REPORT ON DFID'S RESPONSE
TO THE INDIAN OCEAN
DISASTER**

March 2006

FOREWORD

On Boxing Day 2004, a devastating earthquake and tsunami took the lives of over 300,000 people across South Asia and East Africa. The impact of this disaster is still felt today. Many people not only lost loved ones, but also their homes and businesses.

Overall the international relief effort was successful, in part because of the significant levels of funding made available by donors including DFID, resulting in the majority of humanitarian needs being met effectively. The response reduced death and suffering in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Disaster.

The relief effort was an unprecedented response to an unprecedented crisis. Hours after the tsunami hit, DFID set up a crisis team to co-ordinate the response and sent experts to assess the situation in Sri Lanka. Over the following few weeks, DFID arranged 15 airlifts of essential relief supplies and paid for 25 Disasters and Emergency Committee flights to ensure that all the money raised went on aid and not on the cost of getting it there.

DFID funding was used by non-governmental organisations and UN agencies, to distribute relief items and to help rebuild homes, schools, hospitals and businesses in the long term. DFID has also funded projects that provide counselling and help people to increase their incomes.

£7.5 million or 10 per cent of the UK's humanitarian assistance has been set aside to fund projects that will reduce the risk of being hit by another disaster without warning.

The National Audit Office published its report on DFID's response on 1 March 2006. Sir John Bourn, the head of the National Audit Office said "The speed of DFID's response after the tsunami was impressive and demonstrates the importance of pre-planning for disasters."

However, DFID is committed to learning lessons from what we did in order to improve future efforts. To that end the department has asked advisors and independent experts to undertake an extensive review process, culminating in this report. In the context of the overall success of our response, the report deliberately focuses on those areas where improvements can be made.

The findings do not represent DFID policy, and Ministers and management will take a view on how best to progress the ideas contained in the report.

Progress has already been made in a number of areas since the review missions took place.

The multi-agency Tsunami Evaluation Coalition is preparing a more comprehensive and wide-ranging evaluation of the humanitarian response to the tsunami which is expected to report in May. DFID will wish to look

carefully at the TEC report as well as this report in considering the lessons to be learnt from the tsunami.

REPORT ON DFID'S RESPONSE TO THE INDIAN OCEAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI

Executive Summary

1. The tsunami response has shown that there is a correlation between the effectiveness of DFID support to UN agencies and the strength of the institutional relationships DFID has with the agencies. The long-term aspiration for these relationships is to achieve fully developed and resourced UN agencies capable of appropriate coordinated response on their own. The implementation of the DFID response strategy for the tsunami has made a real difference in some of the weakest areas in the UN system, has underpinned the UN coordination role, and has encouraged a more robust response.
2. DFID's response to the tsunami was a flexible mix of support to UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement and NGO sectors through cash, in kind contributions and seconded experts. Ring-fencing of grants was strategically applied where agencies would benefit, or where sectors were being neglected. DFID's 'mix' of interventions was broadly successful, although refinements are needed.
3. It is recommended that DFID support in future should emphasise further capacity building in the UN agencies themselves. It should continue to promote the UNOCHA coordination lead, and the newly mandated UN agency sector leads, through both advocacy and targeted support. It should help to build technical expertise to allow UN agencies to implement the sector lead in practice.
4. In its longer term institutional relationships, DFID needs to be aware of where operational weaknesses remain, and stand ready to assist with the same range of integrated approaches as demonstrated in the tsunami response. In this way, and building on the work undertaken to date, DFID will be supporting the Humanitarian Reform process and reinforcing the decisions of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, particularly regarding response cluster coordination, through practical measures that make a difference. Such activities are an important complement to the provision of direct support during an emergency. In the next emergency response, relief interventions such as those supported by DFID in the tsunami response will be part of a more coherent and cost-effective overall effort, and will have a greater impact on beneficiaries.
5. A set of specific recommendations for each UN agency is included in this report.

Rationale and methodology

6. The goal of the regional monitoring exercise was to establish the extent to which DFID's strategic objectives were achieved in the tsunami response, and to gauge the extent to which each element of DFID support

contributed to the achievement of those objectives. The report concludes with specific recommendations to feed into institutional relationships and future emergency responses.

DFID's strategic objectives in the tsunami response were articulated as follows:

Objective 1: Strengthen the capacity of the UN system to take on its critical role in overall coordination and to take a strong lead in critical sectors of intervention

Objective 2: Strengthen the core capacity of the UN system and specialised agencies to sustain its interventions in key sectors over the coming months

Objective 3: Offer continued support to the International Red Cross Movement, international and national NGOs where they continue to demonstrate comparative advantage and operational capacity

Objective 4: Strengthen in-country response capacity via direct logistics support to partners

7. In a response of such scale and which involves so many actors, it is inevitably difficult to draw out direct impacts uniquely attributable to DFID's contribution. Nevertheless, this exercise attempts to gauge the relative importance of each component of DFID's support in achieving these objectives. It is beyond the scope of this report to comment on the appropriateness of the objectives themselves.
8. The analysis draws on a regional tsunami-response monitoring exercise conducted by CHAD OT on behalf of DFID/CHASE during September and October 2005. The exercise involved the collation of findings relating to DFID's response both at country and regional level, continuous monitoring by field teams and a series of specific monitoring missions to India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Maldives.
9. As part of the monitoring exercise, DFID teams visited UN agency headquarters in Rome, Geneva and New York, where they sought clarification on some of the issues emerging from the DFID-supported components of each agency's tsunami response.

Context

10. The tsunami response context was complex, and in some respects unique. To understand the external environment in which the DFID response strategy was developed and executed, it is important to emphasise the following characteristics of the disaster:

- The tsunami seriously affected several countries simultaneously; All the most affected countries have strong functioning governments and their structures in the capitals were not affected. In Aceh, however, the response structures of local government were severely impacted by the tsunami;
- Two affected areas, north eastern Sri Lanka and the Aceh Province of Indonesia, were politically unstable and semi conflictual environments;
- The tsunami took place in the Christmas holiday season when many agency staff were on leave and away from their duty stations;
- The size of the humanitarian response was unprecedented; it is estimated that at the peak of the relief effort, there were in excess of 350 NGOs present in Aceh – and many of these were new actors not familiar with either emergency response or the individual country contexts. Furthermore, given the scale of funds raised agencies felt obliged to overreach and to broaden their sectoral scope. These factors had profound implications on agencies' ability and desire to coordinate;
- While well-resourced, the UN Flash appeal imposed an unrealistic timeframe on agencies for the programming of immediate emergency funding;

Extent to which DFID's strategic objectives were met in the humanitarian response

11. Four objectives were identified in the DFID Indian Ocean Earthquake/Tsunami Humanitarian Strategy, and provided the platform for the integrated activities undertaken as response measures. This section examines the extent to which the strategic objectives were met.

Objective 1: Strengthen the capacity of the UN system to take on its critical role in overall coordination and to take a strong lead in critical sectors of intervention

12. The scale of the disaster and subsequent response posed particular challenges in terms of coordination. Undoubtedly, a fully funded Flash Appeal and overwhelming public contributions were contributing factors as they allowed agencies to be relatively independent and disinclined to coordinate with other agencies. All agencies have at times shown weaknesses in one or more of the areas critical to coordination: information gathering and management, communication, planning and the establishment of direction and the organisation of effort to make best use of resources available.

13. In other sectors the situation was better, and a view across the entire response allows some general comparative comments to be made about coordination and sectoral lead.
- The UN agencies that grasped their coordination role well and implemented strong programmes are WFP and WHO (HAC);
 - OCHA's overall coordination and sector coordination by UNHCR and UNDSS was weaker;
 - DFID's strategic objective was realised to a more limited extent by FAO and UNICEF, reflecting internal weaknesses at the time;
 - Despite the variety and flexibility of DFID investments, the tsunami manifestation of what are systemic weaknesses in these organisations could not be realistically overcome by DFID support during an emergency response.
14. FAO, UNDSS and OCHA offer opportunities for engagement through institutional relationships. These three agencies have been the most frank and reflective on their performance, most appreciative of the DFID support they have received, and realistic regarding the goals they hope to achieve.
15. In this difficult environment, DFID's combined activities have contributed towards the strengthening of the UN's capacity in overall coordination and leadership in critical sectors of intervention. In this respect, this strategic objective has been partially met by combined DFID approaches, particularly where they have most accurately addressed identified areas of weakness within partner agencies.

Objective 2: Strengthen the core capacity of the UN system and specialised agencies to sustain its interventions in key sectors over the coming months

Given the varying quality of the UN's performance, this DFID objective has been partially met. Again, it is possible to make some comparative comments about agencies:

- WHO (HAC) is the agency that has probably gone the furthest in achieving this objective, in that it has managed to consolidate its position and use its core capacities to guide the next stages of intervention.
 - WFP is the strongest player in the food assistance sector, and commands respect in coordination through the sheer volume of its work, and its ability to execute the large-scale transfer of resources into the hands of beneficiaries.
 - However, WFP's ability to reassess needs and the impact of its programming over time remains a perennial issue, and although more recognised at a headquarters level, the field operations lack a convincing exit strategy and are still inclined to maintain beneficiaries numbers at a high level, at least in part in response to pressure from host governments..
16. A less encouraging picture emerges from the common services (UNHAS and UNJLC). Operational constraints stemmed from the fact that these

agencies effectively acted as 'sub-agencies' of WFP, and appeared unable to carry out strategic medium or long-term planning.

17. UNICEF initiated appropriate and effective child protection programmes both in Sri Lanka and Indonesia and seemingly in spite of the poor representation of its programmes by its headquarters in New York. However, the agency's future plans for child protection appear less well-founded, and are either overambitious, or less appropriate than the immediate intervention. In water and sanitation, UNICEF did not capitalise on existing links with government – a factor that has weakened the possibility of sustainability.
18. FAO is overcoming institutional weaknesses and is starting to take a stronger lead in the key area of recovery, using creative approaches and taking a strategic long-term approach to livelihoods restoration.
19. UNDSS has not yet translated to a field level the fundamental changes and opportunities provided by its recent evolution from its predecessor, UNSECOORD. This has translated into an ineffectual presence on the ground in the tsunami response. However, the monitoring mission visit showed that UNDSS is very aware of its own shortcomings, and has a clear and ambitious vision, and since February 2005 has been starting to implement its expanded responsibilities under a new Under- Secretary General.
20. Following the encouraging start made by UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination teams during the first three weeks of the response, coordination has suffered as a result of institutional weaknesses preventing OCHA from recruiting sufficient numbers of skilled, experienced staff. OCHA needs to do more to address its human resources problem.
21. Having become used to operating in support of weak governments or in situations where no government structure exists, OCHA admits to finding it difficult adapting its complex emergency type approach to situations such as those that prevail in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, where strong and functioning governments are in place.
22. UNHCR's coordination in the shelter sector was problematic in Indonesia, and is an area where UNHCR did not have a sufficiently clear role, capacity or added value. In Sri Lanka, coordination in the shelter sector was achieved by a team of consultants provided by DFID to UNHCR. This was no doubt a valuable contribution.

Objective 3: Offer continued support to the International Red Cross Movement, international and national NGOs where they continue to demonstrate comparative advantage and operational capacity

23. This aspect of DFID response was intended to complement DFID's other objectives within the overall UN structure of coordinated response. This objective has been partly achieved, insofar as DFID generally succeeded in offering support through those Red Cross agencies and NGOs which demonstrated comparative advantage and operational capacity.
24. The performance of NGOs has varied considerably. While it is difficult to encompass the range of performance in a summary report of this type, it is

possible to make some generalisations about the extent to which DFID was able to offer support, and the extent to which this support was effective. The NGOs occupy an important niche as implementers, ideally working in harmony with the UN, the civil authorities and the military. In this capacity, they were generally a fast-mobilising, cost-effective and transparent mechanism for the channelling of DFID resources.

25. It is important to note however, that in this response, DFID struggled to find known reliable partners able to absorb funding, following the unprecedented public response to NGO and Red Cross appeals. While programming quality was not compromised, DFID chose several NGO partners that subsequently required considerable monitoring and assistance to scale up sufficiently in order to adequately fulfil their goals in support of DFID objectives. This was particularly the case in Sri Lanka.

Objective 4: Strengthen in-country response capacity via direct logistics support to partners

26. With the exception of supporting heavy airlift for the DEC NGOs, and the provision of two landing craft for the Government of the Maldives, all DFID direct logistics support was provided for UN agencies. This objective has been achieved to the extent that the need for such support was known and expressed by the agencies, and to the extent that agencies were aware that such support is possible from DFID. With these provisos, DFID played an important role in filling strategic gaps which strengthened in-country response capacity.
27. The provision of vehicles for OCHA and UNDSS was an example of the way in which the direct and timely logistics support facilitated an immediate scale-up of operational capacity in affected countries. The response of these agencies – while compromised by the other issues highlighted in this report – was undoubtedly improved through this strategic DFID intervention.
28. DFID logistics support to WFP took the form of support to common services for the UN. This included the provision of helicopters and a fuel farm for UNHAS. These contributions have been described elsewhere in this report.

Extent to which DFID support contributed to the realisation of the strategic objectives

29. DFID employed several mechanisms to realise the four strategic objectives described above. The relative contributions of these mechanisms are explored and ranked below.

Secondment of specialist staff

30. A well-chosen and suitably qualified secondee that is strategically placed within a UN agency represents a sensitive and flexible type of support. In this respect, the secondment programme has probably been the most

cost-effective component of DFID's response, attracting a high degree of satisfaction from recipient agencies across the board. OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP have repeatedly commended the quality and expertise of staff provided by DFID to help cover critical areas of weakness. This is despite the fact that the arrangements for DFID secondments to some agencies require updating and streamlining. From the DFID perspective, there is much to be gained from secondments, particularly if it is a complementary part of a wider package that might include in-kind or grant support, for example.

We consider that this aspect of DFID support contributed very significantly to the realisation of DFID strategic objectives, insofar as it contributed to the UN's ability to coordinate, lead and sustain interventions.

Ring fenced grant:

31. DFID grants were ring fenced within UN agency appeals to maximise their impact and cover areas which may have been under funded by other donors, such as emergency assessment and coordination. Ring fencing allowed DFID to shape the response, aiming to ensure that unmet needs are covered.
32. DFID's ring-fencing was agreed with the agency concerned and tailored to fit the agency's own internal constraints and pressures.
 - This mechanism was welcomed by OCHA, by WFP and UNHCR, and by UNDSS and FAO.
 - WHO (HAC) preferred fast non-earmarked cash contributions.
 - UNICEF was the notable exception - and complained that ring fencing brought it huge problems. The review team noted that UNICEF continued accepting contributions until it was significantly over-funded for its tsunami operations. It may be challenging for UNICEF to reconcile under-expenditure against its appeal with the excess contributions. UNICEF expressed its requirement for rapidly dispersed, non-earmarked cash contributions.

In-kind and direct logistics support

33. Much of DFID in-kind support been appropriate to address gaps at critical times. In particular, the provision of airlifts and vehicles for agencies has allowed a rapid scaling up of operational capacity (UNDSS, WHO).
34. Other aspects of logistical support were less satisfactory. In particular, DFID's provision of support to UNJLC and UNHAS through WFP was problematic. It is clear that these two common services have an ambiguous relationship with WFP, which nominally acts as 'administrative host' to them. In practice, this has thrown up important practical constraints:

- Firstly, WFP, UNHAS and UNJLC were unable to provide DFID with a single 'entry point' for interfacing with these common services in spite of repeated requests on the part of DFID.
- Secondly, UNJLC was unable to develop a satisfactory regional plan – partly because it does not command respect and support within the UN family.
- Generally, the relationship of UNHAS and UNJLC with WFP calls into question the extent to which these common services are genuinely 'common'. That said, the provision of helicopter capacity to UNHAS and a cash grant to UNJLC undoubtedly contributed to the overall humanitarian effort.

On balance, however, we consider that DFID's in-kind and direct logistics support has made a significant contribution to strengthening in-country capacity, and the realisation of DFID strategic objectives.

35. For the future it is important to note that UNDSS, WHO (HAC) and WFP have ambitious plans to build their own emergency response logistics stocks, linked to the UNDPKO warehouse in Brindisi. While this is a medium term capacity-building aim, it was made clear that in the meantime, the possibility of relying on such DFID direct logistics provision for response is an important facility.

Support to the Red Cross Movement and NGOs

36. The performance of these agencies, and the impact they had on humanitarian needs, depended at least in part on the operating and coordination environment in which they found themselves - an environment heavily mediated by the UN. In this respect, DFID's support to the UN can be seen as an aspect of support to the Red Cross Movement and NGO sector, insofar as the UN creates an 'enabling environment'.
37. Regional monitoring observations point to weak overall coordination mechanisms evident in the NGO sector in most contexts (OCHA lead), and patchy sectoral coordination with particular concerns in the areas of water and sanitation (UNICEF lead) and shelter (UNHCR lead).
38. DFID interactions with its NGO partners have revealed the difficulties NGOs face in meeting the demands in time and human resources of participating in coordination. While this is partly a shortcoming of the NGOs, it also reflects weaknesses in overall coordination,
39. From the DFID perspective, the channelling of resources through NGOs and the Red Cross allowed the specific targeting of resources at sectors and geographical areas. It also allowed DFID support to bypass some of the systemic constraints inherent in the UN systems.
40. DFID's support to NGOs and the Red Cross movement comprised in-kind contributions, cash grants and airlifts for DEC members. Specifically, DFID provided financial support to the ICRC Extended Emergency Appeal for Indonesia and Sri Lanka, and to the Federation Emergency Appeal for Tsunami Affected Countries. Additional targeted DFID financial support

was provided to 25 different NGO programmes in India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

41. These aspects of DFID support have contributed to DFID's ability to support a flexible response - the underwriting of the DEC airlift, in particular, allowed the release of agencies' publicly collected funds for the more direct support of the relief response, at the discretion of the individual agencies concerned. On the other hand, the nature of DFID's grants to agencies – on the basis of specifically articulated proposals – also allowed DFID a degree of sensitivity in programming to meet emerging needs.
42. The huge public fund-raising responses in many countries has resulted in well-funded NGOs operating in affected areas; several international NGOs reportedly have budgets in excess of US\$100 million and the combined total resources available to international NGOs is estimated to be in the region of US\$1 billion.
43. These massive levels of funding are posing new challenges, not only of absorption capacity and more complex co-ordination issues, but also in terms of organisations entering into sectors for which they have no previous experience or technical capacity. Because of these new funding opportunities there is the need for more consistency and compliance with common approaches, standards and policies (i.e. do no harm, protection, guiding principles on IDPs etc.), and the need for strong UN leadership to promote these issues amongst international organisations. This is a unique situation and while most of the larger and experienced NGOs have globally respected co-ordination mechanisms, others, often smaller and less experienced have created some difficulties by working unilaterally, particularly during the relief phase
44. It appears that the experienced international actors have posed less threat to the overall co-ordination efforts than the plethora of well-intentioned but inexperienced actors that have mushroomed in response to the disaster. It is these smaller, less experienced agencies that seem to pose more problems in terms of harmonisation of the response. However, many of these smaller NGOs and actors have now withdrawn, leaving the usual NGO stakeholders, albeit in very large numbers to remain for the recovery phase. Co-ordination does, and will, remain a challenge for the coming months.
45. Support to the DEC airlifts was technically efficient and appreciated by the DEC agencies.

We consider that the mechanisms used (direct cash grants, underwriting DEC airlifts, and donations in kind) were an effective way to realise the DFID strategic objective of providing support to the Red cross Movement and NGOs.

Management of military assets and liaison with other military assets

46. DFID's role in managing UK military assets in Sri Lanka was appreciated and effective in building coordination in response. It was, however, extremely demanding on the DFID field team at a time when there were

other urgent priorities. The DFID liaison with the centralised military command for the regional response in Thailand revealed fundamental weaknesses in the capacity of OCHA Military and Civil Defence Unit to cope with the necessary demands. It has to be noted that this lesson has been identified by OCHA, there are new plans being implemented to address this issue, and at least some opportunities to strengthen the unit for future operations.

47. Due to the effort expended on this aspect of DFID support, we consider that this was a less effective means of achieving DFID strategic objectives.

Institutional Relationships¹

48. In many cases the regional monitoring process revealed that there is scope for strengthening DFID institutional relationships with UN agencies. A more effective institutional engagement would have allowed a more comprehensive understanding of the constraints facing UN agencies – this would have enhanced programming. Better-established lines of communication would have facilitated advocacy.
49. Field based DFID-UN agency relationships tended to be stronger than the institutional relationships existing between DFID and agency headquarters. An exception was the engagement with WFP, where a relationship established at headquarters level was commented on and appreciated by WFP. Although there were still field-level challenges relating to operational support within the WFP operation, the HQ-level relationship contributed towards the realisation of DFID strategic objectives. Elsewhere, the institutional relationship between DFID and UN partners sometimes missed important institutional constraints and/or indecision.
50. The relationships with FAO and UNDSS exemplify this problem; in both cases, institutional developments were not fully understood by DFID at a critical time in programming. In the case of UNDSS, these developments explain why field performance was initially weak.
51. DFID was also not sufficiently aware of the internal debate and disagreement within UNHCR regarding the establishment of a presence in Aceh Province, nor the agency's ambivalence about taking on the shelter lead. This impacted on DFID's shelter intervention in Indonesia. DFID supported UNHCR Indonesia with ring-fenced cash (highly appreciated and commented on at the time), but DFID was not aware how (as UNHCR's ability to engage was compromised) unrealistic the appeal was in terms of UNHCR's potential to respond. Ultimately, UNHCR was requested to leave the province by the Indonesian Government and consequently the DFID investment had limited overall impact on needs in this case. The delay in UNHCR getting back into Aceh has also led to a delay in DFID funds being used.

¹DFID has formal capacity building arrangements with UN agencies, separate from specific support following a disaster. These arrangements set out how DFID funds will be used against an agreed action plan.

52. The review mission also noted that some other DFID partners had not managed to spend all DFID funds according to the original timetable, due to a number of reasons including the changing situation on the ground. CHASE is already aware of this and has been following up with a number of partners
53. The challenging relief context demanded more effort from donors than usual, to encourage the humanitarian actors to engage in a coordinated and coherent response. Areas for possible advocacy at the highest level could have included:
- Making explicit the mandate of the Humanitarian Coordinator to coordinate the specialist agencies;
 - Giving OCHA a reasonable degree of financial autonomy (the agency is impractically tied to the financial administration of UNDP, despite there being a UN resolution already passed to grant it its own bank account);
 - Pressing for more genuine common UN ownership of Common Services;
 - Clarifying the position as sector leads of several specialist UN agencies. Although this is now moving towards clarity within the Inter Agency Standing Committee, there was confusion over this issue during the tsunami relief response. In September 2005 agreement was reached in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee whereby agencies have accepted responsibility for leading in key under-performing response sectors, providing coordination and working collaboratively in 'clusters' such as water and sanitation with key implementing partners to develop plans for, and implement, more effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.
54. As well as allowing a more comprehensive understanding of the constraints facing UN agencies, a closer institutional relationship with UN agencies might have given the scope for strengthened advocacy. For example, DFID could have helped bolster the difficult position of UNDSS, had there been a better dialogue over either the agency's constraints or its strategy, and had it been recognised that there was a requirement for a stronger OCHA presence for it to serve.
55. Generally, the depth of institutional relationships enjoyed by DFID with UN agencies is variable. DFID is more institutionally conversant with some agencies than with others and, within the agencies themselves, is more familiar with some departments than with others. In a complex and massive DFID response, this presented challenges to the even implementation of DFID strategy through UN partners.
56. At the broadest level, the tsunami response underlines the importance of ensuring that DFID's institutional relationships with UN partners are grounded in operational experience. This helps DFID to feed back operational observations about the effectiveness of aid delivery to shape the development of policy within UN agencies.
57. In moving ahead after the tsunami response, we should strengthen the interplay between operational intervention and policy development. As a complement to this, there is also a need to strengthen headquarters-level operational interfaces within the institutional relationships between DFID

and UN agencies. These should be well established in advance of a crisis to enable the full benefit of the DFID response to be realised.

We consider that institutional relationships, which underpin the DFID response, would have made a more significant contribution to the realisation of DFID strategic objectives if they had been more consistent.

Recommendations

Following the observation that institutional relationships are not consistent, these recommendations attempt to address operational gaps that emerged in the tsunami response, and highlight issues in which closer institutional engagement will add value in future emergency response.

The recommendations are made on an agency by agency basis.

OCHA

- DFID has continued to engage with OCHA, the United Nations Secretariat and United Nations Director General. This report recommends DFID consider the following measures:
- Engage with OCHA to address its greatest weakness, the lack of trained experienced, deployable personnel
- Continue to push for specific measures to enhance OCHA's operationality, autonomy and authority, including:
 - Advocate for the Humanitarian Coordinator to have explicit, rather than implicit, authority over the UN specialist agencies in future emergencies;
 - Advocate for action to be taken on the UN decision to allow OCHA its own bank account and administrative procedures;
 - Advocate for UN common services (especially UNHAS and UNJLC) to become closer to OCHA authority in future emergencies;
 - Advocate for the sector leads of UN specialist agencies to be respected and resourced, to give OCHA the agency capacities it needs to undertake stronger coordination down to field level;
 - Engage with OCHA to seek measures to rediscover its capacities to work in support of governments in natural disasters.

58. Issues around the DFID non-ring-fenced contribution to OCHA have been discussed within OCHA and were presented to the review team in Geneva. DFID's £10m contribution to OCHA brought authority to OCHA and its coordinating role by allowing it to disburse grants. From the programmatic perspective, this has allowed the 'slow release' of funding outside the normal DFID/CHASE time window, and has also allowed OCHA to strategically programme funds to address unfilled gaps.

59. As a pilot initiative, this mechanism has not been without challenges. OCHA had no systems in place to transfer funds to another agency, but

has now developed standard MoUs with the concerned agencies. There is also scope for strengthening OCHA's in-house capacity to assess, support, monitor or report on the cash contributions which its transfers to other agencies.

It is recommended that DFID additional capacity building support be provided for OCHA.

UNICEF:

DFID has made great investment in its relationship with UNICEF, and yet from the start of the response, this has been a difficult relationship. It is recommended that DFID take specific steps as follows:

- Make improvements in the capacity of the UNICEF Donor Liaison Department in New York, through the funding of a DFID donor relations staff position, the costs deducted from the new proposed capacity building programme;
- Consider specific options together with UNICEF on how its technical capacity can be built in water and sanitation, and how DFID could provide practical support under the proposed capacity building programme;
- Continue to make careful assessment of UNICEF's capacity to manage what is provided through DFID support.

UNHCR:

UNHCR has struggled in this response, but is keen to build its relationship with DFID. It is recommended that DFID invest in the institutional relationship through:

- Maintaining dialogue with UNHCR to be informed of how its new shelter lead is developed and resourced;
- Considering specific options with UNHCR on how its technical capacity in shelter can be built, and how DFID could support this;
- Should this include specialist staff secondments, establish a new staff secondment procedure for UNHCR;
- Continue to provide ring fenced funding to UNHCR in future responses where appropriate.

WHO:

WHO (HAC) has made great strides in a short time, and has enjoyed strong DFID support. It is recommended that the relationship be developed through:

- Ensuring early financial support in emergencies,
- Maintaining dialogue regarding WHO HAC's capacity building plan;
- Continue to provide procurement, logistical support and transport assets in response when appropriate and when this provides added value.

- Consideration of providing additional capacity building support to WHO through specific contributions to cover agreed core areas of HEAR-Net, which comprises:
 - Specialist training services (partially integrated with UNDAC);
 - Emergency roster and management of 250 trained specialists
 - Emergency stocks to be held in Brindisi

WFP:

DFID has a relatively close working relationship with WFP. It is recommended that DFID build on this in the following areas:

- Encourage and advocate for closer links between WFP and FAO Emergency Division in the areas of needs assessment, monitoring, livelihoods and economic security;
- Continue to provide ring fenced cash to appeals, considering Emergency Operations including Special Operations for UNJLC and Logistics Augmentation;
- Continue to provide skilled personnel, logistical support and transport assets in response;
- Continue dialogue to encourage better-targeted and more flexible programming, and consider providing technical expertise to the ODAN department through secondment if appropriate.

UNDSS:

It is recommended that DFID consider the case for a relationship with UNDSS, as a vehicle to:

- Assist UNDSS in promoting its new security and safety role amongst UN, Red Cross Movement and NGO partners, including NGO consortia. A UNDSS presentation to senior CHASE staff has taken place in London as a first step in the process.
- Continue to maintain open dialogue with UNDSS and once again provide MOSS-compliant vehicles and equipment in kind for emergency response if necessary, and until UNDSS build its own response capability in Brindisi;
- Pursue practical measures to build OCHA capacity (above) as UNDSS is unable to function effectively without a strong OCHA to serve;
- Consider joining the “Friends of UNDSS” donor support group
- Identify a focal point for UNDSS in CHASE/CHAD OT.

FAO:

It is recommended that DFID build a closer relationship with FAO Emergency Division, to capitalise on its role and lead in the agricultural livelihoods sector:

- Assist FAO in promoting its agricultural livelihoods sector lead amongst UN, Red Cross Movement and NGO partners;

- Consider joining the proposed “Friends of FAO TCE (Emergency Division)” donor support group;
- Encourage and advocate for closer links between FAO Emergency Division and WFP in the areas of needs assessment, monitoring and economic security;
- Continue to provide ring- fenced funding to FAO Emergency Division in future responses where appropriate;
- Identify a focal point for FAO Emergency Division in CHASE.

Acronyms

CHAD-OT	Conflict, Security and Humanitarian Department, Operations Team
CHASE	Conflict, Security and Humanitarian Department
DFID	Department for International Development
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation (UN)
FAO TCE	Food and Agricultural Organisation Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division
HEARnet	Health Emergency Action Response Network
IDPs	internally displaced people
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
MOSS	Minimum Operational Security Standards
NGO	non-governmental organisation
ODAN	World Food Programme's Emergency Needs Assessment Branch
UN	United Nations
UNDSS	United Nations Department for Safety and Security
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistics Centre
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
WFP	World Food Programme (UN)
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs