



Regional Assistance Plan for the Caribbean 2007-10

Consultation Draft

Comments on this draft are welcome and should be sent to
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REGIONAL ASSISTANCE PLAN FOR THE CARIBBEAN 2007-10 CONSULTATION DRAFT

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (Group of States)
BMCs	Borrowing Member Countries
CARICAD	Caribbean Centre for Development Administration
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CARIFORUM	Caribbean Forum
CARTAC	Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre
CCCCC	Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CDERA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency
CDM	Comprehensive Disaster Management
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CRNM	Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery
CSME	CARICOM Single Market and Economy
CSR	Comprehensive Spending Review
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEFRA	Department for the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (UK)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DFIDC	Department for International Development Caribbean (UK)
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry (UK)
EC	European Commission
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EDF	European Development Fund
EIB	European Investment Bank
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
HMG	Her Majesty's Government (UK)
HMRC	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (UK)
HR	Human resources
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDPs	International Development Partners
IMF	International Monetary Fund
M & E	Monitoring and evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MICs	Middle-income Countries
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
MTEF	Medium-term Expenditure Framework
MTF	Medium-term Socio-Economic Framework
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OECS	Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
PANCAP	Pan-Caribbean Partnership against HIV/AIDS

PPAs	Partnership Programme Agreements
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RAP	Regional Assistance Plan
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency (UK)
TA	Technical Assistance
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

REGIONAL ASSISTANCE PLAN FOR THE CARIBBEAN 2007-10

PART I – CONTEXT

B. POVERTY CONTEXT

1. The Caribbean comprises a diverse group of countries each with specific opportunities and threats. Their diversity is underlined by divergent rankings on the Human Development Index.¹
2. On the one hand, Caribbean countries share key issues. They are a group of largely mature multi-party democracies, with a wonderful natural environment, and a highly educated population. On the other hand, they are very vulnerable to natural disasters, including floods, hurricanes and earthquakes. Caribbean countries also confront a changing international trade environment which has required significant shifts in most economies away from agriculture and historic preferential trading arrangements. Their small size and limited levels of economic diversification increase the impact of these issues, as do their high levels of indebtedness.
3. The geography of the islands and the Caribbean basin has made the region attractive as a drug transshipment point and a location for a growing range of drug-related criminal offences. Social exclusion, coupled with high levels of unemployment², has provided a potential pool of labour for this criminality. Living with insecurity and in fear of violence is a core part of the experience of poverty for many in the region. Looking across the Caribbean basin there are similar social and economic challenges in Central America.

Poverty and MDGs

4. While most countries in the Caribbean are classified by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as Middle Income Countries (MICs), pockets of poverty and inequality remain a significant challenge. Here, families face food insecurity, unemployment, chronic disease, and poor access to basic services. These conditions can lead to poverty traps producing intergenerational transmission of poverty. Unfortunately, there is not adequate data in the region to estimate number of poor people in a way that can be meaningfully aggregated across countries.
5. Although the data is weak and there is a lack of regional aggregates, it is internationally agreed that the Caribbean has met or is likely to meet a number of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For example, primary enrolment ratios in the region are quite high, with net enrolment ratios of 94.7% in 2002³, and many countries have relatively high levels of secondary enrolment. There is also gender equity in primary enrolment, and girls have a

¹ For example Barbados currently ranks 31st, compared to Guyana 103rd, Jamaica 104th and Haiti 154th. Source: UNDP: "Human Development Report 2006. Beyond scarcity: power, poverty and the global water crisis." New York: UNDP, 2006.

² The 2000 youth unemployment rate for the Caribbean (excluding Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti) was 20.4%. (Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC): "The Millennium Development Goals: A Latin American and Caribbean Perspective", United Nations, 2005.)

³ Data for all Caribbean countries and territories except Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC): "The Millennium Development Goals: A Latin American and Caribbean Perspective", United Nations, 2005.

slight enrolment advantage at the secondary level (1.09), which increases significantly at the tertiary level (1.84).⁴

6. The region also has low rates of child mortality and under-5 malnutrition. For example, in the Caribbean (excluding Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic), under-five mortality was 21.8 per 1000 in 2003 and the average underweight prevalence at the end of the decade was 7.5%.⁵ However, further reductions have been elusive. Most countries in the region have relatively low rates of maternal mortality. For example Bahamas has an estimated maternal mortality ratio of 60 per 100,000 live births. Haiti is a striking exception to this trend, where maternal mortality is estimated at 680/100,000 live births.⁶

7. The HIV/AIDS epidemic continues to represent the leading cause of death among adults aged 15-44 making the Caribbean the worst affected region in the Western hemisphere. Virtually no progress has been made in closing the gap between urban and rural coverage of safe drinking water and sanitation. For example, access to safe drinking remained at 96% for urban areas versus 89% for rural areas throughout the 1990s, and access to improved sanitation increased marginally from 93% urban versus 77% rural in 1990 to 96% urban versus 79% to rural in 2002.⁷

Table 1: Key Statistics on the Caribbean

Country	Population ^a	GNI per capita ^b	HDI rank ^c	Poverty ^d	Youth literacy ^e	Under-5 mortality rate ^f	HIV prevalence ^g
Antigua & Barbuda	81,000	10,920	59	12	...
Bahamas	323,063	...	52	13	3.3%
Barbados	269,556	...	31	...	99.8	12	1.5%
Belize	291,800	3,500	95	...	84.2	39	2.5%
Cuba	11,269,400	...	50	...	100.0	7	0.1%
Dominica	72,000	3,790	68	14	...
Dominican Republic	8,894,907	2,370	94	0.8%	94.2	32	1.1%
Grenada	106,500	3,920	85	21	...
Guyana	751,218	1,010	103	64	2.4%
Haiti	8,527,777	450	154	76.0%	...	117	3.8%
Jamaica	2,657,223	3,400	104	13.3%	94.5	20	1.5%
St. Kitts & Nevis	48,000	8,210	51	21	...
St. Lucia	165,500	4,800	71	59.8%	...	14	...
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	119,051	3,590	88	22	...
Suriname	449,238	2,540	89	...	94.9	39	1.9%
Trinidad & Tobago	1,305,236	10,440	57	20.0%	99.8	20	2.6%

⁴ *ibid*

⁵ *ibid*

⁶ Source: UNICEF. "State of the World's Children 2007. "Women and children: the double dividend of gender equality". New York: UNICEF, 2006.

⁷ Data for all Caribbean countries and territories except Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC): "The Millennium Development Goals: A Latin American and Caribbean Perspective", United Nations 2005.

a Source: World Development Indicators

b Atlas method, current US\$. Source: World Development Indicators

c Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2006

d Percentage of the population below US\$2/day, purchasing power parity adjusted. Source: PovcalNet & Fafo

e Source: UNSTATS & UN-ECLAC

f Source: UNICEF (www.childinfo.org)

g Adults 15-49. Source: UNAIDS

8. Poverty in the Caribbean continues to hit women particularly hard. The high number of single female-headed households in the region means that the position of women has a significant impact on the social fabric in these countries. Despite their increased presence in the labour force, women still tend to have high unemployment rates, encounter greater barriers to entering work, earn lower wages, and perform a higher proportion of insecure, vulnerable and/or unpaid jobs. Although girls may perform better than boys in education this has not been substantively translated into women's empowerment in economic and political spheres. In addition, domestic and sexual violence against women and children remains a serious problem. Gender inequality also affects males, with boys having slightly lower enrolment rates and in some cases lower achievement records than girls in education, and limited employment opportunities. In this context, many young men are drawn to the drug trade and other crimes, which are affecting the security situation in the region.

9. In several countries indigenous and immigrant groups also face chronic poverty and destitution. For example, in Guyana, 9.2% of the population is Amerindian, and predominantly lives in the three regions of the country with the highest levels of poverty.

10. Most poor people employ coping strategies which can be positive, such as relying on family support, but also - less positively - removing children from school. Even less desirable coping strategies include the increasing levels of people trafficking linked to child labour and prostitution in the region, which are heightening the vulnerability of children and women to HIV/AIDS.

11. As the Caribbean has the highest emigration rates in the world, the movement of people plays a significant economic and social role in the region. These migration patterns are characterised by complicated flows back and forth, rather than permanent one way movements. This particularly affects skilled labour, especially in the health and education sectors. Most Caribbean countries have lost more than 50% of their tertiary educated labour force and increasing numbers of women are migrating. The Caribbean is one of the largest sources of illegal immigration into the United States. External and internal developments are giving even greater force to migration pressures, making migration within the Caribbean region an increasingly important policy area.

12. A crucial, but lesser understood component of migration and wealth in the Caribbean comes from remittances, which constitutes an estimated 10.6% of the GNI of the CARIFORUM countries, and 7.2% of the GNI of the Anglophone Caribbean alone.⁸ Remittances present significant opportunities to bolster pro-poor growth in the region and efforts are underway to channel more of them into savings and productive activities and reduce the percentage of these funds eroded by transfer costs.

⁸ Source: World Development Indicators, 2004.

The Challenge

13. The challenge is to tackle the persistent poverty and inequality in the region, and to address a range of economic, environmental and social vulnerabilities which pose significant threats to the development gains the region has made.

14. The profile of donor funds into the Caribbean has been changing in recent years. Traditional donors such as the UK and US have reduced their bilateral programmes, and non traditional donors such as Taiwan, China, India and Venezuela have increased theirs. MIC status means that the only significant flow of grant aid is from the EU, which has a number of funding instruments operating in the region including the European Development Fund, an environmental fund, and transitional assistance for banana and sugar producing countries. The MIC's in the region have access to global financial markets, although generally poor credit ratings makes access to this finance expensive for most countries.

15. As the only country in the region currently to qualify for HIPC debt relief, Guyana has qualified for concessional funding from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). However, Guyana's debt sustainability position remains precarious and, unless it can generate economic growth to repay its debt and to increase spending on poverty reducing measures, it will continue to be reliant on increasingly scarce grant funds.

Economic Vulnerabilities

16. The economic threats and opportunities facing each country vary considerably. Caribbean countries are very susceptible to external economic shocks such as high oil prices (except Trinidad and Tobago), natural disasters, and preference erosion. Where so many economies are reliant on one industry, shocks such as the impact of 9/11 on tourism for example can have devastating results. Pressures for higher government spending, particularly in the face of shocks, combined with poor economic management in some cases, has culminated in unsustainable debt levels in many countries. Seven of the ten most indebted emerging economies in the world are in the Caribbean, with the majority of debt levels being over the IMF's recommended ratio of 60% of GDP. Most countries are now tackling debt through a combination of improved fiscal management, tax reform, and debt rescheduling agreements. Though deeper and more significant growth levels are also needed.

17. Changes in global trade rules affect countries across the region, and require further diversification from agricultural goods to other industries, including in the service sector such as tourism and finance. For example, analysis suggests that in Guyana and Belize, sugar - which has had special access to European markets - should remain viable. This is not so for St Kitts and Nevis, where the government took the decision to close down the four hundred year old industry. These transitions come with the need to ease different types of economic and social impacts.

18. The region's own process of regional integration, as well as the need to be integrated into the global market, present both opportunities and challenges. The Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME), and other regional bodies such as the Caribbean Court of Justice are reflections of the region's commitment to integration. But the region's integration efforts, alongside external trade negotiations such as the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union, are politically difficult and suffer from limited implementation capacity at national and regional level.

Social Exclusion

19. Tackling poverty will also require tackling the underlying causes of social exclusion in the region. In some countries in the region, people face social exclusion because of their race or ethnicity. This affects various groups, including indigenous peoples. Stigma and discrimination – for example because of HIV/AIDS - and physical barriers to the inclusion of People With Disabilities, are present throughout the region. Poor attendance and educational attainment at school among some boys, combined with limited opportunities for employment, mean the region faces a growing problem of young alienated men. In Guyana, ethnicity is aligned with political participation, leading some groups to feel excluded from the political process or from holding government accountable. In Jamaica, many residents of poor urban communities are excluded from access to adequate public services and labour market opportunities due to high levels of violence in their midst; criminal control of local governance structures; and the stigma they face from other sections of society.

Natural Disasters and Climate Change

20. The Caribbean is very prone to natural disasters, with six countries among the world's 10 most disaster prone countries in the world. Because of the small size of most Caribbean countries, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, and floods can, and do, cause catastrophic impacts across the entire social, economic and environmental fabric of a country, and can derail progress on the MDGs. As elsewhere the poor, women, and the marginalised are worst affected. The IMF has estimated that total economic damage to Grenada following Hurricane Ivan was in excess of 200% of GDP. Comparative figures for the impact of Hurricane Katrina on America's GDP and the Asian Tsunami on Indonesia's GDP were approximately 2%.

21. Climate change has intensified the risk of sea-level rise and increased the intensity and volatility of weather patterns, so that natural hazards are becoming increasingly frequent. The Caribbean islands are particularly threatened because of the high concentration of development along their coastlines, with more than half the population of the Caribbean living within 1.5 km of the shore. This combination of climate change and poor planning means that appropriate mitigation and adaptation measures will need to be put in place.

Governance, Crime, and Insecurity

22. Most countries in the Caribbean are mature and functioning multi-party democracies. However, the systems for distributing power, the rules for exercising power and the allocation of resources, and the mechanisms for ensuring accountability and oversight are sometimes weak, causing many people to feel excluded from the political process. In some countries there are worrying signs of ethnically based political parties and in others of infiltration of the state by organised crime.

23. Compared to other regions, civil society engagement in political processes is under-developed. The reasons for this vary from capacity weaknesses to a reluctance to participate in Government-led processes. In some cases, capacity issues limit the scope for engagement and some civil society organisations clearly prefer to work through the media or the private sector rather than engaging directly with government. Further, questions of legitimacy and suspicion over the motivation of civil society organisations may undermine the basis for civil

society involvement in social action on key issues such as the performance of the police and judiciary, or on the quality of service delivery.

24. Consequently, systems that enable citizens to participate in making the decisions that affect their lives, and hold their governments to account need to be further developed at both the national and local levels. These should also help shape reforms that improve service delivery to the poorest, and tackle corruption and mismanagement of public resources.

25. Crime and insecurity are growing problems in the Caribbean and the impact of violent crime hits the poor worst. The rate of violent crime is already extremely high in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago, and it is on the increase in other countries in the region. The World Bank has estimated that the direct cost of crime to the Jamaican economy is 3.7% of GDP, and the indirect cost may be over 14%. The region is a major trans-shipment route for the drug-producing regions of South America, with the proceeds used to corrupt security agencies and other public institutions, and to purchase illegal weapons. These in turn increase crime rates, and undermine social stability. In some countries there are clear links between the political alienation of the poor, the lack of governance accountability, and a growing tendency towards violence.

Poverty Reduction Strategies

Regional Overview

26. Almost all the countries in the region have produced Country Poverty Assessments. Many have a national poverty reduction strategy, some of these accompanying formal programmes with the IMF such as in Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, and Haiti. However, few countries are implementing coordinated poverty strategies linked to budgetary allocations. Weak capacity in the collection and analysis of social statistics undermines the quality of planning and results-based management tools, and severely limits the scope for sound monitoring and evaluation. Tools such as poverty and social impact assessments are under-utilised, removing a possible channel of communication for policy-makers and a point of engagement for citizens

Jamaica

27. Jamaica's current overarching development strategy is articulated through its Medium-Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework (MTF). This includes a monitoring framework with annual targets and indicators in seven thematic areas, namely education, health, national security, justice, environment, macro-economy and poverty. DFID support has helped develop institutional arrangements bringing together Government, civil society private sector and International Development Partners (IDP's) to monitor progress and agree future directions. All Jamaica's IDP's have committed to aligning their support behind the MTF and some use the indicators as triggers to release funds (the EU budget support and DFID debt relief).

28. Implementing these arrangements has been challenging for the Government of Jamaica, since it has required new ways of working that focus on planning for results and joined up working across Departments. Now the MTF is becoming increasingly central to strategic planning and prioritisation across Government and linkages to budgetary processes are progressively strengthening. A new longer-term planning process is underway and the

Government proposes to use the MTF to provide the medium term targets to track progress towards the long term goals.

29. Assessed against DFID's criteria for a comprehensive poverty and development strategy the MTF is country driven, partnership oriented and results oriented. With continued support, there is potential for the MTF to meet the remaining criteria (long-term perspective, comprehensive, prioritised) over the lifetime of the RAP.

Guyana

30. Guyana's first Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) was developed in 2001 and became at the time the theoretical overall framework for sector strategies and initially the focus of partners' contributions around the Government's poverty-reduction priorities. The EC uses indicators from the 2001 PRSP for its budget support programme in Guyana.

31. The 2001 PRSP had four main goals: (i) sustained economic expansion within the context of a deepening participatory democracy; (ii) access to social services including education, health, water and housing ; and (iii) strengthening, and where necessary, expansion of social safety nets. Although the 2001 PRSP was developed using good practice principles at the time and welcomed – by all donors - as a framework strategy for poverty reduction, it has not evolved into the central document for the strategic planning, prioritisation and sequencing of the Government's poverty reduction activities. Neither has it led to establishing linkages with the budgetary process or creating vital tools such as a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).

32. The Government is in the process of developing a new PRSP and it has been suggested that it will continue to use the same structure as the 2001 PRSP. The new 2007-2010 PRSP will benefit from current poverty data and a good statistical analysis. The challenge remains for it to be better prioritised and results-oriented. Also, we hope to see stronger monitoring and evaluation systems developed to inform evidence-based budgeting and delivery.

Our focus

33. With this RAP, we will continue our move towards a more regional perspective for our assistance. Given the nature and scale of the development challenges in Guyana and Jamaica, we will retain a bilateral focus to our assistance in those countries.

C - RISK ANALYSIS

Table 2 – Risk Analysis

	Risk	Impact	Significance	Mitigation
			Probability	
External	Capacity Constraints in Partner Governments, Regional Organisations and International Organisations	Cut-backs or weak capacity could jeopardise jointly-funded activities and impair harmonisation efforts. Weak M&E and planning in Guyana could see the PRSP marginalised from policy making and budgetary allocations.	Medium Medium	Realistic analysis of institutional capacity of partners built into programme design . Capacity building where necessary. Remain vocal in influencing others to actively engage in this issue
	Changes in Govt Priorities and/or Leadership	Loss of key contacts and/or loss of interest in previously shared development objectives. Resources not spent where previously agreed. Particular risk to Jamaica's MTF, given impending elections	Medium Medium	Regular dialogue with Governments in Jamaica and Guyana. HMG dialogue with opposition. Ensuring Government ownership and broad stakeholder consultation on planned policies and activities.
	Ineffective/Weak design of National Poverty Reduction Strategies	The poor continue to be marginalised. Resources are not spent on poverty reduction or do not achieve desired outcomes.	High Medium	Activities to strengthen all aspects of national poverty reduction strategies (consultation, prioritisation monitoring and evaluation, social statistics public financial management etc) and to build public demand for them.
Uncontrollable	Political and Social Instability	An increase in crime and insecurity in the region , could threaten progress. In Haiti there are also implications of regional migration and the spread of HIV/AIDS.	High Medium	Working with others, especially rest of HMG , to promote safety, security and access to justice through cross-Whitehall working. Working with the CDB on support to Haiti. Seek to better understand the role of the Diaspora in influencing political and social change. DFID Placement in Haiti to work on Harmonisation and DRR.
	Natural Disasters	Economic, social, political and environmental costs, poor worse affected. Undermine development progress and divert resources.	High High	Participation in disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation activities.

	Risk	Impact	Significance Probability	Mitigation
	Macroeconomic Stability not maintained	Restrict resources going to planned poverty reduction initiatives.	High Medium	Engagement with Governments, the Regional Development Banks and international Finance Institutions.
Innovative	Move from National to Regional partnerships ignores National delivery	DFID funds may not be spent as effectively to reach National programmes as may be desired.	High Medium	Robust monitoring and policy dialogue incorporated in the design and implementation of new partnership arrangements with clear strategies to ensure impact at National level.
Controllable	HR skills and expertise not aligned to requirements for programme delivery	Slow delivery of programmes and achievement of objectives.	Medium Medium	Tighten focus of our programme Be more rigorous in assessing priorities.

D. WHAT DFIDC HAS LEARNT

34. Key lessons for this new Regional Assistance Plan (RAP) have emerged from our own experiences and from a recent independent evaluation of DFID's assistance to the region between 2000 and 2005. We have learnt that:

Programme Management and Effectiveness

- implementing a regional approach to our assistance has added value to the region's integration process, but success is limited by the slow progress of integration itself. It is difficult to promote change at a regional level in the absence of strong political and popular commitment to integration, and without strong links between regional institutions and their constituents.
- progress through a regional approach requires capacity at both the national and regional levels. DFID need not be working at both levels, but we do need to ensure that through working with others the appropriate linkages are made.
- we need to narrow the scope and size of our programme in order to match our available human and financial resources and to maximise effectiveness. We have experienced mixed results on programme effectiveness where staff have been spread too thinly.
- we cannot effectively tackle cross-cutting issues such as gender, HIV and AIDS and disaster risk reduction without having a dedicated mini-plan and resources.
- we need to be more realistic/less ambitious in our programme design, and to better integrate a results focus into our work. It was easier previously to identify clear benefits at the country level in our bilateral sector-based projects, but this has become more difficult as we have made the transition to working regionally and to more policy engagement. We will focus on improving our monitoring systems appropriately, especially for smaller interventions.

Working with Others

- there is added value in complementing our country and regional expertise with those of DFID departments in the UK, and of other government departments in the UK and in the region. We know that there is scope for us to utilise these networks more.
- there is great value in close and co-ordinated work with other UK Government Departments on issues of common interest such as trade, security, disaster risk reduction and humanitarian response, and EC effectiveness. We have been a driving force behind the development of one of the first single HMG joint country strategies – the Jamaica Forward Strategy.
- in working with multilaterals, we need to engage at an early stage for maximum effectiveness, and we need to devote significant staff time and skills to get results. We are most effective when we work together in-country, at headquarters and on the multilateral boards, and our country presence is important in building the necessary relationships and in sourcing critical information.

- Our ability to be opportunistic, strategic, and responsive, and use relatively small amounts of money for pilots, innovation or filling gaps is key in facilitating effective engagement with multilaterals and other development partners to promote harmonisation and leverage funds.

Internal organisation

- we need to promote greater coherence between our bilateral and regional plans and to improve how we work as a team across our three sites in order to maximise the synergies from our regional and country-level engagement.
- in-country presence in Guyana and Jamaica since 2003 has added value to our work in those countries. Particularly so in building strong platforms for policy engagement with Government, and harmonisation work with other international development partners.

PART II – UK PARTNERSHIP PLANS OVER RAP PERIOD

E – UK AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

Aid Context

35. As a primarily middle-income region, the Caribbean has had declining aid flows in recent years. The region's relatively high debt profile has also limited the utility of official loan funding. The main multilateral donors are the EC, the CDB, the World Bank and the IDB. The region is also well served by UN agencies. There are a small number of traditional bilateral actors, the most important being CIDA, USAID, and DFID. The EC is the single largest grant donor to the Caribbean by far.

36. Increasingly - as DFID did with its 2004-2007 RAP - development partners are implementing regional approaches to replace or complement country-programming. For example, the next phase of European Development Fund assistance has shifted the weight of allocations in the Caribbean towards the regional programme and away from the national programmes.

37. Making the best and most effective use of the limited grant resources available is therefore, of paramount importance, particularly where there are no comprehensive poverty reduction or development plans. For this reason we are actively engaged across the region in enhancing EC effectiveness and supporting harmonisation.

38. The total figure for all the UK's bilateral assistance⁹ to the Caribbean from 2000-2005 is £283.7m. Our contribution to the Caribbean through our support to multilateral institutions and international organisations is twice as much again [TBC].

Partners for Poverty Reduction

Caribbean Regional Institutions

39. In describing the Caribbean's poverty context and development challenges we mentioned their small size and limited levels of economic diversification. We also noted the opportunities and challenges presented by the region's process of integration. The logic of DFID's regional perspective suggests that we should forge strong partnerships with those regional institutions mandated to take forward Caribbean integration, as a way of supporting the region's poverty reduction and development agenda. The biggest of these institutions is the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM)¹⁰, with a secretariat based in Guyana; the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) is a sub-regional grouping of seven countries, with a secretariat based in St Lucia.

40. However, progress on regional integration has not yet moved to a point where Caribbean countries have fully realised the benefits of working together at the sub-regional or regional level on the region's main development challenges and in other areas where deeper integration could

⁹ This includes all technical co-operation, financial aid, grants, humanitarian assistance and debt relief.

¹⁰ CARICOM's membership comprises: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Associate members: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands

help address key vulnerabilities, and facilitate the region's integration into the global economy. At the same time, the secretariats remain institutionally weak, lacking the legal competence and human capacity to implement across their memberships at national level, decisions taken by Heads of State and Government at regional or sub-regional level.

41. Although we do not core fund either of the regional secretariats, we have found working with units and specialised agencies in targeted ways in areas of our particular interest and comparative advantage, an effective delivery mechanism for our support. All but one of our regional institutional partnerships are with agencies or organs of CARICOM¹¹ located across the region. CARIFORUM¹² is the regional grouping that interfaces with the European Union. As working with the European Union is a priority for the Caribbean programme, we have decided to use CARIFORUM to define the outer limits of the geographical focus of this RAP. We have also committed to dedicating advisory resources based in Guyana (close to CARICOM/CARIFORUM Secretariat and to the EU Delegation responsible for Europe's regional programme in the Caribbean) to the regional integration and competitiveness agenda.

Europe

42. Europe is the largest grant donor in the Caribbean providing support at both national and regional levels through a range of instruments including EDF funds and transitional assistance for bananas and sugar. Despite the large volumes of assistance provided and the longstanding partnership between the EU and the Caribbean, the slow disbursement of European funds – due to complex procedures and weak capacity both in Delegations and national governments – has led to a poor reputation for the EU in the region. Changes in the way the Commission operates have begun to address the disbursement issue, for example by moving to multi-annual programming, and the increased use of budget support.

43. The negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and ACP also impact heavily on the EU's partnership and development agenda. EPAs are designed to be tools for development and DFID policy is to ensure that this is the case. DFID is engaged in a broader partnership to improve the developmental effectiveness of the European Investment Bank (EIB), which plays a developmental role in all ACP countries through its ACP Investment Facility. This is intended to support private sector development, and could be an important catalyst for new growth in the Caribbean. The EIB has recently signalled its interest in developing its ongoing relationship with the Caribbean Development Bank to one of full membership status. It has also opened a regional office in the Caribbean to bring it closer to its clients and to strengthen its partnerships with the region.

44. DFID is the only EU member state development agency present in the countries of the English-speaking Caribbean, and consistent with the UK's commitment in the third development White Paper (2006), DFID will work with the EC to improve the effectiveness of its aid in the region, and to ensure that its global policies and partnerships are developmentally beneficial.

The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)

45. The CDB is a key regional development partner. Under its current Strategic Plan, the CDB is currently introducing a range of instruments to help its borrowing member countries

¹¹ For example, the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre in Belize, or the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery in Barbados.

¹² CARICOM minus Montserrat, plus the Dominican Republic.

(BMCs) respond to both the development-related challenges and opportunities they face. The CDB delivers community-level assistance through its Basic Needs Trust Fund, funded through its soft lending window – the Special Development Fund (SDF).

46. The UK is a member of the CDB and alongside Canada, is the largest non-regional shareholder, and one of the largest contributors to the Bank's concessional lending arm. This gives the UK significant leverage to support the Bank in its operations and delivery of its mandate. In the lifetime of this RAP, the Bank will face a significant challenge in extending its services to the first non-Commonwealth member of the Bank, Haiti. Haiti is also by far the poorest and most populous of the Bank's members, with deeper poverty and instability dynamics than the Bank has ever faced. In order to deliver quality services not only to Haiti but to all its members, we will work with the Bank to improve its development effectiveness through supporting further internal and organisational reform, and greater adherence to fulfillment of the Paris harmonisation agenda.

Other donor partners

47. A small number of traditional bilateral and multilateral development partners are engaged in key policy areas throughout the region, working at both the national and regional levels. Focus areas include: improving social statistics, disaster mitigation and risk reduction, HIV/AIDS, and private sector development and competitiveness. However more work needs to be done to strengthen donor coordination and adherence to the principles of the Paris Declaration. Achieving this goal is further complicated by the increasing levels of assistance being provided by new and non-traditional donors such as China, Taiwan, and Venezuela.

Other UK Departments

48. Many UK Government Departments are actively engaged in the Caribbean in areas that overlap with DFID's interests. These include the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), and Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC). Many others, including the British Council and the Department for the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), lead on or have an interest in issues of relevance to the Caribbean. For example, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is the UK Government's lead Department on trade issues which are now negotiated on a EU-wide basis.

Comparative Advantage

49. Drawing upon the evaluation of our programme from 2000-2005, and our own analysis and consultations, we have concluded that DFID Caribbean's comparative advantage lies in:

- Our ability to provide high-quality technical analysis and advice through our staff and TA, especially in the areas of social policy and governance
- Our ability to be fast, responsive, and flexible in deploying small amounts of money to play a catalytic role and leverage bigger funding streams.
- Our knowledge of donor harmonisation and influencing and our country-level capacity in this area.
- Our clear and strong focus on poverty outcomes.

- Our strong and close relationships with partner Governments and organisations in the region which provide an entry point on difficult and sensitive issues such as security and governance.
- Our ability to work as part of HMG, benefiting from relationships and knowledge of other government departments and bringing development expertise and a longer-term perspective to HMG's work
- Our ability to engage on trade issues given our political position and influence as an EU Member State and our long-standing relationship as a development partner in the Caribbean
- Our ability to work across the multilateral system through central DFID departments and our representation at the institutions in Brussels, Washington and in the region.
- The expertise we have developed in certain sectors, for example security and development

DFID's RAP 2007-2010

Geographical Focus

50. Through our regional approach and our development partnerships with regional and international institutions, we will continue to deliver assistance to CARIFORUM countries and to the region. Given the nature and scale of the development challenges in Guyana and Jamaica, we will continue to deliver bilateral programmes in those two countries. We will support Haiti's poverty and disaster risk reduction priorities, and its re-integration to the region, through the multilateral, regional and international organisations working there, including through our Partnership Programme Agreements (PPAs) with international NGOs. Over the course of implementation of this RAP, DFID Caribbean is committed to working more closely with DFID Central America. We will collaborate on a Joint Working Action Plan that will include lesson learning, selected joint activities, and the exploration of the opportunity and feasibility of a future merger.

51. In order to maintain an effective and well-managed programme in these areas, we will have to drop or do less in other areas. Therefore, we will not engage directly in those CARIFORUM countries where we do not have a focus or history, such as the Dominican Republic, Cuba, or Suriname. For those CARICOM countries where we have not had active programmes for some years – e.g. Antigua and Barbuda and the Bahamas - we will only keep a watching brief through a regional partnerships or EC lens.

Objectives

52. Our overarching goal is to assist the Caribbean region in achieving and maintaining sustainable reductions in poverty, and in combating social exclusion and inequality, in line with regional priorities and the MDGs.

53. We have analysed the development context in the Caribbean and mapped out what other donors, UK Government Departments, regional and civil society organisations, are doing in the region. We have reviewed the objectives of our last RAP¹³, considered the findings of the recent evaluation, and our available human and financial resources. Based on this, we have

¹³ In the 2004 RAP, we committed to: Working for improved aid effectiveness; Strengthening the capacity of regional institutions to meet global challenges including economic stabilisation, trade, HIV/AIDS, crime and violence; and Effective delivery of poverty strategies in Guyana and Jamaica.

decided to use our comparative advantage to focus on the following 3 objectives over the period 2007-2010:

- 1) **To strengthen regional capacity to address vulnerabilities.**
- 2) **To support evidence-based, inclusive and poverty-focussed policy processes and frameworks.**
- 3) **To promote safety, security and access to justice.**

54. For all these objectives, we will actively work to promote greater co-ordination of all actors, help unblock funding, and promote more effective use of donor funds, through our participation in regional mechanisms and our shareholding membership of multilateral and international organisations.

55. We see intensifying our partnership with the EC as an important vehicle for achieving these objectives.

Objective 1: Strengthening regional capacity to address vulnerabilities.

56. Working with the leading regional institutions, DFIDC will help strengthen the region's capacity to address its vulnerabilities to HIV and AIDS; natural disasters and climate change; and economic shocks.

57. We will work to strengthen the regional institutional architecture to combat stigma and discrimination around HIV and AIDS which is a key driver of the epidemic. We will work closely with the Pan-Caribbean Partnership against HIV and AIDS to ensure that appropriate structures are put in place to address the issue both nationally and regionally.

58. DFID will also work to strengthen the Caribbean Disaster Management Framework. We will build on the significant progress we have made through our policy engagement in the UN-chaired Eastern Caribbean Donor Group and support CDERA to implement the Framework, which includes institutional support for CDM implementation at regional and national levels, an effective knowledge management mechanism, national mainstreaming of DRR into key sectors and sharing and building community resilience to mitigate and respond to the adverse effects of climate change and disasters. We will engage more actively with the Western Caribbean Donor Group, and with colleagues on the Caribbean rim of Central America. We will also encourage mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction in the wider regional and national planning and budgeting processes in which we are engaged.

59. Drawing on the UK's global leadership role on the issue, we will support the Caribbean's priorities for adaptation to climate change by developing a single joint HMG strategy for the region which will include working with and through the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre .

60. In terms of economic vulnerability, DFID will help the region to maximise the opportunities for growth through improved regional economic integration and building capacity for better trade analysis and negotiation at regional and international levels.

61. We will work with the EC to help CARICOM strengthen the institutions for regional economic integration. We will dedicate an advisory resource to this work based in our office in Guyana.

62. We will complement this regionalisation work, with continued policy engagement to promote developmentally-beneficial results from the multilateral trade arrangements, including the EPAs. In doing this, we will use our unique role as a trusted partner to the Caribbean and an EU Member State, and our significant technical expertise built up around the banana and sugar transitions.

Objective 2: Promoting evidence-based, inclusive and poverty-focussed policy processes and frameworks

63. We will strengthen the pro-poor focus of partner institutions working to improve economic performance and service delivery in the region, through policy engagement, capacity-building and practical work in the areas of social policy and analysis, and social statistics.

64. At the national level, we will focus on strengthening the PRS in Guyana and medium term framework in Jamaica, with particular emphasis on promoting participation (including civil society and the private sector); enhancing monitoring and evaluation systems, and strengthening links to budgets.

65. In Jamaica, the key DFID priorities for the MTF going forward are to support:

- finalisation of the monitoring framework, ensuring that it fully integrates poverty and gender and that the indicators are useful and effective in facilitating measurement.
- stronger linkages with the budgetary process.
- continued linkage with the new long-term development plan.
- continued alignment of HMG and all international development partners behind an increasingly prioritised MTF, even when this entails re-thinking programmes.

66. In Guyana key DFID priorities for the PRSP going forward are to support:

- continuous joint engagement by all partners in Guyana to achieve a good quality country-owned PRSP for 2007.
- a statistical system/framework for Guyana with a robust M&E system.
- stronger linkages with the budgetary process and the formulation of an MTEF. strengthened delivery of strategies linked to the achievement of the PRSP indicators, particularly the national competitiveness strategy and sugar sector reform.

67. In this way, we will help build broader country ownership of the process and we will contribute to meaningful and practical frameworks for poverty reduction, which can guide government budgetary allocations and donor support.

Objective 3: Promoting Safety, Security and Access to Justice

68. Crime and insecurity is the number one concern of the citizens of many countries in the Caribbean. It is also the top priority of HMG in the Caribbean and many UK government departments are actively engaged in providing support across the region to address the problem. DFID will intensify its work on safety, security, and access to justice in the Caribbean over the RAP period. With other UK government departments, we will take forward the

implementation of the cross-Whitehall Jamaica Forward Strategy and the joint security sector reform programme in Guyana.

69. We will work to integrate a poverty and development focus into the UK's support for security reform in the region. We will also work with other development partners to support community-level work to address security issues and to build social cohesion.

70. We will ensure that all our support to security and development addresses the security priorities of the poor and marginalised, which include tackling sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence.

Cross-Cutting themes

71. DFID is committed to **mainstreaming gender** in all our programmes. In the Caribbean, we will actively promote gender equality, and identify and address gender issues in all of our work. This will include: promoting appropriate gender analysis across our focus areas; ensuring inclusive processes give adequate voice to men and women; supporting the collection of gender-disaggregated statistics; and working to promote gender-equitable practices within the organisations we work with.

72. We are also committed to mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and HIV and AIDS in all our programming. In order to do this effectively, we will underpin this RAP with mini-strategies for mainstreaming gender, disaster risk reduction, and HIV and AIDS. These mini-strategies will include monitorable targets and indicators for success. We will allocate resources to cover the required training, analysis, and other activities inviting partners to participate whenever possible.

Strategic Prioritisation and Design

73. Our proposed programme focuses our efforts for maximum impact and effectiveness, taking into account our financial envelope, the evaluation of our 2000-2005 assistance, and the need to align staffing numbers and skills behind programme priorities. We have therefore defined our future areas of work more narrowly, focussing on filling gaps in areas where DFID has skills and capacity, and where we can demonstrably add value. For example, in the broad area of governance and economic management, we are focussing on providing support for the promotion of pro-poor, inclusive and evidence-based regional and national frameworks, rather than a number of specific sector-based initiatives or projects.

74. During the life of the 2004-7 RAP, we have completed all our country level programmes and projects in the Eastern Caribbean. In many instances, further progress should be facilitated through the country programming of our regional partners such as CARICAD and CARTAC. Therefore, aside from our continuing bilateral programmes in Guyana and Jamaica, we can now fully focus our efforts on a regional perspective, which should support the work of the EC and other key partners at both country and regional level.

75. We will no longer work directly in the areas where there are no obvious gaps in donor support or where we do not have a comparative advantage. Let us take **debt** as an example. Several donors and development partners are heavily engaged in providing technical and or financial assistance to assist countries reduce and manage their unsustainable debt burdens. This includes other bilaterals, and several regional organisations – e.g. CDB, IDB, and

CARTAC - to whom we provide support, as well as the International Financial Institutions. Our role will be to provide support for any necessary poverty or social impact analysis, and to use our presence across the international system to encourage harmonisation and co-ordination of this support.

76. Unless a decision is taken to exit from a programme or partnership, we will continue to honour our commitments to partners under existing programmes that do not fall under our new agenda. Where we will be exiting from a particular area of work, we will be alive to the need to develop and implement effective exit strategies that promote the sustainability of impacts and do not leave gaps. This can be achieved through promoting new or different engagement by relevant regional institutions, or other international and/or multilateral partners.

77. We have sought to incorporate most of the major risks to poverty reduction in our programme objectives themselves, and provide mitigating actions in our proposed ways of working. We intend to ensure that our regional partners have an anti-corruption lens on their work to strengthen public systems and service delivery. We will also work to strengthen Parliamentary oversight capacity and mechanisms and to enhance the ability of civil society to hold governments and public agencies to account. Anti-corruption outcomes will be specific targets in any police/security sector reform programmes in Guyana and/or Jamaica. Other UK Departments are heavily involved in working with Caribbean governments and international partners on issues such as compliance with the principles of the Financial Action Task Force on money-laundering, and in the development of anti-proceeds of crime legislation.

Modalities and Ways of Working

78. Across all of our objectives, we will emphasise working with and through others, and promoting greater co-ordination and effectiveness of all aid. We will reduce the number of projects that we implement.

79. We will focus our modalities of assistance over this RAP period on:

- core funding or contributions to regional institutions, government agencies and multi-donor programmes;
- technical assistance;
- and policy engagement by DFID staff.

80. We believe core funding of regional institutions will encourage greater ownership and sustainability, and reduce transaction costs on both sides. We will continue to lead efforts with other development partners to encourage this modality of support for regional organisations in keeping with the Paris Declaration and efforts on harmonisation.

81. We will continue to provide technical assistance support, particularly in areas where there is limited regional capacity, for example in poverty and social impact analysis. We will actively seek to utilise regional technical assistance sources more, in order to promote sustainability.

82. Our policy engagement will allow us to take forward the advocacy and harmonisation agenda that we have set in our areas of focus with our partners, and will build upon the strength of the relationships and technical expertise we have built up.

Key Partners

83. As with the 2004-7 RAP, our main partners will be:

- the regional institutions in our areas of focus, namely the PANCAP, CRNM, CDB, CARTAC, CARICAD, CDERA, CCCCC;
- the Governments of Guyana and Jamaica;
- our international development partners, EC, the World Bank, the IDB and the UN;
- and other UK Departments.

84. Our partnership with the EC will be given the highest priority among the multilaterals in light of its extensive regional coverage, the volume of grant funding available, the UK's position as a Member State, and DFID's corporate priorities on enhancing multilateral effectiveness.

85. We will not core fund the CARICOM or OECS Secretariats as a number of other development partners such as the EC, IDB and CIDA are already doing so. All bar one (CARTAC) of our regional partner institutions are CARICOM agencies.

86. We will also continue to be heavily engaged with helping the CDB achieve its mission of being the "leading catalyst for development resources into the region, working in an efficient, responsive and collaborative manner with [our] BMCs and other development partners, towards the systematic reduction of poverty ...through social and economic development". The UK will continue to be active through the CDB Board, working closely with other Members to help improve the effectiveness of the Bank. We will also support the CDB through our institutional partnership framework, and will continue to explore opportunities for synergies between the Bank's activities and the focus areas and partnerships of this RAP.

87. We will work closely with other UK Government Departments active in the region (including FCO, DEFRA, DTI, SOCA and the Metropolitan Police).

88. We will work to promote the voice and participation of civil society in programme design and monitoring and evaluation, in the context of our specific objectives and partnerships.

Information and Accountability

89. We have recognised that we need to be more systematic in our reporting to improve our effectiveness and to provide an accountability channel with our partners. We will therefore seek to involve partners, including civil society, in the monitoring and evaluation of our programmes, and aim to report annually on the implementation of our regional plan. As far as possible, we will increase the opportunities for partners across programmes to learn from each other by sharing information and providing forums for discussion.

F – RESOURCES

90. Resources for the future are subject to the outcome of the UK Government's ongoing Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) process for the FYs 2008/9 – 2010/11. We will work within the UK Government's commitment to reduce administration costs by at least 5% per year over the 2007-10 CSR period.

Statistical Annex

Caribbean regional profile				
	early 1990s	2000-6		
DFID assessment of likelihood of reaching MDG				
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger <i>2015 target = halve 1990 \$1/day poverty and malnutrition targets</i>				
Population below \$1/day (%)	5.2	0.6	2001	PovcalNet
Population below \$2/day (%)	21.3	4.7	2001	PovcalNet
Prevalence of child malnutrition (underweight, % of children under 5)	8.8	7.5	1995-02	ECLAC 2005
Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (%)	15	10	2000-2	ECLAC 2005
2. Achieve universal primary education <i>2015 target = net enrollment to 100</i>				
Net enrollment ratio in primary education (% of relevant age group)	91.5	94.7	2002	ECLAC 2005
Youth literacy rates (% ages 15-24)	95.1	96.6	2000-4	ECLAC 2005
3. Promote gender equality <i>2015 target = education ratio to 100</i>				
Ratio of girls to boys in primary education	0.99	1.00	2002	ECLAC 2005
Ratio of girls to boys in secondary education	1.08	1.09	2002	ECLAC 2005
Ratio of young literate females to males	...	1.03	2002	ECLAC 2005
Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector	45.3	41.7	2001	ECLAC 2005
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments	12	16	2003	ECLAC 2005
4. Reduce child mortality <i>2015 target = reduce 1990 under-5 mortality by two thirds</i>				
Under-5 mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	...	21.8	2003	ECLAC 2005
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	22.4	16.2	2003	ECLAC 2005
Immunisation, measles (% of 1-year olds)	75	88	2002	ECLAC 2005
5. Improve maternal health <i>2015 target = reduce 1990 maternal mortality by three quarters</i>				
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	...	113	2000	ECLAC 2005
Births attended by skilled health personnel (%)	...	94	2000	ECLAC 2005
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases <i>2015 target = halt and begin to reverse</i>				
HIV prevalence, female (% ages 15-24)	...	2	2004	ECLAC 2005
Malaria prevalence (per 100,000 population)	...	1421	2000	ECLAC 2005
Tuberculosis prevalence (per 100,000 population)	...	29	2002	ECLAC 2005
Tuberculosis death rates (per 100,000 population)	...	3	2002	ECLAC 2005
7. Ensure environmental sustainability <i>2015 target = various</i>				
Forest area (% of total land area)	45.9	42.1	2000	ECLAC 2005
CO2 emissions (metric ton per 1000 population)	225	46	2000	ECLAC 2005
Improved water source (urban, % population)	96	96	2002	ECLAC 2005
Improved water source (rural, % population)	89	89	2002	ECLAC 2005
Improved sanitation (urban, % population)	93	95	2002	ECLAC 2005
Improved sanitation (rural, % population)	77	79	2002	ECLAC 2005
Population living in slums (%)	14	14	2001	ECLAC 2005
8. Develop a global partnership for development				
Youth unemployment rate (% of economically active, 15-24 years)	31.3	20.4	2000	ECLAC 2005
Telephones, fixed line and mobile subscribers (per 1000 people)	18.1	55.2	2002	ECLAC 2005
Personal computers (per 100 population)	6.3	8.7	2002	ECLAC 2005
Internet users (per 100 population)	0.4	16.7	2002	ECLAC 2005

Statistical Annex

General Indicators	CARIFORUM				
	Total*	Anglophone	(range)		
Population	24.0 m	6.2 m	(0.05-2.6)	2005	WDI
Gross National Income (\$ Atlas method)	60.8 bn	34.7 bn	(0.3-13.6)	2005	WDI + UNICEF
Gross National Income per capita (\$ Atlas method)	2527	5618	(1010-14920)	2005	WDI + UNICEF
Aid (% of GNI)	0.9	0.3	(0.0-5.1)	2005	DAC
External debt (% of GNI)	45.3**	51.9**	(0.25-1.74)	2005	WDI
Remittances (% of GNI)	10.6	7.2	(0.7-18.6)	2004	WDI
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)	4.9	6.7	(5.2-14.3)	2005	UNCTAD
Corruption Perceptions Index (0-10 scale, 10=no corruption)	3.5	3.9	(2.5-6.7)	2006	Transparency International

Sources and coverage

a. PovcalNet. Data based on *only*: Dominican Republic, Jamaica, St Lucia, Trinidad & Tobago.

b. ECLAC (2005). Data based on all Caribbean country and territories *except* Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Haiti.

*. Not including Cuba.

** . Not including Cuba, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, or Suriname.