

**Review of DFID's Work to Build Support for  
Development through work with  
Businesses, Trades Unions, Faith  
Communities, Black and Minority Ethnic  
Communities, and Diaspora Groups**

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**Paul Thornton and Shaun Hext  
Verulam Associates Ltd.**

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## CONTENTS

Acknowledgements.....	ii
Contents .....	iii
Acronyms and Abbreviations .....	iv
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	1
Introduction.....	1
Achievements .....	2
Development of the Strategy .....	2
Improving the Effectiveness of the BSDS .....	2
Conclusions .....	4
Recommendations.....	5
1. INTRODUCTION .....	6
2. RELEVANCE .....	8
DFID's Building Support for Development Strategy (BSDS) .....	8
DFID's Interventions with Civil Society Target Groups.....	9
Historic Context of Government Engagement with Civil Society .....	11
A new approach to International Development and BSDS.....	12
Conceptualising Civil Society within the Development Perspective .....	13
Policy Development and the Widening Range of Engagement.....	14
Summary .....	15
3. EFFECTIVENESS .....	17
The DFID Portfolio of Interventions.....	17
Business .....	19
Trade Unions .....	20
Churches and Faith Communities.....	22
Local Government.....	24
Professional Associations .....	25
BME Communities .....	25
Diaspora Groups.....	27
Effectiveness of BSDS Civil Society Interventions .....	28
4. EFFICIENCY .....	29
5. IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY .....	32
6. LESSONS LEARNT.....	33
Strategy Planning and Development.....	33
Programme Partnerships .....	33
Public Engagement and Stakeholder Relationships .....	34
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	35
Recommendations.....	36
Strategic Level .....	36
Operational Level.....	36
Bibliography .....	38
Annexes	
Annex 1: Terms of Reference .....	40
Annex 2: People Interviewed.....	43
Annex 3: UK Government Policy in Relation to the BSDS (1997-2009).....	45
Annex 4: Building Support for Development Expenditures and Budgets.....	50

## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFP	Asian Foundation for Philanthropy
BMA	British Medical Association
BME	Black and Minority Ethnic
BSD	Building Support for Development
BSDS	Building Support for Development Strategy
CBI	Confederation of British Industry
CLGF	Commonwealth Local Government Forum
CIPFA	Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy
CfD	Connections for Development
CSCF	Civil Society Challenge Fund
CSD	Civil Society Department
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CWDE	Centre for World Development Education
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAF	Development Awareness Fund
DAWG	Development Awareness Working Group
DEA	Development Education Association
DEC	Development Education Centre
DFID	Department for International Development
DVI	Diaspora Volunteering Initiative
EES	Enabling Effective Support
FBO	Faith Based Organisation
FCCC	Faith Communities Consultative Council
GTF	Governance and Transparency Fund
IBT	International Broadcast Trust
IDEAS	International Development Education Association Scotland
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
JFS	Joint Funding Scheme
LGA	Local Government Association
LG Alliance	Local Government Alliance
LGIB	Local Government International Bureau
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MGS	Mini Grant Scheme
NCVO	National Council for Voluntary Organisations
NGO	Non Government Organisation
NUJ	National Union of Journalists
ODA	Overseas Development Administration
OECD	Organisations for Economic Co-operation and Development
PEP	Public Enquiry Point
PPA	Partnership Programme Arrangement
PRD	Policy and Research Division
RGBW	Rough Guide for a Better World
SGA	Strategic Grant Agreement
TUC	Trades Union Congress
VSO	Voluntary Services Overseas

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Introduction

1. This report reviews DFID's programme to build support for development through work with businesses and trades unions, faith communities, black and minority ethnic (BME) communities and Diaspora groups.
2. The UK Government's 1997 White Paper on International Development gave priority to building support for development in order to increase public understanding of our mutual dependence and the commitment to eliminate global poverty. The Building Support for Development Strategy (BSDS), published in 1999, set out how this would be achieved. Whilst the overall policy context has developed over the intervening period the BSDS has continued to set the direction for building awareness.
3. The BSDS gave priority to education and the media which were covered by seven of its objectives and the bulk of the funding. However the strategy expressed a commitment to reach hitherto unreached parts of society through innovative organisational partnerships with businesses and trade unions, churches and faiths. Three of the ten BSDS objectives focused on these organisations. These three objectives within the BSDS are the focus of this review which also covers the subsequent support to BME and Diaspora organisations and other civil society groups.
4. For **Business and Trade Unions** there were two objectives:
  - to raise awareness of development issues within the business community and among trade unions; and
  - to seek ways to work with business and trade unions to raise public awareness of global and development issues.
5. Whilst for **Churches and Faiths** there was one objective:
  - to build and support a worldwide alliance with the Christian Church and other Faiths to eliminate poverty.
6. DFID sought to build partnerships with all the key organisations and provided financial support for a range of activities. The key funding instruments were:
  - the development education elements of the Partnership Programme Arrangements (PPAs) with UK based NGOs engaged in international development;
  - the Strategic Grant Agreement (SGA) developed to give direct support or civil society organisations whose primary purpose was not development;
  - the Development Awareness Fund (DAF) and Mini Grants Scheme (MGS), which provided competitive funds, through small and medium sized grants, for specific projects proposed by civil society organisations; and
  - more recently, support for Diaspora groups through the Diaspora Volunteering Initiative (DVI) and more widely through a community linking scheme which is yet to become operational.

## **Achievements**

7. The Building Support for Development Strategy made a bold and ambitious commitment to seek to work with public, private and civil society actors in support of international development. Though investments were relatively modest a wide range of activities were supported and the commitment and energy of many civil society actors affirmed. In particular:
  - The inclusion of civil society alongside formal education was highly relevant to the new approach to international development set out in the 1997 White Paper.
  - The UK Government set a new priority for poverty reduction which has since gained broad popular support and political endorsement.
  - The funding instruments were all relevant ways of providing support and have been used in imaginative ways.
  - A fast growing and broad range of activities have been managed in an administratively efficient manner and, where problems have occurred, DFID has handled the issues sensitively and in a transparent way.
  - Where there was engagement with the private sector considerable interest and commitment was generated (e.g. The Rough Guide to Development)
  - The trade union perspective on development has grown and there is scope to develop and deepen the partnership through the new PPA with the TUC.
  - Whilst less marked than in formal education, BSD support to civil society has resulted in engagement at the local level including through the SGA support to local government, trade unions and other networks.

## **Development of the Strategy**

8. Whilst churches, trade unions, some businesses, local government and professional bodies had been increasingly engaged in development education, awareness and action prior to the BSDS, the rationale for initial selection of target groups and objectives is not clear. The focus on development education, whilst significant, has dominated the analysis, the budget, and the interventions. Understanding UK civil society, its institutional forms and the nature of public engagement was new for DFID and has increasingly included new policy areas. Less broad objectives for an initial exploratory phase and more investment in relationship building, especially with the non development and new actors within civil society, would have been more relevant.
9. The BSDS proposed a dialogue based and participative approach. The strategy also envisaged annual monitoring, evaluation and review. It was intended to set the foundations for a long term process over at least ten years – a period of setting initial priorities from 1999 – 2001, followed by review and updating. This acceptance of the scale of the challenge and the provisional nature of the strategy was appropriate and relevant given the shift that was being proposed.

## **Improving the Effectiveness of the BSDS**

10. Whilst some individual outputs and opportunities have a lot to commend them, the overall effectiveness of the BSD programme of engagement with civil society is modest. There is a wealth of good will and support for DFID's challenging task

and civil society has moved in its development awareness but BSDS has yet to capitalise on this and there is a need to identify more achievable and realistic short term targets and ensure adequate monitoring and lesson learning.

11. With reference to the particular target groups reviewed, there has not been sufficient, sustained BSD engagement with business to achieve the BSDS objective. Nevertheless the UK private sector is influential in a range of ways and its relevance as a BDS target has increased given the focus on globalisation (2006 White Paper) and on climate change (2009 White Paper).
12. Overall the engagement with trade unions has been effective. The trade union perspective on development has grown but DFID has not always played as supportive a role as it might have done. There is scope to develop and deepen the partnership and the new PPA provides the basis for this.
13. The faith related BSD objective was inappropriate at the time and substantive strategic engagement with faith communities was not effectively developed. Faith communities continue to be amongst the strongest advocates of development and social justice. There has been increased engagement around the 2009 White Paper consultations and the current preparation of guidelines on DFID engagement which could form the basis for more effective dialogue.
14. The SGA with the Local Government (LG) Alliance had limited effectiveness but the opportunity to engage the skills and commitment of UK local government and to draw on its links with local government systems internationally had significant benefits. The relationship could have been developed into a robust partnership. The potential remains and a renewed dialogue between DFID and the Local Government Association (LGA) could provide the basis for a more effective working relationship.
15. There are undoubted benefits to building interest within UK professional bodies about development. However without stronger institutional commitment on both sides these initiatives had limited strategic benefit. The SGAs did not prove to be effective instruments and hence this was one of the weakest elements of the BSDS implementation.
16. The creation of a network of Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) voluntary and community organisations and individuals which aimed to mobilise BME civil society for action on development, Connections for Development (CfD), was an admirable vision but the expectations were unrealistic, particularly within the constraints of a three-year timeframe. There is scope for DFID engagement with BME civil society, working with existing networks and established groups. Support through the DAF and MGS has become more effective and provides a possible base for a more strategic approach.
17. Overall Diaspora focused initiatives have had insufficient time to demonstrate impact. However the early signs of organic development by VSO and its partners are positive. The engagement with smaller Diaspora groups and their response to capacity building support is another potentially positive development. Diaspora initiatives seem to have benefited from the lessons of early experience and have potential as entry points for DFID engagement.

## **Efficiency and Management**

18. The review found a low level of spend on the civil society related objectives (business, trade unions and faith) and later activities (BME and Diaspora) with some 75% of the BSDS budget devoted to education across the whole ten years. For the specific business, trade unions and faiths objectives the expenditure was very small indeed and, outside the SGAs, was not based on a strategic engagement with these civil society networks but relied on the competitive funding through the DAF and MGS.
19. The management of the funding relationship seems to have become the dominant element in some of the new relationships, at times overshadowing mutual understanding and a shared approach to development. Other approaches may have been more relevant, for example, continuing the dialogue with key stakeholders developed during the preparation of the BSDS itself, the DFID Development Policy Forums, and more regular engagement with civil society actors to explore issues of mutual concern in relation to both policy and practice.
20. The early flexibility and scope for engagement has declined over time and increasingly time is devoted to administrative oversight and reporting. Further, the skills required for BSD engagement do not seem to have been taken into account. Relevant professional expertise, ideally with a strong UK perspective, is essential if senior managers, policy makers and decision makers in these spheres are to be effectively engaged.

## **Conclusions**

21. The BSDS was a bold and significant move to further support for development through action by the public and civil society partners. Public awareness of the global agenda, the interconnectedness of political and social processes and events appear to have increased even though responses to specific development related surveys do not reflect these trends. Many of the potential civil society partners – in the trade unions, churches, faith communities, BME communities and others – continue to pursue their own organisational strategies in relation to development and international affairs. Faith communities remain active and engaged; international networks of trade unions, businesses and local government have grown and extended; and FBOs have grown within the international development NGO sector, especially those grounded in non Christian faiths. These developments at the macro-, public and civil society institutional levels cannot be attributed to BSDS. However the presence of a strong Government commitment to international development supported by a rapidly increasing budget is widely appreciated and clearly acts as a catalyst.
22. The review has been impressed with the extent of support for DFID's efforts overall and with respect to BSD in particular. Whilst the public may not know the name or the policy, those who are committed and the institutions they work within appreciate what was done in 1997 and what has been achieved since. There is a desire to work together and to ensure continuity. The BSDS has played a part in inviting this response and DFID should continue in a more strategic and focused way to play its part in Building Support for Development including support for the UK Government's policy, programme and budget and those of its civil society partners.

## **Recommendations**

### **Strategic Level**

1. DFID should build and sustain relationships with all core constituencies in civil society with a focus on wider public engagement and the development of deeper stakeholder relationships with key networks notably faith communities, trades unions, the private sector and BME communities.
2. DFID should give higher priority within the BSD Strategy to civil society audiences and institutions resourcing this work financially and with appropriate staff engagement.

### **Operational Level**

3. The Outreach and Stakeholder Relations Team (OSRT) should identify revised BSD outcomes for developing engagement with key civil society stakeholder networks with specific, time bound, indicators.
4. Civil Society Department should integrate the Diaspora and Youth Volunteering work within the respective PPAs with VSO and Christian Aid and agree monitoring indicators and processes with OSRT.
5. Civil Society Department should integrate all support to trade unions through the TUC PPA, again linking with OSRT, to develop the stakeholder relationship.
6. DFID's engagement with the private sector should be coordinated more effectively, including a focus on building support for development through business linkages.
7. DFID should identify new BSD outcomes for work with faith communities, working collaboratively with the network through a mutually agreed institutional framework.
8. DFID should strengthen the level of expertise within the responsible staff team/s (across the Policy and Research Division and the Communications Division) with a particular focus on UK civil society, social inclusion, and institutional analysis.
9. A mechanism for the management of stakeholder relationships with civil society institutions beyond traditional NGOs/CSOs should be developed jointly by CSD and Communications Division to ensure that DFID's civil society expertise and strategic communications skills are combined.
10. Funding instruments and financial support should follow the establishment of institutional relationships and not vice versa.
11. Civil Society Department should review the links between the UK and international programmes of NGOs and CSOs and ensure that the synergies are reinforced through the support provided by all the various funding arrangements with specific targets related to building support for development in all cases.
12. DFID's Management Board should ensure Communications Division and Civil Society Department work together effectively to reframe the BSD Strategy and the related stakeholder relationships.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The UK Government has given significant priority to international development since 1997. It's policy, set out in the White Paper in November 1997<sup>1</sup>, and developed in the subsequent 2000 and 2006 White Papers<sup>2</sup>, is built around a commitment to eliminating poverty and achieving the international development targets. This commitment was further reinforced in the most recent White Paper<sup>3</sup> (July 2009) which addresses the new challenges of world recession, climate change and conflict and reaffirms the contribution of civil society in the UK and internationally.

1.2 The 1997 White Paper gave priority to building support for development in order to increase public understanding of our mutual dependence and the need for international development<sup>4</sup>. The BSDS, set out how this would be achieved. Whilst the overall policy context has developed over the intervening period the BSDS has continued to set the direction for building awareness. After ten years a review is timely given the changes in policy context and in the environment.

1.3 The BSDS focused on work around four main target groups: formal education, the media, business and trade unions, and churches and faiths. Education and the media are addressed in two of the other reviews. This review focuses on the remaining two of the initial four target groups together with others that were added later. The review looks back over the ten years since the BSDS was published, identifying all relevant initiatives and the changes that have taken place.

1.4 The approach, and the report structure, is based on the evaluation criteria developed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC); relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.

1.5 Here the **relevance** of these target groups within the BSDS strategy is considered together with the relevance of the specific approaches adopted. In addition the relevance of the widening range of target groups and the changes in strategic approach are assessed. The **effectiveness** of the interventions supported and their contribution to the achievement of the BSDS objectives are taken into account. **Efficiency** relates to the application of DFID's own human and financial resources as well as the efficiency of the projects supported and activities of partner organisations. Ultimately any strategy is assessed with respect to its impact. Here **impact** is seen in terms of increased awareness and the specific objectives of the BSDS. Finally the review focused on the **sustainability** of the changes in public awareness and support for development within the identified target groups.

1.6 The scope of work for the review is outlined in the Terms of Reference which are included as Annex 1. Documents provided by DFID, interviewees, other stakeholders, and papers identified by individual authors were reviewed. Interviews and discussions were undertaken with staff of DFID in London and East Kilbride. Representatives of the target groups, key informants from a wide range of civil society organisations (CSOs), active with or related to these communities, and others involved with the BSDS over the last ten years were interviewed (a full list of

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<sup>1</sup> DFID (1997) *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century*

<sup>2</sup> DFID (2000) *Eliminating World Poverty: making globalisation work for the poor*, and DFID (2006) *Eliminating World Poverty: making governance work for the poor*

<sup>3</sup> DFID (2009) *Eliminating World Poverty: Building Our Common Future*

<sup>4</sup> 1997, pp. 7, 77-81

interviewees is included at Annex 2). As a component of the assessment of policy relevance, a review of key UK government policy since 1997 and the links to DFID's BSDS was undertaken with a summary included as Annex 3. A questionnaire was developed to elicit information regarding all strands of the BSDS and circulated via the Development Education Association (DEA) network to some 400 recipients. The responses have informed the drafting of this report. Finally three regional consultations were held in England facilitated by the DEA to give an opportunity for stakeholders to feed into all the reviews. Triangulation of data from all sources was undertaken to help ensure reliability and validity of findings.

1.7 The report is divided into 7 chapters. Following this introduction to the BSDS and the specific review, Chapter 2 summarises the history of engagement with these target groups and explores the relevance of interventions with respect to the wider BSDS. Chapter 3 focuses on the effectiveness of the work in relation to these target groups whilst Chapter 4 considers issues of efficiency. Impact and sustainability are discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 draws out the lessons learned over the ten years, and those emerging from the review process, before the conclusions and recommendations of the review are presented in Chapter 7. There are a number of annexes giving detailed information which are referenced in the text.

## **2. RELEVANCE**

2.1 This chapter describes the strategy, its development and the objectives and activities related to this review. It assesses the relevance of BSDS with respect to its targeting of specific groups within society beyond its main focus on education and the media. It considers whether the specific objectives and initial targeting of business and trade unions, churches and faith communities was relevant. The subsequent attention given to BME and Diaspora groups, professional associations and local government is assessed and its appropriateness to the realisation of the BSDS discussed. The chapter moves on to consider whether the specific interventions undertaken represented relevant ways of engaging with these groups and whether engagement with these groups remained relevant to the developing BSDS over the ten years.

### **DFID's Building Support for Development Strategy (BSDS)**

2.1 The BSDS was published in April 1999. It set out the aim of promoting public understanding of interdependence, of the need for international development and of the progress that had been made and that was possible. Expectations were modest; limited to raising awareness, perhaps reflecting uncertainty about the potential for attitudinal or behavioural change. However the objectives were broad, and expected to promote:

- Knowledge and understanding of the major challenges and prospects for development, in particular the poverty reduction agenda; but also of the developing countries themselves
- Understanding of our global interdependence, and in particular that failure to reduce global poverty levels will have serious consequences for all
- Understanding of and support for international efforts to reduce poverty and promote development including the international development targets. Recognition of progress made, and that further progress is both affordable and achievable.
- Understanding of the role that individuals can play; enabling them to make informed choices. (DFID, 1999: 3)

2.2 The BSDS expressed a commitment to reach hitherto unreached parts of society through more innovative organisational partnerships with businesses and trade unions, churches and faiths. Nevertheless the top priority was to work through the formal education system. This priority reflected the commitment expressed in the 1997 White Paper for every child to be educated about development issues, so that they can understand the key global considerations that will shape their lives. A second priority was support to the media to raise awareness amongst the adult population. Four objectives were stated for formal education and a further three related to the media as a vehicle for informing and influencing the general public.

2.3 The remaining three of the ten BSDS objectives focused on Business and Trade Unions, and Churches and Faiths, as potential partners in accessing key target groups within wider society. These objectives were less focused than the formal education objectives, perhaps reflected a more measured approach to what were to be new and relatively unknown partnerships.

2.4 For **Business and Trade Unions** there were two objectives:

- to raise awareness of development issues within the business community and among trade unions; and
- to seek ways to work with business and trade unions to raise public awareness of global and development issues. (DFID, 1999: 5-6).

2.5 Whilst for **Churches and Faiths** there was one very ambitious objective, influenced by the positive role played in the Jubilee 2000 campaign on debt and a growing recognition within DFID that the churches could mobilise an important constituency. The objective was:

- to build and support a worldwide alliance with the Christian Church and other Faiths to eliminate poverty.

2.6 These ten objectives were at the core of the strategy. Although international development NGOs were recognised for their development education work in the UK, particularly in partnership with the Development Education Centres (DECs) and the formal sector, and for their awareness raising and campaigning activities, there was no specific objective stated for NGOs, charities or voluntary organisations whose main work was development. The role of local government was not overtly acknowledged and social inclusion was not expressed in terms of specific targeting of BME communities. Gender was not mentioned at all.

2.7 The targeting of faith communities, trades unions, and businesses was relevant for the BSDS. However whilst the groups were important, the objectives were not realistically framed and they were not necessarily the only groups that could have been considered at the time. There was also confusion between building partnership with the target organisations themselves and their role in reaching segments of the general public.

2.8 The faith target was based on experience of the growing role of the Christian denominations in engaging in policy discourse in relation to public affairs. However the objective of a worldwide multi-faith alliance seemed ambitious and assumed a level of institutional and theological synergy that was certainly lacking at the time. Whilst individual Christian denominations or churches collectively may have shared a common perspective within the UK, the institutional links to their separate international networks and also the linkages with other faiths, were less robust. The objective was too ambitious and not a relevant objective for the BSD.

2.9 Similarly the two business and trade union objectives focused on raising awareness within their respective constituencies and on raising wider public awareness. These objectives do not seem to have taken account of the international agenda of the trade union movement and the ongoing work around workers rights internationally, trade and tariff restrictions and related issues. Campaigns by War on Want on textile workers and other producers in developing countries had captured the attention of UK trade unions and could have provided a more specific objective.

### **DFID's Interventions with Civil Society Target Groups**

2.10 The way in which DFID engaged with these groups through BSD was more complex than in the case of formal education or the media where specific funding instruments were developed. Here a range of existing and new instruments were utilised to provide both direct and indirect support as well as strategic engagement around specific campaigns and activities (e.g. Make Poverty History).

2.11 No direct funding of the development activities of faith communities was provided although key Faith Based Organisations (FBOs) whose primary focus was international development were supported through Partnership Programme Arrangements (PPAs). Christian Aid in particular acted as a link to the Christian Churches and in addition to its PPA DFID produced joint publications to target these faith communities. For civil society organisations whose primary purpose was not development the Strategic Grant Agreement (SGA) was developed to give direct support. Other instruments, the Development Awareness Fund (DAF) and Mini Grants Scheme (MGS), provided a financial channel for support which was accessed by civil society organisations including Trade Unions and FBOs. A further more recent intervention has been engaging with the Diaspora, through support to the Diaspora Volunteering Initiative (DVI). A brief description of each tool, which makes particular reference to each of the BSD target groups considered in this review, is given below. Further details are given in chapter 3 where the effectiveness of each intervention is reviewed set in the broader context of DFID's wider engagement with each of the civil society groups considered.

2.12 SGAs were established in 2003 to work with organisations whose primary purpose was not development but which had a contribution to make to development. This opportunity was facilitated by the 2002 International Development Act which allowed for UK based funding of activities which would lead to poverty impact. This enabled BSD activities beyond a classic development education function to be supported. Building understanding of development within each organisation was seen as the first step of each SGA. The intention was to provide funding for activities within the common area of interest as a practical expression of a wider policy synergy around development. The SGA instrument covered the trade unions relationship through an agreement with the Trades Union Congress (TUC). Five other SGAs were set up with established organisations representing civil society whilst two new bodies were set up explicitly to deliver the SGAs for local government (UK Local Government Alliance - LG Alliance) and for BME (Connections for Development - CfD)

2.13 PPAs by contrast were agreements set up to support organisations traditionally working in development replacing the longstanding support to international NGOs and administered by the Civil Society Department. Many have a BSD dimension, with one of their objectives focusing on development education. Whilst this mainly covers work within formal education it also includes awareness raising amongst its own supporters as civil society organisations. 9 out of the 27 PPAs cover faith or other civil society aspects. More recently a PPA has been set up with the TUC breaking the trend of only holding PPAs with organisations traditionally working in development.

2.14 The Development Awareness Fund and Mini Grants Scheme are competitive funding mechanisms to which organisations can apply for funding to run projects for up to 3 years. Whilst the major part of the funds target formal education, BME and Diaspora groups and FBOs together with Trade Unions and other civil society actors have accessed funds over last 10 years.

2.15 Following publication of the 2006 White Paper (see annex 3) support for Diaspora and volunteering schemes has been developed, including the Diaspora Volunteering Initiative led by Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO). A community linking scheme has also been designed but is not yet operational.

2.16 These funding instruments were all relevant ways of providing support and have been used in imaginative ways. However the management of the funding relationship seems to have become the dominant element in some of the new relationships at times overshadowing mutual understanding and a shared approach to development. Other approaches may have been more relevant, for example; continuing the dialogue with key stakeholders, developed during the preparation of the BSDS itself; the DFID Development Policy Forums; and more regular engagement with civil society actors to explore issues of mutual concern in relation to both policy and practice.

2.17 Indeed the three objectives related to these target groups do not necessarily imply the need for financial support. Whilst financial support has enabled new initiatives to be developed under the BSDS, it has had the effect of changing the nature of the relationship between DFID and some of these organisations from a partnership between civil society stakeholders and the responsible government department to a donor/recipient funding relationship. This may have contributed to the weakening of the strong sense of partnership and participation that had characterised the early stages of the BSDS; the way in which these partnerships evolved is discussed in greater detail below. A deepening of the engagement with the network of key civil society stakeholders alongside the provision of funding would have been a more relevant approach to the strategy and the specific objectives which focused on awareness raising and alliance building.

### **Historic Context of Government Engagement with Civil Society**

2.18 Up until 1997 state-society engagement on development had been limited to providing support to a small network of UK Non Government Organisations engaged in international development and limited support to key UK actors engaged in development education. The budget of DFID's predecessor, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) had remained unchanged (declining in real terms) for many years and ODA operated largely as a technical agency focusing on the effective delivery of the UK aid programme and did not see a role for itself in public engagement or building stakeholder relationships.

2.19 Support to development education focused on a small group of agencies including the Centre for World Development Education (CWDE) (now Worldaware); some of the early Development Education Centres (DECs) and the National Association of DECs (NADEC) and its successor the Development Education Association (DEA); the Scottish sister organisation to DEA, the International Development Education Association Scotland (IDEAS); and from 1982, the International Broadcast Trust (IBT). This support for CWDE, DEA, IDEAS, and IBT, had risen to around £500,000 by 1996/97.

2.20 During the 1980's and 1990's development education, development awareness, and the related issue based campaigning was grounded in the larger NGOs, including Christian Aid and Oxfam, the network of DECs and other local groups and the Christian Churches. Thus the BSDS was not created from a blank canvas but overlaid on an established network of actors and a tradition of engagement with Government. The civil society approach took an integrated approach with development education (school and adult based knowledge and information); development awareness (support for a deeper understanding of the nature and causes of poverty and the need for international development); and

subsequent action (charitable fund raising, twinning/linking arrangements, campaigning) seen as part of an holistic understanding of support to development.

### **A new approach to International Development and BSDS**

2.21 The 1997 election saw a change of Government and a new approach to international development from DFID. The in-coming administration gave high priority to development, committing itself to significant increases in budget and also a new policy framework built around the concept of international development that encompassed the emerging understanding of globalisation and its implications for poverty reduction and sustainable development. DFID moved away from the narrower brief of its predecessors and was headed by a cabinet minister. The new policy was spelt out in *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century*<sup>5</sup>, the first of three White Papers published over the following ten years.

2.22 This first White Paper had high ambitions, setting out the government's policies to 'achieve sustainable development for this planet'. In so doing it committed DFID to increasing public understanding of the 'our mutual interdependence and the need for international development'. It emphasised the need to 'give people the facts about the forces that are shaping the world – and their lives', and further stated that 'the British people should have accurate, unbiased, accessible information about the causes of poverty and inequality in developing countries and about what the international community can do' (DFID, 1997:77).

2.23 One of the four sections in the White Paper focused specifically on Building Support for Development (BSD) with three of the twelve commitments articulated setting the direction for BSD over the coming years:

1. Increase public understanding of our mutual dependence and the need for international development.
2. Ensure that resources made available for development are only used for the purposes intended, and consider the case for a new development act.
3. Provide the necessary resources for the development programme: the government will start to reverse the decline in UK spending on development assistance, and reaffirm the UK commitment to the 0.7% UN target.

2.24 The BSDS provided the strategy to deliver on the first commitment and supported delivery of the other two. Acknowledging the wider expertise, DFID brought a group together to develop the strategy, the Development Awareness Working Group (DAWG). This group included participation from a wide range of civil society groups including the business sector, the trade unions, the churches, the voluntary sector and the media. The DAWG, chaired by the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, advised on the developing BSDS and then on initial implementation. It embodied the enthusiasm for the White Paper's commitment to reverse the long-term decline in UK aid expenditure and champion a better domestic understanding of the importance of global public goods such as poverty reduction and social justice. The DAWG like its wider constituency brought together a range of interests and approaches.

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<sup>5</sup> DFID (1997) *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century*, White Paper on International Development.

## Conceptualising Civil Society within the Development Perspective

2.25 The interest in building public awareness of development and the growing engagement with civil society actors has resulted in changes in DFID's own appreciation of the role of civil society. Prior to 1997 most of DFID's experience of working with civil society had been within the context of its international programmes. Even at the time of the BSDS there was no clear definition of UK civil society articulated by DFID. However there was an emerging view about UK civil society that comfortably accommodated the organisational typology of potential partners outlined: businesses and trade unions, churches and faith groups.

2.26 There has been a recalibration of relations taking place between state and society in the UK as governments look to vest more power in citizens and consumers, away from command and control models of public communications towards more deliberative models of public engagement<sup>6</sup>, processes that aim to vest greater decision-making in the public domain. This approach was reflected in the 1997 White Paper and the BSDS. Subsequently DFID has given greater emphasis to ensuring public understanding through its communications strategy and the broader base of BSDS activity.

2.27 DFID has developed its communications and public engagement activity and extended its role in policy engagement with other government departments. However it's BSDS based support to civil society actors (e.g. the DECs, DEA, school linking and youth volunteer schemes) focused on the funding of agreed activities. This was less the case for the newer civil society partners, business and the trade unions, churches and other faith organisations. Many were concerned with single issue topics – ethical consumerism, local governance – or held contested views on policy issues. Churches and faith groups had long established links with similar institutions that extended beyond a narrow understanding of development. Partnerships here needed to be more organic and evolving. A common agenda could not be assumed and not only were some issues likely to be contested but those differences were the very reason for supporting the relationship. For example the campaign around Make Poverty History often had a critique of government's role that enhanced the processes of building support for development. In some cases funding was not the issue; policy dialogue and an active partnership were more significant.

2.28 Whilst DFID was developing an understanding of this new civil society dynamic, describing it in some SGAs as 'the arena in which people come together to pursue the interests they hold in common, not for profit or exercise of power, but because they care enough about something to take collective action', the implications, for example in terms of a potential clash of business and social

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<sup>6</sup> The terms **public engagement** and **stakeholder engagement** are both used in the field of public participation and policy influencing. The term stakeholder is a generic name for somebody who takes an active and legitimate interest in a particular topic. Although the general public can often be said to fall into this category, by virtue of having a legitimate stake in a public decision for example, it is useful to make a distinction between the public and stakeholders in the context of participation.

Here, we use the term stakeholder is more narrowly defined as somebody who is affected by an issue in a more formal sense - through their professional role or through their involvement in a formal group or organisation. The term **public engagement** in contrast refers to engagement with members of the public in their capacity as **citizens** rather than as in a professional, formal or institutional role. Engagement with stakeholders can give very different results from engagement with members of the general public. In particular, stakeholder groups may be better informed or have more resources available to devote to taking part in engagement processes or otherwise influencing decision making.

development interests among business and professional associations, or the requirement for open, pro-active engagement with partners to understand the differing perspectives and institutional forms were not always appreciated.

### **Policy Development and the Widening Range of Engagement**

2.29 The decade since 1997 has seen dramatic changes in the international development agenda. Annex 3 identifies key milestones in UK Government policy and their relationship to the BSD agenda. Underlying these policy shifts were deeper factors – climate change, globalisation, the post 9/11 conflict agenda, wider issues of peace and security – which have changed public perceptions.

2.30 Whilst the main thrust of BSD support to formal education and the media continued, these changes were reflected in the approach to civil society. This is particularly evident in the engagement with BME groups, the later focus on Diaspora networks and the changing role in relation to faith communities and faith based organisations.

2.31 At the outset of the BSDS the idea of BME engagement was not seen to have been afforded a particularly high priority. BME engagement was presented in the context of diversity: to ensure that ‘the work is inclusive and that ethnic minority groups are fully involved’ (DFID, 1999:6). Nevertheless there was substantive interest and a specific study was commissioned, the GIRT report published in 2001<sup>7</sup>, which was the basis for more focused activity. The inclusion of BME groups as a partner category for the SGAs was indicative of this greater interest in sustaining institutional relations with BME groups<sup>8</sup>.

2.32 Public opinion research published around the same time showed that BME groups were likely to be informed and supportive of international development efforts. However UK BME communities are not homogenous. There is considerable diversity of form, identity and institutional engagement. There was no single established BME network around international development. Rather than the slower process of engagement with the diverse range of attitudes, approaches and perspectives, DFID chose to work through key groups and individuals within UK BME civil society, with an aim of strengthening links between existing networks. This selected group were encouraged to establish a new umbrella body, precipitating the creation of Connections for Development (CfD). The effectiveness of this approach will be discussed in the following chapter.

2.33 With the publication of the 2006 White Paper there was an evident shift in DFID’s understanding and the purpose of BME engagement. At this point the term ‘Diaspora’ became more established in the development vernacular with BME groups valued more for the contribution they could make to economic and political development in their ‘countries of origin or heritage’. Research conducted by DFID’s migration team highlighted the important contribution that ‘Diaspora’ individuals and networks made to poverty reduction and growth. While earlier White Paper (1997) commitments had not overlooked this perspective, emphasising the need to ‘build on the skills and talents of migrants and other ethnic minorities in the UK to promote development in their countries of origin’, this was not developed in the BSDS.

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<sup>7</sup> DFID (2001) *Getting It Right Together: Black and Minority Ethnic Groups and DFID’s Development Agenda Scoping Study*

<sup>8</sup> DFID (2003) *Strategic Grant Agreements: A new way to support UK groups in making a contribution to international development*

2.34 Whilst relevant in an international development context the shift from the BME focus to a Diaspora focus suggests a degree of naivety in terms of the UK political environment. Whilst many communities take a Diaspora perspective this is only one of a range of identities. To define individuals and groups in this way risked excluding many BME citizens and pushed DFID into a potentially limiting mode of engagement.

2.35 A similar narrow and functional approach seems to have been followed with respect to engagement with faith communities. The original single objective for churches and faiths in the BSDS was context specific. It reflected the role that the UK Churches had played in the Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign. The assumption seems to have been that a similar alliance around a wider and more general development agenda could be formed that was both worldwide and multi-faith. This was somewhat ambitious given the extent of interfaith engagement at that stage.

2.36 Finally we turn to the issue of diversity as a UK domestic and international development policy arena in its own right. UK policy in terms of equal opportunities and discrimination has a particularly rich tradition and is an area where civil society has played a key role. A gender dimension was however largely absent from the BSDS, either in the sense of organisational policy or strategic focus. The publications of the DFID Gender Equality Action Plan and the Gender Duty Requirements in 2007 seem to have done little to stimulate change. More generally diversity only extended to BME groups and failed to consider other potentially excluded groups such as organisations focused on the elderly or the disabled.

2.37 Taking the BSDS as a strategy of a UK Government Department the handling of diversity was weak. This issue is symbolic in terms of relevance with the BSDS falling between stools – uncertain as to which approach to adopt – that of donor funding activity or that of Government seeking to develop a new public engagement strategy through civil society partnerships.

## Summary

2.38 The inclusion of civil society alongside formal education was highly relevant to the new approach to international development set out in the 1997 White Paper. The broader policy view needed to be understood within wider UK society and the nature of the global agenda implied engagement by civil society as well as by the state and market actors. The concept of development itself was changing and awareness of this process amongst the adult community was as significant as including development education in the school curriculum. Globalisation, interdependence, climate change and peace and security would be refined and become central to the agenda over subsequent years and were explored more fully in the 2000 and, more particularly, the 2006 White Papers. The 2009 White Paper picks up the theme of interdependence and proposes a new development ‘compact’ with civil society organisations together with significant increases in support for international development and UK based activity and continued commitment to build support for global development issues in the UK<sup>9</sup>.

2.39 The change in understanding of, and Government support for development began in 1997 and the development and implementation of the BSDS was central to that change. The incoming Government set a new priority for poverty reduction which has since gained broad political endorsement. There was also a collective moral imperative shared with a wide range of actors to promote public understanding

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<sup>9</sup> DFID 2009, paras 7.40-7.53

of development which was articulated in the BSDS. This commitment looked beyond the international NGO community, and the focus of the strategy on civil society groups was relevant at a conceptual level and in terms of the call for practical support by individuals, organisations and collectively through Government.

2.40 Whilst churches, trade unions, some businesses, local government and professional bodies had been increasingly engaged in development education, awareness and action over the previous twenty years, the relevance of the initial selection of target groups and the objectives selected for the BSDS is less clear. The focus on development education, whilst significant, has dominated the analysis, the budget, and the interventions. Understanding UK civil society, its institutional forms and the nature of public engagement was new for DFID and has increasingly included new policy areas. Less broad objectives for an initial exploratory phase and more investment in relationship building, especially with the non development and new actors within civil society, would have been more relevant.

2.41 The BSDS proposed a more dialogue based and participative approach. The strategy also envisaged annual monitoring, evaluation and review. The BSDS was intended to set the foundations for a long term process over at least ten years and was seen as setting initial priorities for the 1999 – 2001 period, to be followed by review and updating. This acceptance of the scale of the challenge and the provisional nature of the strategy was appropriate and relevant given the shift that was being proposed.

### **3. EFFECTIVENESS**

3.1 How effective were DFID's efforts to engage business and trade unions, churches and faiths, and subsequently BME and Diaspora groups? This chapter reviews the development of partnerships with these civil society groups and the attempts to work with them to build wider support for development. Effectiveness is in part the effectiveness of DFID's engagement with and influence over the policies and programmes of these groups. However we also consider the effectiveness of the development awareness and related support for development of these groups since without their impact the BSD strategy would not succeed. We therefore review the policy positions and programmes of the civil society actors themselves.

3.2 Firstly we review the interventions adopted by DFID. Then we assess the effectiveness of each target group/CSO network in turn – business, trades unions, churches and other faiths, from the original BSDS; followed by local government professional associations, BME communities and Diaspora groups. In each case the nature of the engagement is described, the effectiveness with respect to the given objectives and finally a review of the BSD programme and its continued synergy with DFID's strategy. The chapter concludes with a summary of the effectiveness of civil society engagement under BSDS.

#### **The DFID Portfolio of Interventions**

3.3 DFID's main focus for BSD intervention with these CSOs was through financial support. Compared to formal education the resources were quite small, however other support has been provided by the Civil Society Department (CSD), and links to Diaspora networks and with business have been supported by other departments in DFID. This has not increased the overall support to BSD activity but it has increased the range of contact points and opportunities for engagement. We review briefly here the key instruments used: the PPA, SGA, DAF and MGS, and more recently specific funding for Diaspora volunteering and community linking.

3.4 The PPAs took over from early funding of international development NGOs. Since 1997 the number has grown steadily and there are currently some 27 PPAs, all with INGOs. However as we note below the SGA with the TUC is now being treated as a PPA and similar future strategic agreements could also be formally operated as PPAs. Five of the NGOs are FBOs, three from the Christian tradition and two with a Muslim orientation. A further four of the 27 are NGOs that operate in specific civil society contexts rather than as traditional providers and aid and development. The Ethical Trading Initiative works with businesses, trade unions and NGOs around ethical trade issues; the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) focuses on policy in relation to livelihood impact; the Panos Institute is a media related CSO; and Transparency International is the international CSO working on corruption.

3.5 Whilst CSD manages the relationship with PPA holders, they have moved from a simple fund management relationship to a stakeholder relationship, with monitored indicators and the development of Mutual Accountability Frameworks, in which both sides are able to be explicit about the partnership. CSD act as stakeholder managers on behalf of the whole of DFID. Amongst the 4-5 objectives included in PPAs, many have one that covers development education. Whilst this is mainly related to formal education, it also covers activities amongst UK CSO

supporters around development awareness. As noted, 9 of the 27 PPAs cover faith or other civil society aspects. Thus the PPA portfolio has a growing BSD dimension.

3.6 The CSD's other main grant streams the Civil Service Challenge Fund (CSCF) and the Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF) are directed at international development activity by UK NGOs and CSOs though a requirement has recently been introduced that 5% of the funding is committed to building domestic awareness of their work; an indirect contribution to BSD. Again some of this activity is in formal education but less so than with the PPAs.

3.7 As outlined in chapter 2, SGAs were established to work with organisations whose primary purpose was not development. Eight SGAs were established, most negotiated during 2003 and becoming operational from 2004 for an initial three years. This group comprised the British Medical Association (BMA), Trades Union Congress (TUC), Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accounting (CIPFA), Connections for Development (CfD), Groundwork UK, Co-operative Movement, UK Local Government Alliance for International Development (LG Alliance), National Union of Journalists (NUJ). Thus six of the SGAs were with established organisations and two with bodies set up explicitly to deliver the SGA for local government - the LG Alliance and for BME communities - CfD.

3.8 SGAs of their very nature required more staff input. Relationship building and mutual understanding were required given the limited shared purpose and the wider range of interests. Some of the SGA partners had extensive international programmes within their own sphere of operation and the links with DFID's development policies needed to be developed into effective strategic partnerships.

3.9 By 2005 the impact of the Gershon review (see annex 3) was putting pressure on DFID's administrative budget, and despite its growing budget, the team delivering BSD faced a staffing cut. In particular SGA management was integrated with the rest of the team, providing less intense involvement with partners, and in 2006 it was decided to discontinue the SGA instrument. Most of the partnerships continued to the end of the first period of support and then ended. The TUC SGA has since been renewed as a PPA and support to the LG Alliance is currently provided through a DAF grant.

3.10 The SGAs demonstrated the need for heavy staff involvement if strategic partnerships beyond the traditional development agenda were to be built. Whilst most failed in practice they did create expectations among partner organisations which were then unfulfilled. Many were disappointed with the manner in which the closures were announced and the lack of any follow-up. Many had geared up their programmes in expectations of a longer term partnership and the cut in resources had a direct impact on their capacity to sustain a programme.

3.11 The DAF and MGS have been reviewed separately. They are both competitive funds for short term support specifically related to BSD activities. In both cases the bulk of applications and grants relate to formal education. Even grants to FBOs tend to be for school based activities. Nevertheless both funds support a small group of civil society activities in the trade union, faith and BME BSDS categories.

3.12 Until recently these funding instruments were the main focus of BSD civil society intervention together with some policy level interaction with other government departments around the Prevent and social cohesion agendas. Most staff time was

taken with the established formal education work and with managing or overseeing the management of the DAF and MGS operations.

3.13 Following the 2006 White Paper (see Annex 3) support from Diaspora volunteering and community linking has been developed. These are activity specific programmes, the first delivered by two consortia, one led by VSO and the second comprising Christian Aid, Islamic Relief and BUNAC. The community linking scheme has been designed but is not yet operational.

## **Business**

3.14 At the time of the BSDS the impact of trade liberalisation and protectionism, particularly in developing countries, was still high on the international development agenda. Multi-lateral, bi-lateral and other development agencies were strategically focused on supporting interventions that aimed to improve workers rights, and to address exploitative working conditions experienced by people working in the informal markets and export processing zones of the developing world. In the developed world a strong ethical trading movement had also emerged.

3.15 Particular attention was being paid to engaging with business, with a view to improving the level of corporate social responsibility in the workplace and the community. Campaigning and advocacy groups were placing greater pressure on business to ensure products were ethically sourced and a related trade justice movement was emerging. Despite this positive context and the strong links between NGOs and FBOs with the ethical trading movement, little was achieved in the early years of the BSDS. DFID's attention was taken with the main formal education sector, the establishment of the DAF and MGS and the relationships that grew into the SGAs. Possibly the lack of a key institutional interlocutor (the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) did not have a history of development or international engagement in the same way as the TUC and other SGA partners) contributed to the limited achievement in this area.

3.16 The exception was in 2004 when DFID published the '*Rough Guide to a Better World*' (RGBW). Produced by DFID, but distributed initially via high street retailers to reach the general public, RGBW resonated well with the business community. TESCO, Starbucks, lastminute.com, Ottakars, the Independent, Telegraph and Financial Times newspapers, Top Shop, Saga, BA and Body Shop either distributed the booklet (sometimes only to their own employees) or were keen to be associated with it. However despite additional print runs the exercise was not repeated and there does not seem to have been any follow up action with the businesses concerned.

3.17 In 2005 Make Poverty History and the UK's G8 Presidency reasserted a private sector focus. In addition, ethical trading was becoming a significant branding issue in the high street. However, there seems to have been no opening for a BSD initiative. This situation continues and, with BSD taking a strong civil society focus, it may be that entering into a completely new cultural arena of business and markets has simply been beyond the scope of a small and pressured team.

3.18 Separately, DFID's Business Alliance Team has been engaging with the business community within the framework of the eighth Millennium Development Goal (MDG 8) on developing the right partnerships to reduce global poverty. This has included seeking greater accountability and transparency in the extractive industries (i.e the Oil Transparency initiative asking the Petro companies to publish

what they pay to governments in Angola, Nigeria etc) and transparency in the international health sector (new investments with Glaxo on supply chain efficiency on life-saving drugs as much of the costs increases on life-saving drugs are made between port and patient).

3.19 As part of this initiative a number of strategic partnerships were established with UK based multi-national organisations such as BP, Shell, Diageo, Glaxo Smith Kline, and Vodaphone. These are not bolt on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives but are designed to make a real difference to the lives of the poor and constitute a private sector development strategy to create a more enabling environment for poverty reduction.

3.20 The initiatives have now been institutionalised within UNDP and constitute part of DFID strategy for multi-lateral engagement. There is a strong link to the Prime Minister's Call to Action at the summit in New York in 2008 and a further set of initiatives are to be announced during May 2009.

3.21 The Call to Action and other business related initiatives show that DFID has the capacity to engage with business, in this case at a high international level. However a CSR/ethical trading relationship with the core of the UK private sector is still proving illusive. As in other areas international development action is proving more accessible than domestic development awareness. Fair trade branding continues to grow and private sector association with Comic Relief, sustainable development and related issues suggests that entry points are present. However, DFID has yet to find the connection and identify the value added of a link with the Government's development policy and programme.

**3.22 *Where there was engagement with business considerable interest and commitment was generated. However there has not been sufficient, sustained BSD engagement to achieve the BSDS objective. Effectiveness has thus been limited. Nevertheless the UK private sector is influential in a range of ways and its relevance as a BDS target has increased given the focus on globalisation (2006 White Paper) and climate change (2009 White Paper).***

## **Trade Unions**

3.23 In the BSDS trade unions were linked with business and in many respects they are closely related. Certainly, the prevailing context in 1999 was similar with the trade unions seen as representatives of the workers; understood as key players in providing information, advice and education to their members and in shaping relations between their members and employers, particularly in respect of core labour standards. Nevertheless the narratives of BSD experience are quite different and so we have kept the effectiveness stories separate.

3.24 The TUC has a history of engagement with the civil society development agenda, working alongside the international NGOs and Churches, during the 1970's and 1980s. Individual unions and the TUC had international links with organised labour in developing and developed countries and a clear policy perspective on aid and trade, international tariffs and related issues. The trade union movement also had a tradition of adult education for members. All of this predisposed the TUC as the focal point for the new SGA instrument as a way of consolidating and building a BSD relationship.

3.25 The TUC SGA aimed to contribute towards a better informed UK trade union movement, able to make a more effective strategic contribution to international

development. To do this it was agreed that funds would be used to build the TUC's knowledge of international development and their capacity to develop their UK affiliates and networks contribution to it, and utilise its specific advantages in order to influence trade unions and other organisations globally.

3.26 There was both a domestic and an international dimension to the agreement. The agreement reflected prevailing development wisdom, that civil society actors, such as trade unions, had more than a passive development awareness role to play, and could actively contribute to poverty reduction through their ability to hold governments in the developing world to account.

3.27 These two dimensions were further articulated as three specific outcomes in the SGA:

- i. The TUC is more aware of the international development agenda, through engagement with key regional, national and international players from across the development sector.
- ii. TUC constituent members will have a greater awareness of international development issues.
- iii. The TUC will have the organisational and institutional capacity to plan and deliver effective activities around its experience and comparative advantage. This should include connections with, and ability to influence international trade union organisations and government.

3.28 Accordingly, the TUC was expected to strengthen its knowledge of new approaches to international development through greater dialogue with DFID and through closer engagement with key development agencies. Union workplace representatives had the potential to influence opinion, not only in the workplace, but also more widely through their role with other bodies, e.g. as local councillors, school governors and members of trade councils. Most importantly, the TUC education service, which annually trained 32,500 members, would continue to raise awareness of development issues.

3.29 However building the confidence and trust on which the SGA was based was no easy task. DFID staff found the TUC movement too political and too difficult to work with, whereas the TUC considered DFID to be uninterested in developing a deeper understanding of the longstanding role the TUC had occupied in international development and far more interested in pushing its own narrow agenda. This opinion was reinforced by a perceived lack of legitimate representation by the TUC on the DAWG, which undermined potential buy-in by the TUC towards the recommendations made by the DAWG.

3.30 TUC support to help mobilise trade unions to attend the Development Forums sponsored by DFID in 2001 helped strengthen relations and was a catalyst for an initial one-year agreement with DFID for development education and awareness-raising. With strong political support the SGA followed.

3.31 The new strategic agreement inadvertently fuelled tensions between the TUC and the development education community. In part this seems to have related to differing perspectives on and ultimately ownership of adult learning and in part tensions over access to DFID and voice in the BSD arena. Underlying these differences appeared to be differing emphases between an individualised development education model and a more collective development awareness

approach. Both were reflected in the BSDS but due to the dominance of the development education perspective the tensions had never surfaced or been addressed.

3.32 The SGA provided a vehicle for small grants to individual unions which the TUC were able to facilitate and monitor. These grants seem to have been more effective than the union and workers education related DAF and MGS grants where there is less trade union attention and understanding. There is a separate CSCF grant, administered through TUC Aid, to undertake projects with partners in developing countries and an HIV project partnership in Nigeria has been established.

3.33 The SGA has an important capacity development component which has enabled the TUC and some of its affiliate members to acquire new project planning and development skills, particularly to access funds for development awareness raising activities from other BSD related grant mechanisms such as the DAF. In 2009 the TUC submitted a successful DAF application for an innovative project linked to the sportswear supply for the forthcoming Olympics and aiming 'to raise the bar on workers rights'. The project has a longer history and was initially developed as a result of relations built up with Oxfam and Christian Aid around the time of the Make Poverty History Campaign.

3.34 These various funding channels could be consolidated within the new PPA which itself demonstrates that, despite the difficulties, the relationship has sustained. Relations between DFID, the wider development community and the TUC have been built up as a result of a number of catalysts, not exclusively related to the BSDS and the net effect has been positive. However confusions and misperceptions remain on both sides. Greater institutional understanding and dialogue is required. The fact that the PPA is being handled by the CSD and those responsible for the BSDS are no longer directly involved risks the old differences re-emerging and also reduces the opportunity for synergies across the wider development community.

**3.35 *Overall the engagement with trade unions has been effective. The trade union perspective on development has grown but DFID has not always played as supportive a role as it might have done. There is scope to develop and deepen the partnership and the new PPA provides the basis for this.***

### **Churches and Faith Communities**

3.36 The main Christian denominations have a long history of support for development that is grounded in their own policy and ideological position. These theological justifications are robust and sustainable, providing both personal and institutional substance to the commitment to reduce poverty and promote social justice. Whilst much charitable action is supported from a Christian perspective the formal arguments are deeper and more aligned with contemporary development thinking. The result has been a long term commitment that was key to establishing the earliest charitable and voluntary aid and development activity. Many of the established international development NGOs have their roots in Christian support even where the founders were from more secular traditions.

3.37 The churches were key actors in the emerging development awareness activity in the 1970's and 1980's. They played a significant role in pressing for increases in the aid and development budgets and in newer initiatives around ethical trading, human rights, and migration. Along with the international development FBOs the churches presented the most significant grouping of committed supporters of

development. It was this history that led to involvement in a series of key campaigns and set churches and faith communities as key partners for the BSDS.

3.38 Other faiths share a similar understanding of poverty and a justice perspective. Nevertheless, the diversity within and between traditions and between differing faith perspectives run counter to, and potentially disrupt, this shared vision. Whilst interfaith relations within the UK have developed considerably, significant areas of disagreement and tension remain. Based on the positive response of the Christian churches to the Jubilee Debt campaign (itself grounded in a biblical tradition shared with the Jewish faith and Islamic teaching) the BSDS objectives for faith communities was as we have noted both ambitious in its scope and scale (an international multi-faith alliance). It also set an agenda for these communities and their institutional structures that was beyond the remit of DFID.

3.39 In practice the entry point for DFID was the existing relationships with the development FBOs. At that stage these were limited to the Christian organisations, and specifically Christian Aid was assumed to be a conduit for engaging with the Christian Churches. This was complemented by a commissioned study which limited its analysis to describing differing faith positions rather than mapping the institutional framework<sup>10</sup>. Though the study recommended a new intermediary body DFID did not pursue this option, an appropriate decision as responsibility rested with the faith networks themselves.

3.40 As with other areas, engagement depended on pre-existing relationships and the presence of identifiable hierarchical structures. The Catholic Bishops' Conference and the Church of England proved accessible, whereas less hierarchically organised faiths were harder for DFID to approach.

3.41 Despite involvement in the DAWG, even the Christian Churches are not engaged with effectively. There were no proposed SGAs related to faith networks and contact has remained ad hoc and issue based. Bishops and Archbishops are invited to comment on development issues or attend events but substantive institutional engagement remains limited. The FBO entry point has itself become less effective as ecumenical collaboration has become less significant. Whilst Christian Aid has a strong support network with over 40 denominations, the major churches now have their own international development policy perspectives as part of their social policy infrastructure. Paradoxically, as ecumenical collaboration has become less of a priority interfaith dialogue has increased, and whilst in 1999 this was limited, today there are growing channels of communication and even space for joint action between faiths.

3.42 Just as FBOs were seen as the point of access to the Christian faith communities so FBOs of other faiths have become the perceived access point for their communities. The PPA with Islamic Relief, the MGS support to Muslim Aid and DAF support to Jewish development education organisations appear to be seen by DFID as key access points. This puts pressure on FBOs to 'represent' in areas where they are unable or unwilling to do so and also demonstrates a continued failure to commit the time to engage in effective dialogue with the less structured faith institutions.

3.43 The review found strong interest in engaging in constructive dialogue towards mutual understanding and the subsequent identification of shared agendas. However

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<sup>10</sup> Bonney R. and Hussain A. (2001) *Faith Communities and the Development Agenda*

we have also heard evidence of frustration and feelings of exclusion. Insufficient time was given to build relationships with the church and faith leaders and networks concerned with development. Aside from the DAF and MGS opportunities support was not provided to these faith networks, other than through the development FBOs. Where engagement was initiated (Make Poverty History, White Paper consultations, the Lambeth Conference, G8 and G20 activities), joint action resulted, suggesting that there is scope for building effective partnerships in this area.

**3.44 *The faith related BSD objective has not been effective and was clearly inappropriate at the time. However more substantive strategic engagement with faith communities was also not effectively developed. Faith communities continue to be amongst the strongest advocates of development and social justice. There has been increased engagement around the 2009 White Paper consultations and the current preparation of guidelines on DFID engagement which could form the basis for more effective dialogue.***

### **Local Government**

3.45 Local government was not an identified target in the BSDS; however, existing relationships with DFID and a strong international dimension to the UK's local government institutions provided a basis for what became an SGA. The key local government organisations established a separate UK Local Government Alliance for International Development (LG Alliance) primarily to access the SGA which was managed on behalf of its partners by the Local Government International Bureau (LGIB), and subsequently the International and European Division of the Local Government Association (LGA).

3.46 The LG Alliance partners cover the widest spectrum of UK local government (Solace, CLGF, NALC, IDEA and the LGA) who are working together on international development matters, including awareness-raising. Coordination has existed in this form for more than ten years and engagement with donors predates DFID, with for instance, partnerships with the World Bank on aspects of local governance, the relationship with ODA when LGA was the managing agent for support to capacity development of local authorities in East European transition and EU accession states, and the CLGF Good Practice Scheme (see para. 2.4). However the LGA never had a strategic relationship with DFID, always relating to individual departments around particular pieces of work. Rather like the TUC, the LGA felt that it has always struggled to convince DFID of the value addition of a UK local government relationship.

3.47 The SGA had some impact in that it enabled the LGA to scale up activities: more regional events, publications, websites, trainings and generally better awareness across the LG Alliance and among LGA members. Although difficult to fully attribute, as there was much interest at the time due to Make Poverty History, there is a sense that the SGA did begin a process of engagement and prompted new support for development within local government. However the relationship between DFID and UK local government did not flourish.

3.48 UK local government through the LGA has keen interest in Diaspora issues – local authorities in Bradford and Leicester in particular and those with strong links to Pakistan, India, and key African countries. There are also synergies around the community cohesion agenda and the LGA is a gateway for public engagement. Whilst there are differences of emphasis and understanding, the lack of a common

view on international experience of decentralisation does not seem to have been sufficient grounds for ending this strategic relationship.

3.49 As with the faith communities and the trade union experience, insufficient time and professional commitment seems to have been given to building mutual understanding. A strategic relationship between institutions with differing orientations and policy agendas but a significant arena of common interest needs more sensitive management and attention.

**3.50 *The SGA with the LG Alliance had limited effectiveness but the opportunity to engage the skills and commitment of UK local government and to draw on its links with local government systems internationally had significant benefits. The relationship could have been developed into a robust partnership. The current DAF grant is an inadequate substitute. The potential remains and a renewed dialogue between DFID and the LGA could provide the basis for a more effective partnership.***

### **Professional Associations**

3.51 It is strange that of the eight SGAs three were with professional associations. These were the BMA, NUJ and CIPFA. In many ways these seem parallel to the trade union relationships. There is little information available on the first two and interviews suggest that in both cases initial engagement with committed individuals was not sustained once an institutional relationship was in place. CIPFA is different. Here the professional body for public finance in the UK has played a key role in providing professional input, including consultancy services, to support DFID's engagement with public finance management internationally. However in all three cases the entry point was the sharing of professional expertise (rather like the CLGF Good Practice Scheme and some other linking models). This does not seem to have a clear link to the BSDS. These SGAs did not contribute to any of the objectives in the strategy and they seem to be examples of building initiatives on pre-existing relationships often mediated through individuals.

**3.52 *There are undoubted benefits to building interest within UK professional bodies about development. However without stronger institutional commitment on both sides these initiatives had limited strategic benefit. The SGAs were not effective instruments and this was one of the weakest elements of the BSDS implementation.***

### **BME Communities**

3.53 Aware of its limited understanding of the UK BME context, DFID commissioned the GIRT Report (see para. 2.31). The report explored the current relationship between DFID and BME groups, and identified three key issues that it believed could be addressed through close engagement with DFID:

- i. The need for greater clarity within and between DFID and UK BME civil society about the specific contribution it makes to international development and how it can be built on.
- ii. The need for DFID to communicate its role, and clarify understanding of international development and development awareness across UK BME civil society.
- iii. The need to build capacity within UK BME civil society.

3.54 This formed the basis of the decision to explore the potential for an SGA with a BME CSO. The SGA would focus on information sharing and capacity building of UK BME civil society, around strategies for poverty reduction in poor countries.

3.55 As discussed in chapter 2 the concept was sound, but the vehicle chosen – a new organisation, Connections for Development (CfD), instigated by DFID and not well embedded in the broader UK BME institutional context – was not.

3.56 The rationale articulated in the SGA with CfD itself - that there were inherent difficulties in trying to engage with UK BME civil society; that the size and diversity of BME civil society made it impossible for DFID to have direct contact with individual groups and networks in the same way as it did with other civil society groups; and that there was no consensus within BME civil society on an existing representative national structure that could negotiate with DFID – demonstrates the weakness in DFID's appreciation of the politics and organisational issues involved. Civil society is vast and complex. Seeking representation is always difficult. Whilst DFID had existing relationships with some networks – the development education community, the international development NGOs – it had no experience of engaging more generally with the 'third sector'. There does not appear to have been any discussion with the acknowledged conduits for policy dialogue (e.g. National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO), the various BME networks and intermediary bodies) and the venture seems to have been predicated on the possibility of forming a single institutional voice for BME interest in international development.

3.57 DFID was aware that BME civil society often understood development and development awareness differently. It knew that most members of BME civil society in the UK were unaware of DFID and had little idea of the international development targets. For this reason, DFID considered it vital that the BME sector was more aware of current development thinking.

3.58 If BME civil society could build on the experience it had gained working on advocacy and rights-based work in the UK, particularly in the context of influencing local government to improve access to services, these interventions might also enable it to replicate these approaches in the south. In this respect the SGA strategy for CfD reflected many of the other SGA strategies in that it contained both domestic and international dimensions; the latter being predicated on a particular accountability role for civil society in the south.

3.59 The notion that CfD would 'bring together diverse segments of UK BME civil society, providing leadership and enabling debate, shared learning and collaboration for actions on international development issues' (CfD SGA, 2003) failed to consider the inevitable conflicts among such a diverse network; particularly one that never really graduated beyond the formative stage as personnel on both sides of the partnerships were constantly changing.

**3.60 *The creation of a network of BME voluntary and community organisations and individuals which aimed to mobilise BME civil society for action on development was an admirable vision but the expectations were unrealistic, particularly within the constraints of a three-year timeframe. There is scope for DFID engagement with BME civil society working with existing networks and established groups. Support through the DAF and MGS has become more effective and provides a possible base for a more strategic approach.***

## Diaspora Groups

3.61 Whilst the CfD relationship did not meet DFID expectations, it did facilitate new BME partnerships and linkages. Some CfD member organisations became partners of the 'diversity unit' within VSO, an initiative started by VSO in response to the challenge that VSO volunteers were predominantly recruited from white middle class society. In this respect BME partners, sensitised in part by the CfD experience, became part of a drive for VSO to be more inclusive.

3.62 It was at this point that the VSO diversity programme expanded with the benefit of core funding from the Big Lottery Fund. The organisation started to consult Diaspora communities to understand their capacity development needs with a view to starting a volunteering programme linked to their countries of heritage and an initial small scale 'Diaspora Volunteering Initiative (DVI)' began.

3.63 The 2006 White Paper proposed an expansion of BSD activity with increases in funding for development education and proposals for Diaspora volunteering schemes (see annex 3 and para. 3.14 check). VSO was invited to submit a bid for a Diaspora volunteering programme and offered funding for three years in addition to its PPA. The one change made to the partnership selection process was a requirement for partners to be focused on MDGs rather than VSO core strategic priorities. It is worthy of note that the Chair of CfD was also the chair of the VSO DVI grants committee. The earlier diversity initiative was reconceptualised as a 'Diaspora pilot' and the DFID funding enabled scale-up from a base of five foundational partnerships: AFFORD, Africa Foundation Stone, Asian Foundation for Philanthropy, Africa Recruit, and Rebuild. The programme has now grown to 18 partnerships and can be judged a success as many returned volunteers become active agents in building support for development with their own communities and beyond.

3.64 An additional effect has been that the capacity building element of the programme has enabled some of the organisations to improve their professionalism, evidenced by a greater success rate in applying for the BSD DAF grant mechanism. Both AFFORD and the Asian Foundation for Philanthropy been awarded two DAF grants since being involved with VSO.

3.65 The programme has certainly helped VSO learn how to work in sensitive UK partnerships and to develop important partnership skills such as flexibility and a supportive long-term approach. It has, as yet, been difficult to quantify impact beyond that of organisational development and the community influence of returned volunteers.

3.66 In December 2008, a more open partnership recruitment process was initiated by VSO and efforts were made to 'spread the partnerships in terms of faith'. Emphasis was placed on forming partnerships with Muslim community groups and four new partnerships were established with: Kashmir International Relief Fund, Nottingham Muslim Community Organisation, Somali Progressive Association in Cardiff, and Hamara.

**3.67 Overall Diaspora focused initiatives have had insufficient time to demonstrate impact. However the early signs of organic development by VSO and its partners are positive. The engagement with smaller Diaspora groups and their response to capacity building support is another potentially positive development. Diaspora initiatives seem to have benefited from the lessons of early experience and have potential as entry points for DFID engagement.**

## **Effectiveness of BSDS Civil Society Interventions**

3.68 With relatively modest resources compared to the major development education investment, the BSDS set ambitious objectives for engagement with civil society, especially as some of these entailed developing new partnerships and institutional relationships. However the interventions were confined to traditional grant support especially once administrative resources were curtailed from 2004.

3.69 The SGA instrument was an appropriate model for providing financial support to enable relationship building with organisations and institutional fora where there was a limited shared agenda around development but clear synergies and common commitments. The requirement was, however, for greater investment in dialogue and partnership rather than funding. The pressure on human resources and the need for increased skill and space for partnership engagement limited the effectiveness. The DAF funding was too small and once contracted out lacked the hands on engagement of DFID so was inappropriate for these new relationships where mutual understanding was essential and sustained engagement was critical.

3.70 As in many situations DFID suffers from institutional impatience. Whilst the BSD required monitoring and revision at least every three years, the relationships and partnerships required at least the ten years that have elapsed to develop effectively. Building deeper appreciation within civil society of the nature of development discourse in the post 1997 context was a substantial task. Equally the assumption that the initial strong sense of partnership and participation (see para 2.17) would be sustained was a misconception.

***3.71 Some individual outputs and opportunities have a lot to commend them. However, the overall effectiveness of the BSD programme of engagement with civil society is modest at best. There is a wealth of good will and support for DFID's challenging task amongst civil society stakeholders. To capitalise on this DFID needs to be more open to continued dialogue around the shared agenda, more modest in its expectations, and willing to identify mutually achievable and realistic short term targets with adequate monitoring and lesson learning.***

## 4. EFFICIENCY

4.1 Efficiency in this case relates to the level and utilisation of resources, both human and financial, to achieve the BSDS objectives. The review looked at overall budgets for BSDS and associated activities. In particular it focused on those of the Civil Society Team and subsequently CSD, which until 2007 was closely associated with the BSD Team. An assessment is made of the spread of financial resources across the BSD objectives and target groups. For the civil society focused objectives of the BSDS (i.e. those relating to Business and Trades Union, and Churches and Faith Groups) the specific application of human and financial resources is reviewed together with an assessment of the necessary skills and competencies.

4.2 Prior to 1997 BSD activities had a very modest budget. From 1997 the budget has risen from £1.3 million to £19 million in 2008/9 (see Annex 4 for details), a rate of increase above that of DFID's overall budget but still relatively modest for the whole of the UK focused activities, other than general information and communications. Until 2006 budget and expenditure reporting was not disaggregated other than to identify the SGA element. Thus the budget line shown as development awareness in Annex 4 accounts for all the BSDS spend (aside from SGA). Annex 4 shows the growth of PPA expenditures alongside BSDS and the other spending lines for CSD.

4.3 The table in Annex 4 also reflects the changing management arrangements as the BSDS developed. The key points are that:

- The original BSD activities were developed within the Information Department with one person responsible for the initial programme in 1997/98 supported by an information officer – effectively DFID's press office.
- By 1999 when the BSDS was published the team had grown to seven members, four staff in what was called the DAF Team and three in the Publicity Team reporting direct to the Head of Department. Together the two teams comprised the Information Department managed alongside the CSD.
- With the first DFID communications strategy in 2003 the DAF, Publicity, Public Enquiry Point (PEP) and External Communications Teams were organised within the Building Support for Development Team with an External Communications & Development Education Head of Department.
- In 2005 SGA management moved into the team from CSD and the establishment increased to some 19.6 fulltime equivalent staff.
- DFID's building support for development work has remained within communications division and, with the publication of a further internal Communications Strategy in 2007, the division expanded and was consolidated in the London office. The BSD Team became the Outreach and Stakeholder Relations Team with 6 staff focusing exclusively on the BSD agenda. Meanwhile CSD has remained in the East Kilbride office becoming part of the Policy and Research Division (PRD).

4.4 The review has been able to track expenditures back to 2004 and a summary of this data is presented in the table below which shows the trends within the BSD programme over the last five years. As can be seen education continues to have the lion's share of the budget. The reduction since 2007 is due simply to the introduction of the new volunteering programmes and education continuing to grow significantly

in cash terms. In fact about 80% of the Mini Grants (MGS) are also for educational activities but this budget line has not been disaggregated here.

4.5 The BSDS activities with business, trades unions, faith, BME and the other civil society groups were negligible in 1999/2000, with most of the £3.7m budget devoted to development education and the ongoing media commitments. By 2004/05 activities with business, trades unions, faith, BME and the other civil society groups accounted for some 15% of the budget (if the MGS is split) and some 25% if the one off expenditure on the Rough Guide for a Better World (RGBW) is included (this was accounted for separately as part of the publicity budget). From this high point the ending of the SGAs saw a reducing amount allocated to these objectives. The introduction of Diaspora and youth volunteering has seen an increase since 2007 returning to around 25%. However the volunteering programmes were not included in the original BSDS objectives and, aside from the Trade Union PPA, spending related to the three objectives focused on FBOs and the Churches and Business and the Trade Unions is now limited to a small proportion of DAF and MGS grants.

**Table 1: Approximate Spend in £millions**

	1999/00		2004/5		2008/9		2009/10 Budget	
Media			£0.28	4%	£0.43	3%	£0.74	3%
Dev Ed			£5.50	73%	£8.60	64%	£15.20	63%
SGA			£0.85	11%	£0.06	1%		
DAF (not ed)			£0.30	4%	£0.80	6%	£1.00	4%
MinGrant			£0.44	6%	£0.55	4%	£0.69	3%
Trade Unions			£0.13	2%	now supported by a PPA within CSD			
Youth/Diaspora Vol & Linking					£3	22%	£6.13	26%
Other							£0.24	1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>£3.70</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>£7.50</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>£13.44</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>£24.00</b>	<b>100%</b>

Notes: 1. 1999/00 details not available  
 2. Dev Ed includes education share of DAF and for 2009/10 new DGSP budget  
 3. MiniGrant figure is total. Over 75% is education

4.6 The review thus finds a low level of spend on the civil society related objectives (business, trade unions and faith) and later activities (BME and Diaspora) with some 75% of the BSDS budget devoted to education across the whole ten years. For the specific business, trade unions and faiths objectives the expenditure was very small indeed and outside the SGAs was not based on a strategic engagement with these civil society networks but relied on the competitive funding through the DAF and MGS.

4.7 With this level of resourcing the limited effectiveness of the DFID support is not surprising. Despite this limited contribution the trade union, local government, and faith communities' engagement and support for development has been very encouraging, relying largely upon support from within these networks themselves.

4.8 The staffing for BSDS in the first five years grew in proportion to the activity base. The team were required to engage with civil society in the preparation of the strategy (supported by the DAWG) and subsequently in implementation. Across the programme key staff engaged extensively with other stakeholders. This was widely reported during the review in the education and media sectors as well as with respect to civil society. In the latter case the development of the SGA instrument and the negotiation of the specific agreements brought the DFID team into close contact

with their civil society partners. This level of engagement was essential if the new focus and the expectations of the relationships were to be effectively shared. As noted in the previous chapter staff reduction in 2005 came just as the SGAs were becoming established.

4.9 Whilst there had been a degree of stability in the BSD team during the early years, from 2005 staff changes became more frequent and closer to the usual DFID 3-year cycle. The focus of staff attention has shifted subsequently with more time required to manage the growing DAF and MGS grant arrangements and subsequently, the contracting out of the DAF, and also the growth of other 'project' activities – the Diaspora and youth volunteering, and community links schemes. In addition the education and media programmes have made increasing project management demands as budgets have grown.

4.10 The net effect of staff reductions and turnover has reinforced this emphasis on the more traditional project management roles. The emphasis since 2005 has moved away from close engagement with the civil society partners who had been supported through SGAs or who were the key access points with business, trade unions, churches and other networks.

4.11 Building support for development, by its very nature, requires engagement around that agenda. Seeking to reach new constituencies required specific skills in engagement and also skills and understanding of civil society and its composition and dynamics. The CfD experience highlighted where limited understanding of UK BME civil society and of the process of organisational and institutional change and development weakened the impact. The BSD team has never had the benefit of adviser expertise in education, the media, social inclusion, social development or governance; skill sets that would seem appropriate to the task. In addition the specific UK nature of the task requires a level of knowledge and understanding of UK civil society and policy engagement which may suggest skills outside the usual DFID domain.

4.12 A fast growing and broad range of activities have been managed in an administratively efficient manner. Most grants from the smallest MGS to the largest education programme been administered well and where problems have occurred DFID has handled the issues sensitively and in a transparent way.

4.13 The early flexibility and scope for engagement has declined over time. Policy level engagement has reduced and excessive time is devoted to administrative oversight and reporting. Further, the skills required for BSD engagement do not seem to have been taken into account. Relevant professional expertise, ideally with a strong UK perspective, is essential if senior managers, policy makers and decision makers in these spheres are to be effectively engaged. If the organisational and capacity building activities are contracted out, as is appropriate, these hands on skills are not required but an appreciation of the processes and challenges is required if the strategy is to become more effective.

## 5. IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY

5.1 The BSDS was a bold and significant move to further development education, development awareness and support for development through action by the public and civil society partners. Whilst the opinion poll research commissioned by DFID shows relatively static levels of awareness, many interviewees report a changing situation over the last ten years. Public awareness of the global agenda, the interconnectedness of political and social processes and events have increased, even if the responses to specific development related surveys do not reflect these trends. Many of the potential civil society partners – in the trade unions, churches, faith communities, BME communities and others – continue to pursue their own organisational strategies in relation to development and international affairs. Faith communities remain active and engaged; international networks of trade unions, businesses and local government have grown and extended; and FBOs have grown within the international development NGO sector, especially those grounded in non Christian faiths. These developments at the macro-, public and civil society institutional levels cannot be attributed to BSDS. However the presence of a strong Government commitment to international development supported by a rapidly increasing budget is widely appreciated and clearly acts as a catalyst.

5.2 Whilst lacking in strategic focus many of the activities supported by the BSDS have had value either at local level or for the groups concerned. Whilst less marked than in formal education, BSD support to civil society has resulted in engagement at the local level and, though short lived in some cases, the SGA support to local government, trade unions and other networks has also had impact at local level.

5.3 However, small disconnected activities, no matter how good, are unlikely to be sustained and are unable to be taken to scale and impact on larger communities. The failure to develop effective partnerships with the initial target audiences and groups, especially businesses and faith communities, has weakened the impact.

5.4 After ten years it is salutatory to have to record that if the monitoring and evaluation proposed in the BSDS had taken place the review could have reported more confidently on impact. It is never too late to put monitoring systems in place in existing and new activities. Further, given the criticisms of the opinion poll based evidence<sup>11</sup>, more sophisticated evaluation of changes in perception of and support for development, as well as of individual programmes, is required if attributable impact is to be identified.

5.5 Many civil society actors now expect a lead in BSD to be taken by DFID. The engagement of Government at political and bureaucratic levels is welcome but there are risks in this assumption. Not least, policies change and sustainability is put at risk. More fundamentally, impact will only be sustained when civil society at large - i.e. the general public and all the ways in which it organises - takes the development agenda seriously. The partnership with government is critical but partnerships need to be two way and robust enough to be mutually independent and critical.

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<sup>11</sup> See for example van Heerde, J. and Hudson, D. 'The righteous considereth the cause of the poor?' Public attitudes towards poverty in development countries, and 'A mile wide and an inch deep': A review and critique of existing surveys on public opinion on development.

## **6. LESSONS LEARNT**

### **Strategy Planning and Development**

- Strategies to build support for development need to be closely linked to the respective international development policies. The BSD was grounded in the 1997 White Paper which gave it credibility and substance. Revisions following the subsequent White Papers would have ensured the policy focus was maintained. The 2009 White Paper reaffirms the role of civil society and provides a strong basis for reframing the BSDS.
- Objectives that are specific, time bound and measurable are more effective. In new areas of work with new partners, shorter term process based objectives are more relevant. The education and media objectives were based on experience whereas the civil society objectives were set at too high a level and were too vague to drive implementation activity. Again revision in the light of experience and DFID current priorities would be appropriate.
- Public communications strategies and public engagement approaches need clear purpose, sound conceptual frameworks and well considered and measurable delivery plans.
- Strategies need to have built in review mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation frameworks, and institutionalised learning processes, that are themselves resourced.
- Gender is often an afterthought. Even when things are written still nothing is done. Guidelines for integrating gender and diversity dimensions need to be supplemented with soft accountability mechanisms.
- Key messages should be shaped with support from strategic partners and public engagement strategies developed with the respective civil society partners in order to ensure messages gain traction with specific audiences.
- Strong civil society partners have their own policies, priorities and agendas. DFID's BSD strategy will be more effective if it seeks to find the overlaps and synergies rather than assuming it can always take the policy lead.
- BSD is a two way process. DFID needs to consider how it can build effect processes for stakeholder engagement and discourse, together with support to its partners that extends beyond the funding of project activity.

### **Programme Partnerships**

- DFID needs to consider why and how it should engage with different public constituencies; there is not a one size fits all strategy that can be encapsulated in a common strategic grant agreement. In so much as each audience needs a tailored message, each large membership organisations might need a more considered approach for public engagement.
- The Strategic Grant Agreement (SGA) was an imaginative innovation that was appropriate to relationship building with civil society institutions that did not have a development focus as their primary purpose. However, the focus remained on the money rather than the relationship. Priority should have been given to developing mutual understanding, establishing a framework for policy dialogue and listening to each other.

- If an umbrella body does not exist there is probably a good reason why. DFID cannot create new UK civil society organisations but it can nurture existing ones, through relations characterised by common vision, shared values and mutual respect.
- Civil society partnerships (e.g. Diaspora and BME partnership) extend beyond individual bi-lateral funded projects. They should be longer term and more joined up. Whatever the entry point (e.g. volunteering, linking, a DAF or MGS grant) a sustained stakeholder relationship is required that can connect across DFID and ensure continuity and learning.
- Outsourcing grant management does not mean that responsibility for public engagement and stakeholder relationships should also be outsourced. DFID needs to have devoted resources to build and maintain strategic relations, ensure collaboration and mutual learning.
- Where DFID is the sole or major funder of civil society activity, as much care needs to be taken in planning and implementing exit processes as to planning and implementing entry processes.

### **Public Engagement and Stakeholder Relationships**

- The moral imperatives and commitments to social justice informed by ideology, faith and belief provide the strongest and most sustained drivers for support for development. DFID can be pro-active in providing support to its partners to increase their effectiveness in these arenas.
- In the context of public engagement communications, DFID could re-position itself as a facilitator, listener and learner and be less instrumentalist; it is more effective to learn together than always be seeking to influence others.
- Civil society is sophisticated and multi-layered; DFID is not necessarily the first choice when the public is seeking information on international development. Encouraging a broad and diverse range of choices can be an effective vehicle for increasing public engagement.
- DFID can play a more effective role as a knowledge hub with respect to development. To do so it needs to become more demand led and interactive, allowing the public to engage with its web platforms in interactive and creative ways.
- Information, Public Engagement, and Stakeholder Relationships are all aspects of the communications function – they require different skills and approaches. DFID needs to strengthen its capacity, especially in building, maintaining and managing its stakeholder relationships with civil society partners.

## **7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

7.1 The Building Support for Development Strategy was a bold and ambitious commitment to seek to work with other public, private and civil society actors in support of international development. It was an initiative that was of its time. A recent change of Government, a new international development policy framework, and a strong commitment to increase resources and broaden the agenda resonated with DFID's identified partners.

7.2 This alliance and the common agenda could not be maintained; indeed it would have been surprising and counterproductive if such a wide spectrum of interests and commitments had continued to focus around the DFID programme. What was required was an intense period of relationship building so that a range of partnerships and institutional networks could be established to take forward the strategy in ways that affirmed the differences.

7.3 This proved in the case of education, and to a degree with the media, where there was a history of collaboration, examples of good practice and a willingness to think creatively. For the other audiences and target groups identified in the strategy insufficient attention was paid to understanding the institutional architecture and building relationships of mutual trust before moving into joint activities and funded work. In the case of business no significant relationships emerged. In the case of the trade unions, a continuing relationship has been established but acknowledged tensions and misunderstandings remain, fuelled by a failure to listen to and appreciate each other's context and approach. With respect to churches and faith communities there was a lack of appreciation of the institutional complexities. As a consequence no sustained relationships have been established at an institutional level with any faith communities. There are concerns amongst the faith communities that DFID is not genuine in its desire for partnership and does not appreciate their depth of commitment to development. As a result none of the three civil society related objectives in the BSDS for Business and Trades Unions and Churches and Faith Groups were met.

7.4 There is a lot of positive interest in development, and more recently issues of sustainability and climate change in the private sector, but no systemic set of relationships with businesses on which to develop joint initiatives. The funding agreement with the TUC complements the TUC's own international development agenda and can be the basis for a shared programme of more extensive trade union support for development. The Christian churches have deepened their commitment to social justice and have developed policies and programmes of action in addition to their support for faith based NGOs. There has also been marked growth in interfaith dialogue and engagement. Amongst faith leaders in the UK there are emerging formal linkages with the potential for more structured engagement. Now is an opportune time for DFID to seek a new engagement with faith communities based on the renewed commitment of the 2009 White Paper.

7.5 The later focus on BME communities was appropriate but relied too much on the CfD initiative. However key players in the same network have remained engaged through the Diaspora based initiatives and there is increasing interest in development within UK BME communities. Working with these specific programmes to build trust and understanding with BME organisations and communities may be more profitable in the next phase of engagement. Not all those with historic or traditional links respond in the same way; not all third and fourth generation young

people wish to volunteer and their elders may not always be supportive. Individual project initiatives need to be developed with care and sensitivity and the engagement with whole communities should not stand or fall on the success of specific projects.

7.6 The BSDS programme with civil society broke new ground. Mistakes were inevitable and are the basis of good lessons learning. More time was required and more attention to engagement and learning. Though relatively small compared to the commitments to education, funding increased but was not matched with the level of staff time and expertise necessary to engage effectively with DFID's partners. Lack of contact, lack of continuity, failure to listen, mutual accountability, but a willingness to try again and deepen the engagement are the messages the review has heard consistently from all partners.

7.7 Support for development should be an integral part of DFID's policy. A reframed BSD Strategy based on the commitments in the 2009 White Paper with a more limited set of objectives for selected audiences and partners and a shared approach to monitoring, evaluation and regular review is, on the basis of this review, relevant and appropriate.

7.8 The review has been impressed with the extent of support for DFID's efforts overall and with respect to BSD in particular. Whilst the public may not know the name or the policy, those who are committed, and the institutions they work within, appreciate what was done in 1997 and what has been achieved since. There is a desire to work together and to ensure continuity. The BSDS has played a part in inviting this response and DFID should continue in a more strategic and focused way to play its part in Building Support for Development including support for both the UK Government's policy, programme and budget and those of its civil society partners.

## **Recommendations**

### **Strategic Level**

1. DFID should seek to build and sustain relationships with all core constituencies in civil society with a focus on wider public engagement and the development of deeper stakeholder relationships with key networks notably faith communities, trades unions, the private sector and BME communities.
2. DFID should give higher priority within the BSD Strategy to civil society audiences and institutions, resourcing this work financially and with appropriate staff engagement.

### **Operational Level**

3. The Outreach and Stakeholder Relations Team (OSRT) should identify revised BSD outcomes for developing engagement with key civil society stakeholder networks with specific, time bound, indicators.
4. Civil Society Department should integrate the Diaspora and Youth Volunteering work within the respective PPAs with VSO and Christian Aid and agree monitoring indicators and processes with OSRT.
5. Civil Society Department should integrate all support to trade unions through the TUC PPA again linking with OSRT to develop the stakeholder relationship.

6. DFID's engagement with the private sector should be coordinated more effectively including a focus on building support for development through business linkages.
7. DFID should identify new BSD outcomes for work with faith communities, working collaboratively with the network through a mutually agreed institutional framework.
8. DFID should strengthen the level of expertise within the responsible staff team/s (across the Policy and Research Division and the Communications Division) with a particular focus on UK civil society, social inclusion, and institutional analysis.
9. A mechanism for identifying lead roles and the management of stakeholder relationships with civil society institutions beyond traditional NGOs/CSOs should be developed jointly by CSD and Communications Division to ensure that DFID's civil society expertise and strategic communications skills are combined.
10. Funding instruments and financial support should follow the establishment of institutional relationships and not vice versa.
11. Civil Society Department should review the links between the UK and international programmes of NGOs and CSOs and ensure that the synergies are reinforced through the support provided by all the various funding arrangements, with specific targets related to building support for development in all cases.
12. DFID's Management Board should ensure Communications Division and Civil Society Department work together effectively to reframe the BSD Strategy and the related stakeholder relationships.

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## Terms of Reference

### Review of DFID's Efforts to Build Support for Development through work with businesses, trades unions, faith, BME and diaspora groups

#### Background

1. In 1999 DFID produced a Building Support for Development Strategy Paper (BSDSP) which lays out how DFID intended to raise public awareness and understanding of international development issues within the UK. This identified the need to build development awareness and support within:
  - the Education Sector;
  - the Media;
  - Business and Trade Unions;
  - Churches and Faith groups.
2. Work funded by DFID to implement the strategy focussed on the education sector and the media. However, some efforts were made by the team primarily responsible for the BSDSP to work with faith groups and the trades unions. Other teams in DFID have also carried out significant work in relation to business, churches and faith groups:
  - the civil society department has funded work with trades unions and faith groups and worked with the churches e.g. on the Call to Action;
  - recently the Call to Action team and the Business Alliances Team have worked with businesses.
3. DFID has also made some efforts to build development awareness, support and involvement by BME and diaspora groups e.g. starting in 2008 a Diaspora Volunteering Programme.
4. In terms of current roles and responsibilities within DFID for increasing development awareness and support amongst businesses, trades unions, faith, BME and diaspora groups, this is as follows:
  - the Business Alliances Team is responsible for work with business;
  - the Civil Society Team works with churches and faith groups on their involvement in global campaigns and advocacy in development issues;
  - the Equity and Rights Team, Civil Society Department, Africa Division and the Outreach and Stakeholder Relations Team all have some role on diaspora groups.

#### Objective

5. To assess: what DFID has done to build development awareness, support and involvement in the UK through work with businesses, trades unions, faith, BME and diaspora groups; what we know about the impact of this work; and whether there are any strategic gaps that the Outreach and Stakeholder Relations Team should seek to cover in future.

#### Scope

6. The review should address / cover the following key issues / questions:
  - **the history of DFID's efforts in to build support for development through businesses, trades unions, faith, BME and diaspora groups**, covering how this developed and, in particular, the *rationale* for this, and what human and financial resources have been employed. This should set out the work undertaken by the team responsible for the BSDSP itself and, separately, by other DFID teams. A short summary of the recent work carried out in relation to businesses is all that is required;

- **the implementation of the BSDSP:** How much progress has been made against the objectives set out in the BSDSP in relation to businesses, trades unions, churches and faith groups
- **definitions:** in the interventions that DFID has funded how have 'development awareness' and 'support for development' tended to be defined? How should DFID define them in future (taking into account the success measures in DFID's internal communications strategy);
- **gender:** have DFID funded interventions drawn attention to the importance of gender equality for development? How could and should this be done better in future?
- **the impact of the DFID's efforts to date.** What do we know about this? What positive changes have occurred as a result of DFID efforts (taking into account the changing climate of UK knowledge and perceptions of global issues)? Particular activities which have led to positive achievements should be highlighted as good practice examples. Shortfalls and any unforeseen achievements or unexpected outcomes should be noted.
- **the changing context for DFID's work.** Have key changes taken place within British society since 1999 that should impact on how DFID seeks to build support for development through trades unions, faith, BME and diaspora groups? What pointers / evidence do we have about this?
- **other UK Government agendas and roles:** how does DFID's work to build development support through diaspora groups etc. fit with these e.g. the community cohesion agenda? Could coordination and synergies be improved and if so, how?
- **knowledge and understanding of aid institutions and the UK Government's role:** to what extent have DFID funded initiatives attempted to generate understanding of aid policy and architecture and specifically of the UK Government's and DFID's own roles and how successful have any such efforts been? How realistic is it to attempt to generate such understanding? How could this best be achieved within what DFID is funding now and could fund in future?
- **recommendations for the future.** Given the above, and taking into account the work already going on in DFID in relation to businesses, trades unions, faith, BME and diaspora groups, are there any strategic gaps (i.e. important in terms of building development awareness and support) that the Outreach and Stakeholder Relations Team should seek to fill in future through funding interventions?

### Method

7. The review will include analysis of key documents and interviews with stakeholders. Initial lists of key stakeholders and documents are provided below.

### Deliverables

8. These are as follows:
  - A draft report no more than 30 pages long covering the issues and questions listed under Scope above with an Executive Summary of no more than 10 pages. This should be submitted to DFID electronically. It must be clearly laid out and easy to read.
  - A final report taking into account comments from DFID. DFID will provide comments on the draft report within four weeks. A final report taking into account DFID's comments should then be submitted within one week of the consultants receiving the comments. Three hard copies of the final report as well as an electronic version should be provided to DFID.
  - A presentation of the draft report findings to DFID and a final presentation.

## Inputs and Timing

9. Up to 20 days of work by a consultant with:

- a good knowledge of methods for increasing awareness among the UK public of international development issues;
- a proven ability to grapple with ideas, strategies and activities that aim to create change in 'external' institutions and amongst individuals.

## DFID Co-ordination

10. The consultant will report to Jenny Yates, Head Outreach and Stakeholder Relations Team. Cathy Welch, Programme Manager, Communities and Faith, Outreach and Stakeholder Relations Team, will also provide guidance and support.

## Stakeholders for Interview and Documents for Review

11. The following are indicative lists only and the consultant is expected to take a proactive approach to identifying additional documents and stakeholders for review / interview.

### *Stakeholders for Interview*

<b>Name</b>	<b>Position &amp; Organisation</b>
Mike Green	Former Head of DFID Information and Civil Society Dept. 2003-7
Frances Burns	Former Head of BSD Team, ICSD
Scott Sinclair	Director of TIDE
Doug Bourn	Director, DERC
Diana Dalton	Former Head of BSD Team 2005-2008 (now in Evaluation Dept.)
Shirley Addies	Building Support for Development Team 2004-2008 (now Research Manager, Human Development Group, Central Research Dept.)
Peter Kerby	Deputy Head of Civil Society Dept. DFID
Lone Sorenson	Team Leader, Stakeholder Management, Civil Society Dept. DFID
Daniel Graymore	Former Head of Business Alliances Team and now Deputy Head Africa Regional Dept., DFID
Peter Gordon	Equity and Rights Team (leads on Migration), Policy and Research Dept., DFID

### *Documents for Review*

Getting It Right Together, DFID 2001

Documents relating to Building Support for Development Team strategic grant agreement with the TUC

Africa Division 2008 report on engagement by DFID with the African diaspora

Moving out of poverty – making migration work better for poor people, DFID, April 2007

Jenny Yates DFID March 2009

## People Interviewed

Name	Position	Organisation
<b>DFID</b>		
Natalie Acton	Deputy Director Strategic Communications	Communications Division
Jenny Yates	Head	Outreach and Stakeholder Relations 2008 - current
Roy Trivedy	Team Leader	2009 White Paper Team
Peter Kirby	Acting Head	Civil Service Department
Margaret Robinson	Policy Officer	CSD
Lone Sorenson	Team Leader	CSD
Steve Nally	Team Leader	CSD
Lorraine Healy	Stakeholder Manager	CSD
Colette O'Neill	Stakeholder Manager	CSD
Colin McGinty	Stakeholder Manager	CSD
Christine Edwards	Deputy Programme Manager	CSD
David Gray	Senior Governance Adviser	DFID
Peter Gordon	Equity and Rights Team (lead on migration)	Policy and Research Division
Richard Calvert	Director Information Department and subsequently Information and Civil Society Department 1998-2002	
Mike Green	Head Information and Civil Society Department 2003-2007	
Frances Burns	Head Building Support for Development (BSD) Team	
Diana Dalton	Head BSD Team 2005-2008; Now Evaluation Dept	
John Murray	Former BSD Team 1998 – Now Evaluation Dept.	
James Medhurst	Former BSD Team 2005-2008	
Shirley Addies	Former Programme Manager BSD Team 2004-2008; Now Research Manager, Human Development Group, Central Research Dept.	
Daniel Graymore	Former Head Business Alliance Team; Now Deputy Head Africa Regional Dept	
<b>Other Organisations</b>		
Scott Sinclair	Director	TIDE
Doug Bourn	Director	Development Education research Centre, Institute of Education, London University
Hetan Shan	Chief Executive	Development Education Association
David Hudson	Lecturer in International Relations and Political Economy	University College London
Jennifer van Heerde	Lecturer in Research Methods	University College London
Nick Roseveare	Chief Executive	BOND
Glen Tarman	Advocacy and Representation Manager	BOND
Jude Mckenzie	Director Advocacy and Communications	Christian Aid
Matthew Reed	Director Stakeholder Relations	Christian Aid
Mark Vyner	Manager Platform2	Christian Aid

Gill Amas	Head of Communications and Campaigns	CARE International UK
Joseph O'Reilly	International Development Project	Association of Teachers and Lecturers
Cathryn Gathercole	Education Manager	Practical Action
James Beadle	International Programme Manager	UK Local Government Association
Celia Mather	Consultant	Advisory Boards DEA
Bala Thakrer	Chief Executive	Asia Foundation for Philanthropy
Anne McCabe	Act Head of Stakeholder Engagement	VSO
Evelyn Rodrigues	DVI Programme Officer	VSO
Anne Watson	International Development Advisor	TUC
Gemma Freedman	International Programmes Officer	TUC
Belinda Aguilas	Policy and Campaigns Director	Action Aid
Caroline Rickatson	International Director	CIPFA
Charles Reed	Secretary International Development	Church of England
Robin Morrison	Provincial Social Affairs Adviser to the Bishops	Church in Wales
Peter Grant	International Director	TearFund
Gillian Temple	Head of Education	Oxfam
Peter Davis	GB Education and Youth – International Coordinator	Oxfam
Abdul Aziz Rajab Ali	Deputy Manager	Islamic Relief (UK)
Muhammad Imran	Manager Development Education	Islamic Relief International
<b>Written Submissions or Notes</b>		
Helen Stawaski	Archbishop of Canterbury's Staff	Deputy Secretary on International Development
Maranda St John Nicholl	Director	Christian Concern for One World
Hetan Shan	Director	DEA
Sarah Fishwick	Global Education Adviser	Dioceses of Ripon & Leeds and Bradford

### UK Government Policy in Relation to the Building Support for Development Programme (1997-2009)

Date	Policy Document	Policy Focus	Policy Relevance & Influence
1997	DFID White Paper	<p><b>Eliminating World Poverty: A challenge for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century</b></p> <p>Foundational policy paper: recognised need to increase public understanding of mutual dependence &amp; for international development.</p> <p>Commitment to reverse decline in UK development assistance, to achieve 0.7% UN target.</p> <p>Desire to raise awareness through information provision to children &amp; partnership with civil society. Strong focus on formal education system.</p>	<p>DFID publishes BSD strategy paper in April 1999.</p> <p>Civil society groups &amp; educationalists in development awareness working group (DAWG) participate in drafting process.</p> <p>Strategy recognises importance of existing development education work undertaken by network of development education centres &amp; others in the voluntary sector. Seeks to change public perceptions: to go beyond compassion &amp; charity &amp; to break out of the groups traditionally regarded as sympathetic to development &amp; reach new audiences right across society.</p> <p>Strategy contains four objectives, with specific objectives against each of four target groups: formal education, the media, business &amp; trade unions, &amp; churches &amp; faiths. Aims to raise awareness, change behaviour &amp; attitudes.</p> <p>No specific strategic objectives for BME/Diaspora.</p>
2000	DFID White Paper	<p><b>Making Globalisation Work for The Poor:</b></p> <p>Reaffirms commitment to UN targets, to development education, particularly to awareness-raising on globalisation &amp; sustainability through global dimension in schools. New priority to strengthen the voices of civil society in developing countries &amp; state accountability.</p>	<p>Majority of DAF/MG funding proposals seek to 'embed the global dimension' in the school curriculum.</p>
2001	ICSD Report	<p><b>Getting It Right Together: Black &amp; Minority Groups &amp; DFID's Development Agenda</b></p> <p>DFID seeks to be more inclusive &amp; extend reach but recognises difficulty in developing contact with individual BME groups &amp; networks.</p>	<p>DFID facilitates dialogue with BME actors with a view to creating umbrella organisation as sector focal point.</p>
2002	International Development Act	<p>New act empowers DFID to promote domestic awareness of global poverty &amp; methods for reducing it.</p>	<p>Paves the way for the introduction of strategic grant agreements (SGAs) with organisations whose primary purpose was not development but who have a contribution to make to development.</p>

<b>Date</b>	<b>Policy Document</b>	<b>Policy Focus</b>	<b>Policy Relevance &amp; Influence</b>
2002	Office for Standards in Education	<p><b>Citizenship: Survey Report.</b></p> <p>4 years after influential Crick Report (DEE, 1998: education for citizenship &amp; teaching democracy in schools), citizenship education becomes statutory part of national curriculum in secondary schools &amp; non-statutory in primary schools.</p>	EES, DAF & MG fund mechanism used to develop capacities & resources to embed global dimensions in citizenship curriculum. Debate about whether global dimensions should only be taught through citizenship or through whole school.
2003	Home Office Strategy	<p><b>Prevent Strategy</b></p> <p>First post 9/11 strategy to prevent international terrorist groups from destabilising UK society &amp; economy (recently updated).</p>	No explicit evidence of operational links between home office & DFID around 2003 strategy.
2004	Gershon Review	<p><b>Independent Review of Public Sector Efficiency</b></p> <p>Sets headcount targets for the civil service. DFID is required to make efficiency savings reflecting its Public Service Agreements.</p>	BSD faces reduction in its administration budget for the first time. Impacts on engagement with SGA recipients limiting capacity for dialogue with these 'non development' partners as well as other policy level interaction around the BSD agenda.
2004	House of Common ODPM Report: Social Cohesion	<p><b>Sixth Report of Session 2003-04</b></p> <p>Following disturbances in the summer of 2001 research is undertaken by an independent review team on community cohesion. Parliamentary committee report published in May 2004 notes that arrival of asylum seekers is placing pressure on local communities.</p> <p>Community &amp; voluntary organisations have a role to play working across different cultural groups. Local Authorities encouraged to make such engagement a condition of grant support.</p>	Recognition within ICPD that BME partnerships can contribute to social cohesion & prevent agendas.
2005	DFID CSD Approach Paper	<p><b>Civil Society &amp; Development:</b></p> <p>Hilary Benn endorses approach to working in partnership with civil society to deliver the millennium development goals &amp; hold international organisations to account.</p>	<p>Proposals for Mini Grant fund requests shift towards MDG awareness raising work. Reinforced by focus on MDGs in some DEC guidelines for MG applicants.</p> <p>Evidence of shift in understanding of civil society away from service provider to means of holding state accountable. Civil society in UK as means to reduce poverty in developing world. Development NGOs focus on MDGs.</p>

Date	Policy Document	Policy Focus	Policy Relevance & Influence
2005	British Government tenure as EU presidency.	<b>Make Poverty History Campaign</b> Government takes leadership role around MPH, Commission for Africa at Gleneagles & Africa Progress panel on MDGs.	MPH leads to greater trust between PPA & SGA recipients, for instance TUC & BOND. Emerging DVI initiatives framed around Africa partnerships. BME network through CfD has strong bias towards UK based organisations with Africa linkages. Trade Union SGA focused on developing linking programmes in Africa. Larger number of DAF/MG proposals focus on building links with African communities
2006	Change in UK Communications Technology	Introduction of 3G technology in UK 3G roll-out enables internet access via mobiles, sending images through mobiles. Increased penetration of web technology across UK society.	PPA, SGA, DAF & MG grant applications all begin to have online & integrated media components reflecting changing approaches to advocacy & communications in civil society. Use of web-based information & learning resources for development education networks renders centre-based business model less relevant. Large NGO move into online campaigning & fund-raising using viral campaigns & message driven strategies that reflect shift away from development education & awareness-raising approaches.
2006	Government creates Office of Third Sector	New cabinet level office aims to enable the third sector to campaign for change, deliver public services, promote social enterprise & strengthen communities.	Introduces standardisation & accountability in sector. Also emphasises distinction between UK civil society engaged on UK poverty & those engaged on international development..
2006	DFID White Paper	<b>Making Governance Work for the Poor:</b> Commitment to double investment in development education & give every UK child the chance to learn about the issues that shape the world. Also commitment to promote more active citizenship, particularly in terms of links between civil society in the UK & those in developing countries with a view to achieving MDGs.	ICPD focuses on Diaspora linking programme  Management of DAF grant mechanism contracted out.
2007	Civil service drive to improve effectiveness,	Further requirement for efficiency savings building on the Gerschon Report (see above 2004).	Plan to renegotiate PPAs with a view to improving accountability, impact & BSD integration at objective level. BSD documentation

Date	Policy Document	Policy Focus	Policy Relevance & Influence
	efficiency & accountability	CSD experience budget cuts & asked to seek improvements in efficiency.	posted on DFID web site.
2007	DFID Practice Paper	<p><b>Gender Equality Action Plan 2007-9</b></p> <p>DFID states that 'gender equality' is a goal in its own right, has a vital role to play in the achievement of MDGs &amp; will require a widespread change in attitudes &amp; perceptions.</p> <p>Under the Gender Equality Duty of the 2006 Equality Act, public bodies in the UK are required to build gender equality into their work &amp; set out their plans in a Gender Duty Scheme.</p> <p>DFID funding for civil society should encourage a greater focus on gender equality &amp; women's empowerment. Plan to review the guidelines for the governance &amp; transparency fund, civil society PPA &amp; civil society challenge funds.</p>	<p>DFID publish Gender Duty Scheme by April 2007, no visible link made to BSD programme as GEAP focused on programmes in developing countries.</p> <p>BSD without specific objective to promote gender in development, only through MDGs (goal 3). Few DAF/MG recipients focused on gender.</p> <p>Little debate between DFID &amp; civil society partners on the importance of gender equality in development.</p> <p>Little evidence of strategic focus on gender in PPA partnerships although recent campaigns on violence against women by VSO, Action Aid &amp; Oxfam.</p>
2008	DFID Annual Report	<p><b>Building Support to Deliver Progress on Poverty Reduction</b></p> <p>Emphasis on achieving MDGs as collective endeavour: among governments, private sector, NGOs &amp; faith groups.</p> <p>Civil society recognised for its diverse role, communicating with British public about global poverty &amp; what is being done by government &amp; civil society &amp; organising campaigns.</p>	<p>Global schools partnership programme, new youth volunteering programme &amp; Diaspora volunteering programme all mentioned as important initiatives for active citizenship &amp; collective MDG endeavours.</p> <p>Evidence that DFID accords greater value to public engagement, particularly at events, conferences &amp; festivals. Recognition that DAF/MG funded UK projects provide an important entry point for Ministers to undertake regional visits &amp; talk to communities about global issues &amp; build confidence in DFID.</p>
2008	DFID Internal communications strategy	<p><b>Communication matters: our communication strategy</b></p> <p>The strategy aims to do a better job of explaining to people what UK aid is spent on &amp; why it matters. It aims demonstrate that UK aid delivers real impact, is good value &amp; of benefit to UK people.</p> <p>Effective communications is a means to improve policy, influence partners &amp; to demonstrate success</p>	<p>BSD strategy needs to draw lessons from the mainstream development agencies, health sector, advertising industry &amp; the central office of information (COI).</p> <p>Psychographics &amp; attitudinal studies need to improve targeting &amp; message creation, leading to more effective public engagement, public influencing &amp; public behavioural change around</p>

Date	Policy Document	Policy Focus	Policy Relevance & Influence
		<p>to the UK public. Most importantly, 'all good communications starts with an understanding of our audience'.</p>	<p>international development issues. BSD strategy needs to recognise the inter-dependence between domestic &amp; international aid policy.</p>
2009	Home Office Strategy Paper	<p><b>New UK Counter Terrorism Strategy</b> The strategy is divided into 4 strands: Prevent, Pursue, Protect &amp; Prepare, is to be delivered working with a wide range of stakeholders including a range of government departments &amp; voluntary agencies.</p>	<p>Likely that development ministers need to be seen to be doing something to engage with the Prevent Agenda &amp; to ensure DFID helps tackle the root causes of radicalisation of individuals. DFID may request VSO &amp; other DVI programme managers to make operational links with other government departments (Department of Communities) to become more joined up. Faith groups &amp; Diaspora may be seen as entry point to tackle disadvantage &amp; to engage in the battle of ideas. Faith groups encouraged to access DAF/MG funds for development awareness raising initiatives.</p>
2009	DFID White Paper	<p><b>Eliminating World Poverty: Assuring our common future</b> Fighting global poverty &amp; achieving the MDGs to be at the heart of continued mission but recognised need to recalibrate elements of the agenda to deal with the changed circumstances which now prevail. Because of globalisation, the world is more interdependent, with a shared environmental &amp; natural resource dependency &amp; now with increasing realisation, a shared future.</p>	<p>Any new or revised BSD strategy is likely to be strongly influenced by the new white paper. Likely that 2009 policy influence will continue to be underpinned by interdependence but with greater focus on addressing prevailing issues of global financial crisis, declining global trade, effect of climate change, conflict &amp; weak government.</p>

**Building Support for Development Expenditures and Budgets (in £ millions)**

Head	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11
Development Education								1.79	2.47	2.68	9.73	10.04
Volunteering and Linking								1.53	2.50	4.80	6.13	7.13
Media									0.35	0.58	0.72	0.72
DAF + admin	<b>1.80</b>	<b>2.00</b>	<b>2.20</b>	<b>2.40</b>	<b>2.60</b>	<b>2.80</b>	<b>3.00</b>	<b>3.12</b>	<b>3.40</b>	<b>4.82</b>	6.50	6.50
Mini Grants + admin							<b>0.37</b>	<b>0.42</b>	<b>0.44</b>	<b>0.55</b>	0.69	0.70
SGA			0.12	0.01	0.47	0.85	1.24	0.73	0.50	0.06		
Other									0.38	0.28	0.26	0.03
<b>Total Expenditure*</b>	<b>3.73</b>	<b>5.58</b>	<b>5.53</b>	<b>5.44</b>	<b>3.15</b>	<b>7.31</b>	<b>9.12</b>	<b>7.59</b>	<b>10.04</b>	<b>13.77</b>		
Budget	3.50	5.75	7.25	6.35	5.00	7.50	10.00	11.80	14.40	19.00	24.00	29.00

## Notes:

1. Figures in **red bold** are estimated by projecting back for the DAF
2. Figures in **red** are exact amounts from DFID expenditure data including management fees
3. \* Totals up until 2003/04 are taken from the Departmental Reports
4. 2009/10 and 210/11 are approved budget figures
5. Until 2006 SGA and DAF were the only budget lines so a breakdown of expenditure is difficult to find
6. In 2006/07 and 2007/08 limited data on breakdown of the whole budget was available